企业虚拟股票期权激励模式探析
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摘要
现代企业制度的确立使得企业的所有权和经营权相互分离,从而建立了股东和经营者的委托代理关系。在委托-代理关系下,企业所有者对经营管理者的有效激励就成为解决代理成本的核心问题。如何建立一个最优的激励机制,使经营管理者创造的经营业绩和企业价值最大化对应并协调起来,就成为了企业选择激励模式的关键。由于传统薪酬激励制度(如年薪制)缺乏长效激励机制,易诱发经营管理者只注重企业的短期行为,而忽略企业的长远发展；传统的股票期权激励制度虽然关注企业长期的发展,一定程度上避免其短期行为,但由于股票价格受股票二级市场噪音影响、股票来源问题等多种原因的影响,亦会导致经营管理者的努力和企业价值相背离。因此,设计出一种对经营管理者进行科学有效的激励机制,就显得迫在眉睫。
本文从整体看是按照“提出问题—分析问题—解决问题”的逻辑顺序,采用规范研究、案例研究等方法展开研究,共分为六部分展开。
第一部分是引言,主要介绍了本文的研究背景与意义,并对国内外关于虚拟股票期权和EVA的研究成果相关文献进行了综述,提出将虚拟股票期权和相对EVA业绩评价体系相结合的研究思路、研究方法及研究框架。
第二部分主要介绍相对EVA下虚拟股票的基础理论,本部分首先对虚拟股票相关理论进行了探讨,包括虚拟股票内涵、特点和虚拟股票构成要素。随后,介绍了EVA理论体系及EVA薪酬激励制度,包括对EVA相关概念及企业对财务报表的调整项目做的简要分析下的EVA的计算、EVA的理论体系即评价指标、管理体系、激励制度以及理念体系“4 M’s”,还详细阐述了EVA薪酬激励制度,包括EVA红利计划和红利银行等西方企业激励模式,为后面阐述相对EVA下虚拟股票期权打好理论基础。最后,本部分探讨了激励机制理论基础,包括委托-代理理论、人力资本理论、管理激励理论和相对业绩评价理论。
第三部分首先对现行激励方式的局限性进行了简要的分析,包括年薪制的局限性、传统股票期权的局限性、EVA激励模式的局限性的分析。紧接着,对国外企业如美国、瑞典、德国等成功应用股票期权和EVA激励模式的经验作了介绍,并详细的介绍了美国IBM公司实施传统股票期权成功例子和瑞典伊莱克斯公司实施EVA下股票期权的激励模式的经验。最后,结合我国国情和国外企业的激励模式的成功经验,提出了五点值得我国企业借鉴之处,包括充分发挥人力资本作用、改革完善激励机制、重整组织结构和规范治理结构、建设企业优秀文化、建立现代企业分配制度等。
第四部分详细阐述了虚拟股票期权与相对EVA业绩评价理论相结合的激励模式设计。首先,对该模式的设计的原则和遵循的逻辑作了分析,概括出该模式设计的总体框架；随后对该模式相对于传统薪酬模式和单一模式设计的优势进行阐述。紧接着,本文就该激励模式的设计要素：授予对象、授予时机、激励基金的来源、虚拟股票的内部价格、行权价格及执行管理进行了详细的设计说明。在该模式的设计中,考虑了对企业经营管理者的短期激励和长期激励的结合,能够较好的将经营管理者的业绩增长同企业股东财富增加统一起来,体现经营者的真实努力程度；同时,引入相对EVA业绩评价思想,能有效剔除股票二级市场噪音的影响,较传统薪酬激励体系和单一的期权激励模式,在反映经营管理者业绩上更加具有客观性。最后,就实施该激励模式,公司内部和外部需要的实施的配套措施和政策提出了相关的建议。
第五部分是相对EVA下的股票期权激励模式的应用。为检验基于相对EVA下的虚拟股票期权的激励机制模式的科学性,本文选取某一上市公司Y公司作为应用对象,在对它的背景和现行高管激励的现状作了简要分析后,结合Y公司的具体实际情况,就实施该激励模式的可行性进行了分析,提出总体设计思路和具体的设计方案,并在最后就该设计方案的进行了评价。
第六部分是研究的结论,在归纳全文研究的基础上提出了若干结论,同时指出了研究的不足。
The separation of ownership and control rights result in principal-agent relationship. Based on the relationship of principal-agent, The enterprise owners incentive effectively the business managers that it becomes the core problem in resolving the agent cost. It becomes the key how companies build a effective inventive mechanism that it makes the managers' achievement match the company's benefit well. Because the traditional salary system such as the yearly salary system can't produce the long-term incentive, it is easy to induce business managers only to pay great attention enterprise's short-term incentive, but neglect enterprise's long-term development. Although the incentive mechanism of traditional stock option makes business managers pay attention to long-term development and avoiding its short-term behavior in the certain extent, but it also causes business managers to depart their effort from enterprise value because stock price of stock market fluctuates and the origin of stock. Therefore, it urges to design a scientific and effective incentive mechanism to business managers.
Based on the "Propose the question-analysis question-solves the problem" logic sequence, this paper adopts research methods such as the standard research, theory and case research and so on. It divides six parts to write.
Chapter one:Foreword, it proposes the background of selecting topic and the significance of research, and makes a brief summary on the domestic and foreign hypothesized stock option and the research results about EVA,and it simultaneously proposes that unifies the phantom stock option and the relative EVA achievement appraisal system,research methods, its fundamental research framework.
Chapter two:in this part, it mainly introduces the based theory of phantom stock option based on the perspective of the relative EVA.First,it introduces the based conception of phantom stock and its character, phantom stock integrant parts.Afterword, it introduces EVA theory system and EVA salary incentive system.it briefly analysis the conception of EVA and the enterprise adjusts of financial reporting's reconciliation item and the EVA theory system including evaluating indicator, the management system, the incentive system and the theory system "4 M's" and proposes this paper to design the incentive model mainly depending on the evaluating indicator and the incentive system; Then it detailly introduces the EVA salary incentive system, including the western enterprise incentive system such as dividend plan and dividend bank.Finally, this paper discusses the foundation of incentive theory Including principal-agent theory, human capital theory, the incentive theory and relative EVA achievement performance theory.
Chapter three, in this part, it first analyzes existing salary incentive model mechanism, including the limitation of the incentive model mechanism of yearly salary system, traditional stock option and EVA driving pattern. Afterword, it introduces overseas enterprises' success experience such as the US, the Sweden about using the incentive mechanism of the stock option or the EVA,and detailly introduces the traditional stock option success example of US IBM Corporation and Sweden Iraq Likes Company implementing the stock option based the relative EVA. Finally, unifying our country national condition and implementing success experience Of the overseas enterprises' incentive mechanism,it proposes five points which our country Enterprises worth studying including displaying completely human capital function, reforming the incentive mechanism, reorganizing the organizational structure and Consummating the government structure, constructing enterprise outstanding culture and establishing modern enterprise distribution system and so on.
Chapter four, this part introduces particularly the incentive model design about the phantom stock option and the relative EVA achievement appraisal theory. First, it analyses this model's design's principle and logic which is followed to and then makes this model's overall frame; Afterward, it particularly introduces the superiority of this model relative to the tradition salary model and the sole model design. Then it makes a qualitative and quota analysis about the incentive model's essential factor:Awarded the object, the award opportunity, the incentive fund origin, the internal price of phantom stock, the management of stock price execution. In this model design, it considers the incentive of the enterprise business manager's short-term and the long-term incentive's union, it is able to unify the business manager's achievement growing with the increasing wealth of the enterprise shareholder and demonstrates the operator's real level of effort; introducing the thought of the relative EVA achievement appraisal makes it can effectively reject the influence of the stock secondary market noise, comparing the traditional salary drive system and the sole option drive pattern, it is able to objectively reflect business manager achievement.In the final part, it introduces the coordinated sets of measures and the suggested policy the company interior and the exterior need take when the incentive is taken.
Chapter five:it is application to the incentive model which is designed in the fourth part. In order to exam the scientific of the incentive mechanism phantom stock option basing on the relative EVA.the paper proposes the system design mentality and the concretely design proposal in the Y Corporation which is listed basing on the feasibility analysis about the incentive model in the company after making a summary analysis about its background and the present incentive situation about the business managers and finally it appraises the design proposal.
Chapter six:it is research conclusion, basing on the full text research it proposes certain conclusions, simultaneously pointes out the research insufficiency.
本文从整体看是按照“提出问题—分析问题—解决问题”的逻辑顺序,采用规范研究、案例研究等方法展开研究,共分为六部分展开。
第一部分是引言,主要介绍了本文的研究背景与意义,并对国内外关于虚拟股票期权和EVA的研究成果相关文献进行了综述,提出将虚拟股票期权和相对EVA业绩评价体系相结合的研究思路、研究方法及研究框架。
第二部分主要介绍相对EVA下虚拟股票的基础理论,本部分首先对虚拟股票相关理论进行了探讨,包括虚拟股票内涵、特点和虚拟股票构成要素。随后,介绍了EVA理论体系及EVA薪酬激励制度,包括对EVA相关概念及企业对财务报表的调整项目做的简要分析下的EVA的计算、EVA的理论体系即评价指标、管理体系、激励制度以及理念体系“4 M’s”,还详细阐述了EVA薪酬激励制度,包括EVA红利计划和红利银行等西方企业激励模式,为后面阐述相对EVA下虚拟股票期权打好理论基础。最后,本部分探讨了激励机制理论基础,包括委托-代理理论、人力资本理论、管理激励理论和相对业绩评价理论。
第三部分首先对现行激励方式的局限性进行了简要的分析,包括年薪制的局限性、传统股票期权的局限性、EVA激励模式的局限性的分析。紧接着,对国外企业如美国、瑞典、德国等成功应用股票期权和EVA激励模式的经验作了介绍,并详细的介绍了美国IBM公司实施传统股票期权成功例子和瑞典伊莱克斯公司实施EVA下股票期权的激励模式的经验。最后,结合我国国情和国外企业的激励模式的成功经验,提出了五点值得我国企业借鉴之处,包括充分发挥人力资本作用、改革完善激励机制、重整组织结构和规范治理结构、建设企业优秀文化、建立现代企业分配制度等。
第四部分详细阐述了虚拟股票期权与相对EVA业绩评价理论相结合的激励模式设计。首先,对该模式的设计的原则和遵循的逻辑作了分析,概括出该模式设计的总体框架；随后对该模式相对于传统薪酬模式和单一模式设计的优势进行阐述。紧接着,本文就该激励模式的设计要素：授予对象、授予时机、激励基金的来源、虚拟股票的内部价格、行权价格及执行管理进行了详细的设计说明。在该模式的设计中,考虑了对企业经营管理者的短期激励和长期激励的结合,能够较好的将经营管理者的业绩增长同企业股东财富增加统一起来,体现经营者的真实努力程度；同时,引入相对EVA业绩评价思想,能有效剔除股票二级市场噪音的影响,较传统薪酬激励体系和单一的期权激励模式,在反映经营管理者业绩上更加具有客观性。最后,就实施该激励模式,公司内部和外部需要的实施的配套措施和政策提出了相关的建议。
第五部分是相对EVA下的股票期权激励模式的应用。为检验基于相对EVA下的虚拟股票期权的激励机制模式的科学性,本文选取某一上市公司Y公司作为应用对象,在对它的背景和现行高管激励的现状作了简要分析后,结合Y公司的具体实际情况,就实施该激励模式的可行性进行了分析,提出总体设计思路和具体的设计方案,并在最后就该设计方案的进行了评价。
第六部分是研究的结论,在归纳全文研究的基础上提出了若干结论,同时指出了研究的不足。
The separation of ownership and control rights result in principal-agent relationship. Based on the relationship of principal-agent, The enterprise owners incentive effectively the business managers that it becomes the core problem in resolving the agent cost. It becomes the key how companies build a effective inventive mechanism that it makes the managers' achievement match the company's benefit well. Because the traditional salary system such as the yearly salary system can't produce the long-term incentive, it is easy to induce business managers only to pay great attention enterprise's short-term incentive, but neglect enterprise's long-term development. Although the incentive mechanism of traditional stock option makes business managers pay attention to long-term development and avoiding its short-term behavior in the certain extent, but it also causes business managers to depart their effort from enterprise value because stock price of stock market fluctuates and the origin of stock. Therefore, it urges to design a scientific and effective incentive mechanism to business managers.
Based on the "Propose the question-analysis question-solves the problem" logic sequence, this paper adopts research methods such as the standard research, theory and case research and so on. It divides six parts to write.
Chapter one:Foreword, it proposes the background of selecting topic and the significance of research, and makes a brief summary on the domestic and foreign hypothesized stock option and the research results about EVA,and it simultaneously proposes that unifies the phantom stock option and the relative EVA achievement appraisal system,research methods, its fundamental research framework.
Chapter two:in this part, it mainly introduces the based theory of phantom stock option based on the perspective of the relative EVA.First,it introduces the based conception of phantom stock and its character, phantom stock integrant parts.Afterword, it introduces EVA theory system and EVA salary incentive system.it briefly analysis the conception of EVA and the enterprise adjusts of financial reporting's reconciliation item and the EVA theory system including evaluating indicator, the management system, the incentive system and the theory system "4 M's" and proposes this paper to design the incentive model mainly depending on the evaluating indicator and the incentive system; Then it detailly introduces the EVA salary incentive system, including the western enterprise incentive system such as dividend plan and dividend bank.Finally, this paper discusses the foundation of incentive theory Including principal-agent theory, human capital theory, the incentive theory and relative EVA achievement performance theory.
Chapter three, in this part, it first analyzes existing salary incentive model mechanism, including the limitation of the incentive model mechanism of yearly salary system, traditional stock option and EVA driving pattern. Afterword, it introduces overseas enterprises' success experience such as the US, the Sweden about using the incentive mechanism of the stock option or the EVA,and detailly introduces the traditional stock option success example of US IBM Corporation and Sweden Iraq Likes Company implementing the stock option based the relative EVA. Finally, unifying our country national condition and implementing success experience Of the overseas enterprises' incentive mechanism,it proposes five points which our country Enterprises worth studying including displaying completely human capital function, reforming the incentive mechanism, reorganizing the organizational structure and Consummating the government structure, constructing enterprise outstanding culture and establishing modern enterprise distribution system and so on.
Chapter four, this part introduces particularly the incentive model design about the phantom stock option and the relative EVA achievement appraisal theory. First, it analyses this model's design's principle and logic which is followed to and then makes this model's overall frame; Afterward, it particularly introduces the superiority of this model relative to the tradition salary model and the sole model design. Then it makes a qualitative and quota analysis about the incentive model's essential factor:Awarded the object, the award opportunity, the incentive fund origin, the internal price of phantom stock, the management of stock price execution. In this model design, it considers the incentive of the enterprise business manager's short-term and the long-term incentive's union, it is able to unify the business manager's achievement growing with the increasing wealth of the enterprise shareholder and demonstrates the operator's real level of effort; introducing the thought of the relative EVA achievement appraisal makes it can effectively reject the influence of the stock secondary market noise, comparing the traditional salary drive system and the sole option drive pattern, it is able to objectively reflect business manager achievement.In the final part, it introduces the coordinated sets of measures and the suggested policy the company interior and the exterior need take when the incentive is taken.
Chapter five:it is application to the incentive model which is designed in the fourth part. In order to exam the scientific of the incentive mechanism phantom stock option basing on the relative EVA.the paper proposes the system design mentality and the concretely design proposal in the Y Corporation which is listed basing on the feasibility analysis about the incentive model in the company after making a summary analysis about its background and the present incentive situation about the business managers and finally it appraises the design proposal.
Chapter six:it is research conclusion, basing on the full text research it proposes certain conclusions, simultaneously pointes out the research insufficiency.
引文
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