国有产业投资基金的风险管理研究
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摘要
国有产业投资基金作为投资基金的一种重要形式,是支持和发展我国经济的一种重要方式和有效途径。虽然产业投资基金在我国有很好的市场发展前景,但同样存在不可忽视的风险,必须进行必要的风险管理。国有产业投资基金在风险管理方面能力的加强,可以显著地提升基金的管理水平和投资能力,提高其投资的效率和效益,从而在引导社会投资、促进经济结构调整、提高国有经济控制力和国有资产保值增值等方面发挥更大的作用,进一步稳固自身在国民经济中的重要地位。因此,本文对国有产业投资基金的风险管理进行研究具有重大的理论价值和现实意义。
本文以国有产业投资基金风险管理为研究对象,采用系统分析法、实证分析法、计量经济学分析方法,在委托代理理论、博弈理论、灰色理论等理论基础上,对国有产业投资基金投资运作过程中的风险进行研究,并依据国有产业投资基金的投资运作过程将基金的风险管理分为四个阶段,即融资阶段、投资阶段、持股阶段和退出阶段,分析了国有产业投资基金投资运作过程中各阶段的风险因素,提出了相应的风险评估方法与风险控制措施。
在融资阶段,为解决投资者的逆向选择问题,本文基于产业投资家与投资者之间对报酬选择的静态博弈,构建了报酬识别模型,讨论了应如何通过设计报酬识别契约来帮助投资者了解自身实力,选择恰当的产业投资家。同时,为解决产业投资家的道德风险问题,本文在分析产生道德风险的主客观原因基础上,建立了声誉激励约束模型,证明了声誉激励对产业投资家职业生涯发展具有重要影响,并以此作为有效抑制产业投资家道德风险的主要手段。
在投资阶段,为有效进行项目风险管理,本文构建了适合国有产业投资基金的项目风险评估指标体系和灰色多层次项目风险度量模型。项目风险评估指标体系共包括9个一级指标和36个二级指标,其中针对国有产业投资基金的政策投资导向和产业引导作用,增加了政策及产业风险和区域影响力2个一级指标,针对产业投资的投资偏向性,增加了技术创新性,市场前景、管理团队素质、产品市场潜力、产品独特性、退出难易程度等二级指标。此外,针对国有产业投资基金投资决策时特有的寻租风险,本文构建了寻租行为博弈模型,分析了政府设租和被投资企业寻租的成因和过程,提出了防范寻租风险的具体措施。
在持股阶段,为实现被投资企业价值增值,保障产业投资基金的权益,本文结合国内外学者的研究成果,深入研究了持股阶段风险管理中存在的问题,分析了持股阶段的主要风险因素,即企业家委托代理风险和被投资企业的经营风险,提出了国有产业投资基金应通过加强增值服务和监控活动来降低风险,并针对持股阶段的风险管理提出了具体的应对措施。
在退出阶段,本文分析了退出风险产生的原因和风险表现形式,首先针对产业投资基金退出方式的选择,研究了影响退出方式选择的环境因素、被投资企业因素、产业投资基金因素、相关人员态度、退出成本和收益与退出市场容量等六个方面,采用了18个子指标对六个方面的影响因素进行评价,并运用模糊优化选择模型确定了产业投资基金的最优退出方式。其次,针对产业投资基金退出时机的选择,本文研究了影响退出时机选择的环境因素、被投资企业因素、产业投资基金自身因素三个方面,采用了12个子指标对三个方面的影响因素进行评价,并运用模糊综合评分法确定了产业投资基金最优退出时机的选择。
最后,本文对湘江产业投资基金进行案例研究,分阶段提出了有利于我国产业投资基金健康发展的对策建议,进而验证了本文的研究成果,所得研究成果对加强我国产业投资基金风险管理意识,提高风险管理水平以及丰富风险管理实践经验具有一定的现实意义。
State-owned Industrial Investment Fund (IIF) is an innovation financial instrument in capital market. As a main form of Investment Fund, IIF is also one of the significant and effective ways to support and develop a country's economy, especially for China's industrial development and industrial restructuring. State-owned Industrial Investment Fund to strengthen risk management capabilities, will significantly enhance the Fund's management and investment capacity, improve efficiency and effectiveness of their investments, thus to guide social investment, promote economic restructuring and improve the state economy and state control Increasing the value of assets, and further secure its important position in the national economy. Therefore, the theoretical research of State-owned Industrial Investment Fund risk is of great theoretical and practical significance.
In this paper, the theoretical research of State-owned Industrial Investment Fund risk during operation is based on principal-agent theory, game theory and risk management theory. According to the operation process of IIF, this paper divides risk management process into four stages, the financing stage, the investment stage, the holding stage and the exit stage. Then analyze the risk factors of each stage, and correspondingly propose suitable methods of risk assessment and risk control. Finally, conduct empirical analysis by a case study.
In the financing stage, in order to solve the problem of adverse selection of investors, based on industry investment and investor choice between the static game of reward, reward recognition model was constructed to discuss how to identify through the design of compensation contracts to help investors understand their own strength, select the appropriate industry investors.At the same time, in order to solve the industry investor moral hazard problem, the paper analyzes moral hazard on the basis of objective and subjective reasons, to establish a reputation incentive constraint model to prove the reputation incentive to the industry, investors have an important influence career development, and thus industrial investors as an effective inhibition of the primary means of moral hazard.
In the investment stage, the purpose of the effective project risk management, the paper construct the state-owned industrial investment funds for project risk evaluation index system and gray multi-level project risk measurement model. Total project risk evaluation index system including 9-level indicators and 36 secondary indicators, of which investment fund for the policy of state-owned industries and industry guide investment orientation, increasing the risk of policy and industry and regional impact of two-level indicators, Bias against investment in industrial investment, and increase technological innovation, market potential, management team quality, market potential, product uniqueness, ease of exit and other secondary indicators.In addition, investment decisions for the Fund that may occur when the rent-seeking risk, the paper construct the rent-seeking behavior game model, the government invested enterprise set up rents and rent-seeking process of the causes and proposed specific measures to guard against the risk of rent-seeking.
In the holding stage, the purpose of risk management is to focus on the core concept of industrial investment, to help the invested enterprises increase in value, in the mean time safeguarding the interests of IIF, reduce the risk of investment decisions and harvest appropriate profits. This paper analyzes the risks of holding stage, proposed industrial investment fund can reduce risk by enhance value-added services and strengthening supervise measures.
In the exit stage, the main risks are the uncertainty of the external environment and the information asymmetry. In this paper, analyze the causes and forms of exit risk, then study the six factors that influence the exit mode of State-owned Industrial Investment Fund, which are environmental factor, invested enterprises factor, industry investment fund factor, staff attitude factor, exit costs and market capacity factor, and obtain optimal exit mode by using fuzzy optimal selection model. Meanwhile, the paper also analyzes the factors that influence exit time, which are environmental factor, invested enterprises factor and IIF factor, obtain the optimal exit time by using fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method.
Finally, analyze and verify the study above by conduct a case study of xiang jiang Industrial Investment Fund, the research results of this paper are valuable to strengthen the awareness of risk management of industrial investment funds, And it's sincerely hoped that the paper can be useful for the further development of industrial investment fund in China.
本文以国有产业投资基金风险管理为研究对象,采用系统分析法、实证分析法、计量经济学分析方法,在委托代理理论、博弈理论、灰色理论等理论基础上,对国有产业投资基金投资运作过程中的风险进行研究,并依据国有产业投资基金的投资运作过程将基金的风险管理分为四个阶段,即融资阶段、投资阶段、持股阶段和退出阶段,分析了国有产业投资基金投资运作过程中各阶段的风险因素,提出了相应的风险评估方法与风险控制措施。
在融资阶段,为解决投资者的逆向选择问题,本文基于产业投资家与投资者之间对报酬选择的静态博弈,构建了报酬识别模型,讨论了应如何通过设计报酬识别契约来帮助投资者了解自身实力,选择恰当的产业投资家。同时,为解决产业投资家的道德风险问题,本文在分析产生道德风险的主客观原因基础上,建立了声誉激励约束模型,证明了声誉激励对产业投资家职业生涯发展具有重要影响,并以此作为有效抑制产业投资家道德风险的主要手段。
在投资阶段,为有效进行项目风险管理,本文构建了适合国有产业投资基金的项目风险评估指标体系和灰色多层次项目风险度量模型。项目风险评估指标体系共包括9个一级指标和36个二级指标,其中针对国有产业投资基金的政策投资导向和产业引导作用,增加了政策及产业风险和区域影响力2个一级指标,针对产业投资的投资偏向性,增加了技术创新性,市场前景、管理团队素质、产品市场潜力、产品独特性、退出难易程度等二级指标。此外,针对国有产业投资基金投资决策时特有的寻租风险,本文构建了寻租行为博弈模型,分析了政府设租和被投资企业寻租的成因和过程,提出了防范寻租风险的具体措施。
在持股阶段,为实现被投资企业价值增值,保障产业投资基金的权益,本文结合国内外学者的研究成果,深入研究了持股阶段风险管理中存在的问题,分析了持股阶段的主要风险因素,即企业家委托代理风险和被投资企业的经营风险,提出了国有产业投资基金应通过加强增值服务和监控活动来降低风险,并针对持股阶段的风险管理提出了具体的应对措施。
在退出阶段,本文分析了退出风险产生的原因和风险表现形式,首先针对产业投资基金退出方式的选择,研究了影响退出方式选择的环境因素、被投资企业因素、产业投资基金因素、相关人员态度、退出成本和收益与退出市场容量等六个方面,采用了18个子指标对六个方面的影响因素进行评价,并运用模糊优化选择模型确定了产业投资基金的最优退出方式。其次,针对产业投资基金退出时机的选择,本文研究了影响退出时机选择的环境因素、被投资企业因素、产业投资基金自身因素三个方面,采用了12个子指标对三个方面的影响因素进行评价,并运用模糊综合评分法确定了产业投资基金最优退出时机的选择。
最后,本文对湘江产业投资基金进行案例研究,分阶段提出了有利于我国产业投资基金健康发展的对策建议,进而验证了本文的研究成果,所得研究成果对加强我国产业投资基金风险管理意识,提高风险管理水平以及丰富风险管理实践经验具有一定的现实意义。
State-owned Industrial Investment Fund (IIF) is an innovation financial instrument in capital market. As a main form of Investment Fund, IIF is also one of the significant and effective ways to support and develop a country's economy, especially for China's industrial development and industrial restructuring. State-owned Industrial Investment Fund to strengthen risk management capabilities, will significantly enhance the Fund's management and investment capacity, improve efficiency and effectiveness of their investments, thus to guide social investment, promote economic restructuring and improve the state economy and state control Increasing the value of assets, and further secure its important position in the national economy. Therefore, the theoretical research of State-owned Industrial Investment Fund risk is of great theoretical and practical significance.
In this paper, the theoretical research of State-owned Industrial Investment Fund risk during operation is based on principal-agent theory, game theory and risk management theory. According to the operation process of IIF, this paper divides risk management process into four stages, the financing stage, the investment stage, the holding stage and the exit stage. Then analyze the risk factors of each stage, and correspondingly propose suitable methods of risk assessment and risk control. Finally, conduct empirical analysis by a case study.
In the financing stage, in order to solve the problem of adverse selection of investors, based on industry investment and investor choice between the static game of reward, reward recognition model was constructed to discuss how to identify through the design of compensation contracts to help investors understand their own strength, select the appropriate industry investors.At the same time, in order to solve the industry investor moral hazard problem, the paper analyzes moral hazard on the basis of objective and subjective reasons, to establish a reputation incentive constraint model to prove the reputation incentive to the industry, investors have an important influence career development, and thus industrial investors as an effective inhibition of the primary means of moral hazard.
In the investment stage, the purpose of the effective project risk management, the paper construct the state-owned industrial investment funds for project risk evaluation index system and gray multi-level project risk measurement model. Total project risk evaluation index system including 9-level indicators and 36 secondary indicators, of which investment fund for the policy of state-owned industries and industry guide investment orientation, increasing the risk of policy and industry and regional impact of two-level indicators, Bias against investment in industrial investment, and increase technological innovation, market potential, management team quality, market potential, product uniqueness, ease of exit and other secondary indicators.In addition, investment decisions for the Fund that may occur when the rent-seeking risk, the paper construct the rent-seeking behavior game model, the government invested enterprise set up rents and rent-seeking process of the causes and proposed specific measures to guard against the risk of rent-seeking.
In the holding stage, the purpose of risk management is to focus on the core concept of industrial investment, to help the invested enterprises increase in value, in the mean time safeguarding the interests of IIF, reduce the risk of investment decisions and harvest appropriate profits. This paper analyzes the risks of holding stage, proposed industrial investment fund can reduce risk by enhance value-added services and strengthening supervise measures.
In the exit stage, the main risks are the uncertainty of the external environment and the information asymmetry. In this paper, analyze the causes and forms of exit risk, then study the six factors that influence the exit mode of State-owned Industrial Investment Fund, which are environmental factor, invested enterprises factor, industry investment fund factor, staff attitude factor, exit costs and market capacity factor, and obtain optimal exit mode by using fuzzy optimal selection model. Meanwhile, the paper also analyzes the factors that influence exit time, which are environmental factor, invested enterprises factor and IIF factor, obtain the optimal exit time by using fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method.
Finally, analyze and verify the study above by conduct a case study of xiang jiang Industrial Investment Fund, the research results of this paper are valuable to strengthen the awareness of risk management of industrial investment funds, And it's sincerely hoped that the paper can be useful for the further development of industrial investment fund in China.
引文
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