现代公司经营者长期激励机制研究
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摘要
现代公司应具有完善的保持公司长期持续发展的制度体系。激励机制尤其是长期激励机制则是其核心内容之一。由于经营者在公司的特殊地位和作用,以及人力资本所具有的“天然”产权特征,使人们越来越认识到建立有效的经营者激励机制的重要性。
目前对公司经营者的单一激励机制研究较多,多种激励机制组合研究较少;短期激励机制研究较多,长期激励机制研究较少;显性激励机制研究较多,隐性激励机制研究较少。因此,系统研究公司经营者的激励机制,尤其是长期激励机制体系十分必要。
论文试图达到的研究目的是借鉴国内外学者理论研究和实证分析成果,对公司激励机制进行疏理,全方位和系统性地审视我国公司经营者长期激励机制,探讨其有效构成体系;探讨各种机制对经营者激励的相互关系、替代效应和互动作用;从显性和隐性两个方面研究公司经营者长期激励机制的作用及需要解决的问题,提出现阶段应优先选择的显性和隐性长期激励机制;构建包括显性和隐性的公司经营者长期激励体系;利用上市公司有关数据实证分析和验证本文有关研究结果;提出公司经营者长期激励机制体系的政策建议。
现代公司经营者长期激励机制研究是理论性和实践性都很强的课题,涉及经济学、管理学等多个领域。本文侧重于公司实践方面的研究,因此研究方法采取经济学和管理学激励理论相结合;定性分析和定量分析相结合;理论分析和实证验证相结合的方法。
论文共八章,主要观点为:
(1)经营者对公司控制权的垄断是其长期激励的根本原因
两权分离后,经营者对公司控制权的垄断是经营者长期激励的根本原因,人力资本只是对经营者进行长期激励的前提条件,而公司的风险机制也决定了需对经营者实施长期激励。经营者对公司控制权的垄断程度应作为经营者激励强度设计的基点,公司治理结构和市场环境决定了经营者长期激励机制方式。
在现代公司委托代理关系下,由于经营者取得了公司“决策管理权”和部分“决策控制权”,可以利用其所掌握的权力在信息上获得优势地位,并凭借其拥有的公司控制权向所有权发出挑战,所有权与经营权之间往往产生权力控制的“博弈”。在双方“博弈”的过程中,任何一方为追求自身利益而过度行使权力,都将损害对方利益,难以维持和延续双方的关系。为实现公司利益最大化,双方必须在利益关系上进行协调,其结果是通过恰当长期激励机制来激励经营者,使其在公司经营管理中,通过追求公司利益最大化来实现自身利益的最大化。
(2)必须构建经营者长期激励机制体系
构建了基于业绩的经营者短长期激励模型,求解结果表明经营者激励和公司当期业绩、边际期望产出及所有者、经营者的绝对风险规避度或其绝对风险规避度的比率有关,给出了短长期激励强度系数的范围。分析表明公司经营者应短期和长期激励相结合,并分别通过年度主要财务指标和发展指标确定短期和长期激励强度系数β_(ⅰ,1)和β_(ⅰ,2),即应该建立公司经营者的长期激励机制。
激励机制关系模型分析和对激励机制作用的研究表明,一方面通常是多种激励机制同时作用于经营者,机制之间相互作用、相互制约、存在替代和互补关系,并基于内外部市场环境产生激励效果;另一方面作为理性的经营者,为达到自我发展、人力资本增值的目标,其激励需求是多层次、多方面的,重视短期激励的同时会更重视长期激励;需要显性激励同时会更需要隐性激励。因此,有效的长期激励机制是一个体系。
我国市场经济体制尚需完善,公司经营者长期激励机制建设正处于关键阶段,系统性地审视了包括股权激励等构成的经营者长期激励机制对经营者的激励效果,认为经营者长期激励体系的各机制需均衡应用。
(3)公司控制权是最重要的经营者长期激励机制
我国公司对经营者激励强度最大的是公司控制权机制。分析表明由于能够取得远远高于显性激励的狭义控制权收益,同时能够取得满足经营者声誉、地位、权力等自我实现需要的广义控制权收益,使经营者不断追求对公司控制权的垄断和长期拥有,以取得更高的激励效果,控制权激励对显性激励的强替代、对隐性激励的制约和互动,严重阻碍其他隐性激励机制的建立,并造成股权激励扭曲或失灵。公司控制权成为目前我国公司经营者最重要的长期激励机制,授予与控制经营者的公司控制权成为激励机制体系是否有效的关键问题。
从经营者控制权授予和约束的分析看,有效使用经营者控制权激励机制就是要控制经营者对公司控制权的垄断,限制狭义控制权收益,把控制权狭义收益的自我隐性激励转化为短长期显性激励,实现“资本化”,同时发挥其控制权广义收益效应,即满足经营者声誉、地位等自我实现的需求。
因此,当前我国公司长期激励机制体系建立的重点是完善治理结构,实现公司控制权的有效均衡配置、相互制约。具体的措施是完善董事会、监事会职能和建立内外部控制机制。
(4)当前要着重建立和完善经营者隐性激励机制
在不完全契约条件下,经营者并不总是按照显性契约约定的条款来确定自己的努力程度,契约中的隐性条款也会成为重要的激励因数,在我国公司经营者拥有的权力、地位等的激励作用远远大于规定的显性激励。在显性长期激励机制取得了长足进步,并将在更大范围内实施,激励强度越来越大的情况,如果没有有效的隐性长期激励机制同时应用,发挥隐性机制约束强于激励的作用,形成激励和约束协调发挥作用的效果,公司经营者长期激励机制将会在很大程度失效,甚至产生负效应。
目前,我国公司经营者隐性激励机制体系建设弱于显性激励体系的建设,表现为控制权激励的扭曲;经营者激励契约终止概率较大,缺乏长期预期等使声誉机制表现为弱有效性;经理人选聘体制化和地域分割等使经理人市场机制也表现为弱有效性,为建立有效的经营者激励机制体系,当前要着重建立和完善隐性激励机制。
论文分析认为,建立隐性激励体系,首先要培养经营者的“企业家精神”,外因通过内因起作用,各种激励机制归根结底需要“内激励”才能发挥作用,具有良好品德和创新动力,对事业强烈追求是经营者激励机制发挥作用的保证条件;其次是完善隐性激励机制所需的制度环境,建立和完善公司控制权、声誉、经理人市场等机制。
(5)经营者持股是股权激励最有效的方式
股权激励机制是目前广泛应用的显性长期激励机制,本文通过分析经营业绩、努力工作激励强度、承担风险激励强度的影响因素表明,有效的股权激励需要同时管理激励强度的斜率和凸度,这需要所有者掌握公司经营情况的充分信息,对公司经营状态有正确判断,并根据公司经营情况及时动态调整激励强度,这是所有者难以做到的,因此股权激励的实际操作是比较复杂的过程。这也可以作为人们有时认为股权激励难以达到预期效果的一个解释。一个推断是国有控股公司由于所有者缺位,股权激励有效性较差或失效。
将股权激励分为持股、期股、期权三种方式,分析了其激励效果和特征的差异,结合我国上市公司实施股权激励的有关情况,从激励方法、激励方案、激励主体和激励对象、激励强度、激励标准及指标体系确定、激励成本等方面的对比分析表明,在治理体系不完善,市场体系不健全的环境中,我国公司经营者持股激励是最有效的显性长期激励机制。
2004-2007年上市公司有关数据的实证验证,较好的支持了论文的观点。
论文的主要创新点:
(1)从公司整体视角全面审视和系统分析了公司经营者长期激励机制体系。建立了激励机制关系模型,并结合上市公司实际,分析了长期激励机制之间的替代、互补和扭曲关系,揭示了长期激励机制体系构建和均衡应用的重要性。
(2)分析表明经营者对公司控制权的垄断是其长期激励的根本原因,因此必须建立经营者的长期激励机制体系。控制权机制是最重要的经营者长期激励机制,授予与控制经营者的公司控制权成为激励机制体系是否有效的关键问题。
(3)构建了基于业绩的经营者短长期激励模型,求解结果表明经营者激励和公司当期业绩、边际期望产出及所有者、经营者的绝对风险规避度或其绝对风险规避度的比率有关,给出了短长期激励强度系数的范围。
A modern corportion should have a perfect institution system which could sustain its development. Incentive mechanism, especially long-term is most critical. Due to the special position and role of the executive in a corporation as well as the natural traits of property rights of human capital, the importance of founding an effective incentive mechanism for executives has been more and more clearly realized.
Right now, there are many researches on singular incentive mechanism while less on manifold ones, more focusing on short-term incentive, less focus in long run, more on the explicit incentive, less on the invisible. Therefore, it is very necessary to study the incentive mechanism systematically, especially in the long-term.
The purpose of this dissertation is, based on the corportion incentive mechanisms analysis both at home and abroad, to discuss its effective composing structure. The dissertation probes into the relationship, substitution effect and interaction between different mechanisms and the incentive effect on executives, to investigate the role of long-term incentive mechanism on executives and the problems arising from both explicit and implicit incentives, and to give suggestions. The dissertation puts up that it should construct a long-term, both explicit and implicit, incentive system on executives.
Research of long-term incentive mechanism on corportion executives is a hot subject both in theory and practice. It involves economics and management as well as many other fields. This dissertation focuses on the corportion practice, therefore, its methodology is an associative one, including incentive theory both in economics and management, qualitative and quantitative analysis, theoretical and empirical research.
The main content is as follows:
(1) Executives' monopoly of the control rights is the ultimate reason of long-term incentive on executive.
With the seperation of two rights separated, the executives' monopoly of the corportion control rights is the ultimate reason of long-term incentive on executive. The human capital being just a precondition, the risk mechanism of the corportion determines the long-term incentive on executive. The degree of monopolization of corportion control rights should be treated as the base to design executive incentive intensity, and the structure of corportion governance and market environment determine the pattern of the long-term incentive mechanism on executive.
According to the relationship of principal-agent in modern corportion, the executive gets the rights to manage and to make decision, he would, therefore, make use of his power to gain advantage in obtaining information, and to challenge the ownership by his control. It is a game between ownership and management. In order to gain the maximum profit, both parties should compromise and the result is to encourage the executive by a proper long-term incentive mechanism to realize the maximum of self-interest through seeking the corportion's maximum interest.
(2) It is critical to construct a long-term incentive system for executive.
An incentive model both in short-term and long-term based on the performance has been devised and the solution shows that the executive incentive is related to the current performance of the corportion, expected marginal production, the degree of risk avoidance of owner and executive or the ratio of their risk avoidance, a scope of the incentive intensity coefficient been given as well. The analysis implies that a combination of short-term and long-term incentivess should be taken.
In corportion practice, on the one hand, incentive effect is generated by a composition of several incentive mechanisms on the executive. On the other hand, as a rational executive, in order to realize the goals such as self-development and human capital increment, his need towards incentive should have multilayer and manifold. He may pay attention to short term incentive but more in the long-trem, less explicit incentive but more on implicit one. In other words, an effective long-term incentive mechanism is a system work.
A perfect market economy has not been set up in china and the construction of long-term incentive mechanism goes up to a key stage. This dissertation gives a systematic review upon the long-term incentive mechanism on executives, discusses the interaction, substitution and relationship of explicit and implicit incentive mechanism, as well as the effective pattern.
(3) The control right is the most important long-term incentive.
The strongest incentive in our country is the right to control the corportion. The analysis implies that, because of the much more gain through control than explicit incentive and the satisfaction to reputation, status, power etc., the executive has a consistent incentive to monopoly the control rights. Such incentive to control has definitely substituted explicit incentives, restrained the implicit ones, blocked the construction of other implicit ones and make the stock incentive distorted and invalid. The control right has become the most important long-term incentive mechanism, therefore.
Based on the analysis of the award and restrain of the executive control right, to make full use of the incentive mechamsm is to avoid the executive's monopoly of control right. Meanwhile, the generalized gain effect through control rights such as executive reputation, status and so on should be given.
Therefore, the key to the foundation of long-term incentive system is to improve governance structure, to balance allocation of corportion control rights. And the specific measure is to improve the function of directors and board of supervisors and set up a mechanism both inside and outside control.
(4) Implicit incentive mechanism should be reconstructed and improved.
In an incomplete contract, the executive does not make full efforts according tothe visible articles, the implicit articles being also important incentives. The incentive effect of rights and status that an executive owns is much bigger than the set material incentives. Since the explicit incentive mechanism has made great progress and will be carried out, with incentive intensity more and more strengthened, if there is not an efficient mechanism of implicit incentive in the long-term, the long-term incentive mechanism for executive will be nonsense, even negative.
In china, the construction of implicit incentive mechanism is not so well as the explicit ones. With the probability of the incentive contract broke-up increased and lack of long-term expectation, the reputation mechanism shows no effective. And as the recruitment of managers is institutionalized and separated by geography, the market mechanism of recruitment becomes ineffective. In order to set up an effective incentive system for executive, the invisible incentive mechanism should be reconstructed and consolidated.
To build up an implicit incentive system, first of all, it is to cultivate the "enterpreneurship" among executives. A kinds of incentive mechanisms won't make sense without executive's own efforts. Secondly, it should put up with the institutional environment which a perfectly implicit incentive mechanism needs, to build up and keep mechanisms such as control rights reputation and managers' market better off.
(5) Executives holding stock is the most effective way of equity-basedincentives.
Equity-based incentive is the most widely used explicit long-term incentive mechanism. Through analysis upon the factors that affect performance, incentive degree on hard-working and risk taking, it is found that an effective equity-based incentive plan needs to balance design of incentive contract. All the supervisor needs is the sufficient information, it is hard to get it. So, in practice, the equity-based incentive is considered as a reason why it is hard for equity-based incentive to work as it supposed to be.
Equity-based incentive are divided into three forms: stocks, future stocks and option. According to the instances of equity-based incentive in listed corportions, some comparative analysis are made ranging from the method and scheme of incentive.
The main contributions or orinnovations are follows:
(1) An overall literature review of the long-term incentive mechanism towards executive is given. A combined model of incentive is set up and the substitution, supplementation, and twisted relationship between diffferent mechanisms are analyzed according to the practice of listed corportions.
(2) The analysis shows that the executive's monopoly of the control rights is the true reason for executive incentive, making it necessary to set up a long-term incentive system for executives. The control rights become the most important long-term incentive mechanism, therefore, its award and delegation has become key question of whether the incentive mechanism is effective or not.
(3) A long-term incentive model based on performance is set up for executives, and the solution implies that the incentive to executives is related to the corporate performance, expected marginal production and the risk avoidance of owner and executive as well as their ratio of risk avoidance, the scope of the coefficient of short and long-term incentive intensity given, too.
目前对公司经营者的单一激励机制研究较多,多种激励机制组合研究较少;短期激励机制研究较多,长期激励机制研究较少;显性激励机制研究较多,隐性激励机制研究较少。因此,系统研究公司经营者的激励机制,尤其是长期激励机制体系十分必要。
论文试图达到的研究目的是借鉴国内外学者理论研究和实证分析成果,对公司激励机制进行疏理,全方位和系统性地审视我国公司经营者长期激励机制,探讨其有效构成体系;探讨各种机制对经营者激励的相互关系、替代效应和互动作用;从显性和隐性两个方面研究公司经营者长期激励机制的作用及需要解决的问题,提出现阶段应优先选择的显性和隐性长期激励机制;构建包括显性和隐性的公司经营者长期激励体系;利用上市公司有关数据实证分析和验证本文有关研究结果;提出公司经营者长期激励机制体系的政策建议。
现代公司经营者长期激励机制研究是理论性和实践性都很强的课题,涉及经济学、管理学等多个领域。本文侧重于公司实践方面的研究,因此研究方法采取经济学和管理学激励理论相结合;定性分析和定量分析相结合;理论分析和实证验证相结合的方法。
论文共八章,主要观点为:
(1)经营者对公司控制权的垄断是其长期激励的根本原因
两权分离后,经营者对公司控制权的垄断是经营者长期激励的根本原因,人力资本只是对经营者进行长期激励的前提条件,而公司的风险机制也决定了需对经营者实施长期激励。经营者对公司控制权的垄断程度应作为经营者激励强度设计的基点,公司治理结构和市场环境决定了经营者长期激励机制方式。
在现代公司委托代理关系下,由于经营者取得了公司“决策管理权”和部分“决策控制权”,可以利用其所掌握的权力在信息上获得优势地位,并凭借其拥有的公司控制权向所有权发出挑战,所有权与经营权之间往往产生权力控制的“博弈”。在双方“博弈”的过程中,任何一方为追求自身利益而过度行使权力,都将损害对方利益,难以维持和延续双方的关系。为实现公司利益最大化,双方必须在利益关系上进行协调,其结果是通过恰当长期激励机制来激励经营者,使其在公司经营管理中,通过追求公司利益最大化来实现自身利益的最大化。
(2)必须构建经营者长期激励机制体系
构建了基于业绩的经营者短长期激励模型,求解结果表明经营者激励和公司当期业绩、边际期望产出及所有者、经营者的绝对风险规避度或其绝对风险规避度的比率有关,给出了短长期激励强度系数的范围。分析表明公司经营者应短期和长期激励相结合,并分别通过年度主要财务指标和发展指标确定短期和长期激励强度系数β_(ⅰ,1)和β_(ⅰ,2),即应该建立公司经营者的长期激励机制。
激励机制关系模型分析和对激励机制作用的研究表明,一方面通常是多种激励机制同时作用于经营者,机制之间相互作用、相互制约、存在替代和互补关系,并基于内外部市场环境产生激励效果;另一方面作为理性的经营者,为达到自我发展、人力资本增值的目标,其激励需求是多层次、多方面的,重视短期激励的同时会更重视长期激励;需要显性激励同时会更需要隐性激励。因此,有效的长期激励机制是一个体系。
我国市场经济体制尚需完善,公司经营者长期激励机制建设正处于关键阶段,系统性地审视了包括股权激励等构成的经营者长期激励机制对经营者的激励效果,认为经营者长期激励体系的各机制需均衡应用。
(3)公司控制权是最重要的经营者长期激励机制
我国公司对经营者激励强度最大的是公司控制权机制。分析表明由于能够取得远远高于显性激励的狭义控制权收益,同时能够取得满足经营者声誉、地位、权力等自我实现需要的广义控制权收益,使经营者不断追求对公司控制权的垄断和长期拥有,以取得更高的激励效果,控制权激励对显性激励的强替代、对隐性激励的制约和互动,严重阻碍其他隐性激励机制的建立,并造成股权激励扭曲或失灵。公司控制权成为目前我国公司经营者最重要的长期激励机制,授予与控制经营者的公司控制权成为激励机制体系是否有效的关键问题。
从经营者控制权授予和约束的分析看,有效使用经营者控制权激励机制就是要控制经营者对公司控制权的垄断,限制狭义控制权收益,把控制权狭义收益的自我隐性激励转化为短长期显性激励,实现“资本化”,同时发挥其控制权广义收益效应,即满足经营者声誉、地位等自我实现的需求。
因此,当前我国公司长期激励机制体系建立的重点是完善治理结构,实现公司控制权的有效均衡配置、相互制约。具体的措施是完善董事会、监事会职能和建立内外部控制机制。
(4)当前要着重建立和完善经营者隐性激励机制
在不完全契约条件下,经营者并不总是按照显性契约约定的条款来确定自己的努力程度,契约中的隐性条款也会成为重要的激励因数,在我国公司经营者拥有的权力、地位等的激励作用远远大于规定的显性激励。在显性长期激励机制取得了长足进步,并将在更大范围内实施,激励强度越来越大的情况,如果没有有效的隐性长期激励机制同时应用,发挥隐性机制约束强于激励的作用,形成激励和约束协调发挥作用的效果,公司经营者长期激励机制将会在很大程度失效,甚至产生负效应。
目前,我国公司经营者隐性激励机制体系建设弱于显性激励体系的建设,表现为控制权激励的扭曲;经营者激励契约终止概率较大,缺乏长期预期等使声誉机制表现为弱有效性;经理人选聘体制化和地域分割等使经理人市场机制也表现为弱有效性,为建立有效的经营者激励机制体系,当前要着重建立和完善隐性激励机制。
论文分析认为,建立隐性激励体系,首先要培养经营者的“企业家精神”,外因通过内因起作用,各种激励机制归根结底需要“内激励”才能发挥作用,具有良好品德和创新动力,对事业强烈追求是经营者激励机制发挥作用的保证条件;其次是完善隐性激励机制所需的制度环境,建立和完善公司控制权、声誉、经理人市场等机制。
(5)经营者持股是股权激励最有效的方式
股权激励机制是目前广泛应用的显性长期激励机制,本文通过分析经营业绩、努力工作激励强度、承担风险激励强度的影响因素表明,有效的股权激励需要同时管理激励强度的斜率和凸度,这需要所有者掌握公司经营情况的充分信息,对公司经营状态有正确判断,并根据公司经营情况及时动态调整激励强度,这是所有者难以做到的,因此股权激励的实际操作是比较复杂的过程。这也可以作为人们有时认为股权激励难以达到预期效果的一个解释。一个推断是国有控股公司由于所有者缺位,股权激励有效性较差或失效。
将股权激励分为持股、期股、期权三种方式,分析了其激励效果和特征的差异,结合我国上市公司实施股权激励的有关情况,从激励方法、激励方案、激励主体和激励对象、激励强度、激励标准及指标体系确定、激励成本等方面的对比分析表明,在治理体系不完善,市场体系不健全的环境中,我国公司经营者持股激励是最有效的显性长期激励机制。
2004-2007年上市公司有关数据的实证验证,较好的支持了论文的观点。
论文的主要创新点:
(1)从公司整体视角全面审视和系统分析了公司经营者长期激励机制体系。建立了激励机制关系模型,并结合上市公司实际,分析了长期激励机制之间的替代、互补和扭曲关系,揭示了长期激励机制体系构建和均衡应用的重要性。
(2)分析表明经营者对公司控制权的垄断是其长期激励的根本原因,因此必须建立经营者的长期激励机制体系。控制权机制是最重要的经营者长期激励机制,授予与控制经营者的公司控制权成为激励机制体系是否有效的关键问题。
(3)构建了基于业绩的经营者短长期激励模型,求解结果表明经营者激励和公司当期业绩、边际期望产出及所有者、经营者的绝对风险规避度或其绝对风险规避度的比率有关,给出了短长期激励强度系数的范围。
A modern corportion should have a perfect institution system which could sustain its development. Incentive mechanism, especially long-term is most critical. Due to the special position and role of the executive in a corporation as well as the natural traits of property rights of human capital, the importance of founding an effective incentive mechanism for executives has been more and more clearly realized.
Right now, there are many researches on singular incentive mechanism while less on manifold ones, more focusing on short-term incentive, less focus in long run, more on the explicit incentive, less on the invisible. Therefore, it is very necessary to study the incentive mechanism systematically, especially in the long-term.
The purpose of this dissertation is, based on the corportion incentive mechanisms analysis both at home and abroad, to discuss its effective composing structure. The dissertation probes into the relationship, substitution effect and interaction between different mechanisms and the incentive effect on executives, to investigate the role of long-term incentive mechanism on executives and the problems arising from both explicit and implicit incentives, and to give suggestions. The dissertation puts up that it should construct a long-term, both explicit and implicit, incentive system on executives.
Research of long-term incentive mechanism on corportion executives is a hot subject both in theory and practice. It involves economics and management as well as many other fields. This dissertation focuses on the corportion practice, therefore, its methodology is an associative one, including incentive theory both in economics and management, qualitative and quantitative analysis, theoretical and empirical research.
The main content is as follows:
(1) Executives' monopoly of the control rights is the ultimate reason of long-term incentive on executive.
With the seperation of two rights separated, the executives' monopoly of the corportion control rights is the ultimate reason of long-term incentive on executive. The human capital being just a precondition, the risk mechanism of the corportion determines the long-term incentive on executive. The degree of monopolization of corportion control rights should be treated as the base to design executive incentive intensity, and the structure of corportion governance and market environment determine the pattern of the long-term incentive mechanism on executive.
According to the relationship of principal-agent in modern corportion, the executive gets the rights to manage and to make decision, he would, therefore, make use of his power to gain advantage in obtaining information, and to challenge the ownership by his control. It is a game between ownership and management. In order to gain the maximum profit, both parties should compromise and the result is to encourage the executive by a proper long-term incentive mechanism to realize the maximum of self-interest through seeking the corportion's maximum interest.
(2) It is critical to construct a long-term incentive system for executive.
An incentive model both in short-term and long-term based on the performance has been devised and the solution shows that the executive incentive is related to the current performance of the corportion, expected marginal production, the degree of risk avoidance of owner and executive or the ratio of their risk avoidance, a scope of the incentive intensity coefficient been given as well. The analysis implies that a combination of short-term and long-term incentivess should be taken.
In corportion practice, on the one hand, incentive effect is generated by a composition of several incentive mechanisms on the executive. On the other hand, as a rational executive, in order to realize the goals such as self-development and human capital increment, his need towards incentive should have multilayer and manifold. He may pay attention to short term incentive but more in the long-trem, less explicit incentive but more on implicit one. In other words, an effective long-term incentive mechanism is a system work.
A perfect market economy has not been set up in china and the construction of long-term incentive mechanism goes up to a key stage. This dissertation gives a systematic review upon the long-term incentive mechanism on executives, discusses the interaction, substitution and relationship of explicit and implicit incentive mechanism, as well as the effective pattern.
(3) The control right is the most important long-term incentive.
The strongest incentive in our country is the right to control the corportion. The analysis implies that, because of the much more gain through control than explicit incentive and the satisfaction to reputation, status, power etc., the executive has a consistent incentive to monopoly the control rights. Such incentive to control has definitely substituted explicit incentives, restrained the implicit ones, blocked the construction of other implicit ones and make the stock incentive distorted and invalid. The control right has become the most important long-term incentive mechanism, therefore.
Based on the analysis of the award and restrain of the executive control right, to make full use of the incentive mechamsm is to avoid the executive's monopoly of control right. Meanwhile, the generalized gain effect through control rights such as executive reputation, status and so on should be given.
Therefore, the key to the foundation of long-term incentive system is to improve governance structure, to balance allocation of corportion control rights. And the specific measure is to improve the function of directors and board of supervisors and set up a mechanism both inside and outside control.
(4) Implicit incentive mechanism should be reconstructed and improved.
In an incomplete contract, the executive does not make full efforts according tothe visible articles, the implicit articles being also important incentives. The incentive effect of rights and status that an executive owns is much bigger than the set material incentives. Since the explicit incentive mechanism has made great progress and will be carried out, with incentive intensity more and more strengthened, if there is not an efficient mechanism of implicit incentive in the long-term, the long-term incentive mechanism for executive will be nonsense, even negative.
In china, the construction of implicit incentive mechanism is not so well as the explicit ones. With the probability of the incentive contract broke-up increased and lack of long-term expectation, the reputation mechanism shows no effective. And as the recruitment of managers is institutionalized and separated by geography, the market mechanism of recruitment becomes ineffective. In order to set up an effective incentive system for executive, the invisible incentive mechanism should be reconstructed and consolidated.
To build up an implicit incentive system, first of all, it is to cultivate the "enterpreneurship" among executives. A kinds of incentive mechanisms won't make sense without executive's own efforts. Secondly, it should put up with the institutional environment which a perfectly implicit incentive mechanism needs, to build up and keep mechanisms such as control rights reputation and managers' market better off.
(5) Executives holding stock is the most effective way of equity-basedincentives.
Equity-based incentive is the most widely used explicit long-term incentive mechanism. Through analysis upon the factors that affect performance, incentive degree on hard-working and risk taking, it is found that an effective equity-based incentive plan needs to balance design of incentive contract. All the supervisor needs is the sufficient information, it is hard to get it. So, in practice, the equity-based incentive is considered as a reason why it is hard for equity-based incentive to work as it supposed to be.
Equity-based incentive are divided into three forms: stocks, future stocks and option. According to the instances of equity-based incentive in listed corportions, some comparative analysis are made ranging from the method and scheme of incentive.
The main contributions or orinnovations are follows:
(1) An overall literature review of the long-term incentive mechanism towards executive is given. A combined model of incentive is set up and the substitution, supplementation, and twisted relationship between diffferent mechanisms are analyzed according to the practice of listed corportions.
(2) The analysis shows that the executive's monopoly of the control rights is the true reason for executive incentive, making it necessary to set up a long-term incentive system for executives. The control rights become the most important long-term incentive mechanism, therefore, its award and delegation has become key question of whether the incentive mechanism is effective or not.
(3) A long-term incentive model based on performance is set up for executives, and the solution implies that the incentive to executives is related to the corporate performance, expected marginal production and the risk avoidance of owner and executive as well as their ratio of risk avoidance, the scope of the coefficient of short and long-term incentive intensity given, too.
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