基于产业化视角的我国农业上市公司募集资金投向变更问题研究
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摘要
现代农业的发展需要以农业上市公司为首的农业企业,以其先进的生产力和优良的组织管理能力,带动农户进行农业生产,建设和完善农业产业链,才能不断推动农业走上产业化、规模化、集约化、资本化和现代化的道路。换言之,作为龙头企业的农业上市公司背负着我国农业产业结构调整升级的希望。但是长期以来,农业上市公司的“背农”现象一直存在,尤其近年来,进行非农领域投资的农业上市公司数量更是呈现出逐年递增的趋势。这说明,我国农业上市公司的非农扩张现象日益严重,部分农业上市公司淡出甚至完全退出了农业领域的生产和经营,这显然和国家扶持农业上市公司以带动我国农业的产业化发展的初衷是相背离的。因此本文以我国农业上市公司的“背农投资”现象为切入点研究了我国农业上市公司募集资金使用中的投向变更问题,对其现象、后果和引致动因做了较为全面深入的研究,并根据实证研究结论提出了相应的对策建议。
一、论文的主要研究内容
(1)首先通过描述性统计分析对我国农业上市公司的募集资金投向进行归纳总结,并讨论我国农业上市公司的收入构成和利润结构,指出我国农业上市公司偏离主业进行经营即“背农投资”的现象是否存在普遍性；
(2)通过数据包络分析和回归分析对我国农业上市公司的募集资金投向变更行为进行实证研究,计算不同研究样本分组的效率值,并确定农业上市公司变更资金投向及程度对公司效率是否存在影响,同时将募集资金的隐性变更纳入实证研究的范畴,讨论资金闲置对公司效率的影响；
(3)通过logistic回归分析对募集资金投向变更的引致因素进行实证研究,将农业上市公司的自然风险、市场风险等外部因素以及公司规模、股本结构等内生变量同时纳入决策影响体系进行讨论。根据实证研究的结果,进一步考虑公司治理结构对资金投向选择的影响,并在实证研究的基础上,进一步将行为金融学的短视损失厌恶概念引入决策层的决策行为中,从理论上探讨在不完善的公司治理结构下,管理层的有限理性对农业上市公司的背农投资决策行为是否存在显著影响；
(4)根据实证研究的结果,在对我国农业上市公司募集资金投向变更行为的后果和引致因素进行实证研究的基础上,对现象的治理提出有针对性的政策建议,并结合农业上市公司的募集资金投向对实现农业产业化结构调整的意义以及农业上市公司产业组织形式的内生矛盾,为农业上市公司的战略选择提出可供参考的建议,并就构建农业纵向产业链、促进我国农业产业化发展的具体模式和实现路径进行讨论。
二、本文的主要研究结论
(1)从理论分析上我国农业上市公司募集资金投向变更的内在机理可以发现,由于农业投资项目往往涉及基础设施的额外投入而导致金额巨大的投资,并面临着投资回收期长,利润率较低等风险,农业上市公司这一产业组织形式在生成之初就面临尴尬的两难选择,既希望享有国家的优惠政策实现上市融资,又希望规避农业行业本身的弱质性和特殊风险,因此,资本逐利性和农业弱质性以及农业上市公司经济责任和社会责任间的冲突是导致我国农业上市公司在使用募集资金时选择背农投资的根源。
(2)我国农业上市公司的背农投资现象非常普遍,资金投向主要用于非农产业,同时也存在相当数量的公司将筹集到的农业项目资金闲置不用。不同的公司资金投向变更的程度和比例都有所不同,但从资金投向的行业特征来看,我国农业上市公司的募集资金往往流入到其他具备高风险高收益的行业如房地产、生物制药等行业。同时,农业上市公司的隐性变更即资金闲置行为也带有群发性特征,存在闲置行为的公司数量占到全部公司数量的一半以上。
(3)在经过数据包络分析和多元回归分析等实证研究后发现,我国农业上市公司的经营效率明显受到资金投向的影响。根据数据包络分析的结果,是否直接变更募集资金投向或者在经营过程中将资金运用于非农的主营业务均显著影响到农业上市公司的效率值,有助于其短期效率的提高；在此基础上,通过进一步将公司效率解构为公司价值、盈利能力和发展能力后进行实证研究,结果显示：农业上市公司选择募集资金投向变更会提高当年的公司价值和盈利能力,但变更程度和这两个变量之间并不存在显著的相关关系。而从长远来看,是否变更资金投向对公司的成长能力并无显著影响,但一旦选择了变更,则变更程度越高,公司的成长能力下降就越为显著,这说明代表核心竞争力的主营业务增长率反而会受到影响,并可能会降低公司的未来盈利能力；此外当农业上市公司将募集资金部分或者全部用于闲置时,对当期的盈利能力、发展能力等都会产生负面影响,如果公司寻求到更好的投资机会,则管理层会基于短期效率的考虑,选择将闲置资金用于非农产业,即偏离招股说明书载明用途进行非农投资以提高短期的公司价值和盈利能力。
(4)通过实证研究方法分别在新古典财务理论和存在委托代理关系的现代公司治理框架下分析了对公司是否变更资金投向造成影响的动因,结论是：
第一,资产规模与是否变更资金投向存在负相关关系,这是在两个不同的理论框架下得出的同一结论。我国农业上市公司同其他行业相比,资产规模相对较小,这也是其更易产生变更资金投向的投资决策,致使经营偏离主业的原因之一；
第二,新古典财务理论的研究框架下,反映公司价值的指标和是否变更资金投向没有统计意义上的相关关系,但风险却成为具备统计相关性的投资决策影响因素且系数为正,这代表由于农业面临更高的风险,发生募资变更的概率也就越高；
第三,反映治理结构的第一大股东、管理层和监事会持股比例等与资金投向间都存在正相关关系且通过了显著性检验。该结论表示代理人持股比例越高,发生募集资金投向变更的可能性也就越高。而大股东、管理层和监事会则可能合谋,基于短期回报的考虑罔顾公司未来成长能力和核心竞争力可能遭受的损害,选择变更募集资金的投向。在不完善的公司治理结构下,进一步运用行为金融学的理论,即决策者往往存在短视损失厌恶的心理可以更好地解释农业上市公司的非效率资金投向选择行为。
第四,在公司治理结构中,董事会持股比例与是否变更募集资金投向存在显著的负相关关系,说明董事会持股比例越高,越不容易产生募集资金投向的变更行为。可能的原因是独立董事的存在,其非利益相关性使得独立董事可以作为独立的第三方依据公司价值最大化和长远发展的需求进行合理的投资方向选择,而不会赞成频繁的变更资金投向、盲目进行非农产业的拓展行为。因此,适当增加独立董事的持股比例,可以从一定程度上遏制决策层的短视心理和相应产生的投资决策非理性,从而规避农业上市公司频频变更资金投向的行为。
(5)通过构建博弈模型对农业上市公司在横向多元化和纵向一体化之间的最优战略进行了分析,发现农业上市公司的较优选择是选择纵向一体化战略而非盲目地横向扩张,因此投资构建纵向的农业产业链将是农业上市公司的较优选择。
三、政策建议
(1)对于农业上市公司背农投资现象的治理和募集资金使用的规范,从具体的政策改进上,建议在政府对农业产业进行政策扶持之时,如将财政补贴用于农业上市公司对上游产业链的投资,可以缓解投资的资金压力,也可以通过政策导向促进农业上市公司采取纵向一体化战略。
(2)考虑到农业生产对象的特性和农业项目的建设周期特征,可以考虑在传统的财务分析和绩效评价体系中采用新的方法作为决策参考,用项目投资期为一个会计期间对农业上市公司的绩效做出评价而非仅仅是一个会计年度的评价标准,或者将投资回收期和农业产品的生长周期结合起来,对收益和成本进行平滑,避免出现在农业项目投资的前期成本高而收益低从而导致投资项目亏损的情况,并规避由此为农业上市公司的短期绩效以及管理者的评价带来的负面影响。这样,可以从制度设计方面治理管理层的短视损失厌恶心理和由此引致的决策非理性。
(3)在制度创新方面,由于农业上市公司进行产业链内投资除了受到前面所述动因的影响,还会存在资金瓶颈的约束,因此可以考虑采用一种“公司+公司”的产业链投资模式作为过渡,根据重庆的试点效果和经验,本文提出了由农业上市公司控股,组建农民参股的上游生产链主体——农民公司这一过渡模式。通过“公司+公司”模式,可以将资本市场筹集到的资金和农民的自由资本以及政府的金融支持有效结合起来,由政府和政策性银行分担农业产业化的部分社会责任,也对缓解农业上市公司的内生矛盾有所裨益。
四、可能的创新之处
(1)研究体系的完善：从产业组织形式自身的缺陷阐释背农现象产生的内在机理,进而从现象入手全面研究了背农的后果和资金投向变更的影响因素,继而提出有针对性的治理建议。
(2)研究视角的创新：将行为金融理论中经理人的有限理性和短视损失厌恶引入我国农业上市公司投资决策影响的分析中,更为深刻地揭示投资决策中决策者心理因素的作用,属于研究视角和切入点的创新。
(3)治理对策中提出的制度创新：首先在提高农业上市公司绩效,治理其背农投资行为的对策建议上,将农业产业链的市场特征引入模型,并提出了“公司+公司”的产业组织形式；其次,在农业上市公司的绩效评价体系中增加以农业项目的投资周期或者农产品的生长周期作为判断公司和经理人绩效的会计期间的财务报告体系,以治理决策者的短视和与之对应的变更资金投向行为。
五、本文的不足和后续研究方向主要有以下方面：
第一,在分析了微观因素对农业上市公司资金投向的影响之后,本文通过回归分析得到的结论是,在宏观经济运行状况好的情况下,农业上市公司可能面临较为突出的农业行业风险而易于将资金投向非农产业,反之,如果系统风险也较为突出的情况下,农业行业特有的风险会从一定程度上得到掩盖,农业上市公司反而不容易变更募集资金的投向。但是,由于观测的样本数量有限,该结论从理论上分析成立,并未通过统计学意义的检验。有待于后续研究进一步对此结论加以论证。
第二,从背农投资现象治理的角度来看,在治理农业上市公司投资怪象的具体策略上未考虑融资监管制度的设计。从制度经济学角度讲,募集资金投资环节出现的问题不单是农业上市公司的个体选择,也应当与融资制度、监管制度有密切的联系。而制度设计是融合现代博弈论、制度经济学等学科的重要研究视角之一,本文在此方面并未做充分的考虑。
因此,本文拟进行的后续研究拟从四个方面展开：首先农业上市公司的募集资金投向变更行为是否存在IPO、增发和配股的不同资金筹集环节上的显著差异；其次,在变更募集资金投向的行为研究中,投资于不同的非农领域是否对绩效产生影响,其变更的具体行业特征是否与变更行为和变更度有显著的相关关系；第三,行为金融理论对农业上市公司投资决策的影响还有待于通过设计和完成行为金融实验进行深入的实证研究；加入政府角色进行创新的管理和运作制度设计,规范我国农业上市公司的筹集资金使用,使研究在理论研究上更为完整,且具备更强的政策导向性。
The development of modern agriculture demands the listed agricultural companies act as the leader and the delegate of advantaged technology and working power to organize the manufacture of farmers, build up the agricultural producing chain and promote the traditional agriculture to transfer to modern mode. Thus the listed agricultural companies, as the leading enterprise in agriculture, bear the hope of agriculture industry adjustment and upgrade. However, listed agricultural companies have invested in non-agricultural area for a long time. Especially in recent years, investment in non-agricultural area is increasing year by year, which demonstrates the expansion of listed companies in non-agricultural area is severer. Even some listed agricultural companies exited the agricultural operating industry, which is against the original wish of our country supporting the listed agricultural companies to drive the development of the whole agricultural industry. Therefore, the text takes the investment in non-agricultural of listed agricultural companies as the entry point to research the changing direction of raised fund by listed agricultural companies. There is comprehensive analysis and detailed research for the situation and consequences followed by suggestions based on the actual research conclusions.
I. the main content
(1) Firstly, the thesis makes the conclusion in raised fund of listed agricultural companies through Descriptive Statistic Analysis, and points out the pervasiveness of operation deviation of listed agricultural companies by analyzing the composition of income and the profit structure.
(2) The thesis does the empirical research to find out whether the listed agricultural companies has changed the investing direction of raised fund through Data Envelopment Analysis and Regression Analysis, figures out the efficiency value of different samples to know how the impact on changing the investing direction and the degree, to the efficiency value, will be, and brings invisible change of raised fund into empirical research system for analysis.
(3) The thesis makes the empirical research and analysis on the changing direction of fund which is the leading factor by Multiple Regression Analysis, brings the inherent risks and market risks of the listed agricultural companies, scale of the companies and capital structure into decision making factor system, and will use the parametric test, the non-parametric testing procedures and the descriptive statistics analysis to analyze the investing decision factors of the listed agricultural companies. The thesis will take the Shortsighted Loss Aversion Psychology in finance into the decision making action of management to analyze the bounded rationality of management on the impact of changing fund's direction in order to deeply analyze the mechanism of action.
(4) Based on the results and analysis of empirical research, I will give suggestions on the norm of the changing fund direction of the listed agricultural companies, and discuss the meaning of the adjustment realization of the agricultural structure to the usage of the raised fund by the listed agricultural companies. And I will raise the issue of using the 'corp+corp'industrial organization style, the newly creative method, to create vertical industrial chain in the rural area in order to improve the development of our countries'agricultural industry.
Ⅱ. Conclusions
(1) Through theoretical analysis, we can find the key factor to cause the change of investing direction is the designated defection of listed agricultural company. As a specific economic organization, it asks for realizing the object of maximizing the profit, and also it should bear certain social responsibility such as leading other agricultural enterprises and organizations to produce and accomplish trade in the market, even finishing some investment of agricultural infrastructure. At the same time, agriculture has obviously serious risk and need to be confronted with possibility of big loss. Thus the listed agricultural company must purse profit but the nature of agriculture industry may be not a profitable industry, so this contradiction originated from the designation of system is the root of phenomenon that the listed agricultural company invest other industry than agriculture.
(2) From the simple statistic analysis, we find the phenomenon of investing other industries is common. And many of the listed agricultural companies also choose to keep the money collected from the stock market in the enterprises or save in the banks, and the extent of change is different. But the analysis of data shows that the listed agricultural companies always invest their money to the industries which have characters of high risk and high revenue, and the percentage of these companies is more than50percent.
(3) After the DEA analysis and the aggression analysis, the efficiency of our listed agricultural company is obviously influenced by the investing direction, if the listed agricultural company invest in other industries, the efficiency of companies in short run will be improved. If we depict the efficiency from three aspects such as ability of gaining profit, developing and value of the companies, we can draw conclusions like this, if companies change investing direction, the value of companies and short-term profitability will be improved, and the extent of change is not relevant. But regarding the long-run operation, the listed agricultural company change investing direction will bring negative influence to the latter profitability. And if the listed agricultural companies choose not to use money collected from the stock market, the outcome will be more serious because the value, profitability and future progress of these companies will become worse.
(4) In order to find the factors that affect the direction of investing decisions, we use aggression method to research the reason why the decision makers choose to change investing direction and invest in other fields than agriculture, and the conclusions are listed as:
First of all, the scale of company is one of the factors which affect investing direction, and these two factors are negative relevant. That means if the scale of the company is big, the decision makers always try to keep the fame of the company and will not tend to change the investing direction. Because our listed agriculture companies are always smaller than companies pursing other industry, so the listed agricultural companies are always tend to change the investing direction.
Secondly, when the decision makers choose the suitable investing direction, risk becomes another key factor to affect the decision of the company. And the conclusion is the higher risk, the bigger possibility of changing investing direction.
Thirdly, the structure of management of the company also affects the investing decision. Some important figures such as the percentage of shares that owned by the first leaded share-holder, the percentage of shares which managers have and etc. These figures are positive relative to the investing decision. That means if the inner managers and important share-holders have the absolute control privilege, these decision makers would like to choose invest money into other industries. And reasons which cause these phenomena are the consideration of maximizing the profit and incomplete message which cannot be grasped by the outer message users. Also the decision makers are always afraid of risk and try to avoid bear these risk, so these attitude will aggravate the trend of changing investing direction and becomes another reason to make decision makers neglect the long-term profitability and future development of the companies.
Fourthly, the percentage of shares which the board own is negative relevant to the decisions whether change investing direction or not. A reasonable explanation is the existence of independent director will change the situation that all managers tend to choose investing direction according to short-term advantage not to future development. So if we add the shares of independent director, the phenomenon of commonly changing investing direction may be reduced from some extent.
Fifthly, through game theory analysis, for the listed agricultural companies, relatively good selection is to invest in the upper aspects of agricultural producing chain such as building up source of raw materials not randomly invest in other industries and purse lateral diversification.
Ⅲ. Policy proposal
(1) From the aspect of system design, the emphasis of the policy should focus on giving subsidies to directly investing in agricultural industry chain, not to give it to the listed agricultural companies in order to reduce the capital pressure of the listed agricultural companies to invest in agriculture producing chain.
(2) Because the listed agricultural companies has special products and long producing cycle, even the facilities that the farmers need also be provided by the listed agricultural companies. So if we check the financial position of these companies, we can find that the performance of the listed agricultural companies is worse in the stage of construction than operation. But the performance of the managers and companies is judged by the short-term operation, not the different stage of project construction or operation. So we may think of innovation of performance estimation, trying to access the financial stand by one period of project construction not a fiscal year. Thus we can help the decision makers avoid investing in other industries which output can be gained in short-run.
(3) And another suggestion is the system innovation of the listed agricultural companies. Through organizing a company of farmers and make the listed agricultural companies invest in this company, the listed agricultural companies and the farmers form a community of interest which can reduce the pressure of both the listed agricultural companies and the farmers and trying to progressively realize the industrialization of agriculture.
IV. Innovative viewpoints
(1) We divided the listed agricultural companies into two groups, and use two kinds of researching method. DEA and aggression method, to compute and estimate the performance of different group and to make comparison. And we also think of the invisible changing of investing direction such as to save money in the banks or keep money in the companies. So the conclusion is more complicated than ever.When refer to the reason that cause changing investing direction, we take both the internal factors and external factors into consideration. For companies, the factors such as the situation of corporate of governance, scale of companies will influence the decision of the investment. And factors originated from outer economic circumstance and nature environment such as risk of weather change are other important aspects to affect the investing decision. Thus the analysis of affecting factors is more comprehensive and systematic.So the research rebuild a comparatively comprehensive framework of the investing decision of the listed agricultural companies.
(2) We introduce new conception of psychology to explain why the decision makers always give importance to short-run operation and relative performance, myopic loss aversion is one kind of typical psychological factor and will seriously influence the selection of investing direction. It's a new view point.
(3) We also suggest to make innovation in system designation. When we discuss the investment of agricultural producing chain, we found the listed agricultural companies always are not reluctant to invest in agricultural project. So we suggest to form companies of farmers and adopt a new organization of corporate plus corporate as a transition。
V. Further research
Due to the limitation in resource, time and research capacity, there still much room left to be improved in this research project. Such as,
(1) After the research of factors of influencing the investing decisions, we found the macro economic situation will have some effect on the decisions. If the macro economy runs well, the systematic risk will be not as obvious as risk of agricultural project, and the listed agricultural companies would like easily to invest in other industries, but in the periods which macro economy runs badly, systematic risk may hide some specific risk which agricultural projects have and then the decision makers would not likely to change investing direction. But because the quantity of observation is limited, so we need further research.
(2) In present research, we didn't think of the system of supervision and the role of government, so in the application of game theory in analyzing the balanced selection of strategy, we have more room to discuss and research.
So the further research is planned to develop through four aspects,
Firstly, whether there is distinction in different stage of financing of listed company such as IPO or subsequent financing?
Secondly, when the decision makers choose different investing fields, the performance of the listed agricultural companies will be affected or not?
Thirdly, whether myopic loss aversion of decision makers will affect investing decision need more evidences, we can design experiment and check the conclusions of theoretical analysis.
And the last one is to analyze the function and shortage of government in instructing and supervising action to give more suggestion to designation of system.
一、论文的主要研究内容
(1)首先通过描述性统计分析对我国农业上市公司的募集资金投向进行归纳总结,并讨论我国农业上市公司的收入构成和利润结构,指出我国农业上市公司偏离主业进行经营即“背农投资”的现象是否存在普遍性；
(2)通过数据包络分析和回归分析对我国农业上市公司的募集资金投向变更行为进行实证研究,计算不同研究样本分组的效率值,并确定农业上市公司变更资金投向及程度对公司效率是否存在影响,同时将募集资金的隐性变更纳入实证研究的范畴,讨论资金闲置对公司效率的影响；
(3)通过logistic回归分析对募集资金投向变更的引致因素进行实证研究,将农业上市公司的自然风险、市场风险等外部因素以及公司规模、股本结构等内生变量同时纳入决策影响体系进行讨论。根据实证研究的结果,进一步考虑公司治理结构对资金投向选择的影响,并在实证研究的基础上,进一步将行为金融学的短视损失厌恶概念引入决策层的决策行为中,从理论上探讨在不完善的公司治理结构下,管理层的有限理性对农业上市公司的背农投资决策行为是否存在显著影响；
(4)根据实证研究的结果,在对我国农业上市公司募集资金投向变更行为的后果和引致因素进行实证研究的基础上,对现象的治理提出有针对性的政策建议,并结合农业上市公司的募集资金投向对实现农业产业化结构调整的意义以及农业上市公司产业组织形式的内生矛盾,为农业上市公司的战略选择提出可供参考的建议,并就构建农业纵向产业链、促进我国农业产业化发展的具体模式和实现路径进行讨论。
二、本文的主要研究结论
(1)从理论分析上我国农业上市公司募集资金投向变更的内在机理可以发现,由于农业投资项目往往涉及基础设施的额外投入而导致金额巨大的投资,并面临着投资回收期长,利润率较低等风险,农业上市公司这一产业组织形式在生成之初就面临尴尬的两难选择,既希望享有国家的优惠政策实现上市融资,又希望规避农业行业本身的弱质性和特殊风险,因此,资本逐利性和农业弱质性以及农业上市公司经济责任和社会责任间的冲突是导致我国农业上市公司在使用募集资金时选择背农投资的根源。
(2)我国农业上市公司的背农投资现象非常普遍,资金投向主要用于非农产业,同时也存在相当数量的公司将筹集到的农业项目资金闲置不用。不同的公司资金投向变更的程度和比例都有所不同,但从资金投向的行业特征来看,我国农业上市公司的募集资金往往流入到其他具备高风险高收益的行业如房地产、生物制药等行业。同时,农业上市公司的隐性变更即资金闲置行为也带有群发性特征,存在闲置行为的公司数量占到全部公司数量的一半以上。
(3)在经过数据包络分析和多元回归分析等实证研究后发现,我国农业上市公司的经营效率明显受到资金投向的影响。根据数据包络分析的结果,是否直接变更募集资金投向或者在经营过程中将资金运用于非农的主营业务均显著影响到农业上市公司的效率值,有助于其短期效率的提高；在此基础上,通过进一步将公司效率解构为公司价值、盈利能力和发展能力后进行实证研究,结果显示：农业上市公司选择募集资金投向变更会提高当年的公司价值和盈利能力,但变更程度和这两个变量之间并不存在显著的相关关系。而从长远来看,是否变更资金投向对公司的成长能力并无显著影响,但一旦选择了变更,则变更程度越高,公司的成长能力下降就越为显著,这说明代表核心竞争力的主营业务增长率反而会受到影响,并可能会降低公司的未来盈利能力；此外当农业上市公司将募集资金部分或者全部用于闲置时,对当期的盈利能力、发展能力等都会产生负面影响,如果公司寻求到更好的投资机会,则管理层会基于短期效率的考虑,选择将闲置资金用于非农产业,即偏离招股说明书载明用途进行非农投资以提高短期的公司价值和盈利能力。
(4)通过实证研究方法分别在新古典财务理论和存在委托代理关系的现代公司治理框架下分析了对公司是否变更资金投向造成影响的动因,结论是：
第一,资产规模与是否变更资金投向存在负相关关系,这是在两个不同的理论框架下得出的同一结论。我国农业上市公司同其他行业相比,资产规模相对较小,这也是其更易产生变更资金投向的投资决策,致使经营偏离主业的原因之一；
第二,新古典财务理论的研究框架下,反映公司价值的指标和是否变更资金投向没有统计意义上的相关关系,但风险却成为具备统计相关性的投资决策影响因素且系数为正,这代表由于农业面临更高的风险,发生募资变更的概率也就越高；
第三,反映治理结构的第一大股东、管理层和监事会持股比例等与资金投向间都存在正相关关系且通过了显著性检验。该结论表示代理人持股比例越高,发生募集资金投向变更的可能性也就越高。而大股东、管理层和监事会则可能合谋,基于短期回报的考虑罔顾公司未来成长能力和核心竞争力可能遭受的损害,选择变更募集资金的投向。在不完善的公司治理结构下,进一步运用行为金融学的理论,即决策者往往存在短视损失厌恶的心理可以更好地解释农业上市公司的非效率资金投向选择行为。
第四,在公司治理结构中,董事会持股比例与是否变更募集资金投向存在显著的负相关关系,说明董事会持股比例越高,越不容易产生募集资金投向的变更行为。可能的原因是独立董事的存在,其非利益相关性使得独立董事可以作为独立的第三方依据公司价值最大化和长远发展的需求进行合理的投资方向选择,而不会赞成频繁的变更资金投向、盲目进行非农产业的拓展行为。因此,适当增加独立董事的持股比例,可以从一定程度上遏制决策层的短视心理和相应产生的投资决策非理性,从而规避农业上市公司频频变更资金投向的行为。
(5)通过构建博弈模型对农业上市公司在横向多元化和纵向一体化之间的最优战略进行了分析,发现农业上市公司的较优选择是选择纵向一体化战略而非盲目地横向扩张,因此投资构建纵向的农业产业链将是农业上市公司的较优选择。
三、政策建议
(1)对于农业上市公司背农投资现象的治理和募集资金使用的规范,从具体的政策改进上,建议在政府对农业产业进行政策扶持之时,如将财政补贴用于农业上市公司对上游产业链的投资,可以缓解投资的资金压力,也可以通过政策导向促进农业上市公司采取纵向一体化战略。
(2)考虑到农业生产对象的特性和农业项目的建设周期特征,可以考虑在传统的财务分析和绩效评价体系中采用新的方法作为决策参考,用项目投资期为一个会计期间对农业上市公司的绩效做出评价而非仅仅是一个会计年度的评价标准,或者将投资回收期和农业产品的生长周期结合起来,对收益和成本进行平滑,避免出现在农业项目投资的前期成本高而收益低从而导致投资项目亏损的情况,并规避由此为农业上市公司的短期绩效以及管理者的评价带来的负面影响。这样,可以从制度设计方面治理管理层的短视损失厌恶心理和由此引致的决策非理性。
(3)在制度创新方面,由于农业上市公司进行产业链内投资除了受到前面所述动因的影响,还会存在资金瓶颈的约束,因此可以考虑采用一种“公司+公司”的产业链投资模式作为过渡,根据重庆的试点效果和经验,本文提出了由农业上市公司控股,组建农民参股的上游生产链主体——农民公司这一过渡模式。通过“公司+公司”模式,可以将资本市场筹集到的资金和农民的自由资本以及政府的金融支持有效结合起来,由政府和政策性银行分担农业产业化的部分社会责任,也对缓解农业上市公司的内生矛盾有所裨益。
四、可能的创新之处
(1)研究体系的完善：从产业组织形式自身的缺陷阐释背农现象产生的内在机理,进而从现象入手全面研究了背农的后果和资金投向变更的影响因素,继而提出有针对性的治理建议。
(2)研究视角的创新：将行为金融理论中经理人的有限理性和短视损失厌恶引入我国农业上市公司投资决策影响的分析中,更为深刻地揭示投资决策中决策者心理因素的作用,属于研究视角和切入点的创新。
(3)治理对策中提出的制度创新：首先在提高农业上市公司绩效,治理其背农投资行为的对策建议上,将农业产业链的市场特征引入模型,并提出了“公司+公司”的产业组织形式；其次,在农业上市公司的绩效评价体系中增加以农业项目的投资周期或者农产品的生长周期作为判断公司和经理人绩效的会计期间的财务报告体系,以治理决策者的短视和与之对应的变更资金投向行为。
五、本文的不足和后续研究方向主要有以下方面：
第一,在分析了微观因素对农业上市公司资金投向的影响之后,本文通过回归分析得到的结论是,在宏观经济运行状况好的情况下,农业上市公司可能面临较为突出的农业行业风险而易于将资金投向非农产业,反之,如果系统风险也较为突出的情况下,农业行业特有的风险会从一定程度上得到掩盖,农业上市公司反而不容易变更募集资金的投向。但是,由于观测的样本数量有限,该结论从理论上分析成立,并未通过统计学意义的检验。有待于后续研究进一步对此结论加以论证。
第二,从背农投资现象治理的角度来看,在治理农业上市公司投资怪象的具体策略上未考虑融资监管制度的设计。从制度经济学角度讲,募集资金投资环节出现的问题不单是农业上市公司的个体选择,也应当与融资制度、监管制度有密切的联系。而制度设计是融合现代博弈论、制度经济学等学科的重要研究视角之一,本文在此方面并未做充分的考虑。
因此,本文拟进行的后续研究拟从四个方面展开：首先农业上市公司的募集资金投向变更行为是否存在IPO、增发和配股的不同资金筹集环节上的显著差异；其次,在变更募集资金投向的行为研究中,投资于不同的非农领域是否对绩效产生影响,其变更的具体行业特征是否与变更行为和变更度有显著的相关关系；第三,行为金融理论对农业上市公司投资决策的影响还有待于通过设计和完成行为金融实验进行深入的实证研究；加入政府角色进行创新的管理和运作制度设计,规范我国农业上市公司的筹集资金使用,使研究在理论研究上更为完整,且具备更强的政策导向性。
The development of modern agriculture demands the listed agricultural companies act as the leader and the delegate of advantaged technology and working power to organize the manufacture of farmers, build up the agricultural producing chain and promote the traditional agriculture to transfer to modern mode. Thus the listed agricultural companies, as the leading enterprise in agriculture, bear the hope of agriculture industry adjustment and upgrade. However, listed agricultural companies have invested in non-agricultural area for a long time. Especially in recent years, investment in non-agricultural area is increasing year by year, which demonstrates the expansion of listed companies in non-agricultural area is severer. Even some listed agricultural companies exited the agricultural operating industry, which is against the original wish of our country supporting the listed agricultural companies to drive the development of the whole agricultural industry. Therefore, the text takes the investment in non-agricultural of listed agricultural companies as the entry point to research the changing direction of raised fund by listed agricultural companies. There is comprehensive analysis and detailed research for the situation and consequences followed by suggestions based on the actual research conclusions.
I. the main content
(1) Firstly, the thesis makes the conclusion in raised fund of listed agricultural companies through Descriptive Statistic Analysis, and points out the pervasiveness of operation deviation of listed agricultural companies by analyzing the composition of income and the profit structure.
(2) The thesis does the empirical research to find out whether the listed agricultural companies has changed the investing direction of raised fund through Data Envelopment Analysis and Regression Analysis, figures out the efficiency value of different samples to know how the impact on changing the investing direction and the degree, to the efficiency value, will be, and brings invisible change of raised fund into empirical research system for analysis.
(3) The thesis makes the empirical research and analysis on the changing direction of fund which is the leading factor by Multiple Regression Analysis, brings the inherent risks and market risks of the listed agricultural companies, scale of the companies and capital structure into decision making factor system, and will use the parametric test, the non-parametric testing procedures and the descriptive statistics analysis to analyze the investing decision factors of the listed agricultural companies. The thesis will take the Shortsighted Loss Aversion Psychology in finance into the decision making action of management to analyze the bounded rationality of management on the impact of changing fund's direction in order to deeply analyze the mechanism of action.
(4) Based on the results and analysis of empirical research, I will give suggestions on the norm of the changing fund direction of the listed agricultural companies, and discuss the meaning of the adjustment realization of the agricultural structure to the usage of the raised fund by the listed agricultural companies. And I will raise the issue of using the 'corp+corp'industrial organization style, the newly creative method, to create vertical industrial chain in the rural area in order to improve the development of our countries'agricultural industry.
Ⅱ. Conclusions
(1) Through theoretical analysis, we can find the key factor to cause the change of investing direction is the designated defection of listed agricultural company. As a specific economic organization, it asks for realizing the object of maximizing the profit, and also it should bear certain social responsibility such as leading other agricultural enterprises and organizations to produce and accomplish trade in the market, even finishing some investment of agricultural infrastructure. At the same time, agriculture has obviously serious risk and need to be confronted with possibility of big loss. Thus the listed agricultural company must purse profit but the nature of agriculture industry may be not a profitable industry, so this contradiction originated from the designation of system is the root of phenomenon that the listed agricultural company invest other industry than agriculture.
(2) From the simple statistic analysis, we find the phenomenon of investing other industries is common. And many of the listed agricultural companies also choose to keep the money collected from the stock market in the enterprises or save in the banks, and the extent of change is different. But the analysis of data shows that the listed agricultural companies always invest their money to the industries which have characters of high risk and high revenue, and the percentage of these companies is more than50percent.
(3) After the DEA analysis and the aggression analysis, the efficiency of our listed agricultural company is obviously influenced by the investing direction, if the listed agricultural company invest in other industries, the efficiency of companies in short run will be improved. If we depict the efficiency from three aspects such as ability of gaining profit, developing and value of the companies, we can draw conclusions like this, if companies change investing direction, the value of companies and short-term profitability will be improved, and the extent of change is not relevant. But regarding the long-run operation, the listed agricultural company change investing direction will bring negative influence to the latter profitability. And if the listed agricultural companies choose not to use money collected from the stock market, the outcome will be more serious because the value, profitability and future progress of these companies will become worse.
(4) In order to find the factors that affect the direction of investing decisions, we use aggression method to research the reason why the decision makers choose to change investing direction and invest in other fields than agriculture, and the conclusions are listed as:
First of all, the scale of company is one of the factors which affect investing direction, and these two factors are negative relevant. That means if the scale of the company is big, the decision makers always try to keep the fame of the company and will not tend to change the investing direction. Because our listed agriculture companies are always smaller than companies pursing other industry, so the listed agricultural companies are always tend to change the investing direction.
Secondly, when the decision makers choose the suitable investing direction, risk becomes another key factor to affect the decision of the company. And the conclusion is the higher risk, the bigger possibility of changing investing direction.
Thirdly, the structure of management of the company also affects the investing decision. Some important figures such as the percentage of shares that owned by the first leaded share-holder, the percentage of shares which managers have and etc. These figures are positive relative to the investing decision. That means if the inner managers and important share-holders have the absolute control privilege, these decision makers would like to choose invest money into other industries. And reasons which cause these phenomena are the consideration of maximizing the profit and incomplete message which cannot be grasped by the outer message users. Also the decision makers are always afraid of risk and try to avoid bear these risk, so these attitude will aggravate the trend of changing investing direction and becomes another reason to make decision makers neglect the long-term profitability and future development of the companies.
Fourthly, the percentage of shares which the board own is negative relevant to the decisions whether change investing direction or not. A reasonable explanation is the existence of independent director will change the situation that all managers tend to choose investing direction according to short-term advantage not to future development. So if we add the shares of independent director, the phenomenon of commonly changing investing direction may be reduced from some extent.
Fifthly, through game theory analysis, for the listed agricultural companies, relatively good selection is to invest in the upper aspects of agricultural producing chain such as building up source of raw materials not randomly invest in other industries and purse lateral diversification.
Ⅲ. Policy proposal
(1) From the aspect of system design, the emphasis of the policy should focus on giving subsidies to directly investing in agricultural industry chain, not to give it to the listed agricultural companies in order to reduce the capital pressure of the listed agricultural companies to invest in agriculture producing chain.
(2) Because the listed agricultural companies has special products and long producing cycle, even the facilities that the farmers need also be provided by the listed agricultural companies. So if we check the financial position of these companies, we can find that the performance of the listed agricultural companies is worse in the stage of construction than operation. But the performance of the managers and companies is judged by the short-term operation, not the different stage of project construction or operation. So we may think of innovation of performance estimation, trying to access the financial stand by one period of project construction not a fiscal year. Thus we can help the decision makers avoid investing in other industries which output can be gained in short-run.
(3) And another suggestion is the system innovation of the listed agricultural companies. Through organizing a company of farmers and make the listed agricultural companies invest in this company, the listed agricultural companies and the farmers form a community of interest which can reduce the pressure of both the listed agricultural companies and the farmers and trying to progressively realize the industrialization of agriculture.
IV. Innovative viewpoints
(1) We divided the listed agricultural companies into two groups, and use two kinds of researching method. DEA and aggression method, to compute and estimate the performance of different group and to make comparison. And we also think of the invisible changing of investing direction such as to save money in the banks or keep money in the companies. So the conclusion is more complicated than ever.When refer to the reason that cause changing investing direction, we take both the internal factors and external factors into consideration. For companies, the factors such as the situation of corporate of governance, scale of companies will influence the decision of the investment. And factors originated from outer economic circumstance and nature environment such as risk of weather change are other important aspects to affect the investing decision. Thus the analysis of affecting factors is more comprehensive and systematic.So the research rebuild a comparatively comprehensive framework of the investing decision of the listed agricultural companies.
(2) We introduce new conception of psychology to explain why the decision makers always give importance to short-run operation and relative performance, myopic loss aversion is one kind of typical psychological factor and will seriously influence the selection of investing direction. It's a new view point.
(3) We also suggest to make innovation in system designation. When we discuss the investment of agricultural producing chain, we found the listed agricultural companies always are not reluctant to invest in agricultural project. So we suggest to form companies of farmers and adopt a new organization of corporate plus corporate as a transition。
V. Further research
Due to the limitation in resource, time and research capacity, there still much room left to be improved in this research project. Such as,
(1) After the research of factors of influencing the investing decisions, we found the macro economic situation will have some effect on the decisions. If the macro economy runs well, the systematic risk will be not as obvious as risk of agricultural project, and the listed agricultural companies would like easily to invest in other industries, but in the periods which macro economy runs badly, systematic risk may hide some specific risk which agricultural projects have and then the decision makers would not likely to change investing direction. But because the quantity of observation is limited, so we need further research.
(2) In present research, we didn't think of the system of supervision and the role of government, so in the application of game theory in analyzing the balanced selection of strategy, we have more room to discuss and research.
So the further research is planned to develop through four aspects,
Firstly, whether there is distinction in different stage of financing of listed company such as IPO or subsequent financing?
Secondly, when the decision makers choose different investing fields, the performance of the listed agricultural companies will be affected or not?
Thirdly, whether myopic loss aversion of decision makers will affect investing decision need more evidences, we can design experiment and check the conclusions of theoretical analysis.
And the last one is to analyze the function and shortage of government in instructing and supervising action to give more suggestion to designation of system.
引文
①中国证券监督管理委员会公布《上市公司行业分类指引》
②中发[2006]1号《中共中央国务院关于推进社会主义新农村建设的若干意见》(2005年12月31日)
③中发[2006]1号《中共中央国务院关于推进社会主义新农村建设的若干意见》(2005年12月31日)
④中发[2008]1号《中共中央国务院关于切实加强农业基础建设进一步促进农业发展农民增收的若干意见》(2007年12月31日)
⑤MM定理实际上是一系列命题的通称,包括最初1958年莫迪利亚尼和米勒在《美国经济评论》提出的定理Ⅰ、定理Ⅱ和定理Ⅲ,1961年关于“股利政策、增长和股票估价”提出的推论,以及1963年发表于《美国经济评论》的“企业所得税和资本成本：一项修正”一文中的修正结论等。
⑥ Jorgenson, Dale W. Capital theory and investment behavior. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings. 1963.53:247-259
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⑧动态契约的订立中,不完全信息的应用则更为广泛,主要的研究有Rogerson(1985)、Malcomson和Spinnewyn(1988)、Fudenberg、Holmstr m和Milgrom(1990).Rey和Salanie(1990)等。
⑨长期契约的研究以Grossman和Hart(1986)、Hart和Moore(1990)、Tirol e(1999)等人的研究较多,成果也相对丰富。
⑩ Meyer, Margaret, Paul Milgrom, and John Roberts. Organizational prospects, influence costs,and ownership changes, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 1992,1::9-35. 异,但是总体含义都较为类似。
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63证监会2001年《关于进一步加强股份有限公司公开募集资金管理的通知(征求意见稿)
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