排污权交易政策下企业的环保行为研究
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摘要
改革开放以来,我国经济发展迅猛,但环境污染问题已经成为我国可持续发展的制约因素之一。排污权交易机制来源于科斯定理,是一种新的市场型环保规制政策,其根本出发点是通过明晰产权,将企业生产的环境外部不经济性“内部化”,通过市场手段治理污染、保护环境。推行排污权交易政策,是用市场经济手段解决环境问题的有益探索。
企业作为排污权交易政策的作用主体,在该政策下的环保行为选择决定了排污权政策的效果。结合我国排污权交易政策实施现状及特点,研究我国企业在排污权交易政策规制下的适应性行为反应,对政府有关部门更有针对性制定和完善相关政策,引导企业节能减排行为具有重要的现实意义。
本研究从排污权交易政策对企业环保行为的影响机制出发,构建企业基于排污权交易政策的行为决策的一般实证模型,以浙江省223家企业的实地调研数据为基础,运用定性分析和定量分析相结合的方法,分别深入考察了企业基于排污权交易政策规制的政策遵从行为、环保投资策略选择、新环保技术采纳行为等行为决策及其影响因素。
本研究的主要结论如下：首先,从排污权交易政策下企业的政策遵从意愿来看,浙江66.4%企业愿意遵从排污权交易政策；企业对排污权交易政策的认知因素对企业的政策遵从意愿具有显著的正向影响,是影响企业参与意愿的最重要因素之一；企业的政策遵从意愿与排污权交易政策的实施强度呈U型关系,其中,政策实施程度好的嘉兴地区和没有试行该政策的地区的企业的政策遵从意愿较高；企业的风险承受能力、行业的污染程度、公众舆论监督、优惠政策等因素能够显著的正向影响企业的政策遵从意愿；而企业组织对企业的政策遵从意愿具有显著的负面影响。
其次,从排污权政策下企业的环保投资策略选择来看,企业选择主动型、应对型和逃避型环保投资策略的比例分别为45.3%,35.9%和18.8%；企业选择主动型策略和应对型策略时,它的策略选择与排污权政策实施强度存在一种U型关系,而企业选择逃避型策略时,它的策略选择与排污权政策实施强度存在一种倒U型关系；排污权交易政策能显著地促使企业选择主动型和应对型投资策略,但企业更偏好选择应对型环保投资策略；排污权价格上涨的预期也会激发企业进行积极的环保投资,但企业更愿意进行应对型环保投资；企业规模对企业选择主动型和应对型投资策略都有显著的正向影响,企业人数越多,企业规模越大,企业采纳积极的环保投资策略的可能性更大；企业的环保荣誉次数也能够显著激励企业选择积极的环保投资策略,但企业更偏好于应对型环保投资；企业的治污压力对企业的环保投资策略选择具有显著的正向影响,随着企业治污压力的增大,企业选择主动型环保投资策略的可能性更大；社区与企业之间的环保纠纷并不利于企业选择积极的环保投资策略；企业组织对企业选择主动型环保投资策略具有正向的显著影响,但对企业选择应对型环保投资策略的影响并不显著。
再次,从排污权交易政策下企业采纳新环保技术的行为意愿来看,有60.5%的浙江企业愿意采纳新的环保技术；企业采纳新环保技术的意愿与排污权政策的实施强度也存在一种的U型态势,但排污权交易政策的实施强度并不能显著的提升企业采纳新环保技术的意愿；排污权交易价格上涨预期能显著的提高企业采纳新环保技术的意愿；企业排污权政策的遵从意愿与企业采纳新环保技术的意愿并不显著相关；政府的技术服务政策、企业的环保现状、企业的风险承受能力、公众舆论压力等因素对企业采纳新环保技术的意愿具有显著的正向激励作用；而社区群众的环保压力却对企业的新环保技术采纳行为产生显著负面的影响。
基于以上研究结论,本文认为：(1)政府应积极进行制度创新,进一步健全和完善排污权交易政策。政府应尊重各地环保部门的主动性和创造性,对各地的实践经验进行及时的提炼和归纳,注重滚动修订相应的政策条例,使该政策能够不断的完善。(2)政府在试点和实施排污权交易政策时,应该尽快提高环保政策的规制强度,给企业形成强力的政策推行意愿,降低政策实施的不确定性,促进企业尽快突破“U”型曲线的拐点,提高该政策的实施效果。(3)政府应根据各个地区和行业的实际情况,有针对性地制定差异化的配套政策措施。(4)进一步完善排污权交易市场,促进企业之间的排污权交易。进一步推行和完善排污权抵押贷款、排污权回购和排污权拍卖会等制度。(5)大力发展环保公益团体(NGO),提高社区群众对企业环保违法行为的监督能力。(6)合理、有效地发挥行业协会和商会等企业组织在引导企业环保行为上的作用。
Since reform and opening up policies were implemented, Chinese economy has increased rapidly. But, environmental pollution problem has become one of the main factors to achieve sustainable development in China. Grounded in the Coase Theory, emissions tradable policy, as a new market-oriented environmental regulation policy, is considered effective in reducing emissions by Clarification of environment property right to make environmental negative externalities internalized by market-oriented methods for pollution control. The emissions tradable policy is an important way to fulfill the target of total pollution load control in China and it is beneficial to implement the emission tradable policy to solve the pollution problem with the increasing severe environmental situation.
Enterprises play a key role in the implementation of emissions tradable policy. The choices of environmental protection decisions and behaviors that enterprises make would determinate the effect of emission tradable policy. When many provinces in China have started to pilot the emissions tradable policy, it is important to study the mechanisms on emissions tradable policy impacting on enterprise environmental protection behaviors for government to draw up and improve the supporting measures and polices for guiding the enterprise behaviors in energy conservation and emission reduction.
The dissertation exploit the intrinsic motivation that emissions tradable policy impacts on enterprise environmental protection behaviors and factors that enterprises make their decisions on environmental protection behaviors. A decision model is set up for simulating enterprises to make their decisions on environmental protection behaviors under the regulation of emission tradable policy. Based on the investigation data of223enterprises from Zhejiang Province, influencing factors that enterprises make their decisions on environmental protection behaviors under the regulation of emission tradable policy are empirical analyzed from exploiting the enterprises behaviors of compliance on emission tradable policy, investment strategies selection on environmental protection and adoption on new environmental protection technology respectively by using qualitative and quantitative methodologies.
The main results in the study on enterprises behaviors of compliance on emission tradable policy are shown as followings:66.4%enterprises from Zhejiang Province will comply with the emission tradable policy. The degree that enterprises know the policy has significant positive effect on compliance willingness of enterprises, which is the main determinant that enterprises comply with the policy. Enterprises compliance willingness and strength that local government implement the policy has U-shaped relationship, in which, the compliance willingness of enterprises is highest in Jiaxing City, where strength that local government implement the policy is biggest, while enterprises take the second place where local government don't impalement the policy. The factors including tolerant ability of risk, pollution level of industry, supervision by public, local preferential policies to promote enterprises to comply with the policy, have significant positive effect on compliance willingness, but business organizations, such as chamber of commerce and association, etc. have negative effect on compliance willingness.
The main results in the study on enterprises behaviors of investment strategies selection on environmental protection under the regulation of emission tradable policy are shown as followings:the percentage that enterprises select the active investment strategies, compliance investment strategies and avoidant investment strategies is45.3%,35.9%and18.8%respectively. When enterprises select the active investment strategies and compliance investment strategies, the willingness of investment strategies that enterprises select and strength that local government implement the policy shows U-shaped relationship. While, enterprises select the avoidant investment strategies, the willingness of avoidant investment strategies that enterprises select and strength that local government implement the policy has inverted U-shaped relationship. The emission tradable policy could promote enterprises to select the active investment strategies and compliance investment strategies significantly. Expectation that the permit price rise could also stimulates enterprises to select active and compliance investment strategies, but enterprises prefer to take compliance investment strategies. Enterprise scale has significant positive effect on active and compliance investment strategies selection, and the greater the scale of the enterprise has, the more likely enterprise prefers to select the active investment strategies. Honor number that enterprises get because of their behaviors on environmental protection has significantly positive effect on the active and compliance investment strategies selection, while enterprises prefer to take the compliance investment strategies. Pressure on pollution abatement that enterprises are facing has significantly positive effect on the investment strategies selection. The more the pressure enterprises have, the more likely enterprises prefer to select the active investment strategies. Environmental disputes between communities and enterprises have negative effect on investment strategies selection. Business organizations, such as, chamber of commerce and association, etc. have positive effect significantly on active investment strategies selection, but does not have a significant impact on compliance investment strategies.
The main results are shown in the study on enterprises adoption behaviors on new environmental protection technology:60.5%enterprises from Zhejiang Province prefer to adopt new environmental protection technology under the regulation of emission tradable policy. Willingness that enterprises adopt new environmental protection technology and strength that local government implements the policy has U-shaped relationship. But, strength that local government implements the policy could not promote enterprises willingness to adopt new environmental protection technology significantly. Price expectations of permit could stimulate enterprises to adopt new environmental protection technology. It is not always involved between the compliance willingness on emission tradable policy and adoption willingness on new environmental protection technology. The factors including public technology service from government, current situation of environmental protection of enterprises, tolerant ability of risk, supervision by public have significant positive effect on adaptation willingness on new environmental protection technology. But environmental pressures from communities have negative effect on adaptation on new environmental protection technology.
The purpose of the dissertation is to provide suggestions for government, especially the environmental protection bureaus, to make up and motive supporting measures and polices to implement the emission tradable policy effectively. Based on the results mentioned above, measurements and policies should be made:(1) Government should go further to conduct institution innovation for improving the emission tradable policy. The government should stimulate the initiative and creativity from regional environmental protection departments, and summarizes the experience from regional environmental protection departments. The corresponding policy regulation terms should be amending according to the practice and feedback from regional environmental protection departments.(2) When piloting and implementation the emission tradable policy, government should improve the implementation strength of the policy promptly to eliminate the uncertainty of policy for promoting enterprises breakthrough the inflection point of U curve as soon as possible to increase the effect of the policy.(3) Different and specific supporting measures should be made according to the actual situation of industry, local economy and environmental capacity.(4) The emissions tradable market should be built and updated to induce enterprises to make permit transaction smoothly. Some measurements, such as, permit mortgage loans, permit repurchase, permit auction, etc. should be draw up and improved.(5) It is beneficial to develop non-governmental organization (NGO) to improve the supervisory ability of communities supervising the environmental violations of enterprises.(6) It is important to make use of business organizations, such as chamber of commerce and association, etc. reasonably and effectively for guiding enterprises to make environmental protection behaviors.
企业作为排污权交易政策的作用主体,在该政策下的环保行为选择决定了排污权政策的效果。结合我国排污权交易政策实施现状及特点,研究我国企业在排污权交易政策规制下的适应性行为反应,对政府有关部门更有针对性制定和完善相关政策,引导企业节能减排行为具有重要的现实意义。
本研究从排污权交易政策对企业环保行为的影响机制出发,构建企业基于排污权交易政策的行为决策的一般实证模型,以浙江省223家企业的实地调研数据为基础,运用定性分析和定量分析相结合的方法,分别深入考察了企业基于排污权交易政策规制的政策遵从行为、环保投资策略选择、新环保技术采纳行为等行为决策及其影响因素。
本研究的主要结论如下：首先,从排污权交易政策下企业的政策遵从意愿来看,浙江66.4%企业愿意遵从排污权交易政策；企业对排污权交易政策的认知因素对企业的政策遵从意愿具有显著的正向影响,是影响企业参与意愿的最重要因素之一；企业的政策遵从意愿与排污权交易政策的实施强度呈U型关系,其中,政策实施程度好的嘉兴地区和没有试行该政策的地区的企业的政策遵从意愿较高；企业的风险承受能力、行业的污染程度、公众舆论监督、优惠政策等因素能够显著的正向影响企业的政策遵从意愿；而企业组织对企业的政策遵从意愿具有显著的负面影响。
其次,从排污权政策下企业的环保投资策略选择来看,企业选择主动型、应对型和逃避型环保投资策略的比例分别为45.3%,35.9%和18.8%；企业选择主动型策略和应对型策略时,它的策略选择与排污权政策实施强度存在一种U型关系,而企业选择逃避型策略时,它的策略选择与排污权政策实施强度存在一种倒U型关系；排污权交易政策能显著地促使企业选择主动型和应对型投资策略,但企业更偏好选择应对型环保投资策略；排污权价格上涨的预期也会激发企业进行积极的环保投资,但企业更愿意进行应对型环保投资；企业规模对企业选择主动型和应对型投资策略都有显著的正向影响,企业人数越多,企业规模越大,企业采纳积极的环保投资策略的可能性更大；企业的环保荣誉次数也能够显著激励企业选择积极的环保投资策略,但企业更偏好于应对型环保投资；企业的治污压力对企业的环保投资策略选择具有显著的正向影响,随着企业治污压力的增大,企业选择主动型环保投资策略的可能性更大；社区与企业之间的环保纠纷并不利于企业选择积极的环保投资策略；企业组织对企业选择主动型环保投资策略具有正向的显著影响,但对企业选择应对型环保投资策略的影响并不显著。
再次,从排污权交易政策下企业采纳新环保技术的行为意愿来看,有60.5%的浙江企业愿意采纳新的环保技术；企业采纳新环保技术的意愿与排污权政策的实施强度也存在一种的U型态势,但排污权交易政策的实施强度并不能显著的提升企业采纳新环保技术的意愿；排污权交易价格上涨预期能显著的提高企业采纳新环保技术的意愿；企业排污权政策的遵从意愿与企业采纳新环保技术的意愿并不显著相关；政府的技术服务政策、企业的环保现状、企业的风险承受能力、公众舆论压力等因素对企业采纳新环保技术的意愿具有显著的正向激励作用；而社区群众的环保压力却对企业的新环保技术采纳行为产生显著负面的影响。
基于以上研究结论,本文认为：(1)政府应积极进行制度创新,进一步健全和完善排污权交易政策。政府应尊重各地环保部门的主动性和创造性,对各地的实践经验进行及时的提炼和归纳,注重滚动修订相应的政策条例,使该政策能够不断的完善。(2)政府在试点和实施排污权交易政策时,应该尽快提高环保政策的规制强度,给企业形成强力的政策推行意愿,降低政策实施的不确定性,促进企业尽快突破“U”型曲线的拐点,提高该政策的实施效果。(3)政府应根据各个地区和行业的实际情况,有针对性地制定差异化的配套政策措施。(4)进一步完善排污权交易市场,促进企业之间的排污权交易。进一步推行和完善排污权抵押贷款、排污权回购和排污权拍卖会等制度。(5)大力发展环保公益团体(NGO),提高社区群众对企业环保违法行为的监督能力。(6)合理、有效地发挥行业协会和商会等企业组织在引导企业环保行为上的作用。
Since reform and opening up policies were implemented, Chinese economy has increased rapidly. But, environmental pollution problem has become one of the main factors to achieve sustainable development in China. Grounded in the Coase Theory, emissions tradable policy, as a new market-oriented environmental regulation policy, is considered effective in reducing emissions by Clarification of environment property right to make environmental negative externalities internalized by market-oriented methods for pollution control. The emissions tradable policy is an important way to fulfill the target of total pollution load control in China and it is beneficial to implement the emission tradable policy to solve the pollution problem with the increasing severe environmental situation.
Enterprises play a key role in the implementation of emissions tradable policy. The choices of environmental protection decisions and behaviors that enterprises make would determinate the effect of emission tradable policy. When many provinces in China have started to pilot the emissions tradable policy, it is important to study the mechanisms on emissions tradable policy impacting on enterprise environmental protection behaviors for government to draw up and improve the supporting measures and polices for guiding the enterprise behaviors in energy conservation and emission reduction.
The dissertation exploit the intrinsic motivation that emissions tradable policy impacts on enterprise environmental protection behaviors and factors that enterprises make their decisions on environmental protection behaviors. A decision model is set up for simulating enterprises to make their decisions on environmental protection behaviors under the regulation of emission tradable policy. Based on the investigation data of223enterprises from Zhejiang Province, influencing factors that enterprises make their decisions on environmental protection behaviors under the regulation of emission tradable policy are empirical analyzed from exploiting the enterprises behaviors of compliance on emission tradable policy, investment strategies selection on environmental protection and adoption on new environmental protection technology respectively by using qualitative and quantitative methodologies.
The main results in the study on enterprises behaviors of compliance on emission tradable policy are shown as followings:66.4%enterprises from Zhejiang Province will comply with the emission tradable policy. The degree that enterprises know the policy has significant positive effect on compliance willingness of enterprises, which is the main determinant that enterprises comply with the policy. Enterprises compliance willingness and strength that local government implement the policy has U-shaped relationship, in which, the compliance willingness of enterprises is highest in Jiaxing City, where strength that local government implement the policy is biggest, while enterprises take the second place where local government don't impalement the policy. The factors including tolerant ability of risk, pollution level of industry, supervision by public, local preferential policies to promote enterprises to comply with the policy, have significant positive effect on compliance willingness, but business organizations, such as chamber of commerce and association, etc. have negative effect on compliance willingness.
The main results in the study on enterprises behaviors of investment strategies selection on environmental protection under the regulation of emission tradable policy are shown as followings:the percentage that enterprises select the active investment strategies, compliance investment strategies and avoidant investment strategies is45.3%,35.9%and18.8%respectively. When enterprises select the active investment strategies and compliance investment strategies, the willingness of investment strategies that enterprises select and strength that local government implement the policy shows U-shaped relationship. While, enterprises select the avoidant investment strategies, the willingness of avoidant investment strategies that enterprises select and strength that local government implement the policy has inverted U-shaped relationship. The emission tradable policy could promote enterprises to select the active investment strategies and compliance investment strategies significantly. Expectation that the permit price rise could also stimulates enterprises to select active and compliance investment strategies, but enterprises prefer to take compliance investment strategies. Enterprise scale has significant positive effect on active and compliance investment strategies selection, and the greater the scale of the enterprise has, the more likely enterprise prefers to select the active investment strategies. Honor number that enterprises get because of their behaviors on environmental protection has significantly positive effect on the active and compliance investment strategies selection, while enterprises prefer to take the compliance investment strategies. Pressure on pollution abatement that enterprises are facing has significantly positive effect on the investment strategies selection. The more the pressure enterprises have, the more likely enterprises prefer to select the active investment strategies. Environmental disputes between communities and enterprises have negative effect on investment strategies selection. Business organizations, such as, chamber of commerce and association, etc. have positive effect significantly on active investment strategies selection, but does not have a significant impact on compliance investment strategies.
The main results are shown in the study on enterprises adoption behaviors on new environmental protection technology:60.5%enterprises from Zhejiang Province prefer to adopt new environmental protection technology under the regulation of emission tradable policy. Willingness that enterprises adopt new environmental protection technology and strength that local government implements the policy has U-shaped relationship. But, strength that local government implements the policy could not promote enterprises willingness to adopt new environmental protection technology significantly. Price expectations of permit could stimulate enterprises to adopt new environmental protection technology. It is not always involved between the compliance willingness on emission tradable policy and adoption willingness on new environmental protection technology. The factors including public technology service from government, current situation of environmental protection of enterprises, tolerant ability of risk, supervision by public have significant positive effect on adaptation willingness on new environmental protection technology. But environmental pressures from communities have negative effect on adaptation on new environmental protection technology.
The purpose of the dissertation is to provide suggestions for government, especially the environmental protection bureaus, to make up and motive supporting measures and polices to implement the emission tradable policy effectively. Based on the results mentioned above, measurements and policies should be made:(1) Government should go further to conduct institution innovation for improving the emission tradable policy. The government should stimulate the initiative and creativity from regional environmental protection departments, and summarizes the experience from regional environmental protection departments. The corresponding policy regulation terms should be amending according to the practice and feedback from regional environmental protection departments.(2) When piloting and implementation the emission tradable policy, government should improve the implementation strength of the policy promptly to eliminate the uncertainty of policy for promoting enterprises breakthrough the inflection point of U curve as soon as possible to increase the effect of the policy.(3) Different and specific supporting measures should be made according to the actual situation of industry, local economy and environmental capacity.(4) The emissions tradable market should be built and updated to induce enterprises to make permit transaction smoothly. Some measurements, such as, permit mortgage loans, permit repurchase, permit auction, etc. should be draw up and improved.(5) It is beneficial to develop non-governmental organization (NGO) to improve the supervisory ability of communities supervising the environmental violations of enterprises.(6) It is important to make use of business organizations, such as chamber of commerce and association, etc. reasonably and effectively for guiding enterprises to make environmental protection behaviors.
引文
1余建英,何旭宏.数据统计分析与SPSS应用.北京：人民邮电出版社,2003,164.
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