产业技术创新战略联盟知识治理研究
详细信息    本馆镜像全文|  推荐本文 |  |   获取CNKI官网全文
摘要
随着技术进步的加快和全球竞争的日益加剧,二十世纪六十年代以来产业技术创新战略联盟在全球蓬勃发展。组建产业技术创新战略联盟,能够有效整合全社会科技创新资源,推进产业共性技术创新,降低研发成本,分散创新风险,提升产业整体发展水平,增强企业的核心竞争力。
     产业技术创新战略联盟是由政府主导建立的,以产业技术创新和产业整体技术水平、技术竞争力提升为目标,由产业内两个或者两个以上技术创新主体形成的联合致力于技术创新活动的组织。知识创新是产业技术创新战略联盟的主体活动和本质属性。知识管理和治理理论发展相对滞后,不能对产业技术创新战略联盟的知识创新实践提供有效指导,因此有必要在推进理论研究的同时,专门就产业技术创新战略联盟知识治理问题展开专门研究,以更好地指导和服务于产业技术创新战略联盟知识创新实践。产业技术创新战略联盟知识治理研究成果可以为产业技术创新战略联盟消除知识创新障碍提供指导,对于政府制定政策推动产业技术创新战略联盟发展具有指导意义。
     知识治理理论为研究产业技术创新战略联盟知识治理奠定了理论基础。本文以契约理论、产权理论、利益相关者理论和资源基础理论为基础,界定了联盟知识交易的资产专用性特征及其对联盟知识活动的影响,构建了一个包括知识治理动因、知识治理结构和知识治理机制的完整且逻辑一贯的联盟知识治理理论体系。联盟契约的任务不仅包括保护专用性知识资产投入方免受“敲竹杠”行为的威胁,也包括在知识资产的产权难以界定和有效实施保护的情况下达成交易并避免受到机会主义行为的损害,这是知识治理与一般的契约治理之间的根本区别。
     在介绍产业技术创新战略联盟知识活动内容的基础上,界定知识交易主体的有限理性、信息不对称和未来的不确定性等知识交易前提条件,引入知识的特殊产权属性特征,即知识的独特自然属性所决定的知识产权的不完备性,分析了产业技术创新战略联盟知识交易中由知识的特殊产权属性引发的事前、事后机会主义行为。
     投入联盟知识是否具有专用性特征是界定产业技术创新战略联盟知识治理主体的标准,产业技术创新战略联盟知识治理具有利益相关者共同治理的典型特征。联盟知识治理结构是就联盟知识共享和创新活动的剩余控制权和剩余索取权的分配。剩余控制权包括决策权和对决策和方案实施进行监督控制的权力,剩余控制权分配需要综合权衡知识成本和代理成本,并能够有效防范知识侵权的机会主义行为;剩余索取权分配决定联盟成员的创新风险承担和知识创新收益预期,通过激励效应影响联盟成员的知识投入活动决策进而决定产业技术创新战略联盟知识产出,索取权分配的基本目标是实现联盟知识创新价值最大化。共同控制模式是最优的联盟知识治理模式。
     知识治理机制是知识治理结构发挥作用的机理和途径。从防范机会主义实现知识创新绩效最大化出发分析,产业技术创新战略联盟知识治理机制包括联盟层面和知识创新团队层面。两者缺一不可。在联盟层面,对于可以通过专利或者其他方式实施有效产权保护的知识资产,可以利用知识保护机制消除机会主义行为的损害;而对于无法证实侵权行为存在的知识交易,只能通过收益分配机制达成知识交易,但前提条件是收益份额超出机会主义带来的损失,如果外部性过高,则只能借助于一体化机制,否则联盟将解体。在团队层面,提升由异质性知识结构成员组成的知识创新团队的知识创新绩效,关键是沟通顺畅、相互信任、协作默契、合作共赢。考虑培育信任和默契的成本,确定团队最佳信任默契度。
     以我国政府主导,主要由我国企业组成并拥有自主知识产权的产业技术创新战略联盟——TD-SCDMA产业联盟为案例研究对象,分析了联盟发展的各主要阶段的知识治理问题及其变迁,联盟的主要知识治理措施和治理效果,以及政府各项支持措施在解决联盟治理问题方面的作用。研究表明,建立和完善知识治理结构和治理机制,是保证联盟不断发展壮大的根本举措。政府通过各种政策手段对联盟提供组织支持、资源支持和适当的保护,是联盟发展的必要条件,政府的外部干预,可以克服联盟内部知识治理机制无法克服的困难,因此,是产业技术创新战略联盟的一个最重要的“外部知识治理机制”。
With the advancement of technology and the acceleration of the globalcompetition, industrial technology innovation strategic alliance has been developingvigorously since the nineteen sixties. The formation of industry technologyinnovation strategic alliance, can effectively integrate social resources to promotescience and technology innovation of industrial generic technology innovation, reducethe cost of R&D, distribute innovation risk, and enhance the development of thewhole industry and the core competitiveness of enterprises.
     Industry technology innovation strategic alliance is a kind of joint technologyinnovation organization patterns formed by two or more technology innovation mainbodies. Industry technology innovation strategic alliance is led to establish by thegovernment, the goal of Industry technology innovation strategic alliance is topromote industry technology innovation and to improve technologicalcompetitiveness. The industry alliance Commits to knowledge innovation, but thedevelop-lagged Knowledge management and governance theory cannot provideeffective guidance to the knowledge innovation practice of industry technologyinnovation strategic alliance. Therefore it is necessary to promote the theoreticalstudy, specifically the study on the knowledge governance of industry technologyinnovation alliance, in order to guide and serve for industry technology innovationstrategic alliance practice better. The research achievements in Industry technologyinnovation strategic alliance knowledge management can be used to eliminateobstacles of knowledge innovation in industry technology innovation strategicalliance, and provide guidance for the government to formulate policies promoting theleague development.
     Knowledge governance theory lay theoretical foundation to study industrialtechnology innovation alliance knowledge governance. Based on contract theory,property rights theory, stakeholder theory and resource-based theory, this paperdefined the knowledge transaction specific assets characteristics of knowledgeactivities, built a complete and consistent logic theory system of knowledgemanagement,including knowledge governance motivation, knowledge governancestructure and governance mechanism. The tasks of Union contracts are not only toprotect the special knowledge assets investment from the " hold-up" threats, but also to realize the deal and avoid the harms from opportunistic behaviors in cases that theknowledge property rights are difficult to define and implement effective protection.
     Based on the introduction of industry technology innovation strategic allianceknowledge activities, the premise of knowledge trades were defined, which includedlimited rationality of transaction parties, information asymmetry between the parties,and uncertainty of knowledge transaction; by introducing particular propertyattributes of knowledge, namely not completed intellectual property determined byknowledge’s unique natural attribute; the opportunism behaviors in industrytechnology innovation strategies alliance knowledge transaction were analysed.
     The main bodies of the industry technology innovation strategic alliance investedasset-specified knowledges into the alliance, so knowledge governance of the allianceshowed the stakeholder governance characteristics. Alliance knowledge governancestructure is the union of the residual rights of control and residual claim assignment,Originating from knowledge sharing and innovation activities. Residual control rightsincluded the power of decision-making and the power of supervising and controllingdecision-making and implementation, the allocation of residual control rights need totradeoff between the knowledge cost and the agent cost, and can effectively preventthe infringement of intellectual opportunism behaviors; residual claim assignmentmeans the assignment of alliance member's knowledge innovation risk and expectedearnings, which influence union members knowledge investment decision and allianceknowledge production through the incentive effect, the basic objective of knowledgeGovernance is to achieve the maximization of the knowledge innovation value.
     Knowledge governance mechanisms are the mechanisms and approaches throughwhich the knowledge governance structure plays a role. To prevent opportunistic andrealize knowledge innovation performance maximization, knowledge governancemechanisms include two levels, named league level and knowledge innovation teamlevel. Not a single one can be omitted. At the league level, in case that the knowledgeassets can be protected effectively through a patent or other means, the opportunismbehavior damage can be eliminated by knowledge protection mechanism; if the tortexisting cannot be proved in knowledge transaction, and the share of proceeds beyondthe opportunistic losses, income distribution mechanism can play a role. if theexternal effect is very high, only with the help of integration mechanism, or alliancewould disintegrate. At the team level, the knowledge innovation team is composed ofmembers who have the heterogeneity of knowledge structure, the key to enhanceknowledge innovation performance included smooth communication, mutual trust, cooperation and win-win cooperation. Considering cost of cultivating trust andunderstanding, it is important to determine the best trust team tacit understanding.
     TD-SCDMA industry alliance is selected to be as a case study. TD-SCDMAindustry alliance was established by the China enterprises with independentintellectual property rights, and dominated and supported by the government.Changeable knowledge governance problems in main development stages of thealliance, union major knowledge management measures and control effect wereanalysed.
     The research in case study shows that, it is very important for the alliancedevelopment to establish and perfect the knowledge governance structure andgovernance mechanisms, and it is the necessary condition that the governmentprovides organizational support, resource support and proper protection throughvarious policy instruments, government’s external intervention can overcome theobstacles that alliance knowledge governance mechanisms can not overcome by itself,so the government's appropriate intervention is one of the most important " externalknowledge governance mechanisms ".
引文
[1]吴寿仁.产业技术创新战略联盟——国家技术创新工程政策解读之一.华东科技,2010,(2):18-19
    [2]李纪珍.产业共性技术:概念、分类与制度供给.中国科技论坛,2006,(3):45-47
    [3]邸晓燕,张赤东.产业技术创新战略联盟的类型与政府支持.科学学与科学技术管理,2011,32(4):78-83
    [4]李新男.创新“产学研结合”组织模式构建产业技术创新战略联盟.中国软科学,2007,(3):26-31
    [5]卫之奇.美国产业技术创新联盟的实践.全球科技经济瞭望,2009,(2):9-14
    [6]霍妍,王幼芳,姜文达.基于成果转化的高校产学研合作模式选择策略研究.科技管理研究,2008,28(12):224-226·
    [7]胡争光,南剑飞.产业技术创新战略联盟战略问题研究.科技进步与对策,2011,28(2):74-77
    [8]向杰.产业技术创新战略联盟已遍地开花,中国科技论坛,2010,(7):19-21
    [9] Cross R, Prusak A, Borgatti P. Knowing what we know: supporting knowledgecreation and sharing in social networks. Organizational Dynamics,2001,30(2):100-120
    [10]任志安.超越知识管理:知识治理理论的概念、框架和应用.科研管理,2007,28(1):20-27
    [11] Grandor I, Governance S. Coordination mechanisms and cognitive models.Journal of Management and Governance,1997,21(1):29-42
    [12] Lundvall B. Product innovation and user-producer interaction. IndustrialDevelopment Research Series, Aalbory: Aalbory University Press,1995,79-91
    [13] Foss N, Torben P. Sources of subsidiaryknowledge and organizational means ofknowledge transfer. Journalof International Management,2002,26(8):49-67
    [14] Williamson E. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press,1985,137-143
    [15]赵汉平.西方经济思想库.北京:经济出版社,1997,36-48
    [16] Hart O, Moore P. Property rights and the nature of thefirm. Journal of PoliticalEconomy,2009,98(5):1145-1167
    [17] Rajan G, Luigi Z. Power in a theory of the firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,40(2):387-432
    [18] Mirrlees J. Note on welfare economics, information and uncertainty in Balch,McFadden, and Wu,(eds.). Essays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty.Amsterdam: North Holland,1974,45-63
    [19] Holmstrom B. Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics,1979,21(10):74-91
    [20] Ross S. The economic theory of agency: the principal’s problem. The AmericanEconomic Review,1973,63(7):134-139
    [21] Wilson R. The Structure of incentives for decentralization under uncertainty. LaDecision,1969,21(7):37-50
    [22] Spence M, Zeckhauser R. Insurance, Information and individual action.American Economic Review,1971,61(2):380-387
    [23]奥利弗·E·威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度——论企业签约与市场签约(段毅才,王伟译).北京:商务印书馆,2002,112-115
    [24] Jones C, Hesterly W, Borgatti S. A general theory of network governance:exchange conditions and social mechanisms. Academy of Management Review,1997,22(4):911-945
    [25]杨瑞龙.杨其静专用性、专有性与企业制度.经济研究,2001,(3):3-11
    [26]贾生华,陈宏辉.利益相关者的界定方法述评.外国经济与管理,2002,24(5):13-18
    [27]曾德明,陈立勇.利益相关者理论与绩效关系研究综述.经济学动态,2003,(2):23-27
    [28] Porter E. Competitive advantage, New York: Free Press,1985,47-49
    [29] Penrose T. The theory of growth of the Firm. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher,1959,213-216
    [30] Barney J. The resource-based theories of competitive advantage: A ten-yearretrospective on the resource-based view. Journal of Management,2001,27(5):643-650
    [31] Richard P, John B. Tautology in the resource-based view and the implications ofexternally determined resource value further comments. The Academy ofManagement Review,2001,26(4):57-66
    [32] Hamal G, Prahalad K. Strategic intent. Harvard Business Review,1989,21(6):63-76
    [33] Nicolai F. Market process economics and the theory of the firm. Working Paper.Copenhagen Business School,1998
    [34] Grant M. Prospering in dynamically-competitive environments: organizationcapability as knowledge integration. Organization Science,1996,7(4):375-387
    [35]王健友.知识治理的起源与理论脉络梳理.外国经济与管理,2007,27(6):23-28
    [36] Nonaka I, Peltokorpi V. Objectivity and subjectivity in knowledge management:A review of20top articles. Knowledge and Process Management,2006,13(2):73-82
    [37] Hagedoorn J. Understanding the cross-level embeddedness of interfirmpartnership formation. Academy of Management Review,2006,31(3):670-680
    [38] Gulati R. Alliances and networks. Strategic Management Journal,1998,19(4):193-317
    [39] Douglas I, Peter K. Sematech purpose and performance. proceedings of thenations. Academy of Sciences of the Sciences of the United States of America,1996,93(23):139-142
    [40] Teece C. Cooperation and innovation. Journal of Economic Behavior andOrganization,1992,24(3):121-147
    [41]李学勇.实施国家技术创新工程推动产业技术创新战略联盟发展.中国科技投资,2010,(12):23-24
    [42]赵志泉.产业技术创新联盟的运行机制研究.创新科技,2009,19(4):17-21
    [43] David F, Disne L, John V. A real options approach to valuing strategic exibilityin uncertain construction projects. Construction Management and Economics,2002,20(7):343-351
    [44] Zhou H R. A study on synergetic mechanism of agile virtual enterprise. Lanhuaetc. Proceedings of2004International Conference on ManagementScience&Engineering. Harbin: Institute of Technology Press,2004,59-64
    [45]李文鹣,陈洋,谢刚系.基于资源基础竞争优势观的企业知识产权管理——以中药企业天士力为例.知识产权,2007,(4):35-42
    [46]龚荒.产业集群对技术创新的外部经济效应分析.特区经济,2009,(4):25-31
    [47]辜胜阻,马军伟.推进国家自主创新示范区建设的政策安排.财政研究,2010,(11):23-26
    [48] Steensma K, Corley G. On the performance of technology-sourcing partnerships:the interaction between partner interdependence and technology attributes.Academy of Management Journal,2000,43(6):1045-1067
    [49]陈菊红.企业知识缺口识别方法及弥补策略研究.科学学研究,2007,25(4):31-35
    [50]吴宪华.动态联盟的分配格局研究.科学学研究,2001,17(3):19-23
    [51]李俊.长江三角洲科技中介联盟的培育与构建.科技管理研究,2008,(5):12-15
    [52]吴琨,赵顺龙.核心技术联盟及其对联盟企业技术创新能力的影响.科学管理研究,2009,27(1):41-45
    [53]朱少英,齐二石.技术联盟合作创新的信誉机制研究.科学管理研究,2008,26(2):6-8
    [54] Ast K. Teng Trust B. Control and risk in technology strategic alliances: anintegrated framework. Organization Studies,2001,22(2):251-283
    [55] Gary B, Elena Katoka&Axel Ocken. Cooperation among strangers with limitedinformation about reputation Journal of Public Economics,2005,89(3):1457-1468
    [56]祁红梅,黄瑞华.影响知识转移绩效的组织情境因素及动机机制实证研究.研究与发展管理,2008,20(2):58-63.
    [57]张海燕.杜荣.基于知识共享的自主创新联盟运作机制分析.科学学研究,2007,26(5):21-25
    [58]张坚.企业技术联盟的利益分配机制研究.科技管理研究,2008,(3):17-20
    [59]彭灿,胡厚宝.知识联盟中的知识创造机制: BaSECI模型.研究与发展管理,2008,20(2):13-17
    [60]胡汉辉,潘安成.组织知识转移与学习能力的系统研究.管理科学学报,2006,9(3):81-86
    [61]孙锐,赵大丽.动态联盟知识共享的演化博弈分析.运筹与管理,2009,11(1):19-23
    [62]龙跃.竞争性联盟中知识共享价值与利益协调机制.情报杂志,2011,29(10):31-35
    [63] Paulo K. Amtonio Caflos de Oliveira. Tiago marques lopes. Knowledge transferin product development processes: A case study in small and mediumentreprises(SMEs) of the metal mechanic sector from Sao Paulo, Brazil.Technovation,2008,28(2):29-36
    [64]宁东玲.知识吸收能力构成维度的实证研究.科技进步与对策,2012,29(11):23-27
    [65]王菁娜,韩德昌.基于知识吸收能力视角的学习型战略联盟成因探析.科学管理研究,2007,19(1):19-23
    [66]杜维.动态联盟知识管理研究综述.情报杂志,2010,28(6):41-47
    [67] Sherwood L. Covin G. Knowledge acquisition in university industry alliances:An empirical investigation from a learning theory perspective. Journal ofProduct Innovation Management,2008,5(2):162-179
    [68]赵大丽,孙锐,卢冰.基于组织视角的动态联盟知识创造机制.科学学与科学技术管理,2008,(10):113-117
    [69] Zhang H. Study on knowledge transfer risks between member enterprises ofvirtual enterprise. Proceedings-2008-Pacific-Asia Workshop ComputationalIntelligence and Industrial Application,2008,(1):909-913
    [70] Dutfield G. Protecting traditional knowledge: Path-ways to the future. Geneva:ICTSD,2006,177-180
    [71] Norman. Protecting knowledge in strategic alliances: Resource and relationalcharacteristics. Journal of High Technology Management Research,2002,13(2):177-187
    [72]刘雷.邹华动态联盟中知识溢出的管理.中国科技产业,2006,(12):25-29
    [73]祁红梅,黄瑞华.动态联盟形成阶段知识产权冲突及激励对策研究.研究与发展管理,2011,23(4):70-76
    [74]石书玲.知识联盟中私有知识保护机制的构建.科技进步与对策,2010,(3):19-23
    [75]彭正银.网络治理:理论与模式研究.北京:经济科学出版社,2003,27-32
    [76] Sakakibara. Knowledge sharing in cooperative research and development.Managerial and Decision Economics,2003,24(2):117-132
    [77] Jordan L. Protecting strategic knowledge: Insights from collaborativeagreements in the Aerospace Sector. Technology Analysis&StrategicManagement,2004,16(2):241-252
    [78]谭劲松,林润辉. TD-SCDMA与电信行业标准竞争的战略选择.管理世界,2006,(6):71-84
    [79] Jap D, Anderson E. Safeguarding interorganizational performance andcontinuity under expost opportunism. Management Science,2003,49(12):1684-1701
    [80] Bekkers R, Geert D, Bart V. Intellectual property rights, strategic technologyagreement and market structure: the Case of GSM, Research Policy,2002,19(31):1140-1161
    [81] Polanyi M. Personal knowledge: Towards a post-critical philosophy. Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1958,43-47
    [82] Miller D, Shamsie J. The resource-based view of the firm in two environments:the Hollywood film studios from1936to1965. Academy of ManagementJournal,1996,39(3):519-543
    [83] Grandori A. Neither hierarchy nor identity: Knowledge governance mechanismsand the theory of the firm. Journal of Management and Governance,2001,17(5):381-399
    [84] Nooteboom B. Learning by interaction: Absorptive capacity. cognitive distanceand governance. Journal of Management and Governance,2000,17(4):69-92
    [85] Osterloh M, Frey S. Motivation, knowledge transfer and organizational forms.Organization Science,2000,11(5):538-550
    [86] Contractor J, Ra W. How knowledge attributes influence alliance governancechoices: A theory development note. Journal of International Management,2002,23(8):11-27
    [87] Nickerson A, Zenger R. A knowledge-based theory of the firm: Theproblem-solving perspective. Organization Science,2004,15(6):617-632
    [88] O’Dwyer M, O’Flynn E. MNC-SME strategic alliances: A model framingknowledge value as the primary predictor of governance modal choice. Journalof International Management,2005,26(11):397-416
    [89] Foss J. The knowledge governance approach. SMG Working Paper, No·1/2005.Center for Strategic Management and Globalization. Copenhagen BusinessSchool,2005,161-199
    [90] Foss J. The emerging knowledge governance approach: Challenges andcharacteristics. Druid Working Paper. No·06-10. Danish Research Unit forIndustrial Dynamics,2006,35-74
    [91] Bryson O, Crosby B. Leadership for the common good. San Francisco:Jossey-Bass,1992,27-44
    [92]黄喜忠,杨建梅.集群治理的一般性研究.科技管理研究,2006,(10):51-54
    [93]张运生,张立飞.高技术产业技术标准联盟治理模式分析.科研管理,2007,(6):17-24
    [94] Knut B, Nikolaus T. Interrelation between patenting and standardisationstrategies: empirical evidence and policy implications. Research Policy,2004,33(2):1583-1598
    [95] Gulati R. Alliance and Networks. Strategic Management Journal,1998,19(5):293-317
    [96] Messner D, Jorg S. Governance and networks: Tool to study. The Dynamics ofClusters and Global Value Chains. Working Paper,2000,147-182
    [97] Milward H, Brinton P, Keith G. How networks are governed. in Laurence E.Lynn, Eds. The empirical study of governance: Theories, models and methods.Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press,2002,156-157
    [98] Parkhe A. strtegic alliance structuring: A game theory and transaction costexamination of inter-firm cooperation. Academy of Management Journal,1993,36(4):794-829
    [99] Shenkar O. Cultural distance revisited: toward a more rigorousconceptualization and measurement of cultural differences. J Int Bus Stud,2001,32(3):519-535
    [100] Watson S, Hewett K. A multi-theoretical model of knowledge transfer inorganizations: Determinants of knowledge contribution and knowledge reuse.Journal of Management Studies,2006,43(2):141-173
    [101] Wathne H, Heide B. Relationship governance in a supply chain network. Journalof Marketing,2004,68(1):73-89
    [102] Paul P. Institution-based trust in interorganizational exchange relationships: therole of online B2B marketplaces on trust formation. Journal of StrategicInformation System,2002,18(11):215-243
    [103]史会斌,李垣.基于资源保护和利用的联盟治理机制动态选择研究.科学学与科学技术管理,2008,28(2):161-166
    [104]陈佳.产业技术创新战略联盟治理模式影响因素探析.科技管理研究,2011,(11):94-96
    [105] Heide B. Inter organizational governance in marketing channels. Journal ofMarketing,1994,58(1):71-85
    [106] Jap D, Anderson E. Safeguarding interorganizational performance andcontinuity under expost opportunism. Management Science,2003,49(12):1684-1701
    [107] Brown R, Dev S, Lee J. Managing marketing channel opportunism: the efficacyof alternative governance mechanisms. Journal of Marketing,2000,64(2):51-65
    [108] Chiles H, Mackin F. Integrating Vvariable risk preferences, trust and transactioncost economics. The Academy of Management Review,1996,25(9):733-991
    [109]李瑶,刘益,杨伟.不同治理机制对联盟中显性知识和隐性知识转移的影响研究.情报杂志,2010,29(11):106-109
    [110] Tsang W, Nguyen T, Erramilli K. Knowledge acquisition and performance ofinternational joint ventures in the transition economy of Vietnam. Journal ofInformation Marketing,2004,12(2):82-103
    [111] Polanyi M. Personal knowledge: The tacit dimension. London: Routledge,1966.European Management Review,2005,20(2):179-197
    [112]杜健,姜雁斌,郑素丽,章威.网络嵌入性视角下基于知识的动态能力构建机制.系统工程学报,2011,26(4):25-29
    [113] Brouthers K, Hennart M. Boundaries of the firm: insights from internationalentry mode research. Journal of Management,2007,33(3):395-425
    [114] Lambert R. Lambert review of business-industry collaboration. Final Report.HMSO, ISBN0-947819-76-2,2003,(12):241-243
    [115] Sherwood L, Covin G. Knowledge acquisition in university-industry alliance: anempirical investigation from a learning theory perspective. Product InnovationManagement,2008,25(3):162-179
    [116] Gulati R, Sytch M. Dependence asymmetry and joint dependence in interorganizational relationships: Effects of embeddedness on a manufacturer’sperformance in procurement relationships. Administrative Science Quarterly,2007,52(7):32-69
    [117] Blumenberg S, Wagner H, Beimborn D. Knowledge transfer processes in IToutsourcing relationships and their impact on shared knowledge and outsourcingperformance. International Journal of Information Management,2009,29(5):342-352
    [118] Pérez Nordtvedt L, Kedia L, Datta K, Rasheed A. Effectiveness and efficiencyof cross-border knowledge transfer: an empirical examination. Journal ofManagement Studies,2008,45(4):717-744
    [119] Doving E, Gooderham N. Dynamic capabilities as antecedents of the scope ofrelated diversification: the case of small firm accountancy practices. StrategicManagement Journal,2008,29(5):841-857
    [120] Danielle D, Shanthi G, Joanne L. An empir1cal study of the impact of firmresources on alliance governance structures. Journal of Engineering andTechnology Management,2009,26(4):181-195
    [121]李世超,蔺楠,苏竣.基于知识转移的产学关系嵌入作用机制研究.科学学研究,2011,29(5):19-23
    [122]肖冬平,顾新,彭雪红.基于嵌入视角下知识网络中的知识流动研究.情报杂志,2009,28(8):43-47
    [123]何宾.技术联盟中机会主义行为的内外部成本构设及其涵意——基于策略行为演化的视角.科学学与科学技术管理,2009,(10):43-47
    [124]王月平.知识联盟R&D投入与绩效的关系——基于知识势差视角的研究.情报杂志,2010,28(9):21-25
    [125] Colombo M G. Alliance form: a test of the contractual and competenceperspectives. Strategic Management Journal,2003,(11):1209-1229
    [126]杨波,张卫国,石磊.企业战略联盟中的机会主义行为及其控制分析,2008,(7):35-42
    [127] David A, Max K, Entrepreneurship and regional growth: an evolutionaryinterpretation. Journal of Evol Econ,2004,9(7):605-616
    [128]李真,盛昭瀚,孟庆峰.基于知识溢出效应的产业创新集聚演化.系统工程,2011,(4):27-32
    [129]张晖.产业升级面临的困境与路径依赖锁定效应,2011,(10):45-52
    [130]陶爱萍.技术标准、锁定效应与技术创新.科技管理研究,2009,(5):37-43
    [131]叶许红等.组织氛围对企业创新实施影响研究.科研管理,2006,(1):75-79
    [132]杨瑞龙.论利益相关者合作逻辑下的共同治理.中国工业经济,1998,(5):34-40
    [133]熊德章,孟卫东.专用性人力资本的治理机制与组织租金的分配.预测,2010,(2):43-48
    [134]骆品亮,司春林.专用性人力资本投资激励研究.管理科学学报,2001,4(2):19-24
    [135]陈佳.产业技术创新战略联盟治理模式影响因素探析.科技管理研究,2011,(11):27-32
    [136] Blankenship S, Ruona A. Exploring knowledge sharing in socialstructures-potential contributions to an overall Knowledge management strategy.Advances in Developing Human Resources,2009,(11):290-306
    [137]曾德明等.技术标准联盟成员的谈判与联盟治理结构研究.中国软科学,2007,(3):35-42
    [138]高峻峰.政府政策对新兴技术演化的影响——以我国TD-SCDMA移动通讯技术的演化为例.中国软科学,2010,(2):33-40
    [139]孙耀吾,陈立勇.技术标准联盟产权激励机制:剩余控制权配置博弈分析,2008,(2):4-9
    [140] Zaur R, Regulatory P. Value of KnowledgeAssets and Innovation Strategy: TheCase of the Orphan Drug Act. Research Policy,2008,23(5):673-689
    [141]王智慧.信息技术对企业中决策权分配影响的模型研究.系统工程理论与实践,2001,21(7):51-56
    [142]聂磊等.基于道德风险防范的虚拟联盟成员二元激励模型.管理学报,2010,7(5):43-48
    [143] Paul E, Bierly I, Scott Gallagher. Explaining alliance partner selection: fit, trustand strategic expediency long range planning. Long Range Planning,2007,40(6):134-153
    [144] Monica L, Sanjit S, Robert K. Effectiveness of horizontal strategic alliances intechnologically uncertain environments are trust and commitment enough?.Journal of Business Research,2004,57(1):951-956
    [145]吴晓波,王莹.基于知识溢出视角的知识密集型创业企业产生机理研究.科技管理研究,2011,(1):23-26
    [146]石书玲.知识联盟中共有知识分享与私有知识保护影响因素研究.科学学研究,2008,26(2):47-52
    [147]陈效林,施建军,张文红.国际联盟中知识获取:知识保护、吸收能力与议价权力.科学学与科学技术管理,2010,30(6):45-50
    [148] Sampson C. Experience effects and collaborative returns in R&D alliances.Strategic Management Journal,2005,26(11):1009-1031
    [149] Ngowi B. The role of trust worthiness in the formation and governance ofconstruction alliances. Building and Environment,2007,42(4):1828-1835
    [150]王黎萤,陈劲.研发团队创造力的影响机制研究——以团队共享心智模型为中介.科学学研究,2010,29(3):57-62
    [151] Paul S A, Berg P T. Social factors of work-environment creativity. Journal ofBusiness and Psychology,2007,21(3):407-428
    [152]黄海艳,李乾文.研发团队的人际信任对创新绩效的影响——以交互记忆系统为中介变量.科学学与科学技术管理,2011,31(10):43-50
    [153]袁勇.中国TD产业链的发展分析.四川兵工学报,2010,(5):31-35
    [154]何景风,宁钟.基于自组织理论的复杂技术创新网络研究———以中国3G技术联盟中心为例.科技进步与对策,2006,23(8):29-36
    [155]中国电子报社. TD-SCDMA产业联盟. TD-SCDMA产业十年发展历程.北京:电子工业出版社,2008,5-76
    [156]马洪亮.浅谈中国移动3G业务发展战略及其未来趋势.信息通信,2012,(11):51-53
    [157]慕名. TD-LTE如何越过雷区?——关于中国移动TD-LTE产业发展模式的思考.中国电信业,2011,(2):19-26
    [158]吴绍波,顾新,彭双.知识链组织合作创新的技术轨道的形成——一个有关我国TD—SCDMA创新的案例分析.科学学与科学技术管理,2009,29(5):29-32
    [159]江积海.企业网络中知识传导绩效的影响因素及其机理——TD-SCDMA产业联盟的案例研究.科学学研究,2010,29(9):47-54
    [160]高俊峰.政府政策对新兴技术演化的影响——以我国TD-SCDMA移动通讯技术的演化为例.中国软科学,2010,(9):35-42

© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号

地址:北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编:100083

电话:办公室:(+86 10)66554848;文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新:66554700