中国上市公司股权激励契约安排与制度设计
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摘要
建立完善的激励约束机制是解决现代公司中委托代理问题的核心。股权激励作为一种长期激励机制,是降低代理成本,实现激励相容的重要手段,但其效应一直是充满争议的论题。近期席卷全球的金融危机再次证明,在巨大利益驱使下,契约设计的不合理与约束条件的缺失使股权激励更多地趋于福利化,甚至带来巨大的风险隐患。究竟股权激励是解决委托代理问题的手段还是导致委托代理问题的来源?其难以替代的作用与逐渐暴露的缺陷之间的矛盾日益凸显,理论研究者、实践者与政策制定者等开始重新审视股权激励及其相关配套制度。
股权分置改革解决了制约中国资本市场发展的重大制度性缺陷,股权激励制度也以此为契机由探索阶段进入了发展阶段。随着相关政策的不断完善和细化,股权激励被越来越多的中国上市公司采用。但公司自身对激励模式与对象的选择不合理、激励期限与考核指标疏于设计等契约层面因素以及经理人市场不完善等宏观制度因素仍然制约着股权激励的发展。在此关键时期,借鉴西方的股权激励理论与实践,结合中国的特殊国情和制度背景,建立适合中国上市公司的股权激励契约结构与制度体系,具有极为重要的理论意义和实践价值。
股权激励研究的最初观点是基于外生视角把股权激励作为一个独立的外生变量来检验其对公司价值的影响。继而产生的内生视角认为股权激励及其与公司价值的关系是各种因素共同作用的均衡结果,并引入影响因素调节变量。但两者的共同局限是将股权激励作为整体,忽视了其契约结构因素与作用过程。而要探索构建适用于中国上市公司的股权激励制度,应将内生性视角应用于股权激励契约结构的研究,但目前该项研究尚处在初步阶段。本文借鉴经济学与管理学相关理论,提出股权激励契约结构内生性假说,并从契约结构内生视角出发,结合股权激励在中国的实践,构建了中国上市公司股权激励契约合理性实现模型。基于该模型,综合运用理论演绎、比较分析、计量模型、案例研究等方法,重点研究了股权激励关键契约要素(激励模式、激励对象、激励期限与激励条件)设计的合理性及其影响因素,揭示了股权激励契约优化的动态趋势及其与公司价值的联结方式。以此为基础,构建了中国上市公司股权激励制度设计模型,并提出契约优化及内外部约束制度设计的政策建议。
上市公司处于不同的环境中,拥有不同的资源禀赋与能力条件,股权激励的契约结构也应因其自身条件的变化而不同,因此,本文在文献评析与理论分析的基础上,提出契约结构内生性假说,即股权激励并非作为整体而独立存在的,其契约结构在设计过程中受到公司基本特征(所处行业、规模、成长性等)、股权结构、治理机制等因素的影响,而又通过上述因素的调节作用对公司绩效或价值产生效应。基于该假说,提出股权激励契约结构内生视角,既从微观层面深入剖析股权激励契约结构的动态内生性问题,又引入调节变量构建起股权激励契约要素与公司价值之间的桥梁。
从契约结构内生视角出发,本文构建了中国上市公司股权激励契约合理性实现模型,以探究股权激励契约的合理性及其实现途径。股权激励契约合理性是指股权激励契约实现预期效应所应具备的属性,适用性、平衡性、长期性与约束性是合理股权激励契约的关键特征,构成了契约合理性的外延。结合中国的制度环境与上市公司实践,该模型确定激励模式、激励对象、激励期限与激励条件为决定契约合理性的关键要素,并阐释了契约合理性的实现途径,即在既定规则之下,上市公司应根据公司基本特征、股权结构、债权融资与治理结构等内生因素对上述要素进行合理设计与有效实施。此外,该模型强调上述过程是随着制度环境的变化而动态演化的,实现了契约结构内生视角在中国情境下的应用。以此为基础,论文第四章、第五章与第六章分别研究了上市公司对于股权激励关键契约要素设计的合理性及影响因素,并取得了诸多具有重要意义的结论。
股权激励模式的选择是一个利弊博弈的过程,这种博弈不仅在体现在不同发展阶段中的优胜劣汰,也体现在同一阶段中对于不同模式的选择。股权激励模式以股权分置改革为契机实现了从业绩股票、业绩单位、虚拟股票等到股票期限与限制性股票的演化。股票期权与限制性股票凭借相对于其他模式的优势,成为上市公司在发展阶段采用的主要模式,两者在表象层、运作层与核心层三个层面存在诸多差异。公司成长性与股权属性是影响激励模式选择的最主要因素,但其显著性随着时间的推移而变化,反映了上市公司对激励模式选择动机的演化趋势,这种演化既源自于上市公司对股权激励契约合理设计的理性思考,也源自于政策环境因素的发展与成熟。
股权激励对象范围与分布的确定是实现股权激励整体效应最大化的关键环节。中国上市公司股权激励的惠及范围不应仅仅局限于高层管理者,而应以核心利益相关者治理理论为基础,实现一种动态的利益平衡。团队生产理论为确定激励对象的甄选原则提供了方法论基础,通过构建股权激励适用对象甄选模型确定了高层管理者、中层管理者与核心员工应成为现阶段股权激励的主要对象。针对上市公司监事能否纳入股权激励对象范围的焦点问题,通过实证检验发现,因监事股权激励带来的合谋倾向在实践中并未显现,而在其他治理约束因素的调节作用下具有显著的治理效应,因此,单纯将监事排除在激励对象范围之外并不是万全之策,而应从对上市公司治理水平的权衡出发,合理设置监事激励契约的构成。股权激励对象范围的确定具有一定的原则与标准,但激励对象的分布却应根据上市公司的内外部因素进行动态调整,实证结果表明,行业特性是影响激励对象分布的显著性因素,公司规模、成长性、盈利能力与股权属性等因素的影响方向与预期一致,但并不显著。
股权激励期限与激励条件作为约束型契约要素,两者的合理设计能够实现股权激励的时间约束效应与绩效约束效应,也是实现股权激励契约的长期性与约束性特征的理想路径。但在现实中却存在由经营者机会主义行为产生的障碍,尤其是在公司治理不尽完善的情况下,两者呈现出短期化与福利化倾向,与股权激励契约合理性背道而驰。实证检验表明,设置较长的激励期限与严格的激励条件是契约合理性与激励效应实现的重要前提；除法律等外部因素制约之外,债权融资约束、独立董事监督与大股东治理等内生因素对两者具有显著的促进作用,进一步证实了公司内部治理机制的互补效应假说。
上述针对激励模式、激励对象、激励期限与激励条件等关键契约要素的理论分析与实证检验为股权激励契约合理性实现模型提供了丰富的理论与经验证据,也为制度设计模型的构建提供了有力支持。运用制度经济学中契约配置与制度配置的耦合性原理,本文在第七章中构建了以契约结构优化为中心、以内外部约束的整合与运作为主体、以持续改进与动态均衡为特征的中国上市公司股权激励制度设计模型。并详细阐述了围绕股权激励契约优化的内外部约束制度设计,包括以薪酬委员会有效运作、独立董事监督、大股东治理与债权人约束等构成的内部治理约束,以申报审核规定、执行过程控制、信息披露制度、会计处理制度等为主体的政府与行业监管以及以经理人市场、资本市场、产品市场组成的外部市场环境。只有不断优化与完善上市公司股权激励制度,才能真正实现其将激励对象利益与公司利益相结合的“利益趋同效应”。
Establishing effective incentive and restraint mechanism is the key to solve the principle-agent problem. As an important long-term incentive mechanism of listed companies, the effect of equity incentive has been a controversial focus in both the theory and practice of community. The recent global financial crisis once again proves the equity-based incentive become benefits because of unreasonable contract and lack of restricted conditions driven by the huge interests. Is equity-based incentive the solution or the source of principal-agent problem? Researchers, practitioners and policy-makers began to rethink the incentive effects of equity-incentive and the supportive system.
Non-tradable shares reform solved the major institutional defects of China' capital market and the development stage of equity incentive has already come. With the development of the institutional system, equity incentive has been adopted by more and more Chinese listed companies. But some contract-level and institution-level factors restrict the development of equity incentive. In this critical period, to establish the appropriate contract structure and institutional system to China's listed companies has grate theoretical and practical value.
Researchers at home and aboard focused mainly on the effects and influential factors of equity incentive so far. According to the differences in theory basis, research idea and method, the relative researches are divided into two perspectives: Exogenous and Endogenous. Many researches use equity incentive as a whole and neglect its contract structure and process. To research the contract structure of equity incentive in depth is imperative, but this perspective is in the primary stage. This paper uses normative analysis, comparative analysis, empirical analysis and case study, proposes the contract structure endogenous hypothesis referring to evolutionary and institutional economics, and establishes Implementation Model on the Rationality of Equity Incentive Contract in Chinese Listed Companies and Institution Optimization Model from the Contract Structure Endogenous Perspective. This paper also researches the contract structure deeply at the micro level and analysis the institutional design systematically at the macro level. The research established a good foundation for the future study and provides references the development of equity incentive in Chinese listed companies.
Listed companies have different resources and conditions in different environment, so their equity incentive plan is also different. Therefore this paper proposes the contract structure endogenous hypothesis through reviewing the literature on equity incentive. The hypothesis advocates equity incentive is not dependent but the structures of it influenced by the characteristics, ownership structure, governance structure and external environment. On basis of that, the contract structure endogenous perspective is proposed to analyze the issue of endogenous dynamics and establish the bridge between equity incentive contract and corporate value by adding moderators.
The rationality of China's listed companies'equity incentive contract analysis model is the application of the contract structure endogenous perspective in the context of China. The rationality of equity incentive contract is the properties that necessary to realize its expected effects not only on the long-term incentive for the incentive objects but also on the improvement of performance and value of the companies. Applicable, balanced, long-term and restricted are the main characteristics of the rational equity incentive contract and form the epitaxy of the rationality of equity incentive contract. According to the principles of importance and feasibility, the key contract elements contain incentive model, incentive object, incentive time horizon and incentive condition. These key elements should be designed according to the endogenous factors of listed companies. Implementation Model on the Rationality of Equity Incentive Contract in Chinese Listed Companies is the application of contract structure endogenous perspective. On the basis of this model, this paper focuses on the four key elements and achieves many valuable conclusions.
The selection of equity incentive model is a process of weighing not only evolutions in the different stages but also compare in the same stage. Stock option and restricted stock are the two main models of China's listed companies after Non-tradable shares reform. They are different in rights and obligations, valuation, restricted stage and accounting. Different listed company has the tendency to choose them. We adopt data of listed companies that has announced stock incentive plans in china to do the empirical research, and the results show that growth and ownership are the main factors to choose the plan.
The reasonable distribution of incentive objects can maximize the incentive effect. Based on core stakeholder theory, the incentive objects should be the owners of key resources and stakeholders. The empirical research shows that industry features and growth capability are the main factors of the distribution. Listed Companies should enforce the effect of strategy location, and make use of other governance mechanisms to ensure equity incentive plans successfully implemented. To ensure the scope of incentive objects is the key to realize selective interests-balance of equity-based incentives, and supervisor equity-based incentives becomes the points at issue. We adopt the Panel Data from 2006-2009 of Listed Companies'in China to do the empirical research. The results show that the Collision Orientation may be induced by supervisor share-hold isn't obvious, but on the contrary, it has positive effects on both the two agency problems and firm value under the effects of the moderators such as executive incentive, independent directors, ownership restriction and debt financing. Therefore, improving corporate governance level is a prerequisite to achieve the effects of supervisor equity-based incentives and to avoid the collision risks effectively.
Equity Incentive is an important part to improve listed companies'corporate governance level. Designing reasonable and effective stock option contracts is the key to success. In this paper, we adopt the data of listed companies that have announced and ones have yet implemented stock option plans in china to do the empirical research. The results show that long-term and incentive are the main features of stock option and timeframe and performance condition are the key elements to embody them. Besides external factors, majority shareholders, creditors and independent directors are main restrictive factors to influence the rationality of stock options. We hope the results can supply useful references to China's listed companies and Regulators.
The above theoretical analysis and empirical researches related to incentive model, incentive object, incentive timeframe and incentive condition are the convincing proof and explanation of the rationality of equity incentive contract in China's listed companies analysis model. In order to increasing operability, this research establishes equity incentive institutional optimization model for China's listed companies. This model includes contract structure optimization, corporate governance restricted mechanism, government and industry regulation and external environment. Following the suggestions on the four levels, equity incentive will be improved continuously and realize the convergence effects of the interests of both the incentive objects and the listed companies.
股权分置改革解决了制约中国资本市场发展的重大制度性缺陷,股权激励制度也以此为契机由探索阶段进入了发展阶段。随着相关政策的不断完善和细化,股权激励被越来越多的中国上市公司采用。但公司自身对激励模式与对象的选择不合理、激励期限与考核指标疏于设计等契约层面因素以及经理人市场不完善等宏观制度因素仍然制约着股权激励的发展。在此关键时期,借鉴西方的股权激励理论与实践,结合中国的特殊国情和制度背景,建立适合中国上市公司的股权激励契约结构与制度体系,具有极为重要的理论意义和实践价值。
股权激励研究的最初观点是基于外生视角把股权激励作为一个独立的外生变量来检验其对公司价值的影响。继而产生的内生视角认为股权激励及其与公司价值的关系是各种因素共同作用的均衡结果,并引入影响因素调节变量。但两者的共同局限是将股权激励作为整体,忽视了其契约结构因素与作用过程。而要探索构建适用于中国上市公司的股权激励制度,应将内生性视角应用于股权激励契约结构的研究,但目前该项研究尚处在初步阶段。本文借鉴经济学与管理学相关理论,提出股权激励契约结构内生性假说,并从契约结构内生视角出发,结合股权激励在中国的实践,构建了中国上市公司股权激励契约合理性实现模型。基于该模型,综合运用理论演绎、比较分析、计量模型、案例研究等方法,重点研究了股权激励关键契约要素(激励模式、激励对象、激励期限与激励条件)设计的合理性及其影响因素,揭示了股权激励契约优化的动态趋势及其与公司价值的联结方式。以此为基础,构建了中国上市公司股权激励制度设计模型,并提出契约优化及内外部约束制度设计的政策建议。
上市公司处于不同的环境中,拥有不同的资源禀赋与能力条件,股权激励的契约结构也应因其自身条件的变化而不同,因此,本文在文献评析与理论分析的基础上,提出契约结构内生性假说,即股权激励并非作为整体而独立存在的,其契约结构在设计过程中受到公司基本特征(所处行业、规模、成长性等)、股权结构、治理机制等因素的影响,而又通过上述因素的调节作用对公司绩效或价值产生效应。基于该假说,提出股权激励契约结构内生视角,既从微观层面深入剖析股权激励契约结构的动态内生性问题,又引入调节变量构建起股权激励契约要素与公司价值之间的桥梁。
从契约结构内生视角出发,本文构建了中国上市公司股权激励契约合理性实现模型,以探究股权激励契约的合理性及其实现途径。股权激励契约合理性是指股权激励契约实现预期效应所应具备的属性,适用性、平衡性、长期性与约束性是合理股权激励契约的关键特征,构成了契约合理性的外延。结合中国的制度环境与上市公司实践,该模型确定激励模式、激励对象、激励期限与激励条件为决定契约合理性的关键要素,并阐释了契约合理性的实现途径,即在既定规则之下,上市公司应根据公司基本特征、股权结构、债权融资与治理结构等内生因素对上述要素进行合理设计与有效实施。此外,该模型强调上述过程是随着制度环境的变化而动态演化的,实现了契约结构内生视角在中国情境下的应用。以此为基础,论文第四章、第五章与第六章分别研究了上市公司对于股权激励关键契约要素设计的合理性及影响因素,并取得了诸多具有重要意义的结论。
股权激励模式的选择是一个利弊博弈的过程,这种博弈不仅在体现在不同发展阶段中的优胜劣汰,也体现在同一阶段中对于不同模式的选择。股权激励模式以股权分置改革为契机实现了从业绩股票、业绩单位、虚拟股票等到股票期限与限制性股票的演化。股票期权与限制性股票凭借相对于其他模式的优势,成为上市公司在发展阶段采用的主要模式,两者在表象层、运作层与核心层三个层面存在诸多差异。公司成长性与股权属性是影响激励模式选择的最主要因素,但其显著性随着时间的推移而变化,反映了上市公司对激励模式选择动机的演化趋势,这种演化既源自于上市公司对股权激励契约合理设计的理性思考,也源自于政策环境因素的发展与成熟。
股权激励对象范围与分布的确定是实现股权激励整体效应最大化的关键环节。中国上市公司股权激励的惠及范围不应仅仅局限于高层管理者,而应以核心利益相关者治理理论为基础,实现一种动态的利益平衡。团队生产理论为确定激励对象的甄选原则提供了方法论基础,通过构建股权激励适用对象甄选模型确定了高层管理者、中层管理者与核心员工应成为现阶段股权激励的主要对象。针对上市公司监事能否纳入股权激励对象范围的焦点问题,通过实证检验发现,因监事股权激励带来的合谋倾向在实践中并未显现,而在其他治理约束因素的调节作用下具有显著的治理效应,因此,单纯将监事排除在激励对象范围之外并不是万全之策,而应从对上市公司治理水平的权衡出发,合理设置监事激励契约的构成。股权激励对象范围的确定具有一定的原则与标准,但激励对象的分布却应根据上市公司的内外部因素进行动态调整,实证结果表明,行业特性是影响激励对象分布的显著性因素,公司规模、成长性、盈利能力与股权属性等因素的影响方向与预期一致,但并不显著。
股权激励期限与激励条件作为约束型契约要素,两者的合理设计能够实现股权激励的时间约束效应与绩效约束效应,也是实现股权激励契约的长期性与约束性特征的理想路径。但在现实中却存在由经营者机会主义行为产生的障碍,尤其是在公司治理不尽完善的情况下,两者呈现出短期化与福利化倾向,与股权激励契约合理性背道而驰。实证检验表明,设置较长的激励期限与严格的激励条件是契约合理性与激励效应实现的重要前提；除法律等外部因素制约之外,债权融资约束、独立董事监督与大股东治理等内生因素对两者具有显著的促进作用,进一步证实了公司内部治理机制的互补效应假说。
上述针对激励模式、激励对象、激励期限与激励条件等关键契约要素的理论分析与实证检验为股权激励契约合理性实现模型提供了丰富的理论与经验证据,也为制度设计模型的构建提供了有力支持。运用制度经济学中契约配置与制度配置的耦合性原理,本文在第七章中构建了以契约结构优化为中心、以内外部约束的整合与运作为主体、以持续改进与动态均衡为特征的中国上市公司股权激励制度设计模型。并详细阐述了围绕股权激励契约优化的内外部约束制度设计,包括以薪酬委员会有效运作、独立董事监督、大股东治理与债权人约束等构成的内部治理约束,以申报审核规定、执行过程控制、信息披露制度、会计处理制度等为主体的政府与行业监管以及以经理人市场、资本市场、产品市场组成的外部市场环境。只有不断优化与完善上市公司股权激励制度,才能真正实现其将激励对象利益与公司利益相结合的“利益趋同效应”。
Establishing effective incentive and restraint mechanism is the key to solve the principle-agent problem. As an important long-term incentive mechanism of listed companies, the effect of equity incentive has been a controversial focus in both the theory and practice of community. The recent global financial crisis once again proves the equity-based incentive become benefits because of unreasonable contract and lack of restricted conditions driven by the huge interests. Is equity-based incentive the solution or the source of principal-agent problem? Researchers, practitioners and policy-makers began to rethink the incentive effects of equity-incentive and the supportive system.
Non-tradable shares reform solved the major institutional defects of China' capital market and the development stage of equity incentive has already come. With the development of the institutional system, equity incentive has been adopted by more and more Chinese listed companies. But some contract-level and institution-level factors restrict the development of equity incentive. In this critical period, to establish the appropriate contract structure and institutional system to China's listed companies has grate theoretical and practical value.
Researchers at home and aboard focused mainly on the effects and influential factors of equity incentive so far. According to the differences in theory basis, research idea and method, the relative researches are divided into two perspectives: Exogenous and Endogenous. Many researches use equity incentive as a whole and neglect its contract structure and process. To research the contract structure of equity incentive in depth is imperative, but this perspective is in the primary stage. This paper uses normative analysis, comparative analysis, empirical analysis and case study, proposes the contract structure endogenous hypothesis referring to evolutionary and institutional economics, and establishes Implementation Model on the Rationality of Equity Incentive Contract in Chinese Listed Companies and Institution Optimization Model from the Contract Structure Endogenous Perspective. This paper also researches the contract structure deeply at the micro level and analysis the institutional design systematically at the macro level. The research established a good foundation for the future study and provides references the development of equity incentive in Chinese listed companies.
Listed companies have different resources and conditions in different environment, so their equity incentive plan is also different. Therefore this paper proposes the contract structure endogenous hypothesis through reviewing the literature on equity incentive. The hypothesis advocates equity incentive is not dependent but the structures of it influenced by the characteristics, ownership structure, governance structure and external environment. On basis of that, the contract structure endogenous perspective is proposed to analyze the issue of endogenous dynamics and establish the bridge between equity incentive contract and corporate value by adding moderators.
The rationality of China's listed companies'equity incentive contract analysis model is the application of the contract structure endogenous perspective in the context of China. The rationality of equity incentive contract is the properties that necessary to realize its expected effects not only on the long-term incentive for the incentive objects but also on the improvement of performance and value of the companies. Applicable, balanced, long-term and restricted are the main characteristics of the rational equity incentive contract and form the epitaxy of the rationality of equity incentive contract. According to the principles of importance and feasibility, the key contract elements contain incentive model, incentive object, incentive time horizon and incentive condition. These key elements should be designed according to the endogenous factors of listed companies. Implementation Model on the Rationality of Equity Incentive Contract in Chinese Listed Companies is the application of contract structure endogenous perspective. On the basis of this model, this paper focuses on the four key elements and achieves many valuable conclusions.
The selection of equity incentive model is a process of weighing not only evolutions in the different stages but also compare in the same stage. Stock option and restricted stock are the two main models of China's listed companies after Non-tradable shares reform. They are different in rights and obligations, valuation, restricted stage and accounting. Different listed company has the tendency to choose them. We adopt data of listed companies that has announced stock incentive plans in china to do the empirical research, and the results show that growth and ownership are the main factors to choose the plan.
The reasonable distribution of incentive objects can maximize the incentive effect. Based on core stakeholder theory, the incentive objects should be the owners of key resources and stakeholders. The empirical research shows that industry features and growth capability are the main factors of the distribution. Listed Companies should enforce the effect of strategy location, and make use of other governance mechanisms to ensure equity incentive plans successfully implemented. To ensure the scope of incentive objects is the key to realize selective interests-balance of equity-based incentives, and supervisor equity-based incentives becomes the points at issue. We adopt the Panel Data from 2006-2009 of Listed Companies'in China to do the empirical research. The results show that the Collision Orientation may be induced by supervisor share-hold isn't obvious, but on the contrary, it has positive effects on both the two agency problems and firm value under the effects of the moderators such as executive incentive, independent directors, ownership restriction and debt financing. Therefore, improving corporate governance level is a prerequisite to achieve the effects of supervisor equity-based incentives and to avoid the collision risks effectively.
Equity Incentive is an important part to improve listed companies'corporate governance level. Designing reasonable and effective stock option contracts is the key to success. In this paper, we adopt the data of listed companies that have announced and ones have yet implemented stock option plans in china to do the empirical research. The results show that long-term and incentive are the main features of stock option and timeframe and performance condition are the key elements to embody them. Besides external factors, majority shareholders, creditors and independent directors are main restrictive factors to influence the rationality of stock options. We hope the results can supply useful references to China's listed companies and Regulators.
The above theoretical analysis and empirical researches related to incentive model, incentive object, incentive timeframe and incentive condition are the convincing proof and explanation of the rationality of equity incentive contract in China's listed companies analysis model. In order to increasing operability, this research establishes equity incentive institutional optimization model for China's listed companies. This model includes contract structure optimization, corporate governance restricted mechanism, government and industry regulation and external environment. Following the suggestions on the four levels, equity incentive will be improved continuously and realize the convergence effects of the interests of both the incentive objects and the listed companies.
引文
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④两者关系的不确定性体现在：一方面,规模大的公司监督成本更大,需要以较高经营者股权获得经营者和所有者的利益一致性,同时更高水平的经营者股权也可以作为吸引与留住人才的手段：而另一方面,由各等级的代理人监控所带来的规模经济效应将导致最低的经营者股权比例。
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①内在价值是指股票的市价超过行权价格的差额,当时美国公司采用的多为平价期权,所以期权的内在价值为零。
②公允价值包含内在价值与时间价值,反映了公司的全部期权费用。
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④详见《企业会计准则第11号——股份支付》第二章第四条。
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④为避免上市公司因利润操纵而使其盈利能力与真实价值难以表现,中国证监会引入非经常性损益概念,其定义是：公司发生的与主营业务和其他经营业务无直接关系,以及虽与主营业务与其他经营业务相关,但由于该交易事项的性质、金额和发生频率,影响了正常反映公司经营、盈利能力的各项交易、事项所产生的损益。扣除非经常性损益后则表示企业在正常情况下生产经营活动产生的净收益。
⑤与上文同,将上市公司正式公布股权激励计划(草案)的年份设为T,T-2年为公布股权激励计划(草案)前2年,而T-1年为公布股权激励计划(草案)前1年。
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②即某一群体是否被赋有法律上的、道义上的或者特定的对于企业的索取权。
③即某一群体是否拥有影响企业决策的地位、能力和相应的手段。
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⑥所谓“多维细分法”,即从多个维度对“企业利益相关者”这一群体进行分类,以期寻找出不同利益相关者在某些特征上的差异。
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①具体内容请参照5.2.3中的论述。
②阿尔钦、德姆塞茨(1972)提出的团队生产理论(Team Production Theory)认为,由于团队生产能带来大于单干的产出,如果这个产出在扣除维持团队纪律的有关考核成本后仍有净利,那么就应该依靠团队生产,而不依靠许多可分离的个体产出的双边交易。
③这里的高层管理者泛指董事、监事及高级管理人员等,具体包括董事会成员、监事会成员、总经理(总裁)、副总经理(副总裁)、财务总监(或财务负责人)、总经济师、董事会秘书等。
①在团队内部分配制度下,每多付出一个单位努力水平所增加的收入。
②在个人效用函数结构既定的情况下,每多付出一单位努力水平的效用减少值。
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⑤非经常性损益的定义为公司发生的与主营业务和其他经营业务无直接关系,以及虽与主营业务与其他经 营业务相关,但由于该交易事项的性质、金额和发生频率,影响了正常反映公司经营、盈利能力的各项交易、事项所产生的损益。因此,扣除非经常性损益后则表示企业在正常情况下生产经营活动产生的净收益。
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④根据2001年4月中国证监会颁布的《上市公司行业分类指引》,将上市公司分为13个行业,剔除金融类上市公司,剩下12个行业,分别为农、林、牧、渔业;采掘业;制造业；电力、煤气及水的生产和供应业;建筑业；交通运输、仓储业：信息技术业：批发和零售贸易；房地产业；社会服务业：传播与文化产业；综合类。
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③详见《国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法》(2006年9月30日)。
④为避免政策环境的变化带来的统计误差与因激励模式不同引起的差异,本章的描述性统计数据以2006-2008年选用股票期权的上市公司为样本。
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⑤同第四章中变量定义。
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②关于程序正义,最早的理论属英国古典的自然正义论,其首要要求是,任何人不得做自己案件的法官,在公司治理中,就衍生为不得自定薪酬,而要保持授薪者与受薪者的距离,这是内部治理的原则(秦子甲,2009)。
③为确保其与公司之间在商业利益上之独立性,独立监事与独立董事一样,不纳入激励对象范围。
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①详见2005年8月23日中国证券监督管理委员会、国务院国有资产监督管理委员会、财政部、中国人民银行、商务部联合发布的《关于上市公司股权分置改革的指导意见》。
①详见《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》(2006年1月1日).
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同时性是指不仅董事会对公司绩效具有直接的促进效应,而且公司绩效也会对董事会产生一定的反馈效应,两者在一个系统中是相互依赖的关系。
①异质性是指董事会与公司绩效都受到公司契约环境中一些可观测和不可观测因素(如公司文化、管理者道德)的影响,这些外生因素既影响董事会也影响公司绩效,因此,董事会与公司绩效之间的任何相关性都可能是伪相关。
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④两者关系的不确定性体现在：一方面,规模大的公司监督成本更大,需要以较高经营者股权获得经营者和所有者的利益一致性,同时更高水平的经营者股权也可以作为吸引与留住人才的手段：而另一方面,由各等级的代理人监控所带来的规模经济效应将导致最低的经营者股权比例。
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①杨华,陈晓升.上市公司股权激励理论、法规与实务[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2009年版：264.
①详见《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》(2006年1月1日)第二章第八条。
②详见《国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法》(2006年9月30日)第二章第十一条。
③详见《股权激励有关事项备忘录1号》(2008年3月17日)第二条。
④详见《股权激励有关事项备忘录2号》(2008年3月17日)第一条。
⑤详见《股权激励有关事项备忘录3号》(2008年9月16日)第七条。
⑥详见《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》(2006年1月1日)第二章第十二条。
⑦详见《国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法》(2006年9月30日)第二章第十六条。
⑧详见《公司法》(2006年)第二节“股份转让”中第一百四十三条。
①详见《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》(2006年1月1日)第四章第二十四条。
②详见《国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法》(2006年9月30日)第二章第十八条。
③、详见《股权激励有关事项备忘录1号》(2008年3月17日)第三条。
④详见《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》(2006年1月1日)第四章第二十三条。
⑤详见《国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法》(2006年9月30日)第二十条。
⑥详见《股权激励有关事项备忘录1号》(2008年3月17日)第三条。
①详见《国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法》(2006年9月30日)第二十二条。
②详见《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》(2006年1月1日)第二章第九条。
③详见《关于规范国有控股上市公司实施股权激励制度有关问题的通知》(2008年12月11日)。
④详见《股权激励有关事项备忘录1号》(2008年3月17日)第五条。
⑤详见《股权激励有关事项备忘录3号》(2008年9月16日)第三条。
⑥详见《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》(2006年1月1日)第十一条。
①详见《股权激励有关事项备忘录2号》(2008年3月17日)第三条。
②详见《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》(2006年1月1日)第十条。
③详见《股权激励有关事项备忘录1号》(2008年3月17日)第一条。
①详见《开展加强上市公司治理专项活动有关事项的通知(证监公司字[2007]28号)》(2007年3月9日)。
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①内在价值是指股票的市价超过行权价格的差额,当时美国公司采用的多为平价期权,所以期权的内在价值为零。
②公允价值包含内在价值与时间价值,反映了公司的全部期权费用。
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④详见《企业会计准则第11号——股份支付》第二章第四条。
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②Cui Huimin, Y.T. Mak. The Relationship Between Managerial Ownership and Firm Perfonnace in High R&D Firms fJl. Journal of Corporate Finance,2002(8):313-336.
③王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值——基于内生性视角的经验分析[J].管理世界,2006(9)：102-116.
④为避免上市公司因利润操纵而使其盈利能力与真实价值难以表现,中国证监会引入非经常性损益概念,其定义是：公司发生的与主营业务和其他经营业务无直接关系,以及虽与主营业务与其他经营业务相关,但由于该交易事项的性质、金额和发生频率,影响了正常反映公司经营、盈利能力的各项交易、事项所产生的损益。扣除非经常性损益后则表示企业在正常情况下生产经营活动产生的净收益。
⑤与上文同,将上市公司正式公布股权激励计划(草案)的年份设为T,T-2年为公布股权激励计划(草案)前2年,而T-1年为公布股权激励计划(草案)前1年。
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②即某一群体是否被赋有法律上的、道义上的或者特定的对于企业的索取权。
③即某一群体是否拥有影响企业决策的地位、能力和相应的手段。
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⑥所谓“多维细分法”,即从多个维度对“企业利益相关者”这一群体进行分类,以期寻找出不同利益相关者在某些特征上的差异。
⑦陈宏辉.利益相关者利益要求：理论与实证研究[M].北京： 经济出版社，2004:62-85.
①具体内容请参照5.2.3中的论述。
②阿尔钦、德姆塞茨(1972)提出的团队生产理论(Team Production Theory)认为,由于团队生产能带来大于单干的产出,如果这个产出在扣除维持团队纪律的有关考核成本后仍有净利,那么就应该依靠团队生产,而不依靠许多可分离的个体产出的双边交易。
③这里的高层管理者泛指董事、监事及高级管理人员等,具体包括董事会成员、监事会成员、总经理(总裁)、副总经理(副总裁)、财务总监(或财务负责人)、总经济师、董事会秘书等。
①在团队内部分配制度下,每多付出一个单位努力水平所增加的收入。
②在个人效用函数结构既定的情况下,每多付出一单位努力水平的效用减少值。
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②传统的“贝利-米恩斯命题”认为,现代公司的主要矛盾是股东与经营者之间的利益冲突,形成了第一类委托代理问题(Jensen & Meckling,1976).但在金字塔结构下,投票权与现金流权的严重分离使控股股东产生了掠夺公司财富的强烈动机和能力,导致其与中小股东之间的矛盾更为凸显,构成了第二类委托代理问题(Shleifer & Vishny,1997；La Port,1998).这两类互相联系的治理关系普遍存在于中国上市公司中,因此,对于上市公司治理问题的研究也从单一治理关系框架向两者权衡分析转变(邓健,2009)。
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⑤非经常性损益的定义为公司发生的与主营业务和其他经营业务无直接关系,以及虽与主营业务与其他经 营业务相关,但由于该交易事项的性质、金额和发生频率,影响了正常反映公司经营、盈利能力的各项交易、事项所产生的损益。因此,扣除非经常性损益后则表示企业在正常情况下生产经营活动产生的净收益。
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④根据2001年4月中国证监会颁布的《上市公司行业分类指引》,将上市公司分为13个行业,剔除金融类上市公司,剩下12个行业,分别为农、林、牧、渔业;采掘业;制造业；电力、煤气及水的生产和供应业;建筑业；交通运输、仓储业：信息技术业：批发和零售贸易；房地产业；社会服务业：传播与文化产业；综合类。
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①2008年3月17日出台的《股权激励有关事项备忘录2号》规定：“为确保上市公司监事独立性,充分发挥其监督作用,上市公司监事不得成为股权激励对象”。
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③详见《国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法》(2006年9月30日)。
④为避免政策环境的变化带来的统计误差与因激励模式不同引起的差异,本章的描述性统计数据以2006-2008年选用股票期权的上市公司为样本。
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⑤同第四章中变量定义。
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②关于程序正义,最早的理论属英国古典的自然正义论,其首要要求是,任何人不得做自己案件的法官,在公司治理中,就衍生为不得自定薪酬,而要保持授薪者与受薪者的距离,这是内部治理的原则(秦子甲,2009)。
③为确保其与公司之间在商业利益上之独立性,独立监事与独立董事一样,不纳入激励对象范围。
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①费用观的主要观点是把股票期权确认为企业的一项费用,作为企业的成本计入利润表。利润分配观则认为股票期权的实质是经理人员对企业剩余价值的分享,应将其确认为利润分配(谢德仁,刘文.关于经理人股票期权会计确认问题的研究[J].会计研究,2002(9):25-30.)
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