我国上市公司治理风险预警研究
|
摘要
从2001年开始至今,国内外相继发生上市公司财务不实以及知名大公司倒闭、兼并等事件,均与上市公司治理风险有关。《2009年中国上市公司100强公司治理评价报告》,显示这些公司整体治理水平多数“不及格”,由此可见我国上市公司治理风险问题突出。全球金融危机的爆发及蔓延,不但严重的损害和威胁了各国经济的发展和社会的稳定,而且也暴露了原有上市公司治理风险理论以及实践中均具有很多缺陷与不足。上市公司治理风险具有较强的潜伏性和隐蔽性,其爆发是一个’从量变到质变的过程,因此,对上市公司的治理风险进行预警与监控是理论界亟待解决的问题,是上市公司有关利益各方迫切的现实需求。
本文首先通过简要介绍国内外关于上市公司治理风险的研究现状,说明了公司治理风险预警研究的重要性。其次,阐述委托代理理论、信息不对称理论等有关的基础理论,借以深刻剖析公司治理风险产生的根源；之后借鉴国内外公司治理风险的研究成果,结合我国上市公司治理的实际情况,分析影响公司治理风险的因素,初步构建上市公司治理风险预警指标体系。接下来,选取违规公司作为样本,并且将同行业规模相近的入选治理板块的公司作为配对样本,使用配对T检验方法进一步筛选预警指标,再应用Logistic回归方法以及生存分析方法中的时依协变量COX回归将上述筛选过的预警指标进行建模,构建上市公司治理风险预警模型。将经过筛选的预警指标代入模型中,对样本公司进行公司治理风险预警的实证分析,比较两种方法的预测效果,得出结论。
Since 2001, domestic and foreign ensued listed company financial false and well-known companies went bankrupt, merger, all events such as the risks associated with corporate governance of listed company. The 2009 the top 100 listed companies in China corporate governance evaluation report shows that these corporate governance level most are "fail", thus the listed companies in China governance risks of problems. Global financial tsunami outbreak and spread, on the one hand, serious damage and the threat of the various countries'economic development and social stability, on the other hand also exposes the original company governance of listed company risk theory and . practice has many defects and deficiencies. Corporate governance of listed company risk has strong latent and concealment, its outbreak is a process from qualitative change to quantitative change, therefore, to the listed company's management risk early warning and supervision is universally problem to be solved, a listed company related interest parties pressing practical needs.
This thesis firstly briefly introduced the domestic and foreign about corporate governance of listed company risk research situation, which shows the research status of corporate governance risk early warning the importance of the study. Through expounding the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and other relevant basic theory, so as to deeply analyze the causes of corporate governance risks. After considering the research results of corporate governance risk from home and abroad, combined with the actual governance of listed companies in China, analyzes the influential factors of corporate governance risks, preliminarily formed early-warning index system of the governance risk of listed company. Next, select the illegal companies as a sample, and the similar in industry scale management plate company as matching samples, using the paired T test methods for screening early warning index, Then applies Logistic regression method and survival analysis method in the time depended covariance COX regression modeling, constructing the governance of listed company risk early warning model. After the screening of the early-warning index generation going into the model, the sample company for corporate governance risk early-warning empirical analysis, to compare the two methods of prediction effect, draws the conclusion.
本文首先通过简要介绍国内外关于上市公司治理风险的研究现状,说明了公司治理风险预警研究的重要性。其次,阐述委托代理理论、信息不对称理论等有关的基础理论,借以深刻剖析公司治理风险产生的根源；之后借鉴国内外公司治理风险的研究成果,结合我国上市公司治理的实际情况,分析影响公司治理风险的因素,初步构建上市公司治理风险预警指标体系。接下来,选取违规公司作为样本,并且将同行业规模相近的入选治理板块的公司作为配对样本,使用配对T检验方法进一步筛选预警指标,再应用Logistic回归方法以及生存分析方法中的时依协变量COX回归将上述筛选过的预警指标进行建模,构建上市公司治理风险预警模型。将经过筛选的预警指标代入模型中,对样本公司进行公司治理风险预警的实证分析,比较两种方法的预测效果,得出结论。
Since 2001, domestic and foreign ensued listed company financial false and well-known companies went bankrupt, merger, all events such as the risks associated with corporate governance of listed company. The 2009 the top 100 listed companies in China corporate governance evaluation report shows that these corporate governance level most are "fail", thus the listed companies in China governance risks of problems. Global financial tsunami outbreak and spread, on the one hand, serious damage and the threat of the various countries'economic development and social stability, on the other hand also exposes the original company governance of listed company risk theory and . practice has many defects and deficiencies. Corporate governance of listed company risk has strong latent and concealment, its outbreak is a process from qualitative change to quantitative change, therefore, to the listed company's management risk early warning and supervision is universally problem to be solved, a listed company related interest parties pressing practical needs.
This thesis firstly briefly introduced the domestic and foreign about corporate governance of listed company risk research situation, which shows the research status of corporate governance risk early warning the importance of the study. Through expounding the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and other relevant basic theory, so as to deeply analyze the causes of corporate governance risks. After considering the research results of corporate governance risk from home and abroad, combined with the actual governance of listed companies in China, analyzes the influential factors of corporate governance risks, preliminarily formed early-warning index system of the governance risk of listed company. Next, select the illegal companies as a sample, and the similar in industry scale management plate company as matching samples, using the paired T test methods for screening early warning index, Then applies Logistic regression method and survival analysis method in the time depended covariance COX regression modeling, constructing the governance of listed company risk early warning model. After the screening of the early-warning index generation going into the model, the sample company for corporate governance risk early-warning empirical analysis, to compare the two methods of prediction effect, draws the conclusion.
引文
[1]李维安.“问题高管”凸现公司治理风险.南开管理评论,2005(1)：1.
[2]何红渠.中国上市公司治理评价研究：(硕士学位论文).长沙：中南大学,2003.
[3]Shleifer Andrei, Vishny Robert W. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance, 1997(52):737-783.
[4]La Porta, R. Lopez-de-Silanes, F. Shleifer. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):3-27.
[5]谢永珍,徐业坤.公司治理风险相关研究述评.山东大学学报,2009(3)：4143.
[6]Vincent Soltes, Vladimir Penjak. A Sturetuerd Approach to Risk Assessment Using Fuzzy Logic. Rocnik9,2001(5):35-36.
[7]Brunswick Warburg. The Report of Coprorate Govenrnace Analyzer. Journal of Financial Economics,2002(3):5-6.
[8]Deutseh Bank. Coprorate Governance:Implication for Investor. Beyond the Numbers,2004(4): 12.
[9]Jean C. Bedard, Johnstone. Earnings Manipulation Risk, Corporate Governance and Audits' Planning and Pricing Decisions. The Accounting Review,2004(79):277-304.
[10]Oleysa V. Grishcheno, LubomirP, Litov. Private Inofmration Trading and Coprorate Governance in Emerging Markets. http://Pages.setm.nyu.edu/ogrishch/research/CorpGov.Pdf.2006-7.
[11]Germ'an Creamer, Yoav Freund. Predicting Performance and Quantifying Corporate Governance Risk for Latin American ADRS and Banks. Proceedings of the Second IASTED Conefrence, Crete,2000:23-25.
[12]胡强.我国券商治理风险及对策.证券市场导报,2006(1)：36.
[13]李维安,谢永珍.上市公司治理风险预警指标体系的理论分析与实际验证.第四届南开大学公司治理国际研讨会,天津,2007：12.
[14]李维安.公司治理评价体系：衡量治理风险的尺度.资本市场,2009(5)：110-112.
[15]Kose John, LubomirLitov, Bernard Yeung. Corporate Governance and Risk-taking. The Journal of Finance,2008(LXIII):1679-1728.
[16]Claessens, Djankov. Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in East Asia. Policy Research paper, 1999:21-22.
[17]崔蓉.上市公司治理风险的预警机制研究：(硕士学位论文).济南：山东大学,2006.
[18]米恩斯,伯利著.甘华鸣,罗锐韧,蔡如海译.现代公司和私有财产.北京：商务印书馆,2005：28.
[19]储小平,刘清兵.心理所有权理论对职业经理人职务侵占行为的一个解释.管理世界,2005(7)：24-27.
[20]宋光磊,刘红霞.董事会治理风险预警研究—COX模型的构建.山西财经大学学报,2010(4)：76-77.
[21]Mc Mullen, Dorothy. Who Controls East Asian Corporations. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper,1999(No.2054):16-19.
[22]孙静芹.完善上市公司的财务治理防范公司治理风险—从伊利“高管落马”谈起.会计之友,2005(11)：83-84.
[23]M. Ericksonetal, Riccardo Tiscini, Francescadi Donato. The Relation Between Accounting Frauds and Corporate Governance Systems:An Analysis of Recent Scandals. http://ssrn.com /abstract=108662.2006-6.
[24]肖作平.中国上市公司董事会结构分析.财政研究,2008(2)：58-59.
[25]Kenneth E. Scott. The Role of Corporate Governance in Coping with Risks and Unknowns. John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Stanford Law School Working Paper,2008(No.356): 23.
[26]周莉莎.高度关注充分竞争行业国有控股公司的治理风险.http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20 050115/01421296378.shtml.2005-1-15.
[27]刘腾.股东层治理风险与公司绩效的相关性研究.财经界,2007(1)：16-17.
[28]蔡志岳,吴世农.董事会特征影响上市公司违规行为的实证研究.南开管理评论,2007(6)：20-21.
[29]刘彦文.上市公司财务危机预警模型研究：(硕士学位论文).大连：大连理工大学,2009.
[30]钟良,石水平.我国上市公司监事会特征：描述与分析.价值工程,2007(2)：146-147.
[31]李维安,牛建波.中国上市公司经理层治理评价与实证研究.中国工业经济,2004，9(9)：57-58.
[32]张媛媛.我国上市公司经理层治理与公司治理效率关系研究：(硕士学位论文).沈阳：沈阳工业大学,2007.
[33]李俊芳.基于委托-代理关系的研究—探索国有企业的改革方向：(硕士学位论文).成都：西南财经大学,2004.
[34]周丹.委托代理理论的研究及应用：(硕士学位论文).成都：电子科技大学,2006.
[35]杨利娟.信息不对称理论研究.北方经贸,2009(5)：20-21.
[36]陈海琼.基于信息不对称理论的我国上市公司独立审计风险控制研究：(硕士学位论文).成都：四川大学,2005.
[37]李长久.市场信息不对称理论及其意义.经济参考报,2001,5(003)：2.
[38]罗洎.信息不对称条件下现代商业银行信贷风险规避的博弈分析：(硕士学位论文).长沙：湖南大学,2006.
[39]袁安照.道德风险、公司理论及其方法.安徽大学学报,1996(05)：12.
[40]上海证券交易所研究中心.中国公司治理报告(2003).上海：复旦大学出版社,2003：12.
[41]陆志明,何建敏,姜丽莉.基于生存分析模型的企业财务困境预测.统计与决策,2007(21)：175-178.
[42]熊明良.上市公司股权缺陷带来的财务会计问题.石家庄铁路工程技术学院学报,2004,12(3)：64.
[43]孙庆振.关于我国董事会结构现状问题的探讨.魅力中国,2009,10(下)：318-319.
[44]石水平,林斌.上市公司监事会特征及其经营绩效的实证分析.贵州财经学院学报,2007(4)：73-74.
[45]李文娟.中国ST企业的生存分析：(硕士学位论文).厦门：厦门大学,2008.
[46]丁钰鑫.我国上市公司财务风险评价的生存分析模型研究：(硕士学位论文).北京：北京林业大学,2009.
[47]宇传华.SPSSll与统计分析教程.北京：电子二工业出版社,2002：142-145.
[2]何红渠.中国上市公司治理评价研究：(硕士学位论文).长沙：中南大学,2003.
[3]Shleifer Andrei, Vishny Robert W. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance, 1997(52):737-783.
[4]La Porta, R. Lopez-de-Silanes, F. Shleifer. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):3-27.
[5]谢永珍,徐业坤.公司治理风险相关研究述评.山东大学学报,2009(3)：4143.
[6]Vincent Soltes, Vladimir Penjak. A Sturetuerd Approach to Risk Assessment Using Fuzzy Logic. Rocnik9,2001(5):35-36.
[7]Brunswick Warburg. The Report of Coprorate Govenrnace Analyzer. Journal of Financial Economics,2002(3):5-6.
[8]Deutseh Bank. Coprorate Governance:Implication for Investor. Beyond the Numbers,2004(4): 12.
[9]Jean C. Bedard, Johnstone. Earnings Manipulation Risk, Corporate Governance and Audits' Planning and Pricing Decisions. The Accounting Review,2004(79):277-304.
[10]Oleysa V. Grishcheno, LubomirP, Litov. Private Inofmration Trading and Coprorate Governance in Emerging Markets. http://Pages.setm.nyu.edu/ogrishch/research/CorpGov.Pdf.2006-7.
[11]Germ'an Creamer, Yoav Freund. Predicting Performance and Quantifying Corporate Governance Risk for Latin American ADRS and Banks. Proceedings of the Second IASTED Conefrence, Crete,2000:23-25.
[12]胡强.我国券商治理风险及对策.证券市场导报,2006(1)：36.
[13]李维安,谢永珍.上市公司治理风险预警指标体系的理论分析与实际验证.第四届南开大学公司治理国际研讨会,天津,2007：12.
[14]李维安.公司治理评价体系：衡量治理风险的尺度.资本市场,2009(5)：110-112.
[15]Kose John, LubomirLitov, Bernard Yeung. Corporate Governance and Risk-taking. The Journal of Finance,2008(LXIII):1679-1728.
[16]Claessens, Djankov. Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in East Asia. Policy Research paper, 1999:21-22.
[17]崔蓉.上市公司治理风险的预警机制研究：(硕士学位论文).济南：山东大学,2006.
[18]米恩斯,伯利著.甘华鸣,罗锐韧,蔡如海译.现代公司和私有财产.北京：商务印书馆,2005：28.
[19]储小平,刘清兵.心理所有权理论对职业经理人职务侵占行为的一个解释.管理世界,2005(7)：24-27.
[20]宋光磊,刘红霞.董事会治理风险预警研究—COX模型的构建.山西财经大学学报,2010(4)：76-77.
[21]Mc Mullen, Dorothy. Who Controls East Asian Corporations. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper,1999(No.2054):16-19.
[22]孙静芹.完善上市公司的财务治理防范公司治理风险—从伊利“高管落马”谈起.会计之友,2005(11)：83-84.
[23]M. Ericksonetal, Riccardo Tiscini, Francescadi Donato. The Relation Between Accounting Frauds and Corporate Governance Systems:An Analysis of Recent Scandals. http://ssrn.com /abstract=108662.2006-6.
[24]肖作平.中国上市公司董事会结构分析.财政研究,2008(2)：58-59.
[25]Kenneth E. Scott. The Role of Corporate Governance in Coping with Risks and Unknowns. John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Stanford Law School Working Paper,2008(No.356): 23.
[26]周莉莎.高度关注充分竞争行业国有控股公司的治理风险.http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20 050115/01421296378.shtml.2005-1-15.
[27]刘腾.股东层治理风险与公司绩效的相关性研究.财经界,2007(1)：16-17.
[28]蔡志岳,吴世农.董事会特征影响上市公司违规行为的实证研究.南开管理评论,2007(6)：20-21.
[29]刘彦文.上市公司财务危机预警模型研究：(硕士学位论文).大连：大连理工大学,2009.
[30]钟良,石水平.我国上市公司监事会特征：描述与分析.价值工程,2007(2)：146-147.
[31]李维安,牛建波.中国上市公司经理层治理评价与实证研究.中国工业经济,2004，9(9)：57-58.
[32]张媛媛.我国上市公司经理层治理与公司治理效率关系研究：(硕士学位论文).沈阳：沈阳工业大学,2007.
[33]李俊芳.基于委托-代理关系的研究—探索国有企业的改革方向：(硕士学位论文).成都：西南财经大学,2004.
[34]周丹.委托代理理论的研究及应用：(硕士学位论文).成都：电子科技大学,2006.
[35]杨利娟.信息不对称理论研究.北方经贸,2009(5)：20-21.
[36]陈海琼.基于信息不对称理论的我国上市公司独立审计风险控制研究：(硕士学位论文).成都：四川大学,2005.
[37]李长久.市场信息不对称理论及其意义.经济参考报,2001,5(003)：2.
[38]罗洎.信息不对称条件下现代商业银行信贷风险规避的博弈分析：(硕士学位论文).长沙：湖南大学,2006.
[39]袁安照.道德风险、公司理论及其方法.安徽大学学报,1996(05)：12.
[40]上海证券交易所研究中心.中国公司治理报告(2003).上海：复旦大学出版社,2003：12.
[41]陆志明,何建敏,姜丽莉.基于生存分析模型的企业财务困境预测.统计与决策,2007(21)：175-178.
[42]熊明良.上市公司股权缺陷带来的财务会计问题.石家庄铁路工程技术学院学报,2004,12(3)：64.
[43]孙庆振.关于我国董事会结构现状问题的探讨.魅力中国,2009,10(下)：318-319.
[44]石水平,林斌.上市公司监事会特征及其经营绩效的实证分析.贵州财经学院学报,2007(4)：73-74.
[45]李文娟.中国ST企业的生存分析：(硕士学位论文).厦门：厦门大学,2008.
[46]丁钰鑫.我国上市公司财务风险评价的生存分析模型研究：(硕士学位论文).北京：北京林业大学,2009.
[47]宇传华.SPSSll与统计分析教程.北京：电子二工业出版社,2002：142-145.