流域水资源治理模式的比较制度分析
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摘要
20世纪80年代末,应对于各流域相继发生的“公地悲剧”,我国开始了水资源治理变革。变革包括两个方向,一是构建流域范围内的统一管理制度实现水资源整体治理,二是实施分权制度解决水资源治理的单一化问题。变革旨在构建不同的治理模式。水资源治理则因此面临比较分析不同治理模式的研究需要。
论文通过分析水资源属性、水资源冲突的制度含义,阐明水资源治理需以提高公共利益为根本目标,综合产权经济学、公共资源管理理论和管理学的研究视角与方法,对比了科层、参与式两类水资源治理模式的结构特征、运作方式、治理局限和适用范围,说明实现不同治理模式的制度互补是提高水资源占用公共利益的基础,并藉此探讨了政府定位问题。论文的研究结果主要包括以下四点：
1、基于水权的不完全和水资源属性的影响,水权是一种公共权属性质的私权,其界定过程是一个消解外部性的过程,也可能是扩大水资源公共领域和引致新外部性的过程。因而,提高水资源占用的公共利益是实施治理更为根本的目标。
2、基于“集中决策”和“科层机制”,科层水资源治理模式在协调跨区域水资源冲突、水资源配置和使用的整体规划设计、维护水资源公共利益方面具有治理优势。然而,水权占用者的多重主体身份导致这种治理模式在结构上表现为“V型权限结构”,激励了具体操作层的策略性行为选择,并因此而具有行政权威与层级程度的悖论关系、“逆公地悲剧”以及行政管理冲突等三类治理局限。在实践中,这些治理局限体现为：(1)治理者需依靠科层体系的扩展来提高用水控制的有效程度,引致管理成本上升；(2)通过配给水位优势方以更多的水权和默认水位劣势方违规用水的“配水矛盾”来降低管理成本,导致监管权威失效；(3)将调控权制度化为“适时水权”以提高水权配置效率,但因弱化了水权的稳定性引致非调度期过量占用水的策略行为。科层水资源治理模式在地方级水资源治理上通常是低效的,由此弱化了其对水资源公共利益的维护效果。
3、基于“网络型权限结构”和“共同决定”的运作方式,参与式水资源治理模式增强了用水户与灌溉管理的利益联结,缩小了水资源消费群体的规模,降低了个体行动的协调、监控和激励成本,弱化了具体操作层的策略性行为选择问题。而在实践中,其面临以下三个问题：(1)引入的水权交易机制属水权共同体内部的利润导向型契约关系,避免了市场交易可能引致的外部性,却因政府持有水价定价权而影响供水公司和用水者协会的持续发展；(2)因政府的选择性干预和参与式管理组织的适应性反应,参与性组织存在强制性、授权性、诱致性和模仿性四类科层化问题,影响其持续发展；(3)治理模式内部的自我管理机制适宜小规模水域范围治理,并因长、短期利益冲突存在是否可持续的治理局限。
4、我国的科层水资源治理模式依据行政体系而构建,与以往的水行政治理体系缺乏实质差异。参与性组织与政府组织间的组织关系以{强控制,强支持}为主,具备显著的科层化问题。因而,我国的水资源治理仍体现为以政府治理为主的单一治理局面。在未来的治理变革中,需放松对各类管理组织的控制,给予流域治理机构更多的管理权、参与性组织更多的监督权及自主发展的支持。
学术的贡献始终是边际性的,依据研究内容,论文扩展了所借鉴的部分观点。论文认为,受水资源属性影响,“水权科层”具备“V型结构特征”,而非层级结构。不同层级的水权主体因此具有宽泛的策略性行为选择。“科层水资源治理模式”需以“科层制”的非政府治理为发展方向,“多中心治理”体现为以水资源层级结构为基础的“差别匹配原则”。与同类研究相比,论文的创新之处在于：
1、综合运用产权经济学、管理学、公共资源管理理论的研究视角和方法,比较分析了不同水资源治理模式的异同及其制度关系,并对塔里木河流域的治理改革进行了系统分析和绩效评价,这些在现有的研究中均鲜有见文。
2、将水资源属性作为理解水事行为关联效应及制度设计的基础,提出水权界定的外部性和公共领域问题的本质是水资源属性所决定的水事行为的关联效应。同时,水资源占用者也因水资源属性而具备多重主体身份,有着广泛的策略性行为选择空间。据此,水权是一种公共权属性质的私权,“水权私有——强有力的公共权控制”是水资源治理变革的制度构建核心。
3、在参与式水资源治理模式的分析中,提出了“参与式水资源治理模式科层化”的概念,并从组织关系的视角对其成因和类别进行了分析,突破了国内学术界对参与式水资源治理模式流于形式的研究限于现象描述的状况。这不仅在很大程度上提升了水资源管理理论,同时为参与式水资源治理模式的持续发展提供了理论支持,表现出较强的理论创新。
From the late 1980's, concerning the problem that Tragedy of the Commons successively happened in most of basins, the governance change of water resource began in our country involving in two directions, the first was that overall governance of water resource was realized by a unified management institution within the basin scope, the second was that homogenization problem of water resource governance was solved by decentralized institution. Therefore, the nature of change was that different water resource governance modes were constructed. As a result, a comparative analysis of different water governance modes is necessary.
In this study, using water resource attribute - water resource confliction-governance model choose analysis model, paper points out that improving public interest is the fundamental objective of water resources governance. Integrating research methods of property rights economics and management and common resource management theory, combined with analysis of structure characteristic of water resource governance pattern and operation mode as well as application scope and governance limitations of bureaucratic and participated patterns as a main in our country in order to discuss the base of improved public interest is to promote complementary of different water governance.
According to the content and objective of this thesis, the conclusions of the thesis include the parts as following:
1. Based on the water properties and water right incompelte, the defined process of water rights is not only a process of eliminating externality, but also may extend the public field of water resource. As a result, water resource attribute determines that water rights private right with public property attribute, and improving public utility of water resource is the basic aim of governance.
2. Due to centralized decision and hierarchical authority, hierarchy water resource governance pattern has the governance advantage on the integrate planning and design of water resources allocation and maintenance of water resources in the public interest and coordination of inter-regional water confilicts. But the V-rights structure causing by multiple identities of water occupants makes it can not cope with strategic choice of local-level water. The limitations of bureaucratic water resource governance pattern are paradox relationship between administrative authority and degree of hierarchy, Tragedy of the Commons induced by multi-level water rights division and confliction of administrative management. The limitations, in practice, display the parts as following:(1)effective degree of water usage controlling was improved by extension of bureaucratic system, and then management costs were continuously improved; (2)management costs were reduced by "water allocation contradiction" of allocating much more water rights to water position prevailing party and tolerating water position inferior party moderate violation of water occupation and these would result in failure of regulatory authority;(3)regulation right was institutionalized into "timely water right" in order to improve allocation efficiency of water rights, but result in strategic behavior of excessive water allocation in non-scheduling period because of the stability weakening of water rights. So, hierarchy water resource governance pattern always is inefficient on governance the local-level water resource which also weakened the public interest.
3. Participated water resource governance pattern, Net-rights structure and joint decision, effectively weakens the strategic behavior. But in practice, the dissertation proposed that (1) water rights transaction mechanism introduced by participated water resource governance pattern pertains to profit-oriented contractual relationship in water rights community, and this avoids the externalities induced by pure water rights transaction, but influences sustainable development of Water Supply Company (water management units) and Water Users Association due to government holding water pricing;(2)participated management organization may induce the fragmentation unification contradiction of water policy and further result in the tendency of bureaucracy. This tendency occurred in advance in our country due to government selective intervention and organizations such as farmer user association adaptive response during the course of construction of participated management organization. In theory, it breaks through the discussion of domestic present study which only localizes phenomenon described of participatory water resources governance of becomes a mere formality, advancing the theory of water resources governance; (3) transformation of water resource management right facilitates the forming of self-management mechanism, however, this mechanism is only suitable to water field scope governance with small size, and governance limitation of whether or not sustainable exists due to interest confliction of long and short term.
4. Because the hierarchy water resource governance pattern constructed based on the administrative system, there has no real difference between the previously administration water resource governance pattern and the hierarchy water resource governance pattern. Due to the organizational relationship between the governmental organizations and participating organizations is{strong control, strong support}, there is significant hierarchy trend in the Participated water resource governance pattern. These effect the sustainable development of the water resource governance pattern. Government should endow more management right and self-development support to NGO and{weak control, strong support} organizational relationship with it.
Academic contribution is always at marginal. According to research content, some views is expanded which refrence by paper. Based on water properties, "water-right hierarchy" with "V-rights structure", different occupants have a wide range of behavior choice collection of strategy. Then hierarchy water resource governance pattern and polycentric governance should develop into a "hierarchical" non-governance and difference-Matching principle of water resource governance mode choosing, respectively.Compared with similar studies, the innovation points of the thesis include the parts as following:
1. This study is to comparative analysis of the similarities and differences and institutional relationship about the different model of water resources governance with comprehensive use of property rights, institutional economics, management, public resources management theory and comparative institutional analysis.
2. Water resource attribute was as a basis to understand correlation effect of water behavior and institution design. Based on it, the study proposes that externality in water resource governance and essence of public field problem was relevance effects of water behavior determined by water resource attributes. Simultaneously, water occupants have multiple identities because of water resource attribute and water rights private right with public property attribute. So, "private water rights——strong public controlled" is the core of the water institutional change.
3.In the analysis of participated water resource governance pattern, the thesis presents the theory of the tendency of bureaucracy.In theory, it breaks through the discussion of domestic present study which only localizes phenomenon described of participatory water resources governance of becomes a mere formality, advancing the theory of water resources governance.
论文通过分析水资源属性、水资源冲突的制度含义,阐明水资源治理需以提高公共利益为根本目标,综合产权经济学、公共资源管理理论和管理学的研究视角与方法,对比了科层、参与式两类水资源治理模式的结构特征、运作方式、治理局限和适用范围,说明实现不同治理模式的制度互补是提高水资源占用公共利益的基础,并藉此探讨了政府定位问题。论文的研究结果主要包括以下四点：
1、基于水权的不完全和水资源属性的影响,水权是一种公共权属性质的私权,其界定过程是一个消解外部性的过程,也可能是扩大水资源公共领域和引致新外部性的过程。因而,提高水资源占用的公共利益是实施治理更为根本的目标。
2、基于“集中决策”和“科层机制”,科层水资源治理模式在协调跨区域水资源冲突、水资源配置和使用的整体规划设计、维护水资源公共利益方面具有治理优势。然而,水权占用者的多重主体身份导致这种治理模式在结构上表现为“V型权限结构”,激励了具体操作层的策略性行为选择,并因此而具有行政权威与层级程度的悖论关系、“逆公地悲剧”以及行政管理冲突等三类治理局限。在实践中,这些治理局限体现为：(1)治理者需依靠科层体系的扩展来提高用水控制的有效程度,引致管理成本上升；(2)通过配给水位优势方以更多的水权和默认水位劣势方违规用水的“配水矛盾”来降低管理成本,导致监管权威失效；(3)将调控权制度化为“适时水权”以提高水权配置效率,但因弱化了水权的稳定性引致非调度期过量占用水的策略行为。科层水资源治理模式在地方级水资源治理上通常是低效的,由此弱化了其对水资源公共利益的维护效果。
3、基于“网络型权限结构”和“共同决定”的运作方式,参与式水资源治理模式增强了用水户与灌溉管理的利益联结,缩小了水资源消费群体的规模,降低了个体行动的协调、监控和激励成本,弱化了具体操作层的策略性行为选择问题。而在实践中,其面临以下三个问题：(1)引入的水权交易机制属水权共同体内部的利润导向型契约关系,避免了市场交易可能引致的外部性,却因政府持有水价定价权而影响供水公司和用水者协会的持续发展；(2)因政府的选择性干预和参与式管理组织的适应性反应,参与性组织存在强制性、授权性、诱致性和模仿性四类科层化问题,影响其持续发展；(3)治理模式内部的自我管理机制适宜小规模水域范围治理,并因长、短期利益冲突存在是否可持续的治理局限。
4、我国的科层水资源治理模式依据行政体系而构建,与以往的水行政治理体系缺乏实质差异。参与性组织与政府组织间的组织关系以{强控制,强支持}为主,具备显著的科层化问题。因而,我国的水资源治理仍体现为以政府治理为主的单一治理局面。在未来的治理变革中,需放松对各类管理组织的控制,给予流域治理机构更多的管理权、参与性组织更多的监督权及自主发展的支持。
学术的贡献始终是边际性的,依据研究内容,论文扩展了所借鉴的部分观点。论文认为,受水资源属性影响,“水权科层”具备“V型结构特征”,而非层级结构。不同层级的水权主体因此具有宽泛的策略性行为选择。“科层水资源治理模式”需以“科层制”的非政府治理为发展方向,“多中心治理”体现为以水资源层级结构为基础的“差别匹配原则”。与同类研究相比,论文的创新之处在于：
1、综合运用产权经济学、管理学、公共资源管理理论的研究视角和方法,比较分析了不同水资源治理模式的异同及其制度关系,并对塔里木河流域的治理改革进行了系统分析和绩效评价,这些在现有的研究中均鲜有见文。
2、将水资源属性作为理解水事行为关联效应及制度设计的基础,提出水权界定的外部性和公共领域问题的本质是水资源属性所决定的水事行为的关联效应。同时,水资源占用者也因水资源属性而具备多重主体身份,有着广泛的策略性行为选择空间。据此,水权是一种公共权属性质的私权,“水权私有——强有力的公共权控制”是水资源治理变革的制度构建核心。
3、在参与式水资源治理模式的分析中,提出了“参与式水资源治理模式科层化”的概念,并从组织关系的视角对其成因和类别进行了分析,突破了国内学术界对参与式水资源治理模式流于形式的研究限于现象描述的状况。这不仅在很大程度上提升了水资源管理理论,同时为参与式水资源治理模式的持续发展提供了理论支持,表现出较强的理论创新。
From the late 1980's, concerning the problem that Tragedy of the Commons successively happened in most of basins, the governance change of water resource began in our country involving in two directions, the first was that overall governance of water resource was realized by a unified management institution within the basin scope, the second was that homogenization problem of water resource governance was solved by decentralized institution. Therefore, the nature of change was that different water resource governance modes were constructed. As a result, a comparative analysis of different water governance modes is necessary.
In this study, using water resource attribute - water resource confliction-governance model choose analysis model, paper points out that improving public interest is the fundamental objective of water resources governance. Integrating research methods of property rights economics and management and common resource management theory, combined with analysis of structure characteristic of water resource governance pattern and operation mode as well as application scope and governance limitations of bureaucratic and participated patterns as a main in our country in order to discuss the base of improved public interest is to promote complementary of different water governance.
According to the content and objective of this thesis, the conclusions of the thesis include the parts as following:
1. Based on the water properties and water right incompelte, the defined process of water rights is not only a process of eliminating externality, but also may extend the public field of water resource. As a result, water resource attribute determines that water rights private right with public property attribute, and improving public utility of water resource is the basic aim of governance.
2. Due to centralized decision and hierarchical authority, hierarchy water resource governance pattern has the governance advantage on the integrate planning and design of water resources allocation and maintenance of water resources in the public interest and coordination of inter-regional water confilicts. But the V-rights structure causing by multiple identities of water occupants makes it can not cope with strategic choice of local-level water. The limitations of bureaucratic water resource governance pattern are paradox relationship between administrative authority and degree of hierarchy, Tragedy of the Commons induced by multi-level water rights division and confliction of administrative management. The limitations, in practice, display the parts as following:(1)effective degree of water usage controlling was improved by extension of bureaucratic system, and then management costs were continuously improved; (2)management costs were reduced by "water allocation contradiction" of allocating much more water rights to water position prevailing party and tolerating water position inferior party moderate violation of water occupation and these would result in failure of regulatory authority;(3)regulation right was institutionalized into "timely water right" in order to improve allocation efficiency of water rights, but result in strategic behavior of excessive water allocation in non-scheduling period because of the stability weakening of water rights. So, hierarchy water resource governance pattern always is inefficient on governance the local-level water resource which also weakened the public interest.
3. Participated water resource governance pattern, Net-rights structure and joint decision, effectively weakens the strategic behavior. But in practice, the dissertation proposed that (1) water rights transaction mechanism introduced by participated water resource governance pattern pertains to profit-oriented contractual relationship in water rights community, and this avoids the externalities induced by pure water rights transaction, but influences sustainable development of Water Supply Company (water management units) and Water Users Association due to government holding water pricing;(2)participated management organization may induce the fragmentation unification contradiction of water policy and further result in the tendency of bureaucracy. This tendency occurred in advance in our country due to government selective intervention and organizations such as farmer user association adaptive response during the course of construction of participated management organization. In theory, it breaks through the discussion of domestic present study which only localizes phenomenon described of participatory water resources governance of becomes a mere formality, advancing the theory of water resources governance; (3) transformation of water resource management right facilitates the forming of self-management mechanism, however, this mechanism is only suitable to water field scope governance with small size, and governance limitation of whether or not sustainable exists due to interest confliction of long and short term.
4. Because the hierarchy water resource governance pattern constructed based on the administrative system, there has no real difference between the previously administration water resource governance pattern and the hierarchy water resource governance pattern. Due to the organizational relationship between the governmental organizations and participating organizations is{strong control, strong support}, there is significant hierarchy trend in the Participated water resource governance pattern. These effect the sustainable development of the water resource governance pattern. Government should endow more management right and self-development support to NGO and{weak control, strong support} organizational relationship with it.
Academic contribution is always at marginal. According to research content, some views is expanded which refrence by paper. Based on water properties, "water-right hierarchy" with "V-rights structure", different occupants have a wide range of behavior choice collection of strategy. Then hierarchy water resource governance pattern and polycentric governance should develop into a "hierarchical" non-governance and difference-Matching principle of water resource governance mode choosing, respectively.Compared with similar studies, the innovation points of the thesis include the parts as following:
1. This study is to comparative analysis of the similarities and differences and institutional relationship about the different model of water resources governance with comprehensive use of property rights, institutional economics, management, public resources management theory and comparative institutional analysis.
2. Water resource attribute was as a basis to understand correlation effect of water behavior and institution design. Based on it, the study proposes that externality in water resource governance and essence of public field problem was relevance effects of water behavior determined by water resource attributes. Simultaneously, water occupants have multiple identities because of water resource attribute and water rights private right with public property attribute. So, "private water rights——strong public controlled" is the core of the water institutional change.
3.In the analysis of participated water resource governance pattern, the thesis presents the theory of the tendency of bureaucracy.In theory, it breaks through the discussion of domestic present study which only localizes phenomenon described of participatory water resources governance of becomes a mere formality, advancing the theory of water resources governance.
引文
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