中国农户私人借贷与农村经济发展问题研究
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摘要
金融在经济发展中的作用一直备受争议。积极的研究观点认为金融发展不仅可以通过平滑消费机制提高家庭福利,而且可以通过杠杆原理撬动企业的投资,进而有助于经济发展。消极的研究观点认为正规金融存在信贷约束,使得享受不到金融服务的贫困家庭或者中小企业缩减投资,经济发展受限。长此以往,易形成恶性循环。越贫困,越得不到融资,就更加贫困,产生“贫困陷阱”,最终导致贫富两极分化。与此观点相悖,积极的研究认为金融对经济发展的消极影响并不严重,因为传统的信贷约束论的研究忽略了民间金融市场的作用,受到信贷约束抑制的中小企业或者贫困家庭往往可以进入民间借贷市场。然而,由于民间金融市场缺少监管,缺乏规范,统计数据困难,其对经济发展的作用难以直接衡量。因此,上述争议仍是学术界和政府关注的热点问题。
本文利用中国两个最新的微观家庭金融调查的数据库,2011年西南财经大学的“中国家庭金融调查”以及2009年北京大学国家发展研究院的“农村金融调查”,以家庭之间的借贷为研究对象,系统性地检验了民间金融市场发展在我国农村经济发展中的作用(对消费和农业生产的影响),以及存在的问题(民间信贷约束,利率两极分化)。
该研究发现：
(1)正规金融通过增加农业生产投入、或者降低定期储蓄的持有来提高总支出水平。同时,农户总支出的增长是依靠教育投资的增加、而非食品消费所拉动的,长期而言,银行贷款对提高农户福利水平具有显著的促进作用。然而,民问融资在农户生产性投资和非生产性支出的相互抵消作用,类似于“拆东墙、补西墙”的机制,对提高农户总福利水平的作用不明显。
(2)与正规金融发展类似,农村民间借贷市场存在信贷约束问题。由于穷人没有额外的资本投资于社会资本,融资渠道受限。与最富的25%的农户相比,最穷的25%无法得到民间借贷。即民间金融市场依然存在信贷约束问题,相对于富人而言,穷人得到民间借贷的可能性较低。受到正规金融信贷约束的农户,该影响尤为严重。在正规、非正规金融双重信贷约束的制约下,贫困农户利用金融杠杆摆脱贫困的难度较大。
(3)不仅穷人会受到民间借贷市场的融资约束,即使穷人可以得到借款,也会因为其不能成为富人的社会资本,或者违约风险较高等因素,不得不向富人支付高额利率。较低收入的阶层不仅在正规金融机构受到“歧视”,同时在民间资本市场也得不到“优待”。因此,相对较穷的农户更多时候可能会因高息而不得不放弃有利可图的生产投资项目,这就可能产生“贫困陷阱”,——穷人越来越穷,富人越来越富,贫富差距将会被扩大。进一步佐证了要点(1)和(2)的研究结论。
(4)除了民间借贷融资方式外,农户往往采用信用交易方式来弥补正规、非正规金融的信贷约束问题。说明金融市场和土地租赁市场存在链接关系,农户在两个市场上的需求需要同时被满足,才能进行交易,进而实现扩大农业生产的可能。
推演本文研究结论可以发现,与正规金融市场发展特点相同,民间金融市场仍存在信贷约束,不能缓解贫困农户借款难的困境。与正规金融市场不同,民间借贷对于提高农户福利水平的作用有限,由于收入分层是导致民间利率两极分化的主要因素,使得民间借贷很可能导致“贫困陷阱”。然而,与民间借贷相比,民间的信用交易对于缓解农户融资难问题,促进土地流转,增加农民收入的作用更为显著。
本文的创新点有三个方面,也是主要贡献：
首先,研究问题的创新,包括三个方面：
(1)肯定了民间借贷市场存在准入门槛。给定存在正规信贷约束的市场环境,最穷的25%的农户在民间借贷市场上仍存在融资难的问题。
(2)收入分层是导致民间借贷利率较高的主要因素。从民间资本定价的角度回答了“人以群分”融资特点背后的原因。
(3)首次验证了金融市场和耕地租赁市场的链接关系。农户在土地租赁过程中采用的信用交易的主要目的是缓解其在农业生产过程中融资难的困境,进而扩大生产实现“家庭农场”。这三个研究发现为金融经济发展理论填补研究空白,扩展了民间金融对农村经济发展影响的研究边界。
其次,研究数据上也有一定的创新。本文同时选择两个微观数据库,是由作者本人参与的西南财经大学2011年“中国家庭金融调查”；二是北京大学国家发展研究院2009年“农村金融调查”。这两个数据库是最新的,具有代表性的,针对民间金融问题研究最为全面的数据库。这两个数据库各有优势,前者具有全国代表性随机抽样调查,信息比较全面,但在民间金融问题上不够深入；后者仅选择黑龙江、湖南以及云南三个不同地区的随机抽样调研,但关于民间融资层面的问题较为详尽。结合这两个数据库,不仅可以深入分析我国农村民间金融市场的发展规律,同时可以代表我国农村经济发展的最新动态。
最后,在研究方法上,本文的创新不大。主要依据现有计量经济模型,根据实际情况选择适合的估计方法,例如,OLS,Probit,Tobit等估计模型。结合研究问题和数据结果,寻找相应的工具变量,采用两阶段(2SLS)估计法等解决内生性问题。并采用分样本回归,交叉项回归,多种衡量方式,多重分位数阀值定义标准等方法进行稳健性检验,或识别影响路径等。本文在估计方法上唯一的创新点是用风险态度作为财富的工具变量,与金融机构的距离最为银行贷款的工具变量。
由于数据、时间和成本的限制,本文为了突出研究重点,对于下述四点问题的探讨不够深入,存在一定的研究局限,有待进一步讨论和分析：
(1)民间金融发展对于经济行为影响并非是静态的,当期或者前一期的影响未必在当期或者后一期能够体现出来,需要观测滞后几期经济指标才能检测到长期动态的影响规律。
(2)农户的非正规融资途径绝大部分来源于亲朋好友间的借贷,家庭之间的借贷(约占农户民间融资来源的90%以上)足以代表整个农村民间金融市场的发展,但仍有的其它非正规金融组织(约占农户民间融资的2%左右),如典当,私募,合作社(合会),小额贷款,抵押担保,风险投资等其它民间融资值得深入分析和讨论。
(3)本文的研究局限在我国农村地区以及农业层面的经济发展,缺少城镇地区或者工业、服务业层面的例证,使得本文的研究结论并不适用于解释中国整体经济发展。
(4)与其他实证研究的局限相同,本文的研究亦是在给定市场均衡基础上,通过检验市场均衡的一阶条件,观测和总结民间金融和农村经济发展规律。缺少更深层次的分析,例如对二阶均衡条件的检验。
综合上述四点局限,本文的研究结论很可能并不适用于解释我国总体民间金融问题,也不适合解释我国整体经济发展,更不适用于一些特殊案例。因此,请谨慎推广本文的研究结论。
The effects of financial development on the economics are debated by researchers and governors. The positive studies show that credit will increase the households'welfare by smooth consumption mechanism, and will draw more the private investment through leverage mechanism, sum up, the credit market improve the economic development. The negative point, however, argue that the poor households or small-medium enterprises(SEMs) are always constrained by the formal financial market, and they has to reduce the investment even though there are profitable project in order to maintain their basic needs, such as food consumption. Hence, the poor or SEMs are restricted to development. On the long-term, there will be a "vicious-circle". That is, the credit constrained poor will become poorer, the poorer are more hardly to get loan, and then they become poorest, we called it "Poverty Trap". The positive literature debates that the negative effect of formal credit on economics are not too serious, because the constrained households or firms can access to the informal credit market, but they can't find the direct evidence to proof their argument because lack the data. The debating is hot nowadays, especially in China.
This thesis examine whether the informal credit can improve or hinder the economic development of rural China both in direct (informal credit affect on consumption and agricultural investment) and indirect (determination of informal credit constraint and interest rate) perspectives used two newest micro-data sets conducted by China Household Finance Survey (CHFS)2011, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, and Rural Finance Survey (RFS)2009, Peking University.
We find that,
(1) Total expenditure of rural households who can get loan from bank is significantly higher than the credit-constrained households', because non-constrained households will increase agricultural input, investment on education, or decrease the fixed saving holdings. The development of formal credit market increases the rural hoseholds'income significantly. Informal credit, however, affect on the total expenditure is insignificantly, because rural hosehold will reduce their consumption more than agricutral input growth when they borrow forma informal credit market.
(2) Both formal and informal credit market constrain the poorer's accessiabilty. The poor donot have extra money to invest on social capital, which the main determination of rural informal financial market. Comparing with richest25%quantile, the poorest25%quantile can not access to the informal credit market, so they can not draw out the poverty. This effect is more serious for those who are constrained by formal bank.
(3) Income disparity is the main reason of zero-high interest rate. The poor will pay higher interest rate when they borrow from the rich, because they can not become the social capital of rich, or they are more likely to default. The poor are "discriminated" by both formal and informal credit market, hence, the relative poor household has to drop the profitable project, or get lower profit although they can borrow money because the higher interest rate.
(4) The rural households always use the trade credit instead of borrowing, when they rent in agricultural lands, to break the credit constraint and increase agricultural production. Farmland rental and financial market are interlinkage because the financial constraint.
Deducing our findings, we can conclude that the poor are constrained both in formal and informal financial market, and have to pay higher interest rate than rich control the profit and risk of project. Only formal loan, but not informal borrowing can increase the total expenditure of rural households, and both formal and informal financial market may explain the poverty trap in rural China. However, the trade credit in farmland rental market affect on the agricultural development significantly positive. These conclude provide the derict evidences for rural firmanice and economic reform.
This thesis contributes to the literatures at three pespectives:
First, we have three new findings which ignored by previous studies.
(1) We confirm that the informal credit market also has the lower boundary to entry. Given the formal financial under-development, the poorest25quatile are hardly to finance from informal market.
(2) Income disparity is one of main reasons that the informal interest rate distribute from zero to usery, which explains why poor borrow from poor from the perspective of informal capital pricing.
(3) We test the relationship between financial market and farmland rental market, and proof that they are interlikage firstly because the farmer uses trade credit to break the financial constraint.
Second, this study uses the two, represented and specialized newest data sets of rural China.these two data sets have advantage and disadwantage respectively. CHFS2011samples are seltected of China randomly, intesitagte the assets, debt, income and expenditures of households, but can not analysis thn informal credit deeply. RFS2009is a specialized survey, which samples are seltected in Heilongjiang, Hunan and Yunnnan province of rural China randomly, but intesitagte the detail information both in formal and informal credit market. Hence, we can find the pattern and understand the informal credit effect on the rural economics when combine these two data in this thesis.
Third, we do not use more creative methold to estimation our hypothsis. We only select the stiuable economictrica model, such as, OLS, Probit or Tobit model, to extimate the empirical framework according the data structure and reality problem. We use the distance to bank, risk attitude as instrument variables of formal loan and wealfare respectively, to slove the endogeneity problem. Moreover, we try to use different measurments and thresholds to re-regress baseline models as robustness check, and conduct interaction term, or sub-sample regression to test the mechanisum.
This thesis are limited by time and cost, there are four issues need to further discussion in the future:
(1) Informal finance effect on the economics are dynamic, not static, the cross-sectional data can't capture the long-term effect.
(2) This work only test the informal borrowing and trade credit effect, do not analysis other informal type, although it is only2%of rural households'informal borrowing sorce. e.g., small loan company, internet finance, etc., affects on the rural economics casued by the data limitation.
(3) The object of our study is to test whether the informal credit reduce the poverty in rural area, this concludes can not extended to the industrial sector, or urban area.
(4) This paper donot test the second order condition according the cross-sectional data, but we provide the first order condition of financial market equilibrium.
This work can not explain the informal credit market and economic development pattern of China, but rural area, and it is not used to understand some special case. Please careful to extend the conclusion.
本文利用中国两个最新的微观家庭金融调查的数据库,2011年西南财经大学的“中国家庭金融调查”以及2009年北京大学国家发展研究院的“农村金融调查”,以家庭之间的借贷为研究对象,系统性地检验了民间金融市场发展在我国农村经济发展中的作用(对消费和农业生产的影响),以及存在的问题(民间信贷约束,利率两极分化)。
该研究发现：
(1)正规金融通过增加农业生产投入、或者降低定期储蓄的持有来提高总支出水平。同时,农户总支出的增长是依靠教育投资的增加、而非食品消费所拉动的,长期而言,银行贷款对提高农户福利水平具有显著的促进作用。然而,民问融资在农户生产性投资和非生产性支出的相互抵消作用,类似于“拆东墙、补西墙”的机制,对提高农户总福利水平的作用不明显。
(2)与正规金融发展类似,农村民间借贷市场存在信贷约束问题。由于穷人没有额外的资本投资于社会资本,融资渠道受限。与最富的25%的农户相比,最穷的25%无法得到民间借贷。即民间金融市场依然存在信贷约束问题,相对于富人而言,穷人得到民间借贷的可能性较低。受到正规金融信贷约束的农户,该影响尤为严重。在正规、非正规金融双重信贷约束的制约下,贫困农户利用金融杠杆摆脱贫困的难度较大。
(3)不仅穷人会受到民间借贷市场的融资约束,即使穷人可以得到借款,也会因为其不能成为富人的社会资本,或者违约风险较高等因素,不得不向富人支付高额利率。较低收入的阶层不仅在正规金融机构受到“歧视”,同时在民间资本市场也得不到“优待”。因此,相对较穷的农户更多时候可能会因高息而不得不放弃有利可图的生产投资项目,这就可能产生“贫困陷阱”,——穷人越来越穷,富人越来越富,贫富差距将会被扩大。进一步佐证了要点(1)和(2)的研究结论。
(4)除了民间借贷融资方式外,农户往往采用信用交易方式来弥补正规、非正规金融的信贷约束问题。说明金融市场和土地租赁市场存在链接关系,农户在两个市场上的需求需要同时被满足,才能进行交易,进而实现扩大农业生产的可能。
推演本文研究结论可以发现,与正规金融市场发展特点相同,民间金融市场仍存在信贷约束,不能缓解贫困农户借款难的困境。与正规金融市场不同,民间借贷对于提高农户福利水平的作用有限,由于收入分层是导致民间利率两极分化的主要因素,使得民间借贷很可能导致“贫困陷阱”。然而,与民间借贷相比,民间的信用交易对于缓解农户融资难问题,促进土地流转,增加农民收入的作用更为显著。
本文的创新点有三个方面,也是主要贡献：
首先,研究问题的创新,包括三个方面：
(1)肯定了民间借贷市场存在准入门槛。给定存在正规信贷约束的市场环境,最穷的25%的农户在民间借贷市场上仍存在融资难的问题。
(2)收入分层是导致民间借贷利率较高的主要因素。从民间资本定价的角度回答了“人以群分”融资特点背后的原因。
(3)首次验证了金融市场和耕地租赁市场的链接关系。农户在土地租赁过程中采用的信用交易的主要目的是缓解其在农业生产过程中融资难的困境,进而扩大生产实现“家庭农场”。这三个研究发现为金融经济发展理论填补研究空白,扩展了民间金融对农村经济发展影响的研究边界。
其次,研究数据上也有一定的创新。本文同时选择两个微观数据库,是由作者本人参与的西南财经大学2011年“中国家庭金融调查”；二是北京大学国家发展研究院2009年“农村金融调查”。这两个数据库是最新的,具有代表性的,针对民间金融问题研究最为全面的数据库。这两个数据库各有优势,前者具有全国代表性随机抽样调查,信息比较全面,但在民间金融问题上不够深入；后者仅选择黑龙江、湖南以及云南三个不同地区的随机抽样调研,但关于民间融资层面的问题较为详尽。结合这两个数据库,不仅可以深入分析我国农村民间金融市场的发展规律,同时可以代表我国农村经济发展的最新动态。
最后,在研究方法上,本文的创新不大。主要依据现有计量经济模型,根据实际情况选择适合的估计方法,例如,OLS,Probit,Tobit等估计模型。结合研究问题和数据结果,寻找相应的工具变量,采用两阶段(2SLS)估计法等解决内生性问题。并采用分样本回归,交叉项回归,多种衡量方式,多重分位数阀值定义标准等方法进行稳健性检验,或识别影响路径等。本文在估计方法上唯一的创新点是用风险态度作为财富的工具变量,与金融机构的距离最为银行贷款的工具变量。
由于数据、时间和成本的限制,本文为了突出研究重点,对于下述四点问题的探讨不够深入,存在一定的研究局限,有待进一步讨论和分析：
(1)民间金融发展对于经济行为影响并非是静态的,当期或者前一期的影响未必在当期或者后一期能够体现出来,需要观测滞后几期经济指标才能检测到长期动态的影响规律。
(2)农户的非正规融资途径绝大部分来源于亲朋好友间的借贷,家庭之间的借贷(约占农户民间融资来源的90%以上)足以代表整个农村民间金融市场的发展,但仍有的其它非正规金融组织(约占农户民间融资的2%左右),如典当,私募,合作社(合会),小额贷款,抵押担保,风险投资等其它民间融资值得深入分析和讨论。
(3)本文的研究局限在我国农村地区以及农业层面的经济发展,缺少城镇地区或者工业、服务业层面的例证,使得本文的研究结论并不适用于解释中国整体经济发展。
(4)与其他实证研究的局限相同,本文的研究亦是在给定市场均衡基础上,通过检验市场均衡的一阶条件,观测和总结民间金融和农村经济发展规律。缺少更深层次的分析,例如对二阶均衡条件的检验。
综合上述四点局限,本文的研究结论很可能并不适用于解释我国总体民间金融问题,也不适合解释我国整体经济发展,更不适用于一些特殊案例。因此,请谨慎推广本文的研究结论。
The effects of financial development on the economics are debated by researchers and governors. The positive studies show that credit will increase the households'welfare by smooth consumption mechanism, and will draw more the private investment through leverage mechanism, sum up, the credit market improve the economic development. The negative point, however, argue that the poor households or small-medium enterprises(SEMs) are always constrained by the formal financial market, and they has to reduce the investment even though there are profitable project in order to maintain their basic needs, such as food consumption. Hence, the poor or SEMs are restricted to development. On the long-term, there will be a "vicious-circle". That is, the credit constrained poor will become poorer, the poorer are more hardly to get loan, and then they become poorest, we called it "Poverty Trap". The positive literature debates that the negative effect of formal credit on economics are not too serious, because the constrained households or firms can access to the informal credit market, but they can't find the direct evidence to proof their argument because lack the data. The debating is hot nowadays, especially in China.
This thesis examine whether the informal credit can improve or hinder the economic development of rural China both in direct (informal credit affect on consumption and agricultural investment) and indirect (determination of informal credit constraint and interest rate) perspectives used two newest micro-data sets conducted by China Household Finance Survey (CHFS)2011, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, and Rural Finance Survey (RFS)2009, Peking University.
We find that,
(1) Total expenditure of rural households who can get loan from bank is significantly higher than the credit-constrained households', because non-constrained households will increase agricultural input, investment on education, or decrease the fixed saving holdings. The development of formal credit market increases the rural hoseholds'income significantly. Informal credit, however, affect on the total expenditure is insignificantly, because rural hosehold will reduce their consumption more than agricutral input growth when they borrow forma informal credit market.
(2) Both formal and informal credit market constrain the poorer's accessiabilty. The poor donot have extra money to invest on social capital, which the main determination of rural informal financial market. Comparing with richest25%quantile, the poorest25%quantile can not access to the informal credit market, so they can not draw out the poverty. This effect is more serious for those who are constrained by formal bank.
(3) Income disparity is the main reason of zero-high interest rate. The poor will pay higher interest rate when they borrow from the rich, because they can not become the social capital of rich, or they are more likely to default. The poor are "discriminated" by both formal and informal credit market, hence, the relative poor household has to drop the profitable project, or get lower profit although they can borrow money because the higher interest rate.
(4) The rural households always use the trade credit instead of borrowing, when they rent in agricultural lands, to break the credit constraint and increase agricultural production. Farmland rental and financial market are interlinkage because the financial constraint.
Deducing our findings, we can conclude that the poor are constrained both in formal and informal financial market, and have to pay higher interest rate than rich control the profit and risk of project. Only formal loan, but not informal borrowing can increase the total expenditure of rural households, and both formal and informal financial market may explain the poverty trap in rural China. However, the trade credit in farmland rental market affect on the agricultural development significantly positive. These conclude provide the derict evidences for rural firmanice and economic reform.
This thesis contributes to the literatures at three pespectives:
First, we have three new findings which ignored by previous studies.
(1) We confirm that the informal credit market also has the lower boundary to entry. Given the formal financial under-development, the poorest25quatile are hardly to finance from informal market.
(2) Income disparity is one of main reasons that the informal interest rate distribute from zero to usery, which explains why poor borrow from poor from the perspective of informal capital pricing.
(3) We test the relationship between financial market and farmland rental market, and proof that they are interlikage firstly because the farmer uses trade credit to break the financial constraint.
Second, this study uses the two, represented and specialized newest data sets of rural China.these two data sets have advantage and disadwantage respectively. CHFS2011samples are seltected of China randomly, intesitagte the assets, debt, income and expenditures of households, but can not analysis thn informal credit deeply. RFS2009is a specialized survey, which samples are seltected in Heilongjiang, Hunan and Yunnnan province of rural China randomly, but intesitagte the detail information both in formal and informal credit market. Hence, we can find the pattern and understand the informal credit effect on the rural economics when combine these two data in this thesis.
Third, we do not use more creative methold to estimation our hypothsis. We only select the stiuable economictrica model, such as, OLS, Probit or Tobit model, to extimate the empirical framework according the data structure and reality problem. We use the distance to bank, risk attitude as instrument variables of formal loan and wealfare respectively, to slove the endogeneity problem. Moreover, we try to use different measurments and thresholds to re-regress baseline models as robustness check, and conduct interaction term, or sub-sample regression to test the mechanisum.
This thesis are limited by time and cost, there are four issues need to further discussion in the future:
(1) Informal finance effect on the economics are dynamic, not static, the cross-sectional data can't capture the long-term effect.
(2) This work only test the informal borrowing and trade credit effect, do not analysis other informal type, although it is only2%of rural households'informal borrowing sorce. e.g., small loan company, internet finance, etc., affects on the rural economics casued by the data limitation.
(3) The object of our study is to test whether the informal credit reduce the poverty in rural area, this concludes can not extended to the industrial sector, or urban area.
(4) This paper donot test the second order condition according the cross-sectional data, but we provide the first order condition of financial market equilibrium.
This work can not explain the informal credit market and economic development pattern of China, but rural area, and it is not used to understand some special case. Please careful to extend the conclusion.
引文
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