企业家人力资源资本化研究
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摘要
如何制定科学的政策、创造合适的社会环境,以促进国内企业的快速发展,一直是我国政府在经济建设过程中面临的核心问题,也是我国经济理论界急需解决的重要研究课题。由于企业家对于企业发展起着十分关键的作用,所以正确认识企业家人力资源资本化问题和相关影响因素,是解决上述问题的关键。
文中论述了企业家人力资源资本化的理论依据,从理论层面分析了企业家人力资源资本化的理由和根据。从激励理论等四个方面探讨了企业家人力资源资本化的理论依据,分析企业家为什么应该参与企业收益分配,明确企业家人力资源资本化的理论渊源。激励理论表明,由于人力资源的特殊性质,企业家人力资源只有在进行充分激励的条件下才会进入生产经营中,转化为企业的现实生产力;人力资本分配论的确立弥补了传统的分配理论对人力资本的忽视,奠定了企业家人力资源资本化的理论基石;人力资本产权论从产权角度确立了企业家人力资本产权的私有性,从制度层面保证了企业家拥有相应的剩余控制权和剩余索取权;人力资本谈判力的增强使得企业家在与物质资本所有者博弈过程中占据优势地位,有能力与物质资本所有者谈判,进而参与企业收益分配,推进企业家人力资源资本化的进程。
从经济学的角度,对企业的性质、企业家的含义和职能、企业家人力资源的概念与特征、企业家人力资本的概念、企业家人力资源资本化的含义、本质以及可行性等基本问题进行了全面研究分析,在此基础上对人力资源与人力资本的概念进行了重新审视和界定,探讨了企业家人力资源资本化的内在涵义,从而为后文的研究奠定基础。
论述了企业家人力资源资本化的基础-企业家选择。企业家选择是企业家人力资源资本化的第一步,只有选择到合适的企业家,才能为企业家人力资源资本化的其它环节提供良好的基础。本章首先从经济学角度对企业家选择过程中的逆向选择、信号传递以及对称无知等问题进行了分析;然后进行了企业家选择的制度设计;并从选择方式、选择主体、选择标准、选择范围以及选择程序等方面对不同的企业家选择机制进行了比较研究;最后分析了我国企业家选择过程中存在的主要问题,并提出了解决对策。
论述了企业家人力资源资本化的措施。从理论上分析了企业家人力资源资本化的三种措施,即年薪制、股票期权以及企业家人力资本折价入股,并对每种措施的实施可行性进行了探讨和评价。
从理论上探寻企业家人力资源资本化的影响因素,揭示影响我国企业家人力资源资本化进程的主要原因,并在此基础上提出实证研究的理论模型与研究假设。选取河南省上市公司为研究样本,采用面板数据(Panel-data)模型,收集和利用有关数据,运用Eviews统计分析软件,对样本企业的企业家人力资源资本化的措施结构、资本化的程度以及有关影响因素进行了实证分析,对有关研究假设进行了检验。
根据文中的研究,对论文的研究结果进行了总结,分析了我国公司制企业进行企业家人力资源资本化的措施结构、程度以及目前实践中仍然存在的问题和障碍;在此基础上提出了解决我国企业家人力资源资本化问题的具体政策建议;展望了进一步研究的方向和内容。
How to constitute scientific policy and create appropriate social environments to promote the rapid development of domestic enterprises is always the core problem, which is confronted with by our government during economic construction; and is also a key investigation subject requesting urgent solutions. Therefore, due to the pivotal role played by the entrepreneur in enterprise development, a correct understanding of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources and relevant influential factors is the hinge to solve the problems mentioned above.
This thesis dissertates the theoretical basis of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources and analyses the reasons and foundation of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources on theoretical facet. It explores the theoretical basis of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources on four aspects such as inspiration theory, analyses why the entrepreneur should participate in the apportion of enterprise proceeds and specifies the theoretical origins of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources. As enunciated by inspiration theory, due to the special characteristics of human resources, entrepreneur human resources can only enter into production and operation under the condition of sufficient inspiration and transfer into practical productivity of the enterprises; establishment of human capital apportion theory recuperates the negligence on human capital of traditional apportion theory and settles the theoretical footstone of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources; human capital property right theory establishes the privateness of entrepreneur human capital property right on aspect of property rights and guarantees the entrepreneur can have corresponding surplus control and surplus demand on policy facet; enhancement of human capital transaction can put the entrepreneur at a preponderate position during the combat between the entrepreneur and the owner of substantial capital, and can negotiate with the owner of substantial capital so as to take part in the apportion of enterprise incomings to propel the proceeding of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources.
This thesis, in view of economics, makes a thorough analysis and investigation on the character of enterprise, signification and function of entrepreneur, concept and character of entrepreneur human resources, concept of entrepreneur human capital and signification, hypostasis and feasibility of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources etc. On basis of that, this thesis makes a new survey and distinguish between the concepts of human resources and human capital, explores the internal meanings of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources, which lays down a foundation for the consequent research.
This thesis dissertates the foundation of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources—entrepreneur's choice, which analyses in theory the three alternatives of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources, i.e., annual salary system, stock options and entrepreneur human capital equivalent shares and also makes a further probe and evaluation on the feasibility of each alternative.
Theoretically, this thesis explores the factors influencing the capitalization of entrepreneur human resources, uncovers the main causes affecting the proceeding of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources in China and forwards the theoretical model and investigation hypothesis for demonstration research. It takes one listed company in Henan Province as a research sample, using Panel-data model, collecting and utilizing relevant data, exerting Eviews statistics analysis software and makes a demonstration analysis on the measures, structures, capitalization degree and relevant influencing factors of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources for the sample enterprise; which verifies the related research hypothesis.
According to the above-mentioned research, this thesis also makes a summary on the research accomplishment, analyses the measures, structures, degrees and problems and obstacles existing in current practices of domestic companies executing capitalization of entrepreneur human resources. On basis of that, it also forwards specific policy proposals to solve the problems of capitalization of domestic entrepreneur human resources and prospects further investigation orientation and contents in the future.
文中论述了企业家人力资源资本化的理论依据,从理论层面分析了企业家人力资源资本化的理由和根据。从激励理论等四个方面探讨了企业家人力资源资本化的理论依据,分析企业家为什么应该参与企业收益分配,明确企业家人力资源资本化的理论渊源。激励理论表明,由于人力资源的特殊性质,企业家人力资源只有在进行充分激励的条件下才会进入生产经营中,转化为企业的现实生产力;人力资本分配论的确立弥补了传统的分配理论对人力资本的忽视,奠定了企业家人力资源资本化的理论基石;人力资本产权论从产权角度确立了企业家人力资本产权的私有性,从制度层面保证了企业家拥有相应的剩余控制权和剩余索取权;人力资本谈判力的增强使得企业家在与物质资本所有者博弈过程中占据优势地位,有能力与物质资本所有者谈判,进而参与企业收益分配,推进企业家人力资源资本化的进程。
从经济学的角度,对企业的性质、企业家的含义和职能、企业家人力资源的概念与特征、企业家人力资本的概念、企业家人力资源资本化的含义、本质以及可行性等基本问题进行了全面研究分析,在此基础上对人力资源与人力资本的概念进行了重新审视和界定,探讨了企业家人力资源资本化的内在涵义,从而为后文的研究奠定基础。
论述了企业家人力资源资本化的基础-企业家选择。企业家选择是企业家人力资源资本化的第一步,只有选择到合适的企业家,才能为企业家人力资源资本化的其它环节提供良好的基础。本章首先从经济学角度对企业家选择过程中的逆向选择、信号传递以及对称无知等问题进行了分析;然后进行了企业家选择的制度设计;并从选择方式、选择主体、选择标准、选择范围以及选择程序等方面对不同的企业家选择机制进行了比较研究;最后分析了我国企业家选择过程中存在的主要问题,并提出了解决对策。
论述了企业家人力资源资本化的措施。从理论上分析了企业家人力资源资本化的三种措施,即年薪制、股票期权以及企业家人力资本折价入股,并对每种措施的实施可行性进行了探讨和评价。
从理论上探寻企业家人力资源资本化的影响因素,揭示影响我国企业家人力资源资本化进程的主要原因,并在此基础上提出实证研究的理论模型与研究假设。选取河南省上市公司为研究样本,采用面板数据(Panel-data)模型,收集和利用有关数据,运用Eviews统计分析软件,对样本企业的企业家人力资源资本化的措施结构、资本化的程度以及有关影响因素进行了实证分析,对有关研究假设进行了检验。
根据文中的研究,对论文的研究结果进行了总结,分析了我国公司制企业进行企业家人力资源资本化的措施结构、程度以及目前实践中仍然存在的问题和障碍;在此基础上提出了解决我国企业家人力资源资本化问题的具体政策建议;展望了进一步研究的方向和内容。
How to constitute scientific policy and create appropriate social environments to promote the rapid development of domestic enterprises is always the core problem, which is confronted with by our government during economic construction; and is also a key investigation subject requesting urgent solutions. Therefore, due to the pivotal role played by the entrepreneur in enterprise development, a correct understanding of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources and relevant influential factors is the hinge to solve the problems mentioned above.
This thesis dissertates the theoretical basis of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources and analyses the reasons and foundation of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources on theoretical facet. It explores the theoretical basis of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources on four aspects such as inspiration theory, analyses why the entrepreneur should participate in the apportion of enterprise proceeds and specifies the theoretical origins of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources. As enunciated by inspiration theory, due to the special characteristics of human resources, entrepreneur human resources can only enter into production and operation under the condition of sufficient inspiration and transfer into practical productivity of the enterprises; establishment of human capital apportion theory recuperates the negligence on human capital of traditional apportion theory and settles the theoretical footstone of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources; human capital property right theory establishes the privateness of entrepreneur human capital property right on aspect of property rights and guarantees the entrepreneur can have corresponding surplus control and surplus demand on policy facet; enhancement of human capital transaction can put the entrepreneur at a preponderate position during the combat between the entrepreneur and the owner of substantial capital, and can negotiate with the owner of substantial capital so as to take part in the apportion of enterprise incomings to propel the proceeding of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources.
This thesis, in view of economics, makes a thorough analysis and investigation on the character of enterprise, signification and function of entrepreneur, concept and character of entrepreneur human resources, concept of entrepreneur human capital and signification, hypostasis and feasibility of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources etc. On basis of that, this thesis makes a new survey and distinguish between the concepts of human resources and human capital, explores the internal meanings of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources, which lays down a foundation for the consequent research.
This thesis dissertates the foundation of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources—entrepreneur's choice, which analyses in theory the three alternatives of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources, i.e., annual salary system, stock options and entrepreneur human capital equivalent shares and also makes a further probe and evaluation on the feasibility of each alternative.
Theoretically, this thesis explores the factors influencing the capitalization of entrepreneur human resources, uncovers the main causes affecting the proceeding of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources in China and forwards the theoretical model and investigation hypothesis for demonstration research. It takes one listed company in Henan Province as a research sample, using Panel-data model, collecting and utilizing relevant data, exerting Eviews statistics analysis software and makes a demonstration analysis on the measures, structures, capitalization degree and relevant influencing factors of capitalization of entrepreneur human resources for the sample enterprise; which verifies the related research hypothesis.
According to the above-mentioned research, this thesis also makes a summary on the research accomplishment, analyses the measures, structures, degrees and problems and obstacles existing in current practices of domestic companies executing capitalization of entrepreneur human resources. On basis of that, it also forwards specific policy proposals to solve the problems of capitalization of domestic entrepreneur human resources and prospects further investigation orientation and contents in the future.
引文
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