人力资本及企业在人才竞争中的策略分析
摘要
就企业功能而言，每一项功能都环环相扣，都有不可或缺的关键性，但剖析每个功能面来看，“人”却是占了首席重要的地位。从资源基础的观点来看，拥有高素质的人力资本是企业竞争优势的来源(Barney, 1991; Wright, McMaham, & Mc Williams,1992)。在当前，中国企业面临内外环境的冲击，企业更应该摆脱以往消极的人事管理制度，通过采取合理、有效的激励相容措施吸引人才并管理人才才能创造竞争优势。有鉴于此，本文对人力资本、人力资本对经济增大的贡献率、企业基于人力资本理论的人才竞争策略分析作出了探讨。
第一章主要介绍研究背景与动机、人力资本及博弈论与非对称信息经济学的相关概念、论文结构。
第二章主要研究人力资本对经济增长的贡献率，给出了不同生产函数条件下测定人力资本贡献份额的算法。
第三章主要研究企业基于人力资本理论的人才竞争策略分析。第一节通过对经典的马尔可夫转移矩阵的分析，指出了其不具有应用的完备性，并对模型进行了改进；第二节建立了企业基于人力资本理论的人才竞争策略的分析框架；第三节证明了若员工的努力水平a可观测，则有(1)，(2)，从而说明了对称信息条件下最优合同应如何制定以及最优合同应具备的特征；第四节证明了若员工的努力水平a不可观测，则有(1)，(2)从而说明了非对称信息条件下最优激励合同应如何制定以及最优激励合同应具备的特征，给出了企业奖惩员工的措施；第五节通过建立线性合同s(m，y)=α+β(m+γy)，分析了与员工努力水平a无关的其他可观测变量y对激励合同的影响，证明了当cov(m，y)≠0时，将y写入激励合同可减少代理成本，也更能提高激励的准确性；第六节讨论人力资本股份化方法，并给出了一种基于人力资本股权化思想企业对利润的分配模型。
As far as the functions of the enterprise are concerned, every function is closely related to each other and is of great significance. However, if each function is dissected , it can be found that "human" is the key factor. From the view of the resource basis, the high-quality human capital is the source of the competition preponderance of the enterprise (Barney, 1991; Wright, Mcmaham & Me Williams, 1992). At present, faced with outer and inner pressure, Chinese enterprises should get rid of the previous negative human management system, and adopt the proper and effective motivation measures to attract and manage the talent for the purpose of creating a competitive atmosphere. This paper deals with the human capital, the contribution rate of human capital to economy growth and the talent competition strategy of the enterprise based on the human capital theory.
Chapter 1, the author introduces the background and motive of the research, the relevant concepts of human capital, game theory and non-symmetry Information Economics and the structure of the paper.
Chapter 2 is mainly about the contribution rate of human resource to economy growth, and offers the algorithms of determining the contribution share under different conditions of production function.
Chapter 3 primarily studies the strategy analysis of talent competition based on the human capital theory. In the first part, I analyze the classical Markov Transional Matrices model and point out that it hasn't applicable completeness, then improve the model. The second part establishes the frame of strategy analysis of talent competition which is based on the human capital theory. The third part proves that: if the stuff's level of effort a is
observable, then (1) , and explains how to
establish the optimum contract under the condition of symmetry information and the
characters which optimum contract should have. The fourth part proves:if the stuff's level
of effort a isn't observable, then
explains how to establish the optimum contract under the condition of non-symmetry information and the characters which optimum contract should have, gives the reward and punishment measures that the enterprise should take on the employees. The fifth part analyses the influence on the motivation contract form other observable variables such as y, which is irrelevant to the stuff's level of effort a by establishing linear contracts s(m,y) = a + (3(m + yy) , proves if cov (m, y) ^0 ,then we can decrease the agent costs and enhance the accuracy of motivation by putting y into the contract. The sixth part presents the idea of human capital carbonization, gives a kind of model on the distribution of profit in enterprise which is based on the thought of human capital carbonization.
第一章主要介绍研究背景与动机、人力资本及博弈论与非对称信息经济学的相关概念、论文结构。
第二章主要研究人力资本对经济增长的贡献率，给出了不同生产函数条件下测定人力资本贡献份额的算法。
第三章主要研究企业基于人力资本理论的人才竞争策略分析。第一节通过对经典的马尔可夫转移矩阵的分析，指出了其不具有应用的完备性，并对模型进行了改进；第二节建立了企业基于人力资本理论的人才竞争策略的分析框架；第三节证明了若员工的努力水平a可观测，则有(1)，(2)，从而说明了对称信息条件下最优合同应如何制定以及最优合同应具备的特征；第四节证明了若员工的努力水平a不可观测，则有(1)，(2)从而说明了非对称信息条件下最优激励合同应如何制定以及最优激励合同应具备的特征，给出了企业奖惩员工的措施；第五节通过建立线性合同s(m，y)=α+β(m+γy)，分析了与员工努力水平a无关的其他可观测变量y对激励合同的影响，证明了当cov(m，y)≠0时，将y写入激励合同可减少代理成本，也更能提高激励的准确性；第六节讨论人力资本股份化方法，并给出了一种基于人力资本股权化思想企业对利润的分配模型。
As far as the functions of the enterprise are concerned, every function is closely related to each other and is of great significance. However, if each function is dissected , it can be found that "human" is the key factor. From the view of the resource basis, the high-quality human capital is the source of the competition preponderance of the enterprise (Barney, 1991; Wright, Mcmaham & Me Williams, 1992). At present, faced with outer and inner pressure, Chinese enterprises should get rid of the previous negative human management system, and adopt the proper and effective motivation measures to attract and manage the talent for the purpose of creating a competitive atmosphere. This paper deals with the human capital, the contribution rate of human capital to economy growth and the talent competition strategy of the enterprise based on the human capital theory.
Chapter 1, the author introduces the background and motive of the research, the relevant concepts of human capital, game theory and non-symmetry Information Economics and the structure of the paper.
Chapter 2 is mainly about the contribution rate of human resource to economy growth, and offers the algorithms of determining the contribution share under different conditions of production function.
Chapter 3 primarily studies the strategy analysis of talent competition based on the human capital theory. In the first part, I analyze the classical Markov Transional Matrices model and point out that it hasn't applicable completeness, then improve the model. The second part establishes the frame of strategy analysis of talent competition which is based on the human capital theory. The third part proves that: if the stuff's level of effort a is
observable, then (1) , and explains how to
establish the optimum contract under the condition of symmetry information and the
characters which optimum contract should have. The fourth part proves:if the stuff's level
of effort a isn't observable, then
explains how to establish the optimum contract under the condition of non-symmetry information and the characters which optimum contract should have, gives the reward and punishment measures that the enterprise should take on the employees. The fifth part analyses the influence on the motivation contract form other observable variables such as y, which is irrelevant to the stuff's level of effort a by establishing linear contracts s(m,y) = a + (3(m + yy) , proves if cov (m, y) ^0 ,then we can decrease the agent costs and enhance the accuracy of motivation by putting y into the contract. The sixth part presents the idea of human capital carbonization, gives a kind of model on the distribution of profit in enterprise which is based on the thought of human capital carbonization.
引文
[1] 闫淑敏，段兴民，中国城镇家庭人力资本投资动态与收益分析[J]．预测，2002，(3)
[2] 兰玉杰，陈晓剑．企业家人力资本激励约束机制的理论基础与政策选择[J]．数量经济技术经济研究，2002，(2)
[3] 孟季．人力资本问题讨论综述[J]．经济理论与经济管理，2002，(7)
[4] 李磊．企业人力资源规划模型的研究[J]．管理工程学报，2001，(4)
[5] 腾春贤，李磊，李皓白．求解一类非线性两级整数规划全局优化的近似算法．中国学术期刊文稿，2000，6(7)：865～867
[6] 邱国栋，刘斌．企业劳动者综合计酬法探讨[J]．运筹与管理，2002，(1)
[7] 刘正道，邓方安，人才评价与选拔的模型及应用[J]．运筹与管理，2002(3)
[8] 戴新民．略论企业人力资源及其计量模型[J]．数量经济技术经济研究，2002，(3)
[9] 金晓彤．人力资本的测度与企业人才流失的调控[J]．数量经济技术经济研究，2002，(1)
[10] 西奥多·W·舒尔茨．论人力资本投资[M]．1990
[11] 周天勇新发展经济学[M]
[12] 李宝元．战略性激励[M]
[13] 李玲，人力资本股权化及其理论构想[J]
[14] 李启明，申立银．风险管理中的风险效应——行为决策模型及分析[J]．系统工程理论与实践，2001，(10)
[15] 孙利辉，万迪晾．企业研究与开发人员报酬激励研究[J]．系统工程学报，2002，(2)
[16] 张维迎．博弈论与信息经济学[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，1996，398-463
[17] 王金营．人力资本与经济增长理论与实证[M]，2002
[18] 荷厚平．企业人力资本投资博弈分析[J]．预测．2001，(2)
[19] 刘兵，康凯．企业经营者的动态激励机制设计[J]．系统工程学报。2001，(1)
[20] Waune F. casio, managing human resource [M]. Mc Graw-hill, 1995
[21] John M. lvancevich, human resource management [M]. The edition, McGraw-hill,
1998.
[22] Dessler, Human Resource Management, Prentice Hall International, lnc, 1998
[23] Grossman S, Hart O. An analysis of the principal-agent problem[J]. Econometrica, 1983, 51(3):7-45
[24] Margaret A, Meyer, John Vickers, Performance comparisons and dynamic incentives[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1997,105(3):547-581
[25] Fudenberg D, Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Short-term contracts and long-term agent relationship[J], Journal of Economic Theory, 1990,51(1):1-31
[26] Harris M, Holmstrom B. A theory of wage dynamics[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1982,49(20:313-333
[27] Macleod B, Malcomson J. Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment[J]. Econometrica, 1989,57(3):447-480
[28] Holmstrom B. Equilibrium long-term labor contracts[J]. Quarterly Journal of Econocmics, 1983,98(1):23-54
[29] Hart O, Moore J. Incomplete contracts and renegotiation[J]. Econometrica, 1986,56(4):744-786
[2] 兰玉杰，陈晓剑．企业家人力资本激励约束机制的理论基础与政策选择[J]．数量经济技术经济研究，2002，(2)
[3] 孟季．人力资本问题讨论综述[J]．经济理论与经济管理，2002，(7)
[4] 李磊．企业人力资源规划模型的研究[J]．管理工程学报，2001，(4)
[5] 腾春贤，李磊，李皓白．求解一类非线性两级整数规划全局优化的近似算法．中国学术期刊文稿，2000，6(7)：865～867
[6] 邱国栋，刘斌．企业劳动者综合计酬法探讨[J]．运筹与管理，2002，(1)
[7] 刘正道，邓方安，人才评价与选拔的模型及应用[J]．运筹与管理，2002(3)
[8] 戴新民．略论企业人力资源及其计量模型[J]．数量经济技术经济研究，2002，(3)
[9] 金晓彤．人力资本的测度与企业人才流失的调控[J]．数量经济技术经济研究，2002，(1)
[10] 西奥多·W·舒尔茨．论人力资本投资[M]．1990
[11] 周天勇新发展经济学[M]
[12] 李宝元．战略性激励[M]
[13] 李玲，人力资本股权化及其理论构想[J]
[14] 李启明，申立银．风险管理中的风险效应——行为决策模型及分析[J]．系统工程理论与实践，2001，(10)
[15] 孙利辉，万迪晾．企业研究与开发人员报酬激励研究[J]．系统工程学报，2002，(2)
[16] 张维迎．博弈论与信息经济学[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，1996，398-463
[17] 王金营．人力资本与经济增长理论与实证[M]，2002
[18] 荷厚平．企业人力资本投资博弈分析[J]．预测．2001，(2)
[19] 刘兵，康凯．企业经营者的动态激励机制设计[J]．系统工程学报。2001，(1)
[20] Waune F. casio, managing human resource [M]. Mc Graw-hill, 1995
[21] John M. lvancevich, human resource management [M]. The edition, McGraw-hill,
1998.
[22] Dessler, Human Resource Management, Prentice Hall International, lnc, 1998
[23] Grossman S, Hart O. An analysis of the principal-agent problem[J]. Econometrica, 1983, 51(3):7-45
[24] Margaret A, Meyer, John Vickers, Performance comparisons and dynamic incentives[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1997,105(3):547-581
[25] Fudenberg D, Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Short-term contracts and long-term agent relationship[J], Journal of Economic Theory, 1990,51(1):1-31
[26] Harris M, Holmstrom B. A theory of wage dynamics[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1982,49(20:313-333
[27] Macleod B, Malcomson J. Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment[J]. Econometrica, 1989,57(3):447-480
[28] Holmstrom B. Equilibrium long-term labor contracts[J]. Quarterly Journal of Econocmics, 1983,98(1):23-54
[29] Hart O, Moore J. Incomplete contracts and renegotiation[J]. Econometrica, 1986,56(4):744-786