优质猪肉供应链中养殖与屠宰加工环节的质量安全行为协调机制研究
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摘要
中国是全球最大的猪肉生产和消费国，猪肉质量安全状况不仅关系着广大消费者的身心健康和生命安全，而且影响着猪肉产业国际竞争力的提升。供应链环境下猪肉的质量受养殖、屠宰加工和流通销售等环节主体的质量安全行为及其协调状况的影响。从猪肉生产工艺流程和猪肉质量形成过程看，优质猪肉是养殖和屠宰加工等各环节主体质量安全行为协同作用的结果；从优质猪肉供应链运作机制看，养殖和屠宰加工是影响猪肉质量安全水平的2个关键环节。因此，对养殖和屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调进行研究具有重要的理论和现实意义。
本文在大量查阅分析国内外相关文献、走访有关专家和实地调研的基础上，依据供应链管理理论，参考优质猪肉供应链建设与管理研究课题组①的前期研究成果，综合运用系统分析、对比分析、统计分析、结构方程模型、进化博弈模型和系统仿真等方法，对优质猪肉供应链中养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调的基本问题、现实状况、影响因素、形成机制、演进过程和对策建议等进行了较为深入系统的研究。
概念界定与理论阐释是本文研究的理论基础。本文在阐释优质猪肉、优质猪肉供应链和养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为等问题的基础上，重点分析了优质猪肉供应链中养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调。研究表明，养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调是一个以认知为基础，以系统观为思想，以提高优质猪肉供应链整体竞争优势、追求个体利益最大化为动因，以动态演化为形成过程，以生产出质量指标符合标准要求的优质猪肉为目标的保障猪肉质量安全、降低猪肉质量成本的过程。
实证分析是本文研究的关键内容。本文利用山东省等10省（市）的991份问卷调查数据，首先从认知协调与行为协调2个层面实证研究了双方在环境维护等7个方面的质量安全行为协调状况。然后，运用结构方程模型分析了养猪场户质量安全行为协调的影响因素。结果表明：屠宰加工企业的质量安全认知与行为均优于养猪场户。其中，双方在疫病防控和投入品来源（采购）方面协调状况较好；在环境维护、生产档案建设、设施配置和员工培训方面协调状况较差；在动物福利方面协调状况差。养猪场户质量安全行为协调的认知受决策者特征、经营特征、环境特征的显著正向影响。养猪场户质量安全行为协调状况受认知特征和环境特征的显著正向影响。其中，环境特征对质量安全行为协调的认知和状况的影响最为显著。
分析优质猪肉供应链中养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调形成机制是本文研究的重点之一。本文从动力机制、传导机制、促进机制、保障机制4个方面探讨了养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调的形成机制。研究表明：提高产品质量、规避风险、增加效益对双方质量安全行为协调具有驱动作用；信息及其传播、价格、行业标准对双方质量安全行为协调具有传导作用；国家食品安全管理制度演变、市场结构变化、消费者观念转变对双方质量安全行为协调具有促进作用；激励政策和约束措施对双方质量安全行为协调具有保障作用。各个机制之间相互影响、相互依存、相互促进，形成“行为改善与协调→生猪质量提高→猪肉质量提高→消费者满意度提高→供应链利益提高→个体利益提高（扣除了协调成本）→协调意识与动力提高→更加协调”的良性循环。
养猪场户与屠宰加工企业的行为协调选择是保障养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调形成的关键。本文应用双种群博弈理论和系统仿真理论，研究了养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调的演进规律、影响因素并对双方的演化过程进行数值模拟。研究表明，协调演化方向受协调成本、协调收益、收益分配系数（损失分摊系数）、被惩罚概率、潜在损失、经营规模和奖惩系数7个因素的影响。降低协调成本，提高协调收益，建立公平有效的利益分配（损失分摊）机制、加强外部监管和惩罚力度，将会促进优质猪肉供应链中养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调的实现。
对策建议是全文研究的落脚点。本文提出了促进优质猪肉供应链中养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调的策略。具体包括：猪肉消费者应加强质量安全认知、猪肉安全购买能力、信息反馈和维权意识；养猪场户应提高管理者素质、提升经营特征、规范质量安全行为、加强与屠宰加工企业的交流沟通；屠宰加工企业应提升企业实力，规范质量安全行为、加大对养猪场户的支持和监管；优质猪肉供应链应建立质量安全行为协调的支撑服务系统、评估体系和利益分配与风险承担机制；政府应加大对质量安全行为协调的宣传并加强人才培养、资金、技术支持和监督管理。
China is the largest producer and consumer of pork in the world, and pork quality safetycondition not only relates to consumers’ lives and health, but also has an impact on the globalcompetitiveness of pork industry. Pork quality in a supply chain is influenced by qualitysafety behaviors of the entities involved in hog breeding, slaughtering and processing,distribution and marketing as well as the coordination of the behaviors. From the perspectiveof pork production technology process and pork quality formation process, high quality porkis the result of synergy of quality safety behaviors of entities involved in breeding,slaughtering and processing and so on; from the perspective of quality pork supply chainoperation mechanism, breeding, slaughtering and processing are two key links the influencepork quality safety. Study on quality safety behavior coordination between breeding andslaughtering and processing links is of theoretical and practical significance.
An in-depth and systematic study of basic issues, status quo, influence factors, formationmechanism, and solutions and suggestions on the coordination issue of quality safetybehaviors between breeding and slaughtering and processing links in a high quality porksupply chain is made, by comprehensively employing methods like system analysis,contrastive analysis, statistical analysis, structural equation model, evolutionary game model,and system simulation, with a reference of the previous studies made by research team ofstudy on high quality pork supply chain construction and management, based on domestic andforeign literature review, expert interview and field survey, as well as supply chainmanagement theories.
Systematic understanding, concept definition and theory explanation of quality safetybehaviors and behavior coordination of the entities involved in breeding, slaughtering andprocessing links in high quality pork supply chain laid the theoretical foundation for this study.This paper introduced high quality pork, high quality pork supply chain, and quality safetybehavior in breeding, slaughtering and processing links in a high quality pork supply chain.Based on this, coordination of quality safety behaviors between breeding, slaughtering andprocessing links in a high quality pork supply chain is analyzed in detail. It shows that qualitysafety behavior coordination between breeding, slaughtering and processing links is adynamic evolutionary process that guarantees pork quality safety and decreases pork qualitycost, with a purpose to produce high quality pork that is up to standard. The process is basedon recognition, directed by systematic perspective and driven by the enhancement of overallcompetitiveness of high quality pork supply chain and pursuit of optimal personal interest.
Empirical analysis is the key of this paper. Data of991surveys from ten provincesincluding Shandong province are utilized.7perspectives such as environmental maintenanceare empirically studied in terms of recognition coordination and behavior coordination.Second, Structure Equation Model is employed to identify factors influencing quality safetybehaviors of pig farms and farmers. It shows that quality safety behavior and recognition ofslaughtering and processing companies are generally better than those of pig farms andfarmers. Two parties are coordinated well in terms of disease prevention and treatment as wellas input purchase; they are not well coordinated in terms of environment maintenance,production record-keeping, equipment configuration and personnel training; theircoordination is bad in terms of animal welfare. Recognition of quality safety behaviorcoordination of pig farms and farmers are positively influenced by decision-makers’characteristics, operation characteristics, environmental characteristics. Coordination ofquality safety behaviors of pig farms and farmers are positively influenced by recognitioncharacteristics and environmental characteristics. Environmental characteristics are the mostsignificant factor to recognition of quality safety behavior coordination and coordination ofquality safety behaviors.
Analysis of coordination formation mechanism of quality safety behaviors of breedingand slaughtering and processing links in high quality pork supply chain is one of the keypoints. Coordination formation mechanism is explored from4aspects: driver mechanism,transmission mechanism, promotion mechanism, and guarantee mechanism. Study shows thatproduct quality improvement, risk avoidance, and revenue increase will drive the coordination;information and transmission, price, industry standard have transmission impact on thecoordination; evolution of government food safety regulation, change in market structure, andchange in consumers’ notion have promotion impact on the coordination; incentive policiesand control measures have guarantee impact on the coordination. Influence factors in eachmechanism interact, interdepend, promote each other, and form a virtuous circle of “behaviorimprovement and coordination→pork quality improvement→customer satisfactionimprovement→supply chain performanceimprovement→individual performanceimprovement (except for cost of coordination)→consciousness and motivationimprovement→behavior coordination facilitation”.
Selection of behavior coordination between pig farms and farmers and slaughtering andprocessing companies is the key to ensure the coordination formation of quality safetybehavior of both parties. Two-population game theory and system simulation theory areemployed to study the evolution process and influence factors of the coordination of quality safety behavior of breeding and slaughtering and processing links. It shows that coordinationevolutionary direction are affected by7influence factors like coordination cost, coordinationrevenue, revenue allocation coefficient (loss sharing coefficient), probability to be punished,potential loss, operation scale and reward and punishment coefficient. In order to realize thecoordination of quality safety behavior of breeding and saughtering and processing links inhigh quality supply chain, coordination cost should be decreased, coordination revenue shouldbe increased, fair and effective revenue allocation (loss sharing) mechanism should be built,and external supervision and punishment should be enforced.
Solutions and suggestions are the ultimate purpose of this study. Tactics that promote thecoordination of quality safety behaviors of breeding and slaughtering and processing links inhigh quality pork supply chain are proposed.Details are as follows: pork consumers shouldimprove their recognition of quality safety, their capability to buy safe pork, their awarenessof information feedback and righ protection; pig farms and farmers should improve theirmanagement capabilities, enhance their operation characteristics, regulate their quality safetybehavior, and strengthen their communication with slaughtering and processsing companies;slaughering and processing companies should elevate their capabilities, regulate their qualitysafety behavior, increase their support for pig farms and farmers, and strengthen their rewardand punishment of pig farms and farmers; high quality pork supply chain should furtherdevelop service system for quality safety behavior coordination, evaluation system, andrevenue allocation and risk sharing mechanism; government should improve the propagandaof quality safety behavior coordination, talent cultivation, capital and technology support aswell as supervision and administration.
本文在大量查阅分析国内外相关文献、走访有关专家和实地调研的基础上，依据供应链管理理论，参考优质猪肉供应链建设与管理研究课题组①的前期研究成果，综合运用系统分析、对比分析、统计分析、结构方程模型、进化博弈模型和系统仿真等方法，对优质猪肉供应链中养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调的基本问题、现实状况、影响因素、形成机制、演进过程和对策建议等进行了较为深入系统的研究。
概念界定与理论阐释是本文研究的理论基础。本文在阐释优质猪肉、优质猪肉供应链和养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为等问题的基础上，重点分析了优质猪肉供应链中养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调。研究表明，养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调是一个以认知为基础，以系统观为思想，以提高优质猪肉供应链整体竞争优势、追求个体利益最大化为动因，以动态演化为形成过程，以生产出质量指标符合标准要求的优质猪肉为目标的保障猪肉质量安全、降低猪肉质量成本的过程。
实证分析是本文研究的关键内容。本文利用山东省等10省（市）的991份问卷调查数据，首先从认知协调与行为协调2个层面实证研究了双方在环境维护等7个方面的质量安全行为协调状况。然后，运用结构方程模型分析了养猪场户质量安全行为协调的影响因素。结果表明：屠宰加工企业的质量安全认知与行为均优于养猪场户。其中，双方在疫病防控和投入品来源（采购）方面协调状况较好；在环境维护、生产档案建设、设施配置和员工培训方面协调状况较差；在动物福利方面协调状况差。养猪场户质量安全行为协调的认知受决策者特征、经营特征、环境特征的显著正向影响。养猪场户质量安全行为协调状况受认知特征和环境特征的显著正向影响。其中，环境特征对质量安全行为协调的认知和状况的影响最为显著。
分析优质猪肉供应链中养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调形成机制是本文研究的重点之一。本文从动力机制、传导机制、促进机制、保障机制4个方面探讨了养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调的形成机制。研究表明：提高产品质量、规避风险、增加效益对双方质量安全行为协调具有驱动作用；信息及其传播、价格、行业标准对双方质量安全行为协调具有传导作用；国家食品安全管理制度演变、市场结构变化、消费者观念转变对双方质量安全行为协调具有促进作用；激励政策和约束措施对双方质量安全行为协调具有保障作用。各个机制之间相互影响、相互依存、相互促进，形成“行为改善与协调→生猪质量提高→猪肉质量提高→消费者满意度提高→供应链利益提高→个体利益提高（扣除了协调成本）→协调意识与动力提高→更加协调”的良性循环。
养猪场户与屠宰加工企业的行为协调选择是保障养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调形成的关键。本文应用双种群博弈理论和系统仿真理论，研究了养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调的演进规律、影响因素并对双方的演化过程进行数值模拟。研究表明，协调演化方向受协调成本、协调收益、收益分配系数（损失分摊系数）、被惩罚概率、潜在损失、经营规模和奖惩系数7个因素的影响。降低协调成本，提高协调收益，建立公平有效的利益分配（损失分摊）机制、加强外部监管和惩罚力度，将会促进优质猪肉供应链中养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调的实现。
对策建议是全文研究的落脚点。本文提出了促进优质猪肉供应链中养殖与屠宰加工环节质量安全行为协调的策略。具体包括：猪肉消费者应加强质量安全认知、猪肉安全购买能力、信息反馈和维权意识；养猪场户应提高管理者素质、提升经营特征、规范质量安全行为、加强与屠宰加工企业的交流沟通；屠宰加工企业应提升企业实力，规范质量安全行为、加大对养猪场户的支持和监管；优质猪肉供应链应建立质量安全行为协调的支撑服务系统、评估体系和利益分配与风险承担机制；政府应加大对质量安全行为协调的宣传并加强人才培养、资金、技术支持和监督管理。
China is the largest producer and consumer of pork in the world, and pork quality safetycondition not only relates to consumers’ lives and health, but also has an impact on the globalcompetitiveness of pork industry. Pork quality in a supply chain is influenced by qualitysafety behaviors of the entities involved in hog breeding, slaughtering and processing,distribution and marketing as well as the coordination of the behaviors. From the perspectiveof pork production technology process and pork quality formation process, high quality porkis the result of synergy of quality safety behaviors of entities involved in breeding,slaughtering and processing and so on; from the perspective of quality pork supply chainoperation mechanism, breeding, slaughtering and processing are two key links the influencepork quality safety. Study on quality safety behavior coordination between breeding andslaughtering and processing links is of theoretical and practical significance.
An in-depth and systematic study of basic issues, status quo, influence factors, formationmechanism, and solutions and suggestions on the coordination issue of quality safetybehaviors between breeding and slaughtering and processing links in a high quality porksupply chain is made, by comprehensively employing methods like system analysis,contrastive analysis, statistical analysis, structural equation model, evolutionary game model,and system simulation, with a reference of the previous studies made by research team ofstudy on high quality pork supply chain construction and management, based on domestic andforeign literature review, expert interview and field survey, as well as supply chainmanagement theories.
Systematic understanding, concept definition and theory explanation of quality safetybehaviors and behavior coordination of the entities involved in breeding, slaughtering andprocessing links in high quality pork supply chain laid the theoretical foundation for this study.This paper introduced high quality pork, high quality pork supply chain, and quality safetybehavior in breeding, slaughtering and processing links in a high quality pork supply chain.Based on this, coordination of quality safety behaviors between breeding, slaughtering andprocessing links in a high quality pork supply chain is analyzed in detail. It shows that qualitysafety behavior coordination between breeding, slaughtering and processing links is adynamic evolutionary process that guarantees pork quality safety and decreases pork qualitycost, with a purpose to produce high quality pork that is up to standard. The process is basedon recognition, directed by systematic perspective and driven by the enhancement of overallcompetitiveness of high quality pork supply chain and pursuit of optimal personal interest.
Empirical analysis is the key of this paper. Data of991surveys from ten provincesincluding Shandong province are utilized.7perspectives such as environmental maintenanceare empirically studied in terms of recognition coordination and behavior coordination.Second, Structure Equation Model is employed to identify factors influencing quality safetybehaviors of pig farms and farmers. It shows that quality safety behavior and recognition ofslaughtering and processing companies are generally better than those of pig farms andfarmers. Two parties are coordinated well in terms of disease prevention and treatment as wellas input purchase; they are not well coordinated in terms of environment maintenance,production record-keeping, equipment configuration and personnel training; theircoordination is bad in terms of animal welfare. Recognition of quality safety behaviorcoordination of pig farms and farmers are positively influenced by decision-makers’characteristics, operation characteristics, environmental characteristics. Coordination ofquality safety behaviors of pig farms and farmers are positively influenced by recognitioncharacteristics and environmental characteristics. Environmental characteristics are the mostsignificant factor to recognition of quality safety behavior coordination and coordination ofquality safety behaviors.
Analysis of coordination formation mechanism of quality safety behaviors of breedingand slaughtering and processing links in high quality pork supply chain is one of the keypoints. Coordination formation mechanism is explored from4aspects: driver mechanism,transmission mechanism, promotion mechanism, and guarantee mechanism. Study shows thatproduct quality improvement, risk avoidance, and revenue increase will drive the coordination;information and transmission, price, industry standard have transmission impact on thecoordination; evolution of government food safety regulation, change in market structure, andchange in consumers’ notion have promotion impact on the coordination; incentive policiesand control measures have guarantee impact on the coordination. Influence factors in eachmechanism interact, interdepend, promote each other, and form a virtuous circle of “behaviorimprovement and coordination→pork quality improvement→customer satisfactionimprovement→supply chain performanceimprovement→individual performanceimprovement (except for cost of coordination)→consciousness and motivationimprovement→behavior coordination facilitation”.
Selection of behavior coordination between pig farms and farmers and slaughtering andprocessing companies is the key to ensure the coordination formation of quality safetybehavior of both parties. Two-population game theory and system simulation theory areemployed to study the evolution process and influence factors of the coordination of quality safety behavior of breeding and slaughtering and processing links. It shows that coordinationevolutionary direction are affected by7influence factors like coordination cost, coordinationrevenue, revenue allocation coefficient (loss sharing coefficient), probability to be punished,potential loss, operation scale and reward and punishment coefficient. In order to realize thecoordination of quality safety behavior of breeding and saughtering and processing links inhigh quality supply chain, coordination cost should be decreased, coordination revenue shouldbe increased, fair and effective revenue allocation (loss sharing) mechanism should be built,and external supervision and punishment should be enforced.
Solutions and suggestions are the ultimate purpose of this study. Tactics that promote thecoordination of quality safety behaviors of breeding and slaughtering and processing links inhigh quality pork supply chain are proposed.Details are as follows: pork consumers shouldimprove their recognition of quality safety, their capability to buy safe pork, their awarenessof information feedback and righ protection; pig farms and farmers should improve theirmanagement capabilities, enhance their operation characteristics, regulate their quality safetybehavior, and strengthen their communication with slaughtering and processsing companies;slaughering and processing companies should elevate their capabilities, regulate their qualitysafety behavior, increase their support for pig farms and farmers, and strengthen their rewardand punishment of pig farms and farmers; high quality pork supply chain should furtherdevelop service system for quality safety behavior coordination, evaluation system, andrevenue allocation and risk sharing mechanism; government should improve the propagandaof quality safety behavior coordination, talent cultivation, capital and technology support aswell as supervision and administration.
引文
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