本杰明·克莱因不完全契约理论述评
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摘要
本杰明·克莱因教授是交易成本经济学的代表人物之一。他也是一位活跃的社会活动家,相比其在交易成本经济学中的学术地位,克莱因的法经济学家和咨询专家身份更为人熟知。多年来,国内理论界对克莱因在交易成本经济学中定位的认识有所欠缺。其实,他在不完全契约理论领域有其独特贡献,对于不完全契约理论的完善和拓展发挥了重要作用,其理论中所阐述的问题虽备受争议却为我们后来人提出了一些非常有价值的研究课题,其理论结论为我们理解现实经济运行提供了诸多借鉴。
本文旨在通过对克莱因不完全契约理论的详细梳理,力求比较全面和客观地呈现克莱因不完全契约理论的面貌,便于理论界更为深入地了解克莱因的不完全契约理论,并以此更为深入地了解和认知不完全契约理论和交易成本经济学。同时,通过对克莱因理论不足的讨论引起研究者对交易成本经济学一些基本问题的重视和思考,促进理论研究的进一步深入。当然,理论研究是为实践服务的,本文的根本目的是通过对克莱因不完全契约理论的研究为更深刻地认识社会经济关系的现实运行提供一种视角,毕竟,在当前的法律制度状况下,合同在中国甚至比在西方更加不完全,中国经济也提供了某种不同于西方国家的制度环境,从此意义上来说,本文的研究也是中国改革实践的需要。
本文包括八章,共四大部分。第一部分为理论基础部分,包括1-3章。本部分主要是提出本文要研究的问题,并对国外和国内的相关研究进行综述,以了解本研究所处的理论环境和研究重点。本部分还对克莱因不完全契约理论的渊源和发展历程进行了梳理,大致理清作者理论发展的逻辑思路。第二部分为核心理论研究与评述部分。本部分沿着克莱因不完全契约理论的逻辑展开研究,先对其理论体系中的几个核心理论做详细剖析,最后围绕这些理论分别进行评论。第三部分是比较分析部分。本部分的主要目的是通过比较突出克莱因不完全契约理论在契约理论一系列基本问题上与其他研究者的差异,以显示出其理论研究的价值所在。在熟悉了作者理论的理论背景、发展逻辑、基本内容及理论特点之后,我们可以对作者的理论最后总结一下了。所以,在第四部分,是对作者理论对中国理论与实践价值的一个评论。本文对克莱因理论的评论是基于三个层次展开的：首先在对每个核心理论进行介绍之后围绕每个单一理论展开讨论,从优点和不足两方面针对性地阐释,便于深入了解该理论；然后通过其理论与威廉姆森和哈特理论的比较突出其理论体系的合理性与不足；最后对其理论总评,重点通过与中国案例的结合验证其合理的方面,另一方面也提出实践对其理论的挑战与质疑,以此促进对相关问题的讨论与深入研究。
本文的主要研究内容由如下几个部分构成。
第一部分,克莱因不完全契约理论的概述。主要分析克莱因理论体系中不完全契约的定义；克莱因不完全契约理论的理论缘起与发展历程；考察克莱因对不完全契约理论的认识是如何逐渐深入的；交待一下克莱因理论的理论假设,这是一个理论必备的基础前提。
第二部分,克莱因不完全契约理论的核心理论。本部分也是本文的核心内容,重点围绕专用的可占用的准租、敲竹杠、自我实施机制、价格作为质量保证等克莱因不完全契约理论中的核心理论展开研究。搞清楚这些理论的含义,理顺了它们之间的理论逻辑才可能真正认识克莱因的理论。而这其中,又以专用的可占用的准租与契约的自我实施机制两个克莱因提出的独特理论为着重研究对象,因为,克莱因之所以可称为不完全契约理论研究的名家之一,此二理论功不可没,对此两个理论的深入剖析,才可找寻到克莱因理论的真谛。
第三部分,克莱因不完全契约理论与其他契约理论研究大家的理论比较。比较有两个目的,其一是通过比较突出本文研究对象的重要意义与价值,其二是通过比较发现研究对象的合理与不合理之处,便于选择性的借鉴,因为,理论研究的根本目的在于更科学、更有效地借鉴。
第四部分,克莱因不完全契约理论对中国的启示。任何理论都有其两面性,克莱因的不完全契约理论也不例外,一方面,他的理论有其普适性,只要理论所需用的条件出现,我们自然可望看到他的理论在中国的交易实践中发挥作用：另一方面,克莱因的理论毕竟产生于西方经济社会实践,与中国的交易环境存在一定差异,不能指望克莱因的理论可以照搬过来解决中国的同类问题。我们对克莱因的理论必须是有选择的借鉴,重在方法与工具的含义。为突出这种东西方环境差异对理论的影响,本文在此部分结合中国的一些案例展开,希望以此佐证先验的判断。
本文是对克莱因不完全契约理论的一个述评,在以下方面具有一定的理论和实践价值：
本文围绕克莱因的不完全契约理论从理论渊源、理论发展、核心内容、理论的特点与应用等方面进行了比较细致、全面的介绍,首次比较客观地展现了克莱因不完全契约理论的全貌,便于理论界客观、全面地评价克莱因的不完全契约理论,准确地在交易成本经济学中为其定位。
本文对克莱因不完全契约理论中“套牢”、“可占用的专用性准租”、“品牌资本”、“自我实施机制”等基本概念和理论的揭示和阐述不但有利于正确认知克莱因的理论,而且利于研究者们厘清这些不完全契约理论研究中基本概念的意蕴,拓展这些理论的应用范围,推动契约理论研究和应用。
近年来,不完全契约理论一直是理论界研究的热点之一,尽管仍在发展、完善之中,但是已经越来越成为组织经济学、政治经济学、公司金融等与制度研究相关领域的重要工具。然而,这一工具是否符合中国的经济社会现实?我们的制度环境是否与它的运行条件匹配?在引入和应用不完全契约理论方面我们应注意什么?本文通过对克莱因不完全契约理论的研究对这些问题作出了一家之言的解答,有利于指导中国经济社会发展实践。
本文的分析存在一些不足：本杰明·克莱因的理论国内介绍的较少,其研究不完全契约问题的文献翻译过来的也较少,这给本文增加了不小的难度和工作量,因此,对文献的整理和把握还有待加强。不完全契约理论一些基本问题的实证一直是该领域研究的软肋,由于理论工具的缺乏和大量实证数据获取的困难,本文在这些问题的实证方面也没有有价值的进展。
本文涉及问题进一步的研究方向是：
第一,如何看待契约。契约是不完全的这一显然正确的观点已成为研究者们的一个共识,但对契约性质的认知则并不统一。那么,契约是权利义务划分的形式还是推动契约履行的履约机制?又抑或是签约双方权利感知的一个参照系?也许打破法学、经济学和行为理论的这种视域界限更有利于我们理解和实施契约。
第二,如何理解契约不完全的基础。虽然关于契约不完全的基础的争议颇多,但大部分人还是相信签约人的有限理性、签约的困难和第三方验证的困难对解释这一问题具有较大的说服力,当然,也有“马斯金-梯若儿批评”这样的声音质疑这些解释因素。正是这些歧见推动了不完全契约理论不断深化。已有的经验告诉我们,跨学科研究是理解这一问题及契约理论中其他争议性问题的基本途径。
第三,完善实证数据库。哈特和霍姆斯特姆曾经表达过对于契约经济学缺乏实证研究的担忧,但最近的情况表明,关于契约理论的实证研究已经越来越多。有大量的研究应用契约理论针对具体问题进行计量经济学验证或进行案例研究。对于不完全契约理论的实证检验来说,妨碍其发展的一个主要限制是合适数据的收集,由于契约和交易问题的很多信息出于保密不允许被披露,使得相关数据库的容量难以得到有效扩充。因此,相关组织的建立、信息渠道的多样化、制度的完善、专业人员实践活动的科学评估变得越来越重要。
Benjamin Klein Professor is one of the representatives of the transaction cost economics. He is also an active social activist. But the identity of law economist and consultant is better known compared to the academic status of the transaction cost economics. Over the years, the domestic theory community is lack of adequate understanding of Klein's positioning in transaction cost economics. In fact, he made a unique contribution in the field of incomplete contract theory, and played an important role in the improvement and expansion of the incomplete contract theory. The issues elaborated in his theory are highly controversial but put forward a number of valuable research topic for us. The theoretical conclusions provide reference for us understanding the reality of economic operation.
This article aims to show up incomplete contract theory comprehensively and objectively by combing the incomplete contract theory of Klein, easy for theory community to understand Klein's incomplete contract theory extensively and go deep into understanding the incomplete contract theory and transaction cost economics. At the same time, the discussion of lack on Klein's theory caused researchers'attention and consideration of some basic problems of transaction cost economics, and promoted further theoretical research. Of course, the theoretical research serves for practice, the fundamental purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective for a more profound understanding of the real run of the social and economic relations by studying the incomplete contract theory. After all, under the current status of the legal system, Chinese contract is incomplete compare with the West, and Chinese economy offers the different institutional environment from the Western countries. Thus this study is the needs of China's reform and practice.
This article includes eight chapters, a total of four parts. The first part is the section of theoretical basis, including1-3chapters. In this section, we propose the problems that need study, and have reviewed foreign and domestic research in order to understand the environment of theory and the key point of the research. This section also combs the origin and the development course of the theory of Klein incomplete contract, roughly sorts out the theoretical development of logical thinking. The second part is the core of theoretical research and comment section. This part follows the Klein's study on incomplete contract theory, logically. Firstly, we have made a detailed analysis of the core theories in its theoretical system, and finally made some comments on these theories. The third part is a comparative analysis. The main purpose of this section is to prominent Klein's incomplete contract theory by comparing the differences of a series of basic issues of contract theory with other researchers, to show the value of his theoretical studies. After familiar with the theoretical background, the logic of development, the basic content and theoretical characteristics of the author's theory, we can make conclusion on the author's theory. Therefore, in the fourth part, we make a comment on the theory's theoretical and practical value in China. This paper's reviewing of Klein theory is carried out based on three levels:Firstly, after the introduction to each core theory,make discussions on each single theory, explain the advantages and weaknesses on understanding of the theory; and then by comparing with Williamson and Hart's theory, we can easily find the rationality and weakness of its theoretical system; finally, overall its theory, by the combination of the Chinese case to verify the reasonable aspects of the theory; on the other hand, we propose that practice makes its theoretical challenge and question, in order to promote the discussion of issues related to the deep study.
The main research contents is composed of the following several parts:
The first part is an overview of Klein incomplete contract theory. Analyze the Klein incomplete contract definition; introduce the origin and course of development of Klein incomplete contract theory; Examine Klein how to gradually understand the incomplete contract theory in-depth; explain assumption of Klein theory, which is the basis of a theoretical premise.
The second part is the core concept of the incomplete contract theory. This section is also the core content of this article, focus on the Appropriable Rents, rip-off, self-enforcing mechanism, price as a quality assurance and other core vocabulary of Klein incomplete contract theory Figure out the meaning of these concepts, and combing the theory of logic between them could really understand the theory of Klein. In these concepts, the Appropriable Rents and self-enforcing mechanism are more important, because Klein is called one of the masters of incomplete contract theory benefit by the two concepts. Making a deep analysis of the two concepts could find the true meaning of Klein theory.
The third part is the comparison between Klein incomplete contract theory and the other contract theories. The Comparison has two purposes, one is to highlight the great significance and value of the research object, the second is convenient for reference by the comparison study between the rational and irrational. Because the fundamental purpose of the theoretical research is to draw more scientific and effective.
Part4The enlightenment of Klein incomplet contract theory on modern China. Every theory has its own pros and cons, so does Klein's. So what it means to us when we combine his theory with Chinese trades practics. On the on hand, Klein theory has the universal applications, it is expected that his theory may play very important role in Chinese trade practices; On the other hand, we do not believe Klein's theory would help to give answers to the same type question in China, espacially in the differential trade conditions exists. However we still look forwad to the right judgement of Klein's theory given the carefull selection of tools and methods along with Chinese cases.
This thesis is about the narrative evaluation of Klein theory, hopefully it would give the theoretical and practical value in the following aspects. The thesis thoroghly talks the root, the development, the core value, the characteristic and application of Klein incomplete contract theory. For the first time, it objectively gives out the panorama of his theory so that it can be precisely located in the trade cost economics. For the following areas of this theory, such as Holds-up, Appropriable Rents, Brand capital and Self-enforcing mechanismn, it reveals those basic definition and narrative theory. It not only helps us to be familiar with this theory, but also helps to get to know the inside information and especially the application range for the academic research.
For the past few years, it is seen the incomplete contract theory as the research hot spot issue. Even though Klein theory has its own drawbacks, it is seen as the very important tool in solving problmes of the areas like, organiztion economics, political economics, corporate finance and other relevant institutional researches. However, what it disclose when it comes to the practical Chinese economy, to the matching of Chinese institutional condition and its operation condition, to the do's and don'ts of the application of its theory. Hopefully, this thesis gives the answers.
The analysis may be not enough for the reasons like, the lack of introduction of Klein incomplete contract theory in China, so does the translation works. Particularlly, this is not very much valu in the empirical study of Klein's theory since it has not gone further step in such field.
This thesis mentions the following research aspects.
First is that how to view contracts. The researchers have reached a consensus about the incompleteness of contracts. but not the nature of it. So. what makes people honour the contracts? Is it the seperation of rights and obligations? Is it the perceptive reference of the both parties? It may helps a lot if there is a wide sphere of vision given the abandonment of law, eoconomic and behavioral theory.
Second it that how to understand the foundation of incomplete contract theory. Though, thers is lots of debates on the foundation of Klein theory, it is persuaded that Klein theory helps to explain the limited rational thinking of contract parties, the difficulties in signing a contract and the Third party testimony. At the same time, the critics, like Maskin-Tirole Critism aslo help in pushing the theory forward. The known experience tells us that the interdiscipline research is the foundmental way in solving other controversial issues.
Third is the adequate empirical study database. Hart and Holmstrom expressed the worry about the lack of empirical study of contractual economics. However, the recent study reveals that more and more empirical research have touched the concrete issue by econometrics study. The obstacle for the empirical test of incomplete contract theory is the limition of gathering appropriate data due to the confidentiality of information. So it becomes more and more important to establish the relevant institutions, full-scale informaiton channels, perfect system building and professional practice evalusitons.
本文旨在通过对克莱因不完全契约理论的详细梳理,力求比较全面和客观地呈现克莱因不完全契约理论的面貌,便于理论界更为深入地了解克莱因的不完全契约理论,并以此更为深入地了解和认知不完全契约理论和交易成本经济学。同时,通过对克莱因理论不足的讨论引起研究者对交易成本经济学一些基本问题的重视和思考,促进理论研究的进一步深入。当然,理论研究是为实践服务的,本文的根本目的是通过对克莱因不完全契约理论的研究为更深刻地认识社会经济关系的现实运行提供一种视角,毕竟,在当前的法律制度状况下,合同在中国甚至比在西方更加不完全,中国经济也提供了某种不同于西方国家的制度环境,从此意义上来说,本文的研究也是中国改革实践的需要。
本文包括八章,共四大部分。第一部分为理论基础部分,包括1-3章。本部分主要是提出本文要研究的问题,并对国外和国内的相关研究进行综述,以了解本研究所处的理论环境和研究重点。本部分还对克莱因不完全契约理论的渊源和发展历程进行了梳理,大致理清作者理论发展的逻辑思路。第二部分为核心理论研究与评述部分。本部分沿着克莱因不完全契约理论的逻辑展开研究,先对其理论体系中的几个核心理论做详细剖析,最后围绕这些理论分别进行评论。第三部分是比较分析部分。本部分的主要目的是通过比较突出克莱因不完全契约理论在契约理论一系列基本问题上与其他研究者的差异,以显示出其理论研究的价值所在。在熟悉了作者理论的理论背景、发展逻辑、基本内容及理论特点之后,我们可以对作者的理论最后总结一下了。所以,在第四部分,是对作者理论对中国理论与实践价值的一个评论。本文对克莱因理论的评论是基于三个层次展开的：首先在对每个核心理论进行介绍之后围绕每个单一理论展开讨论,从优点和不足两方面针对性地阐释,便于深入了解该理论；然后通过其理论与威廉姆森和哈特理论的比较突出其理论体系的合理性与不足；最后对其理论总评,重点通过与中国案例的结合验证其合理的方面,另一方面也提出实践对其理论的挑战与质疑,以此促进对相关问题的讨论与深入研究。
本文的主要研究内容由如下几个部分构成。
第一部分,克莱因不完全契约理论的概述。主要分析克莱因理论体系中不完全契约的定义；克莱因不完全契约理论的理论缘起与发展历程；考察克莱因对不完全契约理论的认识是如何逐渐深入的；交待一下克莱因理论的理论假设,这是一个理论必备的基础前提。
第二部分,克莱因不完全契约理论的核心理论。本部分也是本文的核心内容,重点围绕专用的可占用的准租、敲竹杠、自我实施机制、价格作为质量保证等克莱因不完全契约理论中的核心理论展开研究。搞清楚这些理论的含义,理顺了它们之间的理论逻辑才可能真正认识克莱因的理论。而这其中,又以专用的可占用的准租与契约的自我实施机制两个克莱因提出的独特理论为着重研究对象,因为,克莱因之所以可称为不完全契约理论研究的名家之一,此二理论功不可没,对此两个理论的深入剖析,才可找寻到克莱因理论的真谛。
第三部分,克莱因不完全契约理论与其他契约理论研究大家的理论比较。比较有两个目的,其一是通过比较突出本文研究对象的重要意义与价值,其二是通过比较发现研究对象的合理与不合理之处,便于选择性的借鉴,因为,理论研究的根本目的在于更科学、更有效地借鉴。
第四部分,克莱因不完全契约理论对中国的启示。任何理论都有其两面性,克莱因的不完全契约理论也不例外,一方面,他的理论有其普适性,只要理论所需用的条件出现,我们自然可望看到他的理论在中国的交易实践中发挥作用：另一方面,克莱因的理论毕竟产生于西方经济社会实践,与中国的交易环境存在一定差异,不能指望克莱因的理论可以照搬过来解决中国的同类问题。我们对克莱因的理论必须是有选择的借鉴,重在方法与工具的含义。为突出这种东西方环境差异对理论的影响,本文在此部分结合中国的一些案例展开,希望以此佐证先验的判断。
本文是对克莱因不完全契约理论的一个述评,在以下方面具有一定的理论和实践价值：
本文围绕克莱因的不完全契约理论从理论渊源、理论发展、核心内容、理论的特点与应用等方面进行了比较细致、全面的介绍,首次比较客观地展现了克莱因不完全契约理论的全貌,便于理论界客观、全面地评价克莱因的不完全契约理论,准确地在交易成本经济学中为其定位。
本文对克莱因不完全契约理论中“套牢”、“可占用的专用性准租”、“品牌资本”、“自我实施机制”等基本概念和理论的揭示和阐述不但有利于正确认知克莱因的理论,而且利于研究者们厘清这些不完全契约理论研究中基本概念的意蕴,拓展这些理论的应用范围,推动契约理论研究和应用。
近年来,不完全契约理论一直是理论界研究的热点之一,尽管仍在发展、完善之中,但是已经越来越成为组织经济学、政治经济学、公司金融等与制度研究相关领域的重要工具。然而,这一工具是否符合中国的经济社会现实?我们的制度环境是否与它的运行条件匹配?在引入和应用不完全契约理论方面我们应注意什么?本文通过对克莱因不完全契约理论的研究对这些问题作出了一家之言的解答,有利于指导中国经济社会发展实践。
本文的分析存在一些不足：本杰明·克莱因的理论国内介绍的较少,其研究不完全契约问题的文献翻译过来的也较少,这给本文增加了不小的难度和工作量,因此,对文献的整理和把握还有待加强。不完全契约理论一些基本问题的实证一直是该领域研究的软肋,由于理论工具的缺乏和大量实证数据获取的困难,本文在这些问题的实证方面也没有有价值的进展。
本文涉及问题进一步的研究方向是：
第一,如何看待契约。契约是不完全的这一显然正确的观点已成为研究者们的一个共识,但对契约性质的认知则并不统一。那么,契约是权利义务划分的形式还是推动契约履行的履约机制?又抑或是签约双方权利感知的一个参照系?也许打破法学、经济学和行为理论的这种视域界限更有利于我们理解和实施契约。
第二,如何理解契约不完全的基础。虽然关于契约不完全的基础的争议颇多,但大部分人还是相信签约人的有限理性、签约的困难和第三方验证的困难对解释这一问题具有较大的说服力,当然,也有“马斯金-梯若儿批评”这样的声音质疑这些解释因素。正是这些歧见推动了不完全契约理论不断深化。已有的经验告诉我们,跨学科研究是理解这一问题及契约理论中其他争议性问题的基本途径。
第三,完善实证数据库。哈特和霍姆斯特姆曾经表达过对于契约经济学缺乏实证研究的担忧,但最近的情况表明,关于契约理论的实证研究已经越来越多。有大量的研究应用契约理论针对具体问题进行计量经济学验证或进行案例研究。对于不完全契约理论的实证检验来说,妨碍其发展的一个主要限制是合适数据的收集,由于契约和交易问题的很多信息出于保密不允许被披露,使得相关数据库的容量难以得到有效扩充。因此,相关组织的建立、信息渠道的多样化、制度的完善、专业人员实践活动的科学评估变得越来越重要。
Benjamin Klein Professor is one of the representatives of the transaction cost economics. He is also an active social activist. But the identity of law economist and consultant is better known compared to the academic status of the transaction cost economics. Over the years, the domestic theory community is lack of adequate understanding of Klein's positioning in transaction cost economics. In fact, he made a unique contribution in the field of incomplete contract theory, and played an important role in the improvement and expansion of the incomplete contract theory. The issues elaborated in his theory are highly controversial but put forward a number of valuable research topic for us. The theoretical conclusions provide reference for us understanding the reality of economic operation.
This article aims to show up incomplete contract theory comprehensively and objectively by combing the incomplete contract theory of Klein, easy for theory community to understand Klein's incomplete contract theory extensively and go deep into understanding the incomplete contract theory and transaction cost economics. At the same time, the discussion of lack on Klein's theory caused researchers'attention and consideration of some basic problems of transaction cost economics, and promoted further theoretical research. Of course, the theoretical research serves for practice, the fundamental purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective for a more profound understanding of the real run of the social and economic relations by studying the incomplete contract theory. After all, under the current status of the legal system, Chinese contract is incomplete compare with the West, and Chinese economy offers the different institutional environment from the Western countries. Thus this study is the needs of China's reform and practice.
This article includes eight chapters, a total of four parts. The first part is the section of theoretical basis, including1-3chapters. In this section, we propose the problems that need study, and have reviewed foreign and domestic research in order to understand the environment of theory and the key point of the research. This section also combs the origin and the development course of the theory of Klein incomplete contract, roughly sorts out the theoretical development of logical thinking. The second part is the core of theoretical research and comment section. This part follows the Klein's study on incomplete contract theory, logically. Firstly, we have made a detailed analysis of the core theories in its theoretical system, and finally made some comments on these theories. The third part is a comparative analysis. The main purpose of this section is to prominent Klein's incomplete contract theory by comparing the differences of a series of basic issues of contract theory with other researchers, to show the value of his theoretical studies. After familiar with the theoretical background, the logic of development, the basic content and theoretical characteristics of the author's theory, we can make conclusion on the author's theory. Therefore, in the fourth part, we make a comment on the theory's theoretical and practical value in China. This paper's reviewing of Klein theory is carried out based on three levels:Firstly, after the introduction to each core theory,make discussions on each single theory, explain the advantages and weaknesses on understanding of the theory; and then by comparing with Williamson and Hart's theory, we can easily find the rationality and weakness of its theoretical system; finally, overall its theory, by the combination of the Chinese case to verify the reasonable aspects of the theory; on the other hand, we propose that practice makes its theoretical challenge and question, in order to promote the discussion of issues related to the deep study.
The main research contents is composed of the following several parts:
The first part is an overview of Klein incomplete contract theory. Analyze the Klein incomplete contract definition; introduce the origin and course of development of Klein incomplete contract theory; Examine Klein how to gradually understand the incomplete contract theory in-depth; explain assumption of Klein theory, which is the basis of a theoretical premise.
The second part is the core concept of the incomplete contract theory. This section is also the core content of this article, focus on the Appropriable Rents, rip-off, self-enforcing mechanism, price as a quality assurance and other core vocabulary of Klein incomplete contract theory Figure out the meaning of these concepts, and combing the theory of logic between them could really understand the theory of Klein. In these concepts, the Appropriable Rents and self-enforcing mechanism are more important, because Klein is called one of the masters of incomplete contract theory benefit by the two concepts. Making a deep analysis of the two concepts could find the true meaning of Klein theory.
The third part is the comparison between Klein incomplete contract theory and the other contract theories. The Comparison has two purposes, one is to highlight the great significance and value of the research object, the second is convenient for reference by the comparison study between the rational and irrational. Because the fundamental purpose of the theoretical research is to draw more scientific and effective.
Part4The enlightenment of Klein incomplet contract theory on modern China. Every theory has its own pros and cons, so does Klein's. So what it means to us when we combine his theory with Chinese trades practics. On the on hand, Klein theory has the universal applications, it is expected that his theory may play very important role in Chinese trade practices; On the other hand, we do not believe Klein's theory would help to give answers to the same type question in China, espacially in the differential trade conditions exists. However we still look forwad to the right judgement of Klein's theory given the carefull selection of tools and methods along with Chinese cases.
This thesis is about the narrative evaluation of Klein theory, hopefully it would give the theoretical and practical value in the following aspects. The thesis thoroghly talks the root, the development, the core value, the characteristic and application of Klein incomplete contract theory. For the first time, it objectively gives out the panorama of his theory so that it can be precisely located in the trade cost economics. For the following areas of this theory, such as Holds-up, Appropriable Rents, Brand capital and Self-enforcing mechanismn, it reveals those basic definition and narrative theory. It not only helps us to be familiar with this theory, but also helps to get to know the inside information and especially the application range for the academic research.
For the past few years, it is seen the incomplete contract theory as the research hot spot issue. Even though Klein theory has its own drawbacks, it is seen as the very important tool in solving problmes of the areas like, organiztion economics, political economics, corporate finance and other relevant institutional researches. However, what it disclose when it comes to the practical Chinese economy, to the matching of Chinese institutional condition and its operation condition, to the do's and don'ts of the application of its theory. Hopefully, this thesis gives the answers.
The analysis may be not enough for the reasons like, the lack of introduction of Klein incomplete contract theory in China, so does the translation works. Particularlly, this is not very much valu in the empirical study of Klein's theory since it has not gone further step in such field.
This thesis mentions the following research aspects.
First is that how to view contracts. The researchers have reached a consensus about the incompleteness of contracts. but not the nature of it. So. what makes people honour the contracts? Is it the seperation of rights and obligations? Is it the perceptive reference of the both parties? It may helps a lot if there is a wide sphere of vision given the abandonment of law, eoconomic and behavioral theory.
Second it that how to understand the foundation of incomplete contract theory. Though, thers is lots of debates on the foundation of Klein theory, it is persuaded that Klein theory helps to explain the limited rational thinking of contract parties, the difficulties in signing a contract and the Third party testimony. At the same time, the critics, like Maskin-Tirole Critism aslo help in pushing the theory forward. The known experience tells us that the interdiscipline research is the foundmental way in solving other controversial issues.
Third is the adequate empirical study database. Hart and Holmstrom expressed the worry about the lack of empirical study of contractual economics. However, the recent study reveals that more and more empirical research have touched the concrete issue by econometrics study. The obstacle for the empirical test of incomplete contract theory is the limition of gathering appropriate data due to the confidentiality of information. So it becomes more and more important to establish the relevant institutions, full-scale informaiton channels, perfect system building and professional practice evalusitons.
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