我国商标侵权治理的制度因素研究
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摘要
在新制度经济学中,制度被视为一种行为规则,约束和引导个体理性地追求效用最大化的行为。目前,我国商标侵权屡禁不止。其中一个重要原因就在于我国商标侵权治理的制度因素方面的缺陷,即没有科学考虑利益相关者的利益平衡。商标侵权是市场经济的产物,科学的商标侵权治理制度需要综合平衡相关利益主体的得益分配。
学术界偏重运用定性方法研究商标侵权治理制度。本文在利益相关者理论和法经济学的理论基础上,通过管理科学模型的构建和实证检验,研究了我国商标侵权治理的制度因素问题。运用管理科学的分析方法,研究既有问题,科学分析商标侵权治理制度中各主体的内在利益关系,得出一些具有启发性的结论,具有一定的理论价值和实践意义。
主要研究内容如下:(1)在界定核心概念的基础上,以商标权人、商标侵权人、消费者、职业打假者、政府作为博弈主体,分析各自的策略选择;(2)在演化博弈研究的基础上,基于TOPSIS和负理想点法,构建制度模式选择模型,通过数值模拟,研究最优的制度模式;(3)通过数据的回归分析、方差分析、卡方检验和方差秩检验,以及问卷数据的因子分析,验证模型结论;(4)在完整的规范分析和实证研究的基础上,提出治理商标侵权的制度建议。
经过研究,得出以下主要结论:(1)商标权人是维护商标权利的核心利益主体。在制度设计上应注重激发商标权人的维权积极性,提高商标侵权治理的实效;(2)商标侵权的政府治理,是治理商标侵权的最重要的因素。政府须采取合理的惩罚力度,降低监管成本,强化监管责任,减少商标侵权人的非法得益,建立联动机制。比较而言,降低监管成本比加大处罚力度更有效;(3)商标侵权的司法认定,是治理商标侵权的比较重要的因素。商标侵权构成的司法认定规则应得到改革;(4)商标侵权的赔偿机制,是治理商标侵权的较为重要的因素。商标侵权的实质为对商标价值的侵害,商标侵权损害赔偿金的计算标准应以商标价值为基础;(5)消费者面对商标侵权的态度和行为,也是治理商标侵权的需要完善的因素。为克服消费者存在的一定程度的维权惰性,商标权人和政府应帮助消费者维权。职业打假行为也应得到法律的保护和规范。
本文将管理科学的研究方法运用到法经济学的研究领域,从全新的研究视角分析公共政策问题,具有一定的创新性。
System is a kind of conduct rule. This rule leads individual to pursue the maximal avail. Nowadays market competition is very keen. The trademark will be more and more important for the corporations in the future. So the trademark stratagem should be put in practice widely. It is regretful that the trademark’s infringement can not be abandon in China. Some of the antecedents of trademark’s infringement lie in the limitation of governmance system of trademark infringement.
As a whole, the academe did research on trademark law by means of qualitative method in the past. The research methods in my paper include multi-objective decision theory, game theory, and statistics. The significance for the research means the extension of these methods, the enlargement of trademark research and the promotion of law development. So the paper has the academic value and practical significance.
The research of my paper comprises these aspects. (1) The paper treats the trademark’s owner, the pirate, the consumer and the government as the actor in the model of game theory. (2) According to the method of topsis in multi-objective decision theory, the paper designs the model in order to choose the best system. (3)By means of the statistic test, the paper examines the theoretic conclusion. (4) In the end, the paper tables some proposals about system factor of trademark infringement’s governmance.
My paper obtains the conclusions as follows. (1) The trademark’s owner is the whole show in trademark infringement’s governance.(2) The duty of the government is to constitute the rational degree of punishment, to reduce the cost of administrative management, to intensify the burden of correlative department, to lower the illegal profit from the infringement and build a joint-action mechanism. Moreover, the cost of administrative management is more important than the degree of punishment. (3) The cognizance of trademark’s infringement needs to be reconstructed. The legal appraisal and market investigation can be applied to the judge of trademark similitude. The rule of trademark’s infringement should adopt the principle of fault understandability. The judge of cause and effect ought to be based on the probability that the party can change the damage’s appearance.So the farfamed trademark should be protected distinguishingly.(4) The value of trademark is the foundation of calculation criterion about damage compensation. The judge should take the evaluation method of the market in the lawsuit of trademark’s infringement. (5) The existence of consumer’s inertia has the economic reason. The law should endow the owner of trademark with the right to beat dummy primarily. The owner of trademark should help the consumer exert the right. At the same time, the occupational action of striking trademark’s infringement should be protected and managed by means of legal method.
The paper applies the methodology of management science to the legal domain.So this paper is innovative in a sense.
学术界偏重运用定性方法研究商标侵权治理制度。本文在利益相关者理论和法经济学的理论基础上,通过管理科学模型的构建和实证检验,研究了我国商标侵权治理的制度因素问题。运用管理科学的分析方法,研究既有问题,科学分析商标侵权治理制度中各主体的内在利益关系,得出一些具有启发性的结论,具有一定的理论价值和实践意义。
主要研究内容如下:(1)在界定核心概念的基础上,以商标权人、商标侵权人、消费者、职业打假者、政府作为博弈主体,分析各自的策略选择;(2)在演化博弈研究的基础上,基于TOPSIS和负理想点法,构建制度模式选择模型,通过数值模拟,研究最优的制度模式;(3)通过数据的回归分析、方差分析、卡方检验和方差秩检验,以及问卷数据的因子分析,验证模型结论;(4)在完整的规范分析和实证研究的基础上,提出治理商标侵权的制度建议。
经过研究,得出以下主要结论:(1)商标权人是维护商标权利的核心利益主体。在制度设计上应注重激发商标权人的维权积极性,提高商标侵权治理的实效;(2)商标侵权的政府治理,是治理商标侵权的最重要的因素。政府须采取合理的惩罚力度,降低监管成本,强化监管责任,减少商标侵权人的非法得益,建立联动机制。比较而言,降低监管成本比加大处罚力度更有效;(3)商标侵权的司法认定,是治理商标侵权的比较重要的因素。商标侵权构成的司法认定规则应得到改革;(4)商标侵权的赔偿机制,是治理商标侵权的较为重要的因素。商标侵权的实质为对商标价值的侵害,商标侵权损害赔偿金的计算标准应以商标价值为基础;(5)消费者面对商标侵权的态度和行为,也是治理商标侵权的需要完善的因素。为克服消费者存在的一定程度的维权惰性,商标权人和政府应帮助消费者维权。职业打假行为也应得到法律的保护和规范。
本文将管理科学的研究方法运用到法经济学的研究领域,从全新的研究视角分析公共政策问题,具有一定的创新性。
System is a kind of conduct rule. This rule leads individual to pursue the maximal avail. Nowadays market competition is very keen. The trademark will be more and more important for the corporations in the future. So the trademark stratagem should be put in practice widely. It is regretful that the trademark’s infringement can not be abandon in China. Some of the antecedents of trademark’s infringement lie in the limitation of governmance system of trademark infringement.
As a whole, the academe did research on trademark law by means of qualitative method in the past. The research methods in my paper include multi-objective decision theory, game theory, and statistics. The significance for the research means the extension of these methods, the enlargement of trademark research and the promotion of law development. So the paper has the academic value and practical significance.
The research of my paper comprises these aspects. (1) The paper treats the trademark’s owner, the pirate, the consumer and the government as the actor in the model of game theory. (2) According to the method of topsis in multi-objective decision theory, the paper designs the model in order to choose the best system. (3)By means of the statistic test, the paper examines the theoretic conclusion. (4) In the end, the paper tables some proposals about system factor of trademark infringement’s governmance.
My paper obtains the conclusions as follows. (1) The trademark’s owner is the whole show in trademark infringement’s governance.(2) The duty of the government is to constitute the rational degree of punishment, to reduce the cost of administrative management, to intensify the burden of correlative department, to lower the illegal profit from the infringement and build a joint-action mechanism. Moreover, the cost of administrative management is more important than the degree of punishment. (3) The cognizance of trademark’s infringement needs to be reconstructed. The legal appraisal and market investigation can be applied to the judge of trademark similitude. The rule of trademark’s infringement should adopt the principle of fault understandability. The judge of cause and effect ought to be based on the probability that the party can change the damage’s appearance.So the farfamed trademark should be protected distinguishingly.(4) The value of trademark is the foundation of calculation criterion about damage compensation. The judge should take the evaluation method of the market in the lawsuit of trademark’s infringement. (5) The existence of consumer’s inertia has the economic reason. The law should endow the owner of trademark with the right to beat dummy primarily. The owner of trademark should help the consumer exert the right. At the same time, the occupational action of striking trademark’s infringement should be protected and managed by means of legal method.
The paper applies the methodology of management science to the legal domain.So this paper is innovative in a sense.
引文
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