知识产权政策多维效果研究
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摘要
知识产权制度是政府公共政策的重要组成部分,其政策功能在于维护知识权利的正义秩序和实现知识进步的效益目标。知识产权政策实质上是在国家层面上制定、实施和推进的,通过制度配置和政策安排,对知识资源的创造、归属、利用以及管理等进行指导和规制。知识产权制度为创新者提供了经济、持久的创新激励,有利于创新活动不断向前推进,从而促进创新成果所蕴藏的先进生产力快速增长。知识产权制度已成为创新成果产权化、产业化和市场化的重要政策措施。
我国近年颁布实施国家知识产权战略纲要,标志着知识产权制度建设迈入了战略主动的新阶段。有效利用知识产权制度,努力缩小与发达国家的差距,实现跨越式发展,是我国知识产权政策发展的新趋势。尽管我国相关政策部门在这种新趋势下不断出台知识产权政策,但是对于政策效果的关注不足,且缺乏体系化的政策效果理论依据,使得政策效果的改进实践滞后于现实需求。
本研究开创性地引入政策过程新范式的理论,对知识产权政策的多维效果展开清晰有力的逻辑论证框架。在知识产权政策决策层面下,运用多源流模型,演绎知识产权政策效果合理性的实现；在政策时间层面下,导入间断一平衡理论,探讨知识产权政策效果周期性的把握；在政策空间层面下,借鉴政策创新传播模型,论证知识产权政策效果外部性的调整；在创新视阈内,运用政策交易成本工具和运筹学分析,对因果漏斗模型中的政策要素进行简化,在知识产权不同层面的政策协同中,实现知识产权政策多维效果的耦合,从而优化知识产权政策体系的整体效果。
本文共分七章,各章主要内容如下：
第一章主要介绍本文的研究背景、研究目的与意义、研究方法与技术路线以及研究的创新之处。
第二章是文献综述与理论探讨。评述了国内外知识产权政策的研究现状和不足；阐释了政策效果的概念及政策效果评估的对比分析法；综述了政策过程传统理论,并重点分析了阶段分析框架的贡献和缺陷：论证了政策过程新范式的形成及借鉴价值,遴选出最具科学可验证性的几种图式分析,进而将政策过程要件所再现的政策情境分析应用到具体政策领域,为探讨知识产权政策不同层面的多维效果打下坚实的理论基础。
第三章探讨了决策层面知识产权政策效果的合理性。在政策过程的多源流模型下,实证分析了知识产权决策的政策之窗,建议了相应的决策模式,并引入群决策方法以改善决策参与不足的情况；重点探讨了知识产权制度激励技术创新与消费者福利损失的功能局限,进而描绘决策目标的利益平衡路径,协调技术创新独占与反垄断的关系,同时建构政策工具,以实现知识产权政策效果的合理性预期；深入知识产权决策行动者的特定博弈策略情境,通过专利仿制模型的经济学分析,阐释知识产权政策合理性效果的微妙变化,可能给行动者策略、市场竞争状态、技术创新激励及资源配置带来的深远影响。
第四章探讨了时间层面知识产权政策效果的周期性。以政策间断一平衡模型为支持,描绘出技术创新政策的轨迹,并在政策周期的效果制约法则下,剖析了政策轨迹周期运动的缺陷更新和终结循环；从专利持有时间模型的微观视角,以及反周期调控的宏观经济学视角,论证知识产权政策效果的周期性；实例研究了美国知识产权捐赠的政策及演变,以期对我国相关政策移植和知识产权政策周期的回溯式分析有所启发。
第五章探讨了空间层面知识产权政策效果的外部性。介绍了政策传播模型,尝试区域政策创新的梯度推进,并发挥产业转移中知识产权政策的空间绩效,以探究知识产权政策在区域创新中的作用力；从外部性概念及知识产品的外部性着手,对知识产权政策效果的外部性进行了超域分析,以实现区域政策供给的收益转移；立足于我国知识产权富集区域政策溢出效应的实证研究,将空间层面知识产权政策的效果落入本土化的政策现实中,对知识产权政策效果的外部性进行由现象到实现机理,再到样本决策应用的规律探究中。
第六章是前三章内容的一个重要提炼和升华,探讨了创新视阈内知识产权政策多维效果的优化。分析了政策漏斗模型的借鉴价值,引入政策交易成本,阐明知识产权交易成本,论述知识产权成果产业化的交易成本曲线,试图通过知识产权政策交易成本的研究路径,简化影响知识产权政策过程的复杂自变量,从经济学意义更清晰地展现知识产权政策多维效果的创新价值；对我国基于知识产权政策的技术创新数据进行DEA分析,通过空间分布模式和时间演变模式的建模,探究政策多维效果在创新中的现实表现；最后分析了知识产权政策多维效果的耦合特征和实现机制,通过决策层面、时间层面、空间层面子系统的政策协同,实现知识产权政策合理性效果、周期性效果、外部性效果的耦合,以期对国家知识产权战略体系整体效果优化的应用。
第七章是总结和展望,总结了本文的主要的研究工作,指出了本研究的不足和局限性,在此基础上对今后的研究方向提出了建设性思考。
本研究的创新之处：
(1)知识产权政策效果的研究关注的创新。将知识产权政策体系作为一个动态立体的复杂系统,为政策实践提供具有建设意义的知识产权政策多维效果标尺。
(2)知识产权政策效果的研究路径的创新。开创性地引入政策过程新范式的理论,提炼出政策过程的多制度要件、动态历时要件、多维度要件,进而解析知识产权政策过程的结构和机制,从不同层面论证知识产权政策的多维效果。
(3)知识产权政策多维效果的理论探索的创新。一是,知识产权政策效果合理性的理论创新。二是,知识产权政策效果周期性的理论创新。三是,知识产权政策效果外部性的理论创新。四是,知识产权政策多维效果耦合机制的理论创新。
(4)知识产权政策多维效果的实证研究的创新。第一,对专利模仿博弈策略的情境分析创新。第二,对美国知识产权捐赠政策及演变的回溯分析创新。第三,对我国知识产权富集区域政策溢出效应的实证研究创新。第四,对我国基于知识产权政策的技术创新数据DEA分析的创新。
本研究的核心落点将定位于：探讨完善知识产权政策效果的合理性,以减少决策的非理性因素,平衡政策受众的不同利益诉求；把握知识产权政策效果的周期性,以引导专利持有的微观预期和宏观创新经济的走向,推进政策轨迹的渐进和跃迁；调整知识产权政策效果的外部性,以加快产业转移中的政策要素流动,拓展区域政策创新的视野；耦合知识产权政策的多维效果,以优化知识产权政策体系的整体效果。从而发挥知识产权政策效果的标尺作用,促进知识产权政策走向科学化和民主化。
Intellectual property (IP) is a significant part of public policy, whose function is to maintain the just order of knowledge rights and the efficient goal of knowledge advancement. IP policy is established, implemented and promoted at the national level essentially. It guides and regulates the creation, ownership, use and management of knowledge resources by system configuration and policy arrangement. IP provides the creators the incentive to innovate economically and sustainably. It constantly moves forward the innovation activity to new heights, so as to promote the rapid growth of the advanced productive force hidden in the innovation. The IP system contains the important policy measures for innovation's transformation, industrialization and marketing.
China National Intellectual Property Strategy Outline has been promulgated and implemented recently, and it indicates the IP system's entrance into a new stage of strategic initiative. Utilizing the IP system effectively, and making the efforts to narrow the gap with the developed countries is China IP policy's new goal. Though the IP policy is to be adopted and executed continuously, the lack of government concern about the effects of policies and the lack of systematic theoretical reference to the policy effects, make the policy effect's revision and improvement lag behind the real demand.
This paper introduces a new paradigm of the policy process theory, in order to provide a clear and logical argumentation framework for the multi-dimensional effect of the IP policy. At the IP policy decision-making level, the paper uses the multiple streams model to interpret the implementation of the IP policy's rationality effect; at the IP policy's time level, a punctuated-equilibrium framework is presented to elaborate the control of the IP policy's periodicity effect; under the IP policy's space level, the policy diffusion framework is transplanted to argue the regulation of the IP policy's externality effect; in the innovation panorama, this research simplifies the policy elements in the causal funnel model, by using the policy transaction cost tools and operational research evaluation, and then coordinates the different levels of IP policy to achieve the coupling of the multi-dimensional effects, which optimize the overall effect of the IP policy system.
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters, organized as follows:
The first chapter introduces the research background, the research goal and significance. It also illustrates the research methods, technical route and major innovation.
The second chapter is the literature review and the theory discussion. It firstly reviews the domestic and overseas IP policy research status and deficiency; then it elaborates on the concept of the policy effect and the comparative analysis evaluation; it next focuses on the advantage and disadvantage of the stage heuristic in the traditional policy process theory; it finally demonstrates the formation of the new paradigm of the policy process and its reference value, after selecting several scientifically verifiable map analyses, the essentials for policy process, from which arise the policy scenario analysis, are applied to specific policy areas, so as to lay the solid theoretical foundation for the IP policy's multi-dimensional effects in different levels.
The third chapter discusses IP policy's rationality effect at the decision-making level. It introduces the multiple streams model, analyzes the IP decision-making policy window empirically, and uses the group decision method to improve the inadequate participation; it mainly discusses IP system's function limitations, which inspire the technology innovation and at the same time a loss of the consumer welfare, thereby coordinating the relationship between the technical monopoly and the anti-trust through depicting the benefits balance path of the decision-making target, and constructing the policy tool correspondingly, in order to implement the IP policy's rationality effect; it delves into the particular game strategy scenario of the IP decision-making actors, analyzing the patent imitation economic model, in order to illuminate the subtle variation of IP policy's rationality effect which may have far-reaching influences on the actors strategy, market competition status, technology innovation incentives and the allocation of resources.
The fourth chapter demonstrates IP policy's periodicity effect at the time level. It employs the punctuated-equilibrium framework to depict the policy track of the technology innovation, and analyzes the policy track's periodic motion of defects, updates, endings and circulations, by using the policy cycle's effect restricting rules; it argues IP policy's periodicity effect, from the micro perspective of the patent holder model, as well as the macro-economics perspective of anti-cycle regulation; it makes an empirical study on the evolution of U.S. IP donation policy, for the sake of enlightening the China policy transplant and the retrospective analysis on IP policy cycle.
Chapter V sets forth IP policy's externality effect at the space level. It presents the policy diffusion framework, experiments with the gradient advancement of the regional policy innovation, and exerts IP policy's spatial performance in industry transfer, so as to explore IP policy's action in regional innovation; it enters on the concept of externality and the knowledge product's externality, and analyzes IP policy's externality effect through the extra-domain methodology, so as to transfer the benefit of regional policy supply; it utilizes the case study of the China IP rich regions'policy overflow effect, and then makes the spatial dimension effect of IP policy fall into a localization reality, in order to investigate the IP policy's externality effect from the phenomenon to the implementation, then to the decision-making sample application.
ChapterVI is a significant refining and distillation of chapters Ⅲ,Ⅳ, and Ⅴ to concentrate on the optimization of IP policy's multi-dimensional effects in the innovation panorama. It analyzes the reference value of the policy causal funnel model, and applies the policy transaction cost to explain the IP transaction cost and the IP industrialization's transaction cost curve, attempts to simplify the complicated policy elements, and reveal the innovative value of IP policy's multi-dimensional effects from an economic sense, through the research path of IP policy transaction cost; it uses DEA analysis to process the technological innovation data based on China IP policy, and probes the multi-dimensional effects'actual performance in the innovation, by modeling the spatial distribution pattern and the time evolution mode; finally, it expounds the characteristics and realization of the multi-dimensional effects' coupling which contains IP policy's rationality effect, periodicity effect and externality effect, through the cooperation of the subsystem policy's decision-making level, the time level and the space level, for the purpose of the application to the national IP strategy system's overall effect optimization.
Chapter VII is a summary as well as an outlook. It summarizes the major findings and conclusion of the dissertation, points out the deficiencies and limitations of this study, and based on the above two, gives some directions for further research.
The innovations of this thesis are briefly summarized as follows:
(1) The paper has a sharp focus on the IP policy effect. It presents the IP policy system as a dynamic dimensional complex system, and accordingly provides the policy practice with the measurement of IP policy multi-dimensional effects.
(2) The research path of the IP policy effect is bold. It introduces a new paradigm of the policy process theory, and extracts the multi-system elements, dynamic period elements and the multi-dimensional elements, to analyze the structure and mechanism of IP policy process for the sake of demonstrating the IP policy's multi-dimensional effects at different levels.
(3) The theoretical explorations of IP policy's multi-dimensional effects are new. It firstly puts forward IP policy's rationality effect, and then the periodicity effect is set up. After establishing the externality effect, the coupling mechanism of IP policy's multi-dimensional effects is originally found to make a breakthrough.
(4) The empirical studies of IP policy's multi-dimensional effects are novel. The first study makes the scenario analysis of the patent imitation game strategy. The second one puts the retrospective analysis on the evolution of U.S. IP donation policy. The third conducts the case research upon China IP rich regions'policy overflow effect. The fourth uses DEA analysis to process the technological innovation data based on China IP policy.
The core placement and orientation of this research can be stated. First, perfect IP policy's rationality effect, to reduce the irrational factors of the decision-making, and balance the different interests of the policy audience appeal. Then grasp IP policy's periodicity effect, to lead the patent holding micro-expectation and the trend of the innovation macro-economy, thereby promoting policy trajectory's progress and transition. Next, regulate IP policy's externality effect, to speed up the flow of the policy elements in the industry transfer, and expand the horizons of regional policy innovation. Finally, couple IP policy's multi-dimensional effects, to optimize the overall effect of the IP policy system. Consequently, the IP policy is accelerated toward a more scientific and democratic system by playing IP policy effect's role of a measuring standard.
我国近年颁布实施国家知识产权战略纲要,标志着知识产权制度建设迈入了战略主动的新阶段。有效利用知识产权制度,努力缩小与发达国家的差距,实现跨越式发展,是我国知识产权政策发展的新趋势。尽管我国相关政策部门在这种新趋势下不断出台知识产权政策,但是对于政策效果的关注不足,且缺乏体系化的政策效果理论依据,使得政策效果的改进实践滞后于现实需求。
本研究开创性地引入政策过程新范式的理论,对知识产权政策的多维效果展开清晰有力的逻辑论证框架。在知识产权政策决策层面下,运用多源流模型,演绎知识产权政策效果合理性的实现；在政策时间层面下,导入间断一平衡理论,探讨知识产权政策效果周期性的把握；在政策空间层面下,借鉴政策创新传播模型,论证知识产权政策效果外部性的调整；在创新视阈内,运用政策交易成本工具和运筹学分析,对因果漏斗模型中的政策要素进行简化,在知识产权不同层面的政策协同中,实现知识产权政策多维效果的耦合,从而优化知识产权政策体系的整体效果。
本文共分七章,各章主要内容如下：
第一章主要介绍本文的研究背景、研究目的与意义、研究方法与技术路线以及研究的创新之处。
第二章是文献综述与理论探讨。评述了国内外知识产权政策的研究现状和不足；阐释了政策效果的概念及政策效果评估的对比分析法；综述了政策过程传统理论,并重点分析了阶段分析框架的贡献和缺陷：论证了政策过程新范式的形成及借鉴价值,遴选出最具科学可验证性的几种图式分析,进而将政策过程要件所再现的政策情境分析应用到具体政策领域,为探讨知识产权政策不同层面的多维效果打下坚实的理论基础。
第三章探讨了决策层面知识产权政策效果的合理性。在政策过程的多源流模型下,实证分析了知识产权决策的政策之窗,建议了相应的决策模式,并引入群决策方法以改善决策参与不足的情况；重点探讨了知识产权制度激励技术创新与消费者福利损失的功能局限,进而描绘决策目标的利益平衡路径,协调技术创新独占与反垄断的关系,同时建构政策工具,以实现知识产权政策效果的合理性预期；深入知识产权决策行动者的特定博弈策略情境,通过专利仿制模型的经济学分析,阐释知识产权政策合理性效果的微妙变化,可能给行动者策略、市场竞争状态、技术创新激励及资源配置带来的深远影响。
第四章探讨了时间层面知识产权政策效果的周期性。以政策间断一平衡模型为支持,描绘出技术创新政策的轨迹,并在政策周期的效果制约法则下,剖析了政策轨迹周期运动的缺陷更新和终结循环；从专利持有时间模型的微观视角,以及反周期调控的宏观经济学视角,论证知识产权政策效果的周期性；实例研究了美国知识产权捐赠的政策及演变,以期对我国相关政策移植和知识产权政策周期的回溯式分析有所启发。
第五章探讨了空间层面知识产权政策效果的外部性。介绍了政策传播模型,尝试区域政策创新的梯度推进,并发挥产业转移中知识产权政策的空间绩效,以探究知识产权政策在区域创新中的作用力；从外部性概念及知识产品的外部性着手,对知识产权政策效果的外部性进行了超域分析,以实现区域政策供给的收益转移；立足于我国知识产权富集区域政策溢出效应的实证研究,将空间层面知识产权政策的效果落入本土化的政策现实中,对知识产权政策效果的外部性进行由现象到实现机理,再到样本决策应用的规律探究中。
第六章是前三章内容的一个重要提炼和升华,探讨了创新视阈内知识产权政策多维效果的优化。分析了政策漏斗模型的借鉴价值,引入政策交易成本,阐明知识产权交易成本,论述知识产权成果产业化的交易成本曲线,试图通过知识产权政策交易成本的研究路径,简化影响知识产权政策过程的复杂自变量,从经济学意义更清晰地展现知识产权政策多维效果的创新价值；对我国基于知识产权政策的技术创新数据进行DEA分析,通过空间分布模式和时间演变模式的建模,探究政策多维效果在创新中的现实表现；最后分析了知识产权政策多维效果的耦合特征和实现机制,通过决策层面、时间层面、空间层面子系统的政策协同,实现知识产权政策合理性效果、周期性效果、外部性效果的耦合,以期对国家知识产权战略体系整体效果优化的应用。
第七章是总结和展望,总结了本文的主要的研究工作,指出了本研究的不足和局限性,在此基础上对今后的研究方向提出了建设性思考。
本研究的创新之处：
(1)知识产权政策效果的研究关注的创新。将知识产权政策体系作为一个动态立体的复杂系统,为政策实践提供具有建设意义的知识产权政策多维效果标尺。
(2)知识产权政策效果的研究路径的创新。开创性地引入政策过程新范式的理论,提炼出政策过程的多制度要件、动态历时要件、多维度要件,进而解析知识产权政策过程的结构和机制,从不同层面论证知识产权政策的多维效果。
(3)知识产权政策多维效果的理论探索的创新。一是,知识产权政策效果合理性的理论创新。二是,知识产权政策效果周期性的理论创新。三是,知识产权政策效果外部性的理论创新。四是,知识产权政策多维效果耦合机制的理论创新。
(4)知识产权政策多维效果的实证研究的创新。第一,对专利模仿博弈策略的情境分析创新。第二,对美国知识产权捐赠政策及演变的回溯分析创新。第三,对我国知识产权富集区域政策溢出效应的实证研究创新。第四,对我国基于知识产权政策的技术创新数据DEA分析的创新。
本研究的核心落点将定位于：探讨完善知识产权政策效果的合理性,以减少决策的非理性因素,平衡政策受众的不同利益诉求；把握知识产权政策效果的周期性,以引导专利持有的微观预期和宏观创新经济的走向,推进政策轨迹的渐进和跃迁；调整知识产权政策效果的外部性,以加快产业转移中的政策要素流动,拓展区域政策创新的视野；耦合知识产权政策的多维效果,以优化知识产权政策体系的整体效果。从而发挥知识产权政策效果的标尺作用,促进知识产权政策走向科学化和民主化。
Intellectual property (IP) is a significant part of public policy, whose function is to maintain the just order of knowledge rights and the efficient goal of knowledge advancement. IP policy is established, implemented and promoted at the national level essentially. It guides and regulates the creation, ownership, use and management of knowledge resources by system configuration and policy arrangement. IP provides the creators the incentive to innovate economically and sustainably. It constantly moves forward the innovation activity to new heights, so as to promote the rapid growth of the advanced productive force hidden in the innovation. The IP system contains the important policy measures for innovation's transformation, industrialization and marketing.
China National Intellectual Property Strategy Outline has been promulgated and implemented recently, and it indicates the IP system's entrance into a new stage of strategic initiative. Utilizing the IP system effectively, and making the efforts to narrow the gap with the developed countries is China IP policy's new goal. Though the IP policy is to be adopted and executed continuously, the lack of government concern about the effects of policies and the lack of systematic theoretical reference to the policy effects, make the policy effect's revision and improvement lag behind the real demand.
This paper introduces a new paradigm of the policy process theory, in order to provide a clear and logical argumentation framework for the multi-dimensional effect of the IP policy. At the IP policy decision-making level, the paper uses the multiple streams model to interpret the implementation of the IP policy's rationality effect; at the IP policy's time level, a punctuated-equilibrium framework is presented to elaborate the control of the IP policy's periodicity effect; under the IP policy's space level, the policy diffusion framework is transplanted to argue the regulation of the IP policy's externality effect; in the innovation panorama, this research simplifies the policy elements in the causal funnel model, by using the policy transaction cost tools and operational research evaluation, and then coordinates the different levels of IP policy to achieve the coupling of the multi-dimensional effects, which optimize the overall effect of the IP policy system.
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters, organized as follows:
The first chapter introduces the research background, the research goal and significance. It also illustrates the research methods, technical route and major innovation.
The second chapter is the literature review and the theory discussion. It firstly reviews the domestic and overseas IP policy research status and deficiency; then it elaborates on the concept of the policy effect and the comparative analysis evaluation; it next focuses on the advantage and disadvantage of the stage heuristic in the traditional policy process theory; it finally demonstrates the formation of the new paradigm of the policy process and its reference value, after selecting several scientifically verifiable map analyses, the essentials for policy process, from which arise the policy scenario analysis, are applied to specific policy areas, so as to lay the solid theoretical foundation for the IP policy's multi-dimensional effects in different levels.
The third chapter discusses IP policy's rationality effect at the decision-making level. It introduces the multiple streams model, analyzes the IP decision-making policy window empirically, and uses the group decision method to improve the inadequate participation; it mainly discusses IP system's function limitations, which inspire the technology innovation and at the same time a loss of the consumer welfare, thereby coordinating the relationship between the technical monopoly and the anti-trust through depicting the benefits balance path of the decision-making target, and constructing the policy tool correspondingly, in order to implement the IP policy's rationality effect; it delves into the particular game strategy scenario of the IP decision-making actors, analyzing the patent imitation economic model, in order to illuminate the subtle variation of IP policy's rationality effect which may have far-reaching influences on the actors strategy, market competition status, technology innovation incentives and the allocation of resources.
The fourth chapter demonstrates IP policy's periodicity effect at the time level. It employs the punctuated-equilibrium framework to depict the policy track of the technology innovation, and analyzes the policy track's periodic motion of defects, updates, endings and circulations, by using the policy cycle's effect restricting rules; it argues IP policy's periodicity effect, from the micro perspective of the patent holder model, as well as the macro-economics perspective of anti-cycle regulation; it makes an empirical study on the evolution of U.S. IP donation policy, for the sake of enlightening the China policy transplant and the retrospective analysis on IP policy cycle.
Chapter V sets forth IP policy's externality effect at the space level. It presents the policy diffusion framework, experiments with the gradient advancement of the regional policy innovation, and exerts IP policy's spatial performance in industry transfer, so as to explore IP policy's action in regional innovation; it enters on the concept of externality and the knowledge product's externality, and analyzes IP policy's externality effect through the extra-domain methodology, so as to transfer the benefit of regional policy supply; it utilizes the case study of the China IP rich regions'policy overflow effect, and then makes the spatial dimension effect of IP policy fall into a localization reality, in order to investigate the IP policy's externality effect from the phenomenon to the implementation, then to the decision-making sample application.
ChapterVI is a significant refining and distillation of chapters Ⅲ,Ⅳ, and Ⅴ to concentrate on the optimization of IP policy's multi-dimensional effects in the innovation panorama. It analyzes the reference value of the policy causal funnel model, and applies the policy transaction cost to explain the IP transaction cost and the IP industrialization's transaction cost curve, attempts to simplify the complicated policy elements, and reveal the innovative value of IP policy's multi-dimensional effects from an economic sense, through the research path of IP policy transaction cost; it uses DEA analysis to process the technological innovation data based on China IP policy, and probes the multi-dimensional effects'actual performance in the innovation, by modeling the spatial distribution pattern and the time evolution mode; finally, it expounds the characteristics and realization of the multi-dimensional effects' coupling which contains IP policy's rationality effect, periodicity effect and externality effect, through the cooperation of the subsystem policy's decision-making level, the time level and the space level, for the purpose of the application to the national IP strategy system's overall effect optimization.
Chapter VII is a summary as well as an outlook. It summarizes the major findings and conclusion of the dissertation, points out the deficiencies and limitations of this study, and based on the above two, gives some directions for further research.
The innovations of this thesis are briefly summarized as follows:
(1) The paper has a sharp focus on the IP policy effect. It presents the IP policy system as a dynamic dimensional complex system, and accordingly provides the policy practice with the measurement of IP policy multi-dimensional effects.
(2) The research path of the IP policy effect is bold. It introduces a new paradigm of the policy process theory, and extracts the multi-system elements, dynamic period elements and the multi-dimensional elements, to analyze the structure and mechanism of IP policy process for the sake of demonstrating the IP policy's multi-dimensional effects at different levels.
(3) The theoretical explorations of IP policy's multi-dimensional effects are new. It firstly puts forward IP policy's rationality effect, and then the periodicity effect is set up. After establishing the externality effect, the coupling mechanism of IP policy's multi-dimensional effects is originally found to make a breakthrough.
(4) The empirical studies of IP policy's multi-dimensional effects are novel. The first study makes the scenario analysis of the patent imitation game strategy. The second one puts the retrospective analysis on the evolution of U.S. IP donation policy. The third conducts the case research upon China IP rich regions'policy overflow effect. The fourth uses DEA analysis to process the technological innovation data based on China IP policy.
The core placement and orientation of this research can be stated. First, perfect IP policy's rationality effect, to reduce the irrational factors of the decision-making, and balance the different interests of the policy audience appeal. Then grasp IP policy's periodicity effect, to lead the patent holding micro-expectation and the trend of the innovation macro-economy, thereby promoting policy trajectory's progress and transition. Next, regulate IP policy's externality effect, to speed up the flow of the policy elements in the industry transfer, and expand the horizons of regional policy innovation. Finally, couple IP policy's multi-dimensional effects, to optimize the overall effect of the IP policy system. Consequently, the IP policy is accelerated toward a more scientific and democratic system by playing IP policy effect's role of a measuring standard.
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