福多“概念”理论研究
摘要
概念理论是当代认知科学、语言哲学、认知心理学、实验语言学所共同关注的核心问题之一。因为当前认知科学的经典假设就是,人类的心灵乃是信息处理系统,而既然心灵的运作就是对信息符号的操作,那么必然存在信息符号得以组成的基本结构,而概念就被公认为标准的信息载体。简单来说,概念是思维的基本组成要素,如果我们说思想是一个整体,那么概念就是构成这个整体的基本成分。那么什么是概念?概念是真实存在于我们的大脑中的实体还是我们虚构出的工具?概念具有结构吗?我们如何获得概念?概念是后天习得的还是先天就存在于我们的大脑中?概念的意义是如何确定的?这些问题不仅困扰着历史上的哲学家们,也困扰着当代的学者以及认知科学家们。本文就试图以福多的理论作为基本出发点,考察当前在认知科学哲学领域关于概念理论的基本面貌。我们打算从概念形而上学、概念获得以及概念意义三个问题切入,为读者展现当前关于概念理论的宏观视野。
本文采取的思路如下,首先介绍福多的心理表征思想的基本原理,包括五个基本命题：作为意向科学的心理学、作为意向内容承担者的心理表征、思维的计算模型、信息语义学以及改造的弗雷格语义学。这五个基本命题是整个福多哲学的核心观点,尽管他后来做了一些修改,但是基本的原理并没有发生变化。理解福多心理表征思想之后我们才能更好的理解为什么他如此重视概念在认知科学中的基础性地位。
接下来我将考察当前认知科学中的一些主流概念理论,即概念的定义理论、概念的原型理论以及概念的理论论,并指出它们共同的哲学基础乃是推论作用语义学。然后我们将详细考察福多对这几种主流概念理论的批判,针对目前最主流的原型理论,指出由于语言所具有的组合性原则,因此概念不可能是原型。并且批判了经典的经验主义概念习得模型——假说检验模型,指出经验主义的道路是不可能实现这个目标的。
在考察完福多对主流概念理论的批判后,我们将详细的介绍福多自己的概念理论,我也将主要分成三个部分：首先是福多的概念形而上学,提出概念乃是心理殊相并且是以思想语言的形式存在于大脑中的；其次是福多的概念获得理论,提出概念并非像经验主义者所说的那样是后天习得的,而是先天就存在于我们的大脑中,但是同时是被经验所激发的；最后是福多的概念内容(意义)理论,指出概念的内容并非通过推论作用语义学而确定,而是通过原子式的方式而确定的,并通过在意义原子论与意义整体论的大背景下指出推论作用语义学将会导致与公共性约束原则相悖,这将会导致整个认知科学的失败。
最后我将试图对福多的概念理论的第三部分,即概念内容的整体论与原子论的争论提出自己的观点,并试图整合主流的推论作用语义学和福多的信息语义学原则,提出一种综合性的概念理论,这也是本文最重要的创新之处。
The theory of concept is one of the most hardcore which is discussed by contemporary cognitive science、cognitive psychology、philosophy of language and experimental linguistics. Currently, the classic hypothesis of cognitive science is that the mind of human being is information operating systems. If the processes of mind are operations on informational symbols, then there must be some basic structures of the informational symbols, then the concepts are recognized as normative carrier of information. That is, concepts are basic compositions of mind. So what are concepts? Are concept real entities in our brains or the tools we make up? Does concepts have structures? How we achieve concepts? Do we have concepts innate or acquired? How to decide the meaning of concepts? Such questions puzzle not only the philosophers and cognitive scientists historical but also up-to-date. My thesis attempt to review the basic environment of concept theory, which based on Jerry Fodor's viewpoint. We intent to exhibit the general situations of the concept theory through three main thesis, that is, the metaphysics of concept、concept acquisition and concept content.
First I would like to introduce the basic principles of Fodor'RTM theory, which including five main thesis. First, psychology as intentional science; Second, mental representation as carriers of intentional content; Third, the computational model of mind; Forth, information semantics; And the last, the reconstructive Frege's semantics. These five propositions are the hardcore of Fodor's philosophy. Though he has changed some of his earlier ideas, but these five principles has never changed. To understand the RTM theory we can understand why he consider concepts as the most basic terms of cognitive science.
Then I will discuss the main concept theories of contemporary cognitive science, that is, the definition theory、the prototype theory and the theory theories, and hold that the inferential role semantics is the philosophical foundations of all these empirical theories. Then I will discuss Fodor's critique of the prototype theory. Fodor hold that if languages are compositional then concepts can not be prototype. And then Fodor criticize the classic model of concept acquisition which hold by empiricists, that is the hypothesis - confirmation model, and point out the empiricist way is impasse.
After the discussion of the criticism of the main concept theories, we will introduce Fodor's concept theory, and we will also divide it into three part:First, Fodor's concept metaphysics, which hold that concepts are mental particular and they exist in our brain as mentalese; Second, Fodor's concept acquisition theory, which hold that concept are not acquired but innate and are triggered by our experiences; and the last, Fodor's concept content(meaning) theory, which hold that the contents of concepts are not decided by inferential role semantics which are holistic but by some way atomic. The inferential role semantics will go against the public constraint principles, and will destroy the foundations of cognitive science.
Finally, I will attempt to put forward my own opinions on the third thesis of Fodor's concept theory, that is the controversy of concept holism and atomism. I will attempt to put inferential role semantics and Fodor's information semantics together, and put forward a comprehensive concept theory. This is the most important point and innovations of my thesis.
本文采取的思路如下,首先介绍福多的心理表征思想的基本原理,包括五个基本命题：作为意向科学的心理学、作为意向内容承担者的心理表征、思维的计算模型、信息语义学以及改造的弗雷格语义学。这五个基本命题是整个福多哲学的核心观点,尽管他后来做了一些修改,但是基本的原理并没有发生变化。理解福多心理表征思想之后我们才能更好的理解为什么他如此重视概念在认知科学中的基础性地位。
接下来我将考察当前认知科学中的一些主流概念理论,即概念的定义理论、概念的原型理论以及概念的理论论,并指出它们共同的哲学基础乃是推论作用语义学。然后我们将详细考察福多对这几种主流概念理论的批判,针对目前最主流的原型理论,指出由于语言所具有的组合性原则,因此概念不可能是原型。并且批判了经典的经验主义概念习得模型——假说检验模型,指出经验主义的道路是不可能实现这个目标的。
在考察完福多对主流概念理论的批判后,我们将详细的介绍福多自己的概念理论,我也将主要分成三个部分：首先是福多的概念形而上学,提出概念乃是心理殊相并且是以思想语言的形式存在于大脑中的；其次是福多的概念获得理论,提出概念并非像经验主义者所说的那样是后天习得的,而是先天就存在于我们的大脑中,但是同时是被经验所激发的；最后是福多的概念内容(意义)理论,指出概念的内容并非通过推论作用语义学而确定,而是通过原子式的方式而确定的,并通过在意义原子论与意义整体论的大背景下指出推论作用语义学将会导致与公共性约束原则相悖,这将会导致整个认知科学的失败。
最后我将试图对福多的概念理论的第三部分,即概念内容的整体论与原子论的争论提出自己的观点,并试图整合主流的推论作用语义学和福多的信息语义学原则,提出一种综合性的概念理论,这也是本文最重要的创新之处。
The theory of concept is one of the most hardcore which is discussed by contemporary cognitive science、cognitive psychology、philosophy of language and experimental linguistics. Currently, the classic hypothesis of cognitive science is that the mind of human being is information operating systems. If the processes of mind are operations on informational symbols, then there must be some basic structures of the informational symbols, then the concepts are recognized as normative carrier of information. That is, concepts are basic compositions of mind. So what are concepts? Are concept real entities in our brains or the tools we make up? Does concepts have structures? How we achieve concepts? Do we have concepts innate or acquired? How to decide the meaning of concepts? Such questions puzzle not only the philosophers and cognitive scientists historical but also up-to-date. My thesis attempt to review the basic environment of concept theory, which based on Jerry Fodor's viewpoint. We intent to exhibit the general situations of the concept theory through three main thesis, that is, the metaphysics of concept、concept acquisition and concept content.
First I would like to introduce the basic principles of Fodor'RTM theory, which including five main thesis. First, psychology as intentional science; Second, mental representation as carriers of intentional content; Third, the computational model of mind; Forth, information semantics; And the last, the reconstructive Frege's semantics. These five propositions are the hardcore of Fodor's philosophy. Though he has changed some of his earlier ideas, but these five principles has never changed. To understand the RTM theory we can understand why he consider concepts as the most basic terms of cognitive science.
Then I will discuss the main concept theories of contemporary cognitive science, that is, the definition theory、the prototype theory and the theory theories, and hold that the inferential role semantics is the philosophical foundations of all these empirical theories. Then I will discuss Fodor's critique of the prototype theory. Fodor hold that if languages are compositional then concepts can not be prototype. And then Fodor criticize the classic model of concept acquisition which hold by empiricists, that is the hypothesis - confirmation model, and point out the empiricist way is impasse.
After the discussion of the criticism of the main concept theories, we will introduce Fodor's concept theory, and we will also divide it into three part:First, Fodor's concept metaphysics, which hold that concepts are mental particular and they exist in our brain as mentalese; Second, Fodor's concept acquisition theory, which hold that concept are not acquired but innate and are triggered by our experiences; and the last, Fodor's concept content(meaning) theory, which hold that the contents of concepts are not decided by inferential role semantics which are holistic but by some way atomic. The inferential role semantics will go against the public constraint principles, and will destroy the foundations of cognitive science.
Finally, I will attempt to put forward my own opinions on the third thesis of Fodor's concept theory, that is the controversy of concept holism and atomism. I will attempt to put inferential role semantics and Fodor's information semantics together, and put forward a comprehensive concept theory. This is the most important point and innovations of my thesis.
引文
1参见夏国军.蒯因自然化认识论研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2009：5-14.
2参见田平.自然化的心灵[M].湖南：湖南教育出版社,2000：10-13.
3我们在这里采用广义的自然主义概念,即所有具有自然主义倾向的哲学家和哲学观点都可包括进来,这不仅包括早期的还原式的物理主义、功能主义等等,也包括现在很流行的目的论语义学、进化心理学等等思潮。
4当然目前很多学者提出了很多新的概念研究范式,比如进化论等等,但这并非本文所要考察的主要对象。
1田平.心灵的自然化[M].湖南：湖南教育出版社,2000：116.
2田平.心灵的自然化[M].湖南：湖南教育出版社,2000：116.
3 D.Dennett. Real Patterns,in W.Lycan and J.Prinz (Ed.) Mind and Coginiton:An Anthology (3rd Edition) [M]. Blackwell Publishing,2008:351.
4 D.Dennett. Real Patterns,in W.Lycan and J.Prinz (Ed.) Mind and Coginiton:An Anthology (3rd Edition) [M]. Blackwell Publishing,2008:364.
5 D.Dennett.The intentional stance [M]. The MIT Press,1987:48-49.
6 J. Fodor. Psychosemantics:The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind [M]. The MIT Press,1987:3.
7 J. Fodor. Psychosemantics:The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind [M]. The MIT Press,1987:6.
8 J. Fodor. Psychosemantics:The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind[M]. The MIT Press,1987:9-10.
9 J.Fodor. Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation ,in J.Fodor,Theory of Content & Other Essays[M].Cambridge,Mass.:Mit,1990:16.
10 J. Fodor. The Language of Thought [M]. Harvard University Press,1975:59.
11 J. Fodor. The Language of Thought [M]. Harvard University Press,1975:59.
12 J.Fodor. Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation,in J.Fodor,Theory of Content & Other Essays [M]. Cambridge,Mass.:Mit,1990:
13J.洛克.人类理解论[M].北京：商务印书馆,1959：386.
14高新民.意向性理论的当代发展[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2008：460.
15 F. Dretske. Perception, Knowledge, and belief [M]. Cambridge University Press,2000:199.
16高新民.意向性理论的当代发展[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2008：461.
17 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 12.
18 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 75.
19 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 76.
20叶闯.语言意义指称——自主的意义与实在[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2010：135.
21 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 21-22.
1 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 72.
2 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 86.
3康德也曾提出他自己的范畴化理论,他认为范畴乃是先天的,并且可以分为以下四大类：量的范畴,质的范畴,关系的范畴以及样式的范畴。虽然他和亚里士多德的出发点不同,但是这种将范畴先天化的观点还是很值得当代学者借鉴的,这里我们暂不展开。
4以上关于原型范畴理论的介绍参见王寅.认知语言学[M].上海：上海外语教育出版社,2007： 98-102.
5以上内容参见以下网页：http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog 4ef87db20100fasw.html
6熊哲宏.儿童“心理理论”发展的“理论论”述评[J].心理科学,2001 24(3)。
7以上关于假说检验模型的介绍参见[美]罗伯特.L.索尔所,M.金伯利.麦克林,奥托.H.麦克林.《认知心理学》(第七版)[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2008：372-374.
8 J. Fodor. The Compositionality Papers [M], with Ernie Lepore, Oxford University Press 2002, P28-29.
9 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 95.
10 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 97.
11 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 99.
12 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 100.
13 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 100.
14 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 105.
15 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M], Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:272-273.
16以下关于推论作用语义学的介绍参见高新民.意向性理论的当代发展[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2008：543-570.
17参见高新民.意向性理论的当代发展[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2008：543-570.
18参见最后一章,尽管我采取了福多的信息语义学范式,但是在某种意义上这种理论是和宽窄内容理论相一致的。
19 J. Fodor: Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mina[M]. MIT Press, 1987:47.
1 J. Fodor. In Critical Condition - Polemical Essays On Cognitive Science & The Philosophy Of The Mina[M]. MIT Press,1998:28.
2 J. Fodor. In Critical Condition - Polemical Essays On Cognitive Science & The Philosophy Of The Mind[M]. MIT Press,1998:27.
3 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998:3.
4 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998:4.
5 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 5-6.
1在这里略作一个术语学上的说明,我们在上一章中讨论的原初概念和复杂概念,我们现在依照福多对经验主义的诠释将原初概念替换为感觉概念,而将复杂概念进一步分解为词典概念和短语概念。
2 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:261-262.
3 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:263-264.
4 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:273.
5 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:273.
6转引自J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:276.
7转引自J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:278.
8转引自J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:279.
9转引自[英]布朗主编,高新民等译.劳特里奇哲学史——英国哲学和启蒙时代[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2009：178.
10 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:274-275.
11 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:276-277.
12 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:278.
13 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:279-280.
14 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:296.
J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:298.
16其中引文一引自和休谟同时代的学者David Hattley的一段话,引文二引自Howard C. Warren的著作《联想心理学的历史》一书,引文三引自约翰密尔的《逻辑系统》一书。全部转引自J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:300-302.
17 Fodor: Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M], Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979, P 304.
18 Fodor: Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M], Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979, P 309.
19 Fodor: Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M], Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979, P 309.
20 Fodor: Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M], Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979, P 310.
21 Fodor: Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M], Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979, P 310.
22 Fodor: Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M], Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979, P 311.
23 Fodor: Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M], Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979, P 315-316.
24高新民,储昭华主编.心灵哲学[M].北京：商务印书馆,2002：523.
25高新民,储昭华主编.心灵哲学[M].北京：商务印书馆,2002：524-535.
26 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 125-126.
27 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 131-132.
J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 134.
29 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 135-136.
30 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 135-136.
31 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 135-136.
32 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 136.
33 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 137.
34 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 137.
35 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 141-142.
36转引自J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press, 1998:148.
37 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 150.
38 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 151-152.
J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 153.
J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 155.
J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 160.
1 J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.).Blackwell,1992:9.
2以上关于晚期卡尔纳普和意义整体论关系的论述参见马亮.卡尔纳普意义理论[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2006,最后一章.
3 J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992:12-13.
4 J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992:15.
5注意这是对IRS的一个非常简单的形式化表述,IRS的具体表现形式无疑要复杂得多,但是 基本原理是不变的,我们用这样一个简化的模型来分析是为了抛掉一些无关紧要的内容,更清楚的看到IRS的问题所在。
6其中第二个和第三个术语,即推论性作用和内容性作用可以互相通用,只不过后者更强调在确定概念内容时的作用,而前者不局限在确定概念内容的范围之内,也可应用于其他的方面。
7 Jerry Fodor: The Compositionality Papers [M], with Ernie Lepore, Oxford University Press 2002, P16.
Jerry Fodor: The Compositionality Papers [M], with Ernie Lepore, Oxford University Press 2002, P17.
9 J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992:23-25.
10P.邱奇兰德.科学实在论与心灵的可塑性[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2008：64.
11以上关于马尔的视觉计算理论的介绍参见史忠植.认知科学[M].合肥：中国科学技术大学出版社,2008：107-113.
12此图转引自J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell, 1992:194.
13转引自J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992: 193-194.
14转引自J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992: 188-189.
15P.邱奇兰德.科学实在论与心灵的可塑性[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2008：64.
16P.邱奇兰德.科学实在论与心灵的可塑性[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2008：53-54.
17P.邱奇兰德.科学实在论与心灵的可塑性[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2008：68-69.
18 J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992:198-199.
19 J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992:201.
20 J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992:204-205.
21 J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992:34.
1参见J. D. Cowley: Inferential-role semantics: A theory of concepts for philosophy and psychology[D],University of Arizona,2004:74-81.
2 J. D. Cowley: Inferential-role semantics:A theory of concepts for philosophy and psychology[D], University of Arizona,2004:101.
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2参见田平.自然化的心灵[M].湖南：湖南教育出版社,2000：10-13.
3我们在这里采用广义的自然主义概念,即所有具有自然主义倾向的哲学家和哲学观点都可包括进来,这不仅包括早期的还原式的物理主义、功能主义等等,也包括现在很流行的目的论语义学、进化心理学等等思潮。
4当然目前很多学者提出了很多新的概念研究范式,比如进化论等等,但这并非本文所要考察的主要对象。
1田平.心灵的自然化[M].湖南：湖南教育出版社,2000：116.
2田平.心灵的自然化[M].湖南：湖南教育出版社,2000：116.
3 D.Dennett. Real Patterns,in W.Lycan and J.Prinz (Ed.) Mind and Coginiton:An Anthology (3rd Edition) [M]. Blackwell Publishing,2008:351.
4 D.Dennett. Real Patterns,in W.Lycan and J.Prinz (Ed.) Mind and Coginiton:An Anthology (3rd Edition) [M]. Blackwell Publishing,2008:364.
5 D.Dennett.The intentional stance [M]. The MIT Press,1987:48-49.
6 J. Fodor. Psychosemantics:The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind [M]. The MIT Press,1987:3.
7 J. Fodor. Psychosemantics:The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind [M]. The MIT Press,1987:6.
8 J. Fodor. Psychosemantics:The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind[M]. The MIT Press,1987:9-10.
9 J.Fodor. Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation ,in J.Fodor,Theory of Content & Other Essays[M].Cambridge,Mass.:Mit,1990:16.
10 J. Fodor. The Language of Thought [M]. Harvard University Press,1975:59.
11 J. Fodor. The Language of Thought [M]. Harvard University Press,1975:59.
12 J.Fodor. Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation,in J.Fodor,Theory of Content & Other Essays [M]. Cambridge,Mass.:Mit,1990:
13J.洛克.人类理解论[M].北京：商务印书馆,1959：386.
14高新民.意向性理论的当代发展[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2008：460.
15 F. Dretske. Perception, Knowledge, and belief [M]. Cambridge University Press,2000:199.
16高新民.意向性理论的当代发展[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2008：461.
17 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 12.
18 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 75.
19 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 76.
20叶闯.语言意义指称——自主的意义与实在[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2010：135.
21 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 21-22.
1 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 72.
2 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 86.
3康德也曾提出他自己的范畴化理论,他认为范畴乃是先天的,并且可以分为以下四大类：量的范畴,质的范畴,关系的范畴以及样式的范畴。虽然他和亚里士多德的出发点不同,但是这种将范畴先天化的观点还是很值得当代学者借鉴的,这里我们暂不展开。
4以上关于原型范畴理论的介绍参见王寅.认知语言学[M].上海：上海外语教育出版社,2007： 98-102.
5以上内容参见以下网页：http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog 4ef87db20100fasw.html
6熊哲宏.儿童“心理理论”发展的“理论论”述评[J].心理科学,2001 24(3)。
7以上关于假说检验模型的介绍参见[美]罗伯特.L.索尔所,M.金伯利.麦克林,奥托.H.麦克林.《认知心理学》(第七版)[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2008：372-374.
8 J. Fodor. The Compositionality Papers [M], with Ernie Lepore, Oxford University Press 2002, P28-29.
9 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 95.
10 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 97.
11 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 99.
12 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 100.
13 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 100.
14 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong [M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 105.
15 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M], Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:272-273.
16以下关于推论作用语义学的介绍参见高新民.意向性理论的当代发展[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2008：543-570.
17参见高新民.意向性理论的当代发展[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2008：543-570.
18参见最后一章,尽管我采取了福多的信息语义学范式,但是在某种意义上这种理论是和宽窄内容理论相一致的。
19 J. Fodor: Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mina[M]. MIT Press, 1987:47.
1 J. Fodor. In Critical Condition - Polemical Essays On Cognitive Science & The Philosophy Of The Mina[M]. MIT Press,1998:28.
2 J. Fodor. In Critical Condition - Polemical Essays On Cognitive Science & The Philosophy Of The Mind[M]. MIT Press,1998:27.
3 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998:3.
4 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998:4.
5 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 5-6.
1在这里略作一个术语学上的说明,我们在上一章中讨论的原初概念和复杂概念,我们现在依照福多对经验主义的诠释将原初概念替换为感觉概念,而将复杂概念进一步分解为词典概念和短语概念。
2 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:261-262.
3 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:263-264.
4 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:273.
5 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:273.
6转引自J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:276.
7转引自J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:278.
8转引自J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:279.
9转引自[英]布朗主编,高新民等译.劳特里奇哲学史——英国哲学和启蒙时代[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2009：178.
10 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:274-275.
11 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:276-277.
12 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:278.
13 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:279-280.
14 J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:296.
J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:298.
16其中引文一引自和休谟同时代的学者David Hattley的一段话,引文二引自Howard C. Warren的著作《联想心理学的历史》一书,引文三引自约翰密尔的《逻辑系统》一书。全部转引自J. Fodor. Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M]. Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979:300-302.
17 Fodor: Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M], Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979, P 304.
18 Fodor: Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M], Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979, P 309.
19 Fodor: Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M], Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979, P 309.
20 Fodor: Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M], Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979, P 310.
21 Fodor: Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M], Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979, P 310.
22 Fodor: Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M], Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979, P 311.
23 Fodor: Representations: Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science[M], Harvard Press (UK) and MIT Press (US),1979, P 315-316.
24高新民,储昭华主编.心灵哲学[M].北京：商务印书馆,2002：523.
25高新民,储昭华主编.心灵哲学[M].北京：商务印书馆,2002：524-535.
26 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 125-126.
27 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 131-132.
J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 134.
29 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 135-136.
30 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 135-136.
31 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 135-136.
32 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 136.
33 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 137.
34 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 137.
35 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 141-142.
36转引自J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press, 1998:148.
37 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 150.
38 J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 151-152.
J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 153.
J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 155.
J. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong[M]. Oxford University Press,1998: 160.
1 J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.).Blackwell,1992:9.
2以上关于晚期卡尔纳普和意义整体论关系的论述参见马亮.卡尔纳普意义理论[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2006,最后一章.
3 J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992:12-13.
4 J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992:15.
5注意这是对IRS的一个非常简单的形式化表述,IRS的具体表现形式无疑要复杂得多,但是 基本原理是不变的,我们用这样一个简化的模型来分析是为了抛掉一些无关紧要的内容,更清楚的看到IRS的问题所在。
6其中第二个和第三个术语,即推论性作用和内容性作用可以互相通用,只不过后者更强调在确定概念内容时的作用,而前者不局限在确定概念内容的范围之内,也可应用于其他的方面。
7 Jerry Fodor: The Compositionality Papers [M], with Ernie Lepore, Oxford University Press 2002, P16.
Jerry Fodor: The Compositionality Papers [M], with Ernie Lepore, Oxford University Press 2002, P17.
9 J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992:23-25.
10P.邱奇兰德.科学实在论与心灵的可塑性[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2008：64.
11以上关于马尔的视觉计算理论的介绍参见史忠植.认知科学[M].合肥：中国科学技术大学出版社,2008：107-113.
12此图转引自J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell, 1992:194.
13转引自J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992: 193-194.
14转引自J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992: 188-189.
15P.邱奇兰德.科学实在论与心灵的可塑性[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2008：64.
16P.邱奇兰德.科学实在论与心灵的可塑性[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2008：53-54.
17P.邱奇兰德.科学实在论与心灵的可塑性[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2008：68-69.
18 J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992:198-199.
19 J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992:201.
20 J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992:204-205.
21 J. Fodor. Holism: A Shopper's Guide[M], with Ernie Lepore (eds.). Blackwell,1992:34.
1参见J. D. Cowley: Inferential-role semantics: A theory of concepts for philosophy and psychology[D],University of Arizona,2004:74-81.
2 J. D. Cowley: Inferential-role semantics:A theory of concepts for philosophy and psychology[D], University of Arizona,2004:101.
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