政治关联、多元化战略与企业成长性
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摘要
自改革开放以来,我国进入了由计划经济向市场经济转型的时期,政府职能也在逐步转变。尽管如此,我国的政治体制决定了我国属于强势政府,政府在市场资源的配置中仍具有非常重要的地位。由于非市场化制度已经被证明在资源配置中是低效率的,会导致分配不均衡。因此,为了获取更多的资源,也为了规避经济转型期的外部环境不确定性而带来的风险,企业往往谋求与政府构建政治关联。在我国,政治关联的现象已经较为普遍。近年来,企业家积极获取政治地位,如人大代表、政协委员等(Chen等,2005；胡旭阳,2006；吴文锋等,2005；余明桂等,2008),或聘请具有政府背景的高管到企业工作,同时政府官员下海创办企业或委派到企业担任高管的情况也较为常见。可见,政治关联在我国特殊的制度背景下对企业的发展具有重要影响。但在理论界,政治关联作为一个刚刚兴起的研究领域,相关的研究还有待完善,尤其是我国制度背景下的政治关联研究更是少之又少。现有研究较多关注政治关联与企业绩效提升,但由于研究角度和方法较为狭窄和片面,并未形成一致意见。同时对于政治关联与企业绩效的影响机理并未进行探讨,且现有研究也没有将政治关联置于制度环境背景下。因此,基于我政治关联的现实情况,相关议题有待进一步深入探讨。
为此,本研究对政治关联与企业成长性的关联进行讨论,不仅考察了政治关联对企业静态经营能力的影响,更探究了政治关联对企业动态增长能力作用。同时将政治关联分成纵向和横向两个维度,即行政层级和行政职权,分析不同层面政治关联对企业成长性的不同影响。此外,本文结合战略选择与制度环境理论,引入多元化战略与市场化程度两个因素,对政治关联与企业成长性这一研究主题从内部路径机理和外部环境制约两个角度进行了拓展研究。总体来看,本文就以下问题进行了深入探讨：①政治关联对企业成长性是否具有影响?政治关联的不同维度是否对成长性产生显著影响；②政治关联对企业成长性作用的路径如何,政治关联是否分布的间接影响企业成长性；③制度环境是否对政治关联与企业成长性的关联关系起到一定作用,如何影响。
本文在对相关文献梳理与归纳的基础上,通过多案例探索性研究和大样本实证的分析,在资源基础观的视角下构建了政治关联与企业成长性关系的理论框架,并依据“资源——战略——绩效”的框架,系统梳理了政治关联、多元化战略、市场化程度和企业成长性之间的内在机理和影响关系,形成了政治关联对企业成长性作用的多层次研究体系。
通过理论分析和实证检验,本研究主要得到以下四个方面的结论：首先,政治关联的纵向强度和横向强度均对企业成长性具有积极的正向驱动作用,但影响程度有所不同,同时政治关联对企业增长能力的影响显著高于对企业经营能力的影响；其次,多元化战略在政治关联对企业成长性的作用机制中发挥着重要的中介作用,政治关联能够提升企业资源获取的能力,使企业资源更为丰富,通过多元化战略对资源的有效配置,进而提升企业成长性；再次,政治关联对企业成长性存在两条路径,即“政治关联——企业成长性”的直接影响路径,以及“政治关联——多元化战略——企业成长性”的间接影响路径,通过经营战略决策质量和外部资源获取能力的提高,政治关联为企业成长性提供了双重动力；最后,市场化程度在政治关联和企业成长性之间起到了负向调节作用,在市场化程度越低的地区,政治关联对企业成长性的作用越显著。
上述研究结论深化了对政治关联与企业成长性关系内涵的理解,在政治关联研究领域进行了较为深入的拓展。本文主要有以下三个创新之处：①创新性地将政治关联划分为纵向和横向两个维度,探究政治关联的不同维度对企业成长性影响的本质过程,完善了政治关联的衡量体系；②构建了政治关联对企业成长性影响的两条路径,即“政治关联——企业成长性”的直接影响路径,以及“政治关联——多元化战略——企业成长性”的间接影响路径,系统地揭示了政治关联对企业成长性作用机理；③充分揭示了政治关联在不同市场化程度调节下对企业成长性影响机制的差异,该研究所得能够为企业提供实践启示,为政府提供决策参考。
诚然,囿于本人的研究水平,本文还存在着有待完善之处。基于此,本文也在篇幅的最后,提出了本研究的不足之处,同时也对未来的研究进行了展望。
Since the reform and open policy, China has entered into the transformation period, from Planned economy to Market economy, with governmental function changing gradually. However, the political system here makes China a Strong government, and it plays quite an important part in resource allocation. As Non-market system has been proved inefficiency and inequality, enterprise always seek to build political connection with the government to obtain more resource and avoid risk that from environmental uncertainty during the transformation period. In China, political connection is common. Recently, entrepreneurs are positive for political position, such as NPC member, CPPCC Members, etc. (Chen et al,2005; Hu,2006) or hire someone with government background. Meanwhile, it is common for government officials to set up enterprise, or be appointed as corporate executives. It is thus clear that political position has an important impact in the development of enterprise under our special institutional environment. In Academia, political position, as an emerging field, is far from perfect, and many research need to be done, especially in China's institutional environment. The current study pays much attention to the relationship between political position and enterprise performance improvement. Nevertheless, due to the limitation of study angle and method, there is not a consensus. In addition, study on the effect mechanism between political position and enterprise performance are deficiency, and existing research hasn't place political position in Chinese institutional environment. Therefore, related issues need to be further studied.
This dissertation discussed the relevance between political connection and enterprise growth, studied the influence of political connection on enterprise static management ability and enterprise dynamic growth ability. We divide political connection into two dimensions, administrative level and administrative authority, analyze the effect of each dimension on enterprise growth separately. Furthermore, it combined with the strategic choices and institutional environment theory, brought in diversification strategy and marketization, expand the research from internal function mechanism and external environment condition. Specifically, this dissertation discussed the following questions:①Will political connection have an influence on enterprise growth? And will different dimensions of political connection produce significant effect on enterprise growth?②How will the internal function mechanism, political connection to enterprise growth, realize? And is there indirect effects step by step?③Whether dose the institutional environment regulate the influence of political connection on enterprise growth, and how?
Based on literature review, we build integrated analysis framework, under diversification strategy perspective, for the relationship between political connection and enterprise growth. Through multiple cases exploratory analysis and large sample empirical analysis, we analyze the internal mechanism and correlation about political connection, diversification strategy, marketization and enterprise growth. Under the framework of resource-strategy-performance, we systematically studied the relationship between political connection and enterprise growth.
After theoretical analysis and empirical confirmation, this research mainly reaches the following conclusion:first, both the longitudinal and horizontal dimensions of political connection play a positive role on enterprise growth, with different affection degree. And the effect that political connection on enterprise growth ability is much better than enterprise management ability. Secondly, diversification strategy plays as intervening variable in the internal mechanism of political connection to enterprise growth. Political connection can improve enterprise's ability of resource acquisition, which made the enterprise resourceful, then using diversification strategy allocated resource to enhance enterprise growth. Thirdly, the influence that political connection affects on enterprise growth is direct and indirect. The direct way is like political connection-enterprise growth, and the indirect way is connection-diversification strategy-enterprise growth. With improving enterprise's ability of resource acquisition and decision making quality of operation, political connection double support enterprise growth. Finally, marketization plays a negative role in the relationship between political connection and enterprise growth. The less marketization the area is, the stronger the effect that political connection on enterprise growth is.
The conclusions above deepen the understanding of the influence that political connection on enterprise growth, make a great exploration in the related research area. The innovations of this dissertation reflects in the following five aspects:①Discussed the influence that political connection on enterprise dynamic development ability, analyze the intrinsic value of political connection, and made a valuable complement in this research area.②Creatively divided the political connection into two dimensions, longitudinal dimension and horizontal dimension, studied the effects that each dimension has on enterprise growth separately, and improved the measurement system of political connection.③Build and proved two analysis models, political connection-enterprise growth and connection-diversification strategy-enterprise growth, pointed out that the influence that political connection on enterprise growth is both direct and indirect, and concluded the mechanism that political connection on enterprise growth.④Exposited that political connection place different effects on enterprise growth under different marketization, which may provide an inspiration or reference for both enterprise and government.⑤specifically explained the influence mechanism that political connection on diversification strategy, studied the relationship between top manager and diversification strategy in the perspective of upper echelons theory and social capital theory, expanded the study field of motivation theory in diversification.
Of course, regardless of some academic attainments, the study still remains many Shortcomings.In the last part of this dissertaion, the author presents the limitations of this study and several issues that need to be studied in the future.
为此,本研究对政治关联与企业成长性的关联进行讨论,不仅考察了政治关联对企业静态经营能力的影响,更探究了政治关联对企业动态增长能力作用。同时将政治关联分成纵向和横向两个维度,即行政层级和行政职权,分析不同层面政治关联对企业成长性的不同影响。此外,本文结合战略选择与制度环境理论,引入多元化战略与市场化程度两个因素,对政治关联与企业成长性这一研究主题从内部路径机理和外部环境制约两个角度进行了拓展研究。总体来看,本文就以下问题进行了深入探讨：①政治关联对企业成长性是否具有影响?政治关联的不同维度是否对成长性产生显著影响；②政治关联对企业成长性作用的路径如何,政治关联是否分布的间接影响企业成长性；③制度环境是否对政治关联与企业成长性的关联关系起到一定作用,如何影响。
本文在对相关文献梳理与归纳的基础上,通过多案例探索性研究和大样本实证的分析,在资源基础观的视角下构建了政治关联与企业成长性关系的理论框架,并依据“资源——战略——绩效”的框架,系统梳理了政治关联、多元化战略、市场化程度和企业成长性之间的内在机理和影响关系,形成了政治关联对企业成长性作用的多层次研究体系。
通过理论分析和实证检验,本研究主要得到以下四个方面的结论：首先,政治关联的纵向强度和横向强度均对企业成长性具有积极的正向驱动作用,但影响程度有所不同,同时政治关联对企业增长能力的影响显著高于对企业经营能力的影响；其次,多元化战略在政治关联对企业成长性的作用机制中发挥着重要的中介作用,政治关联能够提升企业资源获取的能力,使企业资源更为丰富,通过多元化战略对资源的有效配置,进而提升企业成长性；再次,政治关联对企业成长性存在两条路径,即“政治关联——企业成长性”的直接影响路径,以及“政治关联——多元化战略——企业成长性”的间接影响路径,通过经营战略决策质量和外部资源获取能力的提高,政治关联为企业成长性提供了双重动力；最后,市场化程度在政治关联和企业成长性之间起到了负向调节作用,在市场化程度越低的地区,政治关联对企业成长性的作用越显著。
上述研究结论深化了对政治关联与企业成长性关系内涵的理解,在政治关联研究领域进行了较为深入的拓展。本文主要有以下三个创新之处：①创新性地将政治关联划分为纵向和横向两个维度,探究政治关联的不同维度对企业成长性影响的本质过程,完善了政治关联的衡量体系；②构建了政治关联对企业成长性影响的两条路径,即“政治关联——企业成长性”的直接影响路径,以及“政治关联——多元化战略——企业成长性”的间接影响路径,系统地揭示了政治关联对企业成长性作用机理；③充分揭示了政治关联在不同市场化程度调节下对企业成长性影响机制的差异,该研究所得能够为企业提供实践启示,为政府提供决策参考。
诚然,囿于本人的研究水平,本文还存在着有待完善之处。基于此,本文也在篇幅的最后,提出了本研究的不足之处,同时也对未来的研究进行了展望。
Since the reform and open policy, China has entered into the transformation period, from Planned economy to Market economy, with governmental function changing gradually. However, the political system here makes China a Strong government, and it plays quite an important part in resource allocation. As Non-market system has been proved inefficiency and inequality, enterprise always seek to build political connection with the government to obtain more resource and avoid risk that from environmental uncertainty during the transformation period. In China, political connection is common. Recently, entrepreneurs are positive for political position, such as NPC member, CPPCC Members, etc. (Chen et al,2005; Hu,2006) or hire someone with government background. Meanwhile, it is common for government officials to set up enterprise, or be appointed as corporate executives. It is thus clear that political position has an important impact in the development of enterprise under our special institutional environment. In Academia, political position, as an emerging field, is far from perfect, and many research need to be done, especially in China's institutional environment. The current study pays much attention to the relationship between political position and enterprise performance improvement. Nevertheless, due to the limitation of study angle and method, there is not a consensus. In addition, study on the effect mechanism between political position and enterprise performance are deficiency, and existing research hasn't place political position in Chinese institutional environment. Therefore, related issues need to be further studied.
This dissertation discussed the relevance between political connection and enterprise growth, studied the influence of political connection on enterprise static management ability and enterprise dynamic growth ability. We divide political connection into two dimensions, administrative level and administrative authority, analyze the effect of each dimension on enterprise growth separately. Furthermore, it combined with the strategic choices and institutional environment theory, brought in diversification strategy and marketization, expand the research from internal function mechanism and external environment condition. Specifically, this dissertation discussed the following questions:①Will political connection have an influence on enterprise growth? And will different dimensions of political connection produce significant effect on enterprise growth?②How will the internal function mechanism, political connection to enterprise growth, realize? And is there indirect effects step by step?③Whether dose the institutional environment regulate the influence of political connection on enterprise growth, and how?
Based on literature review, we build integrated analysis framework, under diversification strategy perspective, for the relationship between political connection and enterprise growth. Through multiple cases exploratory analysis and large sample empirical analysis, we analyze the internal mechanism and correlation about political connection, diversification strategy, marketization and enterprise growth. Under the framework of resource-strategy-performance, we systematically studied the relationship between political connection and enterprise growth.
After theoretical analysis and empirical confirmation, this research mainly reaches the following conclusion:first, both the longitudinal and horizontal dimensions of political connection play a positive role on enterprise growth, with different affection degree. And the effect that political connection on enterprise growth ability is much better than enterprise management ability. Secondly, diversification strategy plays as intervening variable in the internal mechanism of political connection to enterprise growth. Political connection can improve enterprise's ability of resource acquisition, which made the enterprise resourceful, then using diversification strategy allocated resource to enhance enterprise growth. Thirdly, the influence that political connection affects on enterprise growth is direct and indirect. The direct way is like political connection-enterprise growth, and the indirect way is connection-diversification strategy-enterprise growth. With improving enterprise's ability of resource acquisition and decision making quality of operation, political connection double support enterprise growth. Finally, marketization plays a negative role in the relationship between political connection and enterprise growth. The less marketization the area is, the stronger the effect that political connection on enterprise growth is.
The conclusions above deepen the understanding of the influence that political connection on enterprise growth, make a great exploration in the related research area. The innovations of this dissertation reflects in the following five aspects:①Discussed the influence that political connection on enterprise dynamic development ability, analyze the intrinsic value of political connection, and made a valuable complement in this research area.②Creatively divided the political connection into two dimensions, longitudinal dimension and horizontal dimension, studied the effects that each dimension has on enterprise growth separately, and improved the measurement system of political connection.③Build and proved two analysis models, political connection-enterprise growth and connection-diversification strategy-enterprise growth, pointed out that the influence that political connection on enterprise growth is both direct and indirect, and concluded the mechanism that political connection on enterprise growth.④Exposited that political connection place different effects on enterprise growth under different marketization, which may provide an inspiration or reference for both enterprise and government.⑤specifically explained the influence mechanism that political connection on diversification strategy, studied the relationship between top manager and diversification strategy in the perspective of upper echelons theory and social capital theory, expanded the study field of motivation theory in diversification.
Of course, regardless of some academic attainments, the study still remains many Shortcomings.In the last part of this dissertaion, the author presents the limitations of this study and several issues that need to be studied in the future.
引文
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