国有企业财务治理问题研究
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摘要
国有企业财务治理处于企业组织、公司治理及公司财务等多学科的交叉领域。进行国有企业财务治理体系研究,不仅拓展了公司财务的内涵和外延,体现了公司财务中公司治理思想的重要影响和作用,完善了财务理论体系,而且突出了公司治理中财务方面的主导及核心作用,深化了公司治理理论研究,实现了公司治理和财务管理的有效融合,是解决国有企业财务问题、公司治理问题的良好切入点。
本论文将财务治理理论体系按照基础理论、基本理论以及应用理论进行分别研究。首先,进行财务治理基础理论研究,主要阐述了委托代理理论、公司治理理论、财权理论、财权分层理论及财务目标理论,指出财权理论是财务治理理论的基础及源泉。其次,进行财务治理基本理论研究,在论述财务治理内涵及概念、财务治理结构、财务治理机制、财务治理诸范畴关系等前提下,构筑了以财权配置为中心,以资本结构为基础,以激励和监督机制为保证,以财务治理机制为抓手,以提升财务治理效率和实现相关者利益最大化为目的的财务治理基本理论体系。最后,遵循一般财务治理理论指导,结合国有企业特征及财务现状,根据国有企业当前财务治理存在的主要问题及成因分析,并在进行国有企业财务治理问题经典案例剖析基础上,提出了财务治理应用理论——构筑以财权配置为中心，以模式选择为方向,以资本结构为基础,以业绩考核为抓手,以财务内控为支撑,以财务信息披露为工具的国有企业财务治理框架,以促进国有企业价值最大化。本文分别从模式选择和资本结构、财权配置、业绩考核、信息披露、财务内控等五方面对国有企业财务治理理论及应用进行深入、翔实研究。
治理模式的选择奠定了财务治理方向。本文在对市场导向型治理模式、内部控制主导型治理模式、家族控制主导型治理模式等国外典型财务治理模式进行优缺点对比及评价基础上,指出各国财务治理模式的趋同性及差异性将长期存在。根据国有企业特征和中国国情,并顺应公司治理国际发展趋势,提出国有企业财务治理模式应融合股东单边治理模式及利益相关者共同治理模式优势,采用股东主导下的利益相关者共同治理模式,维护股东及利益相关者的共同利益诉求。资本结构是财务治理系统的运行基础,决定了财务治理基本特征及目标取向。资本结构的选择决定了财务治理的基础,资本结构初步决定了公司利益相关者财权配置及利益关系,其中股权结构是分析公司内部股东之间关系处理及整体治理效应基础,债权结构是确定外部债权人权限并促使其合理行使治理权利的基础。本文在进行资本结构整体治理效应、股权结构治理效应、债权结构治理效应理论分析基础上,指出了国有企业资本结构失衡特征及治理效应缺陷,提出优化国企资本结构治理效应举措：通过股权多元化、培育机构投资者、经营者持股、强化债务融资效率等资本结构的合理安排,充分发挥股权融资治理效应与负债融资治理效应的互补性,最终形成一个兼顾各方利益的资本结构制衡机制,以此提高财务治理结构效率。
财权配置是财务治理的核心,国有企业财务治理框架体系各部分有效运转及功能实现均要通过财权合理配置来完成。在研究财权配置基本理论、原则及逻辑框架基础上,进行了多维度财权配置模型研究：财务治理结构维度是按照财务治理主体理论,研究股东会、董事会、监事会、经营者等不同权力主体的财权配置；多级委托代理结构维度是按照国有企业多级委托代理关系理论,研究从国资委至国有企业母子公司内部的财权分割及配置；财务分层维度是按照财务分层理论,研究出资者、经营者、财务经理等不同层次的财权配置。不论何种配置模型,根据股东主导下的利益相关者共同配置财权理论,国有企业应按照多级委托链条及财权分层结构进行逐级分解、多层配置财权。最后进行了财权配置的集权与分权研究,在解析国有企业母子公司集权型、分权型和中间型三种财务控制模式基础上,构筑了相对集权式的国有企业财务管控体系。
国有企业财务治理的核心是财权配置,而比财权配置更关键的问题是建立健全激励与约束相容的财务治理机制,两者分别从动力机制及制衡机制保证财务治理效率的提升。国有企业当前激励约束机制的现状决定了,业绩考核是激励机制的根本,信息披露是约束机制的重点。本文在对国有企业激励机制状况深入解析基础上,通过对国有资本金绩效评价及中央企业负责人经营业绩考核办法例证分析,指出了目前国有企业业绩考核存在问题,从短期激励和长期激励两方面分别进行国有企业业绩考核指标体系的设计,重点就完善归属母公司所有者综合收益总额、经济增加值及经营者股权激励等考核手段提出合理化建议。本文在对国有企业监督机制现状进行深入解析基础上,指出信息披露是财务治理的有效工具,针对目前国有企业信息披露的特征及存在问题,从完善内部治理、外部治理等方面提出提升国有企业财务信息披露质量的对策,并结合企业会计准则等要求就完善国有企业财务治理信息披露内容提出创新思路,对非公开上市国有企业公开对外信息披露也做了初步探析。
离开财务内控的有效支撑,财务治理体系构筑就会成为空中楼阁,在完善财务治理之际沉入财务内控之中,在健全财务内控之时上升到财务治理层次,形成两者良性互动,才能有效解决国有企业财务治理的诸多问题。在深入剖析财务治理与财务内控互动基础和互动关系基础上,阐述了财务内控的财务治理功能,并根据国有企业财务内控实践现状和缺陷,从建设现代企业制度角度出发,提出构筑符合财务治理规范的财务内控框架体系、强化财务控制活动体系建设、从出资人角度推进财务内控建设等完善财务内控体系的建议,从而推动国有企业财务治理效率的提升。
Financial governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) crosses multi-disciplinary areas, such as corporate organization, corporate governance and corporate finance, etc. Study on the financial governance system of SOEs not merely expands the intension and extension of corporate finance, embodies the significant impact of corporate governance ideas in its finance and improves finance theoretical system, but also highlights the dominant and core aspect of financial management in corporate governance, deepens the theoretical study on corporate governance, and realizes the effective combination of corporate governance and financial management. Such study offers a good entry point for solutions of finance and governance problems in SOEs.
The paper makes study on theoretical system of financial governance in accordance with three levels, i.e. basic theories, essential theories and application theories. Firstly, in the study of basic theories, paper elaborates the theories of Entrustment and Agency, Corporate Governance, Financial Rights, Financial Rights Layering and Financial Objectives, pointing out that theories of Financial Rights are the basis and source of corporate governance theories. Secondly, paper makes a research on essential theories. Based on the illustration of connotation, structure, mechanism and relation of all categories of financial governance, paper builds an essential theories system of financial governance which makes financial rights allocation as its center, capital structure as its basis, incentive and supervision mechanisms as its guarantee, financial governance as its handle, and efficiency improvement in financial governance and benefit maximization of stakeholders as its objective. Lastly, following the guidance of general financial governance theories and according to the financial status and characteristics of SOEs, the paper finds out the main problems and reasons which are existed at current financial governance in SOEs. After analyzing classical cases of financial governance problems lied in SOEs, paper comes up with a financial governance application theory which also provides a train of thought for financial governance problems in SOEs. The thought serves for maximizing the value of SOEs via indicating to build a financial governance framework system, which is equipped with financial rights allocation as its center, mode selection as its direction, capital structure as its basis, performance evaluation as its handle, financial internal control as its support, and financial information disclosure as its tools. The paper gives an in-depth, detailed study on both theory and application of financial governance from five aspects:mode selection and capital structure, financial rights allocation, performance evaluation, information disclosure and financial internal control.
The direction of financial governance is laid by mode selection of governance. The paper gives comparison and comments on typical modes of foreign financial governance, including market-oriented mode, internal control-led mode and family control-led mode, etc. Based on this, the paper points out the convergence and divergence of financial governance modes in different countries would exist in long run. According to the characteristics of SOEs and China's national conditions, the paper brings up an idea that is conforming to the international development trend of financial governance. The idea suggests that financial governance pattern in SOEs should combine the advantages of unilateral governance of shareholders and co-governance of all stakeholders, adopting a shareholder-leading co-governance by all stakeholders, which would protect the common interest of both shareholders and stakeholders. Capital structure is the operating foundation of financial governance system, and determines the characteristics and target orientations of financial governance. The selection of capital structure lays the foundation of financial governance. Capital structure initially decides the financial rights allocation and the interest relations among stakeholders. It falls into two categories---stock ownership structure and debt structure. Stock ownership structure provides a reference for analyzing the relations of shareholders inside a corporation and overall governance effect; while debt structure for deciding the authority limits of creditors outside a corporation and urging them to govern reasonably. On the basis of theoretical analysis of overall governance effect of capital structure, governance effect of ownership structure and that of debt structure, the paper provides gives the features of capital structure unbalance and defects in governance effect. Therefore, the paper proposes a few measures for optimization of capital structure governance effect in SOEs. These measures includes reasonable arrangements of capital structure like diversifying stock equity, fostering institutional investors, holding stock by operators and improving efficiency of debt financing, and giving full play to the complementarity of equity financing governance effect and debt financing governance effect. Through these measures, a check-and-balance mechanism of capital structure that gives consideration to the interests of all parties can be formed and can therefore improve efficiency of financial governance.
Financial rights allocation is the core of financial governance. The efficient operation and function realization of all aspects in financial governance system of SOEs are achieved through rational financial rights allocation. The paper elaborates a multi-dimensional financial rights allocation model based on a combined research on its basic theories, principles and logical framework. In accordance with its main theory, structure dimension is focused on studying the financial right allocation among various stakeholders, such as shareholders, board of directors, supervisors and operators. Using the same method, SOEs'multi-level principle-agent structure is focused on studying financial right allocation along SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) to SOEs and their subsidiaries. And financial stratified dimension is focused on researching the financial rights allocation of different hierarchy such as investors, operators and managers, etc. Regardless of the allocation pattern, SOEs should decompose and stratify its financial rights according to its multi-level principle-agent chain and stratification structure of financial rights based on the theory of financial rights co-allocation by both shareholders and stakeholders, but led by the former. Lastly, this paper makes a study on centralization and decentralization of financial right allocation and builds a relatively centralized financial management and control system of SOEs based on the analysis of centralized, decentralized and intermediate financial control patterns of parent company and its subsidiaries.
The core of financial governance of SOEs is financial rights allocation. However, it is more critical to establish an incentives and constrains compatible sound mechanism, which ensures the improvement of financial governance efficiency through driving mechanism and balancing mechanism respectively. The current incentive and constrain mechanism status in SOEs determines that, performance evaluation and information disclosure are fundamental factors when establishing and or reviewing the incentive mechanism and constrain mechanism respectively. By analyzing the current status of SOEs'of incentive mechanism, evaluation system of state-owned capital efficiency, and methods of performance development review which are extended to owners of SOEs, the paper points out there are problems existing in performance development review. It offers a design of performance development review index system from two aspects:short-term incentives and long-term incentives, and mainly provides several rational proposals for perfection of evaluation methods such as the comprehensive income amount attributable to parent company, EVA (Economic Value Added) and equity incentive of operators. By analyzing the current situation of supervision mechanism, the paper points out that information disclosure is an effective tool for financial governance. Considering the characteristics of present information disclosure in SOEs and existing problems, the paper provides methods of improving quality of financial information disclosure from both internal and external governance perfection. Also, it proposes an innovative idea of perfecting the content of information disclosure according to the requirements of ASBE (Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises), and tentatively explores the information disclosure of non-public listed SOEs.
Without the effective support of internal financial control, the financial governance system would be an empty illusion. The problems of financial governance in SOEs would not be solved unless financial governance and internal control interacts with each other systematically---focusing on internal control when perfecting financial governance, and improving the quality of financial governance when intensifying internal control. On the basis of analysis of interactive relations between financial governance and financial internal control, the paper elaborates the financial governance function, and concludes a few improvement suggestions based on the practice and shortfalls of financial control of SOEs for the purpose of establishing modern enterprise management system and for improving financial governance efficiency in SOEs. These suggestions include constructing a financial internal control framework in accordance with norms of financial governance, strengthening the system construction of financial controlling activities, and boosting financial internal control from the angle of investors etc.
本论文将财务治理理论体系按照基础理论、基本理论以及应用理论进行分别研究。首先,进行财务治理基础理论研究,主要阐述了委托代理理论、公司治理理论、财权理论、财权分层理论及财务目标理论,指出财权理论是财务治理理论的基础及源泉。其次,进行财务治理基本理论研究,在论述财务治理内涵及概念、财务治理结构、财务治理机制、财务治理诸范畴关系等前提下,构筑了以财权配置为中心,以资本结构为基础,以激励和监督机制为保证,以财务治理机制为抓手,以提升财务治理效率和实现相关者利益最大化为目的的财务治理基本理论体系。最后,遵循一般财务治理理论指导,结合国有企业特征及财务现状,根据国有企业当前财务治理存在的主要问题及成因分析,并在进行国有企业财务治理问题经典案例剖析基础上,提出了财务治理应用理论——构筑以财权配置为中心，以模式选择为方向,以资本结构为基础,以业绩考核为抓手,以财务内控为支撑,以财务信息披露为工具的国有企业财务治理框架,以促进国有企业价值最大化。本文分别从模式选择和资本结构、财权配置、业绩考核、信息披露、财务内控等五方面对国有企业财务治理理论及应用进行深入、翔实研究。
治理模式的选择奠定了财务治理方向。本文在对市场导向型治理模式、内部控制主导型治理模式、家族控制主导型治理模式等国外典型财务治理模式进行优缺点对比及评价基础上,指出各国财务治理模式的趋同性及差异性将长期存在。根据国有企业特征和中国国情,并顺应公司治理国际发展趋势,提出国有企业财务治理模式应融合股东单边治理模式及利益相关者共同治理模式优势,采用股东主导下的利益相关者共同治理模式,维护股东及利益相关者的共同利益诉求。资本结构是财务治理系统的运行基础,决定了财务治理基本特征及目标取向。资本结构的选择决定了财务治理的基础,资本结构初步决定了公司利益相关者财权配置及利益关系,其中股权结构是分析公司内部股东之间关系处理及整体治理效应基础,债权结构是确定外部债权人权限并促使其合理行使治理权利的基础。本文在进行资本结构整体治理效应、股权结构治理效应、债权结构治理效应理论分析基础上,指出了国有企业资本结构失衡特征及治理效应缺陷,提出优化国企资本结构治理效应举措：通过股权多元化、培育机构投资者、经营者持股、强化债务融资效率等资本结构的合理安排,充分发挥股权融资治理效应与负债融资治理效应的互补性,最终形成一个兼顾各方利益的资本结构制衡机制,以此提高财务治理结构效率。
财权配置是财务治理的核心,国有企业财务治理框架体系各部分有效运转及功能实现均要通过财权合理配置来完成。在研究财权配置基本理论、原则及逻辑框架基础上,进行了多维度财权配置模型研究：财务治理结构维度是按照财务治理主体理论,研究股东会、董事会、监事会、经营者等不同权力主体的财权配置；多级委托代理结构维度是按照国有企业多级委托代理关系理论,研究从国资委至国有企业母子公司内部的财权分割及配置；财务分层维度是按照财务分层理论,研究出资者、经营者、财务经理等不同层次的财权配置。不论何种配置模型,根据股东主导下的利益相关者共同配置财权理论,国有企业应按照多级委托链条及财权分层结构进行逐级分解、多层配置财权。最后进行了财权配置的集权与分权研究,在解析国有企业母子公司集权型、分权型和中间型三种财务控制模式基础上,构筑了相对集权式的国有企业财务管控体系。
国有企业财务治理的核心是财权配置,而比财权配置更关键的问题是建立健全激励与约束相容的财务治理机制,两者分别从动力机制及制衡机制保证财务治理效率的提升。国有企业当前激励约束机制的现状决定了,业绩考核是激励机制的根本,信息披露是约束机制的重点。本文在对国有企业激励机制状况深入解析基础上,通过对国有资本金绩效评价及中央企业负责人经营业绩考核办法例证分析,指出了目前国有企业业绩考核存在问题,从短期激励和长期激励两方面分别进行国有企业业绩考核指标体系的设计,重点就完善归属母公司所有者综合收益总额、经济增加值及经营者股权激励等考核手段提出合理化建议。本文在对国有企业监督机制现状进行深入解析基础上,指出信息披露是财务治理的有效工具,针对目前国有企业信息披露的特征及存在问题,从完善内部治理、外部治理等方面提出提升国有企业财务信息披露质量的对策,并结合企业会计准则等要求就完善国有企业财务治理信息披露内容提出创新思路,对非公开上市国有企业公开对外信息披露也做了初步探析。
离开财务内控的有效支撑,财务治理体系构筑就会成为空中楼阁,在完善财务治理之际沉入财务内控之中,在健全财务内控之时上升到财务治理层次,形成两者良性互动,才能有效解决国有企业财务治理的诸多问题。在深入剖析财务治理与财务内控互动基础和互动关系基础上,阐述了财务内控的财务治理功能,并根据国有企业财务内控实践现状和缺陷,从建设现代企业制度角度出发,提出构筑符合财务治理规范的财务内控框架体系、强化财务控制活动体系建设、从出资人角度推进财务内控建设等完善财务内控体系的建议,从而推动国有企业财务治理效率的提升。
Financial governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) crosses multi-disciplinary areas, such as corporate organization, corporate governance and corporate finance, etc. Study on the financial governance system of SOEs not merely expands the intension and extension of corporate finance, embodies the significant impact of corporate governance ideas in its finance and improves finance theoretical system, but also highlights the dominant and core aspect of financial management in corporate governance, deepens the theoretical study on corporate governance, and realizes the effective combination of corporate governance and financial management. Such study offers a good entry point for solutions of finance and governance problems in SOEs.
The paper makes study on theoretical system of financial governance in accordance with three levels, i.e. basic theories, essential theories and application theories. Firstly, in the study of basic theories, paper elaborates the theories of Entrustment and Agency, Corporate Governance, Financial Rights, Financial Rights Layering and Financial Objectives, pointing out that theories of Financial Rights are the basis and source of corporate governance theories. Secondly, paper makes a research on essential theories. Based on the illustration of connotation, structure, mechanism and relation of all categories of financial governance, paper builds an essential theories system of financial governance which makes financial rights allocation as its center, capital structure as its basis, incentive and supervision mechanisms as its guarantee, financial governance as its handle, and efficiency improvement in financial governance and benefit maximization of stakeholders as its objective. Lastly, following the guidance of general financial governance theories and according to the financial status and characteristics of SOEs, the paper finds out the main problems and reasons which are existed at current financial governance in SOEs. After analyzing classical cases of financial governance problems lied in SOEs, paper comes up with a financial governance application theory which also provides a train of thought for financial governance problems in SOEs. The thought serves for maximizing the value of SOEs via indicating to build a financial governance framework system, which is equipped with financial rights allocation as its center, mode selection as its direction, capital structure as its basis, performance evaluation as its handle, financial internal control as its support, and financial information disclosure as its tools. The paper gives an in-depth, detailed study on both theory and application of financial governance from five aspects:mode selection and capital structure, financial rights allocation, performance evaluation, information disclosure and financial internal control.
The direction of financial governance is laid by mode selection of governance. The paper gives comparison and comments on typical modes of foreign financial governance, including market-oriented mode, internal control-led mode and family control-led mode, etc. Based on this, the paper points out the convergence and divergence of financial governance modes in different countries would exist in long run. According to the characteristics of SOEs and China's national conditions, the paper brings up an idea that is conforming to the international development trend of financial governance. The idea suggests that financial governance pattern in SOEs should combine the advantages of unilateral governance of shareholders and co-governance of all stakeholders, adopting a shareholder-leading co-governance by all stakeholders, which would protect the common interest of both shareholders and stakeholders. Capital structure is the operating foundation of financial governance system, and determines the characteristics and target orientations of financial governance. The selection of capital structure lays the foundation of financial governance. Capital structure initially decides the financial rights allocation and the interest relations among stakeholders. It falls into two categories---stock ownership structure and debt structure. Stock ownership structure provides a reference for analyzing the relations of shareholders inside a corporation and overall governance effect; while debt structure for deciding the authority limits of creditors outside a corporation and urging them to govern reasonably. On the basis of theoretical analysis of overall governance effect of capital structure, governance effect of ownership structure and that of debt structure, the paper provides gives the features of capital structure unbalance and defects in governance effect. Therefore, the paper proposes a few measures for optimization of capital structure governance effect in SOEs. These measures includes reasonable arrangements of capital structure like diversifying stock equity, fostering institutional investors, holding stock by operators and improving efficiency of debt financing, and giving full play to the complementarity of equity financing governance effect and debt financing governance effect. Through these measures, a check-and-balance mechanism of capital structure that gives consideration to the interests of all parties can be formed and can therefore improve efficiency of financial governance.
Financial rights allocation is the core of financial governance. The efficient operation and function realization of all aspects in financial governance system of SOEs are achieved through rational financial rights allocation. The paper elaborates a multi-dimensional financial rights allocation model based on a combined research on its basic theories, principles and logical framework. In accordance with its main theory, structure dimension is focused on studying the financial right allocation among various stakeholders, such as shareholders, board of directors, supervisors and operators. Using the same method, SOEs'multi-level principle-agent structure is focused on studying financial right allocation along SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) to SOEs and their subsidiaries. And financial stratified dimension is focused on researching the financial rights allocation of different hierarchy such as investors, operators and managers, etc. Regardless of the allocation pattern, SOEs should decompose and stratify its financial rights according to its multi-level principle-agent chain and stratification structure of financial rights based on the theory of financial rights co-allocation by both shareholders and stakeholders, but led by the former. Lastly, this paper makes a study on centralization and decentralization of financial right allocation and builds a relatively centralized financial management and control system of SOEs based on the analysis of centralized, decentralized and intermediate financial control patterns of parent company and its subsidiaries.
The core of financial governance of SOEs is financial rights allocation. However, it is more critical to establish an incentives and constrains compatible sound mechanism, which ensures the improvement of financial governance efficiency through driving mechanism and balancing mechanism respectively. The current incentive and constrain mechanism status in SOEs determines that, performance evaluation and information disclosure are fundamental factors when establishing and or reviewing the incentive mechanism and constrain mechanism respectively. By analyzing the current status of SOEs'of incentive mechanism, evaluation system of state-owned capital efficiency, and methods of performance development review which are extended to owners of SOEs, the paper points out there are problems existing in performance development review. It offers a design of performance development review index system from two aspects:short-term incentives and long-term incentives, and mainly provides several rational proposals for perfection of evaluation methods such as the comprehensive income amount attributable to parent company, EVA (Economic Value Added) and equity incentive of operators. By analyzing the current situation of supervision mechanism, the paper points out that information disclosure is an effective tool for financial governance. Considering the characteristics of present information disclosure in SOEs and existing problems, the paper provides methods of improving quality of financial information disclosure from both internal and external governance perfection. Also, it proposes an innovative idea of perfecting the content of information disclosure according to the requirements of ASBE (Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises), and tentatively explores the information disclosure of non-public listed SOEs.
Without the effective support of internal financial control, the financial governance system would be an empty illusion. The problems of financial governance in SOEs would not be solved unless financial governance and internal control interacts with each other systematically---focusing on internal control when perfecting financial governance, and improving the quality of financial governance when intensifying internal control. On the basis of analysis of interactive relations between financial governance and financial internal control, the paper elaborates the financial governance function, and concludes a few improvement suggestions based on the practice and shortfalls of financial control of SOEs for the purpose of establishing modern enterprise management system and for improving financial governance efficiency in SOEs. These suggestions include constructing a financial internal control framework in accordance with norms of financial governance, strengthening the system construction of financial controlling activities, and boosting financial internal control from the angle of investors etc.
引文
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①国资委评价局,2011年《企业财务动态》第1期；
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①中国电力投资集团公司,《风险事件案例选编》,2010年,案例21
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①澳洲注册会计师课程,CPA107“公司治理”第七章,7.50
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①《企业绩效评价标准值2010》,国资委财务监督与考核评价局制定,P1
①白俊：《中国上市公司财务治理效率研究》,2009年,P151
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①白俊：《中国上市公司财务治理效率研究》,2009年,P159
①许江波博士：《预算管理》讲稿
①何召滨：“企业集团资金集中实现形式及管理模式探讨”,《财务与会计》,2010年第01期
①田志龙：“经营者的监督与激励——公司治理的理论与实践”,《中国发展出版社》,p99
①2011年4月5日,《北京晨报》,P1
(1)高山：博士论文《国有企业财务治理研究——基于结构、机制与信息的视角》,P109
①高山：博士论文《国有企业财务治理研究——基于结构、机制与信息的视角》,P123
①高山：博士论文《国有企业财务治理研究——基于结构、机制与信息的视角》,P112
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①蔡柏良：“企业内部控制的现状、成因与对策”,《华东经济管理》,2003年第10期,P125
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87. Graham R. C. and Kingy D. R,2000, "Accounting Practices and the Market Valuation of Accounting Numbers:Evidence from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,Taiwan and Thailand", The International Journal of Accounting.
88.Fama Eugence, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Fim", Journal of Political Economy.
89.Andrei Shleifer and Robert W.Vishny, "A Survey of Corporate Governance" The Journal of Finance,1997,Vol.7, No.2:737-783
90. Jensen, M. C and W. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm.-Managerial Behavior Agency Cost and Capital Structure", Journal of Financial Economics 1976(3):305-360
91. Ross, S. A, "The Determination of Financial Structure:The incentive signaling Approach", Bell Journal of Economics.1977, (8):2340
92.Harris, M. Raviv, A, "Bankruptcy and Agency Cost,Their Significance to the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure".Journal of Finance 1988, (23):2738
93. Hart Moore J, "Property Right and the Nature of the Firm", Journal of Political Economy,1990, (98):1119-1158
94. OECD(2001b), Financial Market Trends, no.80, Septemper, Table2, p.47
95. Zingales L, "The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economy and Law, London: Macmillan",1998,497-502
①国资委评价局,2011年《企业财务动态》第1期；
②国资委主任王勇在中央企业负责人会议上的讲话,2011.01.25,国资委网站
①《21世纪经济报道》,2010.3.31,P1
①伍中信：《现代企业财务治理结构论》,2010,P30
①伍中信,《现代企业财务治理结构论》,2010,P109
①张敦力：“公司治理的核心：财务治理”,《中国审计》2002年第4期,P45
①高山：《国有企业财务治理研究-基于结构、机制与信息的视角》,[博士论文],湖南大学,P49
①朱世和：《国有企业财务治理机制研究》,[硕士论文],厦门大学,2008年,P14
①唐宗锟：“加强证券市场制度建设,促进国有经济战略调整”,《经济研究》,1999年第10期,P8
①中国电力投资集团公司,《风险事件案例选编》,2010年,案例21
①中国电力投资集团公司,《风险事件案例选编》,2010年,案例28
②中国电力投资集团公司,《风险事件案例选编》,2010年,案例29
①经济合作与发展组织(OECD)(2001b),《财务市场趋势》,NO.80,九月,P47
①经济合作与发展组织(OECD)(2001b),《财务市场趋势》,N0.80,九月,P47
①澳洲注册会计师课程,CPA107“公司治理”第七章,7.50
①郝臣：“多维度公司治理式的比较研究”,《审计与经济研究》,2005年第5期,P88-P91
①杨兴全：“我国上市公司融资结构的治理效应分析”,《会计研究》,2002年第8期,P37-P45
①伍中信：《现代企业财务治理结构论》,2010,P207.
①《企业绩效评价标准值2010》,国资委财务监督与考核评价局制定,P1
①白俊：《中国上市公司财务治理效率研究》,2009年,P151
①周宁、张涛： “我国上市公司债务融资的效应分析”,《吉林省经济管理干部学院学报》,2008年第2期,P13-P16
①白俊：《中国上市公司财务治理效率研究》,2009年,P159
①许江波博士：《预算管理》讲稿
①何召滨：“企业集团资金集中实现形式及管理模式探讨”,《财务与会计》,2010年第01期
①田志龙：“经营者的监督与激励——公司治理的理论与实践”,《中国发展出版社》,p99
①2011年4月5日,《北京晨报》,P1
(1)高山：博士论文《国有企业财务治理研究——基于结构、机制与信息的视角》,P109
①高山：博士论文《国有企业财务治理研究——基于结构、机制与信息的视角》,P123
①高山：博士论文《国有企业财务治理研究——基于结构、机制与信息的视角》,P112
①陈工孟等：“公司治理概论”,《清华大学出版社》,2003年,P89-P90
①蔡柏良：“企业内部控制的现状、成因与对策”,《华东经济管理》,2003年第10期,P125
①财政部会计司：《企业内部控制规范讲解》,2010,P26
1.白俊：“中国上市公司财务治理效率研究”,《中国财政经济出版社》,2009年
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8.郝臣：“中国上市公司治理案例”,《中国发展出版社》,2009年
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