后冷战时代联盟政治的多样化
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摘要
这篇论文的灵感源于对在单极世界里如何解释国家行为的困惑,他们是否势均力敌,如果他们势均力敌,那么他们的平衡是属于哪一种或者说在什么条件下会产生这种平衡,这些都是需要进一步探讨的话题。
从新现实主义占据主导地位的理论角度来看,他们认为联盟的形成建立在这样一种假设的基础之上,即在系统层面上大国之间是有可能形成均势的,而增强国家实力、挑战大国权威、意识到威胁的存在或是追求国家利益都是形成平衡的重要因素。例如,现代欧洲联盟体系最重要的特点就是,在多极化的框架内大国联盟是如何通过抗衡一个崛起大国力量或阻止日益强大的霸权威胁来维持现状的。
在冷战期间,二线国家只有选择两极国家站队,而且这种力量平衡的变化不仅是国家间行为,也是美苏两个超级大国争霸的结果。此外,尽管美国是当前秩序中的重要一极,但是除了俄罗斯以外还存在一些主要大国如日本、欧盟和正在崛起的中国,这些都是现实主义者讨论的联盟带来的挑战,尤其是大国和小国之间的联盟重组。
我主要是从非对称联盟体系内小国的角度进行分析,当然不能缺少对美国的研究。我也将前苏联纳入案例之中,并将它和其他一些小国联盟进行比较,发现在非对称联盟体系内似乎存在一些固定的小国间的行为模式。因此,在后冷战时代,非对称性的联盟——当然也包括美国和前苏联,他们模式内的分歧到底是什么?这一疑惑我在论文中也有所提及。在非对称模式中,实力变化如何影响小国的战略选择?在后冷战时代,小国的策略和他们之前有什么不同之处?小国是如何对大国盟友施加影响的?
本文分为六章：第一章：导言；第二章：理论框架,软平衡；第三章：美菲案例；第四章：美韩案例；第五章：俄罗斯和吉尔吉斯斯坦案例和结论。
第一章导言部分提出了论文的主要研究问题,论据,案例选择,研究意义,论文的研究方法和结构。在这篇论文中,我提出两个主要问题：(1)结构的变化是如何影响国家的战略决策的?(2)战后小国联盟的决定是否与美国和苏联有分歧?在非对称权力关系中,小国能否对他们大国盟友施加影响?如果有,战后小国联盟的决策是以什么方式摆脱美国和苏联的束缚的?为了回答这些问题,我探索和应用由罗伯特·帕普和T.V保罗提出的“软平衡”这一概念。
在后冷战时代,反对平衡或霸权主义浪潮的国家挑战着传统的现实主义理论智慧,特别是关于均势和联盟的形成。对于许多现实主义学者来说,均势是不可避免的,而且它也仅仅是其他大国寻求平衡之前的这一时期内所采取的一种方式,即使单极世界也不例外。另一些人则争辩说,国与国之间持久的威胁的存在将会推动各国平衡以维护他们的安全和生存。然而,一些学者认为平衡是不必要的,因为在后冷战时期与美国相比就是实力不对称的,而且也没产生直接的威胁,因此在大国和小国之间进行均势是没有用的。尽管迄今为止的事实上还没有明确的证据显示传统的反对美国的硬权力已经形成,但事实上许多学者都赞成这种平衡类型不同于传统意义上的平衡,即它是软平衡。然而,一些反对软平衡的学者将目光集中于那些有权力操控软权力的大国政治家的身上。
与他们的主张相反,本文指出在后冷战时代,小国也有可能形成软平衡。当小国的领袖们察觉到所面临的既定的国内政治局势下可以最大的获得利益,那么软平衡就发生了。例如,当强烈的公众情绪产生时,如民族主义情绪反对联盟中占据主宰地位的盟友,国家领导人就可以利用软平衡增强自己的合法性基础；或者,当面临政治和经济困难时,政治精英们可以利用软平衡作为反对大国盟友的谈判工具。换句话说,即使在非对称联盟中,小国也可以通过软平衡找到反对老盟友的策略支点,而且政治领袖们也可以利用软平衡来达到维护本国利益的政治目的。
在相关文献综述方面,我首先查找了国际关系中长期争论的大国政治问题。然后,我看了近期解释框架的文献和后冷战时期有交集的国家,尤其是单极秩序下的主要大国的相关方面,并发现一些理论漏洞,这篇文章旨在讨论如何解释当前秩序。我重新考察了近期广受关注的大国之间的软平衡概念,并且把它应用于解释大国与小国之间的关系,这有助于更好地说明小国的行为为什么和怎样挑战传统的国际关系假说。
第二章是本文的理论框架,本文运用软平衡来解释后冷战时期小国的战略行为。软平衡已经被广泛应用到解释单一霸权时代导致国际关系从以前的平衡状态到反对新兴大国或是反对传统硬权力的威胁方面。因此,像许多关于平衡的经典论著论述的一样,软平衡的概念和传统现实主义思想有很多共同要素,并在单极世界中进一步扩展现实主义智慧来解释国家策略行为。为了重新定义软平衡,我首先通过权力平衡的原始概念和它的变异来探究平衡理论的发展：威胁平衡、利益平衡、全方位平衡、硬平衡、和最新的变量—软平衡。文中还分析了不同条件下平衡概念的变化和他们彼此有什么不同。最后,我将从小国的角度来论述在后冷战时期软平衡是如何发挥作用的。
在软平衡重新定义方面,我用软平衡的概念来解释后冷战时代小国应对非对称联盟的策略。外交政策中涉及的软平衡作为一种“非军事”手段限制并影响了大国的决策,从而达成了本国的政治目的。这些策略可能包括与更大联盟的非合作状态,像拒绝或变更军事基地的通道和设施或者帮助另一个大国的军事基地建设用以限制大国盟友在国内的影响。在非对称的双边关系中涉及了小国和弱国,有一种趋势存在就是大国联盟对一些小国事务有相当的影响力。当这种关系更倾向于依靠小国时,这种趋势发生作用的几率就更大一些。
然而,一段时间内,当大国盟友感到不满时,这种影响力就会持续增加。这种不满可能会在反对大国的过程中通过民族主义情绪表现出来,当现任领导人面对可能会对他的声誉甚至会威胁到他的统治地位的国内问题时,政治领导人可能会以反对大国的这一手段来团结民众情绪支持自己的政治主张。此外,小国也可以将软平衡作为蔑视或挑衅大国外交政策的一种手段,从而显示本国的政治领导人在处理内政方面的才能。通过这样做,小国将会在两个方面达到它的政治目的；1)就小国的水平来说,它可以制约强大的盟友对小国的影响,而且可以减少小国对他们的依赖,从而促使小国得到更多的政治决策权。2)就国内政治层面来说,国家领导人可以提高他们的政治形象,并可以动员民族主义者反对他们强大的盟友。因此,软平衡在盟国间权力分配过程中作为一种有效的外交手段,而且也是国内政治领导人获得更多利益的有效杠杆。
第三章探讨第一个案例来支持我的软平衡这一论点：美菲双边关系案例。美国和菲律宾的历史渊源开始于1898年,距今已经超过了一个世纪,这种关系有助于两国的安全联盟和经济的巩固与发展。菲律宾曾经是美国反其他许多具有潜在威胁的大国的基地,而且在冷战期间美国为了达到其战略目的,两国也保持了亲密的关系。然而,随着冷战结束国际环境的改变对他们的“特殊关系”也提出了一些挑战,在阿基诺政府期间终止了他们的军事基地协议,并且他们的关系直到拉莫斯政府中期依旧模棱两可。在这部分,我将介绍他们之间从冷战到冷战结束这段时间的安全协议给彼此的外交政策带来了哪些变化。在这一过程中,我也会系统的提出对以下问题的研究：(1)美菲安全协议的主要目标是什么?(2)在后冷战时代,美菲联盟关系是如何从形影不离演变为奄奄一息?什么因素可以解释他们关系的变化?(3)为什么美菲关系在世纪之交前还处于疏远状态?我认为菲律宾的两届政府(阿基诺和拉莫斯)都被国内的一些因素所限制着,为了维护他们的地位,在与美国抗衡的过程中他们都作出了次佳的战略选择。在本节中我会做如下安排：(1)美菲安全联盟的历史背景；(2)冷战中的间断联盟—阿诺基政府；(3)拉斯莫政府时期模棱两可的美菲联盟。
第四章中所提到的美韩联盟是另一个让人“又爱又恨”的主客关系,他们的联盟可以追溯到二战结束时,当日本输给美国时他不得不放弃对韩国和朝鲜近半个世纪的占领权。即使在这么短的时间内,美韩同盟也形成了并在冷战期间得到了巩固,在政治、经济、安全领域都有所合作,共同的目的就是阻止共产主义的扩散和来自于北朝鲜的潜在威胁。然而,随着冷战高潮的到来,每个国家都重新考虑、发展各自的外交政策,东亚地区也重新定义他们的同盟：从主客关系变为平等的伙伴关系。
冷战结束后,由于长期的一党独裁,他们的关系也变得忽冷忽热,双方想重新谈判其联盟的条件,而且在韩国金大中(1998-2003)和开放国民党的卢武铉(2003-2008)政府时期都是反对美国民主党的。本文将继续回顾后冷战时代美韩联盟关系的转变并对以下问题进行研究：(1)美韩安全同盟的来源?他们联盟的首要目的是什么?(2)为什么美韩同盟会在世纪之交从有共同理想演变为不和谐?促成此种差异的内因和外因分别是什么?(3)朝鲜是如何影响他们的关系的?美韩的同盟关系与如何处理朝鲜的潜在行动是密不可分的。
我认为韩国摇摆不定的行为源于韩国对于他和美国与朝鲜的三边关系持什么态度。金大中和卢武铉政府的进步之处在于更多的考虑了与朝鲜的政策,希望在朝鲜半岛能够缓解北朝鲜的好战情绪。此外,随着韩国的政治、经济、军事实力的增强,并且解决了与美国在这一区域地缘战略的不确定性,汉城已经鼓足勇气摆脱华盛顿的束缚去追求更加独立的外交政策,尤其是在朝鲜问题方面更加明显。然而,这项政策立即引起小布什政府的反对并导致他们的联盟关系变得更加紧张。此外,连续不平等的联盟条约也增加了民族不满情绪的高涨,尤其在年轻
人中引起了反响。卢武铉利用了公众的反美情绪,通过将位于首尔的中央基地迁往更南部的平泽,从而推动美国目前位于韩国心脏部位的军事基地的变迁。通过这样做,他可以利用这些民族主义情绪来反对他的保守派对手,目的是降低他们的政治地位,提高他自己的政治合法性。接下来的几节将如下安排：(1)美韩安全同盟的历史；(2)金大中政府时期的北朝鲜政策及其对美韩同盟的影响；(3)卢武铉政府时期不和谐的美韩同盟关系。
第五章涉及的是俄罗斯与吉尔吉斯斯坦案例。苏联解体后在亚洲和欧洲大陆上出现了一系列新兴国家,在这些国家中,1991年产生五个中亚国家：哈萨克斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦、塔吉克斯坦、土库曼斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦。由于俄罗斯内部遇到了政治、经济困难和地区的霸权的衰落,曾经对中亚地区的影响力也不复存在了。然而,在过去的十年中,俄罗斯试图对他们重新制定外交政策。尽管如此,这些国家外交方针的战略意义也随着地缘环境的变化而受到影响,尤其是美国的“全球战争与恐怖主义”和后来入侵阿富汗,同时也将中亚的地缘战略位置置于美国的华盛顿战略地图中,表现为在乌兹别克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦设置军事基地。因此,这两个事件似乎在这一区域开始了拉锯战,俄罗斯、中国和美国为了政治和经济影响力而进行战争。
由于美国的军事基地位于俄罗斯前领土范围内,之后的一系列事件都令其很不满,因为它认为这些国家仍是其势力范围的一部分。因此,开始的时候俄罗斯还可以勉强的接受,但是后来运用摇摆的外交政策去说服这些国家在其领土范围内摆脱美国的军事基地的影响。这个问题被称为“大国博弈”,这种竞赛的焦点更多的集中在大国身上以及他们如何在政治上轻易的操控弱小国家外交政策的制定。大国的争论忽视了在乌兹别克斯坦国内政治在赞成或者排斥这些军事基地的过程中所扮演的重要角色,并且重新协商了与吉尔吉斯斯坦的部分协定。因此,本节将讨论小国国内政治的变化和政治领导人面临的挑战,尤其是吉尔吉斯斯坦,苏联解体后对他与大靠山—俄罗斯的外交政策有什么影响。
本节讨论了以下问题：(1)面对后苏联时代的变化,像吉尔吉斯斯坦这样的国家在安全、政治和经济方面面临怎样的挑战?政治精英是如何处理这种情况的?(2)在新的外交环境中,吉尔吉斯斯坦的“多边外交”政策是如何在时间上限制并影响俄罗斯的政治精英对外交政策的制定?(3)美国的地缘政治战略即军事基地的建设是如何促使政治精英的目的合法化?吉尔吉斯斯坦的外交政策已经倾向于俄罗斯一方。
然而,911事件后,随着地缘政治的重要性被再次强调,吉尔吉斯斯坦的政治领导人发现在国内层面,吉尔吉斯斯坦的“多边外交”政策不仅能够复苏吉尔吉斯斯坦疲乏的经济,而且对政治精英、他们的家人和亲密朋友的政治篡夺也是有好处的。因此,在阿斯卡尔·阿卡耶夫政权(1991-2005)和巴基耶夫政权(2003-2008)期间,由政治精英提出的,为了本国的利益军事基地的开发与利用也会带来政治、经济和个人的获益。此外,美国军事基地的创建也在反抗俄罗斯的过程中给这两个政治领袖提供了一个讨价还价的杠杆,并制约着俄罗斯对吉尔吉斯斯坦外交的影响力。这个案例会分为三部分：(1)后苏联时代吉尔吉斯斯坦的历史概况;(2)阿斯卡尔·阿卡耶夫的“多边外交”政策；(3)巴基耶夫“多边外交”的延续。
This dissertation was inspired by the bigger puzzle of how to explain state behavior in the unipolar order, whether states conduct balancing or not, and if they do, what kind of balancing occurs and the conditions under which it happens are just some of the issues for further discourse.
From the dominant theoretical perspective of neorealism, they assume that alliance formation through balancing is treated as a predetermined behavior among great powers in the systemic level. Balancing takes place to augment state capacity and balance against a rising power, a perceived threat, or to pursue state's interest. For instance, the modern European system characterized by a multipolar structure typifies how alliances among great powers work to balance against a rising power or threat in order to prevent the rise of a hegemon and thus preserve the status quo.
During the Cold War, second-tier states had only two poles to choose sides with, and the balance of power translated not just into state behavior but also as a consequence due to both the United States and Soviet Union's preponderance in power capacity.. Moreover, while the US endures to be the unipole of the current order, the existence of other major powers aside from Russia such as Japan, the European Union and China, with its re-emergence and as realist scholars argue a rising challenge complicates the question of alliance configuration especially between smaller states and great powers.
I analyse state behaviour from the perspective of smaller states within asymmetric alliances that involves the United States. I also look at the case of the former Soviet Union and its alignment with another smaller state and found out that there seems to be a pattern of behavior among smaller states in asymmetric alliance. Therefore, in the post-Cold War, the divergence in alliance patterns with asymmetric features that involves the United States and the former Soviet Union is a puzzle that I pose in this thesis. How does the change in their asymmetric capacities affect small states strategic behavior? How do small states strategies toward them differ in the post-cold war? Can small states wield influence over their much greater ally?
This dissertation is divided into six chapters:
Chapter I:Introduction; Chapter Ⅱ:Theoretical Framework:Soft Balancing; Chapter III:U.S.-Philippine Case; Chapter Ⅳ:U.S.-South Korea Case; Chapter V: Russia-Kyrgyzstan Case; and Conclusion.
Chapter I:Introduction The first chapter is divided into two sections:the Introduction and Related Literature Review. In the Introduction I pose the dissertation's main research questions, argument, case selection, significance of the study, methodology and structure of thesis. I pose two main questions in this thesis:(1) how does the change in the structure affect states'strategic decision? and,(2) in what ways have small states alliance decisions towards the United States and the Soviet Union diverge in the post-cold war? Can small states wield influence over their much greater ally in asymmetric power relations? If any, in what ways have small states' alliance decisions toward the United States and the Soviet Union diverged after the Cold War? To answer these questions, I explore and apply theoretical concept of "soft balancing" by Robert Pape and T.V. Paul.
Whether states do balancing against or bandwagon with a hegemon in the post-Cold War era challenges conventional wisdom of realist theories, especially with regard to balance of power and alliance formation. For some realist scholars, balance of power is unavoidable and it is just a matter of time before other great powers resort to balancing even in a unipolar world. Others contend that the persistence of perceived threat among states will push states to balance in order to uphold their security and survival. Some scholars, however, argue that balancing is unnecessary because the US in the post-Cold War period is so asymmetric in terms of its capacity and does not pose a direct threat that making balance of power is not helpful for great powers and small states. While it is true that so far, there is no clear evidence of the formation of traditional hard balancing against the US, in actual many scholars are likely to agree that states form a type of balancing different from its traditional meaning, that is—soft balancing. When scholars contend soft balancing, however, they are more likely to focus on the role of great powers as political actors who have more weight to strategically conduct soft balancing.
Contrary to their argument, this paper contends that small states are as likely to form soft balancing in the post-Cold War period. Soft balancing takes place when political leaders of small states perceive that they can maximize their political gains through its use within a given domestic political situation that they face. For instance, state leaders could make use of soft balancing for their own legitimacy when there is strong public sentiment such as nationalism against the preponderant ally; or, political elites could take advantage of soft balancing as a negotiating tool against the bigger ally when confronted with political and economic difficulties.In other words, even in asymmetric alliance, small states could find more strategic leverage against their old allies through the use of soft balancing. And political leaders make use of soft balancing when they could take advantage of it for their own domestic political purposes.
In the Review of Related Literature, I first review major arguments on great power politics in international relations that had framed the on-going debate on the subject. I then review recent literature that explain the structure and interaction of states in the post-Cold War period specifically among great powers in the unipolar order and reflect on some of the theoretical lacunae for which this paper aims to contribute to the discussion on how to explain the current order. In particular, I re-examine the concept of soft balancing among great powers that have gained much attention recently and propose a more inclusive dialogue on the relations between great powers and smaller states in order to present why and how the behavior of small states can pose as a challenge to traditional international relations assumptions in the current period.
Chapter II:Theoretical Framework presents the Theoretical Framework of this dissertation. This paper uses soft balancing to explain small states'strategic behavior in the post-Cold War period. Soft balancing has been widely applied to explain the distinctive features of balancing in the era of a single hegemon led international relations from previous balancing studies that explain states'effort to balance against an emerging great power or threat based on conventional concepts of hard balancing. Like many classical arguments with regards to balancing, therefore, the concept of soft balancing shares core elements with conventional realist thoughts but further extends realist wisdom to account for states'strategic behavior in a unipolar world. In order to arrive at my re-conceptualization of soft balancing, I first explore the development of the balancing theory by looking at the original concept of balance of power and its variants:balance of threat, balance of interest, omnibalancing, hard balancing, and the most recent variant, soft balancing. The paper also analyzes under which conditions these diverse concepts of balancing are used and how they differ from each other. Finally, I discuss how soft balancing has been applied in the post-Cold War period and employ its meaning from small states'perspective. In terms of the reconceptualization of soft balancing, I use the concept of soft balancing-te-explain smaller states' strategic response to asymmetric alliances in the post-Cold War. Soft balancing involves the strategic foreign policy use that is "nonmilitary" means as a way to limit the behavior or influence of the bigger state in order to achieve domestic political purpose. These strategies may include non-cooperation with the bigger ally such as denying or relocating military base access and facilities or inviting another great power's military base to constrain the bigger ally's domestic influence. In asymmetric bilateral relations involving small and weaker states, there is a tendency for the bigger ally to have a considerable domestic influence on the affairs of the smaller states. This happens particularly when the relationship leans more towards dependence on the part of the smaller state.
Overtime, however, this continued influence and assertion by the big ally could turn into discontent or even resentment within the domestic sphere of the smaller partner. This dissatisfaction maybe manifested through nationalistic emotions among the constituents against the bigger state. When incumbent political leaders face a domestic issue that could have negative implications on their reputation or even jeopardize their staying power, political leaders could make use of the issue against the bigger state as a way to rally the people's sentiments and support behind the incumbent leaders. Furthermore, small states can conduct soft balancing as an act of defiance or noncompliance to the bigger ally's foreign policy decisions to show the domestic political leaders'resolve against such imposition. By doing so, the smaller state can achieve its political purpose on two levels:1) in terms of state level, it constrains the influence of the great power ally on the small states and reduce of dependence of the small state on them, thereby resulting in more autonomy with the small states'political decisions; and2) in terms of domestic politics, state leaders can enhance their political image and standing through the mobilization of nationalistic issue against the bigger ally. Thus, soft balancing works not only as a strategic foreign policy response to the change in the distribution of power between allies but also as an effective leverage to advance the domestic political leaders' interests.
Chapter Ⅲ:U.S.-Philippine Case examines the first case study to support my argument on soft balancing:the case of the U.S.-Philippine bilateral relations. The United States and the Philippines shares more than a century of historical relations, starting with the colonial period in early1900s, which contributed to their extensive security alliance and economic relations. The Philippines, which had once hosted of the many strategic bases established by the United States as a measure against any potential aggressive power, has served the U.S. strategic purposes well during the Cold War with the two countries maintaining cordial and close ties. However, the changing environment with the end of the Cold War also presented several challenges to their "special partnership" that resulted in the termination of the military bases agreement during the Aquino administration and their relationship continued to be equivocal right until the mid-term of the Ramos administration. In this section, I will present the security agreements between them from the Cold War up to the end of the Cold War that brought about the shift in each other's foreign policy attitude,
In the course of doing so, I will pose the following research questions to systematically present the case:(1) What was the main objective of the U.S.-Philippine security relations?(2) How did the U.S.-Philippine alliance shifted from one of friendship to moribund relations at the turn of the post-Cold War? What factors can account for the change in their relations? and,(3) Why did the U.S.-Philippine relationship continue to be distant right before the turn of this century? Ⅰ contend that the Philippine government under two administrations (Aquino to Ramos) was constrained by domestic considerations that left them with a second-best strategic choice against the United States in order to keep them in power. I will organize this section in the following:(1) historical background of U.S.-Philippine Security Relations;(2) the (dis)continuity of the Cold War alliance-Aquino Administration; and (3) the ambivalence of the U.S.-Philippine relationship-Ramos administration.
Chapter Ⅳ:U.S.-South Korea Case The U.S.-South Korea alliance relationship is another case of "love-hate" relations between the patron and its client. Their alliance dates back to the end of the Second World War, when Japan lost to the United States and had to give up its almost half a century's colonial occupation of the Korean peninsula. Even with this relative short span of time, U.S.-South Korean relationship has been shaped and strengthened over the course of the Cold War years, from politics, economics and security, with a common aim of preventing the spread of communism and deterring the potential threat of North Korea. With the culmination of the Cold War, however, the evolving strategic circumstances and each country's shifting foreign policy assessments within the East Asian region provided another round of redefining their alliance:from one of patron-client relations to a more equitable partnership.
And as the two countries attempted to renegotiate the conditions of their alliance, it has also blown hot and cold on the certainty of their relationship from the long-held authoritarian ruling party several years after the cold war and after South Korea's transition to the opposition of the United Democratic Party under Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and the Uri Party of Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) administrations. This paper will review the shifting patterns of US-South Korea relations in the post-Cold War era with the following research questions in mind:(1) How did the U.S.-South Korea security relations come about? What was the primary purpose of their alliance?(2) Why did the U.S.-South Korea alliance change from having the same direction to one of discordant relationship at the turn of the century? What external and internal causes prompted such differences? and,(3) How did the North Korean playing card affect their relations? US-South Korea security alliance cannot be separated from the question of how to deal with North Korea's unpredictable actions.
I argue that South Korea's oscillating behavior comes from the country's changing attitude towards the trilateral relations—between the United States and North Korea. The progressive administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun considered more engagement policies with North Korea in the hopes of reducing the North's belligerent policies in the peninsula. Also, with South Korea's political, economic and military enhancements and accomplishments coupled with the United States geopolitical strategic uncertainty in the region, Seoul has mustered the courage to follow a more independent foreign policy course from Washington particularly with regards to the North Korean issue. This policy, however, in several instances contradicted with the United States'views particularly during the second George Bush administration that contributed to their more disagreeable relations. Furthermore, the continued unequal provisions of the alliance treaty led to the rise in the country's national sensitivities especially with the younger generation, and Roh took advantage of the public's seething attitude against the United States to relocate U.S. military presence in the heart of the capital by pushing for the relocation of the central base in Seoul to farther down southern part, Pyungtaek, Kyongki. By doing so, he could use these nationalist sentiments against his conservative opponents in order to downplay their political posture enhance his political legitimacy. The next few sections will be organized as follows:(1) history of U.S.-South Korea Security Relations;(2) the shifting policy towards North Korea and effects on the alliance-Kim Dae-jung Administration; and (3) the discordant U.S.-South Korea relations-Roh Moo-hyun administration.
Chapter Ⅴ:Russia-Kyrgyzstan Case The post-Soviet Union brought about a sequence of newly independent states in the Asian and European continents. Among them, five Central Asian states were born in1991:Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Due to Russia's economic and political troubles at home and the decline of its regional hegemony, Russia's once considerable influence over these Central Asian states had retreated. Over the last decade, however, Russia had tried to reassert its foreign policy sway over them. Nevertheless, the foreign policy strategic interests of these countries have also been affected by the change in geopolitical environment. In particular, the United States' global 'war on terror'and its subsequent invasion of Afghanistan suddenly placed Central Asia's trivial geopolitical position into Washington's strategic map by placing military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Thus, these two incidents started the seeming tug-of-war among great powers in the region—Russia, China and the United States—for political and economic influence.
As the United States positioned its military bases in Russia's former territories, the latter of course was unsatisfied with this turn of event since it still considered these states as part of its sphere of influence. Thus, Russia in the beginning grudgingly accepted but later used its foreign policy sway to convince these states to get rid of the bases in their territories. The problem with the'great power game' contention is that there is too much focus on great powers and how they can easily politically manipulate smaller and weaker states' foreign policy decisions. The argument on great powers' roles neglects the importance of how domestic politics played a crucial role in the decision-making process of consenting to have these bases, rejecting the bases on the part of Uzbekistan, and renegotiating the terms of agreement on the part of Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, this section will discuss how the domestic political changes and challenges facing political leaders of small states particularly in Kyrgyzstan in post-Soviet Union affected their strategic foreign policy towards their bigger patron, Russia.
This section addresses the following questions:(1)In the face of the changes in post-Soviet era, what security, political and economic challenges did small states such as Kyrgyzstan face? How did political elites cope with such situation?(2) How did Kyrgyzstan's multi-vector policy usher in a new kind of diplomacy that for a time worked to limit the influence of Russia on the political elites'foreign policy decisions? (3) How did the United States' geopolitical strategic role of placing military base in the country work for the legitimizing purposes of political elites? The foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan has always leaned towards the side of Russia.
However, with its renewed geopolitical importance after9/11, Kyrgyzstan's political leaders found that on the domestic level, the multi-vector foreign policy working not only to resuscitate Kyrgyzstan's ailing economy but also for the personal usurpation of the political elites, their families and close contacts. Thus, the political, economic and personal gains that the military bases presented was significantly exploited by political elites during the Askar Akaev regime (1991-2005) and Kurmanbek Bakiyev (2005-2010) for domestic self-interests; furthermore, the hosting of U.S. military base gave these two political leaders a bargaining leverage against Russia to constrain its foreign policy influence over Kyrgyzstan. This case will be divided into three parts:(1) historical overview of Kyrgyzstan after post-Soviet Union era;(2) Askar Akaev's "multi-vector policy"; and (3) Kurmanbek Bakiyev's multi-vector policy continuation.
从新现实主义占据主导地位的理论角度来看,他们认为联盟的形成建立在这样一种假设的基础之上,即在系统层面上大国之间是有可能形成均势的,而增强国家实力、挑战大国权威、意识到威胁的存在或是追求国家利益都是形成平衡的重要因素。例如,现代欧洲联盟体系最重要的特点就是,在多极化的框架内大国联盟是如何通过抗衡一个崛起大国力量或阻止日益强大的霸权威胁来维持现状的。
在冷战期间,二线国家只有选择两极国家站队,而且这种力量平衡的变化不仅是国家间行为,也是美苏两个超级大国争霸的结果。此外,尽管美国是当前秩序中的重要一极,但是除了俄罗斯以外还存在一些主要大国如日本、欧盟和正在崛起的中国,这些都是现实主义者讨论的联盟带来的挑战,尤其是大国和小国之间的联盟重组。
我主要是从非对称联盟体系内小国的角度进行分析,当然不能缺少对美国的研究。我也将前苏联纳入案例之中,并将它和其他一些小国联盟进行比较,发现在非对称联盟体系内似乎存在一些固定的小国间的行为模式。因此,在后冷战时代,非对称性的联盟——当然也包括美国和前苏联,他们模式内的分歧到底是什么?这一疑惑我在论文中也有所提及。在非对称模式中,实力变化如何影响小国的战略选择?在后冷战时代,小国的策略和他们之前有什么不同之处?小国是如何对大国盟友施加影响的?
本文分为六章：第一章：导言；第二章：理论框架,软平衡；第三章：美菲案例；第四章：美韩案例；第五章：俄罗斯和吉尔吉斯斯坦案例和结论。
第一章导言部分提出了论文的主要研究问题,论据,案例选择,研究意义,论文的研究方法和结构。在这篇论文中,我提出两个主要问题：(1)结构的变化是如何影响国家的战略决策的?(2)战后小国联盟的决定是否与美国和苏联有分歧?在非对称权力关系中,小国能否对他们大国盟友施加影响?如果有,战后小国联盟的决策是以什么方式摆脱美国和苏联的束缚的?为了回答这些问题,我探索和应用由罗伯特·帕普和T.V保罗提出的“软平衡”这一概念。
在后冷战时代,反对平衡或霸权主义浪潮的国家挑战着传统的现实主义理论智慧,特别是关于均势和联盟的形成。对于许多现实主义学者来说,均势是不可避免的,而且它也仅仅是其他大国寻求平衡之前的这一时期内所采取的一种方式,即使单极世界也不例外。另一些人则争辩说,国与国之间持久的威胁的存在将会推动各国平衡以维护他们的安全和生存。然而,一些学者认为平衡是不必要的,因为在后冷战时期与美国相比就是实力不对称的,而且也没产生直接的威胁,因此在大国和小国之间进行均势是没有用的。尽管迄今为止的事实上还没有明确的证据显示传统的反对美国的硬权力已经形成,但事实上许多学者都赞成这种平衡类型不同于传统意义上的平衡,即它是软平衡。然而,一些反对软平衡的学者将目光集中于那些有权力操控软权力的大国政治家的身上。
与他们的主张相反,本文指出在后冷战时代,小国也有可能形成软平衡。当小国的领袖们察觉到所面临的既定的国内政治局势下可以最大的获得利益,那么软平衡就发生了。例如,当强烈的公众情绪产生时,如民族主义情绪反对联盟中占据主宰地位的盟友,国家领导人就可以利用软平衡增强自己的合法性基础；或者,当面临政治和经济困难时,政治精英们可以利用软平衡作为反对大国盟友的谈判工具。换句话说,即使在非对称联盟中,小国也可以通过软平衡找到反对老盟友的策略支点,而且政治领袖们也可以利用软平衡来达到维护本国利益的政治目的。
在相关文献综述方面,我首先查找了国际关系中长期争论的大国政治问题。然后,我看了近期解释框架的文献和后冷战时期有交集的国家,尤其是单极秩序下的主要大国的相关方面,并发现一些理论漏洞,这篇文章旨在讨论如何解释当前秩序。我重新考察了近期广受关注的大国之间的软平衡概念,并且把它应用于解释大国与小国之间的关系,这有助于更好地说明小国的行为为什么和怎样挑战传统的国际关系假说。
第二章是本文的理论框架,本文运用软平衡来解释后冷战时期小国的战略行为。软平衡已经被广泛应用到解释单一霸权时代导致国际关系从以前的平衡状态到反对新兴大国或是反对传统硬权力的威胁方面。因此,像许多关于平衡的经典论著论述的一样,软平衡的概念和传统现实主义思想有很多共同要素,并在单极世界中进一步扩展现实主义智慧来解释国家策略行为。为了重新定义软平衡,我首先通过权力平衡的原始概念和它的变异来探究平衡理论的发展：威胁平衡、利益平衡、全方位平衡、硬平衡、和最新的变量—软平衡。文中还分析了不同条件下平衡概念的变化和他们彼此有什么不同。最后,我将从小国的角度来论述在后冷战时期软平衡是如何发挥作用的。
在软平衡重新定义方面,我用软平衡的概念来解释后冷战时代小国应对非对称联盟的策略。外交政策中涉及的软平衡作为一种“非军事”手段限制并影响了大国的决策,从而达成了本国的政治目的。这些策略可能包括与更大联盟的非合作状态,像拒绝或变更军事基地的通道和设施或者帮助另一个大国的军事基地建设用以限制大国盟友在国内的影响。在非对称的双边关系中涉及了小国和弱国,有一种趋势存在就是大国联盟对一些小国事务有相当的影响力。当这种关系更倾向于依靠小国时,这种趋势发生作用的几率就更大一些。
然而,一段时间内,当大国盟友感到不满时,这种影响力就会持续增加。这种不满可能会在反对大国的过程中通过民族主义情绪表现出来,当现任领导人面对可能会对他的声誉甚至会威胁到他的统治地位的国内问题时,政治领导人可能会以反对大国的这一手段来团结民众情绪支持自己的政治主张。此外,小国也可以将软平衡作为蔑视或挑衅大国外交政策的一种手段,从而显示本国的政治领导人在处理内政方面的才能。通过这样做,小国将会在两个方面达到它的政治目的；1)就小国的水平来说,它可以制约强大的盟友对小国的影响,而且可以减少小国对他们的依赖,从而促使小国得到更多的政治决策权。2)就国内政治层面来说,国家领导人可以提高他们的政治形象,并可以动员民族主义者反对他们强大的盟友。因此,软平衡在盟国间权力分配过程中作为一种有效的外交手段,而且也是国内政治领导人获得更多利益的有效杠杆。
第三章探讨第一个案例来支持我的软平衡这一论点：美菲双边关系案例。美国和菲律宾的历史渊源开始于1898年,距今已经超过了一个世纪,这种关系有助于两国的安全联盟和经济的巩固与发展。菲律宾曾经是美国反其他许多具有潜在威胁的大国的基地,而且在冷战期间美国为了达到其战略目的,两国也保持了亲密的关系。然而,随着冷战结束国际环境的改变对他们的“特殊关系”也提出了一些挑战,在阿基诺政府期间终止了他们的军事基地协议,并且他们的关系直到拉莫斯政府中期依旧模棱两可。在这部分,我将介绍他们之间从冷战到冷战结束这段时间的安全协议给彼此的外交政策带来了哪些变化。在这一过程中,我也会系统的提出对以下问题的研究：(1)美菲安全协议的主要目标是什么?(2)在后冷战时代,美菲联盟关系是如何从形影不离演变为奄奄一息?什么因素可以解释他们关系的变化?(3)为什么美菲关系在世纪之交前还处于疏远状态?我认为菲律宾的两届政府(阿基诺和拉莫斯)都被国内的一些因素所限制着,为了维护他们的地位,在与美国抗衡的过程中他们都作出了次佳的战略选择。在本节中我会做如下安排：(1)美菲安全联盟的历史背景；(2)冷战中的间断联盟—阿诺基政府；(3)拉斯莫政府时期模棱两可的美菲联盟。
第四章中所提到的美韩联盟是另一个让人“又爱又恨”的主客关系,他们的联盟可以追溯到二战结束时,当日本输给美国时他不得不放弃对韩国和朝鲜近半个世纪的占领权。即使在这么短的时间内,美韩同盟也形成了并在冷战期间得到了巩固,在政治、经济、安全领域都有所合作,共同的目的就是阻止共产主义的扩散和来自于北朝鲜的潜在威胁。然而,随着冷战高潮的到来,每个国家都重新考虑、发展各自的外交政策,东亚地区也重新定义他们的同盟：从主客关系变为平等的伙伴关系。
冷战结束后,由于长期的一党独裁,他们的关系也变得忽冷忽热,双方想重新谈判其联盟的条件,而且在韩国金大中(1998-2003)和开放国民党的卢武铉(2003-2008)政府时期都是反对美国民主党的。本文将继续回顾后冷战时代美韩联盟关系的转变并对以下问题进行研究：(1)美韩安全同盟的来源?他们联盟的首要目的是什么?(2)为什么美韩同盟会在世纪之交从有共同理想演变为不和谐?促成此种差异的内因和外因分别是什么?(3)朝鲜是如何影响他们的关系的?美韩的同盟关系与如何处理朝鲜的潜在行动是密不可分的。
我认为韩国摇摆不定的行为源于韩国对于他和美国与朝鲜的三边关系持什么态度。金大中和卢武铉政府的进步之处在于更多的考虑了与朝鲜的政策,希望在朝鲜半岛能够缓解北朝鲜的好战情绪。此外,随着韩国的政治、经济、军事实力的增强,并且解决了与美国在这一区域地缘战略的不确定性,汉城已经鼓足勇气摆脱华盛顿的束缚去追求更加独立的外交政策,尤其是在朝鲜问题方面更加明显。然而,这项政策立即引起小布什政府的反对并导致他们的联盟关系变得更加紧张。此外,连续不平等的联盟条约也增加了民族不满情绪的高涨,尤其在年轻
人中引起了反响。卢武铉利用了公众的反美情绪,通过将位于首尔的中央基地迁往更南部的平泽,从而推动美国目前位于韩国心脏部位的军事基地的变迁。通过这样做,他可以利用这些民族主义情绪来反对他的保守派对手,目的是降低他们的政治地位,提高他自己的政治合法性。接下来的几节将如下安排：(1)美韩安全同盟的历史；(2)金大中政府时期的北朝鲜政策及其对美韩同盟的影响；(3)卢武铉政府时期不和谐的美韩同盟关系。
第五章涉及的是俄罗斯与吉尔吉斯斯坦案例。苏联解体后在亚洲和欧洲大陆上出现了一系列新兴国家,在这些国家中,1991年产生五个中亚国家：哈萨克斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦、塔吉克斯坦、土库曼斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦。由于俄罗斯内部遇到了政治、经济困难和地区的霸权的衰落,曾经对中亚地区的影响力也不复存在了。然而,在过去的十年中,俄罗斯试图对他们重新制定外交政策。尽管如此,这些国家外交方针的战略意义也随着地缘环境的变化而受到影响,尤其是美国的“全球战争与恐怖主义”和后来入侵阿富汗,同时也将中亚的地缘战略位置置于美国的华盛顿战略地图中,表现为在乌兹别克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦设置军事基地。因此,这两个事件似乎在这一区域开始了拉锯战,俄罗斯、中国和美国为了政治和经济影响力而进行战争。
由于美国的军事基地位于俄罗斯前领土范围内,之后的一系列事件都令其很不满,因为它认为这些国家仍是其势力范围的一部分。因此,开始的时候俄罗斯还可以勉强的接受,但是后来运用摇摆的外交政策去说服这些国家在其领土范围内摆脱美国的军事基地的影响。这个问题被称为“大国博弈”,这种竞赛的焦点更多的集中在大国身上以及他们如何在政治上轻易的操控弱小国家外交政策的制定。大国的争论忽视了在乌兹别克斯坦国内政治在赞成或者排斥这些军事基地的过程中所扮演的重要角色,并且重新协商了与吉尔吉斯斯坦的部分协定。因此,本节将讨论小国国内政治的变化和政治领导人面临的挑战,尤其是吉尔吉斯斯坦,苏联解体后对他与大靠山—俄罗斯的外交政策有什么影响。
本节讨论了以下问题：(1)面对后苏联时代的变化,像吉尔吉斯斯坦这样的国家在安全、政治和经济方面面临怎样的挑战?政治精英是如何处理这种情况的?(2)在新的外交环境中,吉尔吉斯斯坦的“多边外交”政策是如何在时间上限制并影响俄罗斯的政治精英对外交政策的制定?(3)美国的地缘政治战略即军事基地的建设是如何促使政治精英的目的合法化?吉尔吉斯斯坦的外交政策已经倾向于俄罗斯一方。
然而,911事件后,随着地缘政治的重要性被再次强调,吉尔吉斯斯坦的政治领导人发现在国内层面,吉尔吉斯斯坦的“多边外交”政策不仅能够复苏吉尔吉斯斯坦疲乏的经济,而且对政治精英、他们的家人和亲密朋友的政治篡夺也是有好处的。因此,在阿斯卡尔·阿卡耶夫政权(1991-2005)和巴基耶夫政权(2003-2008)期间,由政治精英提出的,为了本国的利益军事基地的开发与利用也会带来政治、经济和个人的获益。此外,美国军事基地的创建也在反抗俄罗斯的过程中给这两个政治领袖提供了一个讨价还价的杠杆,并制约着俄罗斯对吉尔吉斯斯坦外交的影响力。这个案例会分为三部分：(1)后苏联时代吉尔吉斯斯坦的历史概况;(2)阿斯卡尔·阿卡耶夫的“多边外交”政策；(3)巴基耶夫“多边外交”的延续。
This dissertation was inspired by the bigger puzzle of how to explain state behavior in the unipolar order, whether states conduct balancing or not, and if they do, what kind of balancing occurs and the conditions under which it happens are just some of the issues for further discourse.
From the dominant theoretical perspective of neorealism, they assume that alliance formation through balancing is treated as a predetermined behavior among great powers in the systemic level. Balancing takes place to augment state capacity and balance against a rising power, a perceived threat, or to pursue state's interest. For instance, the modern European system characterized by a multipolar structure typifies how alliances among great powers work to balance against a rising power or threat in order to prevent the rise of a hegemon and thus preserve the status quo.
During the Cold War, second-tier states had only two poles to choose sides with, and the balance of power translated not just into state behavior but also as a consequence due to both the United States and Soviet Union's preponderance in power capacity.. Moreover, while the US endures to be the unipole of the current order, the existence of other major powers aside from Russia such as Japan, the European Union and China, with its re-emergence and as realist scholars argue a rising challenge complicates the question of alliance configuration especially between smaller states and great powers.
I analyse state behaviour from the perspective of smaller states within asymmetric alliances that involves the United States. I also look at the case of the former Soviet Union and its alignment with another smaller state and found out that there seems to be a pattern of behavior among smaller states in asymmetric alliance. Therefore, in the post-Cold War, the divergence in alliance patterns with asymmetric features that involves the United States and the former Soviet Union is a puzzle that I pose in this thesis. How does the change in their asymmetric capacities affect small states strategic behavior? How do small states strategies toward them differ in the post-cold war? Can small states wield influence over their much greater ally?
This dissertation is divided into six chapters:
Chapter I:Introduction; Chapter Ⅱ:Theoretical Framework:Soft Balancing; Chapter III:U.S.-Philippine Case; Chapter Ⅳ:U.S.-South Korea Case; Chapter V: Russia-Kyrgyzstan Case; and Conclusion.
Chapter I:Introduction The first chapter is divided into two sections:the Introduction and Related Literature Review. In the Introduction I pose the dissertation's main research questions, argument, case selection, significance of the study, methodology and structure of thesis. I pose two main questions in this thesis:(1) how does the change in the structure affect states'strategic decision? and,(2) in what ways have small states alliance decisions towards the United States and the Soviet Union diverge in the post-cold war? Can small states wield influence over their much greater ally in asymmetric power relations? If any, in what ways have small states' alliance decisions toward the United States and the Soviet Union diverged after the Cold War? To answer these questions, I explore and apply theoretical concept of "soft balancing" by Robert Pape and T.V. Paul.
Whether states do balancing against or bandwagon with a hegemon in the post-Cold War era challenges conventional wisdom of realist theories, especially with regard to balance of power and alliance formation. For some realist scholars, balance of power is unavoidable and it is just a matter of time before other great powers resort to balancing even in a unipolar world. Others contend that the persistence of perceived threat among states will push states to balance in order to uphold their security and survival. Some scholars, however, argue that balancing is unnecessary because the US in the post-Cold War period is so asymmetric in terms of its capacity and does not pose a direct threat that making balance of power is not helpful for great powers and small states. While it is true that so far, there is no clear evidence of the formation of traditional hard balancing against the US, in actual many scholars are likely to agree that states form a type of balancing different from its traditional meaning, that is—soft balancing. When scholars contend soft balancing, however, they are more likely to focus on the role of great powers as political actors who have more weight to strategically conduct soft balancing.
Contrary to their argument, this paper contends that small states are as likely to form soft balancing in the post-Cold War period. Soft balancing takes place when political leaders of small states perceive that they can maximize their political gains through its use within a given domestic political situation that they face. For instance, state leaders could make use of soft balancing for their own legitimacy when there is strong public sentiment such as nationalism against the preponderant ally; or, political elites could take advantage of soft balancing as a negotiating tool against the bigger ally when confronted with political and economic difficulties.In other words, even in asymmetric alliance, small states could find more strategic leverage against their old allies through the use of soft balancing. And political leaders make use of soft balancing when they could take advantage of it for their own domestic political purposes.
In the Review of Related Literature, I first review major arguments on great power politics in international relations that had framed the on-going debate on the subject. I then review recent literature that explain the structure and interaction of states in the post-Cold War period specifically among great powers in the unipolar order and reflect on some of the theoretical lacunae for which this paper aims to contribute to the discussion on how to explain the current order. In particular, I re-examine the concept of soft balancing among great powers that have gained much attention recently and propose a more inclusive dialogue on the relations between great powers and smaller states in order to present why and how the behavior of small states can pose as a challenge to traditional international relations assumptions in the current period.
Chapter II:Theoretical Framework presents the Theoretical Framework of this dissertation. This paper uses soft balancing to explain small states'strategic behavior in the post-Cold War period. Soft balancing has been widely applied to explain the distinctive features of balancing in the era of a single hegemon led international relations from previous balancing studies that explain states'effort to balance against an emerging great power or threat based on conventional concepts of hard balancing. Like many classical arguments with regards to balancing, therefore, the concept of soft balancing shares core elements with conventional realist thoughts but further extends realist wisdom to account for states'strategic behavior in a unipolar world. In order to arrive at my re-conceptualization of soft balancing, I first explore the development of the balancing theory by looking at the original concept of balance of power and its variants:balance of threat, balance of interest, omnibalancing, hard balancing, and the most recent variant, soft balancing. The paper also analyzes under which conditions these diverse concepts of balancing are used and how they differ from each other. Finally, I discuss how soft balancing has been applied in the post-Cold War period and employ its meaning from small states'perspective. In terms of the reconceptualization of soft balancing, I use the concept of soft balancing-te-explain smaller states' strategic response to asymmetric alliances in the post-Cold War. Soft balancing involves the strategic foreign policy use that is "nonmilitary" means as a way to limit the behavior or influence of the bigger state in order to achieve domestic political purpose. These strategies may include non-cooperation with the bigger ally such as denying or relocating military base access and facilities or inviting another great power's military base to constrain the bigger ally's domestic influence. In asymmetric bilateral relations involving small and weaker states, there is a tendency for the bigger ally to have a considerable domestic influence on the affairs of the smaller states. This happens particularly when the relationship leans more towards dependence on the part of the smaller state.
Overtime, however, this continued influence and assertion by the big ally could turn into discontent or even resentment within the domestic sphere of the smaller partner. This dissatisfaction maybe manifested through nationalistic emotions among the constituents against the bigger state. When incumbent political leaders face a domestic issue that could have negative implications on their reputation or even jeopardize their staying power, political leaders could make use of the issue against the bigger state as a way to rally the people's sentiments and support behind the incumbent leaders. Furthermore, small states can conduct soft balancing as an act of defiance or noncompliance to the bigger ally's foreign policy decisions to show the domestic political leaders'resolve against such imposition. By doing so, the smaller state can achieve its political purpose on two levels:1) in terms of state level, it constrains the influence of the great power ally on the small states and reduce of dependence of the small state on them, thereby resulting in more autonomy with the small states'political decisions; and2) in terms of domestic politics, state leaders can enhance their political image and standing through the mobilization of nationalistic issue against the bigger ally. Thus, soft balancing works not only as a strategic foreign policy response to the change in the distribution of power between allies but also as an effective leverage to advance the domestic political leaders' interests.
Chapter Ⅲ:U.S.-Philippine Case examines the first case study to support my argument on soft balancing:the case of the U.S.-Philippine bilateral relations. The United States and the Philippines shares more than a century of historical relations, starting with the colonial period in early1900s, which contributed to their extensive security alliance and economic relations. The Philippines, which had once hosted of the many strategic bases established by the United States as a measure against any potential aggressive power, has served the U.S. strategic purposes well during the Cold War with the two countries maintaining cordial and close ties. However, the changing environment with the end of the Cold War also presented several challenges to their "special partnership" that resulted in the termination of the military bases agreement during the Aquino administration and their relationship continued to be equivocal right until the mid-term of the Ramos administration. In this section, I will present the security agreements between them from the Cold War up to the end of the Cold War that brought about the shift in each other's foreign policy attitude,
In the course of doing so, I will pose the following research questions to systematically present the case:(1) What was the main objective of the U.S.-Philippine security relations?(2) How did the U.S.-Philippine alliance shifted from one of friendship to moribund relations at the turn of the post-Cold War? What factors can account for the change in their relations? and,(3) Why did the U.S.-Philippine relationship continue to be distant right before the turn of this century? Ⅰ contend that the Philippine government under two administrations (Aquino to Ramos) was constrained by domestic considerations that left them with a second-best strategic choice against the United States in order to keep them in power. I will organize this section in the following:(1) historical background of U.S.-Philippine Security Relations;(2) the (dis)continuity of the Cold War alliance-Aquino Administration; and (3) the ambivalence of the U.S.-Philippine relationship-Ramos administration.
Chapter Ⅳ:U.S.-South Korea Case The U.S.-South Korea alliance relationship is another case of "love-hate" relations between the patron and its client. Their alliance dates back to the end of the Second World War, when Japan lost to the United States and had to give up its almost half a century's colonial occupation of the Korean peninsula. Even with this relative short span of time, U.S.-South Korean relationship has been shaped and strengthened over the course of the Cold War years, from politics, economics and security, with a common aim of preventing the spread of communism and deterring the potential threat of North Korea. With the culmination of the Cold War, however, the evolving strategic circumstances and each country's shifting foreign policy assessments within the East Asian region provided another round of redefining their alliance:from one of patron-client relations to a more equitable partnership.
And as the two countries attempted to renegotiate the conditions of their alliance, it has also blown hot and cold on the certainty of their relationship from the long-held authoritarian ruling party several years after the cold war and after South Korea's transition to the opposition of the United Democratic Party under Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and the Uri Party of Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) administrations. This paper will review the shifting patterns of US-South Korea relations in the post-Cold War era with the following research questions in mind:(1) How did the U.S.-South Korea security relations come about? What was the primary purpose of their alliance?(2) Why did the U.S.-South Korea alliance change from having the same direction to one of discordant relationship at the turn of the century? What external and internal causes prompted such differences? and,(3) How did the North Korean playing card affect their relations? US-South Korea security alliance cannot be separated from the question of how to deal with North Korea's unpredictable actions.
I argue that South Korea's oscillating behavior comes from the country's changing attitude towards the trilateral relations—between the United States and North Korea. The progressive administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun considered more engagement policies with North Korea in the hopes of reducing the North's belligerent policies in the peninsula. Also, with South Korea's political, economic and military enhancements and accomplishments coupled with the United States geopolitical strategic uncertainty in the region, Seoul has mustered the courage to follow a more independent foreign policy course from Washington particularly with regards to the North Korean issue. This policy, however, in several instances contradicted with the United States'views particularly during the second George Bush administration that contributed to their more disagreeable relations. Furthermore, the continued unequal provisions of the alliance treaty led to the rise in the country's national sensitivities especially with the younger generation, and Roh took advantage of the public's seething attitude against the United States to relocate U.S. military presence in the heart of the capital by pushing for the relocation of the central base in Seoul to farther down southern part, Pyungtaek, Kyongki. By doing so, he could use these nationalist sentiments against his conservative opponents in order to downplay their political posture enhance his political legitimacy. The next few sections will be organized as follows:(1) history of U.S.-South Korea Security Relations;(2) the shifting policy towards North Korea and effects on the alliance-Kim Dae-jung Administration; and (3) the discordant U.S.-South Korea relations-Roh Moo-hyun administration.
Chapter Ⅴ:Russia-Kyrgyzstan Case The post-Soviet Union brought about a sequence of newly independent states in the Asian and European continents. Among them, five Central Asian states were born in1991:Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Due to Russia's economic and political troubles at home and the decline of its regional hegemony, Russia's once considerable influence over these Central Asian states had retreated. Over the last decade, however, Russia had tried to reassert its foreign policy sway over them. Nevertheless, the foreign policy strategic interests of these countries have also been affected by the change in geopolitical environment. In particular, the United States' global 'war on terror'and its subsequent invasion of Afghanistan suddenly placed Central Asia's trivial geopolitical position into Washington's strategic map by placing military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Thus, these two incidents started the seeming tug-of-war among great powers in the region—Russia, China and the United States—for political and economic influence.
As the United States positioned its military bases in Russia's former territories, the latter of course was unsatisfied with this turn of event since it still considered these states as part of its sphere of influence. Thus, Russia in the beginning grudgingly accepted but later used its foreign policy sway to convince these states to get rid of the bases in their territories. The problem with the'great power game' contention is that there is too much focus on great powers and how they can easily politically manipulate smaller and weaker states' foreign policy decisions. The argument on great powers' roles neglects the importance of how domestic politics played a crucial role in the decision-making process of consenting to have these bases, rejecting the bases on the part of Uzbekistan, and renegotiating the terms of agreement on the part of Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, this section will discuss how the domestic political changes and challenges facing political leaders of small states particularly in Kyrgyzstan in post-Soviet Union affected their strategic foreign policy towards their bigger patron, Russia.
This section addresses the following questions:(1)In the face of the changes in post-Soviet era, what security, political and economic challenges did small states such as Kyrgyzstan face? How did political elites cope with such situation?(2) How did Kyrgyzstan's multi-vector policy usher in a new kind of diplomacy that for a time worked to limit the influence of Russia on the political elites'foreign policy decisions? (3) How did the United States' geopolitical strategic role of placing military base in the country work for the legitimizing purposes of political elites? The foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan has always leaned towards the side of Russia.
However, with its renewed geopolitical importance after9/11, Kyrgyzstan's political leaders found that on the domestic level, the multi-vector foreign policy working not only to resuscitate Kyrgyzstan's ailing economy but also for the personal usurpation of the political elites, their families and close contacts. Thus, the political, economic and personal gains that the military bases presented was significantly exploited by political elites during the Askar Akaev regime (1991-2005) and Kurmanbek Bakiyev (2005-2010) for domestic self-interests; furthermore, the hosting of U.S. military base gave these two political leaders a bargaining leverage against Russia to constrain its foreign policy influence over Kyrgyzstan. This case will be divided into three parts:(1) historical overview of Kyrgyzstan after post-Soviet Union era;(2) Askar Akaev's "multi-vector policy"; and (3) Kurmanbek Bakiyev's multi-vector policy continuation.
引文
1 Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, "Balancing on Land and at Sea:Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?" International Security, Vol.35, No.1 (Summer,2010), pp.7-43.
2 David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics:New Trends versus Old Tendencies," World Politics, Vol. 32, No.2(January,1979), pp.161-194; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion:Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol.17, No.4 (Spring,1993), pp.5-51; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York:Norton,2000; John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future:Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol.15, No.1 (Summer,1990), pp.5-56; Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," International Security, Vol.25, No.1 (Summer,2000) pp.5-41; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Massachusetts:Addison-Wesley,1979. For a discussion of different theories, see Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations:One World, Many Theories," Foreign Policy, No.110 (1998), pp.29-46.
3 Martha Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity:Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be," World Politics, Vol.61, No.1 (January,2009), pp.58-85; G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," World Politics, Vol.61, No.1 (January,2009), pp.1-27; Robert Jervis, "Unipolarity a Structural Perspective," World Politics, Vol.61, No.1 (January,2009), pp.188-213; Nuno P. Monteiro, "Unrest Assured:Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful," International Security, Vol.36, No.3 (Winter 2011/12) pp.9-40; Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," World Politics, Vol.61, No.1 (January,2009), pp.86-120.
1 Jack Levy and William Thompson, "Hegemonic Threats and Great Power Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA (August,2003).
2 For earlier views on the challenge of China, see Richard Berstein and Ross Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America,'" Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, No.2 (March/April,1997), pp.18-32:Qimao Chen, "New Approaches in China's Foreign Policy:The Post-Cold War Era," Asian Survey, Vol.33, No.3, (March,1993), pp.237-251; Thomas Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Affairs, Vol.75, No.5 (September/October,1996), pp.37-52; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry:Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol.18, No.3 (Winter,1993/1994), pp.5-33; John Garver, "China's Push through the South China Sea:The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests," China Quarterly Vol.132 (December,1992), pp.999-1028. For recent views, Rosemary Foot, "Chinese Strategies in a US-hegemonic Global Order:Accommodating and Hedging," International Affairs, Vol.82, No.1 (2006), pp.77-94:Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol.19, No.1 (Summer,1994), pp.149-168:Denny Roy, "The "China Threat" Issue:Major Arguments," Asian Survey, Vol.36, No.8 (August,1996), pp.758-771. For an opposing view of China's potential challenge, see David Kang, "Hierarchy in Asian International Relations: 1300-1900," Asian Security, Vol.1, No.1 (January,2005), pp.53-79; David Kang, "Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations," International Security, Vol.28, No.3 (Winter/Spring, 2003/2004), pp.165-180:David Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong:The Need for New Analytic Frameworks," International Security, Vol.27, No.4 (Spring,2003), pp.57-85; David Lampton, "The Faces of Chinese Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol.86, No.1 (January/February,2007), pp.115-127; Joseph Nye, "China's Re-emergence and the Future of the Asia Pacific," Survival Vol.39, No.4 (Winter,1997), pp.65-79; Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, "After Unipolarity:China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline," International Security, Vol.36, No.1 (Summer,2011), pp.41-72. For a pessimistic view of China's challenge, see Michael Becley, "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure," International Security, Vol.36, No.3 (Winter 2011/12), pp.26-27.
1 Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited:The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," International Security Vol.31, No.2 (Fall,2006), pp.7-41; Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion:Why New Great Powers Will Rise"; John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," The Atlantic, August 1990, pp. 35-50; Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War"; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol.18, No.2 (Fall,1993), pp.44-79.
2 Stephen M. Walt, "Taming American Power," Foreign Affairs, (September/October 2005); Stephen M. Walt, "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation:The Case of Southwest Asia," International Organization, Vol.42, No.2 (Spring,1988), pp.275-316; Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," International Security, Vol.9, No.4 (Spring,1985), pp.3-43.
3 Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, "Still Not Pushing Back:Why the European Union is not Balancing the United States," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.53, No.5 (2009), pp.727-744; Kier A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing:Why the World is not Pushing Back," International Security, Vol.30, Issue 1 (Summer,2005), pp.109-139.
4 Randall L. Schweller, "Unanswered Threats:A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," International Security, Vol.29, No.2 (Fall,2004), pp.159-201; Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit:Bringing the Revisionist State Back in," International Security, Vol.9, No.1 (Summer,1994), pp.72-107.
1 Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World."
2 Robert Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," International Security, Vol.30, No.1 (Summer,2005), pp.7-45; T. V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," International Security, Vol.30, No.1 (Summer, 2005), pp.46-71.
3 For other research studies that propose soft balancing use by small states, see Kai He, "Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory:Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia,'" European Journal of International Studies, Vol.14, No.3 (September,2008), pp.489-518; Kai He and Huiyun Feng, "If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China,'" Security Studies, Vol.17, No.2 (April,2008), pp.363-395:Judith Kelley, "Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing:Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq," International Politics, Vol.42 (2005), pp.153-173; Ilai Saltzman, "Soft Balancing as Foreign Policy:Assessing American Strategy toward Japan in the Interwar Period," Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol.8, Issue 2 (April,2012), pp.131-150:Beth Elise Whitaker, "Soft Balancing among Weak States? Evidence from Africa," International Affairs, Vol.86, Issue 5 (September,2010), pp.1109-1127.
1 Victor Cha, "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia:The United States, Japan, and Korea," International Studies Quarterly, Vol.44, No.2 (June,2000), pp.261-291; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol.30, No.2 (January,1978), pp.167-214; Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol.36, No.4 (1984), pp.461-495.
2 G. John Ikenberry, "Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony," Political Science Quarterly, Vol.104, No. 3 (Autumn,1989), pp.375-400; G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," International Organization, Vol.44, No.3 (Summer,1990), pp.283-315; G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol.23, No.3 (Winter, 1998/1999), pp.43-78:Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing:Why the World is not Pushing Back"; Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing."
1 The cases of the Philippines and South Korea are typical examples of how anti-Americanism as a domestic issue against the U.S. military bases had been often politicized. For a review of the politicization of U.S. military bases, see Daniel P. Aldrich's book review of Base Politics:Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas by Alexander Cooley, Ithaca, New York:Cornell University Press (2008) in Critical Dialogues, Vol.7, No.2 (June, 2009), pp.389-391. See also Alexander Cooley, "Base Politics:Redeploying U.S. Troops," Foreign Affairs (November/December 2005).
2 Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States":Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy."
3 The multi-vector policy was adopted by most post-Soviet States as a way to get more financial aid and investment from Western institutions and states such as the United States. See, for instance, Avinoam Idan and Brenda Shaffer, "The Foreign Policies of Post-Soviet Landlocked States," Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.27, No.3 (2011), pp.241-268.
1 In 1999, President Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan officially announced the country's foreign policy of "the Great Silk Road." See excerpts of translation from the "President of Kyrgyzstan:Our foreign policy doctrine is the Great Silk Road" in the Executive Intelligence Review, Vol.26, No.15 (April,1999), pp.49-52.
1 Jae-Chang Kim, "The New International Order and the US-ROK Alliance," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.15, No.2 (Fall,2003), pp.57-75.
1 He, "Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory:Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia;" Evelyn Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," International Security, Vol.32, No.3 (Winter 2007/08), pp.113-157.
2 For one of earlier discussions on the topic, see for instance Michael N. Barnett and Jack Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments:the case of Egypt,1962-73," International Organization, Vol.45, Issue 3 (June,1991), pp.369-395.
1 Brantly Womack, "How Size Matters:The United States. China and Asymmetry," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.24, No.4 (December,2001), pp.123-150:Brantly Womack, "China and Southeast Asia:Asymmetry, Leadership and Normalcy," Pacific Affairs, Vol.76, No.3 (Winter,2003/2004), pp.529-548.
2 For more discussion, see Victor Cha, "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia:The United States, Japan, and Korea," International Studies Quarterly, Vol.44, No.2 (June,2000), pp.261-291.
1 See Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Why is there No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol.7, No.3 (2007), pp.287-312; Stanley Hoffman, "An American Social Science:International Relations, Daedalus, Vol.106, No.3 (Summer,1977), pp.41-60; Brian Schmidt, "The Historiography of Academic International Relations,"Review of International Studies, Vol.20, No.4 (October,1994), pp.349-367. For a debate on the issue, see Ole Waever, "The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline:American and European Developments in International Relations," International Organization, Vol.52, No. (Autumn,1998), pp.687-727.
1 See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations:The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf,1978, pp.4-15.
2 See noted realist arguments from Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation:A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol.42 (1988), pp.485-508; Joseph M. Grieco, "Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics," in New Thinking in International Relations, Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), Boulder:Westview Press (1997), pp.163-201; Robert Jervis, "Realism in the Study of World Politics," International Organization, Vol.52, No.4 (Autumn,1998), pp.971-991:Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion:Why New Great Powers will Rise"; Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant:The Myth of the Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol.19, No.2 (Autumn,1994), pp.5-49; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War."
3 Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
4 Walt,"Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power."
5 Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit:Bringing the Revisionist State Back In."
6 For other notable studies that look at the importance of domestic politics in international relations, see Barnett and Jack Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments;" G. John Ikenberry, "The State Strategies of International Adjustment," World Politics, Vol.39, No.1 (October,1986), pp.53-77; J. Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets:Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1985; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire:Domestic Politics and International Ambition, New York:Columbia University Press,1991.
1 Inis L, Claude, "The Balance of Power Revisited." Review of International Studies, Vol.15, Special Issue 2 (April,1989), pp.77-85 at p.77.
2 For a classical study, see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society:A Study of Order in World Politics, London: McMillan,1977. For contemporary arguments, see Barry Buzan, "From International System to International Society:Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School," International Organization, Vol.47, No. 3 (1993), pp.327-352; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "The Idea of International System:Theory Meets History," International Political Science Review, Vol.15, No.3 (1994), pp.231-256; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "Reconceptualizing Anarchy:Structural Realism Meets World History," European Journal of International Relations, Vol.2, No.4 (1996), pp.403-438:Richard Little, "Neorealism and the English School:A Methodological, Ontological and Theoretical Reassessment," European Journal of International Studies, Vol.1, No.1 (1995), pp.9-34. For a critique, see Dale C. Copeland, "A Realist Critique of the English School," Review of International Studies, Vol.29, No.3 (2003), pp.427-441.
3 David Kang, China Rising:Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia, New York:Columbia University Press,2007; David Kang, "Hierarchy in Asian International Relations:1300-1900," Asian Security, Vol.1, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.53-79; David Kang, "Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations,'' International Security, Vol.28, No.3 (Winter/Spring,2003/2004), pp.165-180:David Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytic Frameworks," International Security, Vol.27, No.4 (Spring,2003), pp.57-85.
4 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.887.
1 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus, Vol.93, No.3 (Summer,1964), pp.881-909.
2 For a general view of small states behavior, see J. Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets:Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1985; Benjamin Nimer, "Great States, Small States, & the Prospects for International Relations Theory," Polity, Vol.8, No.1 (Autumn 1975), pp.131-146; Amry Vandenbosch, "The Small States in International Politics and Organization," The Journal of Politics, Vol.26, No.2 (May,1964), pp.293-312.
3 Steven David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics, Vol.43, No.2 (January,1991), pp.233-256; Hans Mouritzen, "Tension Between the Strong, and the Strategies of the Weak," Journal of Peace Research, Vol.28, No.2 (May,1991), pp.217-230; Robert L. Rothstein, "Alignment, Nonalignment, and Small Powers: 1945-1965," International Organization, Vol.20, No.3 (Summer,1966), p.397-418. For a review and critique of research on small states''non-alignment;, see Robert Keohane, "Lilliputians" Dilemmas:Small States in International Politics," International Organization, Vol.23, No.2 (Spring,1969), pp.291-310.
4 Rothstein, "Alignment, Nonalignment, and Small Powers:1945-1965," p.409.
5 Richard Ned Lebow, "Small States and Big Alliances," American Political Science Review, Vol.91, No.3 (September,1997), pp.705-709 at p.706.
6 See Steven David, "Explaining Third World Alignment."
7 T. V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts:War Initiation by Weaker Powers, New York:Cambridge University Press, 1994.
8 Jervis, "Unipolarity A Structural Perspective," p.191.
1 Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," p.28.
2 Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, "After Unipolarity:China's Vision of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline," p. 46.
1 Jervis, "Unipolaritv A Structural Perspective," p.195.
2 Beckley, "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure," p.43.
1 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Understanding International Conflicts:An Introduction to Theory and History, Pearson Education, Inc.,2004, pp.191-216.
2 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependence Revisited," International Organization, Vol.41, Issue 4 (Autumn,1987), pp.725-753 at p.731.
3 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependence Revisited," International Organizatio Vol.41, Issue 4 (Autumn,1987), p.727.
4 He and Huiyun Feng, "If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China," p.365.
1 Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order (1998-1999),'" p. 43.
2 Ibid, p.44.
3 Ibid, p.45.
4 Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol.80, No.4, (December 1986), pp.1154-1155; John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Kantian Peace:The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations," World Politics, Vol.52, No.1 (1999), pp.1-37; John M. Owen, "Give Democratic Peace a Chance? How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol.19, No.2 (Autumn,1994), pp.87-125. For some critiques, see David E. Spiro. "Give Democratic Peace a Chance? The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," International Security, Vol.19, No.2 (Autumn,1994), pp.50-86; Thomas Schwartz and Kiron K. Skinner, "The Myth of the Democratic Peace," Orbis, Vol.46, No.1 (2002), pp.159; Chalmers Johnson, Blowback:The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, New York: Henry Hold and Company,2000.
1 Waltz, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," p.28.
2 Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World."
3 Shiping Tang, "The Security Dilemma:A Conceptual Analysis," Security Studies, Vol.18, No.3 (2009), pp.587-623 at p.595.
1 Waltz. "Structural Realism After the Cold War."
2 Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," p.76.
3 Pape, "Soft Balancing Against the United States," p.10. See also Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy" for same argument.
4 Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," p.58.
1 Levy and William R. Thompson, "Balancing on Land and at Sea:Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?" p.14.
2 Stephen Walt, "Taming American Power," p.112.
1 Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing:Why the World Is Not Pushing Back."
2 He and Huiyun Feng, "If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China," p.365.
3 Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," p.74.
4 Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing,p.104.
1 Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing:Why the World Is Not Pushing Back," p.109.
2 Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," p.131.
3 Ibid, p.133.
4 John J. Mearsheimer, "The Future of American Pacifier," Foreign Affairs, Vol.80, No.5 (September/October, 2010), pp.46-61 at p.49.
5 Robert Merry, National Interest. December 29,2011.
1 Levy and William Thompson, "Balancing on Land and at Sea:Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power," p.8.
2 Ibid, p.18.
1 Jean-Marc Rickli, "European Small States' Military Policies After the Cold War:From Territorial to Niche Strategies," Paper presented at the University of Geneva (2008), pp.1-19 at p.2.
2 For a thorough discussion of the concept of asymmetry, see Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam:The Politics of Asymmetry, New York:Cambridge University Press,2006.
3 See the following link: http://www.jiss.org/publications/military-balance/the-military-balance-2012/press-statement/figure-comparative-de fence-statistics/
1 Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam:The Politics Of Asymmetry, New York:Cambridge University Press,2006.
1 In terms of military spending, Military(1a), source:Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2012 Yearbook (figures are in US$Bn). In terms of economy, source, Economy(1b), CIA World Factbook (2000-2012) (figures are in US$trillion). And in terms of population, Population(1c), source for US is 2013 official census while the Philippines is based on 2010 census (figures in millions).
2 Military(2a), source:Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2012 Yearbook (figures are in US$Bn). In terms of economy, source, Econoomy(2b), CIA World Factbook (2000-2012) (figures are in US$trillion). And in terms of population, Population(2c), source for US is 2013 official census while South Korea is based on 2012 census (figures in millions).
3 Military(3a), source:Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2012 Yearbook (figures are in US$Bn). In terms of economy, source, Economy(3b), CIA World Factbook (2000-2012) (figures are in US$trillion). And in terms of population, Population(3c), source for Russia is 2013 official census while Kyrgyzstan is based on 2012 census (figures in millions).
1 Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia:Analvzine Regional Security Strategies" p.116
'Yuen Foong Khong, "Coping with Strategic Uncertainty:The Role of Institutions and Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia's Post Cold War Strategy," in J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, eds., Rethinking Security in East Asia:Identity, Power, and Efficiency, Stanford, California:Stanford University Press,2004 nn 172-208.
3 Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia:Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," p.132.
4 Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia:Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," p.133.
1 He, "Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory:Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia," p.495.
2 Ibid, p.496.
1 Judith Kelley, "Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing:Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq," International Politics, Vol.42, No.2 (2005), pp.153-73.
2 Ibid, p.154.
3 Beth Elise Whitaker, "Soft Balancing Among Weak States? Evidence from Africa," International Affairs, Vol.86, No.5 (2010), pp.1109-1127 at p.1111.
1 Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments:The Case of Egypt,1962-73," p.373.
2 David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," p.235.
1 Schweller, "Unanswered Threats:A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," p.169.
1 Ilai Saltzman, "Soft Balancing as Foreign Policy:Assessing American Strategy toward Japan in the Interwar Period." For earlier discussion on state strategies, see G John Ikenberry, "The state strategies of international adjustment," World Politics, Vol.39, No.1 (1986), pp.53-77.
2 He and Huiyun Feng. "If Not Soft Balancing. Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China," pp.364-365.
1 Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," p.51.
2 Walt "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," p.4.
3 Ibid, pp.8-9.
4 Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," p.4.
1 Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," p.15.
2 Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit:Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," p.74.
1 Schweller, "Unanswered Threats:A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," p.162.
2 David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," p.233.
1 Pape, "Soft Balancing Against the United States," p.15.
1 Pape, "Soft Balancing Against the United States," p.16.
2 Ibid, p.17-18.
3 Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," p.59.
4 Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia:Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," p.132.
1 Kai He, "Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory:Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia.'"
2 Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia:Analyzing Regional Security Strategies."
3 Saltzman, "Soft Balancing as Foreign Policy:Assessing American Strategy toward Japan in the Interwar Period." p.132.
1 For further explanation on strategic non-cooperation, see Kelley, "Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq."
2 Saltzman, "Soft Balancing as Foreign Policy:Assessing American Strategy toward Japan in the Interwar Period.'
1 Ibid, p.133.
2 For discussions on arguments for institutions, see Robert Keohane, After Hegemony:Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton:Princeton University Press,1984; Friedrich V. Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie, "International Organization:A State of the Art on an Art of the State," International Organization, Vol.40, No.4 (Autumn,1986), pp.753-775; Lisa L. Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," International Organization. Vol.52, No.4 (Autumn,1998), pp.729-757; Oran R. Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation:On the Development of Institutions in International Society,'" International Organization, Vol.45, No.3 (Summer,1991), pp.349-376. For critics, see Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation:A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism;" John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol.13, No.3 (Winter 1994-1995), pp.5-49.
3 Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia:Analyzing Regional Security Strategies."
1 Michael N. Barnett and Jack Levy "Domestic sources of alliances and alignments:the case of Egypt,1962-73:' Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks:Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol.44, No.2 (Spring,1990), pp.137-168; Miriam Fendius Elman, "The Foreign Policies of Small States:Challenging Neorealism in its Own Backyard," British Journal of Political Science, Vol.25, No.2 (April,1995), pp.171-217; Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics;" Walt "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation:The Case of Southwest Asia."
2 Victor D. Cha, "Abandonment Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia:the United States, Japan, and Korea." International Studies Quarterly, Vol.44, No.2 (2000), pp.261-291.
1 Saltzman, "Soft Balancing as Foreign Policy:Assessing American Strategy toward Japan in the Interwar Period," p.133.
1 For a review of the U.S. strategic security foreign policy after the Second World War, see Hans W. Weigert, "U.S. Strategic Bases and Collective Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol.25, No.2 (January,1947), pp.250-262.
2 For a description of the functions of the military bases, see Gregory P. Corning, "The Philippine Bases and U.S. Pacific Strategy," Pacific Affairs, Vol.63, No.1 (Spring,1990), pp.6-23; William R. Feeney, "The United States and the Philippines:The Bases Dilemma," Asian Affairs, Vol.10, No.4 (Winter,1984), pp.63-85; F. A. Mediansky, "The U.S. Military Facilities in the Philippnes," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.8, No.4 (March, 1987), pp.308-319.
1 Ronald E. Dolan, ed. Philippines:A Country Study. Washington:GPO for the Library of Congress,1991.
2 Feeney, "The United States and the Philippines:The Bases Dilemma," p.66.
3 For a historical description of PACOM, see Corning, "The Philippine Bases and U.S. Pacific Strategy,"pp.6-7; Mediansky, "The U.S. Military Facilities in the Philippines," pp.308-309.
1 For current information on the US Pacific Command, see the following link: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/pacom.htm
2 For details, see Chan Robles Virtual Law Library, http://www.chanrobles.com/mutualdefensetreaty.htm
3 For details of the Manila Pact of 1954, see the following link: http://avalon.law. yale.edu/20th_century/usmuO03.asp
4 Corning, "The Philippine Bases and U.S. Pacific Strategy," p.7.
1 Then President Richard Nixon announced the Guam Doctrine to reduce the United States' over-commitment abroad in the future particularly with its involvement in Vietnam. For a thorough discussion, see J. L. S. Girling, "The Guam Doctrine," International Affairs, Vol.46, No.1 (January,1970), pp.48-62.
2 Corning, "The Philippine Bases and U.S. Pacific Strategy," p.10-14.
1 Feeney, "The United States and the Philippines:The Bases Dilemma," p.69; Mediansky, "The U.S. Military Facilities in the Philippines," p.309.
1 Peter Bacho, "U.S.-Philippine Relations in Transition:The Issue of Bases," Asian Survey, Vol.28, No.6 (June, 1988), pp.650-660 at p.657.
2 Feeney, "The United States and the Philippines:The Bases Dilemma," p.71-72.
1 Asian Studies Center, "The Key Role of U.S. Bases in the Philippines," Backgrounder, No.7 (January 10,1984), pp.1-11 at p.2.
1 Asian Studies Center, "The Key Role of U.S. Bases in the Philippines;" Mediansky, "The U.S. Military Facilities in the Philippines.'"
2 Asian Studies Center, "The Key Role of U.S. Bases in the Philippines," p.3.
1 Asian Studies Center, "The Key Role of U.S. Bases in the Philippines,"
2 Ibid.
3 Feeney, "The United States and the Philippines:The Bases Dilemma."
1 Leszek Buszynski, "The Philippines, Asean and the Future of the American Bases," The World Today, Vol.44, No.5 (May,1988), pp.82-85 at pp.82-83.
2 Asian Studies Center, "The Key Role of U.S. Bases in the Philippines."
1 Bacho, "U.S.-Philippine Relations in Transition:The Issue of Bases," pp.656-657.
1 Buszynski, "The Philippines, Asean and the Future of the American Bases," p.83.
2 Asian Studies Center, "How the Marcos Opposition Challenges the United States," Backgrounder, No.31 (July 2, 1985) pp.1-13 at pp.6-7.
3 For information on the 1987 Philippine Constitution, see for instance the following link: http://www.gov.ph/the-philippine-constitutions/the-1987-constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines/
1 Renato Cruz De Castro, "The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations:A Ghost from the Cold War or an Alliance of the 21st Century?" Asian Survey, Vol.43, No.6 (November-December,2003) pp.911-988 at p.974.
1 Rowena Carranza, "September 16,1991:The Day the Impossible Happened," Bulatlat, Vol.2, No.32 (September 15-21,2002), downloaded at http://www.bulatlat.com/news/2-32/2-32-bases.html; New York Times, "Philippines Orders U.S. to Leave Strategic Navy Base at Subic Bay,'" December 28,1991, downloaded at: http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/28/world/philippines-orders-us-to-leave-strategic-navy-base-at-subic-bay.html?p agewanted=all&src=pm.
2 Carranza, "September 16,1991:The Day the Impossible Happened.'
1 From the mid-1990s, there was another change in the strategic environment with China's potential challenge sparked by the South China Sea and Taiwan issues. For earlier arguments on the issue, see Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry:Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol.18, No.3 (Winter,1993/1994), pp.5-33:John Garver, "China's Push through the South China Sea:The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests,'" China Quarterly, No.132 (December,1992), pp.999-1028.For other contentions, see Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol.75, No.2 (March/April,1997), pp. 18-32; Thomas Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik." Foreign Affairs, Vol.75, No.5 (September/October,1996), pp.37-52; David Lampton, "The Faces of Chinese Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol.86, No.1 (January/February, 2007), pp.115-127; Joseph Nye, "China's Re-emergence and the Future of the Asia Pacific," Survival. Vol.39, No. 4 (Winter,1997), pp.65-79; Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the "Constrainment" of China," International Security, Vol.20, No.4 (Spring,1996), pp.107-135; For opposing view, see Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum:Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes of Thought" Asian Survey, Vol.38, No.5 (May, 1998), pp.425-440:David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia:Reshaping the Regional Order," International Security, Vol.29, No,3 (Winter,2004/2005), pp.64-99:Allen Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China:The Security Dimension," Asian Survey, Vol.37, No.4 (April,1997), pp.299-322.
1 Jae-Jeok Park, "A Comparative Case Study of the U.S.-Philippines Alliance in the 1990s and the U.S.-South Korea Alliance between 1998 and 2008," Asian Survey, Vol.51, No.2 (March/April,2011), pp.268-289.
2 Barton Brown, "The Philippines-United States Bases Debate:Why the Twain Never Met," Asian Affairs, Vol.20, No.3 (Fall,1993), pp.162-178.
1 Stephen R. Shalom, "Securing the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement of 1947," Bulletin of Concerned Scholars, Vol.22, No.4 (October-December,1990), pp.3-12.
1 Jae-Jeok Park, "A Comparative Case Study of the U.S.-Philippines Alliance in the 1990s and the U.S.-South Korea Alliance between 1998 and 2008.'
1 Bacho, "U.S.-Philippine Relations in Transition:The Issue of Bases."
1 Edward A. Olsen, "U.S. Security Policy and the Two Koreas," World Affairs, Vol.162, No.4 (Spring,2000), pp. 150-157 at p.151.
1 Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, Stanford, California:Stanford University Press (1999), p.38.
1.Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, Stanford, California:Stanford University Press (1999), p.38.
2 Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, Stanford, California:Stanford University Press (1999), p.41.
1 Earl G. Ravenal, "The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments," Foreign Affairs (January,1971).
1 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, p.73.
2 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle p.111.
1 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle,p.115.
1 For further discussion of nordpolitik, see Jangho Kim, "Ostpolitik Revisited:The Lessons and the Remaining Consequences of Nordpolitik," International Area Review, Vol.13, No.3 (Autumn,2010), pp.73-88.
1 Aidan Foster-Carter, "Sunshine or Sunset?" The World Today, Vol.55, No.3 (March,1999), pp.11-13 at p.12.
2 For a discussion of the U.S. and South Korea's different perception towards the AF, see Victor Cha, "Realism, Liberalism, and the Durability of the U.S.-South Korean Alliance," Asian Survey, Vol.37, No.7 (July,1997), pp. 609-622.
1 For a discussion of Progressive's Views Towards North Korea, see Hahm Chaibong, "South Korea's Progressives and the U.S.-ROK Alliance," Dynamic Forces on the Korean Peninsula:Strategic & Economic Implications (undated), pp.188-201.
1 Relations between China and South Korea had been growing since especially after the 1997 Financial Crisis, in which public perceptions of South Korea had been more positive as compared to the United States. See, for instance, Jae Ho Chung, "South Korea between Eagle and Dragon:Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic Dilemma," Asian Survey, Vol.41, No.5 (September/October,2001), pp.777-796.
1 For comments on the 2nd Korean nuclear crisis, see Victor D. Cha and David Kang, "The Korea Crisis," Foreign Policy, No.136 (May-June,2003), pp.20-24+26+28; David Kang, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol.47, No.3 (September,2003), pp.301-324.
2 Victor D. Cha, "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," International Security, Vol.27, No.1 (Summer,2002), pp.40-78.
1 For a discussion of how to manage the U.S.-ROK alliance following a new strategic environment, see Jae-Chang Kim, "The New International Order and the US-ROK Alliance," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.15, No. 2 (2003, pp.57-75.
2 Hazel Smith, "Threat or Opportunity?" The World Today, Vol.58, No.1 (January,2002), pp.21-22.
3 See Victor Cha, "Korea's Place in the Axis," Foreign Affairs, Vol.81, No.3 (May/June,2002), pp.79-92.
4 Seethe following link:(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1908571.stm)
1 Seong Ryoul Cho, "The ROK-US Alliance and the Future of US Forces in South Korea," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.15, No.2 (Fall,2003), pp.77-104; Jimmy H. Koo, "The Uncomfortable SOFA: Anti-Americanism Sentiments in South Korea and the U.S.-South Korea Status of Forces Agreement," American University National Security Law Brief, Vol.1, Issue 1 (2011), pp.102-105; Jinwung Kim, "Ambivalent Allies: Recent South Korean Perceptions of the United States Forces Korea (USFK)," Asian Affairs, Vol.30, No.4 (Winter,2004), pp.268-285.
2 For a discussion, see Jei Guk Jeon, "Driven By Peace Operations:A Balanced Development of the ROK-U.S. Alliance," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.22, No.4 (2010), pp.407-420.
1 Sung-han Kim, "Anti-American Sentiment and the ROK-US Alliance," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 15, No.2 (2003), pp.105-130.
2 See the following link:http://www.rjkoehler.com/2004/01/18/us-korea-agree-on-yongsan-garrison-move/
1 See the following link:(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/korea-orbat.htm). For a discussion of how public perception is linked to the value of the USFK,see Shi Young Lee & Taejoon Han, "An Economic Assessment of USFK:Linking Public Perception and Value," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.15, No.2 (2003), pp.131-152.
2 Zannou Andre Corneille, "ROK-U.S. Military Alliance and the Future of Korea's Defense Policy," The Review of Korean Studies, Vol.10, No.2 (June,2007), pp.147-160 at p.152.
1 Lee Jong-sup, "The ROK-U.S. Alliance and Self-Reliant Defense in the ROK," in A Turning Point:Democratic Consolidation in the ROK and Strategic Readjustment in the US-ROK Alliance (unspecified publisher, undated).
2 Sook-Jong Lee, "Allying with the United States:Changing South Korean Attitudes," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.17, No.1 (2005), pp.81-104.
1 Seong Ryoul Cho, "The ROK-US Alliance and the Future of US Forces in South Korea," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.15, No.2 (2003), pp.77-104.
2 Choong Nam Kim, "The Roh Moo Hyun Government's Policy Toward North Korea," East-West Center Working Papers:Politics, Governance, and Security Series, No.11 (August,2005), pp.1-28 at pp.7-8.
1 David Rapkin, "The United States, Japan, and the Power to Block:the APEC and AMF Cases," Pacific Review, Vol.14, No.3 (September,2001), pp.373-410.
2 Chaibong, "South Korea's Progressives and the U.S.-ROK Alliance," p.196.
1 For more discussions on anti-Americanism, see Myongsob Kim, Suzanne Parker and Jun Young Choi, "Increasing Distrust of the USA in South Korea," International Political Science Review, Vol.27, No.4 (2006), pp. 427-445; Seung-Hwan Kim, "Anti-Americanism in Korea," Washington Quarterly, Vol.26, No.1 (Winter, 2002/2003), pp.109-122; Sung-Han Kim, "Anti-American Sentiment and the ROK-US Alliance," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.15, No.2 (Fall,2003), pp.105-130; Hyun-Wook Kim. "Domestic Events, Ideological Changes and the Post-Cold War US-South Korea Alliance," Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.63, No.4 (December,2009), pp.482-504.
2 Kim, "The Roh Moo Hyun Government's Policy Toward North Korea," p.10.
1 Kim, "The Roh Moo Hyun Government's Policy Toward North Korea," p.17.
1 For some discussions of 'great power' game in Central Asia, see Roy Allison, "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy," International Affairs, Vol.80, No.2 (March,2004), pp.277-293; Lowell Dittmer, "Central Asia and the Regional Powers," China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly, Vol.5, No.4 (2007), pp.7-22; Eugene Huskey, "Foreign Policy in a Vulnerable State:Kyrgyzstan as Military Entrepot between the Great Powers," China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol.6, No.4 (2008), pp.5-18; Fabio Indeo, "The Geopolitical Consequences of the U.S. Russian "Military Airbase Race" in Central Asia," China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly, Vol.8, No.3 (2010), pp.149-172; Dianne L. Smith, "Central Asia:A New Great Game? Asian Affairs, Vol.23, No.3 (Fall, 1996), pp.147-175.
1 Alexander Cooley, "U.S. Bases and Democratization in Central Asia," Orbis (Winter,2008), pp.65-90 at p.67.
1 Regine Spector, "The Transformation of Askar Akaev, President of Kyrgyzstan," Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies (Spring,2004), pp.1-35 at pp.11-12.
1 Regine Spector, "The Transformation of Askar Akaev, President of Kyrgyzstan," Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies (Spring,2004), p.12.
1 Regine Spector, "The Transformation of Askar Akaev, President of Kyrgyzstan," Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies (Spring,2004), p.12.
2 Yasar Sari, "Foreign Policy of Kyrgyzstan Under Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev," Perceptions, Vol. XVII, No.3 (Autumn,2012), pp.131-150 at p.137.
1 BBC "Central Asia:Struggling for a Future," see the following link: http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/specials/1238_wag_comms/page4.shtml
1 Sari, "Foreign Policy of Kyrgyzstan Under Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev," p.138.
1 See "President of Kyrgyzstan:Our Foreign Policy Doctrine is the Great Silk Road," Executive Intelligence Review, Vol.26, No.15 (April 9,1999) pp.49-52.
2 Alexander Cooley, "U.S. Bases and Democratization in Central Asia," pp.70-71.
1 Alexander Cooley, "Depoliticizing Manas:The Domestic Consequences of the U.S. Military Presence in Kyrgyzstan," PONARS Policy Memo No.362 (February,2005), pp.1-8; Alexander Cooley, "Manas Matters: The Changing Politics of the U.S. Military Base in Kyrgyzstan," PONARS Policy Conference Memo No.423 (December,2006), pp.1-5.
2 Alexander Cooley, "Manas Matters:The Changing Politics of the U.S. Military Base in Kyrgyzstan," p.2.
1 For more discussions on the Tulip Revolution, see Anara Karagulova and Megoran, Nick, "Discourses of Danger and the'War on Terror':Gothic Kyrgyzstan and the Collapse of the Akaev Regime," Review of International Studies, Vol.37, No.1 (January,2011), pp.29-48; David Lewis, "The Dynamics of Regime Change:Domestic and International Factors in the Tulip Revolution" Central Asian Survey, Vol.27, No.3/4 (September/December, 2008), pp.265-277; Erica Marat "March and After:What Has Changed? What Has Stayed the Same?'" Central Asian Survey, Vol.27, No.3/4 (September/December,2008), pp.229-240; Stefanie Ortmann, "Diffusion as Discourse of Danger:Russian Self-representation and the Framing of the Tulip Revolution," Central Asian Survey, Vol.27, No.3/4 (September/December,2008), pp.363-378; Shairbek Juraev, "Kyrgyz Democracy? The Tulip Revolution and Beyond," Central Asian Survey, Vol.27, Nos.3/4 (September/December,2008), pp.253-264.
2 Evgeny Troitskiy, "Turmoil in Kyrgyzstan:A Challenge to Russian Foreign Policy," Swedish Institute of International Affairs Occasional Papers, No.8 (2012), pp.1-37 at p.13.
1 Evgeny Troitskiy, "Turmoil in Kyrgyzstan:A Challenge to Russian Foreign Policy," Swedish Institute of International Affairs Occasional Papers, No.8 (2012), pp.1-37 at p.13.
1 Sari, "Foreign Policy of Kyrgyzstan Under Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev," pp.142-143.
1 Sari, "Foreign Policy of Kyrgyzstan Under Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev," p.143-144.
1 Troitskiy, "Turmoil in Kyrgyzstan:A Challenge to Russian Foreign Policy,"p.14.
1 Troitskiy, "Turmoil in Kyrgyzstan:A Challenge to Russian Foreign Policy," p.16.
1 Indeo, "The Geopolitical Consequences of the U.S.-Russian "Military Airbase Race" in Central Asia," p.150.
2 Michael Mihalka, "Not Much of a Game:Security Dynamics in Central Asia," China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol.5, No. (2007 pp.21-39 at p.22.
1 Alisher Khamidov. "The Base of Contention:Kyrgyzstan, Russia and The U.S. in Central Asia (2001-2010)," A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland (May,2011), p.3.
2 Ibid, p.3.
3 Andrew T. Bernard, "The Eagle, the Bear, and the Yurt:Evaluating Kyrgyzstan's Foreign Policy Behavior with the United States and Russia in the Post-9/11 Security Environment," A thesis submitted to the Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey, California (June,2005), p.7.
1 Cooley, "Manas Matters:The Changing Politics of the U.S. Military Base in Kyrgyzstan," p.4.
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2 David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics:New Trends versus Old Tendencies," World Politics, Vol. 32, No.2(January,1979), pp.161-194; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion:Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol.17, No.4 (Spring,1993), pp.5-51; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York:Norton,2000; John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future:Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol.15, No.1 (Summer,1990), pp.5-56; Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," International Security, Vol.25, No.1 (Summer,2000) pp.5-41; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Massachusetts:Addison-Wesley,1979. For a discussion of different theories, see Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations:One World, Many Theories," Foreign Policy, No.110 (1998), pp.29-46.
3 Martha Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity:Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be," World Politics, Vol.61, No.1 (January,2009), pp.58-85; G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," World Politics, Vol.61, No.1 (January,2009), pp.1-27; Robert Jervis, "Unipolarity a Structural Perspective," World Politics, Vol.61, No.1 (January,2009), pp.188-213; Nuno P. Monteiro, "Unrest Assured:Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful," International Security, Vol.36, No.3 (Winter 2011/12) pp.9-40; Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," World Politics, Vol.61, No.1 (January,2009), pp.86-120.
1 Jack Levy and William Thompson, "Hegemonic Threats and Great Power Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA (August,2003).
2 For earlier views on the challenge of China, see Richard Berstein and Ross Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America,'" Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, No.2 (March/April,1997), pp.18-32:Qimao Chen, "New Approaches in China's Foreign Policy:The Post-Cold War Era," Asian Survey, Vol.33, No.3, (March,1993), pp.237-251; Thomas Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Affairs, Vol.75, No.5 (September/October,1996), pp.37-52; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry:Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol.18, No.3 (Winter,1993/1994), pp.5-33; John Garver, "China's Push through the South China Sea:The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests," China Quarterly Vol.132 (December,1992), pp.999-1028. For recent views, Rosemary Foot, "Chinese Strategies in a US-hegemonic Global Order:Accommodating and Hedging," International Affairs, Vol.82, No.1 (2006), pp.77-94:Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol.19, No.1 (Summer,1994), pp.149-168:Denny Roy, "The "China Threat" Issue:Major Arguments," Asian Survey, Vol.36, No.8 (August,1996), pp.758-771. For an opposing view of China's potential challenge, see David Kang, "Hierarchy in Asian International Relations: 1300-1900," Asian Security, Vol.1, No.1 (January,2005), pp.53-79; David Kang, "Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations," International Security, Vol.28, No.3 (Winter/Spring, 2003/2004), pp.165-180:David Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong:The Need for New Analytic Frameworks," International Security, Vol.27, No.4 (Spring,2003), pp.57-85; David Lampton, "The Faces of Chinese Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol.86, No.1 (January/February,2007), pp.115-127; Joseph Nye, "China's Re-emergence and the Future of the Asia Pacific," Survival Vol.39, No.4 (Winter,1997), pp.65-79; Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, "After Unipolarity:China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline," International Security, Vol.36, No.1 (Summer,2011), pp.41-72. For a pessimistic view of China's challenge, see Michael Becley, "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure," International Security, Vol.36, No.3 (Winter 2011/12), pp.26-27.
1 Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited:The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," International Security Vol.31, No.2 (Fall,2006), pp.7-41; Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion:Why New Great Powers Will Rise"; John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," The Atlantic, August 1990, pp. 35-50; Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War"; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol.18, No.2 (Fall,1993), pp.44-79.
2 Stephen M. Walt, "Taming American Power," Foreign Affairs, (September/October 2005); Stephen M. Walt, "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation:The Case of Southwest Asia," International Organization, Vol.42, No.2 (Spring,1988), pp.275-316; Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," International Security, Vol.9, No.4 (Spring,1985), pp.3-43.
3 Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, "Still Not Pushing Back:Why the European Union is not Balancing the United States," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.53, No.5 (2009), pp.727-744; Kier A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing:Why the World is not Pushing Back," International Security, Vol.30, Issue 1 (Summer,2005), pp.109-139.
4 Randall L. Schweller, "Unanswered Threats:A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," International Security, Vol.29, No.2 (Fall,2004), pp.159-201; Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit:Bringing the Revisionist State Back in," International Security, Vol.9, No.1 (Summer,1994), pp.72-107.
1 Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World."
2 Robert Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," International Security, Vol.30, No.1 (Summer,2005), pp.7-45; T. V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," International Security, Vol.30, No.1 (Summer, 2005), pp.46-71.
3 For other research studies that propose soft balancing use by small states, see Kai He, "Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory:Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia,'" European Journal of International Studies, Vol.14, No.3 (September,2008), pp.489-518; Kai He and Huiyun Feng, "If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China,'" Security Studies, Vol.17, No.2 (April,2008), pp.363-395:Judith Kelley, "Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing:Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq," International Politics, Vol.42 (2005), pp.153-173; Ilai Saltzman, "Soft Balancing as Foreign Policy:Assessing American Strategy toward Japan in the Interwar Period," Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol.8, Issue 2 (April,2012), pp.131-150:Beth Elise Whitaker, "Soft Balancing among Weak States? Evidence from Africa," International Affairs, Vol.86, Issue 5 (September,2010), pp.1109-1127.
1 Victor Cha, "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia:The United States, Japan, and Korea," International Studies Quarterly, Vol.44, No.2 (June,2000), pp.261-291; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol.30, No.2 (January,1978), pp.167-214; Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol.36, No.4 (1984), pp.461-495.
2 G. John Ikenberry, "Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony," Political Science Quarterly, Vol.104, No. 3 (Autumn,1989), pp.375-400; G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," International Organization, Vol.44, No.3 (Summer,1990), pp.283-315; G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol.23, No.3 (Winter, 1998/1999), pp.43-78:Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing:Why the World is not Pushing Back"; Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing."
1 The cases of the Philippines and South Korea are typical examples of how anti-Americanism as a domestic issue against the U.S. military bases had been often politicized. For a review of the politicization of U.S. military bases, see Daniel P. Aldrich's book review of Base Politics:Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas by Alexander Cooley, Ithaca, New York:Cornell University Press (2008) in Critical Dialogues, Vol.7, No.2 (June, 2009), pp.389-391. See also Alexander Cooley, "Base Politics:Redeploying U.S. Troops," Foreign Affairs (November/December 2005).
2 Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States":Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy."
3 The multi-vector policy was adopted by most post-Soviet States as a way to get more financial aid and investment from Western institutions and states such as the United States. See, for instance, Avinoam Idan and Brenda Shaffer, "The Foreign Policies of Post-Soviet Landlocked States," Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.27, No.3 (2011), pp.241-268.
1 In 1999, President Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan officially announced the country's foreign policy of "the Great Silk Road." See excerpts of translation from the "President of Kyrgyzstan:Our foreign policy doctrine is the Great Silk Road" in the Executive Intelligence Review, Vol.26, No.15 (April,1999), pp.49-52.
1 Jae-Chang Kim, "The New International Order and the US-ROK Alliance," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.15, No.2 (Fall,2003), pp.57-75.
1 He, "Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory:Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia;" Evelyn Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," International Security, Vol.32, No.3 (Winter 2007/08), pp.113-157.
2 For one of earlier discussions on the topic, see for instance Michael N. Barnett and Jack Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments:the case of Egypt,1962-73," International Organization, Vol.45, Issue 3 (June,1991), pp.369-395.
1 Brantly Womack, "How Size Matters:The United States. China and Asymmetry," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.24, No.4 (December,2001), pp.123-150:Brantly Womack, "China and Southeast Asia:Asymmetry, Leadership and Normalcy," Pacific Affairs, Vol.76, No.3 (Winter,2003/2004), pp.529-548.
2 For more discussion, see Victor Cha, "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia:The United States, Japan, and Korea," International Studies Quarterly, Vol.44, No.2 (June,2000), pp.261-291.
1 See Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Why is there No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol.7, No.3 (2007), pp.287-312; Stanley Hoffman, "An American Social Science:International Relations, Daedalus, Vol.106, No.3 (Summer,1977), pp.41-60; Brian Schmidt, "The Historiography of Academic International Relations,"Review of International Studies, Vol.20, No.4 (October,1994), pp.349-367. For a debate on the issue, see Ole Waever, "The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline:American and European Developments in International Relations," International Organization, Vol.52, No. (Autumn,1998), pp.687-727.
1 See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations:The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf,1978, pp.4-15.
2 See noted realist arguments from Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation:A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol.42 (1988), pp.485-508; Joseph M. Grieco, "Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics," in New Thinking in International Relations, Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), Boulder:Westview Press (1997), pp.163-201; Robert Jervis, "Realism in the Study of World Politics," International Organization, Vol.52, No.4 (Autumn,1998), pp.971-991:Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion:Why New Great Powers will Rise"; Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant:The Myth of the Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol.19, No.2 (Autumn,1994), pp.5-49; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War."
3 Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
4 Walt,"Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power."
5 Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit:Bringing the Revisionist State Back In."
6 For other notable studies that look at the importance of domestic politics in international relations, see Barnett and Jack Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments;" G. John Ikenberry, "The State Strategies of International Adjustment," World Politics, Vol.39, No.1 (October,1986), pp.53-77; J. Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets:Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1985; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire:Domestic Politics and International Ambition, New York:Columbia University Press,1991.
1 Inis L, Claude, "The Balance of Power Revisited." Review of International Studies, Vol.15, Special Issue 2 (April,1989), pp.77-85 at p.77.
2 For a classical study, see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society:A Study of Order in World Politics, London: McMillan,1977. For contemporary arguments, see Barry Buzan, "From International System to International Society:Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School," International Organization, Vol.47, No. 3 (1993), pp.327-352; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "The Idea of International System:Theory Meets History," International Political Science Review, Vol.15, No.3 (1994), pp.231-256; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "Reconceptualizing Anarchy:Structural Realism Meets World History," European Journal of International Relations, Vol.2, No.4 (1996), pp.403-438:Richard Little, "Neorealism and the English School:A Methodological, Ontological and Theoretical Reassessment," European Journal of International Studies, Vol.1, No.1 (1995), pp.9-34. For a critique, see Dale C. Copeland, "A Realist Critique of the English School," Review of International Studies, Vol.29, No.3 (2003), pp.427-441.
3 David Kang, China Rising:Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia, New York:Columbia University Press,2007; David Kang, "Hierarchy in Asian International Relations:1300-1900," Asian Security, Vol.1, No.1 (January, 2005), pp.53-79; David Kang, "Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations,'' International Security, Vol.28, No.3 (Winter/Spring,2003/2004), pp.165-180:David Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytic Frameworks," International Security, Vol.27, No.4 (Spring,2003), pp.57-85.
4 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.887.
1 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus, Vol.93, No.3 (Summer,1964), pp.881-909.
2 For a general view of small states behavior, see J. Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets:Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1985; Benjamin Nimer, "Great States, Small States, & the Prospects for International Relations Theory," Polity, Vol.8, No.1 (Autumn 1975), pp.131-146; Amry Vandenbosch, "The Small States in International Politics and Organization," The Journal of Politics, Vol.26, No.2 (May,1964), pp.293-312.
3 Steven David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics, Vol.43, No.2 (January,1991), pp.233-256; Hans Mouritzen, "Tension Between the Strong, and the Strategies of the Weak," Journal of Peace Research, Vol.28, No.2 (May,1991), pp.217-230; Robert L. Rothstein, "Alignment, Nonalignment, and Small Powers: 1945-1965," International Organization, Vol.20, No.3 (Summer,1966), p.397-418. For a review and critique of research on small states''non-alignment;, see Robert Keohane, "Lilliputians" Dilemmas:Small States in International Politics," International Organization, Vol.23, No.2 (Spring,1969), pp.291-310.
4 Rothstein, "Alignment, Nonalignment, and Small Powers:1945-1965," p.409.
5 Richard Ned Lebow, "Small States and Big Alliances," American Political Science Review, Vol.91, No.3 (September,1997), pp.705-709 at p.706.
6 See Steven David, "Explaining Third World Alignment."
7 T. V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts:War Initiation by Weaker Powers, New York:Cambridge University Press, 1994.
8 Jervis, "Unipolarity A Structural Perspective," p.191.
1 Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," p.28.
2 Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, "After Unipolarity:China's Vision of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline," p. 46.
1 Jervis, "Unipolaritv A Structural Perspective," p.195.
2 Beckley, "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure," p.43.
1 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Understanding International Conflicts:An Introduction to Theory and History, Pearson Education, Inc.,2004, pp.191-216.
2 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependence Revisited," International Organization, Vol.41, Issue 4 (Autumn,1987), pp.725-753 at p.731.
3 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependence Revisited," International Organizatio Vol.41, Issue 4 (Autumn,1987), p.727.
4 He and Huiyun Feng, "If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China," p.365.
1 Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order (1998-1999),'" p. 43.
2 Ibid, p.44.
3 Ibid, p.45.
4 Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol.80, No.4, (December 1986), pp.1154-1155; John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Kantian Peace:The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations," World Politics, Vol.52, No.1 (1999), pp.1-37; John M. Owen, "Give Democratic Peace a Chance? How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol.19, No.2 (Autumn,1994), pp.87-125. For some critiques, see David E. Spiro. "Give Democratic Peace a Chance? The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," International Security, Vol.19, No.2 (Autumn,1994), pp.50-86; Thomas Schwartz and Kiron K. Skinner, "The Myth of the Democratic Peace," Orbis, Vol.46, No.1 (2002), pp.159; Chalmers Johnson, Blowback:The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, New York: Henry Hold and Company,2000.
1 Waltz, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," p.28.
2 Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World."
3 Shiping Tang, "The Security Dilemma:A Conceptual Analysis," Security Studies, Vol.18, No.3 (2009), pp.587-623 at p.595.
1 Waltz. "Structural Realism After the Cold War."
2 Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," p.76.
3 Pape, "Soft Balancing Against the United States," p.10. See also Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy" for same argument.
4 Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," p.58.
1 Levy and William R. Thompson, "Balancing on Land and at Sea:Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?" p.14.
2 Stephen Walt, "Taming American Power," p.112.
1 Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing:Why the World Is Not Pushing Back."
2 He and Huiyun Feng, "If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China," p.365.
3 Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," p.74.
4 Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing,p.104.
1 Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing:Why the World Is Not Pushing Back," p.109.
2 Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," p.131.
3 Ibid, p.133.
4 John J. Mearsheimer, "The Future of American Pacifier," Foreign Affairs, Vol.80, No.5 (September/October, 2010), pp.46-61 at p.49.
5 Robert Merry, National Interest. December 29,2011.
1 Levy and William Thompson, "Balancing on Land and at Sea:Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power," p.8.
2 Ibid, p.18.
1 Jean-Marc Rickli, "European Small States' Military Policies After the Cold War:From Territorial to Niche Strategies," Paper presented at the University of Geneva (2008), pp.1-19 at p.2.
2 For a thorough discussion of the concept of asymmetry, see Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam:The Politics of Asymmetry, New York:Cambridge University Press,2006.
3 See the following link: http://www.jiss.org/publications/military-balance/the-military-balance-2012/press-statement/figure-comparative-de fence-statistics/
1 Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam:The Politics Of Asymmetry, New York:Cambridge University Press,2006.
1 In terms of military spending, Military(1a), source:Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2012 Yearbook (figures are in US$Bn). In terms of economy, source, Economy(1b), CIA World Factbook (2000-2012) (figures are in US$trillion). And in terms of population, Population(1c), source for US is 2013 official census while the Philippines is based on 2010 census (figures in millions).
2 Military(2a), source:Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2012 Yearbook (figures are in US$Bn). In terms of economy, source, Econoomy(2b), CIA World Factbook (2000-2012) (figures are in US$trillion). And in terms of population, Population(2c), source for US is 2013 official census while South Korea is based on 2012 census (figures in millions).
3 Military(3a), source:Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2012 Yearbook (figures are in US$Bn). In terms of economy, source, Economy(3b), CIA World Factbook (2000-2012) (figures are in US$trillion). And in terms of population, Population(3c), source for Russia is 2013 official census while Kyrgyzstan is based on 2012 census (figures in millions).
1 Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia:Analvzine Regional Security Strategies" p.116
'Yuen Foong Khong, "Coping with Strategic Uncertainty:The Role of Institutions and Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia's Post Cold War Strategy," in J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, eds., Rethinking Security in East Asia:Identity, Power, and Efficiency, Stanford, California:Stanford University Press,2004 nn 172-208.
3 Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia:Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," p.132.
4 Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia:Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," p.133.
1 He, "Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory:Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia," p.495.
2 Ibid, p.496.
1 Judith Kelley, "Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing:Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq," International Politics, Vol.42, No.2 (2005), pp.153-73.
2 Ibid, p.154.
3 Beth Elise Whitaker, "Soft Balancing Among Weak States? Evidence from Africa," International Affairs, Vol.86, No.5 (2010), pp.1109-1127 at p.1111.
1 Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments:The Case of Egypt,1962-73," p.373.
2 David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," p.235.
1 Schweller, "Unanswered Threats:A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," p.169.
1 Ilai Saltzman, "Soft Balancing as Foreign Policy:Assessing American Strategy toward Japan in the Interwar Period." For earlier discussion on state strategies, see G John Ikenberry, "The state strategies of international adjustment," World Politics, Vol.39, No.1 (1986), pp.53-77.
2 He and Huiyun Feng. "If Not Soft Balancing. Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China," pp.364-365.
1 Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," p.51.
2 Walt "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," p.4.
3 Ibid, pp.8-9.
4 Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," p.4.
1 Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," p.15.
2 Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit:Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," p.74.
1 Schweller, "Unanswered Threats:A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," p.162.
2 David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," p.233.
1 Pape, "Soft Balancing Against the United States," p.15.
1 Pape, "Soft Balancing Against the United States," p.16.
2 Ibid, p.17-18.
3 Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," p.59.
4 Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia:Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," p.132.
1 Kai He, "Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory:Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia.'"
2 Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia:Analyzing Regional Security Strategies."
3 Saltzman, "Soft Balancing as Foreign Policy:Assessing American Strategy toward Japan in the Interwar Period." p.132.
1 For further explanation on strategic non-cooperation, see Kelley, "Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq."
2 Saltzman, "Soft Balancing as Foreign Policy:Assessing American Strategy toward Japan in the Interwar Period.'
1 Ibid, p.133.
2 For discussions on arguments for institutions, see Robert Keohane, After Hegemony:Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton:Princeton University Press,1984; Friedrich V. Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie, "International Organization:A State of the Art on an Art of the State," International Organization, Vol.40, No.4 (Autumn,1986), pp.753-775; Lisa L. Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," International Organization. Vol.52, No.4 (Autumn,1998), pp.729-757; Oran R. Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation:On the Development of Institutions in International Society,'" International Organization, Vol.45, No.3 (Summer,1991), pp.349-376. For critics, see Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation:A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism;" John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol.13, No.3 (Winter 1994-1995), pp.5-49.
3 Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia:Analyzing Regional Security Strategies."
1 Michael N. Barnett and Jack Levy "Domestic sources of alliances and alignments:the case of Egypt,1962-73:' Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks:Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol.44, No.2 (Spring,1990), pp.137-168; Miriam Fendius Elman, "The Foreign Policies of Small States:Challenging Neorealism in its Own Backyard," British Journal of Political Science, Vol.25, No.2 (April,1995), pp.171-217; Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics;" Walt "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation:The Case of Southwest Asia."
2 Victor D. Cha, "Abandonment Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia:the United States, Japan, and Korea." International Studies Quarterly, Vol.44, No.2 (2000), pp.261-291.
1 Saltzman, "Soft Balancing as Foreign Policy:Assessing American Strategy toward Japan in the Interwar Period," p.133.
1 For a review of the U.S. strategic security foreign policy after the Second World War, see Hans W. Weigert, "U.S. Strategic Bases and Collective Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol.25, No.2 (January,1947), pp.250-262.
2 For a description of the functions of the military bases, see Gregory P. Corning, "The Philippine Bases and U.S. Pacific Strategy," Pacific Affairs, Vol.63, No.1 (Spring,1990), pp.6-23; William R. Feeney, "The United States and the Philippines:The Bases Dilemma," Asian Affairs, Vol.10, No.4 (Winter,1984), pp.63-85; F. A. Mediansky, "The U.S. Military Facilities in the Philippnes," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.8, No.4 (March, 1987), pp.308-319.
1 Ronald E. Dolan, ed. Philippines:A Country Study. Washington:GPO for the Library of Congress,1991.
2 Feeney, "The United States and the Philippines:The Bases Dilemma," p.66.
3 For a historical description of PACOM, see Corning, "The Philippine Bases and U.S. Pacific Strategy,"pp.6-7; Mediansky, "The U.S. Military Facilities in the Philippines," pp.308-309.
1 For current information on the US Pacific Command, see the following link: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/pacom.htm
2 For details, see Chan Robles Virtual Law Library, http://www.chanrobles.com/mutualdefensetreaty.htm
3 For details of the Manila Pact of 1954, see the following link: http://avalon.law. yale.edu/20th_century/usmuO03.asp
4 Corning, "The Philippine Bases and U.S. Pacific Strategy," p.7.
1 Then President Richard Nixon announced the Guam Doctrine to reduce the United States' over-commitment abroad in the future particularly with its involvement in Vietnam. For a thorough discussion, see J. L. S. Girling, "The Guam Doctrine," International Affairs, Vol.46, No.1 (January,1970), pp.48-62.
2 Corning, "The Philippine Bases and U.S. Pacific Strategy," p.10-14.
1 Feeney, "The United States and the Philippines:The Bases Dilemma," p.69; Mediansky, "The U.S. Military Facilities in the Philippines," p.309.
1 Peter Bacho, "U.S.-Philippine Relations in Transition:The Issue of Bases," Asian Survey, Vol.28, No.6 (June, 1988), pp.650-660 at p.657.
2 Feeney, "The United States and the Philippines:The Bases Dilemma," p.71-72.
1 Asian Studies Center, "The Key Role of U.S. Bases in the Philippines," Backgrounder, No.7 (January 10,1984), pp.1-11 at p.2.
1 Asian Studies Center, "The Key Role of U.S. Bases in the Philippines;" Mediansky, "The U.S. Military Facilities in the Philippines.'"
2 Asian Studies Center, "The Key Role of U.S. Bases in the Philippines," p.3.
1 Asian Studies Center, "The Key Role of U.S. Bases in the Philippines,"
2 Ibid.
3 Feeney, "The United States and the Philippines:The Bases Dilemma."
1 Leszek Buszynski, "The Philippines, Asean and the Future of the American Bases," The World Today, Vol.44, No.5 (May,1988), pp.82-85 at pp.82-83.
2 Asian Studies Center, "The Key Role of U.S. Bases in the Philippines."
1 Bacho, "U.S.-Philippine Relations in Transition:The Issue of Bases," pp.656-657.
1 Buszynski, "The Philippines, Asean and the Future of the American Bases," p.83.
2 Asian Studies Center, "How the Marcos Opposition Challenges the United States," Backgrounder, No.31 (July 2, 1985) pp.1-13 at pp.6-7.
3 For information on the 1987 Philippine Constitution, see for instance the following link: http://www.gov.ph/the-philippine-constitutions/the-1987-constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines/
1 Renato Cruz De Castro, "The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations:A Ghost from the Cold War or an Alliance of the 21st Century?" Asian Survey, Vol.43, No.6 (November-December,2003) pp.911-988 at p.974.
1 Rowena Carranza, "September 16,1991:The Day the Impossible Happened," Bulatlat, Vol.2, No.32 (September 15-21,2002), downloaded at http://www.bulatlat.com/news/2-32/2-32-bases.html; New York Times, "Philippines Orders U.S. to Leave Strategic Navy Base at Subic Bay,'" December 28,1991, downloaded at: http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/28/world/philippines-orders-us-to-leave-strategic-navy-base-at-subic-bay.html?p agewanted=all&src=pm.
2 Carranza, "September 16,1991:The Day the Impossible Happened.'
1 From the mid-1990s, there was another change in the strategic environment with China's potential challenge sparked by the South China Sea and Taiwan issues. For earlier arguments on the issue, see Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry:Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol.18, No.3 (Winter,1993/1994), pp.5-33:John Garver, "China's Push through the South China Sea:The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests,'" China Quarterly, No.132 (December,1992), pp.999-1028.For other contentions, see Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol.75, No.2 (March/April,1997), pp. 18-32; Thomas Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik." Foreign Affairs, Vol.75, No.5 (September/October,1996), pp.37-52; David Lampton, "The Faces of Chinese Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol.86, No.1 (January/February, 2007), pp.115-127; Joseph Nye, "China's Re-emergence and the Future of the Asia Pacific," Survival. Vol.39, No. 4 (Winter,1997), pp.65-79; Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the "Constrainment" of China," International Security, Vol.20, No.4 (Spring,1996), pp.107-135; For opposing view, see Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum:Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes of Thought" Asian Survey, Vol.38, No.5 (May, 1998), pp.425-440:David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia:Reshaping the Regional Order," International Security, Vol.29, No,3 (Winter,2004/2005), pp.64-99:Allen Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China:The Security Dimension," Asian Survey, Vol.37, No.4 (April,1997), pp.299-322.
1 Jae-Jeok Park, "A Comparative Case Study of the U.S.-Philippines Alliance in the 1990s and the U.S.-South Korea Alliance between 1998 and 2008," Asian Survey, Vol.51, No.2 (March/April,2011), pp.268-289.
2 Barton Brown, "The Philippines-United States Bases Debate:Why the Twain Never Met," Asian Affairs, Vol.20, No.3 (Fall,1993), pp.162-178.
1 Stephen R. Shalom, "Securing the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement of 1947," Bulletin of Concerned Scholars, Vol.22, No.4 (October-December,1990), pp.3-12.
1 Jae-Jeok Park, "A Comparative Case Study of the U.S.-Philippines Alliance in the 1990s and the U.S.-South Korea Alliance between 1998 and 2008.'
1 Bacho, "U.S.-Philippine Relations in Transition:The Issue of Bases."
1 Edward A. Olsen, "U.S. Security Policy and the Two Koreas," World Affairs, Vol.162, No.4 (Spring,2000), pp. 150-157 at p.151.
1 Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, Stanford, California:Stanford University Press (1999), p.38.
1.Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, Stanford, California:Stanford University Press (1999), p.38.
2 Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, Stanford, California:Stanford University Press (1999), p.41.
1 Earl G. Ravenal, "The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments," Foreign Affairs (January,1971).
1 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, p.73.
2 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle p.111.
1 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle,p.115.
1 For further discussion of nordpolitik, see Jangho Kim, "Ostpolitik Revisited:The Lessons and the Remaining Consequences of Nordpolitik," International Area Review, Vol.13, No.3 (Autumn,2010), pp.73-88.
1 Aidan Foster-Carter, "Sunshine or Sunset?" The World Today, Vol.55, No.3 (March,1999), pp.11-13 at p.12.
2 For a discussion of the U.S. and South Korea's different perception towards the AF, see Victor Cha, "Realism, Liberalism, and the Durability of the U.S.-South Korean Alliance," Asian Survey, Vol.37, No.7 (July,1997), pp. 609-622.
1 For a discussion of Progressive's Views Towards North Korea, see Hahm Chaibong, "South Korea's Progressives and the U.S.-ROK Alliance," Dynamic Forces on the Korean Peninsula:Strategic & Economic Implications (undated), pp.188-201.
1 Relations between China and South Korea had been growing since especially after the 1997 Financial Crisis, in which public perceptions of South Korea had been more positive as compared to the United States. See, for instance, Jae Ho Chung, "South Korea between Eagle and Dragon:Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic Dilemma," Asian Survey, Vol.41, No.5 (September/October,2001), pp.777-796.
1 For comments on the 2nd Korean nuclear crisis, see Victor D. Cha and David Kang, "The Korea Crisis," Foreign Policy, No.136 (May-June,2003), pp.20-24+26+28; David Kang, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol.47, No.3 (September,2003), pp.301-324.
2 Victor D. Cha, "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," International Security, Vol.27, No.1 (Summer,2002), pp.40-78.
1 For a discussion of how to manage the U.S.-ROK alliance following a new strategic environment, see Jae-Chang Kim, "The New International Order and the US-ROK Alliance," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.15, No. 2 (2003, pp.57-75.
2 Hazel Smith, "Threat or Opportunity?" The World Today, Vol.58, No.1 (January,2002), pp.21-22.
3 See Victor Cha, "Korea's Place in the Axis," Foreign Affairs, Vol.81, No.3 (May/June,2002), pp.79-92.
4 Seethe following link:(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1908571.stm)
1 Seong Ryoul Cho, "The ROK-US Alliance and the Future of US Forces in South Korea," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.15, No.2 (Fall,2003), pp.77-104; Jimmy H. Koo, "The Uncomfortable SOFA: Anti-Americanism Sentiments in South Korea and the U.S.-South Korea Status of Forces Agreement," American University National Security Law Brief, Vol.1, Issue 1 (2011), pp.102-105; Jinwung Kim, "Ambivalent Allies: Recent South Korean Perceptions of the United States Forces Korea (USFK)," Asian Affairs, Vol.30, No.4 (Winter,2004), pp.268-285.
2 For a discussion, see Jei Guk Jeon, "Driven By Peace Operations:A Balanced Development of the ROK-U.S. Alliance," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.22, No.4 (2010), pp.407-420.
1 Sung-han Kim, "Anti-American Sentiment and the ROK-US Alliance," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 15, No.2 (2003), pp.105-130.
2 See the following link:http://www.rjkoehler.com/2004/01/18/us-korea-agree-on-yongsan-garrison-move/
1 See the following link:(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/korea-orbat.htm). For a discussion of how public perception is linked to the value of the USFK,see Shi Young Lee & Taejoon Han, "An Economic Assessment of USFK:Linking Public Perception and Value," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.15, No.2 (2003), pp.131-152.
2 Zannou Andre Corneille, "ROK-U.S. Military Alliance and the Future of Korea's Defense Policy," The Review of Korean Studies, Vol.10, No.2 (June,2007), pp.147-160 at p.152.
1 Lee Jong-sup, "The ROK-U.S. Alliance and Self-Reliant Defense in the ROK," in A Turning Point:Democratic Consolidation in the ROK and Strategic Readjustment in the US-ROK Alliance (unspecified publisher, undated).
2 Sook-Jong Lee, "Allying with the United States:Changing South Korean Attitudes," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.17, No.1 (2005), pp.81-104.
1 Seong Ryoul Cho, "The ROK-US Alliance and the Future of US Forces in South Korea," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.15, No.2 (2003), pp.77-104.
2 Choong Nam Kim, "The Roh Moo Hyun Government's Policy Toward North Korea," East-West Center Working Papers:Politics, Governance, and Security Series, No.11 (August,2005), pp.1-28 at pp.7-8.
1 David Rapkin, "The United States, Japan, and the Power to Block:the APEC and AMF Cases," Pacific Review, Vol.14, No.3 (September,2001), pp.373-410.
2 Chaibong, "South Korea's Progressives and the U.S.-ROK Alliance," p.196.
1 For more discussions on anti-Americanism, see Myongsob Kim, Suzanne Parker and Jun Young Choi, "Increasing Distrust of the USA in South Korea," International Political Science Review, Vol.27, No.4 (2006), pp. 427-445; Seung-Hwan Kim, "Anti-Americanism in Korea," Washington Quarterly, Vol.26, No.1 (Winter, 2002/2003), pp.109-122; Sung-Han Kim, "Anti-American Sentiment and the ROK-US Alliance," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.15, No.2 (Fall,2003), pp.105-130; Hyun-Wook Kim. "Domestic Events, Ideological Changes and the Post-Cold War US-South Korea Alliance," Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.63, No.4 (December,2009), pp.482-504.
2 Kim, "The Roh Moo Hyun Government's Policy Toward North Korea," p.10.
1 Kim, "The Roh Moo Hyun Government's Policy Toward North Korea," p.17.
1 For some discussions of 'great power' game in Central Asia, see Roy Allison, "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy," International Affairs, Vol.80, No.2 (March,2004), pp.277-293; Lowell Dittmer, "Central Asia and the Regional Powers," China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly, Vol.5, No.4 (2007), pp.7-22; Eugene Huskey, "Foreign Policy in a Vulnerable State:Kyrgyzstan as Military Entrepot between the Great Powers," China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol.6, No.4 (2008), pp.5-18; Fabio Indeo, "The Geopolitical Consequences of the U.S. Russian "Military Airbase Race" in Central Asia," China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly, Vol.8, No.3 (2010), pp.149-172; Dianne L. Smith, "Central Asia:A New Great Game? Asian Affairs, Vol.23, No.3 (Fall, 1996), pp.147-175.
1 Alexander Cooley, "U.S. Bases and Democratization in Central Asia," Orbis (Winter,2008), pp.65-90 at p.67.
1 Regine Spector, "The Transformation of Askar Akaev, President of Kyrgyzstan," Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies (Spring,2004), pp.1-35 at pp.11-12.
1 Regine Spector, "The Transformation of Askar Akaev, President of Kyrgyzstan," Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies (Spring,2004), p.12.
1 Regine Spector, "The Transformation of Askar Akaev, President of Kyrgyzstan," Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies (Spring,2004), p.12.
2 Yasar Sari, "Foreign Policy of Kyrgyzstan Under Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev," Perceptions, Vol. XVII, No.3 (Autumn,2012), pp.131-150 at p.137.
1 BBC "Central Asia:Struggling for a Future," see the following link: http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/specials/1238_wag_comms/page4.shtml
1 Sari, "Foreign Policy of Kyrgyzstan Under Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev," p.138.
1 See "President of Kyrgyzstan:Our Foreign Policy Doctrine is the Great Silk Road," Executive Intelligence Review, Vol.26, No.15 (April 9,1999) pp.49-52.
2 Alexander Cooley, "U.S. Bases and Democratization in Central Asia," pp.70-71.
1 Alexander Cooley, "Depoliticizing Manas:The Domestic Consequences of the U.S. Military Presence in Kyrgyzstan," PONARS Policy Memo No.362 (February,2005), pp.1-8; Alexander Cooley, "Manas Matters: The Changing Politics of the U.S. Military Base in Kyrgyzstan," PONARS Policy Conference Memo No.423 (December,2006), pp.1-5.
2 Alexander Cooley, "Manas Matters:The Changing Politics of the U.S. Military Base in Kyrgyzstan," p.2.
1 For more discussions on the Tulip Revolution, see Anara Karagulova and Megoran, Nick, "Discourses of Danger and the'War on Terror':Gothic Kyrgyzstan and the Collapse of the Akaev Regime," Review of International Studies, Vol.37, No.1 (January,2011), pp.29-48; David Lewis, "The Dynamics of Regime Change:Domestic and International Factors in the Tulip Revolution" Central Asian Survey, Vol.27, No.3/4 (September/December, 2008), pp.265-277; Erica Marat "March and After:What Has Changed? What Has Stayed the Same?'" Central Asian Survey, Vol.27, No.3/4 (September/December,2008), pp.229-240; Stefanie Ortmann, "Diffusion as Discourse of Danger:Russian Self-representation and the Framing of the Tulip Revolution," Central Asian Survey, Vol.27, No.3/4 (September/December,2008), pp.363-378; Shairbek Juraev, "Kyrgyz Democracy? The Tulip Revolution and Beyond," Central Asian Survey, Vol.27, Nos.3/4 (September/December,2008), pp.253-264.
2 Evgeny Troitskiy, "Turmoil in Kyrgyzstan:A Challenge to Russian Foreign Policy," Swedish Institute of International Affairs Occasional Papers, No.8 (2012), pp.1-37 at p.13.
1 Evgeny Troitskiy, "Turmoil in Kyrgyzstan:A Challenge to Russian Foreign Policy," Swedish Institute of International Affairs Occasional Papers, No.8 (2012), pp.1-37 at p.13.
1 Sari, "Foreign Policy of Kyrgyzstan Under Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev," pp.142-143.
1 Sari, "Foreign Policy of Kyrgyzstan Under Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev," p.143-144.
1 Troitskiy, "Turmoil in Kyrgyzstan:A Challenge to Russian Foreign Policy,"p.14.
1 Troitskiy, "Turmoil in Kyrgyzstan:A Challenge to Russian Foreign Policy," p.16.
1 Indeo, "The Geopolitical Consequences of the U.S.-Russian "Military Airbase Race" in Central Asia," p.150.
2 Michael Mihalka, "Not Much of a Game:Security Dynamics in Central Asia," China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol.5, No. (2007 pp.21-39 at p.22.
1 Alisher Khamidov. "The Base of Contention:Kyrgyzstan, Russia and The U.S. in Central Asia (2001-2010)," A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland (May,2011), p.3.
2 Ibid, p.3.
3 Andrew T. Bernard, "The Eagle, the Bear, and the Yurt:Evaluating Kyrgyzstan's Foreign Policy Behavior with the United States and Russia in the Post-9/11 Security Environment," A thesis submitted to the Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey, California (June,2005), p.7.
1 Cooley, "Manas Matters:The Changing Politics of the U.S. Military Base in Kyrgyzstan," p.4.
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