中国农户金融的微观行为结构研究
|
摘要
中国农户是中国经济社会转型中的特殊群体。近现代中国转型是在世界资本主义外部竞争压力下的被迫转型,并在西方资本主义主导的现代世界体系中长期扮演着“边缘地区”角色。而与中国东部沿海和城市地区工业经济快速发展相比,中国广大的农村地区处于更加“边缘”的地位。和发达资本主义国家城市工商经济与乡村经济长期相互促进、相对均衡发展的历史过程不同,由于中国经济面临赶超的外部竞争压力,使得中国农村地区在中国赶超战略发展中长期处于从属地位,城乡经济处于持续不平衡状态。在这种赶超发展战略模式中,无论是农户传统生产行为方式还是农村经济制度约束,使得广大农户群体不具备完全市场经济条件下市场主体的行为能力。由于经济发展的不平衡性和农村经济发展的制度约束,农村地区资金要素无法与农村土地要素及其他要素有效结合,从根本上造成了农民“贷款难”和农村资金外流问题。通常情况下,农村发展的金融需求得不到满足问题被概括在农村金融研究范畴之中。
本研究注意到“三农”问题中的资金问题,实际上是在金融制度安排和农村金融服务上没有注意到农户行为及其制度约束的特殊性,农村金融核心应该是农户金融问题。在农村经济中,中小企业、个体工商在金融需求上也体现了现代工业经济和城市经济中中小企业和个体工商“贷款难”的特征,但是,这两者之间并没有本质区别,都是金融机构市场选择和这些主体在信用信息及抵押担保资产不足等方面共同造成的结果。但是,与中小企业、个体工商相比,农户明显更多是受到传统小农经济生产行为的影响和农村经济制度的约束。首先,农户家庭是传统小农经济的产物,是集生产、消费为一体的经济单位。受长期小农经济习惯的影响,在生产、消费和资金资源配置上首先是满足于家庭消费,而不是基于市场交换。其次,在中国赶超西方发达资本主义国家的经济战略中,国家对农村土地、农户宅基地及房产等要素市场自由流通进行了限制,从而使得农户家庭主要资产不具有抵押担保功能和按市场配置资源的能力。再次,中国长期经济赶超发展战略,政策上把农村劳动力和资金要素集中向具有效率的工业经济部门倾斜,而且农村社会保障体系等发展都相对滞后,使得农村经济长期处于从属地位,进一步弱化了农户作为市场主体参与市场配置资源的能力。最后,在政策和宏观管理层面,“三农”问题本质上更多是从社会稳定角度思考的问题,而不是完全按照市场的效率机制来进行制度安排和政策设计。因此,本研究集中把农户金融作为一个独立的研究主题从农村金融中单列出来,把农户金融的微观行为结构作为研究的切入点,系统地揭示了农户金融中各个主体的行为特征与行为互动机制,从而为建立完善的农户金融体系作了初步探索。
本论文共包括农户金融的理论基础、农户金融的主体行为和农户金融的互动行为机制三个部分。理论基础包括第1-3章,从研究的总体安排到研究综述,再到农户金融微观行为特征的理论基础,三个方面阐述了本研究的总体理论思路。第二部分和第三部分是本论文的主体部分。第二部分共包括第4章、第5章和第6章,重点是对农户金融中主要参与者——农户、农村信用社和政府三个主体的主要行为特征进行了实证研究。通过实证研究,重点揭示了农户融资选择行为、农村信用社商业行为、内部人控制与政治塞责行为,以及政府干预农户金融的两种干预行为等特征和机理。实证研究表明,根据现代市场经济对市场主体行为能力的要求审视,农户在融资选择方面存在明显的内源融资偏好,农户对资金的跨期配置能力和把握市场机会能力较弱,说明我国生产性农户仍然具有道义小农假说特征。对农户金融的主体机构农村信用社商业行为与政策任务的承担方面分析发现,当前农村信用社已经初步按照利润最大化原则行事,但是政策性支农任务对其仍然有很大的负面影响。两者结合起来,说明在当前农户金融仍然不能完全按照自由市场原则进行制度安排,需要保持对金融机构经营行为的合理干预。其中,在针对农户金融的具体干预政策方面,案例分析说明最好以扶持机构可持续发展和“广覆盖”为目标,而避免对农户信贷行为的直接干预。
第三部分共包括第7章、第8章、第9章和第10章,重点是对农户金融各参与主体主要行为的互动机制进行了考察。通过对金融机构成本约束与利率定价及市场行为机制,本研究考察了在农村金融市场,农户金融市场机制的有效性,发现农户金融市场并非有效,说明当前少数机构垄断着农户金融市场。而其他涉农类经济主体参与程度高的领域,农村机构数量将增加,适度竞争市场局面将出现,从而形成相对有效的市场机制。同时,在考察金融机构成本约束行为时,重点分析了农村信用社成本按照行政层级的分布情况,通过对比分析,认为在维持欠发达地区农村金融网点“广覆盖”和机构可持续性之间的平衡保持县级法人管理体制是当前农村信用社管理体系的最佳策略。进一步分析农户信用演进机制和农户信用制度变迁特征,发现农户信用从传统乡村社会治理机制向农村信用体系变迁过程,实际是农户信用从特殊主义信用向普遍主义信用变迁的过程,在两种信用制度变迁过程中,可能会出现乡村社会信用治理机制短期缺失的现象,从而导致农户信用违约率升高。因此,要通过加快农村信用体系建设弥补乡村传统特殊信用治理机制失效的状态。同时,在农村熟人社会信用机制仍然发挥作用的情况下,农村信用体系建设一方面要充分通过信用村等信用共同体建设形式把这种资源内化为普遍主义信用制度的内容,同时,还要通过建立农村熟人社会信用机制与银行信用的联结机制,来完善农村信用体系建设。
最后,本研究围绕上述研究结果,提出了针对性地发展农户金融的相关政策建议。其中,值得关注的要点在于：辩证认识农户金融问题,要从历史视角和现代世界体系视角审视农户金融的特殊性,农户融资选择行为并不具备市场完全理性,因此,农户金融在制度安排和政策扶持方面都不能遵循完全市场化发展思路,更多要着眼于农户金融的逐步过渡和农村金融市场的逐渐成熟,形成推进农户金融渐渐式发展的道路。在此基础上,农村金融机构的管理体制、农户金融的扶持政策和农户金融信用制度体系建设等方面都要具有对农户经济特殊行为特征的兼容性。
本研究主要从以下几个方面作出微小贡献：一是研究视角上直接把农户金融从农村金融中提取出来,直指农村金融的核心。农户这个经济主体的特殊性特征是农户金融制度特殊安排的基础,从而为中国农户金融更加系统化研究提供理论准备。二是秉承实证主义研究路线,对农户金融的主体行为进行实证分析,为系统认识农户金融的微观行为结构提供了基础。三是本研究通过人民银行系统取得了大量数据,无论是涉及全国10省市2万户农户借贷情况调查分析问卷,还是基于贵州省相关农村金融机构数据,都为认识当前农户金融发展现状提供了可靠的证据。四是本研究在实证过程中也有点滴闪光的火焰,例如：利用大样本数据回答了农户在融资选择行为方面是倾向于理性假说还是道义假说；通过农村金融机构利率定价和内部成本相关数据为论证农村地区金融市场机制有效性提供了一种可验证思路；通过对我国农村社会信用发展演变特征的揭示,实证性地提出了熟人社会信用向市场发展型信用转变过程的倒U型特征；通过案例分析形式提出了一种在当前农村体制约束下连接农村熟人社会信用机制与银行信用的联结机制模式；回答了经常困惑政策制定者的单个农村金融机构网点盈亏平衡点等问题。
Chinese agricultural population is a special group in the period of social transition which is driven by external forces from the west-led capitalist competition in which china is marginalized. By contrast to coastal cities and other urban areas, china's rural areas are placed at a more disadvantaged position. There has been obvious gap between the urban and the rural which has long been to subjected to sacrifice in the economic strategy because of china's pressure of outscore in the global competition, this is quite different from the coordination of the two part in the western countries. In china's pattern, the traditional mode of agricultural production as well as the rural economic institution severely restricts the farmers'capacity of adopting the role of market entity in the market economy. Due to the economic imbalance and the obstacle from the institutions, it is always hard to effectively bring capital, rural land and other subjects together, therefore the farmers find it troublesome to take loans and the rural areas constantly see the outflow of cash.
This study detects that it is the ignorance of the farmers'behaviors and the institutional restraints in the financial service that causes the problems of the capital. The focus of rural financing should lie in the farmers'financing request. In the rural economy, the obstacles the small and middle sized enterprises or the self-employed meet resemble that of the urban economy, there is no essential difference between them. They both result from the lack of credit information and mortgage capital of the market entity. However, compared with the other two enterprises, the farmers are more tied to the influence of the small-scaled peasant economy and the rural institutions. Firstly, the rural families which are producer and consumer rolled into one are stemmed from the peasant economy. Bound to the peasant habit, they take family consumption as priority in production, consumption and capital distribution, instead of market exchanges. Secondly, to serve china's "overtaking the west strategy", the state set limitation on the free flow of rural land, housing sites and housing property in order to prevent the farmers' major property going to mortgage or market distribution. Thirdly, in china's strategy, the policymakers tend to direct more resource to the industry of high efficiency, in addition the fact that the rural social security system has been relatively lagging makes it subjected to the urban economy and weakens the farmers' capacity of entering the market and resource distribution. Last, in the perspective of policy and macro management,"San Nong" is a social issue concerning stability, which means it does not closely follow the market mechanism. Therefore my study is designed to focus on farmer families' financing separated from the rural financing. Beginning with study of the financial micro-behavior of them, I will uncover the relevant mechanism of the interaction of each subject's behaviors in rural financing, making an effort to promote the establishment of system serving the farmers' financing requests.
My thesis includes three parts:The fundamental theory of farmers'financing, The subject behaviors, The mechanism of interactive behaviors. The first part includes chapter 1-3, dealing with the outline and structuring of my study from 3 aspects. The second and the third part is the main body of the thesis. The second part includes chapters4-6, focusing on the behavioral traits of the major participants of the farmers financing, which include farmers, rural popular bank and government. Through the empirical research, it is meant to reveal the internal mechanism in the behavioral traits of the farmers financing, of the rural popular banks, the insiders or the governments' red tape and two modes of intervention of the government. The research finds that, according to the modern market economy's demand on the participants' capacity, the farmers have a preference for home financing and have little control on financing over a span of periods and market opportunities, this indicates that china's rural financing still bases on moral bonds. Through the analysis of the rural credits cooperatives and the policymakers, it can be concluded that they have already built up the mechanism of maximizing profits, but the political negative influence should not be overlooked. Considering the two aspects, it can be summed that the farmers are still unable to behave according to the market rules and it is necessary to conduct considerable
The third part includes chapter 7—10 which focus on dynamic mechanism stemmed from the major behaviors of the participants in the farmers' financing. This study looks into this market by the way of restraints on the financing cost, market choice behavior and discovers the efficiency and inefficiency of this market and furthermore prove the monopoly by a minority. However as the number of the participants grows,a relatively effective market mechanism will emerge. In the meantime, by analyzing the administration-based structure of the rural credit cooperatives, it can be advised that it is the best strategy to maintain the balance between the wide coverage of the cooperatives and the sustainability and the county-level-cooperate-body management system. By further analysis of the evolution of the rural credits cooperative, it is discovered that this is indeed a step from credit of specializing to universalizing, and in this process, it is likely to see the lack of management mechanism, which leads to the rise of credit-breach. Therefore it is urgent to improve the rural credit system and besides take advantage connection-based system in countryside and combine it with the bank-credit mechanism.
At last, the study makes some proposals on the policy aimed at the peasant household financing. In particular, this issue should be analyzed historically and globally, because of the lack of solid market-mind, more attention should be given to assist the growth during the transition, instead of leaving it solely to the market's hand. In this sense, the management, policymaking and the buildup of a credit mechanism are required to have extensive tolerance for the special functioning of the rural.
My study are aimed to devote to such areas:first, highlight the major issue of rural financing which is the peasant household's financing pave the way for the theoretical research. Second, build up approach to empirical study on the issue. Third, offer valid PBC data for further research and policymaking. Forth, encourage innovative thinking based on empirical study, for instance, my study tries to answer whether the farmers make decision on account of reason or tradition; come up with the U-shaped evolution mode of the rural credit market; detect the mechanism that links the connection-based system and the banking system and the equilibrium point of profit and loss in each individual financial body, which is a question tricking many policymakers.
本研究注意到“三农”问题中的资金问题,实际上是在金融制度安排和农村金融服务上没有注意到农户行为及其制度约束的特殊性,农村金融核心应该是农户金融问题。在农村经济中,中小企业、个体工商在金融需求上也体现了现代工业经济和城市经济中中小企业和个体工商“贷款难”的特征,但是,这两者之间并没有本质区别,都是金融机构市场选择和这些主体在信用信息及抵押担保资产不足等方面共同造成的结果。但是,与中小企业、个体工商相比,农户明显更多是受到传统小农经济生产行为的影响和农村经济制度的约束。首先,农户家庭是传统小农经济的产物,是集生产、消费为一体的经济单位。受长期小农经济习惯的影响,在生产、消费和资金资源配置上首先是满足于家庭消费,而不是基于市场交换。其次,在中国赶超西方发达资本主义国家的经济战略中,国家对农村土地、农户宅基地及房产等要素市场自由流通进行了限制,从而使得农户家庭主要资产不具有抵押担保功能和按市场配置资源的能力。再次,中国长期经济赶超发展战略,政策上把农村劳动力和资金要素集中向具有效率的工业经济部门倾斜,而且农村社会保障体系等发展都相对滞后,使得农村经济长期处于从属地位,进一步弱化了农户作为市场主体参与市场配置资源的能力。最后,在政策和宏观管理层面,“三农”问题本质上更多是从社会稳定角度思考的问题,而不是完全按照市场的效率机制来进行制度安排和政策设计。因此,本研究集中把农户金融作为一个独立的研究主题从农村金融中单列出来,把农户金融的微观行为结构作为研究的切入点,系统地揭示了农户金融中各个主体的行为特征与行为互动机制,从而为建立完善的农户金融体系作了初步探索。
本论文共包括农户金融的理论基础、农户金融的主体行为和农户金融的互动行为机制三个部分。理论基础包括第1-3章,从研究的总体安排到研究综述,再到农户金融微观行为特征的理论基础,三个方面阐述了本研究的总体理论思路。第二部分和第三部分是本论文的主体部分。第二部分共包括第4章、第5章和第6章,重点是对农户金融中主要参与者——农户、农村信用社和政府三个主体的主要行为特征进行了实证研究。通过实证研究,重点揭示了农户融资选择行为、农村信用社商业行为、内部人控制与政治塞责行为,以及政府干预农户金融的两种干预行为等特征和机理。实证研究表明,根据现代市场经济对市场主体行为能力的要求审视,农户在融资选择方面存在明显的内源融资偏好,农户对资金的跨期配置能力和把握市场机会能力较弱,说明我国生产性农户仍然具有道义小农假说特征。对农户金融的主体机构农村信用社商业行为与政策任务的承担方面分析发现,当前农村信用社已经初步按照利润最大化原则行事,但是政策性支农任务对其仍然有很大的负面影响。两者结合起来,说明在当前农户金融仍然不能完全按照自由市场原则进行制度安排,需要保持对金融机构经营行为的合理干预。其中,在针对农户金融的具体干预政策方面,案例分析说明最好以扶持机构可持续发展和“广覆盖”为目标,而避免对农户信贷行为的直接干预。
第三部分共包括第7章、第8章、第9章和第10章,重点是对农户金融各参与主体主要行为的互动机制进行了考察。通过对金融机构成本约束与利率定价及市场行为机制,本研究考察了在农村金融市场,农户金融市场机制的有效性,发现农户金融市场并非有效,说明当前少数机构垄断着农户金融市场。而其他涉农类经济主体参与程度高的领域,农村机构数量将增加,适度竞争市场局面将出现,从而形成相对有效的市场机制。同时,在考察金融机构成本约束行为时,重点分析了农村信用社成本按照行政层级的分布情况,通过对比分析,认为在维持欠发达地区农村金融网点“广覆盖”和机构可持续性之间的平衡保持县级法人管理体制是当前农村信用社管理体系的最佳策略。进一步分析农户信用演进机制和农户信用制度变迁特征,发现农户信用从传统乡村社会治理机制向农村信用体系变迁过程,实际是农户信用从特殊主义信用向普遍主义信用变迁的过程,在两种信用制度变迁过程中,可能会出现乡村社会信用治理机制短期缺失的现象,从而导致农户信用违约率升高。因此,要通过加快农村信用体系建设弥补乡村传统特殊信用治理机制失效的状态。同时,在农村熟人社会信用机制仍然发挥作用的情况下,农村信用体系建设一方面要充分通过信用村等信用共同体建设形式把这种资源内化为普遍主义信用制度的内容,同时,还要通过建立农村熟人社会信用机制与银行信用的联结机制,来完善农村信用体系建设。
最后,本研究围绕上述研究结果,提出了针对性地发展农户金融的相关政策建议。其中,值得关注的要点在于：辩证认识农户金融问题,要从历史视角和现代世界体系视角审视农户金融的特殊性,农户融资选择行为并不具备市场完全理性,因此,农户金融在制度安排和政策扶持方面都不能遵循完全市场化发展思路,更多要着眼于农户金融的逐步过渡和农村金融市场的逐渐成熟,形成推进农户金融渐渐式发展的道路。在此基础上,农村金融机构的管理体制、农户金融的扶持政策和农户金融信用制度体系建设等方面都要具有对农户经济特殊行为特征的兼容性。
本研究主要从以下几个方面作出微小贡献：一是研究视角上直接把农户金融从农村金融中提取出来,直指农村金融的核心。农户这个经济主体的特殊性特征是农户金融制度特殊安排的基础,从而为中国农户金融更加系统化研究提供理论准备。二是秉承实证主义研究路线,对农户金融的主体行为进行实证分析,为系统认识农户金融的微观行为结构提供了基础。三是本研究通过人民银行系统取得了大量数据,无论是涉及全国10省市2万户农户借贷情况调查分析问卷,还是基于贵州省相关农村金融机构数据,都为认识当前农户金融发展现状提供了可靠的证据。四是本研究在实证过程中也有点滴闪光的火焰,例如：利用大样本数据回答了农户在融资选择行为方面是倾向于理性假说还是道义假说；通过农村金融机构利率定价和内部成本相关数据为论证农村地区金融市场机制有效性提供了一种可验证思路；通过对我国农村社会信用发展演变特征的揭示,实证性地提出了熟人社会信用向市场发展型信用转变过程的倒U型特征；通过案例分析形式提出了一种在当前农村体制约束下连接农村熟人社会信用机制与银行信用的联结机制模式；回答了经常困惑政策制定者的单个农村金融机构网点盈亏平衡点等问题。
Chinese agricultural population is a special group in the period of social transition which is driven by external forces from the west-led capitalist competition in which china is marginalized. By contrast to coastal cities and other urban areas, china's rural areas are placed at a more disadvantaged position. There has been obvious gap between the urban and the rural which has long been to subjected to sacrifice in the economic strategy because of china's pressure of outscore in the global competition, this is quite different from the coordination of the two part in the western countries. In china's pattern, the traditional mode of agricultural production as well as the rural economic institution severely restricts the farmers'capacity of adopting the role of market entity in the market economy. Due to the economic imbalance and the obstacle from the institutions, it is always hard to effectively bring capital, rural land and other subjects together, therefore the farmers find it troublesome to take loans and the rural areas constantly see the outflow of cash.
This study detects that it is the ignorance of the farmers'behaviors and the institutional restraints in the financial service that causes the problems of the capital. The focus of rural financing should lie in the farmers'financing request. In the rural economy, the obstacles the small and middle sized enterprises or the self-employed meet resemble that of the urban economy, there is no essential difference between them. They both result from the lack of credit information and mortgage capital of the market entity. However, compared with the other two enterprises, the farmers are more tied to the influence of the small-scaled peasant economy and the rural institutions. Firstly, the rural families which are producer and consumer rolled into one are stemmed from the peasant economy. Bound to the peasant habit, they take family consumption as priority in production, consumption and capital distribution, instead of market exchanges. Secondly, to serve china's "overtaking the west strategy", the state set limitation on the free flow of rural land, housing sites and housing property in order to prevent the farmers' major property going to mortgage or market distribution. Thirdly, in china's strategy, the policymakers tend to direct more resource to the industry of high efficiency, in addition the fact that the rural social security system has been relatively lagging makes it subjected to the urban economy and weakens the farmers' capacity of entering the market and resource distribution. Last, in the perspective of policy and macro management,"San Nong" is a social issue concerning stability, which means it does not closely follow the market mechanism. Therefore my study is designed to focus on farmer families' financing separated from the rural financing. Beginning with study of the financial micro-behavior of them, I will uncover the relevant mechanism of the interaction of each subject's behaviors in rural financing, making an effort to promote the establishment of system serving the farmers' financing requests.
My thesis includes three parts:The fundamental theory of farmers'financing, The subject behaviors, The mechanism of interactive behaviors. The first part includes chapter 1-3, dealing with the outline and structuring of my study from 3 aspects. The second and the third part is the main body of the thesis. The second part includes chapters4-6, focusing on the behavioral traits of the major participants of the farmers financing, which include farmers, rural popular bank and government. Through the empirical research, it is meant to reveal the internal mechanism in the behavioral traits of the farmers financing, of the rural popular banks, the insiders or the governments' red tape and two modes of intervention of the government. The research finds that, according to the modern market economy's demand on the participants' capacity, the farmers have a preference for home financing and have little control on financing over a span of periods and market opportunities, this indicates that china's rural financing still bases on moral bonds. Through the analysis of the rural credits cooperatives and the policymakers, it can be concluded that they have already built up the mechanism of maximizing profits, but the political negative influence should not be overlooked. Considering the two aspects, it can be summed that the farmers are still unable to behave according to the market rules and it is necessary to conduct considerable
The third part includes chapter 7—10 which focus on dynamic mechanism stemmed from the major behaviors of the participants in the farmers' financing. This study looks into this market by the way of restraints on the financing cost, market choice behavior and discovers the efficiency and inefficiency of this market and furthermore prove the monopoly by a minority. However as the number of the participants grows,a relatively effective market mechanism will emerge. In the meantime, by analyzing the administration-based structure of the rural credit cooperatives, it can be advised that it is the best strategy to maintain the balance between the wide coverage of the cooperatives and the sustainability and the county-level-cooperate-body management system. By further analysis of the evolution of the rural credits cooperative, it is discovered that this is indeed a step from credit of specializing to universalizing, and in this process, it is likely to see the lack of management mechanism, which leads to the rise of credit-breach. Therefore it is urgent to improve the rural credit system and besides take advantage connection-based system in countryside and combine it with the bank-credit mechanism.
At last, the study makes some proposals on the policy aimed at the peasant household financing. In particular, this issue should be analyzed historically and globally, because of the lack of solid market-mind, more attention should be given to assist the growth during the transition, instead of leaving it solely to the market's hand. In this sense, the management, policymaking and the buildup of a credit mechanism are required to have extensive tolerance for the special functioning of the rural.
My study are aimed to devote to such areas:first, highlight the major issue of rural financing which is the peasant household's financing pave the way for the theoretical research. Second, build up approach to empirical study on the issue. Third, offer valid PBC data for further research and policymaking. Forth, encourage innovative thinking based on empirical study, for instance, my study tries to answer whether the farmers make decision on account of reason or tradition; come up with the U-shaped evolution mode of the rural credit market; detect the mechanism that links the connection-based system and the banking system and the equilibrium point of profit and loss in each individual financial body, which is a question tricking many policymakers.
引文
[1]MeKinnon, Ronald.1,1973:"Money and Capital in Economic Development, Brooking Institutes, Washington DC. Lampiran.
[2]Shaw, Edward.S,1973:Financial Deepening in Economic Development. New York:Oxford University Press.
[3]Stiglitz,J. and A.Weiss,1981:"Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, American Economic Review71:3938—410.
[4]AvishayBraverman&MonikaHuppi改进发展中国家的农村金融.世界银行季刊,1991(3)
[5]MonikaHuPPi&GershonFeder.团体与信贷合作社在农村信贷中的作用.世界银行研究评论,1990(7)
[6]WbrldBnak, InofmralFinnacialIniemrediationinFourArfieanCountries, Findings:Arfica region, No.79, Jnauayrl997.
[7]Adams, DaleW., Filling the Deposit Gap in Microfinance. Paper of the Best Practices in Savings Mobilization Conference, Washington, DC.
[8]Gulli, Hege, Microfinnace, Questioning the Conventional Wisdom, International American Development Bank.NewYork,1998.
[9]Adams, Dale and Fitchett, D.A., Inofrmal Finance in Low Income Countries, Westview Press, Colorado,1992.
[10]Elizabeth Littlefield. Is Microfinance An Effective Strategy To Reach the Millennium Development Goals? Focus Note.2003.1
[11]Joan Parke. Microfinance, Grants, and Non-Financial Responses to Proverty Reduction:Where Does Microcedit Fit? Focus Note.2001.5
[12]Mark Schreiner. Scoring:The Next Breakthrough In Microfinance?.Focus Note.2003.1
[13]Brigit Helms.Interest Rate ceiling and Microfinance:The Story So Far.2004.9
[14]Robet Christen. The Rush to Regulate:Legal Framework for Microfinance. Focus Note.2000.4
[15]Fred D.Levy. Apex Institutions in Microfinance. Focus Note.2002.1
[16]Syed Hashemi. Linking Microfinance and Safety Net Programs to Include the Poorest:The Case of IGVGD in Bangladesh. Focus Note.2002.5
[17]Stiglitz, J. E. andWeiss, A. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. "American Economic Review,1981,71(3), pp.393-410.
[18]Feder, G.; Lau, L. J.; Lin, Justin Y. and Luo, Xiaopeng. "Agricultural Credit and Farm Performance in China. "Journal of Comparative Economics,1989, 13 (4), pp.508-526.
[19]Kon, Y. and Storey, D. J. "A Theory of Discouraged Borrowers. "Small Business Economics,2003,21, pp.37-49.
[20]Von Braun, J.; Malik, S. and Zeller, M.:Credit Markets, Input Support Policies and the Poor:Insight from Africa and Asia, Intema6onalFoodPolicy Research Institute, WashingtonDC,1993.
[21]Braverman,A.and Gausch,J.L.".Rural Credit in LDCs:Issues and Evidences, Journal of Economic Development 14:7-34,1989;
[22]Kochar, A.(1997):An Empirical Investigation of Rationing Constraints in Rural Credit Markets in India, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.53: 339～371
[23]Bose P. (1998), Formal—nformal sector interaction in rural credit markets, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.56:265-280
[24]ACOB YARON. Rural Finance:Issues, Design and best products[J]. World Bank,1999.
[25]Mckinnon, Ronald, Money and captial in economic development, The Bookings Washington D.C.1973.
[26]Shaw, E., Financial Deepening in the development, Oxford University Press, New York.1973.
[27]Hoff K.&Stiglitz,J.:The Economics of Rural Organization:Theory, Practice and Policy,Oxford University Press,1992.
[28]Cheng Hsiao, Analysis of Panel Data,Cambridge University Press,Second Edition,2003;
[29]Mckinnon, Ronald, Money and captial in economic development, The Bookings Washington D.C.1973.
[30]Shaw, E., Financial Deepening in the development, Oxford University Press, New York.1973.
[31]Hoff K.&Stiglitz,J.:The Economics of Rural Organization:Theory, Practice and Policy,Oxford University Press,1992.
[32]Granovetter,M.Economic Action and Social Structure:The Problem of Embeddedness[J]. American Journal of Sociology,1985,91(3):481-510.
[33]Uzzi B. Social structure and competition in inter-firm net-works.the paradox of embeddedness[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1997,42(1): 35-67.
[34]Diamond, D.W,1991.Monitoring and Reputation:The Choice Between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt[J].Journal of Political Economy, Aug, Vol.99 Issue 4.
[35]Fudenberg, D., D. Kreps&D. Levine(1988), "On the robust-ness of equilibrium refinement", Journal of Economic Theory 44:354-380.
[36]Boot and Thakor,(2000)"Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?"Journal of Finance, April,No.2 pp679-713.
[37]Uzzi,Brian.(1999)."Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social Relations and Network Benefit Firms Seeking Financing",American Sociological Review,62,pp481-505.
[38]Fuentes G.A.1996, "The Use of Villages in Rural Credit Delivery".The Journal of Development Studies,33(2) 188-209.
[39]Ghate,1992, Informal Finance:Some Findings from Asia, Boston:Oxford University Press.
[40]Hoff and Stigliz,1997,"Moneylenders and Bankers:Price-Increasing Subsidies in a Monopolistically Competitive Market",Journal of development economics,52:429-462.
[41]Varghese,2005."Bank-Moneylender Linkage as an Alternative to Bank Competition in Rural Credit Market",Oxford Economics Papers,57:315-335.
[42]Kreps.D.,P. Milgrom, J.Roberts, and R.Wilson,"Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma", Journal of Economic Theory,1982 (27).
[43]Abreu D.,Gul,"Bargaining and reputation" ,Econometrica,2002,68(1).
[44]乔海曙：农村经济发展中的金融约束及解除,农业经济问题[J].2001年第3期。
[45]曹力群(2001)：农村金融改革与农户借贷行为研究,中国农村研究[J].第2期；
[46]高帆(2002)：中国农村中的需求型金融抑制及其解除,中国农村经济[J].第2期；
[47]李锐、李宁辉(2004)：农户借贷行为及其福利效果分析,经济研究[J]第12期；
[48]王芳(2005)：中国农村金融需求与农村金融制度：一个理论框架,金融研究[J].第4期；
[49]王翼宁、赵顺龙(2007)：外部性约束、认知偏差、行为偏差与农户贷款困境,管理世界[J]第9期；
[50]张杰(2003)：中国农村金融制度：结构、变迁与政策[M],中国人民大学出版社；
[51]周天芸、李杰(2005)：农户借贷行为与中国农村二元金融结构的经验研究,世界经济[J]第11期；
[52]朱守银、张照新、张海阳、汪承先(2003)：中国农村金融市场供给和需求——以传统农区为例,管理世界[J].第3期；
[53]朱喜、李子奈(2006)：中国农村正式金融机构对农户的信贷配给——一个联立离散选择模型的实证分析,数量经济技术经济研究[J].第3期；
[54]程郁、韩俊、罗丹(2009)：供给配给与需求压抑交互影响下的正规信贷约束：来自1874户农户金融需求行为考察.世界经济,第5期；
[55]刘莉亚、胡乃红、李基礼、柳永明、骆玉鼎(2009)：农户融资现状 及其成因分析——基于中国东部、中部、西部千社万户的调查,中国农村观察,第3期；
[56]何广文(2001)：中国农村金融供求特征及均衡供求的路径选择,中国农村经济[J].第10期；
[57]王冀宁、赵顺龙(2007)：外部性约束、认知偏差、行为偏差与农户贷款困境—来自716户农户贷款调查问卷数据的实证检验,管理世界[J].第9期；
[58]国务院发展研究中心.小额信贷发展的国际经验.调查研究报告[M].第160号(总号2219).2004.11.4；
[59]李均锋、曾冬青(2003).小额信贷商业化运作：阿尔巴尼亚和乌克兰的经验.中国农村信用合作[J].第5期；
[60]史清华、卓建伟(2003).农户家庭储蓄借贷行为的实证分析——以山西农村203个农户的调查为例.当代经济[J].第8期：第52-59页；
[61]汪三贵(2001),贫困农户信贷资金的供给与需求[M].北京：中国农业出版社,2001；
[62]韩俊等(2007),信贷约束下农户借贷需求行为的实证研究.农业经济问题[J]2007年第2期；
[63]李锐、李超(1998).农户借贷行为和偏好的计量分析.中国农村经济[J].2007年第8期：第4-14页；
[64]U贝克尔.家庭论[M].北京：商务印书馆,1998；
[65]中国人民银行农户借贷情况问卷调查分析小组(2009).农户借贷情况调查问卷调查分析报告[M].经济科学出版社；
[66]黄宗智.华北的小农经济与社会变迁[M].中华书局,2002年；
[67]张杰(2005).农户、国家与中国农贷制度.金融研究[J].2005年第2期；
[68]曹力群(2001).农村金融改革与农户借贷行为研究.中国农村研究[J].2001年第2期；
[69]高帆(2002).中国农村中的需求型金融抑制及其解除.中国农村经济[J].第2期；
[70]王翼宁、赵顺龙(2007).外部性约束、认知偏差、行为偏差与农户贷款困境.管理世界[J].2007年第9期；
[71]周天芸、李杰(2005).农户借贷行为与中国农村二元金融结构的经验研究.世界经济[J].第11期；
[72]李锐(2004),农户借贷行为及其福利效果分析.经济研究[J].第12期；
[73]曹廷求、段玲玲(2005).治理机制、高管特征与农村信用社经营绩效——以山东省为例的实证分析.南开管理评论.2005年8卷,第4期；
[74]安翔(2007).当前农村信用社改革绩效及评价指标研究.社会科学家.第4期；
[75]刘民权、徐忠(2005).农村信用社市场化改革探索[J].金融研究,2005年第四期：99-113；
[76]谢平、徐忠、沈明高(2006).农村信用社改革绩效评价[J].金融研究,2006年第1期1：23-39；
[77]杨俊凯(2008),农村信用社改革的成效考察——西部某地区调查的时序全局主成分分析.西安交通大学学报(社会科学版),2008年3月；
[78]陆磊(2005).走在十字路口的农村信用社改革：一个中期评估[J].南方金融,2005年第10期：5-11.
[79]陈鹏、孙涌(2006),农村信用社改革模式选择：贵州证据,改革[J],2006年第9期；
[80]曾康霖(2006).农村金融改革值得探讨的几个理论问题[J].金融研究,第8期：93-102；
[81]刘锡良(2006).中国转型期农村金融体系研究.北京,中国金融出版社.2006；
[82]中国人民银行研究局中国农村金融服务研究小组(2008).中国农村金融服务报告[M].2008年9月19日；
[83]宋磊、王家传(2007).山东省农村信用社产权改革绩效评价的实证研究.农业经济问题[J](月刊).第8期；
[84]菜防(2008).中国农村改革三十年：制度经济学分析.中国社会科学[J].第6期；
[85]刘锡良、齐稚平(2010).城乡统筹视野的城市金融与农村金融对接：成都个案.改革[J].第2期；
[86]中国人民银行农村金融服务研究小组(2010).中国农村金融服务报 告[M].2010年3月；
[87]成思危.我国农村金融的发展历程及面临的挑战.http://www.crifs.org.cn.2008年4月22日；
[88]杜鹰(2007).当前农业农村工作需关注和研究的重大问题.在全国发展改革系统农村经济工作会议上的讲话.2007年6月21日；
[89]陈鹏、孙涌(2007).边际约束及成本结构变动下的农村金融改革与发展.管理世界[J].第3期；
[90]汤敏(2007).”农村金融完全可以商业化高利率并不可怕.”中国经济报告.2007年；
[91]刘锡良.中国转型期农村金融体系研究.北京,中国金融出版社.2006年;
[92]曾康霖(2004).关于金融抑制论的再审视.经济学动态[J].2004年；
[93]周小川(2004,关于农村金融改革的几点思路.经济学动态[J].第8期；
[94]姚耀军(2005).轨经济中的农村金融：管制与放松管制.财经科学[J].第6期
[95]徐忠、程恩江(2004).利率政策、农村金融机构行为与农村信贷短缺.金融研究[J].第12期；
[96]周振海(2007).垄断和价格管制条件下中国农村小额信贷市场分析.金融研究[J].第8期；
[97]韩伟(2004).市场结构与政策冲击：贷款利率浮动政策效应研究.金融研究[J].2004年第11期；
[98]陈鹏、孙涌(2006).农村信用社改革模式选择：贵州证据.改革[J].第9期；
[99]徐丹丹,商业银行成本核算中作业成本法与经济增加值的结合应用,华东经济管理[J],2005年3月；
[100]王平心(2001),作业成本计算理论与应用研究[M].大连,东北财经大学出版社；
[101]谢平、徐忠、沈明高(2006).农村信用社改革绩效评价.金融研究[J]. 第1期；
[102]中华人民共和国财政部,金融企业会计制度[M],2002年2月；
[103]黄宗智.华北的小农经济与社会变迁[H].北京：中华书局,2000.
[104]Jens Beckert,叶鹏飞翻译(2004),经济社会学与嵌入性：对“经济行动”的理论抽象.经济社会体制比较[J].2004年第6期；
[105]刘锡良(2006).中国转型期农村金融体系研究[M].北京,中国金融出版社.2006；
[106]罗必良(2009).村庄环境条件下的组织特性、声誉机制与关联博弈.改革[J].2009.2；
[107]中国人民银行农户借贷调查分析小组.农户借贷情况问卷调查分析报告[M].经济科学出版社.2009.9
[108]李婵(2004),农村社区精英研究综述.中共济南市委党校学报[J].2004年第3期：60-63.
[109]黄少卿、余晖(2005),民间商会的集体行动机制.经济社会体制比较[J].2005年第4期：66-73；
[110]曾军平(2004).集体行动的个体异质效应研究.财经研究[J].2004年第3期：58-66；
[111]曼瑟尔.奥尔森.集体行动的逻辑[M].上海：上海人民出饭社,1995.
[112]赵丙奇(2008).声誉、非正式金融与农户融资.社会科学战线[J].2008年第12期；
[113]李春来(2004).中国农村信贷制度的演变及其适应性.当代经济研究[J].2004年第10期；
[114]陈雨露、马勇(2008).社会信用文化、金融体系结构与金融业组织形式.经济研究[J].2008年第3期；
[115]武翔宇.我国农村金融联结制度的设计.金融研究[J].2008年第8期；
[116]唐双宁(2007).关于我国当前农村金融的几个问题.财经科学[J].2007年第9期；
[117]赵岩青、何广文(2007).农户联保贷款有效性问题研究.金融研究[J].2007年第7期；
[118]费孝通.乡土中国.生育制度[M].北京：北京大学出版社,1998；
[119]侯家驹(1998).中国经济史[M].新星出版社.1998年；
[120]托马斯.C.谢林(2005).微观动机与宏观行为.中国人民大学出版社.2005年11月；
[2]Shaw, Edward.S,1973:Financial Deepening in Economic Development. New York:Oxford University Press.
[3]Stiglitz,J. and A.Weiss,1981:"Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, American Economic Review71:3938—410.
[4]AvishayBraverman&MonikaHuppi改进发展中国家的农村金融.世界银行季刊,1991(3)
[5]MonikaHuPPi&GershonFeder.团体与信贷合作社在农村信贷中的作用.世界银行研究评论,1990(7)
[6]WbrldBnak, InofmralFinnacialIniemrediationinFourArfieanCountries, Findings:Arfica region, No.79, Jnauayrl997.
[7]Adams, DaleW., Filling the Deposit Gap in Microfinance. Paper of the Best Practices in Savings Mobilization Conference, Washington, DC.
[8]Gulli, Hege, Microfinnace, Questioning the Conventional Wisdom, International American Development Bank.NewYork,1998.
[9]Adams, Dale and Fitchett, D.A., Inofrmal Finance in Low Income Countries, Westview Press, Colorado,1992.
[10]Elizabeth Littlefield. Is Microfinance An Effective Strategy To Reach the Millennium Development Goals? Focus Note.2003.1
[11]Joan Parke. Microfinance, Grants, and Non-Financial Responses to Proverty Reduction:Where Does Microcedit Fit? Focus Note.2001.5
[12]Mark Schreiner. Scoring:The Next Breakthrough In Microfinance?.Focus Note.2003.1
[13]Brigit Helms.Interest Rate ceiling and Microfinance:The Story So Far.2004.9
[14]Robet Christen. The Rush to Regulate:Legal Framework for Microfinance. Focus Note.2000.4
[15]Fred D.Levy. Apex Institutions in Microfinance. Focus Note.2002.1
[16]Syed Hashemi. Linking Microfinance and Safety Net Programs to Include the Poorest:The Case of IGVGD in Bangladesh. Focus Note.2002.5
[17]Stiglitz, J. E. andWeiss, A. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. "American Economic Review,1981,71(3), pp.393-410.
[18]Feder, G.; Lau, L. J.; Lin, Justin Y. and Luo, Xiaopeng. "Agricultural Credit and Farm Performance in China. "Journal of Comparative Economics,1989, 13 (4), pp.508-526.
[19]Kon, Y. and Storey, D. J. "A Theory of Discouraged Borrowers. "Small Business Economics,2003,21, pp.37-49.
[20]Von Braun, J.; Malik, S. and Zeller, M.:Credit Markets, Input Support Policies and the Poor:Insight from Africa and Asia, Intema6onalFoodPolicy Research Institute, WashingtonDC,1993.
[21]Braverman,A.and Gausch,J.L.".Rural Credit in LDCs:Issues and Evidences, Journal of Economic Development 14:7-34,1989;
[22]Kochar, A.(1997):An Empirical Investigation of Rationing Constraints in Rural Credit Markets in India, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.53: 339～371
[23]Bose P. (1998), Formal—nformal sector interaction in rural credit markets, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.56:265-280
[24]ACOB YARON. Rural Finance:Issues, Design and best products[J]. World Bank,1999.
[25]Mckinnon, Ronald, Money and captial in economic development, The Bookings Washington D.C.1973.
[26]Shaw, E., Financial Deepening in the development, Oxford University Press, New York.1973.
[27]Hoff K.&Stiglitz,J.:The Economics of Rural Organization:Theory, Practice and Policy,Oxford University Press,1992.
[28]Cheng Hsiao, Analysis of Panel Data,Cambridge University Press,Second Edition,2003;
[29]Mckinnon, Ronald, Money and captial in economic development, The Bookings Washington D.C.1973.
[30]Shaw, E., Financial Deepening in the development, Oxford University Press, New York.1973.
[31]Hoff K.&Stiglitz,J.:The Economics of Rural Organization:Theory, Practice and Policy,Oxford University Press,1992.
[32]Granovetter,M.Economic Action and Social Structure:The Problem of Embeddedness[J]. American Journal of Sociology,1985,91(3):481-510.
[33]Uzzi B. Social structure and competition in inter-firm net-works.the paradox of embeddedness[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1997,42(1): 35-67.
[34]Diamond, D.W,1991.Monitoring and Reputation:The Choice Between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt[J].Journal of Political Economy, Aug, Vol.99 Issue 4.
[35]Fudenberg, D., D. Kreps&D. Levine(1988), "On the robust-ness of equilibrium refinement", Journal of Economic Theory 44:354-380.
[36]Boot and Thakor,(2000)"Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?"Journal of Finance, April,No.2 pp679-713.
[37]Uzzi,Brian.(1999)."Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social Relations and Network Benefit Firms Seeking Financing",American Sociological Review,62,pp481-505.
[38]Fuentes G.A.1996, "The Use of Villages in Rural Credit Delivery".The Journal of Development Studies,33(2) 188-209.
[39]Ghate,1992, Informal Finance:Some Findings from Asia, Boston:Oxford University Press.
[40]Hoff and Stigliz,1997,"Moneylenders and Bankers:Price-Increasing Subsidies in a Monopolistically Competitive Market",Journal of development economics,52:429-462.
[41]Varghese,2005."Bank-Moneylender Linkage as an Alternative to Bank Competition in Rural Credit Market",Oxford Economics Papers,57:315-335.
[42]Kreps.D.,P. Milgrom, J.Roberts, and R.Wilson,"Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma", Journal of Economic Theory,1982 (27).
[43]Abreu D.,Gul,"Bargaining and reputation" ,Econometrica,2002,68(1).
[44]乔海曙：农村经济发展中的金融约束及解除,农业经济问题[J].2001年第3期。
[45]曹力群(2001)：农村金融改革与农户借贷行为研究,中国农村研究[J].第2期；
[46]高帆(2002)：中国农村中的需求型金融抑制及其解除,中国农村经济[J].第2期；
[47]李锐、李宁辉(2004)：农户借贷行为及其福利效果分析,经济研究[J]第12期；
[48]王芳(2005)：中国农村金融需求与农村金融制度：一个理论框架,金融研究[J].第4期；
[49]王翼宁、赵顺龙(2007)：外部性约束、认知偏差、行为偏差与农户贷款困境,管理世界[J]第9期；
[50]张杰(2003)：中国农村金融制度：结构、变迁与政策[M],中国人民大学出版社；
[51]周天芸、李杰(2005)：农户借贷行为与中国农村二元金融结构的经验研究,世界经济[J]第11期；
[52]朱守银、张照新、张海阳、汪承先(2003)：中国农村金融市场供给和需求——以传统农区为例,管理世界[J].第3期；
[53]朱喜、李子奈(2006)：中国农村正式金融机构对农户的信贷配给——一个联立离散选择模型的实证分析,数量经济技术经济研究[J].第3期；
[54]程郁、韩俊、罗丹(2009)：供给配给与需求压抑交互影响下的正规信贷约束：来自1874户农户金融需求行为考察.世界经济,第5期；
[55]刘莉亚、胡乃红、李基礼、柳永明、骆玉鼎(2009)：农户融资现状 及其成因分析——基于中国东部、中部、西部千社万户的调查,中国农村观察,第3期；
[56]何广文(2001)：中国农村金融供求特征及均衡供求的路径选择,中国农村经济[J].第10期；
[57]王冀宁、赵顺龙(2007)：外部性约束、认知偏差、行为偏差与农户贷款困境—来自716户农户贷款调查问卷数据的实证检验,管理世界[J].第9期；
[58]国务院发展研究中心.小额信贷发展的国际经验.调查研究报告[M].第160号(总号2219).2004.11.4；
[59]李均锋、曾冬青(2003).小额信贷商业化运作：阿尔巴尼亚和乌克兰的经验.中国农村信用合作[J].第5期；
[60]史清华、卓建伟(2003).农户家庭储蓄借贷行为的实证分析——以山西农村203个农户的调查为例.当代经济[J].第8期：第52-59页；
[61]汪三贵(2001),贫困农户信贷资金的供给与需求[M].北京：中国农业出版社,2001；
[62]韩俊等(2007),信贷约束下农户借贷需求行为的实证研究.农业经济问题[J]2007年第2期；
[63]李锐、李超(1998).农户借贷行为和偏好的计量分析.中国农村经济[J].2007年第8期：第4-14页；
[64]U贝克尔.家庭论[M].北京：商务印书馆,1998；
[65]中国人民银行农户借贷情况问卷调查分析小组(2009).农户借贷情况调查问卷调查分析报告[M].经济科学出版社；
[66]黄宗智.华北的小农经济与社会变迁[M].中华书局,2002年；
[67]张杰(2005).农户、国家与中国农贷制度.金融研究[J].2005年第2期；
[68]曹力群(2001).农村金融改革与农户借贷行为研究.中国农村研究[J].2001年第2期；
[69]高帆(2002).中国农村中的需求型金融抑制及其解除.中国农村经济[J].第2期；
[70]王翼宁、赵顺龙(2007).外部性约束、认知偏差、行为偏差与农户贷款困境.管理世界[J].2007年第9期；
[71]周天芸、李杰(2005).农户借贷行为与中国农村二元金融结构的经验研究.世界经济[J].第11期；
[72]李锐(2004),农户借贷行为及其福利效果分析.经济研究[J].第12期；
[73]曹廷求、段玲玲(2005).治理机制、高管特征与农村信用社经营绩效——以山东省为例的实证分析.南开管理评论.2005年8卷,第4期；
[74]安翔(2007).当前农村信用社改革绩效及评价指标研究.社会科学家.第4期；
[75]刘民权、徐忠(2005).农村信用社市场化改革探索[J].金融研究,2005年第四期：99-113；
[76]谢平、徐忠、沈明高(2006).农村信用社改革绩效评价[J].金融研究,2006年第1期1：23-39；
[77]杨俊凯(2008),农村信用社改革的成效考察——西部某地区调查的时序全局主成分分析.西安交通大学学报(社会科学版),2008年3月；
[78]陆磊(2005).走在十字路口的农村信用社改革：一个中期评估[J].南方金融,2005年第10期：5-11.
[79]陈鹏、孙涌(2006),农村信用社改革模式选择：贵州证据,改革[J],2006年第9期；
[80]曾康霖(2006).农村金融改革值得探讨的几个理论问题[J].金融研究,第8期：93-102；
[81]刘锡良(2006).中国转型期农村金融体系研究.北京,中国金融出版社.2006；
[82]中国人民银行研究局中国农村金融服务研究小组(2008).中国农村金融服务报告[M].2008年9月19日；
[83]宋磊、王家传(2007).山东省农村信用社产权改革绩效评价的实证研究.农业经济问题[J](月刊).第8期；
[84]菜防(2008).中国农村改革三十年：制度经济学分析.中国社会科学[J].第6期；
[85]刘锡良、齐稚平(2010).城乡统筹视野的城市金融与农村金融对接：成都个案.改革[J].第2期；
[86]中国人民银行农村金融服务研究小组(2010).中国农村金融服务报 告[M].2010年3月；
[87]成思危.我国农村金融的发展历程及面临的挑战.http://www.crifs.org.cn.2008年4月22日；
[88]杜鹰(2007).当前农业农村工作需关注和研究的重大问题.在全国发展改革系统农村经济工作会议上的讲话.2007年6月21日；
[89]陈鹏、孙涌(2007).边际约束及成本结构变动下的农村金融改革与发展.管理世界[J].第3期；
[90]汤敏(2007).”农村金融完全可以商业化高利率并不可怕.”中国经济报告.2007年；
[91]刘锡良.中国转型期农村金融体系研究.北京,中国金融出版社.2006年;
[92]曾康霖(2004).关于金融抑制论的再审视.经济学动态[J].2004年；
[93]周小川(2004,关于农村金融改革的几点思路.经济学动态[J].第8期；
[94]姚耀军(2005).轨经济中的农村金融：管制与放松管制.财经科学[J].第6期
[95]徐忠、程恩江(2004).利率政策、农村金融机构行为与农村信贷短缺.金融研究[J].第12期；
[96]周振海(2007).垄断和价格管制条件下中国农村小额信贷市场分析.金融研究[J].第8期；
[97]韩伟(2004).市场结构与政策冲击：贷款利率浮动政策效应研究.金融研究[J].2004年第11期；
[98]陈鹏、孙涌(2006).农村信用社改革模式选择：贵州证据.改革[J].第9期；
[99]徐丹丹,商业银行成本核算中作业成本法与经济增加值的结合应用,华东经济管理[J],2005年3月；
[100]王平心(2001),作业成本计算理论与应用研究[M].大连,东北财经大学出版社；
[101]谢平、徐忠、沈明高(2006).农村信用社改革绩效评价.金融研究[J]. 第1期；
[102]中华人民共和国财政部,金融企业会计制度[M],2002年2月；
[103]黄宗智.华北的小农经济与社会变迁[H].北京：中华书局,2000.
[104]Jens Beckert,叶鹏飞翻译(2004),经济社会学与嵌入性：对“经济行动”的理论抽象.经济社会体制比较[J].2004年第6期；
[105]刘锡良(2006).中国转型期农村金融体系研究[M].北京,中国金融出版社.2006；
[106]罗必良(2009).村庄环境条件下的组织特性、声誉机制与关联博弈.改革[J].2009.2；
[107]中国人民银行农户借贷调查分析小组.农户借贷情况问卷调查分析报告[M].经济科学出版社.2009.9
[108]李婵(2004),农村社区精英研究综述.中共济南市委党校学报[J].2004年第3期：60-63.
[109]黄少卿、余晖(2005),民间商会的集体行动机制.经济社会体制比较[J].2005年第4期：66-73；
[110]曾军平(2004).集体行动的个体异质效应研究.财经研究[J].2004年第3期：58-66；
[111]曼瑟尔.奥尔森.集体行动的逻辑[M].上海：上海人民出饭社,1995.
[112]赵丙奇(2008).声誉、非正式金融与农户融资.社会科学战线[J].2008年第12期；
[113]李春来(2004).中国农村信贷制度的演变及其适应性.当代经济研究[J].2004年第10期；
[114]陈雨露、马勇(2008).社会信用文化、金融体系结构与金融业组织形式.经济研究[J].2008年第3期；
[115]武翔宇.我国农村金融联结制度的设计.金融研究[J].2008年第8期；
[116]唐双宁(2007).关于我国当前农村金融的几个问题.财经科学[J].2007年第9期；
[117]赵岩青、何广文(2007).农户联保贷款有效性问题研究.金融研究[J].2007年第7期；
[118]费孝通.乡土中国.生育制度[M].北京：北京大学出版社,1998；
[119]侯家驹(1998).中国经济史[M].新星出版社.1998年；
[120]托马斯.C.谢林(2005).微观动机与宏观行为.中国人民大学出版社.2005年11月；