经理人股票期权会计的经济后果研究
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摘要
随着中国资本市场的不断发展,经理人股票期权作为一项全新的激励制度在中国兴起。2007年开始实施的中国新会计准则第11号(以下简称新会计准则第11号)首次对经理人股票期权会计处理进行了明确规定,该项会计准则的实施效果直接关系到经理人股票期权激励作用的发挥。
基于以上考虑,本文以新会计准则第11号的实施为契机,根据会计经济后果理论建立了经理人股票期权会计经济后果的分析框架,试图回答以下几个主要问题:经理人股票期权披露受什么因素的影响?管理者是否对经理人股票期权执行价进行了操纵?我国新会计准则第11号对经理人股票期权执行价操纵行为是否产生了制约效果?股票市场对我国新会计准则第11号的实施做出了什么反应?经理人股票期权会计变革在中国和法国引起的市场反应是否不同?本文通过解决上述问题,得到了如下具有一定创新性的研究结果:
(1)提出了经理人股票期权披露影响因素假说,并通过经理人股票期权披露程度差异性检验及二分类Logistic回归模型,对经理人股票期权披露影响因素假说的五个子假说进行了检验,结果发现在中国经理人股票期权实施初期,高管持有比例以及企业债务契约约束程度是影响经理人股票期权披露策略的两个主要因素。
(2)对经理人股票期权执行价操纵行为在中国的存在性及新会计准则第11号对该操纵行为的约束效果进行了检验。在应用事件研究方法对样本公司经理人股票期权计划草案公布日前后一个月内的股价异常波动进行了分析之后,发现中国确实存在经理人股票期权执行价操纵行为,而新会计准则第11号的实施并没有消除该项操纵行为。
(3)应用事件研究法,分析了经理人股票期权会计变革在中国引起的市场反应,结果发现从短时间窗口来看,实施新的经理人股票期权会计方法,并没有使上市公司的股价发生明显波动,不过从长时间窗口(230个交易日)来看,经理人股票期权费用化对中国上市公司股价有负面影响。
(4)在国内首次采用法国CAC40和SBF120指数数据对经理人股票期权会计变革在法国引起的市场反应进行了事件研究,并将结果与中国市场反应作进一步的国际比较研究,结果发现资本市场成熟度的差异,导致基本相同的经理人股票期权会计变革并没有对法国投资者和企业产生明显影响,而在中国却降低了投资者对于企业价值的判断。
上述的研究结果将为经理人股票期权激励在中国的应用以及相关会计准则的进一步完善提供理论依据。
Executive stock option (ESO) is becoming more and more important in China as an effective incentive system with the great development of China capital market. China GAAP No.11 gives clear guidelines for ESO accounting from 2007. Economic consequences of ESO accounting have direct connection with ESO encouraging power.
Basing on the above mentioned, this paper builds up the framework of economic consequence analysis for ESO accounting according to the accounting economic consequence theory. This paper tries to answer several main problems as follows: What are the influencing factors of ESO disclosure? Do managers really manipulate exercise price of ESO? Does China GAAP No.11 have control over ESO exercise price manipulation? What is the market reaction to China GAAP No.11? What is the difference of market reaction caused by ESO accounting transform between China and France? This paper gets the following innovative results by stdudying all the above questions:
(1) It puts forward the influencing factor hypothesis of ESO disclosure strategy and analyzes five detailed influencing factor hypothesis by difference significance test and logistic regression. This paper finds out that proportion of ESO held by managers and liability constraint are two main influencing factors of ESO disclosure strategy.
(2) It analyzes the exercise price manipulation behavior of ESO. Using event study method, it tests abnormal stock pirces around the date when ESO plan were put out and finally proves the exercise price manipulation exists in China and China GAAP No. 11 has not eliminated this behavior.
(3) Using event study method, it analyzes the market reaction caused by ESO accounting transform in China and finds out that there is not significant reaction in short time window and negative reaction in long time window (230 trading days).
(4) It makes the same event study using data from CAC40 and SBF120. Comparing capital market maturity difference and market reaction caused by expensing ESO between China and France, this paper finds out the more mature the capital market is, the weaker market reaction caused by expensing ESO.
According to the above results, this paper will surely give some useful advices to China GAAP No.11 and stock option compensation under the special capital market circumstance of China.
基于以上考虑,本文以新会计准则第11号的实施为契机,根据会计经济后果理论建立了经理人股票期权会计经济后果的分析框架,试图回答以下几个主要问题:经理人股票期权披露受什么因素的影响?管理者是否对经理人股票期权执行价进行了操纵?我国新会计准则第11号对经理人股票期权执行价操纵行为是否产生了制约效果?股票市场对我国新会计准则第11号的实施做出了什么反应?经理人股票期权会计变革在中国和法国引起的市场反应是否不同?本文通过解决上述问题,得到了如下具有一定创新性的研究结果:
(1)提出了经理人股票期权披露影响因素假说,并通过经理人股票期权披露程度差异性检验及二分类Logistic回归模型,对经理人股票期权披露影响因素假说的五个子假说进行了检验,结果发现在中国经理人股票期权实施初期,高管持有比例以及企业债务契约约束程度是影响经理人股票期权披露策略的两个主要因素。
(2)对经理人股票期权执行价操纵行为在中国的存在性及新会计准则第11号对该操纵行为的约束效果进行了检验。在应用事件研究方法对样本公司经理人股票期权计划草案公布日前后一个月内的股价异常波动进行了分析之后,发现中国确实存在经理人股票期权执行价操纵行为,而新会计准则第11号的实施并没有消除该项操纵行为。
(3)应用事件研究法,分析了经理人股票期权会计变革在中国引起的市场反应,结果发现从短时间窗口来看,实施新的经理人股票期权会计方法,并没有使上市公司的股价发生明显波动,不过从长时间窗口(230个交易日)来看,经理人股票期权费用化对中国上市公司股价有负面影响。
(4)在国内首次采用法国CAC40和SBF120指数数据对经理人股票期权会计变革在法国引起的市场反应进行了事件研究,并将结果与中国市场反应作进一步的国际比较研究,结果发现资本市场成熟度的差异,导致基本相同的经理人股票期权会计变革并没有对法国投资者和企业产生明显影响,而在中国却降低了投资者对于企业价值的判断。
上述的研究结果将为经理人股票期权激励在中国的应用以及相关会计准则的进一步完善提供理论依据。
Executive stock option (ESO) is becoming more and more important in China as an effective incentive system with the great development of China capital market. China GAAP No.11 gives clear guidelines for ESO accounting from 2007. Economic consequences of ESO accounting have direct connection with ESO encouraging power.
Basing on the above mentioned, this paper builds up the framework of economic consequence analysis for ESO accounting according to the accounting economic consequence theory. This paper tries to answer several main problems as follows: What are the influencing factors of ESO disclosure? Do managers really manipulate exercise price of ESO? Does China GAAP No.11 have control over ESO exercise price manipulation? What is the market reaction to China GAAP No.11? What is the difference of market reaction caused by ESO accounting transform between China and France? This paper gets the following innovative results by stdudying all the above questions:
(1) It puts forward the influencing factor hypothesis of ESO disclosure strategy and analyzes five detailed influencing factor hypothesis by difference significance test and logistic regression. This paper finds out that proportion of ESO held by managers and liability constraint are two main influencing factors of ESO disclosure strategy.
(2) It analyzes the exercise price manipulation behavior of ESO. Using event study method, it tests abnormal stock pirces around the date when ESO plan were put out and finally proves the exercise price manipulation exists in China and China GAAP No. 11 has not eliminated this behavior.
(3) Using event study method, it analyzes the market reaction caused by ESO accounting transform in China and finds out that there is not significant reaction in short time window and negative reaction in long time window (230 trading days).
(4) It makes the same event study using data from CAC40 and SBF120. Comparing capital market maturity difference and market reaction caused by expensing ESO between China and France, this paper finds out the more mature the capital market is, the weaker market reaction caused by expensing ESO.
According to the above results, this paper will surely give some useful advices to China GAAP No.11 and stock option compensation under the special capital market circumstance of China.
引文
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