公司治理溢价研究
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摘要
在成熟的资本市场上,投资者持有治理质量良好的上市公司股票能够给其带来超出市场平均水平的投资回报,也即治理溢价(李维安,2002)。公司治理溢价既是面向证券市场和投资者的价值溢价,也是上市公司治理效率的动态评价和市场反馈,不同的公司治理安排体现着不同的治理溢价。然而,治理溢价到底是如何生成的,其本质和来源又是什么?现有文献均没有给出明确、系统的解释。随着近年来我国资本市场的蓬勃发展,公司治理改革的制度基础日益巩固,如何准确认识、理解我国转轨经济制度背景下的公司治理溢价及其生成机制等,从而引导上市公司改善治理水平,促进证券市场合理反映治理溢价便具有极其重要的现实意义。
本文在系统综述国内外相关研究成果的基础上,综合运用公司治理理论、代理理论、企业价值理论以及风险资产定价理论,紧密结合我国特定的制度背景,采用规范分析与实证研究相结合的方法,对我国上市公司治理溢价问题进行了深入的研究。首先,从“溢价”的真实来源和各契约主体的视角对治理溢价进行了重新界定,强化了治理溢价的风险与价值本质,还改进多因子风险资产定价模型来对治理溢价进行计量；其次,从公司治理的价值相关性角度,论述了治理溢价的形成机制,分析了代理问题在治理溢价生成中的地位和作用,并通过构建公司治理综合指数和完善公司业绩衡量方法,实证分析了公司治理与公司绩效之间的跨期交互作用,提出了治理溢价存在性的新证据；再次,从利益相关者治理的角度,论述了治理溢价的影响机制,对内外部治理机制如何影响治理溢价进行了理论分析,并以我国上市公司为研究样本,从治理机制、治理环境和治理行为等方面,实证分析了治理溢价的影响问题；最后,理论联系实际,探讨了完善我国公司治理溢价的制度安排。
本文通过理论和实证研究,发现：(1)治理溢价是与治理风险、治理成本等相关联的对价,是归属于所有契约主体的价值溢价,是公司治理过程中有关治理质量的反馈和评价,它包括制度溢价、代理溢价、要素溢价等,其本质是公司解决代理问题的治理效用的一部分；(2)利用四因子风险资产定价模型对治理溢价进行计量,区分开了溢价的政策风险与市场风险来源,完整揭示出了公司治理的市场溢价、规模溢价、价值溢价以及动量溢价；(3)我国上市公司总体上存在着年均约3.6%的治理溢价,治理溢价率显著关联于公司治理质量,相比较而言,内部治理机制比外部治理机制的溢价效应更为显著；(4)公司治理的价值相关性与市场和投资者的预期偏差是治理溢价生成的重要原因。委托代理问题的价值效应决定了治理溢价的产生,而公司治理与公司价值、公司绩效之间的跨期交互影响关系,使得治理溢价被进一步放大和显化；(5)治理溢价受到治理机制、治理环境、治理行为等的影响。当前,我国资本市场化程度、控制权市场竞争、投资者法律保护、政府行为、历史和文化等外部机制,以及董事会治理、债务约束、信息披露等内部机制均显著影响着上市公司治理溢价；(6)此外,理论联系实际,本文从利益相关者角度,从健全内外部治理机制着手,为完善公司治理,提高公司治理溢价提出了一套制度安排。
Today the theory and practice of corporate governance have developed to the new stage of corporate governance evaluation (Li Weian,2002). However how to scientifically evaluate the corporate governance level of listed companies, to help investors to form a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between corporate governance and firm value, to promote the securities market to reasonably reflect corporate governance premium, have become the focus of attention. However, the origin and the formation mechanism and the nature of governance premium are still a mystery. In this paper, based on the relevant research results at home and abroad, uses the standard analysis and empirical research methods by adopting a new method to measure governance premium and research its nature, formation mechanism and influencing factors to obtaine a series of theoretical and practical perspectives and conclusions.
Firstly, this research establishes a theoretical framework for the formation mechanism of governance premium based on theoretically analysis of agency problems. Governance premium is redefined as asking price of bearing the additional corporate governance risk which is the part of excess value as corporate governance activities. It lies in that the market or investors do not correctly recognize that the correlation among agency problems, corporate governance and corporate performance. In that word, unexpected agency costs are passed to the stock market to gain the premium.
Then, this paper empiricaly researches the mutual intertemporal effect by constructing a dynamic endogeneity model and improving corporate performance measured method. In the process of constructing a broad corporate governance index by the using of principal component analysis and developing a system of simultaneous equations and dynamic panel GMM mode to test the relationship between Corporate governance as measured by CGI with corporate performance as measured by the rate of return on common stockholders'equity by excluding the impact of earnings management. The results support the hypothesis of the mutual intertemporal effect between corporate governance with corporate performance. This is the new evidence and new explanation for the existence of governance premium.
Secondly, this paper procees factors affecting analysis of governance premium in theory and empirical based on the institutional background as governance mechanism by two dimensions including the elements of governance and governance mechanisms and the environment, the results shows that there is 3.6% of governance premium per year, and the internal governance mechanism has a significant positive correlation between with governance premium, but the external governance mechanism is affected on conditional.
Finally, this paper puts forward to the system arrangement and advices to improve governance premium and corporate governance based on the above findings.
本文在系统综述国内外相关研究成果的基础上,综合运用公司治理理论、代理理论、企业价值理论以及风险资产定价理论,紧密结合我国特定的制度背景,采用规范分析与实证研究相结合的方法,对我国上市公司治理溢价问题进行了深入的研究。首先,从“溢价”的真实来源和各契约主体的视角对治理溢价进行了重新界定,强化了治理溢价的风险与价值本质,还改进多因子风险资产定价模型来对治理溢价进行计量；其次,从公司治理的价值相关性角度,论述了治理溢价的形成机制,分析了代理问题在治理溢价生成中的地位和作用,并通过构建公司治理综合指数和完善公司业绩衡量方法,实证分析了公司治理与公司绩效之间的跨期交互作用,提出了治理溢价存在性的新证据；再次,从利益相关者治理的角度,论述了治理溢价的影响机制,对内外部治理机制如何影响治理溢价进行了理论分析,并以我国上市公司为研究样本,从治理机制、治理环境和治理行为等方面,实证分析了治理溢价的影响问题；最后,理论联系实际,探讨了完善我国公司治理溢价的制度安排。
本文通过理论和实证研究,发现：(1)治理溢价是与治理风险、治理成本等相关联的对价,是归属于所有契约主体的价值溢价,是公司治理过程中有关治理质量的反馈和评价,它包括制度溢价、代理溢价、要素溢价等,其本质是公司解决代理问题的治理效用的一部分；(2)利用四因子风险资产定价模型对治理溢价进行计量,区分开了溢价的政策风险与市场风险来源,完整揭示出了公司治理的市场溢价、规模溢价、价值溢价以及动量溢价；(3)我国上市公司总体上存在着年均约3.6%的治理溢价,治理溢价率显著关联于公司治理质量,相比较而言,内部治理机制比外部治理机制的溢价效应更为显著；(4)公司治理的价值相关性与市场和投资者的预期偏差是治理溢价生成的重要原因。委托代理问题的价值效应决定了治理溢价的产生,而公司治理与公司价值、公司绩效之间的跨期交互影响关系,使得治理溢价被进一步放大和显化；(5)治理溢价受到治理机制、治理环境、治理行为等的影响。当前,我国资本市场化程度、控制权市场竞争、投资者法律保护、政府行为、历史和文化等外部机制,以及董事会治理、债务约束、信息披露等内部机制均显著影响着上市公司治理溢价；(6)此外,理论联系实际,本文从利益相关者角度,从健全内外部治理机制着手,为完善公司治理,提高公司治理溢价提出了一套制度安排。
Today the theory and practice of corporate governance have developed to the new stage of corporate governance evaluation (Li Weian,2002). However how to scientifically evaluate the corporate governance level of listed companies, to help investors to form a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between corporate governance and firm value, to promote the securities market to reasonably reflect corporate governance premium, have become the focus of attention. However, the origin and the formation mechanism and the nature of governance premium are still a mystery. In this paper, based on the relevant research results at home and abroad, uses the standard analysis and empirical research methods by adopting a new method to measure governance premium and research its nature, formation mechanism and influencing factors to obtaine a series of theoretical and practical perspectives and conclusions.
Firstly, this research establishes a theoretical framework for the formation mechanism of governance premium based on theoretically analysis of agency problems. Governance premium is redefined as asking price of bearing the additional corporate governance risk which is the part of excess value as corporate governance activities. It lies in that the market or investors do not correctly recognize that the correlation among agency problems, corporate governance and corporate performance. In that word, unexpected agency costs are passed to the stock market to gain the premium.
Then, this paper empiricaly researches the mutual intertemporal effect by constructing a dynamic endogeneity model and improving corporate performance measured method. In the process of constructing a broad corporate governance index by the using of principal component analysis and developing a system of simultaneous equations and dynamic panel GMM mode to test the relationship between Corporate governance as measured by CGI with corporate performance as measured by the rate of return on common stockholders'equity by excluding the impact of earnings management. The results support the hypothesis of the mutual intertemporal effect between corporate governance with corporate performance. This is the new evidence and new explanation for the existence of governance premium.
Secondly, this paper procees factors affecting analysis of governance premium in theory and empirical based on the institutional background as governance mechanism by two dimensions including the elements of governance and governance mechanisms and the environment, the results shows that there is 3.6% of governance premium per year, and the internal governance mechanism has a significant positive correlation between with governance premium, but the external governance mechanism is affected on conditional.
Finally, this paper puts forward to the system arrangement and advices to improve governance premium and corporate governance based on the above findings.
引文
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