后股权分置时期终极股权结构与公司绩效研究
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摘要
股权结构是研究公司治理的基础性问题。股权结构(Ownership Structure),也称为所有权结构,是指公司不同性质的所有者在公司总股本中所占的比例。公司的股权结构决定了公司控制权在股东间的分配,从而决定股东在公司内部决策中的话语权和决策权,最终将影响公司绩效水平。近年来国内外学者对股权结构与公司绩效的关系进行了深入的探讨。LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer (1999)开创性地通过追溯上市公司股东控制链以鉴别终极控制股东的研究范式,使得股权结构与公司绩效的研究跨入了一个新的时期。
股权分置改革是中国证券市场发展过程中具有里程碑意义的一件大事,股权分置改革改变了公司部分股份的流通属性以及导致股东持股比例发生了重大改变。股权结构的变化对上市公司的财务决策行为将产生怎样的影响?这些变化最终对于公司绩效又会是什么样的影响?目前上市公司是否存在最优的股权结构?回答以上问题是本论文研究的主要目的。
本论文研究内容是基于终极控制权下的股权结构与公司绩效之间的关系,采用终极控制股东控股比例、两权分离度及股权制衡度来度量上市公司股权结构,分组实证检验不同性质、级别、时期的终极控制人对上市公司财务决策、代理成本,以及公司绩效的影响。本论文得到如下研究结论：
1.在终极股权结构与资本结构的关系研究中发现,国有属性的上市公司终极控制权比例对资产负债率呈现显著的负向影响,并且股权分置改革没有改变这种关系,但在分组检验中却发现,拥有控股股东的公司在后股权分置时期仍然呈现负向影响关系；而非国有属性公司由04年-06年期间的负向影响在后股权分置时期变得不显著。
2.在终极股权结构与投资决策的关系研究中发现,对于国有属性与非国有属性的上市公司整体样本而言,在后股权分置时期,终极控制权比例对资本支出呈现显著的负向影响,但在分组检验中则发现有所不同。两权分离度对于国有属性公司资本支出的影响在04-09年期间一直不显著,但在分组检验中的结果差异很大。
3.在终极股权结构对现金股利的影响关系研究中发现,从国有属性与非国有属性公司分组的整体样本而言,在04-09年期间终极控制权比例对现金股利一直呈现显著的正向影响关系,但这种关系在国有属性进一步分组的检验中却并不总是成立的。股权制衡度水平对于现金股利的影响基本上一直呈现显著的正向影响。
4.在研究终极股权结构与股东之间代理成本的关系时发现,国有属性的公司终极控制权比例对股东间代理成本的影响一直是显著的负向关系,但分组检验发现绝对控股组的实证结果却是显著为正向。非国有属性公司在04年-06年随着控制权比例的上升代理成本也会升高,但在后股权分置时期却显著为负向影响。无论从股权制衡度还是两权分离度来看,非国有上市公司都存在着很强的侵占中小股东利益的动机,但在国有属性的公司却没有发现类似的证据。
5.在终极股权结构对管理层与股东间代理成本的研究发现,在国有属性公司样本整体检验中,终极控制权比例对销售及管理费用率的影响由正向转为后股权分置时期的负向,但对于分组检验的结果来看,没有找到终极控制股东发挥对管理层实施有效监督的证据。
6.在研究终极股权结构对公司绩效时,从财务绩效和市场绩效来展开。终极股权结构与财务绩效关系研究时发现,对于国有属性公司,在后股权分置时期终极控制权比例与财务绩效呈现显著的倒U型,出现了最优控股结构；在进一步的分组检验得到更为明确的结果是,拥有控股股东的公司(相对控股与绝对控股)在后股权分置时期均出现了最优股权结构。另外,研究还发现,无论是从整体还是分组检验,股权制衡程度对于财务绩效的影响都一直表现为显著的正向影响关系。在研究股权结构对市场绩效的影响时,我们发现国有属性公司终极控制比例与Tobin'Q之间的关系呈现显著的U型关系,这一点刚好与财务绩效的检验结果相反。在股权制衡度对市场绩效的影响结果是一致的,都呈现出显著的正向关系。
通过以上研究所得到的主要结论,我们还得到了对国有属性与非国有属性的上市公司两点重要的启示：
第一,在后股权分置时期,国有属性上市公司的股权结构出现了最优结构,第二大股东对公司的制衡作用在提高公司绩效方面的作用是积极的,没有证据表明国有属性的上市公司控股股东持股比例的提高会增加侵占中小股东利益行为的动机。所以对于国有属性公司的监督和支持,目前应该以充分发挥大股东之间股权制衡作用为主,过分关注控股股东侵占中小股东利益的行为不应该是问题的关键。
第二,在后股权分置时期,非国有属性公司控股股东的持股比例与财务绩效之间呈现正向的影响；其他大股东的股权制衡积极作用在非国有属性公司同样起作用；但是有证据表明股权制衡程度对股东间代理成本的作用是正向的,存在着在大股东之间共谋以侵占中小股东利益的可能性；两权分离度越大,股东间的代理成本也越高,这一点在国有属性上市公司没有发现。
本论文的创新点主要包括三个方面：
一是建立了“股权结构—财务决策—公司绩效”的理论体系,并充分考虑两类代理成本(管理者与股东的代理成本以及股东之间的代理成本)对公司绩效的影响。
二是建立了按照“性质—比例—时期”分组实证检验的研究框架。这可以使研究过程更为细化,使实证结果更为准确,避免了总体样本的均值化而掩盖了一些真实信息。
三是通过实证研究得出后股权分置时期终极股权结构与公司绩效关系的一些新证据。研究发现,在后股权分置时期,国有属性的上市公司出现了最优股权结构,并且股权制衡水平对于公司绩效发挥了积极的促进作用；而非国有属性的上市公司终极控制股东存在侵占中小股东利益的倾向,但这一点在国有属性公司没有发现。这些相关的结论丰富了国内股权结构的研究内容,以及为监管层提供了有帮助作用的信息。
Ownership structure is the fundamental problem on corporate governance study. Ownership structure, refer to the portfolio of the company's total share capital holding by different nature of the company's owners. The company's ownership structure determines the control of the company distribution among the shareholders, to determine the shareholders in the company's internal decision-making discourse and decision-making, and ultimately will affect the company's performance level. Recent years, domestic and foreign scholars have made in-depth discussion on relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer (1999) groundbreaking retrospective shareholders of listed companies through the control chain to identify the ultimate controlling shareholder of the research paradigm, making the ownership structure and performance of the company into a new period.
Split share structure reform is a milestone event of China's securities market development, split share structure reform makes changes of certain company shares flow properties and result in a significant proportion of shareholding changes occurred. What impact will be on changing the ownership structure to the listed company's financial decision-making behavior? What's the final impact of these changes will ultimately look like for the company performance? Is there any optimal ownership structure existing in the current listed companies? This thesis will focus on study and try to find some answer for the above questions. This thesis is based on the ultimate control over the content under the ownership structure and corporate performance relationship between the controlling shareholders with ultimate control of the ratio of degree of separation of ownership and the degree of checks and balances to measure the equity ownership structure of listed companies, grouping the different nature of empirical test level, during the ultimate controller of the listed company's financial decision-making, agency costs, and company performance. Conclusions of this thesis are as follows:
1. In the study of the ultimate ownership structure and capital structure's relationship, it was found that state-owned property's ultimate control over the proportion of listed companies has a significant negative impact on the asset-liability ratio, and the share reform has not changed this connection, but in the separate group test it. was found that companies with controlling shareholders still shows negative impact during the period of post-split share structure; however, negative impact during the period of year 04-06 for post-split share structure becomes not significant for those non state-owned property companies.
2. In the study of the relationship between ultimate ownership structure and investment decision making, it was found that, state-owned properties and non-state properties of the overall sample, the ultimate control over the capital expenditure ratio has significantly negative impact, but we also found that this connection does not always exist in the further research in separate group test. Separation of ownership and the degree of state-owned property for the impact of capital expenditure has been in year 04-09 period was not significant, but the results of testing in the group vary widely.
3. In the study of the ultimate ownership structure influence to the cash dividend research, it was found that, among of state-owned properties and non-state properties of the overall sample, ultimate control over the proportion of listed companies has a significant negative impact on the cash dividend ratio, in the period of year 04-09. But we also found that this connection does not always exist in the further research of state-owned properties separate group test. Ownership structure level of equity and balance basically shows significant positive influence to the cash dividend.
4. In the study of the relationship between ultimate ownership structure and agency costs between shareholders, it was found that ultimate control over the proportion of listed companies has a significant negative impact on the agency costs between shareholders of the state-owned properties. But contra finding shows in the group testing that physically result was is significantly positive. Non-state property in year 04-06 with the rise in the proportion of control agency costs will also increase respectively, in the post-split share period it shows significantly negative impact then. Despite on equity or balance in terms of separation of ownership of view, non state-owned listed companies occupy a strong motivation for the interests of minority shareholders, but to the state-owned property companies have not found similar evidence.
5. In the study of the ultimate ownership structure influence to the agency costs between shareholders and managers, it was found that, state-owned property company in the test sample as a whole, the ultimate control over the selling and administrative expense ratio on the rate of converse from positive to negative after period of post-split share. However, there has no evidence on ultimate controlling shareholder on play effective role to supervise the management team from the separate group test result.
6. We expand from two aspect, financial performance and market performance in the study the ultimate ownership structure on corporate performance. The ultimate relationship between ownership structure in Post non-tradable share reform era and financial performance for the state-owned property company shows a significant inverted U-emergence of the optimal holding structure; further group test shows the optimal result for companies with controlling shareholders (as opposed to holding and the absolute majority of shares) in post non-tradable share reform era. In addition, the study also found that, either the former or the latter, stock checks and balances ratio has been showing a significant positive influence for the financial performance. In the study of the impact of market performance, we found that the proportion of ultimate control of state-owned property company shows significant U-shaped relationship with Tobin'Q, which is opposite to the impact of financial performance from the group test results. The degree of checks and balances in the equity market performance impact on the results are consistent, emerged as a significant positive relationship.
Through the proceeding conclusion, two important revelations can be implied with respect to state-owned property and non-listed state-owned property:
First, in the post-split-share period, the listed company ownership state-owned-property structure is the optimal structure, the balancing effect in the role of the second largest shareholder in terms of corporate performance is positive, and no evidence indicates that the increase in proportion of shareholders in state-owned listed companies will enhance the motivation of undermining a higher proportion of small shareholders'interests. Therefore, to supervise and support the state-owned property companies, more focus should be put on balancing the equity right of the majority shareholder, rather than overly concerned with the activities that undermine the interests of minority shareholders.
Secondly, in the period of post-split-share, there is a positive relation between the percentage of non-state properties of the controlling shareholder's ownership and financial performance, and balancing the equities of non-state property of the company has a similar effect. However, there is evidence indicates that the impact of balancing shareholder equity on agency cost is positive, and it is possible that the major shareholders may collude to exploit the interests of minority shareholders. The more the degree of separation of ownership, the greater agency costs between shareholders. However this effect doesn't happen to listed in state-owned property companies.
The innovation of this paper is three fold:
Firstly, it established the theoretical system of "ownership structure-financial decision-making-firm performance," thoroughly taking into account the impact on corporate performance from two types of agency costs (agency costs of managers and shareholders, and the agency costs among shareholders.
Secondly, it established the research framework of "characteristic-ratio-period" grouping empirical analysis, thus refining the course of study, making empirical results more accurate, and avoiding the possibility that some useful information was concealed by averaging population sample.
Thirdly, new evidence was found through empirical research of the ultimate relationship of the post-split share between ownership structure and corporate performance. The study found that in the period after the split share structure, the state-owned listed companies appeared the optimal ownership structure, and played an active role in balancing the level of equity performance for the companies. However the ultimate controlling shareholders of the non-state-owned listed companies tend be in favor of the minority shareholders'interests, which is not found in state-owned property companies. These related findings enrich the content of domestic ownership structure, and provide the regulators with helpful information.
股权分置改革是中国证券市场发展过程中具有里程碑意义的一件大事,股权分置改革改变了公司部分股份的流通属性以及导致股东持股比例发生了重大改变。股权结构的变化对上市公司的财务决策行为将产生怎样的影响?这些变化最终对于公司绩效又会是什么样的影响?目前上市公司是否存在最优的股权结构?回答以上问题是本论文研究的主要目的。
本论文研究内容是基于终极控制权下的股权结构与公司绩效之间的关系,采用终极控制股东控股比例、两权分离度及股权制衡度来度量上市公司股权结构,分组实证检验不同性质、级别、时期的终极控制人对上市公司财务决策、代理成本,以及公司绩效的影响。本论文得到如下研究结论：
1.在终极股权结构与资本结构的关系研究中发现,国有属性的上市公司终极控制权比例对资产负债率呈现显著的负向影响,并且股权分置改革没有改变这种关系,但在分组检验中却发现,拥有控股股东的公司在后股权分置时期仍然呈现负向影响关系；而非国有属性公司由04年-06年期间的负向影响在后股权分置时期变得不显著。
2.在终极股权结构与投资决策的关系研究中发现,对于国有属性与非国有属性的上市公司整体样本而言,在后股权分置时期,终极控制权比例对资本支出呈现显著的负向影响,但在分组检验中则发现有所不同。两权分离度对于国有属性公司资本支出的影响在04-09年期间一直不显著,但在分组检验中的结果差异很大。
3.在终极股权结构对现金股利的影响关系研究中发现,从国有属性与非国有属性公司分组的整体样本而言,在04-09年期间终极控制权比例对现金股利一直呈现显著的正向影响关系,但这种关系在国有属性进一步分组的检验中却并不总是成立的。股权制衡度水平对于现金股利的影响基本上一直呈现显著的正向影响。
4.在研究终极股权结构与股东之间代理成本的关系时发现,国有属性的公司终极控制权比例对股东间代理成本的影响一直是显著的负向关系,但分组检验发现绝对控股组的实证结果却是显著为正向。非国有属性公司在04年-06年随着控制权比例的上升代理成本也会升高,但在后股权分置时期却显著为负向影响。无论从股权制衡度还是两权分离度来看,非国有上市公司都存在着很强的侵占中小股东利益的动机,但在国有属性的公司却没有发现类似的证据。
5.在终极股权结构对管理层与股东间代理成本的研究发现,在国有属性公司样本整体检验中,终极控制权比例对销售及管理费用率的影响由正向转为后股权分置时期的负向,但对于分组检验的结果来看,没有找到终极控制股东发挥对管理层实施有效监督的证据。
6.在研究终极股权结构对公司绩效时,从财务绩效和市场绩效来展开。终极股权结构与财务绩效关系研究时发现,对于国有属性公司,在后股权分置时期终极控制权比例与财务绩效呈现显著的倒U型,出现了最优控股结构；在进一步的分组检验得到更为明确的结果是,拥有控股股东的公司(相对控股与绝对控股)在后股权分置时期均出现了最优股权结构。另外,研究还发现,无论是从整体还是分组检验,股权制衡程度对于财务绩效的影响都一直表现为显著的正向影响关系。在研究股权结构对市场绩效的影响时,我们发现国有属性公司终极控制比例与Tobin'Q之间的关系呈现显著的U型关系,这一点刚好与财务绩效的检验结果相反。在股权制衡度对市场绩效的影响结果是一致的,都呈现出显著的正向关系。
通过以上研究所得到的主要结论,我们还得到了对国有属性与非国有属性的上市公司两点重要的启示：
第一,在后股权分置时期,国有属性上市公司的股权结构出现了最优结构,第二大股东对公司的制衡作用在提高公司绩效方面的作用是积极的,没有证据表明国有属性的上市公司控股股东持股比例的提高会增加侵占中小股东利益行为的动机。所以对于国有属性公司的监督和支持,目前应该以充分发挥大股东之间股权制衡作用为主,过分关注控股股东侵占中小股东利益的行为不应该是问题的关键。
第二,在后股权分置时期,非国有属性公司控股股东的持股比例与财务绩效之间呈现正向的影响；其他大股东的股权制衡积极作用在非国有属性公司同样起作用；但是有证据表明股权制衡程度对股东间代理成本的作用是正向的,存在着在大股东之间共谋以侵占中小股东利益的可能性；两权分离度越大,股东间的代理成本也越高,这一点在国有属性上市公司没有发现。
本论文的创新点主要包括三个方面：
一是建立了“股权结构—财务决策—公司绩效”的理论体系,并充分考虑两类代理成本(管理者与股东的代理成本以及股东之间的代理成本)对公司绩效的影响。
二是建立了按照“性质—比例—时期”分组实证检验的研究框架。这可以使研究过程更为细化,使实证结果更为准确,避免了总体样本的均值化而掩盖了一些真实信息。
三是通过实证研究得出后股权分置时期终极股权结构与公司绩效关系的一些新证据。研究发现,在后股权分置时期,国有属性的上市公司出现了最优股权结构,并且股权制衡水平对于公司绩效发挥了积极的促进作用；而非国有属性的上市公司终极控制股东存在侵占中小股东利益的倾向,但这一点在国有属性公司没有发现。这些相关的结论丰富了国内股权结构的研究内容,以及为监管层提供了有帮助作用的信息。
Ownership structure is the fundamental problem on corporate governance study. Ownership structure, refer to the portfolio of the company's total share capital holding by different nature of the company's owners. The company's ownership structure determines the control of the company distribution among the shareholders, to determine the shareholders in the company's internal decision-making discourse and decision-making, and ultimately will affect the company's performance level. Recent years, domestic and foreign scholars have made in-depth discussion on relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer (1999) groundbreaking retrospective shareholders of listed companies through the control chain to identify the ultimate controlling shareholder of the research paradigm, making the ownership structure and performance of the company into a new period.
Split share structure reform is a milestone event of China's securities market development, split share structure reform makes changes of certain company shares flow properties and result in a significant proportion of shareholding changes occurred. What impact will be on changing the ownership structure to the listed company's financial decision-making behavior? What's the final impact of these changes will ultimately look like for the company performance? Is there any optimal ownership structure existing in the current listed companies? This thesis will focus on study and try to find some answer for the above questions. This thesis is based on the ultimate control over the content under the ownership structure and corporate performance relationship between the controlling shareholders with ultimate control of the ratio of degree of separation of ownership and the degree of checks and balances to measure the equity ownership structure of listed companies, grouping the different nature of empirical test level, during the ultimate controller of the listed company's financial decision-making, agency costs, and company performance. Conclusions of this thesis are as follows:
1. In the study of the ultimate ownership structure and capital structure's relationship, it was found that state-owned property's ultimate control over the proportion of listed companies has a significant negative impact on the asset-liability ratio, and the share reform has not changed this connection, but in the separate group test it. was found that companies with controlling shareholders still shows negative impact during the period of post-split share structure; however, negative impact during the period of year 04-06 for post-split share structure becomes not significant for those non state-owned property companies.
2. In the study of the relationship between ultimate ownership structure and investment decision making, it was found that, state-owned properties and non-state properties of the overall sample, the ultimate control over the capital expenditure ratio has significantly negative impact, but we also found that this connection does not always exist in the further research in separate group test. Separation of ownership and the degree of state-owned property for the impact of capital expenditure has been in year 04-09 period was not significant, but the results of testing in the group vary widely.
3. In the study of the ultimate ownership structure influence to the cash dividend research, it was found that, among of state-owned properties and non-state properties of the overall sample, ultimate control over the proportion of listed companies has a significant negative impact on the cash dividend ratio, in the period of year 04-09. But we also found that this connection does not always exist in the further research of state-owned properties separate group test. Ownership structure level of equity and balance basically shows significant positive influence to the cash dividend.
4. In the study of the relationship between ultimate ownership structure and agency costs between shareholders, it was found that ultimate control over the proportion of listed companies has a significant negative impact on the agency costs between shareholders of the state-owned properties. But contra finding shows in the group testing that physically result was is significantly positive. Non-state property in year 04-06 with the rise in the proportion of control agency costs will also increase respectively, in the post-split share period it shows significantly negative impact then. Despite on equity or balance in terms of separation of ownership of view, non state-owned listed companies occupy a strong motivation for the interests of minority shareholders, but to the state-owned property companies have not found similar evidence.
5. In the study of the ultimate ownership structure influence to the agency costs between shareholders and managers, it was found that, state-owned property company in the test sample as a whole, the ultimate control over the selling and administrative expense ratio on the rate of converse from positive to negative after period of post-split share. However, there has no evidence on ultimate controlling shareholder on play effective role to supervise the management team from the separate group test result.
6. We expand from two aspect, financial performance and market performance in the study the ultimate ownership structure on corporate performance. The ultimate relationship between ownership structure in Post non-tradable share reform era and financial performance for the state-owned property company shows a significant inverted U-emergence of the optimal holding structure; further group test shows the optimal result for companies with controlling shareholders (as opposed to holding and the absolute majority of shares) in post non-tradable share reform era. In addition, the study also found that, either the former or the latter, stock checks and balances ratio has been showing a significant positive influence for the financial performance. In the study of the impact of market performance, we found that the proportion of ultimate control of state-owned property company shows significant U-shaped relationship with Tobin'Q, which is opposite to the impact of financial performance from the group test results. The degree of checks and balances in the equity market performance impact on the results are consistent, emerged as a significant positive relationship.
Through the proceeding conclusion, two important revelations can be implied with respect to state-owned property and non-listed state-owned property:
First, in the post-split-share period, the listed company ownership state-owned-property structure is the optimal structure, the balancing effect in the role of the second largest shareholder in terms of corporate performance is positive, and no evidence indicates that the increase in proportion of shareholders in state-owned listed companies will enhance the motivation of undermining a higher proportion of small shareholders'interests. Therefore, to supervise and support the state-owned property companies, more focus should be put on balancing the equity right of the majority shareholder, rather than overly concerned with the activities that undermine the interests of minority shareholders.
Secondly, in the period of post-split-share, there is a positive relation between the percentage of non-state properties of the controlling shareholder's ownership and financial performance, and balancing the equities of non-state property of the company has a similar effect. However, there is evidence indicates that the impact of balancing shareholder equity on agency cost is positive, and it is possible that the major shareholders may collude to exploit the interests of minority shareholders. The more the degree of separation of ownership, the greater agency costs between shareholders. However this effect doesn't happen to listed in state-owned property companies.
The innovation of this paper is three fold:
Firstly, it established the theoretical system of "ownership structure-financial decision-making-firm performance," thoroughly taking into account the impact on corporate performance from two types of agency costs (agency costs of managers and shareholders, and the agency costs among shareholders.
Secondly, it established the research framework of "characteristic-ratio-period" grouping empirical analysis, thus refining the course of study, making empirical results more accurate, and avoiding the possibility that some useful information was concealed by averaging population sample.
Thirdly, new evidence was found through empirical research of the ultimate relationship of the post-split share between ownership structure and corporate performance. The study found that in the period after the split share structure, the state-owned listed companies appeared the optimal ownership structure, and played an active role in balancing the level of equity performance for the companies. However the ultimate controlling shareholders of the non-state-owned listed companies tend be in favor of the minority shareholders'interests, which is not found in state-owned property companies. These related findings enrich the content of domestic ownership structure, and provide the regulators with helpful information.
引文
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