家族企业控制权转移绩效研究
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摘要
我国家族企业发展到今天,已经走过了三四十个春秋,改革开放的大潮给创业者带来了前所未有的商机,如今,老一辈创业者即将退居二线,企业控制权转移问题成了能否将辛苦一辈子打拼的基业保持万古长青的关键因素。近些年来,家族企业的研究得到了越来越多的关注,相对家族企业发展的现实来看,理论显得有些滞后。对于控制权转移绩效方面的研究,尽管国外已经有了大量的实证学术论著,但是中国与西方国家的国情不同,市场环境也不同,使得这些结论只能具有借鉴意义,而不能生搬硬套。
本文期望从我国家族企业所面临的国情现状出发,选择控制权世袭制和控制权共享制两种转移模式,立足于已经发生控制权转移的家族企业,通过对它们的研究,得出哪一种模式更适合我国家族企业的发展。因此,本文运用实证研究方法分别从家族企业控制权转移的短期效应和长期绩效两个方面,对家族企业控制权转移绩效给予合理的分析。在短期效应研究中,采用市场反应法中的超额累计收益率进行实证分析;在长期绩效研究中,运用因子分析和显著性检验得出结论。
通过本文的研究,我们得出在短期内,由于职业经理人还没有更好的了解企业,导致企业业绩的下滑,相反,对于子承父业的继任者由于自身的归属感再加上先进的理论知识,使得公司业绩在短期小步上升。随着时间的推移,职业经理人将自己先进的管理理念融合到了企业当中,公司绩效得到改善并稳步向利好事态发展,而子承父业继任者由于能力的不足,从长远角度并不能很好的掌控企业,使企业绩效逐步下滑。
Until now, Family enterprise has been developing for three or four decades in China, the entrepreneurs faced to hitherto unknown opportunities for the tide of reform and opening up, Nowadays, the older generation of entrepreneurs is going to the second line, Corporate control right transfer has become the key factor of whether the hard life of hard foundation keep evergreen. In recent years, the research of family business has been paid more and more attention, Compared the development of the family enterprise reality, the theory appears to be a little of lag. As for the study of the control right transfer performance, although the foreign countries have already had a large number of empirical academic works, Compared with China, Western countries have different national conditions and market environment, the conclusion has reference significance only, and cannot be applied mechanically.
This research starts from the national situation and reality of our family enterprise, shows two kinds of transfer model---control hereditary system and control share system. through the study of control right transferred family enterprises, I expect to get the conclusion that which model is more suitable for the development of our family enterprise. Therefore, this paper uses empirical research methods, from the short-term effect and long-term performance two aspects, gives reasonable analysis to corporate control right transfer performance of the family firm. In the short term performance study, the paper gives empirical analysis by the cumulative abnormal return of the market reaction; in the long-term performance study, the paper gives the conclusion by using the factor analysis and the test of significance.
Through this research, we conclude that in the short term, because the occupation managers have no better understanding of the enterprise, which causes to the enterprise performance declines, instead, due to the successors’sense of belonging together with the advanced theories of knowledge, which makes the company performance rise in a short step .As the time goes by, their occupation managers will put the advanced management concepts into the enterprise, and the company performance is improved and steadily to the positive developments, however, people who inherit father's assets, due to lack of ability, can't control enterprise better from a long-term perspective, the enterprise performance gradually decline.
本文期望从我国家族企业所面临的国情现状出发,选择控制权世袭制和控制权共享制两种转移模式,立足于已经发生控制权转移的家族企业,通过对它们的研究,得出哪一种模式更适合我国家族企业的发展。因此,本文运用实证研究方法分别从家族企业控制权转移的短期效应和长期绩效两个方面,对家族企业控制权转移绩效给予合理的分析。在短期效应研究中,采用市场反应法中的超额累计收益率进行实证分析;在长期绩效研究中,运用因子分析和显著性检验得出结论。
通过本文的研究,我们得出在短期内,由于职业经理人还没有更好的了解企业,导致企业业绩的下滑,相反,对于子承父业的继任者由于自身的归属感再加上先进的理论知识,使得公司业绩在短期小步上升。随着时间的推移,职业经理人将自己先进的管理理念融合到了企业当中,公司绩效得到改善并稳步向利好事态发展,而子承父业继任者由于能力的不足,从长远角度并不能很好的掌控企业,使企业绩效逐步下滑。
Until now, Family enterprise has been developing for three or four decades in China, the entrepreneurs faced to hitherto unknown opportunities for the tide of reform and opening up, Nowadays, the older generation of entrepreneurs is going to the second line, Corporate control right transfer has become the key factor of whether the hard life of hard foundation keep evergreen. In recent years, the research of family business has been paid more and more attention, Compared the development of the family enterprise reality, the theory appears to be a little of lag. As for the study of the control right transfer performance, although the foreign countries have already had a large number of empirical academic works, Compared with China, Western countries have different national conditions and market environment, the conclusion has reference significance only, and cannot be applied mechanically.
This research starts from the national situation and reality of our family enterprise, shows two kinds of transfer model---control hereditary system and control share system. through the study of control right transferred family enterprises, I expect to get the conclusion that which model is more suitable for the development of our family enterprise. Therefore, this paper uses empirical research methods, from the short-term effect and long-term performance two aspects, gives reasonable analysis to corporate control right transfer performance of the family firm. In the short term performance study, the paper gives empirical analysis by the cumulative abnormal return of the market reaction; in the long-term performance study, the paper gives the conclusion by using the factor analysis and the test of significance.
Through this research, we conclude that in the short term, because the occupation managers have no better understanding of the enterprise, which causes to the enterprise performance declines, instead, due to the successors’sense of belonging together with the advanced theories of knowledge, which makes the company performance rise in a short step .As the time goes by, their occupation managers will put the advanced management concepts into the enterprise, and the company performance is improved and steadily to the positive developments, however, people who inherit father's assets, due to lack of ability, can't control enterprise better from a long-term perspective, the enterprise performance gradually decline.
引文
[1] Steven H L. Conflicts that plaque family businesses. Harvard Business Review, 1971(7): 378~387.
[2] Vancil R F. Passing the baton: Managing the process of CEO succession.Boston. Harvard Business School Press, 1987: 54~63.
[3] Louis B B, Simon A H. Transferring Power in the Family Business. Family Business Review, 1994(12): 311~392.
[4] William S S, Michael H L. Agency Relationships in Family Firms: Theory and Evidence. Organization Science, 2001(7): 99~116.
[5] Francisco. Inherited Control and Firm Performance. The American Economic Review, 2006(6): 32~47.
[6] Belen V, Raphael A. How do Family Ownership Control and Management Affect Firm Value. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006(5): 117~132.
[7] Morten B, Kasper M N. Inside the Family Firm: the Role of Families in Succession Decisions and Performance. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2007(5): 647~691.
[8] Catherine M D, Marc J D. An Empirical EYamination of Ownership Structure in Family and Professionally Managed Firms. Family Business Review, 1992(6): 113~237.
[9] Daniel L M. Founding Family Controlled Firms: Efficiency and Value. Review of Financial Economics, 1998(7): 1~19.
[10] Brian F S, Ben A A. Management Succession and Financial Performance of Family Controlled Firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 1999(9): 341~368.
[11]曹德骏.家族企业研究的几个理论问题.财经科学,2002(6):55~60.
[12]别保强,申加强.我国家族企业代际传承模式分析.科技信息,2010(7):35~38.
[13]储小平.职业经理与家族企业的成长.管理世界,2002(4):100~109.
[14]王思齐,王朝全.论家族企业控制权转移其与社会人力资本的融合.西南科技大学学报,2008(1):6~9.
[15]汪继峰.家族企业如何迈过“三代必衰”这道坎.职业,2003(11):47~51.
[16]严红,王代敬.论家族企业对职业经理的选择.广东财经职业学院学报,2003(5):56~59.
[17]李新春.经理人市场失灵与家族企业治理.管理世界,2003(4):87~97.
[18]李松青,刘异玲.代际传承的家族企业权力转移合理性与效率分析.求索,2010(5):37~42.
[19]汪其昌.股份表决权信托:解决家族企业控制权转移的一种方式.上海经济研究,2010(6): 48~56.
[20]晃上.论家族企业权力的代际传递.南开管理评论,2002(2):47~51.
[21]叶国灿.论家族企业控制权的转移与内部治理结构的演变.管理世界,2004(4):147~148.
[22]张兵.家族企业代际传承模式研究:(博士学位论文).杭州:浙江大学,2004.
[23]尉静.家族企业控制权转移的障碍分析.商场现代化,2009(4):23~26.
[24]张月亮.企业继任者成功继任的影响因素分析.哈尔滨商业大学学报,2010(3):17~19.
[25]王彦.家族企业代理和绩效问题研究:(博士学位论文).沈阳:辽宁大学,2006.
[26]王永东.中国家族企业代际传承研究:(博士学位论文).沈阳:辽宁大学,2007.
[27]董巍.中国家族企业权力继任者选择模型研究:(博士学位论文).成都:西南交通大学,2007.
[28]余鹏翼.家族企业的控制权转移、融资结构与公司治理.金融教学与研究,2005(3):24~26.
[29]姚灵玲,高成丽.家族企业职业经理人精神激励机制研究.中南财经政法大学研究生学报,2007(6):34~37.
[30]邹晖.家族企业大股东侵占与股权制衡-基于家族类上市公司控制权转移事件的实证分析.现代管理科学,2008(4):95~96.
[31]朱靓.中国家族企业经营权传承问题的研究-基于委托代理理论的分析:(硕士学位论文).厦门:厦门大学,2008.
[32]李雅洁.我国家族企业传承问题及对策研究:(硕士学位论文).北京:中国石油大学,2009.
[33] Chandler A D. Strategy and structure:chapters in the history of the industrial enterprise. Cambridge: M.I.T.Press, 1962: 132~137.
[34] Donnelley. The Family Business. Harvard Business Review, 1964(3): 93~105.
[35]叶银华.家族控股集团、核心企业与报酬互动之研究-台湾与香港证券市场之比较.管理评论,1999,18(2):21~26.
[36]潘必胜.乡镇企业中的家族经营问题.中国农村观察,1998(1):35~37.
[37] Berle,Malme. The modern corporation and private property. United States: Transaction publishers, 1932: 125~130.
[38] Jensen M C, Riehard. The Market for Corporate Control: the Seientifie Evidenee. Journal of Finaneial Eeonomies, 1983(11): 5~50.
[39]张维迎.公有制经济中的委托人-代理人关系:理论分析和政策含义.经济研究,1995(5):61~65.
[40]钱颖一.现代经济学与中国经济改革.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2003.15~16.
[41]朱弈馄,陈雪梅. 21世纪亚太中小企业发展与支持系统国际研讨会综述.经济学动态,2001(3):76~81.
[42]刘磊,万迪防.企业中的核心控制权与一般控制权.中国工业经济,2004(2):39~42.
[43]陈滢旭,杜向荣.国内家族企业引入职业经理人的问题研究.现代商业,2007(4):22~24.
[44]张月亮.企业继任者成功继任的影响因素分析.哈尔滨商业大学学报,2010(3):17~19.
[45]王连娟.家族企业接班人选择研究综述.学术研究,2007(4):31~37.
[46]程兆谦,李小娜.家族企业代际传承中后代培养意愿及方式.经济管理,2008(23):74~80.
[47]余向前.家族企业子女接班意愿的影响.软科学,2008(8):55~59.
[2] Vancil R F. Passing the baton: Managing the process of CEO succession.Boston. Harvard Business School Press, 1987: 54~63.
[3] Louis B B, Simon A H. Transferring Power in the Family Business. Family Business Review, 1994(12): 311~392.
[4] William S S, Michael H L. Agency Relationships in Family Firms: Theory and Evidence. Organization Science, 2001(7): 99~116.
[5] Francisco. Inherited Control and Firm Performance. The American Economic Review, 2006(6): 32~47.
[6] Belen V, Raphael A. How do Family Ownership Control and Management Affect Firm Value. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006(5): 117~132.
[7] Morten B, Kasper M N. Inside the Family Firm: the Role of Families in Succession Decisions and Performance. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2007(5): 647~691.
[8] Catherine M D, Marc J D. An Empirical EYamination of Ownership Structure in Family and Professionally Managed Firms. Family Business Review, 1992(6): 113~237.
[9] Daniel L M. Founding Family Controlled Firms: Efficiency and Value. Review of Financial Economics, 1998(7): 1~19.
[10] Brian F S, Ben A A. Management Succession and Financial Performance of Family Controlled Firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 1999(9): 341~368.
[11]曹德骏.家族企业研究的几个理论问题.财经科学,2002(6):55~60.
[12]别保强,申加强.我国家族企业代际传承模式分析.科技信息,2010(7):35~38.
[13]储小平.职业经理与家族企业的成长.管理世界,2002(4):100~109.
[14]王思齐,王朝全.论家族企业控制权转移其与社会人力资本的融合.西南科技大学学报,2008(1):6~9.
[15]汪继峰.家族企业如何迈过“三代必衰”这道坎.职业,2003(11):47~51.
[16]严红,王代敬.论家族企业对职业经理的选择.广东财经职业学院学报,2003(5):56~59.
[17]李新春.经理人市场失灵与家族企业治理.管理世界,2003(4):87~97.
[18]李松青,刘异玲.代际传承的家族企业权力转移合理性与效率分析.求索,2010(5):37~42.
[19]汪其昌.股份表决权信托:解决家族企业控制权转移的一种方式.上海经济研究,2010(6): 48~56.
[20]晃上.论家族企业权力的代际传递.南开管理评论,2002(2):47~51.
[21]叶国灿.论家族企业控制权的转移与内部治理结构的演变.管理世界,2004(4):147~148.
[22]张兵.家族企业代际传承模式研究:(博士学位论文).杭州:浙江大学,2004.
[23]尉静.家族企业控制权转移的障碍分析.商场现代化,2009(4):23~26.
[24]张月亮.企业继任者成功继任的影响因素分析.哈尔滨商业大学学报,2010(3):17~19.
[25]王彦.家族企业代理和绩效问题研究:(博士学位论文).沈阳:辽宁大学,2006.
[26]王永东.中国家族企业代际传承研究:(博士学位论文).沈阳:辽宁大学,2007.
[27]董巍.中国家族企业权力继任者选择模型研究:(博士学位论文).成都:西南交通大学,2007.
[28]余鹏翼.家族企业的控制权转移、融资结构与公司治理.金融教学与研究,2005(3):24~26.
[29]姚灵玲,高成丽.家族企业职业经理人精神激励机制研究.中南财经政法大学研究生学报,2007(6):34~37.
[30]邹晖.家族企业大股东侵占与股权制衡-基于家族类上市公司控制权转移事件的实证分析.现代管理科学,2008(4):95~96.
[31]朱靓.中国家族企业经营权传承问题的研究-基于委托代理理论的分析:(硕士学位论文).厦门:厦门大学,2008.
[32]李雅洁.我国家族企业传承问题及对策研究:(硕士学位论文).北京:中国石油大学,2009.
[33] Chandler A D. Strategy and structure:chapters in the history of the industrial enterprise. Cambridge: M.I.T.Press, 1962: 132~137.
[34] Donnelley. The Family Business. Harvard Business Review, 1964(3): 93~105.
[35]叶银华.家族控股集团、核心企业与报酬互动之研究-台湾与香港证券市场之比较.管理评论,1999,18(2):21~26.
[36]潘必胜.乡镇企业中的家族经营问题.中国农村观察,1998(1):35~37.
[37] Berle,Malme. The modern corporation and private property. United States: Transaction publishers, 1932: 125~130.
[38] Jensen M C, Riehard. The Market for Corporate Control: the Seientifie Evidenee. Journal of Finaneial Eeonomies, 1983(11): 5~50.
[39]张维迎.公有制经济中的委托人-代理人关系:理论分析和政策含义.经济研究,1995(5):61~65.
[40]钱颖一.现代经济学与中国经济改革.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2003.15~16.
[41]朱弈馄,陈雪梅. 21世纪亚太中小企业发展与支持系统国际研讨会综述.经济学动态,2001(3):76~81.
[42]刘磊,万迪防.企业中的核心控制权与一般控制权.中国工业经济,2004(2):39~42.
[43]陈滢旭,杜向荣.国内家族企业引入职业经理人的问题研究.现代商业,2007(4):22~24.
[44]张月亮.企业继任者成功继任的影响因素分析.哈尔滨商业大学学报,2010(3):17~19.
[45]王连娟.家族企业接班人选择研究综述.学术研究,2007(4):31~37.
[46]程兆谦,李小娜.家族企业代际传承中后代培养意愿及方式.经济管理,2008(23):74~80.
[47]余向前.家族企业子女接班意愿的影响.软科学,2008(8):55~59.