第一人称信念的哲学研究
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摘要
本文是关于第一人称信念的弗雷格哲学研究。通过对比佩里、刘易斯和斯塔尔内克的信念理论,突显信念研究过程中的罗素哲学倾向和弗雷格哲学倾向之间的比照,从而在更深的层次上探究信念(尤其是第一人称信念)的本质所在。传统的弗雷格信念理论坚持两个基本主张:第一、信念体现为有生命的主体和抽象的思想实体之间的关系,这个抽象的思想实体通常被称为命题;第二、命题具有真值,其真值不随说话的时间、地点和人称的改变而改变。传统的信念理论无法解释第一人称信念问题,构成第一人称信念内容的思想实体不是传统的命题概念所能够概括得了的,即使存在能够概括第一人称信念内容的命题,其真值因不同说话时间、地点和人称而不断发生改变。基于此,佩里和刘易斯对传统的弗雷格理论进行修正,以期达到解释第一人称信念的目的。在他们各自的理论重构过程中,他们分别在不同方面表现出了罗素哲学倾向。佩里在本体论上接受了罗素的单称命题,而刘易斯在认识论上认同于罗素的亲知关系。信念理论的罗素哲学倾向无助于理解信念的本体意义。与此相对照,斯塔尔内克则从维护传统的弗雷格信念理论的立场出发,对传统的命题概念进行了形而上的分析,并给出了关于命题的逻辑构造。斯塔尔内克提出了命题概念(propositional concept),并建立了命题概念分析模型。在这个模型之中,第一人称信念的内容是由对角线命题表征出来的。在斯塔尔内克的理论框架中,第一人称信念内容不仅得到了充分的理论说明,同时,也获得了形而上的理论解释。第一人称信念在理论上所反映的是元语义事实,元语义事实构成了信念赖以产生的事实基础。这样的一个事实基础其实就是弗雷格的涵义概念所要概括的理论内容。一旦,我们通过元语义事实来解读弗雷格的涵义概念,那么,我们就达到了关于第一人称信念的弗雷格哲学研究。
本文首先对弗雷格语言哲学进行必要的阐释,继而展开对第一人称信念问题的理论说明和理论解释,最后建立关于第一人称信念的弗雷格哲学研究取向。
This dissertation is designed to do a Fregean study of the first-personal belief. Through the detailed discussions of Perry, Lewis and Stalnaker, there surfaces the contrast between Russellian and Fregean understanding of belief. Thereafter, the essence of belief (especially the first-personal belief) will be explored on a new level. The traditional Fregean belief theory holds the following two doctrines: (1) Belief is a relation between an animate subject and an abstract object which is called a proposition; (2) Propositions have truth-values, and their truth-values do not vary with time, place, or person. This traditional belief theory fails to explain the first-personal belief. The content of the first-personal belief is not to be characterized merely as a proposition. The truth-value of a sentence expressing the first-personal belief varies with time, place and person. Seeing that, Perry and Lewis attempted to revise the traditional Fregean theory in order to make it account for the first-personal belief. In the process, they proposed the new belief theories, which reveal a strong Russellian philosophy. Perry’s theory contains singular propositions while Lewis recognizes relations of acquaintance in his theory. Compelling otherwise though it is, Russellian belief theory does not provide anything about what belief in nature is. In contrast, Stalnaker tried to defend Fregean belief theory, giving a philosophical analysis of proposition and constructing a propositional structure. Stalnaker proposed a theory of propositional concept, in which a diagonal proposition represents the content of the first-personal belief. In the two-dimensional theory of propositional concept, the first-personal belief is interpreted as established on meta-semantic facts. In essence, meta-semantic facts constitute what Frege means by sense. Meta-semantic facts can be used to account for Frege’s sense, which is the focus of Frege’s philosophy. As a consequence, a Fregean philosophy of belief is achieved.
本文首先对弗雷格语言哲学进行必要的阐释,继而展开对第一人称信念问题的理论说明和理论解释,最后建立关于第一人称信念的弗雷格哲学研究取向。
This dissertation is designed to do a Fregean study of the first-personal belief. Through the detailed discussions of Perry, Lewis and Stalnaker, there surfaces the contrast between Russellian and Fregean understanding of belief. Thereafter, the essence of belief (especially the first-personal belief) will be explored on a new level. The traditional Fregean belief theory holds the following two doctrines: (1) Belief is a relation between an animate subject and an abstract object which is called a proposition; (2) Propositions have truth-values, and their truth-values do not vary with time, place, or person. This traditional belief theory fails to explain the first-personal belief. The content of the first-personal belief is not to be characterized merely as a proposition. The truth-value of a sentence expressing the first-personal belief varies with time, place and person. Seeing that, Perry and Lewis attempted to revise the traditional Fregean theory in order to make it account for the first-personal belief. In the process, they proposed the new belief theories, which reveal a strong Russellian philosophy. Perry’s theory contains singular propositions while Lewis recognizes relations of acquaintance in his theory. Compelling otherwise though it is, Russellian belief theory does not provide anything about what belief in nature is. In contrast, Stalnaker tried to defend Fregean belief theory, giving a philosophical analysis of proposition and constructing a propositional structure. Stalnaker proposed a theory of propositional concept, in which a diagonal proposition represents the content of the first-personal belief. In the two-dimensional theory of propositional concept, the first-personal belief is interpreted as established on meta-semantic facts. In essence, meta-semantic facts constitute what Frege means by sense. Meta-semantic facts can be used to account for Frege’s sense, which is the focus of Frege’s philosophy. As a consequence, a Fregean philosophy of belief is achieved.
引文
1本文所谈的分析哲学是指区别于欧陆哲学的西方哲学,或者说,英语世界的主流哲学。
2 Jason Stanley (2006)“Philosophy of Language in the Twentieth Century”,参见Jason Stanley的主页,http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~jasoncs/
3 David Kaplan (1975)“How to Russell a Frege-Church”, The Journal of Philosophy 72: 716-729.
4该理论主要见于John Perry (1977)“Frege on Demonstratives”, The Philosophical Review 86: 474-497和John Perry (1979)“The Problem of the Essential Indexical”, No?s 13: 3-21.
5该理论主要见于David Lewis (1979a)“Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”, The Philosophical Review 88: 513-543.
6该理论主要见于Robert Stalnaker (1981)“Indexical Belief”, in R. Stalnaker (ed.) Context and Content, Oxford University Press, 130-149.
11佩里这里所讲的demonstratives既包括一般意义上的demonstratives也包括indexcals。不过, 他后期对这两种词做了细分。详见John Perry (1997)“Indexicals and Demonstrative”in Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (eds.) Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwells Publishers Inc., pp. 534-554.
13 Michael Dummett (1981) Frege: Philosophy of Language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., p. 83.
14不过,我并不认同达米特对弗雷格意义理论中关于指称的阐述,所以,后面关于弗雷格意义理论的综述中有些部分与达米特的理解并不一致,我更倾向于麦克道维尔和埃文斯的观点,他们的观点见于John McDowell (1977)“The Sense and Reference of Proper Name”Mind 86: 159-185, Gareth Evans (1982) Varieties of Reference, Oxford University Press and Gareth Evans (1981)“Understanding Demonstratives”in Gareth Evans (ed.) Collected Papers, Clarendon Press,本章后面会有详细论述。
15事实上,这是一种高阶的谓词逻辑语言,因为其中包含了对具体谓词的高阶刻画。
16 Michael Dummett (1981) Frege: Philosophy of Language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., p. 83.
17这些术语的中文翻译在这里只是起着提示作用,没有任何理论说明作用。读者权且把它们当作几个特殊符号来处理即可,切莫根据汉语望文生义。其中sense翻译为“涵义”,是借用王路的翻译,参见《弗雷格哲学论著选辑》(商务印书馆2006年)。另外两个词的翻译没有参照任何中国学者的译文。tone翻译为“语色”是因为达米特告诉我们弗雷格原文这个术语是指“lighting”“colouring”,参见Michael Dummett (1981) Frege: Philosophy of Language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., p. 84。
19如果读者认为这一段文字叙述不是很清楚,那么,请参照Michael Dummett (1981) Frege: Philosophy of Language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 89-90。
21 Saul Kripke (1980) Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. p. 59.
22 Strawson (1950)“On Referring”Mind 59: 320-344.
23 Gareth Evens (1981)“Understanding Demonstratives”in Gareth Evans (ed.) Collected Papers, Clarendon Press,p. 294, footnote 6.
24 Gareth Evans (1982) Varieties of Reference Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, p.17 footnote 17.
25戴维森认为,我们可以通过塔尔斯基的定义真的方式来建立意义理论。一个理想的意义理论应该能够给出关于所有如同“‘雪是白的’为真当且仅当雪是白的”这样句子的意义的知识基础的说明。当然,戴维森这里把塔尔斯基定义出来的真视为初始概念,用真这个概念来建立意义理论。详见,Donald Davidson (1967)“Truth and Meaning”Synthese 17: 304-323.
26当然,这只是对命题态度语词的一个直观的粗略分析,其中更复杂的问题和更深入的分析不是本节这样的概述性文字所能完成的。
27关于埃文斯指称理论细节,读者可以参考Gareth Evans (1982) Varieties of Reference Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York,尤其是第一章。
28虽然弗雷格在“Logik”一文中也谈到第一人称问题,但是,我认为那里的讨论在本质上没有涉及到这个问题。
29 Gottlob Frege (1918)“Thought”, in M. Beaney (ed.) The Frege Reader, Blackwell Publishers, 325-345.
31 Michael Dummett (1981). Frege: Philosophy of Language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. p. 296.
32 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 477.
33 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 478.
34 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 480.
35 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 482.
36 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 482.
37 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 485.
39这其实就是佩里的那著名的“不可或缺索引词”(the essential indexical)理论,详细论述,参见,John Perry (1979)“The problem of the essential indexical”No?s 13: 3-21.
40 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 490-491.
41 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 491.
42 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 492.
43 David Lewis (1968)“Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic”The Journal of Philosophy 65: 113-126.
45 David Lewis (1979a)“Attitudes de dicto and de se”Philosophical Review 88: 522-523.
47 David Lewis (1979a)“Attitudes de dicto and de se”Philosophical Review 88: 538.
48 David Lewis (1979a)“Attitudes de dicto and de se”Philosophical Review 88: 539.
49 David Lewis (1979a)“Attitudes de dicto and de se”Philosophical Review 88: 541.
50 David Lewis (1979a)“Attitudes de dicto and de se”Philosophical Review 88: 542.
51中心世界的概念是蒯因最先提出来的,中心世界是指由世界和其中的特定时空点所构成的二元组。参见W. V. O. Quine (1969)“Propositional Objects”in W. V. O. Quine (ed.) Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (Columbia University Press, pp. 139-160.
52 Robert Stalnaker (1981)“Indexical belief”, in R. Stalnaker (ed.) Context and Content, Oxford University Press, 130-149.
54“不可或缺索引词”是佩里的理论术语,参见John Perry (1979)“The problem of the essential indexical”No?s 13: 3-21.
57关于这个问题的详细讨论,参见我的论文“克里普克关于个体的跨界同一性的讨论”,《自然辩证法研究》,2007年第6期,第29-32页。
58即,特征(character)和内容(content)这两个概念。详细内容,参见David Kaplan (1989) “Demonstratives”in Themes from Kaplan Oxford University Press, pp. 481-564.
59卡尔纳普意义上的内涵与外延,详细内容,参见Rudolf Carnap (1956) Meaning and Necessity University of Chicago Press, pp. 1-68。
60 Robert Stalnaker (1978)“Assertion”, in R. Stalnaker (ed.) Context and Content, Oxford University Press, p. 78.
64这里显然隐含着格莱斯的意义理论,详细内容,参见Paul Grice (1957)“Meaning”The Philosophical Review 66: 377-388。
65关于刘易斯的会话调节理论,参见David Lewis (1979b)“Scorekeeping in a Language Game”Journal of Philosophical Logic 8: 339-359。
66关于斯塔尔内克的直陈式条件句理论,参见Robert Stalnaker (1975)“Indicative Conditionals”, in R. Stalnaker (ed.) Context and Content, Oxford University Press, 63-77。
67 Robert Stalnaker (1988)“Belief Attribution and Context”, in R. Stalnaker (ed.) Context and Content, Oxford University Press, p. 156.
69 Robert Adams(1974)“Theories of Actuality”No?s 8: 211-231.
70 Gareth Evans (1979)“Reference and Contingency”in Evans G. (ed.) Collected Papers, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 181.
71这两种解释源于开普兰的有关论述,参见David Kaplan (1989)“Afterthoughts”in Themes from Kaplan, p. 573。
72 Joseph Almog (1984)“Semantic Anthropology”Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9: 479-489.
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Quine, W. V. (1960) Word and Object, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Quine, W. V. (1961) From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Quine, W. V. (1961a)“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”in Quine (1961) pp. 20-46.
Quine, W. V. (1966)“Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes”in A. Martinich (ed.) The Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 332-338.
Quine, W. V. (1969)“Propositional Objects”in W. V. O. Quine (ed.) Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (Columbia University Press, pp. 139-160.
Russell, B. (1905)“On Denoting”Mind 14: 479-493.
Russell, B. (1910-1911)“Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”Aristotelean Society Proceedings 11: 108-128.
Russell, B. (1912) The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Salmon, N. (1986) Frege’s Puzzle, Bradford Books, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Soames, S. (2002) Beyond Rigidity: the Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity, Oxford University Press, New York.
Stalnaker, R. (1975)“Indicative Conditionals”in R. Stalnaker (1999), pp. 63-77.
Stalnaker, R. (1976a)“Possible Worlds”No?s 10: 65-75.
Stalnaker, R. (1976b)“Propositions”in A. Martinich (ed.) The Philosophy of Language, OxfordUniversity Press, New York and Oxford, 373-380.
Stalnaker, R. (1978)“Assertion”in R. Stalnaker (1999), pp. 78-95.
Stalnaker, R. (1981)“Indexical Belief”in R. Stalnaker (1999), pp. 130-149.
Stalnaker, R. (1987)“Semantics for Belief”in R. Stalnaker (1999), pp. 117-129.
Stalnaker, R. (1988)“Belief Attribution and Context”in R. Stalnaker (1999), pp. 150-166.
Stalnaker, R. (1999) Context and Content, Oxford University Press.
Stalnaker, R. (2003) Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-metaphysical Essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Stanley, J. (1997)“Names and Rigid Designation”in Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (eds.) Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwells Publishers Inc., pp. 555-585.
Strawson, P. (1950)“On Referring”Mind 59: 320-344.
2 Jason Stanley (2006)“Philosophy of Language in the Twentieth Century”,参见Jason Stanley的主页,http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~jasoncs/
3 David Kaplan (1975)“How to Russell a Frege-Church”, The Journal of Philosophy 72: 716-729.
4该理论主要见于John Perry (1977)“Frege on Demonstratives”, The Philosophical Review 86: 474-497和John Perry (1979)“The Problem of the Essential Indexical”, No?s 13: 3-21.
5该理论主要见于David Lewis (1979a)“Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”, The Philosophical Review 88: 513-543.
6该理论主要见于Robert Stalnaker (1981)“Indexical Belief”, in R. Stalnaker (ed.) Context and Content, Oxford University Press, 130-149.
11佩里这里所讲的demonstratives既包括一般意义上的demonstratives也包括indexcals。不过, 他后期对这两种词做了细分。详见John Perry (1997)“Indexicals and Demonstrative”in Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (eds.) Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwells Publishers Inc., pp. 534-554.
13 Michael Dummett (1981) Frege: Philosophy of Language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., p. 83.
14不过,我并不认同达米特对弗雷格意义理论中关于指称的阐述,所以,后面关于弗雷格意义理论的综述中有些部分与达米特的理解并不一致,我更倾向于麦克道维尔和埃文斯的观点,他们的观点见于John McDowell (1977)“The Sense and Reference of Proper Name”Mind 86: 159-185, Gareth Evans (1982) Varieties of Reference, Oxford University Press and Gareth Evans (1981)“Understanding Demonstratives”in Gareth Evans (ed.) Collected Papers, Clarendon Press,本章后面会有详细论述。
15事实上,这是一种高阶的谓词逻辑语言,因为其中包含了对具体谓词的高阶刻画。
16 Michael Dummett (1981) Frege: Philosophy of Language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., p. 83.
17这些术语的中文翻译在这里只是起着提示作用,没有任何理论说明作用。读者权且把它们当作几个特殊符号来处理即可,切莫根据汉语望文生义。其中sense翻译为“涵义”,是借用王路的翻译,参见《弗雷格哲学论著选辑》(商务印书馆2006年)。另外两个词的翻译没有参照任何中国学者的译文。tone翻译为“语色”是因为达米特告诉我们弗雷格原文这个术语是指“lighting”“colouring”,参见Michael Dummett (1981) Frege: Philosophy of Language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., p. 84。
19如果读者认为这一段文字叙述不是很清楚,那么,请参照Michael Dummett (1981) Frege: Philosophy of Language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 89-90。
21 Saul Kripke (1980) Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. p. 59.
22 Strawson (1950)“On Referring”Mind 59: 320-344.
23 Gareth Evens (1981)“Understanding Demonstratives”in Gareth Evans (ed.) Collected Papers, Clarendon Press,p. 294, footnote 6.
24 Gareth Evans (1982) Varieties of Reference Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, p.17 footnote 17.
25戴维森认为,我们可以通过塔尔斯基的定义真的方式来建立意义理论。一个理想的意义理论应该能够给出关于所有如同“‘雪是白的’为真当且仅当雪是白的”这样句子的意义的知识基础的说明。当然,戴维森这里把塔尔斯基定义出来的真视为初始概念,用真这个概念来建立意义理论。详见,Donald Davidson (1967)“Truth and Meaning”Synthese 17: 304-323.
26当然,这只是对命题态度语词的一个直观的粗略分析,其中更复杂的问题和更深入的分析不是本节这样的概述性文字所能完成的。
27关于埃文斯指称理论细节,读者可以参考Gareth Evans (1982) Varieties of Reference Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York,尤其是第一章。
28虽然弗雷格在“Logik”一文中也谈到第一人称问题,但是,我认为那里的讨论在本质上没有涉及到这个问题。
29 Gottlob Frege (1918)“Thought”, in M. Beaney (ed.) The Frege Reader, Blackwell Publishers, 325-345.
31 Michael Dummett (1981). Frege: Philosophy of Language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. p. 296.
32 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 477.
33 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 478.
34 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 480.
35 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 482.
36 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 482.
37 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 485.
39这其实就是佩里的那著名的“不可或缺索引词”(the essential indexical)理论,详细论述,参见,John Perry (1979)“The problem of the essential indexical”No?s 13: 3-21.
40 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 490-491.
41 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 491.
42 John Perry (1977)“Frege on demonstratives”Philosophical Review 86: 492.
43 David Lewis (1968)“Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic”The Journal of Philosophy 65: 113-126.
45 David Lewis (1979a)“Attitudes de dicto and de se”Philosophical Review 88: 522-523.
47 David Lewis (1979a)“Attitudes de dicto and de se”Philosophical Review 88: 538.
48 David Lewis (1979a)“Attitudes de dicto and de se”Philosophical Review 88: 539.
49 David Lewis (1979a)“Attitudes de dicto and de se”Philosophical Review 88: 541.
50 David Lewis (1979a)“Attitudes de dicto and de se”Philosophical Review 88: 542.
51中心世界的概念是蒯因最先提出来的,中心世界是指由世界和其中的特定时空点所构成的二元组。参见W. V. O. Quine (1969)“Propositional Objects”in W. V. O. Quine (ed.) Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (Columbia University Press, pp. 139-160.
52 Robert Stalnaker (1981)“Indexical belief”, in R. Stalnaker (ed.) Context and Content, Oxford University Press, 130-149.
54“不可或缺索引词”是佩里的理论术语,参见John Perry (1979)“The problem of the essential indexical”No?s 13: 3-21.
57关于这个问题的详细讨论,参见我的论文“克里普克关于个体的跨界同一性的讨论”,《自然辩证法研究》,2007年第6期,第29-32页。
58即,特征(character)和内容(content)这两个概念。详细内容,参见David Kaplan (1989) “Demonstratives”in Themes from Kaplan Oxford University Press, pp. 481-564.
59卡尔纳普意义上的内涵与外延,详细内容,参见Rudolf Carnap (1956) Meaning and Necessity University of Chicago Press, pp. 1-68。
60 Robert Stalnaker (1978)“Assertion”, in R. Stalnaker (ed.) Context and Content, Oxford University Press, p. 78.
64这里显然隐含着格莱斯的意义理论,详细内容,参见Paul Grice (1957)“Meaning”The Philosophical Review 66: 377-388。
65关于刘易斯的会话调节理论,参见David Lewis (1979b)“Scorekeeping in a Language Game”Journal of Philosophical Logic 8: 339-359。
66关于斯塔尔内克的直陈式条件句理论,参见Robert Stalnaker (1975)“Indicative Conditionals”, in R. Stalnaker (ed.) Context and Content, Oxford University Press, 63-77。
67 Robert Stalnaker (1988)“Belief Attribution and Context”, in R. Stalnaker (ed.) Context and Content, Oxford University Press, p. 156.
69 Robert Adams(1974)“Theories of Actuality”No?s 8: 211-231.
70 Gareth Evans (1979)“Reference and Contingency”in Evans G. (ed.) Collected Papers, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 181.
71这两种解释源于开普兰的有关论述,参见David Kaplan (1989)“Afterthoughts”in Themes from Kaplan, p. 573。
72 Joseph Almog (1984)“Semantic Anthropology”Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9: 479-489.
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