企业资本结构、产权性质与多元化
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摘要
企业多元化是一种常见的企业投资和经营行为。尽管一些企业进行多元化(曾经)取得了成功,但国内外大量的现实案例和学术文献都表明,多元化对于企业来说具有很高的风险,企业进行多元化需要谨慎决策。然而,在我国企业的经营实践中,却存在一种令人困惑的现象：一方面,一些企业已经负债累累,甚至濒临破产的边缘；另一方面,它们却还在“积极”开展多元化,或者依然维持程度很高的多元化经营状态。企业在高负债情境下进一步从事风险很高的多元化,这有悖经济学直觉,因为这无疑会增大企业的破产风险,最终可能危及企业自身和债权人的利益。那么,企业在高负债情境下仍然“积极”进行多元化的动因是什么?一个更一般的问题是,负债对企业多元化存在什么样的影响,其内在的逻辑是什么?这些问题值得思考和研究。特别是考虑到我国现阶段金融市场还不健全,企业在投资运营中普遍利用财务杠杆,大量企业前赴后继进行多元化,容易积累经营风险和金融风险,准确理解负债在企业多元化决策中的作用,无疑具有重要的现实意义。
多元化动因的理论研究迄今已形成了资源利用、市场势力、内部资本市场、资产组合、代理理论(股东-经理人冲突视角)、CEO过度自信等理论解释,然而,它们均未关注负债对企业多元化的作用。另一方面,在公司金融学领域中,企业资本结构(负债)影响企业投资行为(多元化是一种典型的企业投资行为)的基础理论已经相当成熟,如代理成本理论(包含股东-经理人冲突视角和股东-债权人冲突视角)、财务契约理论、信号模型、优序融资理论等,它们为分析负债对企业多元化的影响提供了潜在的理论基础。不过,这些理论并未直接指出企业资本结构对多元化存在什么影响,相应的经验研究也非常匮乏。因此,基于企业资本结构影响企业投资行为的相关理论,来分析企业资本结构对多元化的影响并提供实证检验,不仅有助于从理论和实践上来理解负债对企业多元化的影响,还可以拓展这些理论的应用范围和提供丰富的经验证据。
在具体探讨企业资本结构对多元化的影响时,有两个方面的情况需要进一步关注。一是负债本身存在不同的类型,而不同类型的负债在代理成本、债务治理等方面存在差异。二是多元化通常包括相关多元化和非相关多元化两种类型,它们对企业产生的风险和收益通常存在明显差异。负债和多元化各自内部丰富的类型,可能会使得企业资本结构对多元化的影响变得更加丰富和复杂。此外,企业资本结构影响企业投资行为的相关理论及其前提假设,是基于西方制度背景提出来的,而我国经济转型时期特殊的制度背景,可能会影响到这些理论在我国的适用性,从而使得企业资本结构如何影响多元化的问题趋于复杂化。其中非常突出的一点是,国有企业在我国转型经济中拥有特殊地位,这可能会使得资本结构对多元化的影响在国有和非国有企业之间出现差异,即企业产权性质可能会对资本结构与多元化之间的关系造成影响。这些问题都有待提供更加确切的经验证据和更加合理的理论解释。
本文采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法,基于企业资本结构影响企业投资行为的相关理论,结合我国转型经济制度背景,系统分析了我国企业资本结构对多元化的影响,以及企业产权性质对此的作用,并利用沪深两市A股制造业上市公司2007-2010年的数据进行了实证检验。本研究的主要内容与结论包括：
第一,在我国上市公司中,企业总体负债水平(在总体上)正向影响企业多元化。企业资本结构影响企业投资行为的相关理论认为,负债对企业投资行为存在多种效应,如资产替代效应、债务积压效应、风险规避效应和债务治理效应等。其中,在资产替代效应下,企业资本结构对多元化具有正向影响；在其余三种效应下,企业资本结构对多元化具有负向影响。在我国转型经济背景下,一方面由于存在企业外部治理机制尚不完善、企业破产机制不够健全等因素,相对于西方发达经济体,负债的治理和约束作用均比较弱,使得负债对企业多元化的负向抑制作用也比较弱。另一方面,由于历史和体制的原因,包括银行(特别是国有商业银行)在内的债权人对债务企业的监督和约束经常处于乏力甚至缺位的状态,对企业融资和非效率投资行为等的约束长期不力,这在一定程度上强化了负债的资产替代效应,增强了负债对企业多元化的正向刺激作用。因此,我国上市公司的总体负债水平对其多元化便呈现出较为明显的正向作用。
第二,企业资本结构对多元化的效应因多元化类型不同而有所差异,从总体上看,相比相关多元化,企业总体负债水平(以及银行借款和商业信用)对非相关多元化的正向影响更强。相关的理论和实证研究表明,对于企业来说,开展非相关多元化的风险和一旦取得成功后的收益通常高于相关多元化。因此,相比相关多元化,许多企业更倾向于进行非相关多元化。这一差异在我国的经济和市场现实中表现得尤为突出。过去十来年中,由于种种原因,我国大部分制造业行业的增长普遍较为缓慢,有的行业甚至陷入停滞,许多制造业企业便通过非相关多元化进入那些毛利率更高的行业(如房地产、能源、矿产、金融投资等领域)寻找发展空间。根据资产替代效应的逻辑,投资项目的风险和潜在收益越高,企业越可能进行过度投资。由此,在我国上市公司中,相比相关多元化,负债对非相关多元化的正向刺激作用更大。
第三,企业资本结构对多元化的效应因负债来源不同而有所差异,从总体上看,相比银行借款,商业信用对企业多元化(包括总体多元化、相关多元化和非相关多元化)的正向影响更强。相关的理论和实证研究表明,银行借款通常比商业信用具有更强的相机治理作用(相应地会导致更强的债务积压效应和风险规避效应)。尽管我国银行借款的治理效应相对于西方发达经济体长期偏弱,但是与商业信用等其它类型的负债相比,银行借款的治理效应又相对较强。随着我国国有商业银行股份制改革的深化和银行内部治理水平的不断提升,银行借款对债务企业的治理作用也不断增强。因此,相比银行借款,商业信用对企业多元化的正向作用更大。
第四,针对我国制造业上市公司的实证研究发现,企业资本结构对多元化的影响因企业产权性质不同而存在差异。这具体又表现在三个方面。一是相对于非国有企业,银行借款对国有企业多元化的正向影响更强。其原因在于,国有企业相对于非国有企业通常享有较弱的融资约束和预算约束,使得银行借款对国有企业的治理效应偏弱。二是相对于非国有企业,商业信用对国有企业多元化的正向影响更弱。其原因在于,国有企业借用商业信用来缓解融资约束的客观需要和主观动机较弱,从而使得商业信用对国有企业的治理效应相对较强。三是相对于非国有企业,国有企业的总体负债水平对其多元化的正效应更强。其原因在于,尽管商业信用对国有企业的治理效应比非国有企业相对较强,银行借款对国有企业的治理效应比非国有企业相对较弱,但是银行借款是我国企业债务资金的最主要来源,这最终使得企业总体负债水平对国有企业的负向影响相对弱于非国有企业。
本研究的学术价值和创新点主要集中在以下三点：
第一,本文基于企业资本结构影响企业投资行为的相关理论,系统分析并实证检验了负债对企业多元化的影响,从企业资本结构的角度为多元化动因研究提供了一个新的观察视角。已有的多元化动因理论从不同角度对企业多元化的动因作出了各有说服力的解释,不过它们均没有关注负债以及债权治理对多元化的影响。本文在研究视角上为多元化动因研究提供了有益的探索。
第二,基于我国制造业上市公司的数据,从多层面、多角度实证检验了企业资本结构对多元化的影响,提供了丰富的经验证据。一是实证检验了企业总体负债水平对企业总体多元化的影响。二是把企业总体多元化划分为相关多元化和非相关多元化,同时从负债来源角度把负债主要区分为银行借款和商业信用,然后基于一贯的理论逻辑,实证检验了银行借款、商业信用(以及企业总体负债水平)分别对企业总体多元化、相关多元化和非相关多元化的影响。三是在进行上述全部实证检验的过程中,充分考虑了我国在转型经济时期资本市场欠发达、公司治理水平偏低、企业破产机制尚不健全等制度背景特征。
第三,在我国的转型经济背景下,分析和检验了企业资本结构对多元化的效应,发现了企业产权性质对此的重要影响。企业资本结构影响企业投资行为的相关理论是基于西方的制度环境提出来的,在该环境中企业的融资与债务通常具有硬约束特征。然而,在我国经济现实中,国有企业相比非国有企业普遍存在弱融资约束和软预算约束特征。因此,它们在企业资本结构与多元化的关系方面存在明显差异。这一研究发现为企业资本结构影响企业投资行为的相关理论,在我国转型制度背景下的适用性和具体表现形式提供了证据,增进了对这些理论与现实情境之间关系的认识。
此外,本研究有助于理解负债对多元化的现实影响(包括企业在高负债情境下仍然“积极”进行多元化的现象),对企业加强自身风险管控、规范上市公司的多元化行为和增强债权人的利益保护等,均具有一定的现实意义。
Diversification is a common enterprise investment and business activity. Although some companies have achieved diversify (or has already done) success, but a large number of domestic and international cases and academic literature have shown that diversity for businesses with high risk, companies need to be careful of the decision to diversify. However, in our corporate business practice, there is a puzzling phenomenon:on the one hand, some companies are already heavily in debt, or even on the verge of bankruptcy; On the other hand, they are still diversifying "actively", or still maintain a high degree of diversification status. The phenomenon that enterprises in high debt situations engage further in diversification with high risk is at odds with people's economic counterintuitive, because it will undoubtedly increase the risk of bankruptcy of enterprises and ultimately can endanger the enterprises themselves and the interests of creditors. So what is the motivation of companies in the high debt situations is still "positive" to diversify? A more general problem is that how will debts affect corporate diversification and what is the inherent logic behind it? Especially considering China's current financial market is not perfect yet, enterprises generally exploit financial leverage in the investment operations, a large number of companies pour in diversify tend to accumulate business and financial risks, an accurate understanding of the role of debt in the corporate decision-making of diversification undoubtedly has important practical significance.
Theoretical research for motives of diversification to date has formed resource utilization, market power, internal capital market, asset portfolio, agency theory (shareholder-manager conflict perspective), CEO overconfidence and others theoretical explanations, however, they were not concerned about the role of debt for the corporate diversification. On the other hand, in the field of corporate finance, the basic theory of corporate capital structure (debt) affect investment behavior (diversification is a typical corporate investment behavior) is already quite mature, such as agency cost theory (including shareholders-managers conflict perspective and shareholders-creditors conflict perspective), financial contract theory, signal model, pecking order theory, which provide a potential theoretical foundation for analyzing the impact of debt on corporate diversification. However, these theories do not directly point out the effect of corporate capital structure on diversification, the corresponding empirical research is also very scarce. Therefore, using the related theories based on the effect of capital structure on investment behavior to analyze the effect of corporate capital structure on diversification and provide empirical tests, is not only helpful for the theoretical and practical understanding of the impact of debt on corporate diversification, but also useful for expanding the scope of application of theories, as well as providing more empirical evidence.
About the specific impact of debt on diversification, there are two aspects requires further attention. Firstly, there are different types of debt, which are different in agency costs and debt governance; secondly, diversification typically includes two types:related diversification and unrelated diversification, and the risks and revenue of them are usually significantly different. The different types of debts and diversification may make the relationship between debt and diversification become more complicated. In addition, the underlying assumptions of the dominant theories of the effect of corporate capital structure on investment behavior is based on Western institutional context, which is quite different from China's transitional economic environment, especially the characteristics of the state-owned enterprises
This paper, based on theories of the effect of capital structure on investment behavior, considering China's transitional economic environment, systematically analyzes the impact of the capital structure on diversification, and uses the data of listed manufacturing companies from2007to2010to carry out an empirical test.In this study, the main contents and conclusions include:
Firstly, in general, for listed companies in China, the company's overall debt has positive effect on diversification. There are two kinds of different views on the relationshiop between debt and diversification:one insists that debt has positive effect on diversification, mainly the asset substitution effect theory; the other argue that debt has nagetive effect on diversification, including debt governance, debt overhang and risk avoidance theory. In China's transitional economic environment, debt has weaker governance effect than that in western countries due to the non-effective of the external governance mechanism. Meanwhile, the asset substitution effect of debt is stronger due to the fact that debt owners (especially banks) have weaker willingness and ability to supervise and restrict the non-effective financing and investing behaviors of debtors. Therefore, the company's overall debt has positive effect on diversification in China.
Secondly, the effect of corporate capital structure on different types of diversification differs, in general, debt (including overall debt, bank loan and business credit) has stronger positive effect on non-related diversification (compared to related diversification). Relevant theoretical and empirical studies have shown that, the risks and benefits of non-related diversification are both higher than those of related diversification. Therefore, most of the companies prefer non-related diversification than related diversification, which is quite more universal in China. Over the past decade, many manufacturing companies has entered into industries with higher margin (such as real estate, energy, mining, financial investments and other areas). According to the logic of asset substitution effect, debt boosts companies to seek investment opportunities with higher risks and benefits. Thus, debt has stronger positive effect on unrelated diversification than that on related diversification for China's listed companies.
Thirdly, different kind of debt has different effect on diversification. In general, compared to bank loans, commercial credit has stronger positive effect on corporate diversification (including the overall diversification, related diversification and unrelated diversification). Relevant theoretical and empirical studies show that bank loan is stronger in debt governance than commercial credit. Although the debt governance effect of bank loan in China is not so apparent as that in Western developed economies, the debt governance effect of bank loan is stronger than that of commercial credit. Therefore, commercial credit has stronger positive effect on diversification than bank loan.
Fourthly, the empirical study of China's manufacturing industry listed companies indicates that the relationship between debt and diversification are different between stateowned and non-stateowned companies,(a) The bank loan of state-owned enterprises has stronger positive effect on diversification than that of non-state-owned enterprises. The reason is that state-owned enterprises have weaker financial constraints and softer budget constraints than non-state-owned enterprises, which weaken the governance effect of bank loan on state-owned enterprises.(b) The commercial credit of state-owned enterprises has weaker positive effect on diversification than that of non-state-owned enterprises, due to the fact that commercial credit has stronger restrictions on state-owned enterprises.(c) The overall debt of state-owned enterprises has stronger positive effect on diversification than that of non-state-owned enterprises because that bank loan is the most important source of China companies'debt.
Academic value of this study is mainly concentrated in the following three points:
Firstly, based on theories of the effect of capital structure on investment behavior, this paper analyzes and empirical tests the effect of debt on diversification, providing a new perspective for the motivation of diversification, while the existing theories of diversification motivation are not concerned about the role of debt and debt governance.
Secondly, using the data of China's manufacturing industry listed companies, this paper empirically examines the effect of the corporate capital structure to diversification from multi-level, providing additional empirical evidence. The empirical tests include examining the effect of overall debt on diversification and comparing the effect of different kinds of debt (bank loan and commercial credit) on different kinds of diversification (related diversification and unrelated diversification) in China's transitional economic environment.
Thirdly, this paper, based on the institutional background of China's transitional economy, analyzes and examines the impact of the capital structure on diversification and points out the important role companies'ownership type in the relationship between capital structure and diversification. In China, stateowned companies have weaker financing constraints and softer budget constraints than non-stateowned companies and most companies in western countries, resulting in the different effect of debt on diversification between stateowned and non-stateowned companies.
In addition, this study is helpful to understand the effect of debt on diversification in reality (including the phenomena of enterprises with high debt seek opportunities of diversification). Meanwhile, this study also has reference value for companies's risk control and diversification decision as well as creditor benefits protection.
多元化动因的理论研究迄今已形成了资源利用、市场势力、内部资本市场、资产组合、代理理论(股东-经理人冲突视角)、CEO过度自信等理论解释,然而,它们均未关注负债对企业多元化的作用。另一方面,在公司金融学领域中,企业资本结构(负债)影响企业投资行为(多元化是一种典型的企业投资行为)的基础理论已经相当成熟,如代理成本理论(包含股东-经理人冲突视角和股东-债权人冲突视角)、财务契约理论、信号模型、优序融资理论等,它们为分析负债对企业多元化的影响提供了潜在的理论基础。不过,这些理论并未直接指出企业资本结构对多元化存在什么影响,相应的经验研究也非常匮乏。因此,基于企业资本结构影响企业投资行为的相关理论,来分析企业资本结构对多元化的影响并提供实证检验,不仅有助于从理论和实践上来理解负债对企业多元化的影响,还可以拓展这些理论的应用范围和提供丰富的经验证据。
在具体探讨企业资本结构对多元化的影响时,有两个方面的情况需要进一步关注。一是负债本身存在不同的类型,而不同类型的负债在代理成本、债务治理等方面存在差异。二是多元化通常包括相关多元化和非相关多元化两种类型,它们对企业产生的风险和收益通常存在明显差异。负债和多元化各自内部丰富的类型,可能会使得企业资本结构对多元化的影响变得更加丰富和复杂。此外,企业资本结构影响企业投资行为的相关理论及其前提假设,是基于西方制度背景提出来的,而我国经济转型时期特殊的制度背景,可能会影响到这些理论在我国的适用性,从而使得企业资本结构如何影响多元化的问题趋于复杂化。其中非常突出的一点是,国有企业在我国转型经济中拥有特殊地位,这可能会使得资本结构对多元化的影响在国有和非国有企业之间出现差异,即企业产权性质可能会对资本结构与多元化之间的关系造成影响。这些问题都有待提供更加确切的经验证据和更加合理的理论解释。
本文采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法,基于企业资本结构影响企业投资行为的相关理论,结合我国转型经济制度背景,系统分析了我国企业资本结构对多元化的影响,以及企业产权性质对此的作用,并利用沪深两市A股制造业上市公司2007-2010年的数据进行了实证检验。本研究的主要内容与结论包括：
第一,在我国上市公司中,企业总体负债水平(在总体上)正向影响企业多元化。企业资本结构影响企业投资行为的相关理论认为,负债对企业投资行为存在多种效应,如资产替代效应、债务积压效应、风险规避效应和债务治理效应等。其中,在资产替代效应下,企业资本结构对多元化具有正向影响；在其余三种效应下,企业资本结构对多元化具有负向影响。在我国转型经济背景下,一方面由于存在企业外部治理机制尚不完善、企业破产机制不够健全等因素,相对于西方发达经济体,负债的治理和约束作用均比较弱,使得负债对企业多元化的负向抑制作用也比较弱。另一方面,由于历史和体制的原因,包括银行(特别是国有商业银行)在内的债权人对债务企业的监督和约束经常处于乏力甚至缺位的状态,对企业融资和非效率投资行为等的约束长期不力,这在一定程度上强化了负债的资产替代效应,增强了负债对企业多元化的正向刺激作用。因此,我国上市公司的总体负债水平对其多元化便呈现出较为明显的正向作用。
第二,企业资本结构对多元化的效应因多元化类型不同而有所差异,从总体上看,相比相关多元化,企业总体负债水平(以及银行借款和商业信用)对非相关多元化的正向影响更强。相关的理论和实证研究表明,对于企业来说,开展非相关多元化的风险和一旦取得成功后的收益通常高于相关多元化。因此,相比相关多元化,许多企业更倾向于进行非相关多元化。这一差异在我国的经济和市场现实中表现得尤为突出。过去十来年中,由于种种原因,我国大部分制造业行业的增长普遍较为缓慢,有的行业甚至陷入停滞,许多制造业企业便通过非相关多元化进入那些毛利率更高的行业(如房地产、能源、矿产、金融投资等领域)寻找发展空间。根据资产替代效应的逻辑,投资项目的风险和潜在收益越高,企业越可能进行过度投资。由此,在我国上市公司中,相比相关多元化,负债对非相关多元化的正向刺激作用更大。
第三,企业资本结构对多元化的效应因负债来源不同而有所差异,从总体上看,相比银行借款,商业信用对企业多元化(包括总体多元化、相关多元化和非相关多元化)的正向影响更强。相关的理论和实证研究表明,银行借款通常比商业信用具有更强的相机治理作用(相应地会导致更强的债务积压效应和风险规避效应)。尽管我国银行借款的治理效应相对于西方发达经济体长期偏弱,但是与商业信用等其它类型的负债相比,银行借款的治理效应又相对较强。随着我国国有商业银行股份制改革的深化和银行内部治理水平的不断提升,银行借款对债务企业的治理作用也不断增强。因此,相比银行借款,商业信用对企业多元化的正向作用更大。
第四,针对我国制造业上市公司的实证研究发现,企业资本结构对多元化的影响因企业产权性质不同而存在差异。这具体又表现在三个方面。一是相对于非国有企业,银行借款对国有企业多元化的正向影响更强。其原因在于,国有企业相对于非国有企业通常享有较弱的融资约束和预算约束,使得银行借款对国有企业的治理效应偏弱。二是相对于非国有企业,商业信用对国有企业多元化的正向影响更弱。其原因在于,国有企业借用商业信用来缓解融资约束的客观需要和主观动机较弱,从而使得商业信用对国有企业的治理效应相对较强。三是相对于非国有企业,国有企业的总体负债水平对其多元化的正效应更强。其原因在于,尽管商业信用对国有企业的治理效应比非国有企业相对较强,银行借款对国有企业的治理效应比非国有企业相对较弱,但是银行借款是我国企业债务资金的最主要来源,这最终使得企业总体负债水平对国有企业的负向影响相对弱于非国有企业。
本研究的学术价值和创新点主要集中在以下三点：
第一,本文基于企业资本结构影响企业投资行为的相关理论,系统分析并实证检验了负债对企业多元化的影响,从企业资本结构的角度为多元化动因研究提供了一个新的观察视角。已有的多元化动因理论从不同角度对企业多元化的动因作出了各有说服力的解释,不过它们均没有关注负债以及债权治理对多元化的影响。本文在研究视角上为多元化动因研究提供了有益的探索。
第二,基于我国制造业上市公司的数据,从多层面、多角度实证检验了企业资本结构对多元化的影响,提供了丰富的经验证据。一是实证检验了企业总体负债水平对企业总体多元化的影响。二是把企业总体多元化划分为相关多元化和非相关多元化,同时从负债来源角度把负债主要区分为银行借款和商业信用,然后基于一贯的理论逻辑,实证检验了银行借款、商业信用(以及企业总体负债水平)分别对企业总体多元化、相关多元化和非相关多元化的影响。三是在进行上述全部实证检验的过程中,充分考虑了我国在转型经济时期资本市场欠发达、公司治理水平偏低、企业破产机制尚不健全等制度背景特征。
第三,在我国的转型经济背景下,分析和检验了企业资本结构对多元化的效应,发现了企业产权性质对此的重要影响。企业资本结构影响企业投资行为的相关理论是基于西方的制度环境提出来的,在该环境中企业的融资与债务通常具有硬约束特征。然而,在我国经济现实中,国有企业相比非国有企业普遍存在弱融资约束和软预算约束特征。因此,它们在企业资本结构与多元化的关系方面存在明显差异。这一研究发现为企业资本结构影响企业投资行为的相关理论,在我国转型制度背景下的适用性和具体表现形式提供了证据,增进了对这些理论与现实情境之间关系的认识。
此外,本研究有助于理解负债对多元化的现实影响(包括企业在高负债情境下仍然“积极”进行多元化的现象),对企业加强自身风险管控、规范上市公司的多元化行为和增强债权人的利益保护等,均具有一定的现实意义。
Diversification is a common enterprise investment and business activity. Although some companies have achieved diversify (or has already done) success, but a large number of domestic and international cases and academic literature have shown that diversity for businesses with high risk, companies need to be careful of the decision to diversify. However, in our corporate business practice, there is a puzzling phenomenon:on the one hand, some companies are already heavily in debt, or even on the verge of bankruptcy; On the other hand, they are still diversifying "actively", or still maintain a high degree of diversification status. The phenomenon that enterprises in high debt situations engage further in diversification with high risk is at odds with people's economic counterintuitive, because it will undoubtedly increase the risk of bankruptcy of enterprises and ultimately can endanger the enterprises themselves and the interests of creditors. So what is the motivation of companies in the high debt situations is still "positive" to diversify? A more general problem is that how will debts affect corporate diversification and what is the inherent logic behind it? Especially considering China's current financial market is not perfect yet, enterprises generally exploit financial leverage in the investment operations, a large number of companies pour in diversify tend to accumulate business and financial risks, an accurate understanding of the role of debt in the corporate decision-making of diversification undoubtedly has important practical significance.
Theoretical research for motives of diversification to date has formed resource utilization, market power, internal capital market, asset portfolio, agency theory (shareholder-manager conflict perspective), CEO overconfidence and others theoretical explanations, however, they were not concerned about the role of debt for the corporate diversification. On the other hand, in the field of corporate finance, the basic theory of corporate capital structure (debt) affect investment behavior (diversification is a typical corporate investment behavior) is already quite mature, such as agency cost theory (including shareholders-managers conflict perspective and shareholders-creditors conflict perspective), financial contract theory, signal model, pecking order theory, which provide a potential theoretical foundation for analyzing the impact of debt on corporate diversification. However, these theories do not directly point out the effect of corporate capital structure on diversification, the corresponding empirical research is also very scarce. Therefore, using the related theories based on the effect of capital structure on investment behavior to analyze the effect of corporate capital structure on diversification and provide empirical tests, is not only helpful for the theoretical and practical understanding of the impact of debt on corporate diversification, but also useful for expanding the scope of application of theories, as well as providing more empirical evidence.
About the specific impact of debt on diversification, there are two aspects requires further attention. Firstly, there are different types of debt, which are different in agency costs and debt governance; secondly, diversification typically includes two types:related diversification and unrelated diversification, and the risks and revenue of them are usually significantly different. The different types of debts and diversification may make the relationship between debt and diversification become more complicated. In addition, the underlying assumptions of the dominant theories of the effect of corporate capital structure on investment behavior is based on Western institutional context, which is quite different from China's transitional economic environment, especially the characteristics of the state-owned enterprises
This paper, based on theories of the effect of capital structure on investment behavior, considering China's transitional economic environment, systematically analyzes the impact of the capital structure on diversification, and uses the data of listed manufacturing companies from2007to2010to carry out an empirical test.In this study, the main contents and conclusions include:
Firstly, in general, for listed companies in China, the company's overall debt has positive effect on diversification. There are two kinds of different views on the relationshiop between debt and diversification:one insists that debt has positive effect on diversification, mainly the asset substitution effect theory; the other argue that debt has nagetive effect on diversification, including debt governance, debt overhang and risk avoidance theory. In China's transitional economic environment, debt has weaker governance effect than that in western countries due to the non-effective of the external governance mechanism. Meanwhile, the asset substitution effect of debt is stronger due to the fact that debt owners (especially banks) have weaker willingness and ability to supervise and restrict the non-effective financing and investing behaviors of debtors. Therefore, the company's overall debt has positive effect on diversification in China.
Secondly, the effect of corporate capital structure on different types of diversification differs, in general, debt (including overall debt, bank loan and business credit) has stronger positive effect on non-related diversification (compared to related diversification). Relevant theoretical and empirical studies have shown that, the risks and benefits of non-related diversification are both higher than those of related diversification. Therefore, most of the companies prefer non-related diversification than related diversification, which is quite more universal in China. Over the past decade, many manufacturing companies has entered into industries with higher margin (such as real estate, energy, mining, financial investments and other areas). According to the logic of asset substitution effect, debt boosts companies to seek investment opportunities with higher risks and benefits. Thus, debt has stronger positive effect on unrelated diversification than that on related diversification for China's listed companies.
Thirdly, different kind of debt has different effect on diversification. In general, compared to bank loans, commercial credit has stronger positive effect on corporate diversification (including the overall diversification, related diversification and unrelated diversification). Relevant theoretical and empirical studies show that bank loan is stronger in debt governance than commercial credit. Although the debt governance effect of bank loan in China is not so apparent as that in Western developed economies, the debt governance effect of bank loan is stronger than that of commercial credit. Therefore, commercial credit has stronger positive effect on diversification than bank loan.
Fourthly, the empirical study of China's manufacturing industry listed companies indicates that the relationship between debt and diversification are different between stateowned and non-stateowned companies,(a) The bank loan of state-owned enterprises has stronger positive effect on diversification than that of non-state-owned enterprises. The reason is that state-owned enterprises have weaker financial constraints and softer budget constraints than non-state-owned enterprises, which weaken the governance effect of bank loan on state-owned enterprises.(b) The commercial credit of state-owned enterprises has weaker positive effect on diversification than that of non-state-owned enterprises, due to the fact that commercial credit has stronger restrictions on state-owned enterprises.(c) The overall debt of state-owned enterprises has stronger positive effect on diversification than that of non-state-owned enterprises because that bank loan is the most important source of China companies'debt.
Academic value of this study is mainly concentrated in the following three points:
Firstly, based on theories of the effect of capital structure on investment behavior, this paper analyzes and empirical tests the effect of debt on diversification, providing a new perspective for the motivation of diversification, while the existing theories of diversification motivation are not concerned about the role of debt and debt governance.
Secondly, using the data of China's manufacturing industry listed companies, this paper empirically examines the effect of the corporate capital structure to diversification from multi-level, providing additional empirical evidence. The empirical tests include examining the effect of overall debt on diversification and comparing the effect of different kinds of debt (bank loan and commercial credit) on different kinds of diversification (related diversification and unrelated diversification) in China's transitional economic environment.
Thirdly, this paper, based on the institutional background of China's transitional economy, analyzes and examines the impact of the capital structure on diversification and points out the important role companies'ownership type in the relationship between capital structure and diversification. In China, stateowned companies have weaker financing constraints and softer budget constraints than non-stateowned companies and most companies in western countries, resulting in the different effect of debt on diversification between stateowned and non-stateowned companies.
In addition, this study is helpful to understand the effect of debt on diversification in reality (including the phenomena of enterprises with high debt seek opportunities of diversification). Meanwhile, this study also has reference value for companies's risk control and diversification decision as well as creditor benefits protection.
引文
2 转引自沈艺峰(1999),第17页。
1 对JM有限责任效应的说明参考了沈艺峰(1999)的相关研究,第214-215页.
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