中国IPO市场上市公司会计师事务所选择行为研究
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摘要
独立审计是一种降低代理成本的机制。从理论上讲,公司代理成本不同,其对审计质量的需求也不同。代理成本越高,公司选择高质量审计的动机也就越强。Jensen和Meckling(1976)分析了公司内部所有者和外部所有者间的代理问题,并指出,如果内部所有者引入外部监督或约束机制(比如外部审计、预算等),以向外部投资者表明其将约束自身的侵占行为,公司价值会提高。因此,内部所有者有约束侵占行为的动机。DeFond(1992)指出,代理冲突的程度决定了对审计的需求程度。代理冲突的程度越高,代理人降低代理成本的动力也就越强,公司对高审计质量的需求就越大。
根据原红旗、李海建(2003)的观点,当IPO公司特有风险上升时,选择高质量审计师能比选择低质量审计师带来更大的边际收益,然而,选择高质量审计师的边际成本也可能较大。国内关于审计市场的研究大多集中于考察供给方行为,但是在审计服务的提供者(会计师事务所)和购买者(上市公司)之间的博弈中,会计师事务所处于一种弱势地位,在整个市场中是上市公司选择事务所而不是事务所选择上市公司,这就使得上市公司会计师事务所选择行为的研究具有极其重要的地位。
中国是个新兴市场,各种法律制度以及对会计师事务所的违规处罚措施都还有待完善。同时,会计师事务所为了获取更大的市场份额,也可能降低自身的审计质量要求。但在法律制度不够完善的国家,并不意味着有效的外部审计不能得到。
本文选择IPO审计市场为考察对象,分析上市公司的审计师选择行为,是因为会计师事务所变更会给上市公司带来与新任事务所的熟悉和沟通成本,同时也会增加监管部门的关注,因此上市公司一旦选定事务所,则较少发生变更;并且,IPO公司对会计师事务所的选择通常代表着其在上市过程中对会计师事务所的初次选择,能够更好地体现一般情况下公司对审计产品的需求,而会计师事务所变更则会反映特定上市公司对审计产品需求的变化。
本文试图站在审计市场需求方角度,探讨政府干预、成本效益因素、公司特有风险对我国上市公司在IPO市场上的审计师选择行为的影响,并检验我国IPO公司会计师事务所选择行为的经济需求动因(审计信息功能需求和保险功能需求),以期在IPO公司会计师事务所选择的问题上得到一些有意义的启示。因此,本文的研究主要集中于三个方面:第一,描述中国IPO市场会计师事务所选择行为的市场需求特征和IPO审计服务市场的制度背景;第二,检验并解释中国IPO市场会计师事务所选择行为的影响因素;第三,检验和分析IPO公司审计师选择的经济需求动因,即通过实证分析的方法检验IPO公司对审计信息功能和保险功能的需求状况。
本文一共六章,第1章是对全文研究思路和方法的导论介绍,第6章对全文的研究结论做了总体概括,探讨了本文的主要创新点、局限性、后续研究可能的方向以及相关政策建议。除这两章外,全文从结构上共分为三个部分:
第一部分,即第2章,IPO公司会计师事务所选择行为研究的理论框架。本部分重点从受托经济责任观的角度分析了IPO审计市场的行为主体和IPO公司的外部审计需求,并在探讨首次公开发行抑价的理论解释的基础上以期寻求审计师在公司首次公开发行过程中角色的理论解释。
第二部分,即第3章。在这部分,笔者主要探讨IPO市场会计师事务所选择行为的相关制度背景。IPO审计需求市场是整体审计需求市场的一部分,本部分首先回顾了我国整体审计需求市场从萎缩中断到自愿需求程度不断加大的发展历程,以期管中窥豹,得出我国IPO审计需求市场发展的总体趋势。在分析我国审计需求市场发展趋势的基础上,笔者进一步阐述了我国新股发行上市审计制度安排中的政府控制特征。
第三部分,第4、5章。在这部分主要通过实证分析描述和检验我国IPO市场会计师事务所选择行为的影响因素及审计的信息功能和保险功能对我国IPO公司审计需求的影响。在第4章,笔者通过自选择分析模型,对IPO公司会计师事务所选择行为的内生性问题加以控制,研究发现,在选择普通会计师事务所的IPO公司样本组,自选择分析结果与成本最小化假设一致,且对于条件期望成本的分析进一步证明,该组样本公司的实际会计师事务所声誉类型选择符合成本最小化假设;但知名会计师事务所样本组的自选择变量系数不显著。并且IPO公司在选择普通会计师事务所时,国有实际控制人与总成本大小正相关,而民营实际控制人与总成本大小负相关;但在选择知名会计师事务所样本组,国有控制变量和民营控制变量对总成本的影响都不显著。
第5章通过对IPO上市公司的审计师选择行为的研究揭示我国IPO市场审计功能定位,并对审计的信息功能和保险功能加以区分,并在此基础上,探讨2006年2月15日财政部颁布之新审计准则对IPO市场审计功能定位及其效用的初步影响。研究结果表明,我国IPO市场对审计功能的需求动因主要是出于对其信息功能的需求而不是对其保险功能的需求;并且新审计准则的颁布对提高我国本土会计师事务所执业质量起到了积极作用。
论文的创新点主要包括:
1.本文着眼于IPO市场的审计需求研究,深入系统地分析了我国IPO市场审计需求的市场特征及其发展变化趋势。国内关于IPO市场上市公司会计师事务所选择的研究大多是考察政府因素的影响,并且研究结论大都认为我国审计市场自愿性需求不充分,市场功能缺失。本文则将市场因素纳入,结合我国审计服务市场的政府影响特征,考察IPO市场上市公司对审计的自愿性需求与政府干预的共同作用,发现IPO公司的风险特征、实际控制权结构和由此导致的其对成本效益因素的权衡会在一定程度上对其会计师事务所的自愿选择行为产生影响。本文对IPO公司初次上市审计选择行为的研究,对现有文献做出了有益的延伸和拓展,映证了外部审计有效性的经典理论,为新兴市场中的自愿审计需求行为提供了有说服力的理论与实证证据。
2.本文基于受托经济责任理论,初步探索了IPO市场会计师事务所选择行为的理论框架,从理论上阐述审计在IPO市场上的重要地位。本文通过对IPO抑价理论和受托经济责任理论的分析,实现了受托经济责任观和审计控制论在IPO审计领域的拓展,为IPO市场审计需求提供了理论支持。
3.本文引入IPO公司实际控制权结构变量,结合我国IPO审计市场特有特征,对我国IPO市场会计师事务所选择行为的研究模型加以修正。
4.本文对新审计准则对IPO市场审计功能需求定位及其实施效果进行检验,初步证实了新审计准则在提高我国本土会计师事务所执业质量方面所起到的积极作用。
Independent audit is a mechanism to reduce agency cost. Theoretically speaking, a company’s demand for audit quality changes with its agency cost. The higher the agency cost, the higher the company’s motivation to hire high quality audit. Jensen and Meckling (1976) analyze the agency problem between insiders and outsiders. They find that if insiders introduce external regulation system (e.g. external audit, budget etc.) into the company, the company’s value will increase.
According to Yuan Hongqi and Li Haijian (2003), as IPO companies’special risk increases, hiring high quality auditors can bring more marginal benefit than hiring low quality auditors. However, the marginal cost of the former may also be higher. Domestic research about audit market is primarily focused on the behavior of the supply side. However, in the game between the audit service supplier (audit firm) and purchaser (listed company), audit firm is at a subordinate position. In general, the case is that listed companies choose audit firms, but not the reverse, which makes the research on listed companies’audit firm choice behavior important.
Chinese security market is an emerging market. In a country with imperfect regulation system, it is still possible to get efficient external audit. This dissertation analyzes listed companies’auditor choice behavior in the IPO audit market mainly for two reasons. The first, the shift of audit firms brings communication costs between the listed company and its new auditor and invokes regulators’attention; therefore, once the company hires an audit firm, it seldom shifts. The second, an IPO company’s audit firm choice always presents its first choice toward an audit firm in the listing process, which can show the company’s demand for audit product under a general case.
This dissertation is aimed at discussing the effects of government intervention, costs and benefits factors and companies’special risks on companies’audit firm choice behavior in Chinese IPO market and testing the demand for audit’s information function and insurance function. Therefore, the study is concentrated on three aspects: the first, describing the market demand characteristics and system background in Chinese IPO audit market; the second, testing and illustrating the factors of audit firm choice behavior in Chinese IPO market; the third, testing and analyzing the economic motivation of IPO companies’auditor choice, which is to test the demand for audit’s information function and insurance function through empirical analysis.
The dissertation is composed of 6 chapters. Besides the introduction and conclusion, the remaining chapters are classified into 3 parts.
The first part refers to Chapter 2, which analyzes the behavior subjects in IPO audit market and IPO companies’demand for external audit from the perspective of accountability.
The second part refers to Chapter 3, which discusses relating system background. Based on the analysis of the development trend in Chinese audit demand market, the paper further expatiates on the government characteristics in the IPO audit system.
The third part refers to Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, which describes and tests the factors affecting IPO companies’audit firm choices and the effects of information function as well as insurance function on the demand for audit in the IPO market.
Chapter 4 shows that in Normal firm group, results of the selectivity analysis are identical to cost-minimization hypothesis. Further studies on conditional expected costs again testify that the actual audit quality choice in the Normal group is cost-minimized. However, the selectivity coefficient of Famous firm group is not significant. Moreover, if IPO companies choose normal firm, state– owned is positively associated to total costs, while private– owned is negatively related to total costs. The controlling shareholder structure is insignificant with respect to total costs in Famous firm group.
Chapter 5 indicates the demand for audit’s function through studies on IPO companies’audit firm choices. Based on the differentiation of audit’s information function and insurance function, Chapter 5 further discusses the influence of the new auditing standards issued in 2006 on audit function in the IPO market. Results show that in Chinese IPO market, the demand for audit is primarily in its information function but not insurance function. Moreover, the issuance of the new auditing standards imposed a positive effect on enhancing quality of Chinese domestic audit firms.
The innovations of this dissertation are as the following:
Firstly, the dissertation focuses on audit demand in the IPO market and systematically analyzes the market characteristics as well as its development trend of audit demand in IPO market. This study examines the combined effects of market factors and government intervention on voluntary demand for audit in IPO market. Results show that IPO companies’risk characteristics, actual control rights and their tradeoff between costs and benefits factors can affect their voluntary choices of audit firms. This study demonstrates the effectiveness of external audit and extends existing literature by showing evidence on voluntary demand for audit functions in an emerging market.
Secondly, on the basis of accountability theory, this dissertation probes to establish a theory frame for IPO companies’audit firm choice behavior and illustrates the importance of audit in the IPO market through a theoretical perspective, which realizes the extension of accountability and audit control in the fields of IPO audit.
Thirdly, this dissertation introduces IPO companies’actual control rights and some specific characteristics in Chinese IPO audit market to modify the self– selection model.
The last, this dissertation initially shows evidence on the influence of the new auditing standards on the demand for audit functions in the IPO market. Results indicate that the issuance of the new auditing standards imposed a positive effect on enhancing quality of domestic audit firms.
根据原红旗、李海建(2003)的观点,当IPO公司特有风险上升时,选择高质量审计师能比选择低质量审计师带来更大的边际收益,然而,选择高质量审计师的边际成本也可能较大。国内关于审计市场的研究大多集中于考察供给方行为,但是在审计服务的提供者(会计师事务所)和购买者(上市公司)之间的博弈中,会计师事务所处于一种弱势地位,在整个市场中是上市公司选择事务所而不是事务所选择上市公司,这就使得上市公司会计师事务所选择行为的研究具有极其重要的地位。
中国是个新兴市场,各种法律制度以及对会计师事务所的违规处罚措施都还有待完善。同时,会计师事务所为了获取更大的市场份额,也可能降低自身的审计质量要求。但在法律制度不够完善的国家,并不意味着有效的外部审计不能得到。
本文选择IPO审计市场为考察对象,分析上市公司的审计师选择行为,是因为会计师事务所变更会给上市公司带来与新任事务所的熟悉和沟通成本,同时也会增加监管部门的关注,因此上市公司一旦选定事务所,则较少发生变更;并且,IPO公司对会计师事务所的选择通常代表着其在上市过程中对会计师事务所的初次选择,能够更好地体现一般情况下公司对审计产品的需求,而会计师事务所变更则会反映特定上市公司对审计产品需求的变化。
本文试图站在审计市场需求方角度,探讨政府干预、成本效益因素、公司特有风险对我国上市公司在IPO市场上的审计师选择行为的影响,并检验我国IPO公司会计师事务所选择行为的经济需求动因(审计信息功能需求和保险功能需求),以期在IPO公司会计师事务所选择的问题上得到一些有意义的启示。因此,本文的研究主要集中于三个方面:第一,描述中国IPO市场会计师事务所选择行为的市场需求特征和IPO审计服务市场的制度背景;第二,检验并解释中国IPO市场会计师事务所选择行为的影响因素;第三,检验和分析IPO公司审计师选择的经济需求动因,即通过实证分析的方法检验IPO公司对审计信息功能和保险功能的需求状况。
本文一共六章,第1章是对全文研究思路和方法的导论介绍,第6章对全文的研究结论做了总体概括,探讨了本文的主要创新点、局限性、后续研究可能的方向以及相关政策建议。除这两章外,全文从结构上共分为三个部分:
第一部分,即第2章,IPO公司会计师事务所选择行为研究的理论框架。本部分重点从受托经济责任观的角度分析了IPO审计市场的行为主体和IPO公司的外部审计需求,并在探讨首次公开发行抑价的理论解释的基础上以期寻求审计师在公司首次公开发行过程中角色的理论解释。
第二部分,即第3章。在这部分,笔者主要探讨IPO市场会计师事务所选择行为的相关制度背景。IPO审计需求市场是整体审计需求市场的一部分,本部分首先回顾了我国整体审计需求市场从萎缩中断到自愿需求程度不断加大的发展历程,以期管中窥豹,得出我国IPO审计需求市场发展的总体趋势。在分析我国审计需求市场发展趋势的基础上,笔者进一步阐述了我国新股发行上市审计制度安排中的政府控制特征。
第三部分,第4、5章。在这部分主要通过实证分析描述和检验我国IPO市场会计师事务所选择行为的影响因素及审计的信息功能和保险功能对我国IPO公司审计需求的影响。在第4章,笔者通过自选择分析模型,对IPO公司会计师事务所选择行为的内生性问题加以控制,研究发现,在选择普通会计师事务所的IPO公司样本组,自选择分析结果与成本最小化假设一致,且对于条件期望成本的分析进一步证明,该组样本公司的实际会计师事务所声誉类型选择符合成本最小化假设;但知名会计师事务所样本组的自选择变量系数不显著。并且IPO公司在选择普通会计师事务所时,国有实际控制人与总成本大小正相关,而民营实际控制人与总成本大小负相关;但在选择知名会计师事务所样本组,国有控制变量和民营控制变量对总成本的影响都不显著。
第5章通过对IPO上市公司的审计师选择行为的研究揭示我国IPO市场审计功能定位,并对审计的信息功能和保险功能加以区分,并在此基础上,探讨2006年2月15日财政部颁布之新审计准则对IPO市场审计功能定位及其效用的初步影响。研究结果表明,我国IPO市场对审计功能的需求动因主要是出于对其信息功能的需求而不是对其保险功能的需求;并且新审计准则的颁布对提高我国本土会计师事务所执业质量起到了积极作用。
论文的创新点主要包括:
1.本文着眼于IPO市场的审计需求研究,深入系统地分析了我国IPO市场审计需求的市场特征及其发展变化趋势。国内关于IPO市场上市公司会计师事务所选择的研究大多是考察政府因素的影响,并且研究结论大都认为我国审计市场自愿性需求不充分,市场功能缺失。本文则将市场因素纳入,结合我国审计服务市场的政府影响特征,考察IPO市场上市公司对审计的自愿性需求与政府干预的共同作用,发现IPO公司的风险特征、实际控制权结构和由此导致的其对成本效益因素的权衡会在一定程度上对其会计师事务所的自愿选择行为产生影响。本文对IPO公司初次上市审计选择行为的研究,对现有文献做出了有益的延伸和拓展,映证了外部审计有效性的经典理论,为新兴市场中的自愿审计需求行为提供了有说服力的理论与实证证据。
2.本文基于受托经济责任理论,初步探索了IPO市场会计师事务所选择行为的理论框架,从理论上阐述审计在IPO市场上的重要地位。本文通过对IPO抑价理论和受托经济责任理论的分析,实现了受托经济责任观和审计控制论在IPO审计领域的拓展,为IPO市场审计需求提供了理论支持。
3.本文引入IPO公司实际控制权结构变量,结合我国IPO审计市场特有特征,对我国IPO市场会计师事务所选择行为的研究模型加以修正。
4.本文对新审计准则对IPO市场审计功能需求定位及其实施效果进行检验,初步证实了新审计准则在提高我国本土会计师事务所执业质量方面所起到的积极作用。
Independent audit is a mechanism to reduce agency cost. Theoretically speaking, a company’s demand for audit quality changes with its agency cost. The higher the agency cost, the higher the company’s motivation to hire high quality audit. Jensen and Meckling (1976) analyze the agency problem between insiders and outsiders. They find that if insiders introduce external regulation system (e.g. external audit, budget etc.) into the company, the company’s value will increase.
According to Yuan Hongqi and Li Haijian (2003), as IPO companies’special risk increases, hiring high quality auditors can bring more marginal benefit than hiring low quality auditors. However, the marginal cost of the former may also be higher. Domestic research about audit market is primarily focused on the behavior of the supply side. However, in the game between the audit service supplier (audit firm) and purchaser (listed company), audit firm is at a subordinate position. In general, the case is that listed companies choose audit firms, but not the reverse, which makes the research on listed companies’audit firm choice behavior important.
Chinese security market is an emerging market. In a country with imperfect regulation system, it is still possible to get efficient external audit. This dissertation analyzes listed companies’auditor choice behavior in the IPO audit market mainly for two reasons. The first, the shift of audit firms brings communication costs between the listed company and its new auditor and invokes regulators’attention; therefore, once the company hires an audit firm, it seldom shifts. The second, an IPO company’s audit firm choice always presents its first choice toward an audit firm in the listing process, which can show the company’s demand for audit product under a general case.
This dissertation is aimed at discussing the effects of government intervention, costs and benefits factors and companies’special risks on companies’audit firm choice behavior in Chinese IPO market and testing the demand for audit’s information function and insurance function. Therefore, the study is concentrated on three aspects: the first, describing the market demand characteristics and system background in Chinese IPO audit market; the second, testing and illustrating the factors of audit firm choice behavior in Chinese IPO market; the third, testing and analyzing the economic motivation of IPO companies’auditor choice, which is to test the demand for audit’s information function and insurance function through empirical analysis.
The dissertation is composed of 6 chapters. Besides the introduction and conclusion, the remaining chapters are classified into 3 parts.
The first part refers to Chapter 2, which analyzes the behavior subjects in IPO audit market and IPO companies’demand for external audit from the perspective of accountability.
The second part refers to Chapter 3, which discusses relating system background. Based on the analysis of the development trend in Chinese audit demand market, the paper further expatiates on the government characteristics in the IPO audit system.
The third part refers to Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, which describes and tests the factors affecting IPO companies’audit firm choices and the effects of information function as well as insurance function on the demand for audit in the IPO market.
Chapter 4 shows that in Normal firm group, results of the selectivity analysis are identical to cost-minimization hypothesis. Further studies on conditional expected costs again testify that the actual audit quality choice in the Normal group is cost-minimized. However, the selectivity coefficient of Famous firm group is not significant. Moreover, if IPO companies choose normal firm, state– owned is positively associated to total costs, while private– owned is negatively related to total costs. The controlling shareholder structure is insignificant with respect to total costs in Famous firm group.
Chapter 5 indicates the demand for audit’s function through studies on IPO companies’audit firm choices. Based on the differentiation of audit’s information function and insurance function, Chapter 5 further discusses the influence of the new auditing standards issued in 2006 on audit function in the IPO market. Results show that in Chinese IPO market, the demand for audit is primarily in its information function but not insurance function. Moreover, the issuance of the new auditing standards imposed a positive effect on enhancing quality of Chinese domestic audit firms.
The innovations of this dissertation are as the following:
Firstly, the dissertation focuses on audit demand in the IPO market and systematically analyzes the market characteristics as well as its development trend of audit demand in IPO market. This study examines the combined effects of market factors and government intervention on voluntary demand for audit in IPO market. Results show that IPO companies’risk characteristics, actual control rights and their tradeoff between costs and benefits factors can affect their voluntary choices of audit firms. This study demonstrates the effectiveness of external audit and extends existing literature by showing evidence on voluntary demand for audit functions in an emerging market.
Secondly, on the basis of accountability theory, this dissertation probes to establish a theory frame for IPO companies’audit firm choice behavior and illustrates the importance of audit in the IPO market through a theoretical perspective, which realizes the extension of accountability and audit control in the fields of IPO audit.
Thirdly, this dissertation introduces IPO companies’actual control rights and some specific characteristics in Chinese IPO audit market to modify the self– selection model.
The last, this dissertation initially shows evidence on the influence of the new auditing standards on the demand for audit functions in the IPO market. Results indicate that the issuance of the new auditing standards imposed a positive effect on enhancing quality of domestic audit firms.
引文
①朱红军、夏立军、陈信元:《转型经济中审计市场的需求特征研究》,《审计研究》,2004年第5期
①彭桃英:《审计质量与审计市场行为主体关系研究》,中南大学博士学位论文,2005(9)
①胡勇:《转轨时期我国中央、地方政府的经济博弈分析》,《南京审计学院学报》,2006(2)
②刘凤委、于旭辉、李琳:《地方保护能提升公司绩效吗——来自上市公司的经验证据》,《中国工业经济》,2007(4)
①根据DeAngelo(1981)和Watts、Zimmerman(1981)的定义,审计质量是指注册会计师发现并报告出其客户财务报告中错报的联合概率。因此,在其他条件相同的情况下,会计师事务所出具非标意见的概率可以代表其审计质量。
②杨华军:《投资者利益冲突研究综述》[J],《商业时代》,2007(13)
①蔡春:《审计理论结构研究》[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2001:pp. 80~81.
②Herbert L., Auditing the Performance of Management, Wadsworth Inc. 1979, pp. 4~5.转引自蔡春:《审计理论结构研究》[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2001:pp. 80~81.
①蔡春:《审计理论结构研究》[M],大连,东北财经大学出版社,2001:p.44.
②蒋永明、蒋顺才:《西方IPO抑价理论及对中国IPO研究的启示》,《财经理论与实践》(双月刊),2006(5)
①易琮:《行业制度变迁的诱因与绩效》,暨南大学博士学位论文,2002(4),p. 74。
①陈信元、夏立军:《中国审计服务市场的地区分割:现象、成因及后果》,工作稿,2005,p. 5。
②陈信元、夏立军:《中国审计服务市场的地区分割:现象、成因及后果》,工作稿,2005,p. 6。
①刘峰、林斌:《会计师事务所脱钩与政府选择:一种解释》,《会计研究》,2000(2)
①濮晓达:《审计需求的契约观、信息观、以及保险观》,《上海会计》,2004(3)
①潘克勤:《民营上市公司实际控制人出任关键领导职务、审计师选择与市场评价关系研究》,《财会月刊》(理论版),2007(5)
①苏启林、朱文:《上市公司家族控制与企业价值》,《经济研究》,2003(8)
①夏立军、方轶强:《政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据》,《经济研究》,2005(5)
①陈晓、李静:《地方政府财政行为在提升上市公司业绩中的作用探析》,《会计研究》,2001(12)
②李增泉,余谦,王晓坤:《掏空、支持与并购重组——来自我国上市公司的经验证据》,《经济研究》,2005(1)
①Maddala, G. S. 1983. Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 223-226.
①本文没有将招股说明书中的风险因素个数作为IPO公司特有风险的替代变量,是由于在我国不同公司IPO招股说明书中关于风险因素的表述方式不统一,很难通过直接计数来区分风险差异。
②黄少安、张岗:《中国上市公司股权融资偏好分析》,《经济研究》,2001(11),p. 15。
①蔡春:《审计理论结构研究》,东北财经大学出版社,2001
②蔡春:《审计理论结构研究》,东北财经大学出版社,2001
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【98】苏启林、朱文:《上市公司家族控制与企业价值》[J],《经济研究》,2003(8)
【99】孙铮、曹宇:《股权结构与审计需求》[J],《审计研究》,2004(3)
【100】王光远、瞿曲:《内部审计外包:述评与展望》[J],《审计研究》,2005(2)
【101】王玉华、李世光:《中央与地方政府财政分权研究》[J],《山东财政学院学报》,2006(6)
【102】夏立军:《政府干预与市场失灵——上市公司之会计师事务所选择研究》,上海财经大学博士学位论文,2005
【103】夏立军、方轶强:《政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据》[J],《经济研究》,2005(5)
【104】徐浩萍、罗炜:《投资银行声誉机制有效性——执业质量与市场份额双重视角的研究》[J],《经济研究》,2007(2)
【105】杨华军:《投资者利益冲突研究综述》[J],《商业时代》,2007(13)
【106】叶勇、胡培、何伟:《上市公司终极控制权、股权结构及公司绩效》[J],《管理科学》,2005(4)
【107】易琮:《行业制度变迁的诱因与绩效》,暨南大学博士学位论文,2002(4)
【108】原红旗、李海建:《会计师事务所组织形式、规模与审计质量关系的实证研究》,工作稿,http://www.paper.edu.cn,2003
【109】约翰.A.克斯藤森、乔尔.S.德姆斯基(著),程小可、辛清泉、毛丽娟(译):《会计理论》[M],北京:中国人民大学出版社,2006
【110】赵亚娟、林涛:《浅析我国内部审计外包业务》[J],《财会月刊》,2002(9)
【111】曾颖、叶康涛:《股权结构、代理成本与外部审计需求》[J],《会计研究》,2005(10)
【112】周侃:《新股发行低定价的信息经济学解释》[J],《外国经济与管理》,2001(5)
【113】朱红军、陈继云、喻立勇:《中央政府、地方政府和国有企业利益分歧下的多重博弈与管制失效——宇通客车管理层收购案例研究》[J],《管理世界》,2006(4)
【114】朱红军、夏立军、陈信元:《转型经济中审计市场的需求特征研究》[J],《审计研究》,2004(5)
①彭桃英:《审计质量与审计市场行为主体关系研究》,中南大学博士学位论文,2005(9)
①胡勇:《转轨时期我国中央、地方政府的经济博弈分析》,《南京审计学院学报》,2006(2)
②刘凤委、于旭辉、李琳:《地方保护能提升公司绩效吗——来自上市公司的经验证据》,《中国工业经济》,2007(4)
①根据DeAngelo(1981)和Watts、Zimmerman(1981)的定义,审计质量是指注册会计师发现并报告出其客户财务报告中错报的联合概率。因此,在其他条件相同的情况下,会计师事务所出具非标意见的概率可以代表其审计质量。
②杨华军:《投资者利益冲突研究综述》[J],《商业时代》,2007(13)
①蔡春:《审计理论结构研究》[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2001:pp. 80~81.
②Herbert L., Auditing the Performance of Management, Wadsworth Inc. 1979, pp. 4~5.转引自蔡春:《审计理论结构研究》[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2001:pp. 80~81.
①蔡春:《审计理论结构研究》[M],大连,东北财经大学出版社,2001:p.44.
②蒋永明、蒋顺才:《西方IPO抑价理论及对中国IPO研究的启示》,《财经理论与实践》(双月刊),2006(5)
①易琮:《行业制度变迁的诱因与绩效》,暨南大学博士学位论文,2002(4),p. 74。
①陈信元、夏立军:《中国审计服务市场的地区分割:现象、成因及后果》,工作稿,2005,p. 5。
②陈信元、夏立军:《中国审计服务市场的地区分割:现象、成因及后果》,工作稿,2005,p. 6。
①刘峰、林斌:《会计师事务所脱钩与政府选择:一种解释》,《会计研究》,2000(2)
①濮晓达:《审计需求的契约观、信息观、以及保险观》,《上海会计》,2004(3)
①潘克勤:《民营上市公司实际控制人出任关键领导职务、审计师选择与市场评价关系研究》,《财会月刊》(理论版),2007(5)
①苏启林、朱文:《上市公司家族控制与企业价值》,《经济研究》,2003(8)
①夏立军、方轶强:《政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据》,《经济研究》,2005(5)
①陈晓、李静:《地方政府财政行为在提升上市公司业绩中的作用探析》,《会计研究》,2001(12)
②李增泉,余谦,王晓坤:《掏空、支持与并购重组——来自我国上市公司的经验证据》,《经济研究》,2005(1)
①Maddala, G. S. 1983. Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 223-226.
①本文没有将招股说明书中的风险因素个数作为IPO公司特有风险的替代变量,是由于在我国不同公司IPO招股说明书中关于风险因素的表述方式不统一,很难通过直接计数来区分风险差异。
②黄少安、张岗:《中国上市公司股权融资偏好分析》,《经济研究》,2001(11),p. 15。
①蔡春:《审计理论结构研究》,东北财经大学出版社,2001
②蔡春:《审计理论结构研究》,东北财经大学出版社,2001
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