董事会监督职能研究
详细信息    本馆镜像全文|  推荐本文 |  |   获取CNKI官网全文
摘要
“董事会中心主义”的兴起,表明董事会在公司治理结构中处于核心地位。而加强董事会的监督职能是现代上市公司治理结构一种发展趋势。本文对我国上市公司董事会引入独立董事制度进行了系统研究。在独立董事责任方面,提出了我国立法应该明确规定:独立董事因缺乏注意或勤勉而没有适当履行相应义务以致于损害公司或股东利益时,应当承担连带赔偿责任。在独立董事职权方面,提出了增加否决权,对公司的重大投资、交易和分配等行为,独立董事应具有一票否决权。在董事会下增设审计委员会、薪酬委员会和提名委员会等专业委员会,这些专业委员会的成员主要或全部由独立董事构成。在独立董事管理方面,提出建立独立董事事务所和独立董事协会,把独立董事的自然人责任转化为法人责任,独立董事以加入事务所的方式执业,其承担责任就有可能组织化。我国专业人士的在商誉体系尚未建立起来的情况下,由事务所和协会直接出面对独立董事的行为加以约束,承担相应的损失赔偿责任。在独立董事激励方面,提出:第一建立物质激励机制,主要是建立报酬激励机制。独立董事的报酬机制,近期内宜采取适度津贴和奖金的办法,在取得一定经验基础上,过渡到固定津贴加奖金加少量股票期权多种组合的报酬激励机制。第二建立精神激励机制,主要是建立声誉激励机制。对独立董事的资质进行考核和认定,发放资格证书,把这一职业看作是具有较高社会地位的高尚职业;对成绩突出、素质高、职业道德良好的独立董事,通过独立董事协会确认为终身独立董事,使他们珍惜自己的声誉和地位;发挥优秀独立董事在独立董事协会中的作用,对授予终身独立董事者,在独立董事协会中,他们对独立董事的资格认定和推荐具有决定权:奖励有突出贡献的独立董事。在独立董事约束方面,提出:建立对独立董事的约束机制。对没有尽职尽责、缺乏努力的独立董事,不能获得相应的奖金和津贴及其他回报。对独立董事的败德行为应在经济上予以制裁并让其承担相应的法律后果。建立对独立董事的淘汰机制。通过独立董事的退出机制淘汰那些不称职的独立董事。独立董事在市场上失败,在他的职业生涯中应记载失败记录,有失败记录者在重新谋求到独立董事的职位时应受到限制。在独立董事与监事会协调方面,提出:一是改革监事会的组成结构,引入独立监事。二是扩大监事会的职权。在完善董事会的同时,使监事会能够充分发挥作用。独立董事与监事会在监督方面应各有侧重,功能互补。具有一定的理论价值和现实指导意义。
The rise of "directorate-centrism" indicates that BOD is in the core position of the company management frame. To strengthen the directorate' s function of surveillance is a tendency of the company management frame of modern marketed companies. This thesis conducted a systematic study on the introduct ion of independent directorate system into marketed companies in China. Concerning
    
    the responsibility of independent directorate, it' s proposed that it should he def ini tely stated in legislature that the independent directorate should hear associated compensation obligation where the independent directorate fails to carry out the corresponding obligations because of lacking of attention or diligence so as to cause damage to the benefits of the company or stockholders. Concerning the authority of the independent directorate, it' s proposed that the right of denial should be added to the authority of the independent directorate, that is, the ID should have one-poll-denial right respecting the important investment, transactions and allocating actions of the company. Specialized committees such as auditing committee, payroll committee and nominating committee should be set up under the supervision of the directorate, whose members are.made up mainly or entirely of independent directorates. Concerning the management of [D, it' s proposed that ID off ice and ID association should be set up so
     as to transform the responsibility of ID as natural person into that of juridical person because once ID executes by attending an office his / her responsibility is then possible to be shifted to that of the organization. The specialists in China restrict the deeds of independent di rectoratos through direct control and supervision of offices and associat ions under the circumstance that the business credit system is not yet established. Concerning the motivation of ID, the following solutions are proposed: I. In establish material motivating system, referring mainly to the remunorat ion-motivation system. The remuneration system for ID should adopt the way of appropriate subsidy plus bonus in short term, and then transfer to a mixed remuneration system with fixed subsidy plus bonus and a few stock rights after having accumulated some experience. II. To establish spiritual motivation
    
    
    system, which refers mainly to the reputation motivation system. To examine and evaluate the independent directorate' s qualification and grant certificates for the qualified ID, regarding this profession as a higher ranked profession with high social position. For those ID with special contribution, excellent qualification, and good professional morality, the ID association should admit them as 1 i felong ID by proper procedure of recognition so as to make them cherish their reputation and position. The excellent ID should be enabled to perform their function in the ID association, the lifelong ID enjoy decision-making rights respecting the qualification recognition and recommendation of ID in the ID association. The ID with prominent contributions should receive awards and encouragement. Concerning the regulating of ID, it' s proposed that a restricting system should be set up to regulate the ID. Those ID who fail to complete their duties or pay little efforts should not receive corresponding bonus, subsid
    ies or other remunerations. The ID who conducts immoral deeds should be punished financially and bear corresponding legal aftermath. A select ing-out system should be set up to apply to the ID management. The disqualified ID should be sifted out through the selecting-out system. A failure record should be put to the ID' s career file where he /she fails in the market. Those ID with failure records should be confined in regaining the position of ID. Concerning the coordination between ID and surveillance board, two suggestions are proposed: I. To improve the structure of the surveillance board by introducing independent surveillance. II, To enlarge the authority of the surveillance board. These measures are to enable the surveillance boar
引文
[1] 江平主编:《新编公司法教程》,法律出版社,1994.
    [2] 徐向艺主编:《工业公司管理学》,山东大学出版社,1991.
    [3] 陈东:《英国公司法上的董事“受信义务”》,《比较法研究》,1998(2).
    [4] 束小江、宗延军:《略论美国公司治理结构制度》,《河北法学》,1996(6).
    [5] 马俊驹、聂德宗:《公司法人治理结构的当代发展—兼论我国公司法人治理结构的重构》,《法学研究》,2000(2).
    [6] 范健、蒋大兴著:《公司法论》,南京大学出版社,1997.
    [7] 王保树:《现代股份公司法发展中的几个趋势性问题》,《中国法学》,1992(2).
    [8] 上海证券交易所在2000年11月2日至3日召开的“中国上市公司治理国际研讨会”上提交的《公司治理:国际经验与中国实践》报告中的《公司治理专题报告》,《中国上市公司治理机制与独立董事制度建设》.
    [9] 罗培新、毛玲玲:《公司治理途径-独立董事制度》,《证券市场导报》2001(2).
    [10] 李维安、张俊喜:《公司治理前沿》(第一辑),中国财政经济出版社,2003.
    [11] 胡翊:《公司董事会异化与CMF机制的运用》,《中国经济问题》.2000(2).
    [12] 张民安著:《现代英美董事法律地位研究》,法律出版社,2000.
    [13] 顾功耘:《公司法律评论》(2003年卷),上海人民出版社,2003.
    [14] (美)罗伯特·C·克拉克著,胡平等译:《公司法则》,工商出版社,1999.
    [15] 全美公司董事会联合会蓝带委员会:《董事的职业化和专业素质》,《公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验》,中国人民大学出版社,2000.
    [16] 蒋大兴:《公司法的展开与评判》,法律出版社,2001.
    [17] 梁能主编:《公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验》,中国人民大学出版社,2000.
    [18] 朱羿锟:《上市公司董事会改革研究》,载梁慧星主编:《民商法论丛》第17卷,金桥文化出版社(香港)有限公司2000.
    [19] 卞耀武主编:《当代外国公司法》,法律出版社,1996.
    [20] 刘冠伦:《美国上市公司管治制度近况》,《中外法学》,1998(5).
    [21] 顾功耘:《公司法律评论》(2002年卷),上海人民出版社,2002.
    [22] 梅慎实:《现代公司机关权力构造论(修订本)[M]》,中国法大学出版社,2000
    [23] 徐子桐:《独立董事与监事会的关系架构[J]》,法学(沪),2001,(7)
    [24] 杜景林、卢谌译:《德国股份法·德国有限责任公司法·德国公司改组法·德国参
    
    与决定法》,中国政法大学出版社,2000.
    [25] 赵旭东:《公司法学》,高等教育出版社,2003.
    [26] 杜景林、卢谌译:《德国股份法·德国有限责任公司法·德国公司改组法·德国参与决定法》,中国政法大学出版社,2000.
    [27] E.伯格洛夫(Eric Berglof):《转轨经济中的公司治理结构:理论及其政策含义[M]》,中国经济出版社,1995.
    [28] 包国宪、王永纲:《建立独立董事制度完善公司治理结构[N]》,光明日报,2001-08-28.
    [29] 张民安:《公司法上的利益平衡》,北京大学出版社,2003.
    [30] 梁能主编:《公司治理结构:中国实践与美国的经验[M]》,法律出版社,1997.
    [31] 郑若山:《公司制的异化》,北京大学出版社,2003.
    [32] 石少侠:《公司法教程》,中国政法大学出版社,2002.
    [33] 范永进、李志强:《上市公司发展指南》,上海人民出版社,2003.
    [34] 倪建林:《公司治理结构法律与实践》,法律出版社,2001.
    [35] 吴建斌:《日本公司法规范》,法律出版社,2003.
    [36] 何美欢:《公众公司及其股权证券[M]》,北京大学出版社,1999.
    [37] 王克岭、马立军:《浅淡独立董事在上市公司中的权利与义务[J]》经济问题探索,2001(9).
    [38] 美国投资者责任研究中心:《1997年董事会实务:标准普尔1500家超大型企业的实践》,载于《公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验》,中国人民大学出版社,2000.
    [39] 殷少平:《关于独立董事制度的思考[N]》,中国证券报,2001—04—25(16).
    [40] 梁能:《公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验[M]》,中国人民大学出版社,2000.
    [41] 世界银行:《公司治理结构:一个执行的框架》,1998(8).
    [42] Center for European Policy Studies, Report of a CEPS Working Party: Corporate Governance in Europe, 1995.
    [43] Richard Smerdon: A Practical Guide to Corporate Governance, Sweet & Maxwell, 1998.

© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号

地址:北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编:100083

电话:办公室:(+86 10)66554848;文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新:66554700