危机应对体系评估与机制研究
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摘要
目前,全球化与网络化使本已复杂的社会环境更趋动态和不确定,公共危机和突发事件已成为社会环境的常态和“新标签”。如果没有一套科学有效的应对机制,危机的不确定性、复杂性和不可测性,将很可能导致危机的失控。对危机应对体系和机制的研究将有助于建立起完整的危机应对体系,从而对经济社会发展起到支持、保障和稳定的作用。当前学术界对危机应对体系和机制的研究上仍然较为薄弱,大多数为零星、初步的理论性探讨,还没有形成一个体系化、系统化的研究,而结合我国实际的系统、深入研究还很少,定量研究更是少之又少。
本文基于危机周期理论、全面危机管理理论和可持续发展理论,运用模型分析、案例分析、实证分析和统计与计量分析方法对区域弹性要素、应急决策模式、协调型危机制度等问题进行研究,主要研究内容及创新如下:
1、态势管理下的区域弹性评估。基于态势管理的视角,从内部、时间和外部三个基准面分析区域弹性构成,进而构建一个层次结构的区域弹性评估模型,有助于发现危机应对体系的弱点。研究发现:区域弹性由抵抗力、恢复力和创新力等三个内在属性构成,各内在属性的关键要素可作为区域弹性的具体衡量指标。
2、危机应对体系的主要影响因素分析。基于区域弹性评估模型,利用10个城市2003-2007年间的面板数据对区域弹性评估的要素进行实证分析,找出影响区域弹性的关键因素。结果表明,区域弹性与人均收入、应急通路、应急保障、社会制度等因素正相关,其中应急保障对区域弹性的影响因子最大。而信息传播、GDP和失业率等因素与区域弹性负相关。
提出面向危机的区域弹性提升建议:应当改变当前以“环境换发展”的经济发展模式,从强调发展、经济GDP,向生态文明、人文GDP转变;建立跨部门的应急保障体系,实行扁平化管理;构建完善的信息传播机制,保证危机信息的真实、完整、科学;通过改善初次分配来提高大部分人的收入,避免内部协调的失衡。
3、危机应对协同治理模式研究。从协同学理论的角度出发,分析危机应对体系的特点,进一步研究了危机应对体系的外部开放机制、内部协同机制和动力机制,对构建危机协同治理机制的有效路径进行深入探讨并模拟仿真了危机应对体系的自组织演化过程。研究发现:建立跨部门的、综合型的危机管理机构,构建多层面的危机应对协调机制,加强应急资源的保障和软实力建设,将有助于实现危机应对的协同治理,危机应对体系经过足够的时间将会自组织演化至均衡状态。
运用自组织理论分析危机应对体系自组织演化机制,研究危机应对体系自组织演化的必要条件和动因。并借用生态学中的Logistic模型构建危机应对体系的系统动力学模型。以含3个应急管理主体的模型为基础,对其进行仿真模拟。结果表明,危机应对体系可自组织演化至稳定状态;应急管理主体达到的平衡所需时间与初始状态和固有增长率正相关,平衡时的规模与网络内应急管理主体的数量、自身最大规模正相关,应急管理主体平衡状态时的规模与竞合效应系数密切相关。因此,通过增强资源保障、多元参与、信息共享及协同治理等举措有助于危机应对体系的自组织演化。
4、危机应对的动态决策模式和沟通对策研究。基于不完全信息动态博弈,分析危机管理者如何根据新接收的信息和阶段性的应对结果进行应急决策。并根据危机各阶段的公众需求制定沟通对策,以有效地应对危机。研究发现:构建危机管理者的应急决策函数,分析应急方案优劣,将有助于危机管理者进行动态决策。而公众的信息需求是危机沟通对策选择的关键因素。
构建了动态危机应对螺旋模型,对危机的动态应对过程进行分析。把危机决策过程看成是博弈双方为“危机管理者”和“危机”的多阶段不完全信息动态博弈过程,分析了危机管理者进行危机应对的动态应急决策过程,通过应急决策函数计算各个救援方案之间期望效用的大小来比较它们的优劣,为危机管理者的决策提供支撑。
提出了基于公众需求的危机沟通策略。从公众需求的视角出发,研究了在危机潜伏期、爆发期、延续期及结束期间公众对三类危机信息的需求变化,并据此提出四阶段危机周期的沟通策略:内在信息占优策略、结构信息占优策略、调节信息占优策略和内在信息强化策略,以使受灾公众及时获取所需信息,有效地应对危机。
5、协调型危机制度的进化博弈分析。运用进化博弈论对危机应对中的中央政府与地方政府、政府与媒体和应急物资供应商等关键主体两两之间的协调问题进行研究,探求协调型危机制度的变迁路径。研究发现:博弈的多均衡性导致了危机制度的多样性。而不同危机制度间的效益差就产生了制度变迁的压力,但是制度变迁能否实现还取决于与制度所对应的均衡是否具有随机稳定性。
构建了基于信息的中央政府和地方政府博弈矩阵。通过分析认为经过足够长的时间博弈双方最终会达到公开消息均衡,而完善政府官员考核制度和建立政府内部危机信息共享制度将使其尽快达到这一均衡。
从进化博弈视角研究危机沟通制度变迁。构建了参与方为政府和媒体的危机沟通制度博弈矩阵。双方的博弈是风险占优的博弈,且具有收敛性,即无论政府和媒体间的初始机制是什么,最终达到相互独立的均衡状态。而信息公开、政媒分家、公众参与等制度的建立会加快政府、媒体向相互独立的均衡转变。
建立了应急物资供应商间竞价博弈矩阵。通过分析得出应急物资供应商之间最终会在竞价的过程中,形成一个主供应商和多个次供应商的多供应商机制,且主供应商会不断变更。因而政府要建立备用供应商资料库,并为供应商提供积极的公平氛围和报价机制。
Nowadays, the globalization and the network have already made the complex society more dynamic and uncertain. The public crises and unexpected events have been the normality and“new tags”of the social environment. The crisis becomes more and more uncertain, complicated and unpredictable. If we don’t have a scientific and effective crisis countermeasure mechanism, the crisis is likely to get out of control. The study on crisis countermeasure system and mechanism helps to build a complete crisis countermeasure system which plays an important part in support, indemnification and stability of the economic and social development. At present, the studies on the crisis countermeasure system and mechanism are still very weak. They are mostly sporadic and preliminary but not systemic and in-depth. In particular, there are few quantitative studies on the crisis countermeasure system.
This article studies the regional resilience factors, emergency decision-making patterns and coordination institution of crisis countermeasure through the model analysis, case analysis, empirical analysis and statistic and econometric techniques based on the crisis cycle theory, total disaster risk management theory and sustainable development theory. The main studies and innovations are as follow.
1. The regional resilience evaluation under the situation management. This article analyzes the composition of regional resilience from three base-level (namely internality, time and externality) based on the situation management. Furthermore, this article builds a hierarchical structural regional resilience evaluation model, which helps to identify weaknesses in crisis countermeasure system. The result shows that the regional resilience is composed of the resistance, restoration and innovation. The key elements of resistance, restoration and innovation can be used as the specific measurement indexes of the region resilience.
2. The main determinants of crisis countermeasure system. In order to find out the key factors of the regional resilience, this article examines the determinants of the regional resilience evaluation with the pooled data of 10 cities for the period of 2003-2007 based on the regional resilience evaluation model. The results show that the per capita income, emergency pathway, emergency support, social system are positively related with the regional resilience. And the emergency support has the greatest impact on regional resilience. While the influences of information dissemination, GDP and unemployment rate on regional resilience are negative.
This article puts forward some suggestions which enhance the regional resilience based on crisis. We should change the present economic development pattern of sacrificing the environment for development, which emphasize from the development, economic GDP to the ecological civilization, culture GDP. We should establish an inter-departmental emergency support system and carry out flat management. That ensures the truth, integrity and science of crisis information through exploring the effective crisis information dissemination mechanisms. And we should avoid the internal imbalance of people by improving the initial distribution to increase the income of most people.
3. The synergetic governance model of crisis countermeasure. Based on the synergetic theory, the article analyzes the characteristics of the crisis countermeasure system, studies the external opening mechanism, the internal synergetic mechanism and the dynamic mechanism of the crisis synergetic governance, and explores the path of establishing the synergetic governance mechanism. We can make the crisis countermeasure system change from disorder to order through building the cross-sector and comprehensive crisis management agency and the multi-level crisis countermeasure coordination mechanisms, and strengthening the emergency resources support and soft power. Finally we realize the synergetic governance of crisis countermeasure. The research shows that we can realize the synergetic governance of crisis countermeasure through building the cross-sector and comprehensive crisis management agency, constructing the multi-level crisis countermeasure coordination mechanisms, and strengthening the emergency resources support and soft power.
Then we analyze the self-organization evolution mechanism of crisis countermeasure system by using self-organization theory. It studies on the necessary conditions and impetus of the self-organization evolution of crisis countermeasure system. A dynamic model of crisis countermeasure system is established by applying Logistic model from biology. Then it simulates with computer based on the model combined by three emergency management agencies. The results indicate that crisis countermeasure system can receive the steady state by self-organization evolution; The time which emergency management agencies reach the balance is positively correlated with the initial state and the intrinsic growth rate of them; The scale is positively correlated with the number of emergency management agencies in crisis countermeasure system and the largest scale which it relies on its own ability; The scale which emergency management agencies reach the balance is closely correlated with the competition-cooperation effect coefficient. Thus, we can accelerate self-organization evolution of crisis countermeasure system through resources guarantee, multi-participation, information sharing and collaborative governance.
4. The dynamic decision-making patterns and communication strategies of crisis countermeasure. In order to deals with the crisis effectively, this article studies how crisis manager makes emergency decision-making according to the increasing information and previous activities based on dynamic game of incomplete information. And crisis manager makes crisis communication strategy based on the public demands. The research shows that: We build the emergency decision-making function of crisis manager to analyze emergency programs, which will help crisis manager makes dynamic decision-making. And the public information need is the key factors of the selection of crisis communication strategy.
Furthermore, this article develops a dynamic crisis countermeasure helix model to analyze the dynamics countermeasure process of crisis. We suppose that the crisis decision-making process is a dynamic game process under the incomplete information between“crisis manager”and“crisis”. Then we analyze the dynamics decision-making patterns of crisis countermeasure, select the aid programs by calculating the expected utility of them according to the emergency decision-making function, which gives support to crisis manager.
Moreover, this article suggests the crisis communication strategy based on public demands. From the perspective of public demands, we analyze the change of public demands for three types of information in times of crisis prodromal, breakout, chronic and resolution. And consequently, we suggest four strategies for four stages of crisis: internalizing information dominant strategy, instructing information dominant strategy, adjusting information dominant strategy and internalizing information strengthening strategy. So that public who are suffering from crises to obtain necessary information can cope with the crisis more effective.
5. The evolutionary game on coordination crisis institution. For exploring the changing path of the coordination crisis institution, the article studies the coordination problems between the central and local governments, the government and the media, the supplier of emergency material through the evolutionary game theory. The results show that: the diversity of coordination crisis institution is caused by the multi—equilibrium of coordination game. And the different efficiency of coordination crisis institution causes the pressure of institution change,but the change of institution lies on the stochastic stability of the corresponding institution equilibrium.
This article builds the game matrix between the central and local governments based on information. The results show that the game between the central and local governments will reach the public information equilibrium ultimately. And the improvement of the government official appraisal system and the establishment of the official internal information sharing institution help to achieve this equilibrium.
Furthermore, this article studies the crisis communication mechanism based on the evolutionary game. This article builds the game matrix of the crisis communication mechanism that the participants are the government and the media. This game is risk dominant game and is convergent. Whatever the initial mechanism between the government and the media are, they will be independent ultimately. The information open, the separation of government and media and the public participation will speed up the shift of the independent equilibrium between the government and the media.
Moreover, this article sets up the game matrix of bidding of emergency suppliers. There will be a multi-supplier mechanism of a main supplier and some sub-suppliers in the bidding process, and the main suppliers will change continually during the process of bidding of emergency suppliers. Therefore, the government should establish the backup supplier database, and provide a positive fair atmosphere and pricing mechanism for suppliers.
本文基于危机周期理论、全面危机管理理论和可持续发展理论,运用模型分析、案例分析、实证分析和统计与计量分析方法对区域弹性要素、应急决策模式、协调型危机制度等问题进行研究,主要研究内容及创新如下:
1、态势管理下的区域弹性评估。基于态势管理的视角,从内部、时间和外部三个基准面分析区域弹性构成,进而构建一个层次结构的区域弹性评估模型,有助于发现危机应对体系的弱点。研究发现:区域弹性由抵抗力、恢复力和创新力等三个内在属性构成,各内在属性的关键要素可作为区域弹性的具体衡量指标。
2、危机应对体系的主要影响因素分析。基于区域弹性评估模型,利用10个城市2003-2007年间的面板数据对区域弹性评估的要素进行实证分析,找出影响区域弹性的关键因素。结果表明,区域弹性与人均收入、应急通路、应急保障、社会制度等因素正相关,其中应急保障对区域弹性的影响因子最大。而信息传播、GDP和失业率等因素与区域弹性负相关。
提出面向危机的区域弹性提升建议:应当改变当前以“环境换发展”的经济发展模式,从强调发展、经济GDP,向生态文明、人文GDP转变;建立跨部门的应急保障体系,实行扁平化管理;构建完善的信息传播机制,保证危机信息的真实、完整、科学;通过改善初次分配来提高大部分人的收入,避免内部协调的失衡。
3、危机应对协同治理模式研究。从协同学理论的角度出发,分析危机应对体系的特点,进一步研究了危机应对体系的外部开放机制、内部协同机制和动力机制,对构建危机协同治理机制的有效路径进行深入探讨并模拟仿真了危机应对体系的自组织演化过程。研究发现:建立跨部门的、综合型的危机管理机构,构建多层面的危机应对协调机制,加强应急资源的保障和软实力建设,将有助于实现危机应对的协同治理,危机应对体系经过足够的时间将会自组织演化至均衡状态。
运用自组织理论分析危机应对体系自组织演化机制,研究危机应对体系自组织演化的必要条件和动因。并借用生态学中的Logistic模型构建危机应对体系的系统动力学模型。以含3个应急管理主体的模型为基础,对其进行仿真模拟。结果表明,危机应对体系可自组织演化至稳定状态;应急管理主体达到的平衡所需时间与初始状态和固有增长率正相关,平衡时的规模与网络内应急管理主体的数量、自身最大规模正相关,应急管理主体平衡状态时的规模与竞合效应系数密切相关。因此,通过增强资源保障、多元参与、信息共享及协同治理等举措有助于危机应对体系的自组织演化。
4、危机应对的动态决策模式和沟通对策研究。基于不完全信息动态博弈,分析危机管理者如何根据新接收的信息和阶段性的应对结果进行应急决策。并根据危机各阶段的公众需求制定沟通对策,以有效地应对危机。研究发现:构建危机管理者的应急决策函数,分析应急方案优劣,将有助于危机管理者进行动态决策。而公众的信息需求是危机沟通对策选择的关键因素。
构建了动态危机应对螺旋模型,对危机的动态应对过程进行分析。把危机决策过程看成是博弈双方为“危机管理者”和“危机”的多阶段不完全信息动态博弈过程,分析了危机管理者进行危机应对的动态应急决策过程,通过应急决策函数计算各个救援方案之间期望效用的大小来比较它们的优劣,为危机管理者的决策提供支撑。
提出了基于公众需求的危机沟通策略。从公众需求的视角出发,研究了在危机潜伏期、爆发期、延续期及结束期间公众对三类危机信息的需求变化,并据此提出四阶段危机周期的沟通策略:内在信息占优策略、结构信息占优策略、调节信息占优策略和内在信息强化策略,以使受灾公众及时获取所需信息,有效地应对危机。
5、协调型危机制度的进化博弈分析。运用进化博弈论对危机应对中的中央政府与地方政府、政府与媒体和应急物资供应商等关键主体两两之间的协调问题进行研究,探求协调型危机制度的变迁路径。研究发现:博弈的多均衡性导致了危机制度的多样性。而不同危机制度间的效益差就产生了制度变迁的压力,但是制度变迁能否实现还取决于与制度所对应的均衡是否具有随机稳定性。
构建了基于信息的中央政府和地方政府博弈矩阵。通过分析认为经过足够长的时间博弈双方最终会达到公开消息均衡,而完善政府官员考核制度和建立政府内部危机信息共享制度将使其尽快达到这一均衡。
从进化博弈视角研究危机沟通制度变迁。构建了参与方为政府和媒体的危机沟通制度博弈矩阵。双方的博弈是风险占优的博弈,且具有收敛性,即无论政府和媒体间的初始机制是什么,最终达到相互独立的均衡状态。而信息公开、政媒分家、公众参与等制度的建立会加快政府、媒体向相互独立的均衡转变。
建立了应急物资供应商间竞价博弈矩阵。通过分析得出应急物资供应商之间最终会在竞价的过程中,形成一个主供应商和多个次供应商的多供应商机制,且主供应商会不断变更。因而政府要建立备用供应商资料库,并为供应商提供积极的公平氛围和报价机制。
Nowadays, the globalization and the network have already made the complex society more dynamic and uncertain. The public crises and unexpected events have been the normality and“new tags”of the social environment. The crisis becomes more and more uncertain, complicated and unpredictable. If we don’t have a scientific and effective crisis countermeasure mechanism, the crisis is likely to get out of control. The study on crisis countermeasure system and mechanism helps to build a complete crisis countermeasure system which plays an important part in support, indemnification and stability of the economic and social development. At present, the studies on the crisis countermeasure system and mechanism are still very weak. They are mostly sporadic and preliminary but not systemic and in-depth. In particular, there are few quantitative studies on the crisis countermeasure system.
This article studies the regional resilience factors, emergency decision-making patterns and coordination institution of crisis countermeasure through the model analysis, case analysis, empirical analysis and statistic and econometric techniques based on the crisis cycle theory, total disaster risk management theory and sustainable development theory. The main studies and innovations are as follow.
1. The regional resilience evaluation under the situation management. This article analyzes the composition of regional resilience from three base-level (namely internality, time and externality) based on the situation management. Furthermore, this article builds a hierarchical structural regional resilience evaluation model, which helps to identify weaknesses in crisis countermeasure system. The result shows that the regional resilience is composed of the resistance, restoration and innovation. The key elements of resistance, restoration and innovation can be used as the specific measurement indexes of the region resilience.
2. The main determinants of crisis countermeasure system. In order to find out the key factors of the regional resilience, this article examines the determinants of the regional resilience evaluation with the pooled data of 10 cities for the period of 2003-2007 based on the regional resilience evaluation model. The results show that the per capita income, emergency pathway, emergency support, social system are positively related with the regional resilience. And the emergency support has the greatest impact on regional resilience. While the influences of information dissemination, GDP and unemployment rate on regional resilience are negative.
This article puts forward some suggestions which enhance the regional resilience based on crisis. We should change the present economic development pattern of sacrificing the environment for development, which emphasize from the development, economic GDP to the ecological civilization, culture GDP. We should establish an inter-departmental emergency support system and carry out flat management. That ensures the truth, integrity and science of crisis information through exploring the effective crisis information dissemination mechanisms. And we should avoid the internal imbalance of people by improving the initial distribution to increase the income of most people.
3. The synergetic governance model of crisis countermeasure. Based on the synergetic theory, the article analyzes the characteristics of the crisis countermeasure system, studies the external opening mechanism, the internal synergetic mechanism and the dynamic mechanism of the crisis synergetic governance, and explores the path of establishing the synergetic governance mechanism. We can make the crisis countermeasure system change from disorder to order through building the cross-sector and comprehensive crisis management agency and the multi-level crisis countermeasure coordination mechanisms, and strengthening the emergency resources support and soft power. Finally we realize the synergetic governance of crisis countermeasure. The research shows that we can realize the synergetic governance of crisis countermeasure through building the cross-sector and comprehensive crisis management agency, constructing the multi-level crisis countermeasure coordination mechanisms, and strengthening the emergency resources support and soft power.
Then we analyze the self-organization evolution mechanism of crisis countermeasure system by using self-organization theory. It studies on the necessary conditions and impetus of the self-organization evolution of crisis countermeasure system. A dynamic model of crisis countermeasure system is established by applying Logistic model from biology. Then it simulates with computer based on the model combined by three emergency management agencies. The results indicate that crisis countermeasure system can receive the steady state by self-organization evolution; The time which emergency management agencies reach the balance is positively correlated with the initial state and the intrinsic growth rate of them; The scale is positively correlated with the number of emergency management agencies in crisis countermeasure system and the largest scale which it relies on its own ability; The scale which emergency management agencies reach the balance is closely correlated with the competition-cooperation effect coefficient. Thus, we can accelerate self-organization evolution of crisis countermeasure system through resources guarantee, multi-participation, information sharing and collaborative governance.
4. The dynamic decision-making patterns and communication strategies of crisis countermeasure. In order to deals with the crisis effectively, this article studies how crisis manager makes emergency decision-making according to the increasing information and previous activities based on dynamic game of incomplete information. And crisis manager makes crisis communication strategy based on the public demands. The research shows that: We build the emergency decision-making function of crisis manager to analyze emergency programs, which will help crisis manager makes dynamic decision-making. And the public information need is the key factors of the selection of crisis communication strategy.
Furthermore, this article develops a dynamic crisis countermeasure helix model to analyze the dynamics countermeasure process of crisis. We suppose that the crisis decision-making process is a dynamic game process under the incomplete information between“crisis manager”and“crisis”. Then we analyze the dynamics decision-making patterns of crisis countermeasure, select the aid programs by calculating the expected utility of them according to the emergency decision-making function, which gives support to crisis manager.
Moreover, this article suggests the crisis communication strategy based on public demands. From the perspective of public demands, we analyze the change of public demands for three types of information in times of crisis prodromal, breakout, chronic and resolution. And consequently, we suggest four strategies for four stages of crisis: internalizing information dominant strategy, instructing information dominant strategy, adjusting information dominant strategy and internalizing information strengthening strategy. So that public who are suffering from crises to obtain necessary information can cope with the crisis more effective.
5. The evolutionary game on coordination crisis institution. For exploring the changing path of the coordination crisis institution, the article studies the coordination problems between the central and local governments, the government and the media, the supplier of emergency material through the evolutionary game theory. The results show that: the diversity of coordination crisis institution is caused by the multi—equilibrium of coordination game. And the different efficiency of coordination crisis institution causes the pressure of institution change,but the change of institution lies on the stochastic stability of the corresponding institution equilibrium.
This article builds the game matrix between the central and local governments based on information. The results show that the game between the central and local governments will reach the public information equilibrium ultimately. And the improvement of the government official appraisal system and the establishment of the official internal information sharing institution help to achieve this equilibrium.
Furthermore, this article studies the crisis communication mechanism based on the evolutionary game. This article builds the game matrix of the crisis communication mechanism that the participants are the government and the media. This game is risk dominant game and is convergent. Whatever the initial mechanism between the government and the media are, they will be independent ultimately. The information open, the separation of government and media and the public participation will speed up the shift of the independent equilibrium between the government and the media.
Moreover, this article sets up the game matrix of bidding of emergency suppliers. There will be a multi-supplier mechanism of a main supplier and some sub-suppliers in the bidding process, and the main suppliers will change continually during the process of bidding of emergency suppliers. Therefore, the government should establish the backup supplier database, and provide a positive fair atmosphere and pricing mechanism for suppliers.
引文
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