市场结构、产权和中国工业市场绩效：理论与经验研究
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摘要
在对转轨经济研究中，学者们发现许多很难应用标准理论解释的产业经济现象，如产业逆集中化、集中度利润率关系弱化、集中度与流动性的正相关性等。这些产业经济现象一方面揭示了哈佛学派传统的SCP产业研究范式在发展中国家直接应用的局限性；另一方面也说明了决定发展中国家尤其是转轨经济国家市场绩效因素的复杂性。本文将转型期中国工业市场绩效差异放在由市场结构和产权结构组成的二维空间中，市场结构看成是决定产业绩效的一个坐标，而把产权结构看成是决定产业绩效的另一个坐标，从理论和经验两方面全面考察转型期中国工业绩效的影响因素。
第二章对中国工业市场的集中度和利润率关系静态视角的研究发现，在市场化初期，高集中度行业组的盈利性显著高于低集中度组，但随着市场化改革进程的深入，集中度与盈利性之间不存在简单线性正相关关系，高低集中度组的盈利性仍然存在差异，但统计上并不显著。这说明转型期工业行业利润率的决定是一个复杂的产业现象，受诸多因素影响，集中度仅是其中一个因素而已。耐人寻味的是，如果把样本按照国有化程度分为三个子组有效分解出产权结构对于行业盈利性的影响后，研究发现高集中度组的平均利润率显著高于低集中度组。企业层面经验研究结果表明，企业市场份额与盈利性之间表现出多层次关系，某些行业存在显著正向关系，而另一些行业正向关系不明显甚至出现负向关系。因此，不能过分强调企业规模对市场控制力的决定作用的结构主义观点。或许在基于规模经济和范围经济的传统工业经济时代，企业相对规模水平与企业对于市场价格、产量的控制力直接相关，市场操纵力总是掌握在行业内的大企业手中。而在知识经济时代，高科技产业的竞争特点与传统产业有着本质不同，在位小企业或者潜在进入厂商可以通过创新导致行业技术范式的转变颠覆在位主导性厂商的支配地位，行业的操纵能力与企业规模水平并不成比例。知识经济时代的产业新特点对传统产业组织政策，尤其是结构主义“结构操纵”思想提出了挑战。
第三章进一步考察了中国工业部门集中度的变化和市场份额的流动性，从动态视角为研究中国工业经济竞争程度提供一种新的产业组织方法。尽管在样本考察期内，中国工业集中度保持相对稳定，但通过市场份额流动性的经验研究发现，稳定的背后影藏着巨大的流动性。对在位企业市场份额变动模式的研究也得到相同结论。进一步考察工业集中度与流动性关系，集中度与流动性显著正相关。集中度并不能预测流动性，对行业竞争程度的衡量上，集中度指标与流动性指标是相互补充而不是相互替代。论文对简单“结构操纵”产业组织政策提出质疑，政府需要关注那些高度集中的市场，但高度集中并不是反垄断的充分条件，高度集中的背后或许影藏着巨大的流动性。
针对哈佛学派与芝加哥学派对集中度-利润率关系解释存在巨大分歧，第四章应用两种思路，检验中国工业经济利润率与集中度正向关系背后是反映大企业经营效率还是垄断势力。基本结论是：基于Martin的研究方法更多支持芝加哥的效率规范，组平均劳动生产率对于组价格-成本加成有显著的正向影响；而基于Clarke的研究方法更多支持哈佛学派的合谋规范，对于那些推测变量值大于零的行业，市场集中度对行业推测弹性或合谋程度有显著地正向影响。这说明在中国工业市场上，市场集中和利润率的市场势力和效率解释是相互补充而不是相互替代的，同时也给反垄断法的制定敲响警钟，在政策制定上切忌一刀切，应针对行业不同的特征实施不同的产业组织政策。
国企低效率通常被认为是先天性制度缺陷，变革产权也被顺理成章地认可为解决国企低效率的唯一方式。第五章的经验研究发现，总体而言国有经济成分比较私人经济成分的低效率不仅表现在糟糕的财务绩效上，其技术进步率也相对比较缓慢。将国有企业依照行业国有产权集中度划分成不同竞争类型行业时，我们惊讶地发现，竞争程度的提高不仅提高各种非公有制类型企业效率，国有企业效率也得到提升。通过国有企业和私人企业多层次的博弈分析，模型比较了不同情形下各种所有制企业间的效率差异和社会福利含义,论证国有企业过高的社会负担的确是其与私人企业利润差距的根本原因。私有化并不是解决国企低效率的充分条件，国有企业改革的思路应该放在如何给国有企业“松绑”，培育成真正市场主体。在改善国企经营绩效上，竞争比产权更重要。第六章适当假定后，市场结构和产权结构对于行为的影响便可以在统一的委托-代理模型中进行。研究得出，无论在完全垄断市场还是在竞争市场上，国有企业管理者管理松懈度都不高于私人企业，并且管理松懈度随着国有化程度上升而下降。对于垄断市场和竞争市场委托-代理模型均衡结果的比较，竞争市场下的国企经理比垄断市场的国企经理有更高的管理努力程度，再一次证实国企改革思路中培育竞争环境的重要性。
围绕着“熊彼特假说”关于静态效率和动态效率的争论，第七章经验研究表明企业规模和研发投入之间存在较为稳定的正相关关系，“倒U型”假说成立。但企业规模与研发产出的关系比较模糊，表现在资本密集型行业和劳动密集型行业的差异。通过自由进入、进入障碍博弈模型与社会最优情形的比较，得出行业技术机会是影响集中度的关键变量。本文论证自由进入的均衡企业数超过社会最优数，并导致动态福利损失。在制定行业竞争政策时，要充分考虑到行业特点，对于技术机会低的行业应降低进入标准，在不损失太多动态效率下提高静态效率；对技术机会高的行业比如高科技行业应适当提高进入标准，提高市场集中度获得更多的动态效率。第八章结合论文主要研究结论，强调我国未来竞争政策需反行政垄断和经济垄断并举、立足本国放眼世界和实现从维护竞争向促进创新的反垄断思想的转变，并对尚未出台的并购指南提出建言。
Researchers have found many phenomena which it is hard to explain usingstandard industrial theory in the transition economy study, such as de-centralization, aweaken relationship between concentration and profitability, and positive relationshipbetween concentration and mobility. These industrial phenomena reveal the directapplication's limitation of the Harvard School SCP paradigm in the developingcountries. On the other hand it also shows the complexity which determines marketperformance of developing countries especially in transition economy. This papertakes China's industrial sector performance into two dimensional spaces, onecoordinate is market structure, the other is property right structure. From theoreticaland empirical angles, the paper explores factors which determine the performance ofChina's industrial sector.
Chapter2explores the relationship between China's industrial sectorconcentration and profitability from static efficiency perspective. The study finds theprofitability of high concentration group is significantly higher than that of lowconcentration group in the early stage. With the deepening of market reform thesample linear positive correlation between concentration and profitability does notappear. The difference between them do exists but not statistically significant. Theconclusion suggests the determinants of transitional economy profitability arecomplex phenomenon and influenced by many factors, concentration is just one factor.Interestingly the study finds the average profit margin of higher concentration groupis higher than that of lower concentration group significantly after divided the sampleinto three subgroups according the degree of nationalization which controls theproperty right structure's influence on industry profitability effectively. The empiricalstudy of firm lever shows multi-lever relations between market share and profitability,many industries exist significant positive relationship and others' positive relationshipis not obvious even negative relationship. Therefore policy makers can't put too muchemphasis on firms' absolute scale role in determining market power. Perhaps in thetraditional industry based on scale economy and scope economy, firms' scale isrelative to price making directly and market manipulation is always in the hands ofthe incumbent giants. In the era of knowledge economy, the competition of thehigh-tech industries has essential difference with traditional industry. A small firm orpotential entering can subvert the dominant role of the incumbent giants with the change of industry technology paradigm by innovation, market power isn'tproportionate to firms' market share or scale. The characteristics of knowledgeeconomy put forward challenges to traditional industrial organization policyespecially the structure school “structure manipulation”.
Chapter3further discusses the change of concentration and the mobility inChina's industrial sector which offers a new method to study competition degree fromdynamic perspective. The paper explores market share's mobility of China's industrialsector which offers a new industrial organization method to study China's industrialcompetition degree from dynamic angle. Although concentration degree holdsrelatively stable through period from2004to2008, there is huge mobility under staticconcentration by an empirical study on market share's mobility. To study the changemode of enterprise's market share also gets the same conclusion. Further researchfinds there has significant positive correlation between industrial concentration andmobility, so concentration can't predict mobility. Concentration and mobility arecomplement index each other and not alternative as a proxy of measuring the degreeof competition in the industry. The paper questions the sample “structuremanipulation” policy. Government should pay attention to those highly concentratedindustry, but highly centralized are not the sufficient condition of antitrust, becausehighly centralized may shadow huge mobility.
Considering the huge discrepancy between Harvard School and Chicago Schoolabout the explanation of concentration-profitability relationship, Chapter4exploreswhether the positive relationship of China's industrial concentration and profitabilityreflects scale economy or market power using two ways separately. The method basedon Martin support Chicago School's efficiency paradigm, the average group laborproductivity has significantly influence on group price-cost-margin. The methodbased on Clarke more proves Harvard School's collusion paradigm. As to an industrywith positive conjecture variable market concentration has significantly impact onconjecture elasticity or the degree of implicit collusion. It shows as for explaining therelationship between concentration and profitability of China's industrial sector,efficiency or/and market power are complement each other and not alternative. Thisconclusion also give some advice to the formulation of antitrust law, policy makersshould avoid “one size fits all” sample rule and implement different industrialorganization policy against the characteristics of different industry.
The low efficiency of SOEs is generally considered to be congenital defects, therefore scholars take property-reforming as only way for granted to solve the lowefficiency of SOEs. The empirical study in chapter5finds in general SOEs have lowefficiency in comparison with private sectors not only in obscure financialperformance but in relatively slow technical progress rate. After divided SOEs intodifferent groups according to nationalization degree, we are surprised to find theincreasing of competition not only enhances the efficiency of non-public ownershipenterprises also increases SOEs' efficiency. By the analysis of multi-lever gamemodels between SOEs and private enterprises, we compare the efficiency discrepancybetween all kinds of enterprises and social welfare implications in different context,and proves undue social burden is a critical reason which causes the profitability gapbetween SOEs and private sector. Privatization isn't sufficient to solve SOEs' lowefficiency, SOEs' reform ideas should address how to cultivate them into real marketcompetitive players and how to “deburden” for SOEs. Competition does matter thanproperty as to improve business efficiency. After appropriate assumption marketstructure and property right structure that influence firm's behavior can be unified to asimple principal-agent model in chapter6. The study shows the managerial slack ofSOEs' managers are not more than that of private competitors either in competitionmarket or in monopoly market, and once again, proves the importance of cultivatingcompetitive environment.
Around “Schumpeter hypothesis” about tradeoff between static efficiency anddynamic efficiency, in chapter7empirical study shows firm scale and R&D inputexist relatively stable positive and “inverted U” correlation. But the relationshipbetween R&D output and firm scale is vague, as shown in the discrepancy betweenthe capital-intensive industries and the labor-intensive industries. By comparison free-entry oligopoly and blocked-entry oligopoly with social optical model, the gamemodel finds industry technological opportunity is a key variable which determinessocially optical industry concentration ratio. The section demonstrates the equilibriumfirm number of free-entry will exceed the social optimum and leads to dynamicwelfare loss. Therefore the formulation and implementation of competition policyshould take industry characteristics into consideration. To the industry with lowtechnological opportunity, the policy should reduce entry standard to improve statisticefficiency without losing too much dynamic efficiency. To the industry with hightechnological opportunity such as high-tech industry, on the contrary, industrial policyshould increase entry standard to improve market concentration and get more dynamic efficiency. Based on the paper's main conclusions chapter8provides someadvice to China's future competition policy and M&A guideline, namely, not onlyemphasize economy monopoly but administrative monopoly, look around the worldbased on domestic market, realize the change from the maintenance of competition toencouraging innovation.
第二章对中国工业市场的集中度和利润率关系静态视角的研究发现，在市场化初期，高集中度行业组的盈利性显著高于低集中度组，但随着市场化改革进程的深入，集中度与盈利性之间不存在简单线性正相关关系，高低集中度组的盈利性仍然存在差异，但统计上并不显著。这说明转型期工业行业利润率的决定是一个复杂的产业现象，受诸多因素影响，集中度仅是其中一个因素而已。耐人寻味的是，如果把样本按照国有化程度分为三个子组有效分解出产权结构对于行业盈利性的影响后，研究发现高集中度组的平均利润率显著高于低集中度组。企业层面经验研究结果表明，企业市场份额与盈利性之间表现出多层次关系，某些行业存在显著正向关系，而另一些行业正向关系不明显甚至出现负向关系。因此，不能过分强调企业规模对市场控制力的决定作用的结构主义观点。或许在基于规模经济和范围经济的传统工业经济时代，企业相对规模水平与企业对于市场价格、产量的控制力直接相关，市场操纵力总是掌握在行业内的大企业手中。而在知识经济时代，高科技产业的竞争特点与传统产业有着本质不同，在位小企业或者潜在进入厂商可以通过创新导致行业技术范式的转变颠覆在位主导性厂商的支配地位，行业的操纵能力与企业规模水平并不成比例。知识经济时代的产业新特点对传统产业组织政策，尤其是结构主义“结构操纵”思想提出了挑战。
第三章进一步考察了中国工业部门集中度的变化和市场份额的流动性，从动态视角为研究中国工业经济竞争程度提供一种新的产业组织方法。尽管在样本考察期内，中国工业集中度保持相对稳定，但通过市场份额流动性的经验研究发现，稳定的背后影藏着巨大的流动性。对在位企业市场份额变动模式的研究也得到相同结论。进一步考察工业集中度与流动性关系，集中度与流动性显著正相关。集中度并不能预测流动性，对行业竞争程度的衡量上，集中度指标与流动性指标是相互补充而不是相互替代。论文对简单“结构操纵”产业组织政策提出质疑，政府需要关注那些高度集中的市场，但高度集中并不是反垄断的充分条件，高度集中的背后或许影藏着巨大的流动性。
针对哈佛学派与芝加哥学派对集中度-利润率关系解释存在巨大分歧，第四章应用两种思路，检验中国工业经济利润率与集中度正向关系背后是反映大企业经营效率还是垄断势力。基本结论是：基于Martin的研究方法更多支持芝加哥的效率规范，组平均劳动生产率对于组价格-成本加成有显著的正向影响；而基于Clarke的研究方法更多支持哈佛学派的合谋规范，对于那些推测变量值大于零的行业，市场集中度对行业推测弹性或合谋程度有显著地正向影响。这说明在中国工业市场上，市场集中和利润率的市场势力和效率解释是相互补充而不是相互替代的，同时也给反垄断法的制定敲响警钟，在政策制定上切忌一刀切，应针对行业不同的特征实施不同的产业组织政策。
国企低效率通常被认为是先天性制度缺陷，变革产权也被顺理成章地认可为解决国企低效率的唯一方式。第五章的经验研究发现，总体而言国有经济成分比较私人经济成分的低效率不仅表现在糟糕的财务绩效上，其技术进步率也相对比较缓慢。将国有企业依照行业国有产权集中度划分成不同竞争类型行业时，我们惊讶地发现，竞争程度的提高不仅提高各种非公有制类型企业效率，国有企业效率也得到提升。通过国有企业和私人企业多层次的博弈分析，模型比较了不同情形下各种所有制企业间的效率差异和社会福利含义,论证国有企业过高的社会负担的确是其与私人企业利润差距的根本原因。私有化并不是解决国企低效率的充分条件，国有企业改革的思路应该放在如何给国有企业“松绑”，培育成真正市场主体。在改善国企经营绩效上，竞争比产权更重要。第六章适当假定后，市场结构和产权结构对于行为的影响便可以在统一的委托-代理模型中进行。研究得出，无论在完全垄断市场还是在竞争市场上，国有企业管理者管理松懈度都不高于私人企业，并且管理松懈度随着国有化程度上升而下降。对于垄断市场和竞争市场委托-代理模型均衡结果的比较，竞争市场下的国企经理比垄断市场的国企经理有更高的管理努力程度，再一次证实国企改革思路中培育竞争环境的重要性。
围绕着“熊彼特假说”关于静态效率和动态效率的争论，第七章经验研究表明企业规模和研发投入之间存在较为稳定的正相关关系，“倒U型”假说成立。但企业规模与研发产出的关系比较模糊，表现在资本密集型行业和劳动密集型行业的差异。通过自由进入、进入障碍博弈模型与社会最优情形的比较，得出行业技术机会是影响集中度的关键变量。本文论证自由进入的均衡企业数超过社会最优数，并导致动态福利损失。在制定行业竞争政策时，要充分考虑到行业特点，对于技术机会低的行业应降低进入标准，在不损失太多动态效率下提高静态效率；对技术机会高的行业比如高科技行业应适当提高进入标准，提高市场集中度获得更多的动态效率。第八章结合论文主要研究结论，强调我国未来竞争政策需反行政垄断和经济垄断并举、立足本国放眼世界和实现从维护竞争向促进创新的反垄断思想的转变，并对尚未出台的并购指南提出建言。
Researchers have found many phenomena which it is hard to explain usingstandard industrial theory in the transition economy study, such as de-centralization, aweaken relationship between concentration and profitability, and positive relationshipbetween concentration and mobility. These industrial phenomena reveal the directapplication's limitation of the Harvard School SCP paradigm in the developingcountries. On the other hand it also shows the complexity which determines marketperformance of developing countries especially in transition economy. This papertakes China's industrial sector performance into two dimensional spaces, onecoordinate is market structure, the other is property right structure. From theoreticaland empirical angles, the paper explores factors which determine the performance ofChina's industrial sector.
Chapter2explores the relationship between China's industrial sectorconcentration and profitability from static efficiency perspective. The study finds theprofitability of high concentration group is significantly higher than that of lowconcentration group in the early stage. With the deepening of market reform thesample linear positive correlation between concentration and profitability does notappear. The difference between them do exists but not statistically significant. Theconclusion suggests the determinants of transitional economy profitability arecomplex phenomenon and influenced by many factors, concentration is just one factor.Interestingly the study finds the average profit margin of higher concentration groupis higher than that of lower concentration group significantly after divided the sampleinto three subgroups according the degree of nationalization which controls theproperty right structure's influence on industry profitability effectively. The empiricalstudy of firm lever shows multi-lever relations between market share and profitability,many industries exist significant positive relationship and others' positive relationshipis not obvious even negative relationship. Therefore policy makers can't put too muchemphasis on firms' absolute scale role in determining market power. Perhaps in thetraditional industry based on scale economy and scope economy, firms' scale isrelative to price making directly and market manipulation is always in the hands ofthe incumbent giants. In the era of knowledge economy, the competition of thehigh-tech industries has essential difference with traditional industry. A small firm orpotential entering can subvert the dominant role of the incumbent giants with the change of industry technology paradigm by innovation, market power isn'tproportionate to firms' market share or scale. The characteristics of knowledgeeconomy put forward challenges to traditional industrial organization policyespecially the structure school “structure manipulation”.
Chapter3further discusses the change of concentration and the mobility inChina's industrial sector which offers a new method to study competition degree fromdynamic perspective. The paper explores market share's mobility of China's industrialsector which offers a new industrial organization method to study China's industrialcompetition degree from dynamic angle. Although concentration degree holdsrelatively stable through period from2004to2008, there is huge mobility under staticconcentration by an empirical study on market share's mobility. To study the changemode of enterprise's market share also gets the same conclusion. Further researchfinds there has significant positive correlation between industrial concentration andmobility, so concentration can't predict mobility. Concentration and mobility arecomplement index each other and not alternative as a proxy of measuring the degreeof competition in the industry. The paper questions the sample “structuremanipulation” policy. Government should pay attention to those highly concentratedindustry, but highly centralized are not the sufficient condition of antitrust, becausehighly centralized may shadow huge mobility.
Considering the huge discrepancy between Harvard School and Chicago Schoolabout the explanation of concentration-profitability relationship, Chapter4exploreswhether the positive relationship of China's industrial concentration and profitabilityreflects scale economy or market power using two ways separately. The method basedon Martin support Chicago School's efficiency paradigm, the average group laborproductivity has significantly influence on group price-cost-margin. The methodbased on Clarke more proves Harvard School's collusion paradigm. As to an industrywith positive conjecture variable market concentration has significantly impact onconjecture elasticity or the degree of implicit collusion. It shows as for explaining therelationship between concentration and profitability of China's industrial sector,efficiency or/and market power are complement each other and not alternative. Thisconclusion also give some advice to the formulation of antitrust law, policy makersshould avoid “one size fits all” sample rule and implement different industrialorganization policy against the characteristics of different industry.
The low efficiency of SOEs is generally considered to be congenital defects, therefore scholars take property-reforming as only way for granted to solve the lowefficiency of SOEs. The empirical study in chapter5finds in general SOEs have lowefficiency in comparison with private sectors not only in obscure financialperformance but in relatively slow technical progress rate. After divided SOEs intodifferent groups according to nationalization degree, we are surprised to find theincreasing of competition not only enhances the efficiency of non-public ownershipenterprises also increases SOEs' efficiency. By the analysis of multi-lever gamemodels between SOEs and private enterprises, we compare the efficiency discrepancybetween all kinds of enterprises and social welfare implications in different context,and proves undue social burden is a critical reason which causes the profitability gapbetween SOEs and private sector. Privatization isn't sufficient to solve SOEs' lowefficiency, SOEs' reform ideas should address how to cultivate them into real marketcompetitive players and how to “deburden” for SOEs. Competition does matter thanproperty as to improve business efficiency. After appropriate assumption marketstructure and property right structure that influence firm's behavior can be unified to asimple principal-agent model in chapter6. The study shows the managerial slack ofSOEs' managers are not more than that of private competitors either in competitionmarket or in monopoly market, and once again, proves the importance of cultivatingcompetitive environment.
Around “Schumpeter hypothesis” about tradeoff between static efficiency anddynamic efficiency, in chapter7empirical study shows firm scale and R&D inputexist relatively stable positive and “inverted U” correlation. But the relationshipbetween R&D output and firm scale is vague, as shown in the discrepancy betweenthe capital-intensive industries and the labor-intensive industries. By comparison free-entry oligopoly and blocked-entry oligopoly with social optical model, the gamemodel finds industry technological opportunity is a key variable which determinessocially optical industry concentration ratio. The section demonstrates the equilibriumfirm number of free-entry will exceed the social optimum and leads to dynamicwelfare loss. Therefore the formulation and implementation of competition policyshould take industry characteristics into consideration. To the industry with lowtechnological opportunity, the policy should reduce entry standard to improve statisticefficiency without losing too much dynamic efficiency. To the industry with hightechnological opportunity such as high-tech industry, on the contrary, industrial policyshould increase entry standard to improve market concentration and get more dynamic efficiency. Based on the paper's main conclusions chapter8provides someadvice to China's future competition policy and M&A guideline, namely, not onlyemphasize economy monopoly but administrative monopoly, look around the worldbased on domestic market, realize the change from the maintenance of competition toencouraging innovation.
引文
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1对市场集中度的划分标准参考王俊豪.产业经济学[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2008:46-52.
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1魏后凯(2001)、刘小玄(2000)曾以1995年第三次全国工业普查数据光盘为数据源，核算出四分位小类产业相关数据，但二者的研究主要是以描述性统计分析为主。
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2Donsimoni(1984)认为结构主义本质上是一系列并非相互独立的结构因素对市场绩效产生的共同影响。
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2《2005年大企业年鉴》中能够核算小类行业的四企业卖方集中度的行业共127个，模型估计已经包含总体的全部个体，故不存在增加样本容量的可能。
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2刘志彪.现代产业经济学[M].北京:高等教育出版社，2003:170.
3即便从Stigler意义上将，对不同所有制企业的差别利率或中小企业融资条件差异都构成真正进入障碍。
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1Carter(1978)在价格—成本加成基础上的实证研究也支持Demsetz的推断。Peltzman(1977)建立了一个非常复杂、严格设定的成本削减模型进行更为复杂的检验。理论推演出技术革新成本下降后，会使集中度和效率都提高，估计结果也非常满意。
2约瑟夫·熊彼特.资本主义、社会主义和民主[M].北京：商务印书馆,1999:148-149.
3约瑟夫·熊彼特.资本主义、社会主义和民主[M].北京：商务印书馆,1999:146-147.
1约瑟夫·熊彼特.资本主义、社会主义和民主[M].北京：商务印书馆,1999:145.
2约瑟夫·熊彼特.资本主义、社会主义和民主[M].北京：商务印书馆,1999:176.
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1于立,吴绪亮.产业组织与反垄断法[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2008:184.
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