两次世界大战后美国处理德国战争赔偿问题的政策演变
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摘要
20世纪人类社会曾经爆发了两次世界大战,德国在两次大战中都是主要的参与者、发动者,曾经给世界各国人民带来巨大伤害。因而,每次大战后战胜国如何处置德国就显得特别引人注目。在诸多战后德国问题中,战争赔偿是一个关键性的问题,因为它不仅关系到重建战后国际格局的稳定、恢复战后经济秩序、引导德国重新融入战后国际体系,还关系到美国战后的战略目标能否顺利实现,美国的国家利益能否得到有效保证等一系列问题。
由于美国超强的经济实力、举足轻重的国际地位使得美国索赔政策对一战、二战后的德国、欧洲、乃至整个国际格局都产生了重大影响。然而到目前为止,国内外学术界尚未出现全面、系统的研究两次世界大战后美国如何处理德国战争赔偿问题的专著。因此,如何以档案资料为依据,全面、系统地梳理两次大战后美国赔偿政策、赔偿理念的发展脉络;分析影响美国赔偿政策的诸种国内因素;探究美国赔偿政策运行机制的特点及其演变规律等,就成为本论文试图回答的主要问题。
本文除了绪论外,分为六个章节。每章主要内容包括。
第一章:首先分析美国诸种国内因素,包括商业立国的思想、三权分立的政治体制、实用主义外交哲学对美国赔偿政策产生的影响。然后论述巴黎和会前,美国赔偿政策形成的过程。接着重点论述巴黎和会上,美国提出的赔偿政策、坚持的赔偿原则在英、法等协约国的压力下如何逐一地被挫败。最后分析美国赔偿政策失败的深层次原因。
第二章:主要论述20年代共和党政府的赔偿政策。首先分析共和党政府奉行的经济政策和强硬、不妥协的战债政策对德国赔偿问题产生的影响,以及20年代美国赔偿政策确立的过程。阐述美国如何以鲁尔危机为契机公开介入了德国赔偿问题,并主持制订、实施了道威斯计划和杨格计划。阐述了两个赔偿计划的内容,实施的过程。大危机爆发后,美国决策者对德国赔偿问题的处理,以及德国赔偿问题的最终了结等。最后思考美国赔偿政策与20年代“经济外交”之间的关系。
第三章:本章是承上启下的一章。首先阐述美国各界,包括美国民众、学术界、决策层对一战后赔偿政策失败的反思。重点分析美国决策层中以财政部为代表的严厉派和以陆军部为代表的温和派,对于一战后赔偿政策失败的不同反思,得出的赔偿经验和教训,以及这些经验和教训又如何影响了它们各自主张的赔偿政策,进而说明美国一战后赔偿政策和二战后赔偿政策一脉相承,前后相继的关系。
第四章:阐述二战末期美国各个行政部门,包括国务院、陆军部、财政部各自提出的赔偿政策,分析各种赔偿政策的外交思想、欲达到的赔偿目的。论述各部门对赔偿决策权的争夺、及其对美国赔偿决策产生的影响。然后叙述美、英、苏三大国各自主张的赔偿政策,对历次国际会议上美国与盟国,特别是对美国与苏联之间围绕德国赔偿的争论焦点进行了逐一分析。
第五章:本章是全文的重点内容。将详细论述二战结束后,美国赔偿政策的修改与执行情况。包括占领初期,占领军政府与国务院就赔偿问题产生的矛盾与冲突,并分析其原因。论述国务卿贝尔纳斯在斯图加特讲话的背景、及其影响。通过对美国“智力赔偿"计划进行个案分析,论述“智力赔偿"计划的内容,实施的过程,并评估美国通过“智力赔偿”计划获取的赔偿价值。然后阐述莫斯科会议期间的德国赔偿问题,论述马歇尔计划与德国赔偿问题的关系,说明马歇尔计划既避免了一战后的赔偿困境,又通过该计划将德国纳入了以美国为首的西方阵营,从而比较成功地解决了德国战争赔偿问题。最后,论述马歇尔计划之后的美国赔偿政策,说明美国对以色列向德国索赔问题的解决所发挥的重要影响。
第六章:对全文进行总结与再思考。首先分析美国决策者通过纵向反思、横向对比,其赔偿理念不断深化与丰富的演变过程,总结美国赔偿理念的变化规律。分析美国赔偿政策运行机制,及其逐步完善过程,从而为美国赔偿政策的制订与实施提供了组织上、制度上的保障。思考美国“智力赔偿”计划探索出的新的支付、索赔方式有什么优点等。最后,分析影响战胜国处理德国赔偿问题成败的诸种因素。
There had been two world wars broken out in the 20~(th) century. German involved itself in both of them. It has brought about enormous losses to people of many countries. So, it has attracted great attention how the victorious nations deal with German after the wars. The war reparations has always been a key issue since it would affect the international structure's steadiness, economic order's restoration and guiding German to merge into the international system after the war. It also would affect if American's strategic aims could be realized, and whether American's interests could be safeguarded. Therefore, the USA separately made and carried out the war reparations policy for German after every War.
American reparations policy has had great impact on German, Europe, and the whole world after two World Wars because of American's powerful economy and its important international status. However, up to now, there are not any comprehensive and systematic monographs about "American war reparations policy for German" in the academic field. Therefore, describing the development of American reparations policy and reparations idea on the basis of archives comprehensively and systematically, finding out the influential elements of American reparations policy, studying the feature of American reparations policy's mechanism have become the main objects of my dissertation.
The dissertation is composed of six chapters except the preface.
Chapter one firstly analyses various domestic influential elements which including the idea of mercantilism, the political system of separation of power, the pragmatism diplomacy philosophy. Then, it discusses the process of the formulation of American reparations policy before the Paris Peace Conference. It focuses on how American reparations policy and principle were defeated by Britain and France in the conference. At last, it analyses the profound causes of American reparations policy's failure.
Chapter two mainly interprets republican government's reparations policy. Firstly, it analyses the effect of republican government's economic policy and unyielding debt policy on the Germany reparations problem. It discusses the formulation of American reparations policy in the 1920s. Then, it discusses American's intervention in Germany reparations issue because of the Ruhr Crisis, the formulation of the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan, and the contents of two plans. It also explores after the Great Depression, how American policymakers dealt with Germany reparations problem and how Germany reparations problem ended. Lastly, it studies the relations between American reparations policy and economic diplomacy in the 1920s.
Chapter three is a bind. It describes the introspections of American people, the academic field, and policymakers for the failure of American reparations policy after the First World War. It analyses the different introspections, experiences and lessons about American reparations policy's failure between the sterns and the moderates, which was respectively represented by the Finance Ministry and the War Ministry. And it also discusses how the experiences and lessons have affected their reparations policy. Therefore, it proves that the two reparations policies are closely linked and coming out from one strain.
Chapter four discusses the reparations policy of various departments which including the Department of State, the War Ministry, the Finance Ministry. It analyses the ideas and goals of various reparations policy, how the various departments fighting for the authority of handling the reparations problem, and its influence on American reparations policy. Then, it respectively describes the reparations policies of the USA, Britain and the Soviet Union. It especially analyses the USA and Soviet Union's major controversies over the Germany reparations issue.
Chapter five is a major one of the whole dissertation. It mainly discusses the revising and the executing of American reparations policy after the Second World War. It analyses the conflicts and causes about Germany reparations between OMGUS and the Department of State. It explores the background and the influence of Byrnes's Stuttgart Speech. Then it analyses the content of American "Intellectual Reparations" Plan, and the Plan's value. Furthermore, it discusses Germany reparations problem in the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers, the relationship between the Marshall Plan and Germany reparations. The Marshall Plan not only avoided the dilemma after the First World War, but also made Germany Merge into the western world. Therefore, the USA smoothly settled the Germany reparations problem. Finally, it discusses that the American Reparations policy after the Marshall Plan can successfully illustrate the important impact of the USA on the Israel claim against German.
Chapter six sums up and reconsiders the dissertation. It discusses the deepening and the enriching of American reparations idea through introspecting and comparing. It summarizes the regularity of American reparations idea's development. It analyses the functional mechanism of American reparations policy, and the mechanism's revising process. The mechanism provides organizational and systematic premise for the American reparations policy. It studies the advantages of the American "Intellectual Reparations" Plan which has brought about a new reparations form. At Last, it analyses various influential elements on the result of Germany reparations.
由于美国超强的经济实力、举足轻重的国际地位使得美国索赔政策对一战、二战后的德国、欧洲、乃至整个国际格局都产生了重大影响。然而到目前为止,国内外学术界尚未出现全面、系统的研究两次世界大战后美国如何处理德国战争赔偿问题的专著。因此,如何以档案资料为依据,全面、系统地梳理两次大战后美国赔偿政策、赔偿理念的发展脉络;分析影响美国赔偿政策的诸种国内因素;探究美国赔偿政策运行机制的特点及其演变规律等,就成为本论文试图回答的主要问题。
本文除了绪论外,分为六个章节。每章主要内容包括。
第一章:首先分析美国诸种国内因素,包括商业立国的思想、三权分立的政治体制、实用主义外交哲学对美国赔偿政策产生的影响。然后论述巴黎和会前,美国赔偿政策形成的过程。接着重点论述巴黎和会上,美国提出的赔偿政策、坚持的赔偿原则在英、法等协约国的压力下如何逐一地被挫败。最后分析美国赔偿政策失败的深层次原因。
第二章:主要论述20年代共和党政府的赔偿政策。首先分析共和党政府奉行的经济政策和强硬、不妥协的战债政策对德国赔偿问题产生的影响,以及20年代美国赔偿政策确立的过程。阐述美国如何以鲁尔危机为契机公开介入了德国赔偿问题,并主持制订、实施了道威斯计划和杨格计划。阐述了两个赔偿计划的内容,实施的过程。大危机爆发后,美国决策者对德国赔偿问题的处理,以及德国赔偿问题的最终了结等。最后思考美国赔偿政策与20年代“经济外交”之间的关系。
第三章:本章是承上启下的一章。首先阐述美国各界,包括美国民众、学术界、决策层对一战后赔偿政策失败的反思。重点分析美国决策层中以财政部为代表的严厉派和以陆军部为代表的温和派,对于一战后赔偿政策失败的不同反思,得出的赔偿经验和教训,以及这些经验和教训又如何影响了它们各自主张的赔偿政策,进而说明美国一战后赔偿政策和二战后赔偿政策一脉相承,前后相继的关系。
第四章:阐述二战末期美国各个行政部门,包括国务院、陆军部、财政部各自提出的赔偿政策,分析各种赔偿政策的外交思想、欲达到的赔偿目的。论述各部门对赔偿决策权的争夺、及其对美国赔偿决策产生的影响。然后叙述美、英、苏三大国各自主张的赔偿政策,对历次国际会议上美国与盟国,特别是对美国与苏联之间围绕德国赔偿的争论焦点进行了逐一分析。
第五章:本章是全文的重点内容。将详细论述二战结束后,美国赔偿政策的修改与执行情况。包括占领初期,占领军政府与国务院就赔偿问题产生的矛盾与冲突,并分析其原因。论述国务卿贝尔纳斯在斯图加特讲话的背景、及其影响。通过对美国“智力赔偿"计划进行个案分析,论述“智力赔偿"计划的内容,实施的过程,并评估美国通过“智力赔偿”计划获取的赔偿价值。然后阐述莫斯科会议期间的德国赔偿问题,论述马歇尔计划与德国赔偿问题的关系,说明马歇尔计划既避免了一战后的赔偿困境,又通过该计划将德国纳入了以美国为首的西方阵营,从而比较成功地解决了德国战争赔偿问题。最后,论述马歇尔计划之后的美国赔偿政策,说明美国对以色列向德国索赔问题的解决所发挥的重要影响。
第六章:对全文进行总结与再思考。首先分析美国决策者通过纵向反思、横向对比,其赔偿理念不断深化与丰富的演变过程,总结美国赔偿理念的变化规律。分析美国赔偿政策运行机制,及其逐步完善过程,从而为美国赔偿政策的制订与实施提供了组织上、制度上的保障。思考美国“智力赔偿”计划探索出的新的支付、索赔方式有什么优点等。最后,分析影响战胜国处理德国赔偿问题成败的诸种因素。
There had been two world wars broken out in the 20~(th) century. German involved itself in both of them. It has brought about enormous losses to people of many countries. So, it has attracted great attention how the victorious nations deal with German after the wars. The war reparations has always been a key issue since it would affect the international structure's steadiness, economic order's restoration and guiding German to merge into the international system after the war. It also would affect if American's strategic aims could be realized, and whether American's interests could be safeguarded. Therefore, the USA separately made and carried out the war reparations policy for German after every War.
American reparations policy has had great impact on German, Europe, and the whole world after two World Wars because of American's powerful economy and its important international status. However, up to now, there are not any comprehensive and systematic monographs about "American war reparations policy for German" in the academic field. Therefore, describing the development of American reparations policy and reparations idea on the basis of archives comprehensively and systematically, finding out the influential elements of American reparations policy, studying the feature of American reparations policy's mechanism have become the main objects of my dissertation.
The dissertation is composed of six chapters except the preface.
Chapter one firstly analyses various domestic influential elements which including the idea of mercantilism, the political system of separation of power, the pragmatism diplomacy philosophy. Then, it discusses the process of the formulation of American reparations policy before the Paris Peace Conference. It focuses on how American reparations policy and principle were defeated by Britain and France in the conference. At last, it analyses the profound causes of American reparations policy's failure.
Chapter two mainly interprets republican government's reparations policy. Firstly, it analyses the effect of republican government's economic policy and unyielding debt policy on the Germany reparations problem. It discusses the formulation of American reparations policy in the 1920s. Then, it discusses American's intervention in Germany reparations issue because of the Ruhr Crisis, the formulation of the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan, and the contents of two plans. It also explores after the Great Depression, how American policymakers dealt with Germany reparations problem and how Germany reparations problem ended. Lastly, it studies the relations between American reparations policy and economic diplomacy in the 1920s.
Chapter three is a bind. It describes the introspections of American people, the academic field, and policymakers for the failure of American reparations policy after the First World War. It analyses the different introspections, experiences and lessons about American reparations policy's failure between the sterns and the moderates, which was respectively represented by the Finance Ministry and the War Ministry. And it also discusses how the experiences and lessons have affected their reparations policy. Therefore, it proves that the two reparations policies are closely linked and coming out from one strain.
Chapter four discusses the reparations policy of various departments which including the Department of State, the War Ministry, the Finance Ministry. It analyses the ideas and goals of various reparations policy, how the various departments fighting for the authority of handling the reparations problem, and its influence on American reparations policy. Then, it respectively describes the reparations policies of the USA, Britain and the Soviet Union. It especially analyses the USA and Soviet Union's major controversies over the Germany reparations issue.
Chapter five is a major one of the whole dissertation. It mainly discusses the revising and the executing of American reparations policy after the Second World War. It analyses the conflicts and causes about Germany reparations between OMGUS and the Department of State. It explores the background and the influence of Byrnes's Stuttgart Speech. Then it analyses the content of American "Intellectual Reparations" Plan, and the Plan's value. Furthermore, it discusses Germany reparations problem in the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers, the relationship between the Marshall Plan and Germany reparations. The Marshall Plan not only avoided the dilemma after the First World War, but also made Germany Merge into the western world. Therefore, the USA smoothly settled the Germany reparations problem. Finally, it discusses that the American Reparations policy after the Marshall Plan can successfully illustrate the important impact of the USA on the Israel claim against German.
Chapter six sums up and reconsiders the dissertation. It discusses the deepening and the enriching of American reparations idea through introspecting and comparing. It summarizes the regularity of American reparations idea's development. It analyses the functional mechanism of American reparations policy, and the mechanism's revising process. The mechanism provides organizational and systematic premise for the American reparations policy. It studies the advantages of the American "Intellectual Reparations" Plan which has brought about a new reparations form. At Last, it analyses various influential elements on the result of Germany reparations.
引文
[1]杨生茂:《美西战争资料选辑》[Z]上海:上海人民出版社,1981年版,第38-39页。
[2]Edward Buchrig,Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of power,Indiana University Press,1955,p.14.
[1]FRUS,1918,Sup.1,p.343.The Secretary of State t0 the Swiss Charge(Oederlin).
[2]豪斯参与停战协议谈判的过程、结果参见豪斯从1918年10月28日—11月3日连续发给国务卿的几份电报·FRUS,1918,Sup.1,The World War,Vol.1,pp.405-455.The special reperesentative(House)to the Secretary of State.
[3]王铁崖选译:《一九一四——一九一八年第一次世界大战》第147页。
[4]其主要内容有:(1)在停战协定签字以后六小时,须停止陆空战事。(2)立即从下列被占领的国家撤退:法国、比利时、卢森堡及阿尔萨斯—洛林。撤退须自停战协定签字之日起十五天的期限内完成。(3)德国军队必须放弃完好无损的战争物资,就地向协约国和美国军队移交。(4)德国军队须从莱茵河左岸的国家撤退。莱茵河左岸的国家将由在协约国和美国占领部队监督下的地方当局来管理。协约国和美国部队应通过掌握莱茵河各主要通过点(美因兹、科布伦茨、科隆)连同各该点上右岸周围三十公里的桥头堡的驻军以及同样掌握该区战略据点的驻军以保证占领。(5)在盟国和美国指定的海港内,须把现存的 所有潜水艇(包括潜水巡洋舰和所有布雷艇),连同全副军各和装备一起,向协约国和美国移交。(6)德国必须交出协约国指定数量的大炮、机枪、迫击炮、战斗机和轰炸机,以及车厢、火车头、卡车。(7)财政条款(即第19条款):在协约国和美国方面保留今后提出的任何权利和要求。其财政方面的要求是:赔偿所遭受的损失。在停战期间,敌人不得移动足以对协约国作为支付战争赔偿担保品的有价证券。立即归还比利时国家银行的库存,而一般地应立即移交有关被占领国的国家利益和私人利益的所有文件、有价物(动产和纸币及其印刷机)德国军队拿走的俄国和罗马尼亚黄金应予归还并向它们移交,该黄金在签订和约以前由协约国负责保管。FRUS,1918,Sup 1.The World War,Vol.1,p.463-468.Nov.4.1918.The Special Representative(House)to the Secretary of State.另参见,《国际条约集,1917—1923》[Z]北京:世界知识出版社.1961年版,第61-65页.
[1]FRUS,1918,Sup 1.The World War,Vol.1,pp.381-383.October.23.1918.The Secretary of State to the Swiss Charge(Oederlin).
[2]FRUS,1918,Sup 1.The World War,Vol.1,p.466.Nov.4.1918.The Special Representative(House)to the Secretary of State.
[3]FRUS,1919,The PPC,Vol.2,p.586.Memorandum by the Advisory counsel of the American Mission to the Inter—Allied Council on War Purchase and Finance(Cravath).
[4]FRUS,1919,The PPC,Vol.2,pp.585-604.Memorandum by the Advisory counsel of the American Mission to the Inter—Allied Council on War Purchase and Finance(Cravath).
[1]FRUS,1919,The PPC.,Vol.2,pp.606-607.Memorandum by Dr.A.Young:A Suggestion for American Policy with Repect to Indemnities.
[2]FRUS,1919,The PPC.Vol.1,pp.298-304.The Technical Advisers to the Commissin to Negotiate Peace(Scott,Miller)to the Secretary of State.
[1]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.10.
[2]Edward M.House,What really happened at Paris:The Story of the Peace Conference,1918-1919 by American Delegates,pp.275-276.
[3]Arthur Walworth,Wilson and his Peacemakers,American Diplomacy at the Paris Conference,1919,p.107.
[4]FRUS,1919,The PPC,vol.2,pp.575-576.The Italian Ambassador(Machi di Cellere)to the Secretary of State.
[5]FRUS,1919,The PPC,vol.2,pp.601-606.Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M.Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay.
[6]FRUS,1919,The PPC.,vol.2,pp.693-703.Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M.Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay.
[1]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.22.
[2]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.23.
[3]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the.American Delegation,p.24.
[1]Philip M.Burnentt,Keparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.26.
[2]Arthur Walworth,Wilson and his Peacemakers:American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference,1919,pp.173-174.
[3]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.27.
[4]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.62.
[5]Edward Mandell House,What really happened at Paris:The Story of the Peace Conference,1918-1919 by American Delegates,p.269.
[1]Lloyd G.David,The truth about Reparations and War-Debts.London,W.Heinemann,1932,Vol.1,pp.493-495.
[2]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.63.
[3]link Arthur,Thepapers of Woodrow Wilson,Vol.56,p.360.
[4]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.31,
[1]FRUS,1919,The PPC,Vol.1,p.575.The Special Representative(House)to President Wilson.pp.136-137.President Wilson to the Special Representative(House).
[1]FRUS,1919,The PPC.Vol.5,Notes of a Meeting Held in President W'dson's House in Place des Etats-Unis,Paris Appendix.pp.27-28.
[1]FRUS,1919,The PPC,Vo12,p.74.The Acting Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister(Sulzer).
[2]C·E·布莱克、E·C·赫尔姆赖克:《二十世纪欧洲史》[M](上),北京:人民出版社,1984年版,第136页。
[3]Kent Bruce,The Spoils of War:The Politices,Economics and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918-1932,Oxford,Clarendon Press,1989,p.70.
[4]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.69.
[5]Edward Mandell House,What really happened at Paris:The Story of the Peace Conference,1918-1919 by American Delegates,p.288.
[6]Thomas A.Bailey,A Diplomatic History of the American People,p.145.
[1]Schwabe Klaus,Woodrow Wilson,Revolutionary Germany,and Peacemakking,1918-1919:Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power,Chapel Hill.North Careolina Uni.Press,1985,p.290.
[2]Klaus Schwabe,Woodrow Wilson,Revolutionary Germany,and Peacemaking,1918-1919,p.187.
[3]卡尔·迪特利希·埃尔德曼:《德意志史》(第四卷,世界大战时期,1914-1950,上册),北京:商务印书馆,1986年版,第219页。
[4]link Arthur,Thepapers of Woodrow Wilson,Vol.59,p.581.
[1]FRUS.1919,The PPC,vol.3,pp.413-420.The Presentation of the Conditions of Peace to the German Delegate.
[2]例如,关于上西西里亚的归属必须经公民投票来决定;德国在不久的将来可以加入国联;如果德国履行它的和约义务,法国可以提早从莱茵地区撤军:德国被允许可以提出有关赔款问题的建议.
[3]其主要内容如下:第一,将国联盟约置于条约的第一部分。第二,重划了德国的疆界。第三,瓜分德国的殖民地。第四.限制德国军备,第五,赔偿和经济问题.和约第231条、232条、233条、234条、235条及附件规定:协约及参战各国政府宣言德国及其各盟国使协约及参战各国政府及其国民因德国及其各盟国之侵略,以致酿成战争之后果,所受一切损失与损害,德国承认由德国及其各盟国负担责任。德国须遵守其已发之诺言,对于违反1839年条约之结果.担任偿还比利时在1918年11月11日以前向协约及参战各国政府所借之一切款项,及按年五厘利息,其总数由赔偿委员会决定。德国的赔偿数额由赔偿委员会在1921年5月1日前确定,并通告德国政府。以示该国之义务范围。在此之前,德国应以黄金、煤、机器和其它物资先偿付200亿马克。德国应交出1,600吨级商船的全部,1,400吨级商船的一半,1/4的渔船和风细雨1/5的内河船只:5年内应为协约国建造20万吨船舶。此外,从1920年起的10年内向法、比、意等协约国提供4,000万吨的煤、及大量机器、化工产品等。和约还规定,战胜国对德输出输入的货物不受限制,德国关税不得高于别国;易北河、奥得河、多瑙河等重要河流由国际专门委员会控制:外国军舰和商船可以自由出入基尔运河等。参见,《国际条约集,1917-1923》[Z]第72-273页。
[4]Levin Gordon,Woodrow Wilson and World Politics:America's Response to War and Revolution.N.Y.1968p.123.
[5]FRUS,1918,SUP.1,The World War I,pp.316-321.Address of President Wilson,opening the Campaign for the Fourth Liberty Loan,Delivered at the Metropolitan Opera House in N.Y.City.September 27,1918.
[1]Arnold.A Offner,The Origin of Second World War:American Foreign Policy and World Politics,1917-1941,N.Y.Praeger Publishers,1975,p.24.
[2]James Scott,President Wilson's Foreign Policy:Messages,Addresses,Papers,p.320.
[3]FRUS,1918,Sup.1,The World War Vol.1,pp.108-113.Address of the President of U.S.Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two House of Congress.
[4]Levin Gordon,Woodrow Wilson and World Politics:America's Response to War and Revolution,p.129.
[5]Levin Gordon,Woodrow Wilson and World Politics:America's Response to War and Revolution,p.128.
[1]John Dulles,challenge and Response in United States Policy.Foreign Affairs ⅩⅩⅩⅥ p.41-42.转引,石斌《杜勒斯与美国对苏战略》[M]北京:中国社会科学出版社.2004年版.第56页.
[2]Arthur Walworth,Wilson and his Peacemakers:American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference,1919,p.167.
[1]Marc Tracchtenberg,Reparation in World Politics:France and European Econimic Doplomacy,1916-1923,N.Y.Columbia University Press,1980,p.54.
[2]Levin Gordon,Woodrow Wilson and World Politics:America's Response to War and Revolution,p.144.
[3]Edward·M·House,What really happened at Paris:The Story of the Peace Conference,1918-1919 by American Delegates.p.289.
[4]FRUS,1919,The PPC.Vol.2,p.556.The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State.
[5]Marc Tracchtcnbcrg,Reparation in World Politics:France and European Econimic Doplomacy,1916-1923,pp.54-55.
[1]王铁崖选译:《一九一四——一九一八年第一次世界大战》[Z]第147页.
[2]FRUS.1918.Sup 1.,The World War,Vol.,1.p.466.Nov.4.1918.The Special Representative(House)to the Secretary of State.
[3]其中,英国战死87.5万人。伤200多万人,商船损毁不下900万吨,船舶及货物损失价值7.5亿英镑,丧失了1/4的海外投资。公债由战争开始时的6.5亿英镑增加到80亿英镑。另外还欠下美国9亿英镑,大约合42亿美元。樊亢、宋则行等:《主要资本主义国家经济简史》[M]北京:人民出版社,1973年版,第88页。
[4]法国北部和东北部最发达的10个省遭受严重破坏,矿区、工厂、房屋、公共建筑、铁路、公路、桥梁都化为废墟,其中包括9,000家工厂,近100万幢建筑物,1,000英里铁路,物资损失达2,000亿法郎,200万人无家可归。杜蒙德:《现代美国》[M]北京:商务印书馆,1984年版,第278页。
[1]Kent Brace,The Spoils of War:The Politices,Economics and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918-1932,p.70.
[2][法]夏尔·卢梭著.张凝等译:《武装冲突法》第442页.
[3][法]夏尔·卢梭著,张凝等译:《武装冲突法》第152页.
[4]这两个英文单词译成汉语基本都有归还、赔偿、补偿的涵义,但在国际法中它们的涵义并不完全相同.《国际法词典》对这两个词的解释如下,“Indemnity”:Monies paid by a defeated state to a victor after a war.Indemnity is based on the “right of the victor”,regardless of whether the war waged by the victory was just or
[1]Arnold A.Offner,The Origins of the Second World War:American Foreign Policy and World Politics,1917-1941,N.Y.Praeger Publishers,1975,p.4.
[2]Jean—Baptiste Duroselle,From Wilson to Roosevelt:Foreign Policy of the United States 1913-1945,p.134.
[1]S·F·比米斯:《美国外交史》(第三分册),第658页。
[2]FRUS,1920,Vol.2,p.393.The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain(Davis).
[3]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.24.
[4]该法案反对取消协约国欠美国的战债.要求债务国自1922年起在25年内付清全部战债的本金和不低于4.25%的利息。
[1]例如,6月15日,在休斯发给驻英国大使的电报中说,世界大战外债委员会要求与英国尽可能早地就战债问题进行谈判,让大使通知英国政府任命谈判代表重开谈判。FRUS,1922,Vol.1,p.402.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain(Harvey).6月30日,法国驻美大使朱赛兰通知国务院,应美国外债委员会要求,法国将派两名财政部官员近期内访问美国,就战债问题进行谈判.参见,FRUS,1922,Vol.1,p.402.The French Ambassador(Juserand)to the Secretary of State.
[2]FRUS,1922,Vol.1,pp.404-405.The Frence President of the Council and Minisiter of Foreign Affairs(Poincare)to the Secretary of State.
[3]FRUS,1922,Vol.1,pp..406-410.The British Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs(Balfour)to the French Ambassador in Great Britian(Saint-Aulaire).
[4]New York Times,October 17,1922.
[5]FRUS,1922,Vol.2,p.175.The Ambassador in France(Herrick)to the Secretary of State.
[1]Frank Costigliola,Awkward Dominion:American Political,Economic,and Cultural Relations with Europe,1919-1933,p.106.
[2]这些会议包括:圣雷莫(Sanremo)会议,海斯(Hythe)会议,斯巴(Spa)会议,布鲁塞尔(Brussels)会议等。
[3]在一战期间,是协约国处理军事、政治问题的最高决策、协调机关。停战后,它负有筹备和会的任务。《凡尔赛和约》签字后,它又兼有处理和约善后问题的职责。最高会议由协约国政府首脑或其代表组成。参见,王绳祖:《国际关系史》[M](第四卷),北京:世界知识出版社,1995年版,第264页注释3.
[4]据《凡尔赛和约》第235条规定:德国应照赔偿委员会所定之分期交付及办法(用现金、商品、船只及有价值之物或用他物),于1919年,1920年间,及1921年之最初四个月间,偿付与200亿金马克价值相等之物。1918年11月11日停战以后各占领军之费用,应在此数内首先提偿。美国驻法国大使韦尔斯向国务院报告:由于美国尚未批准和约,赔偿委员会中的其他国家代表(如英国代表布拉德伯格)质疑美国是否拥有和约赋予的权利;大使还报告说,比利时宣称它有比占领军费用更优先的权利,要求优先得到德国赔偿。国务院立即指示韦尔斯:美国虽然尚未批准和约,但美国在莱茵地区的驻军是以《停战协定》为法律基础。《停战协定》还继续有效,所以美国有权从德国直接收取占领费用,当然它也不反对赔偿委员会代为收缴。国务院又强调说优先提偿占领军费用不仅是和约所规定的,也是1919年1月24日四巨头会议一致赞同的,它比比利时赔偿具有更优先的权利。参见。《国际条约集.1917-1923》[Z》第159页、FRUS,1920,vol.2,pp.338-340.The Ambassador in Frence(Wallace)to the Acting Secretary of State.、FRUS,1920,vol.2,pp.343-345.The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France(Wallace).
[1]FRUS,I921,Vol.1,pp.8-9.The Secretary of State to the Ambassdor in France(Wallace).
[2]美国参议院最后一次否决《凡尔赛和约》后,参众两院曾联合通过了要求结束与德国和其他中欧同盟国的停战状态的提案。即诺克斯——波特决议案,其内容是建议结束与德国的战争状态,废除1917年通过的宣布对德战争.但威尔逊总统否决了联合提案。这样在战争结束两年以后,在法理上美国与德国还处于停战状态。
[3]FRUS,1921,vol.2,p.1,The Commissioner at Berlin(Dresel)to the Acting Secretary of State.
[4]FRUS,1921,Vol.2,p.2.The Secretary of State to the Commission at Berlin(Dresel).
[5]FRUS.1921.Vol.2.p.40.The Secretary of State to the Commission at Berlin(Dresel).
[6]1921年8月25日,德赛尔与德国缔结了和约。1921年10月,哈定总统签署了《德国和美国恢复和平条约》,又称《柏林和约》。德国议会也很快通过了这一和约。美国派往德国的第一任大使是马萨诸塞州的工业家、前国会议员阿兰森·霍顿.参见,FRUS,1921,vol.2,pp.7-8.The Commissioner at Berlin(Dresel)to the Secretary of State.、FRUS,1921,vol.2.pp.29-33.Treaty Between the United States of American and Germany,Signed at Berlin,August 25,1921.
[7]按照《凡尔赛和约》规定,赔偿委员会设在巴黎。委员有五人,赔偿委员会主席由法国人担任,秘书长由英国人担任,而且劳合·乔治同意在投票表决双方票数相等时,法国总统有裁决权。
[1]主要内容:建议德国的赔偿总额为2,260亿金马克,再加德国每年出口额的12%,42年内付清。Manfred Jonas,The United States and Germany:A Diplomacy History,p.155.
[2]FRUS,1921,Vol.2,pp.37-39.The Commissioner at Berlin(Dresel)to the Secretary of State.
[3]FRUS,1921,vol.2,p.40.The Secretary of State to the Commissioner at Berlin(Dresel).
[4]FRUS,1921,Vol.2,pal.The Commissioner at Berlin(Dresel)to the Secretary of State.
[1]FRUS,1921,Vol.2,pp.44-45.The Secretary of State to the Commissioner at Berlin(Dresel).
[2]FRUS,1921,Vol.2,pp.48-50.Memorandum by the under Secretary of State(Fletcher)of a Conversation between the Secretary of State and the British and French Ambasadors(Geddes,Jusserand).
[3]该计划将德国的赔偿总额确定为1320亿金马克,42年内还清.该计划规定.支付款项分为A、B、C三类。其中C类为820亿金马克,可以留待德国有能力支付时再行偿还,其余的赔偿额除1921年5月31日以前先交付10亿金马克外,从1921年5月1日起.按每年20亿金马克支付。为完成支付,应对德国财政进行监督,设立保证委员会机构等。如果德国不履行以上规定,协约国就控制德国税务,扩大征收德国税款,换用对协约国更为有利的另种计划。参见,王绳祖:《国际关系史》[Z](第四卷),第267-268页。
[4]FRUS,1921,Vol.1,p.14.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France(Wallace).
[1]FRUS,1922,vol.2,p.160.The German Charge(Von Thermannn)to the Acting Secretary of State.
[2]FRUS,1922,vol.2,pp.160-162.The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State.
[3]FRUS,1922,vol.2,p.163.The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State.
[4]FRUS,1922,Vol.2,pp.165-168.The Ambassador in France(Herrick)to the Secretary of State.
[5]FRUS,1922,vol.2,pp.198-199.The Ambassador in France(Herrick)to the Secretary of State.
[1]FRUS,1922.Vol.2,pp.199-202.The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France(Herrick).
[1]FRUS,1923,vol.2,pp..57-60.The German Embassy to the Department of State.
[2]FRUS,1923,vol.2,pp.60-61.Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the German Ambassador(Wielfeldt).
[3]FRUS,1923,vol.2,pp.61-62.Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the Belgian
[1]FRUS,1923,Vol.2,pp.70-74.The Secretary of State to the British Charge(Chilton).
[2]Conan Fischer,The Ruhr Crisis,1923-1924,Oxford University Press,2003,p.290.
[3]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.100.
[4]FRUS,1923,Vol.2,pp.74-75.The Ambassador in Belgium(Fletcher)to the Secretary of State.
[5]FRUS,1923,Vol.2,pp.94-95.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France(Herrick). Secretary of State.、FRUS,1923,Vol.2,pp.106-107.The Ambassador in France(Herrick)to the Secretary of State.
[1]Charles G Dawes,A Journal of Reparations,London Macmillan,1939,P.2.
[2]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.91.
[3]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.92.
[4]2月23日,休斯发给兰格的电报中说,美国大约有5亿美元的花消因为技术的原因没有被列入占领军的军费开支之中,美国政府认为这5亿美元的费用应该得到补偿,或者由“混合权利委员会”(美国与德国签订《柏林和约》时建立的机构,主要处理因战争而产生的德国对美国的财政义务问题.笔者注)来决定如何处理。他让道威斯和杨格提醒委员会,美国的合法权利要予以考虑.参见,FRUS,1924,vol.2,pp.1-2.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France(Herrick).
[1]Dawes C.Gates,A Journal of Reparations.pp.299-301.另参见,王绳祖:《国际关系史》(第四卷),第284页.
[2]Dawes C.Gates,A Journal of Reparations,pp.313-328.
[3]Dawes C.Gates,A Journal of Reparations,pp.308-310.
[4]Dawes C.Gates,A Journal of Reparations,pp.332-334.
[1]Bruck Kent,The Spoiols of War:The Politics,Economics,and Diplomacy of Reparations,1918-1932,pp.247-248
[2]Dawes C.Gates,A Journal of Reparations,p.247.
[3]Dawes C.Gates,A Journal of Reparations,pp.227-228.
[4]FRUS,1924,Vol.2,pp.13-15.The Secretary of Stale to the Ambassador in French(Herrick).
[5]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.108.
[1]William C.Mcneil,American Money and the Weimar Republic:Economics and Politices on the eve of the Great Depression,N.Y.Colubia University,1986,p.280.
[2]William C.Mcneil,American Money and the Weimar Republic:Economics and Politices on the eve of the Great Depression,p.27.
[3]William C.Mcneil,American Money and the Weimar Republic:Economics and Politices on the eve of the Great Depression,pp.32-33.
[4]Manfred Jonas,The United States and Germany:A Diplomatic History,p.181.
[1]王绳祖:《国际关系史》[M]武汉:武汉大学出版社,第373页。
[2]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,pp.154-155.
[3]Frank Costigliola,Awkward Dominion American Political,Economic,and Cultural Relations With Europe,1919-1933,p.149.
[4]从1923年开始.美国已经与欧洲的债务国陆续达成了协议,美国同意削减债务利息,各国的债务也有所减少,但应付债款的总数仍然是当初借款的两倍以上。财政部长梅隆在接受普林斯顿大学约翰·哈本博士采访时,详细地说明了美国与其债务国之间的债务情况,以及美国的政策原则.参见,福克纳:《美国经济史》[M]北京:商务印书馆,1964年版,第412页、FRUS,1927,Vol.2,pp.732-738.Press Release Issued by the Treasury Department,March 17,1927.
[1]FRUS,1927,Vol.2,p.738.Press Release Issued by the Treasury Department,March 17,1927.
[2]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.195.
[3]William C.Mcneil,American Money and the Weimar Republic:Economics and Politices on the eve of the Great Depression,p.222.
[4]Melvyn P.Lefflet,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933.p.183.
[5]包括:1、德国说新的专家委员会将为解决问题提供一个极好的机会,但最终问题的解决将在很大程度上依赖于吉尔伯特的努力;2、法国建议举行双边谈判。而德国更愿意通过专家委员会而不是外交会议来谈判,就像1924年的那样,可以邀请不对美国政府负责的美国专家个人参加;3、德国认为,英国为了抑制 德国工业的竞争,英国可能更喜欢目前这种状态,不一定愿意用直接的方式全面地解决问题;4、德团确信,赔偿与国际债务能够实现相互分离。参见,FRUS,1928,vol.2,p.871.The Charge in Germany(Poole)to the Secretary of State.
[1]FRUS,1928,vol.2,p.872.The Charge in Germany(Poole)to the Secretary of State.
[2]FRUS,1928,vol.2,pp.872-873.Memorandum Handed by the German Ambassador(Von Prittwitz)to the Secretary of State on October 30,1928.
[3]FRUS,1928,Vol.2,pp.873-874.The Secretary of State to the Charge in France(Armour).
[4]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.203.
[1]FRUS,1929,Vol.2,pp.1029-1034.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France(Herrick).
[2]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.205.
[3]William C.Mcneil,American Money and the Weimar Republic,p.232.
[4]FRUS,1929,Vol.2,pp.1029-1034.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France(Herrick).
[1]FRUS,1929,Vol.2,pp.1038-1040.The Secretary of State to the Charge in France(Armour).
[2]FRUS,1929,vol.2,pp.1043-1045.The Charge in France(Armour)to the Secretary of State.
[3]FRUS,1929,Vol.2,pp.1070-1071.The Secretary of State to the Charge in France(Armour).Statement Issued to the Press by the Secretary of State,May 16,1929.
[4]FRUS,1929,Vol.2,pp.1071-1072.The Charge in France(Armour)to the Secretary of State.
[5]FRUS,1929,Vol.2,pp.1072-1073.The Secretary of State to the Charge in France(Armour).
[6]FRUS,1929,Vol.2,pp.1075-1076.The Secretary of State to the Charge in France(Armour).
[7]《杨格计划》分11章,另有8个附件,其主要内容:1、赔偿总额与年序:计划规定在59年的期限内,支付总额为1210亿马克,比伦敦会议规定的1320亿马克减少了110亿马克.从1929年9月1日至1966年3月31日,在此37年中,德国每年平均应付19.88亿马克,每年逐年递加;在后22年内,即从1966年4月1日后每年递减。2、无条件赔偿和有条件赔偿:前者指无论德国经济如何,每年必须付6.6亿马克,不得延缓.后者指如德国遇到经济危机时可以延期支付,但以两年为限.3、成立国际清算银行:由与赔偿问题有关各国的中央银行共同组织,其主要任务是负责接收管理并分配德国年度赔偿.负责维持德国金融的稳定和促进国际贸易的发展.《道威斯计划》的收付和管理赔偿的机构停止工作。4、限期取消货物抵付赔偿:《道威斯计划》规定以货物抵付赔款目的在于增加德国出口以便恢复德国工业.但德国大量用货物支付赔偿.会对债权国在国际贸易的竞争不利。所以《杨格计划》规定以货抵现办法限期10 年为止,且每年付货数量逐渐减少.5、发行公债的办法:《杨格计划》力图使赔偿支付摆脱国际政治的束缚。使之商业化等等.参见,王绳祖:《国际关系史》(第四卷),第311-315页。
[1]Melvyn P.Loffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,pp.213-214.
[2]Thomas W.Lamont,The final reparations settlement,Foreign Affair.Apr30.vol.8,pp.336-362.
[3]Robert Forrell,American Diplomacy in the Great Depression:Hoover—Stimson Foreign Policy 1929-1933,Yale Uni.Press,1957,p.11.
[4]Melvyn P.Loffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933, p.218.
[1]Melvyn P.Loffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,pp.217-218.
[1]FRUS,1931,vol.1,pp.2-5.The Charge in Germany(Gordon)to the Secretary of State.
[2]FRUS,1931,Vol.1,pp.6-7.The Charge in Great Britain(Atherton)to the Secretary of State.
[3]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.235.
[4]Patricia Clavin,The Failure of Economic Diplomacy,London,Maclillan,1996,p.14.
[5]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.234.
[6]FRUS,1931,vol.1,pp.32-33.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Germany(Sackett).
[7]其主要内容:美国政府建议。在一年期内延付一切各政府间债务、赔偿和救济借款的本利。但是私人方面对各政府的债务当然除外。在能得到国会通过的条件之下,美国政府从7月份财政年度起,将延缓外国政府对美国一切债务的偿付一年。不过各主要国家间,对债务也须作同样的展缓一年。上项举动的目的,在于给来年以世界经济恢复的机会,并有助于使美国已经运转起来的恢复力量免受国外障碍的影响。……现在并且愿乘这个机会,坦率宣布我个人对于德国赔款和欧洲协约政府欠美国的债务中间的关系。……赔偿完全是一个欧洲问题,和美国没有关系。关于取消对美的债务,我没有丝毫赞同的意思。……不过上述债务的解决,是根据在寻常情形下的偿付能力,倘然我们顾虑到现在世界的反常情势,我们就应该遵照我们的政策同原则。我确实知道,美国人民没有意思想在债务人偿付能力以外,榨取任何金钱。……美国对于讨论严格的欧洲问题,不愿意牵涉在内,像德国赔款问题,就是其中一个。我们的举动可以表示我们对于世界繁荣的及早恢复,愿意做出贡献。美国人民对于世界繁荣。有深切的注意。参见。齐世荣:《世界通史资料选辑:现代部分》(第一分册),第76-77页。另参见。FRUS,1931,vol.1,pp.33-35.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France(Edge).
[8]王绳祖:《国际关系史》(第五卷),第39页.另参见,FRUS,1931,vol.1,pp.54-55.Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of West European Affairs(Boal).
[1]FRUS,1932,vol.1,pp.673-674.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain(Mellon).
[2]FRUS,1932,vol.1,pp.675-677.The Ambassador in Great Britain(Mellon)to the Secretary of State.
[3]王绳祖:《国际关系史》(第五卷),第20页。
[4]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.291.
[5]FRUS,1932,vol.1,pp.682-683.Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State(Castle)of a Conversation with the German Ambassador(Von Prittwite).
[1]FRUS,1932,vol.1,p.691.President Hoover to Senator Willian E.Borah.
[2]王绳祖:《国际关系史》(第五卷),第21页。
[1]周永生:《经济外交》[M]北京:中国青年出版社,2004年版,第9-11页。
[2]“十四点”计划的第二点“海洋自由”主要目的就是保证美国的海外贸易畅通无阻;第三点“消除贸易壁垒”主张消除国家间歧视性或排他性的关税壁垒,美国凭借其强大的经济实力实现对外经济扩张的目的。
[3]William C.Mcneil,American Money and the Weimar Republic,N.Y.Colubia University,1986,p.3.
[4]1918年的《韦布—波默林法》。允许美国公司出于推进外贸的原因而联合,不受反托拉斯法的限制;1919年的《爱齐法》从法律上认可美国银行在国外的分行;1920年的《商船法》授权政府向私人企业出售船只,并贷款支持建造新商船。
[5]Jean—Baptiste Duroselle,From Wilson to Roosevelt:Foreign policy of the United States 1913-1945,p.167.
[6]William C.Mcneil,American Money and the Weimar Republic,p.1.
[1]齐世荣:《世界通史资料选辑:现代部分》(第一分册),第33页.
[2]William C.Mcneil,American Money and the Weimar Republic,p.38,p.279.
[3]Jean—Baptiste Duroselle,From Wilson to Roosevelt:Foreign policy of the United States 1913-1945,p.169.
[1]Jean—Baptiste Duroselle,From Wilson to Roosevelt:Foreign policy of the United States,1913-1945,p.171.
[2]1921年11月,当法郎出现危机的时候.法国政府与摩根集团多次进行谈判,要求美国提供贷款。但国务院拒绝了法国的请求。
[3]樊亢、宋则行编:《外国经济史:近代现代》[M]北京:人民出版社,1990年版,第42页.
[4]阿瑟·S·林克:《1900年以来的美国史》(上册)[M]北京:中国社会科学出版社,1983年版,第405页.
[5]Jean—Baptiste Duroslle,From Wilson to the Roosevelt:Foreign Policy of the United State,1913-1945.p.173.
[6]C·E·布莱克、E·C·赫尔姆赖克:《二十世纪欧洲史》(上),第403页。
[7]C·E·布莱克、E·C·赫尔姆赖克:《二十世纪欧洲史》(上),第403页。
[1]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,New Orleans Pauser Press,1959,p.9.
[1]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition,Duke Uni.Press,1978,p.29.
[2]Samuuel F.Bemis,A Diplomatic History of the United State,p.639.
[3]Samuuel F.Bemis,A Diplomatic History of the United State,p.724.
[1]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition,Duke Uni.Press,1978,p.10.
[2]Andrew M.Scott,The Functioning of the International Political System,N.Y.Macmillia,1967,pp.88-90.
[1]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition,p.12.
[2]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition,p.12.
[3]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition,p.15.
[1]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,pp.7-8,pp.171-172.
[2]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,pp.77-78.
[1]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,pp.5-6.
[2]Edward.N Peterson,TheAmerican Occupation of Germany:Retreat to Victory,p.27.
[3]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,N.Y.Harper & Brothers,1948,p.202.
[1]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.204.
[2]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,pp.204-205.
[3]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.211.
[4]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,pp.205-206.
[5]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.206.
[1]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.206.
[2]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.213.
[3]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.217.
[1]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,pp.567-568.
[1]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.13.
[2]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.19.
[3]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,pp.20-21.
[4]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.28.
[5]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.48.
[6]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.63.
[7]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.78.
[1]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.78.
[2]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.79.
[3]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.79.
[4]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.20.
[1]John L,Gaddis,The United States and the Origins of the Cold War,1941-1947,N,Y.,Columbia University Press,1972,pp.99-100.
[2]罗伯特·达莱克:《罗斯福与美国对外政策1932-1945》[M](下册),北京:商务印书馆,1984年版,第671页。
[3]同上,第671页.
[4]Harold Zink,The United States in Germany,1944-1955,p.87.
[1]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East-West:Dilemma over Germany,p.13.
[2]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.567.
[3]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.569.
[1]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.570.
[2]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,pp.571-573.
[1]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.574.
[1]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.575.
[2]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,pp.578-579.
[1]FRUS,Conference at Malt and Yalta,1945,pp.194-196.Briefing Book Paper:Reparation and Restitution Policy toward Germany.
[2]John Gimble,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.54.
[3]Dennis Merrill ed.,Documentary History of the Truman Presidency vol.3,United States Policy in Occupied Germany after World War Ⅱ:Denazification,Decartelization,Demilitarization,and Democratization,Uni.Publication of American,1995,p.25.
[2]FRUS,1945,vol.3,pp.1222-1226.Instruction for the United States Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations(Pauley).
[1]Henry L.Stimson.On active Service in Peace and War.pp.571-573.
[1]Carolyn Eisenbery,Drawing the line:the American decision to divide Germany 1944-1949,pp.18-19.
[2]Kuklick Bruce,American Policy and the division of Germany:The Clash with Russian over Reparations,p.22.
[3]John L,Gaddis,The United States and the Origins of the Cold War,1941-1947,p.98.
[4]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transtion,p.30.
[5]此项目仔细地研究了德国的净国民产值,把1925-1938年的国民产值使用作为研究的起点。以这些数据为基础估算德国的赔偿能力。认为战后头两年是休养生息。第三年赔偿15亿马克,接下来的连续5年赔偿额有望提高到每年160亿马克,根据这个估算赔偿总额在12年之内将达到1200亿马克。这个估算是以1938年物价以及马克对美元的汇率。联邦储备局文件的结论是。最终的数额是“一个现实的而不是理想的数字”。参见,John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transtion,p.30.
[6]经济学家认为赔偿应该限定在能够增强德国战后经济、社会秩序的范围之内,而不是当成控制德国军事
[1]Bruce Kuklick,American Policy and the Division of Germany:The Clash with Russia over Reparations,p.6.
[2]Bruce Kuklick,American Policy and the Division of Germany:The Clash with Russia over Reparations,p.41.
[1]Henry Stimson,On Active Service in War and Peace,pp.591-592.
[2]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.63.
[3]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.67.
[1]John L,Gaddis,The United States and the Origins of the Cold War,1941-1947,Colub Uni.Press,p.118.
[2]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.69.
[3]FRUS,1943,The Conference at Cairo and Tehran.Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury(White).August 13,1944.不知为何该文件收入了FRUS,1943年卷中.
[4]该计划共有十四点,其主要内容:1、德国彻底非军事化.2、德国新边界以及新德国的组成:法国将合并萨尔地区;波兰将获得大部分西里西亚以及没有被苏联合并的东普鲁士部分地区:其余的德国将被分成两个独立的国家.各自内部以联邦形式进行管理.巴伐利亚、符腾堡、巴登及南部和西南部的小省份组成一个国家.剩下的普鲁士、撒克森、图林根及北部的小省将组成第二个德国.3、德国将成为一个农业化的“地理概念”.根据摩根索计划,鲁尔及其周围地区所有现存的工业将被剥夺,在可预见的未来不能成为工业地区.非工业化将完成两个任务:(1)关闭全部煤矿.(2)拆除、转移所有没有被军事行动破坏的工业及设备给盟国作为赔偿.4、偿还和赔偿.德国要偿还战争中掠夺的受害国的财产;保留在德国的工厂和设备作为赔偿分配给受破坏的国家.另外一些赔偿将由德国的海外资产以及由德国之外的德国劳工支付.5、教育、宣传以及政治的去中央化.6、占领军对当地德国经济的责任.控制德国经济的唯一军事目的是有利于军事行动和军事占领,占领军政府将不承担诸如价格控制、汇率、失业、重建,生产、消费、分配之类的经济问题。占领军政府也不会制定任何保持或者是加强德国经济的计划,除非是军事行动所必需的。7、对德国经济发展的控制.至少是在德国投降20年内,联合国要对德国经济进行充分的控制,包括控制外贸,限制资本输入以防止德国建立和扩大军事工业的基础,控制其他关键性的工业.8、农业计划。德国大地产将被分散给小农。长子继承制将被废止.9、惩处战犯和特定的团体。10、美国的责任。为了全面执行对德计划,美国尽管要承担相应的军事和民事责任,但德国的政治和民事管理责任主要由德国的邻国来承担.特别是苏联、法国、波兰、荷兰、比利时等国。这样。美国军队能够在相对短的时间内撒出。“摩根索计划”的内容参见,摩根索:《德国是我们的问题》(Henry Morgenthau.Germany is our Problem)一书的前插页部分。
[1]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.77.
[2]Kuklick Bruce,American Policy and the division of Germany:The Clash with Russian over Reparations,p.49.
[3]Herny Morgenthau,Morgenthau Diaries,N.Y.,Da Capo Press,1974,p.57.
[1]如在1933年总统曾让摩根索探讨与苏联建立外交关系的可能性.在1934年,摩根索和总统已经讨论“纳粹的反人类政策”。在美国参战前。摩根索尽力阻断纳粹德国与拉丁美洲国家的经济联系,冻结德国在美国的财产。
[2]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.66.
[3]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.72.
[4]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p73.
[5]Carolyn Eisenbery,Drawing the line:the American decision to divide Germany,1944-1949,p.35.
[1]New York Post,Nov 25,1947.
[2]FRUS,1944,Vol.1,pp.S44-546.Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of War.
[3]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition,p.32.
[4]Carolyn Eisenbery,Drawing the line:the American decision to divide Germany,1944-1949,p.37.
[1]例如,有关经济的方案如下:1、德国人生活标准应降低到维持的水平。2、德国在欧洲的经济地位必须降低。3、德国经济必须被改变成严重依靠进出口以至于德国不能用自己的设备再次转向战争生产。
[2]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.570.
[3]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,pp.574-574.
[1]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.574.
[2]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.85.
[3]这些条款包括:1、美国将占领和控制英占区内的不莱梅和不莱梅港地区.2、美国有权穿过英占区,在不莱梅、不莱梅港口与南部美占区之间进行交通和通讯。参见,John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.87.
[4]协议主要包括四点:1、苏联和其他受破坏的国家应该有权“为了弥补他们所遭受的损失,拆迁他们需要的机器”;2、萨尔和鲁尔地区的重工业将被关闭;3、萨尔和鲁尔地区将置于某种形式的国际共管,以防止其重新工业化以及扫除该地区潜在的战争潜力;4、萨尔与鲁尔地区未来将转变成以以农业、牧业为主要特征的地区。参见,John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany.pp.88-89.
[5]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.578.
[6]威廉·哈代·麦克尼尔:《国际事务概览1939—1946:美国、英国和俄国:他们的合作和冲突1941—1946年》[Z]上海:上海译文出版社,1978年版,第752页。
[7]例如,在9月17日的新方案中,一些词语作了微小的改动,但它的含义却意味着巨大的改变。以前方案允许德国接受必需的最少食品“防止疾病和动乱”。新方案改成“防止严重疾病和严重动乱。”新方案还 要求更加彻底地“非纳粹化”。参见:John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.91.
[1]例如,《纽约时报》攻击它不实现;伦敦的《观察者》认为“摩根索计划”主张的破坏德国生产能力,削弱德国市场竞争力在帮助英国方面起不到多大作用。英国工党领袖在下议院指出,“摩根索计划”将使欧洲的生活水准普遍降低.参见,John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.97.
[2]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.580.
[3]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.99.
[4]FRUS,1944,vol.1,pp.344-346.Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President Roosevelt.
[1]Kuklick Bruce,American Policy and the division of Germany:The Clash with Russian over Reparations,p.89.
[2]Kuklick Bruce,American Policy and the division of Germany:The Clash with Russian over Reparations,P.91.
[3]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.583.
[4]继任总统一个月之后,他指着一幅世界地图对史汀生说,通过自由贸易可以将欧洲东部的农、牧区与北部的工业区联系起来。为了便于自由贸易,莱茵河与多瑙河沿岸的每个国家都应该拥有河岸管理权。因此,在波茨坦会议上,杜鲁门总统建议将多瑙河置于国际共管之下。其目的是将其联合成一个自然的经济体,杜鲁门认为这是实现欧洲稳定和安全的第一步。Hadley Arkcs,Bureaucracy,the Marshall Plan,and the National Interest,New Jersey,Princeton Uni.Press,1972,p.24.
[1]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.583.
[2]哈里·杜鲁门:《杜鲁门回忆录:决定性的一年1945》 北京:三联书店,1974年版,第253页.
[3]James McAllister,No Exit:American and the German Problem,1943-1954,Ithaca University Press,2002,p.82.,John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition,p.42.
[4]James McAllister,No Exit:American and the German Problem,1943-1954,p.82.
[5]罗斯福通常自己做出决策,他不信任国务院,他更愿意听取他信任的私人朋友的建议.参见罗伯特·达莱克:《罗斯福与美国对外政策1932—1945》 第758-759页.
[1]FRUS,1945,Conference at Malta and Yalt,pp.193-194.Briefing Book Paper:Reparation and Restitution Policy toward Germany.
[2]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Conference,Vol.1,pp,527-528.The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations(Panley)to the Sacretary of State.
[3]Kuklick Bruce,American Policy and the division of Germany:The Clash with Russian over Reparations.p.121.
[1]James P.Warburg,Germany:Key to Peace,London,Andre Beutsch Limited,1954,p.13.
[2]fan D,Turner,Reconstruction in post-war Germany:British Occupation Policy and the West Zones,N.Y.1989,p.128.
[3]迈克尔·鲍尔弗等:《国际事务概览1939—1946年:四国对德国和奥地利的管制1945—1946年》[Z]上海:译文出版社,1980年版,第47页。
[4]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.21.
[5]Ian D.Turner,Reconstruction in post-war Germany:British Occupation Policy and the West Zones,p.129.
[1]John L.SnelI,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.38.
[2]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.38.
[3]Aleksei M.Filitov,Problems of post-war construction policy conceptions during World War Ⅱ,Francesca Goriedite(ed.),The Soviet Union and Europe in the cold war,1943-53,Macmilliarn Press Ltd,1996,p.5.
[4]Aleksei M.Filitov,Problems of post-war construction policy conceptions during World War Ⅱ,Francesca Gofiedite(ed.),The Soviet Union and Europe in the cold war,1943-53,p.7.
[5]Aleksei M.Filitov,Problems of post-war construction policy conceptions during World War Ⅱ,Francesca Goriedite(ed.),The Soviet Union and Europe in the cold war,1943-53,p.17.
[1]B · Kuklick,American Policy and the division of Germany:The Clash with Russian over Reparations,p.42.
[2]Aleksei M.Filitov,Problems of post-war construction policy conceptions during World War Ⅱ,Francesca Goriedite(ed.),The Soviet Union and Europe in the cold war,1943-53,p.17.
[3]Aleksei M.Filitov,Problems of post-war construction policy conceptions during World War Ⅱ,Francesca Goriedite(ed.),The Soviet Union and Europe in the cold war,1943-53,p.17.
[1]FRUS,1945,Conference at Malta and Yalt,p.622.Second Plenary Meeting,February 5,1945.另参见,《德黑兰、雅尔塔、波茨坦会议记录摘编》[Z]上海:上海人民出版社,1974年版,第121-122页。
[2]FRUS,1945,Conference at Malta and Yalt,pp.621-622.Second Plenary Meeting,February 5,1945.另参见,萨纳柯耶夫、崔布列夫斯基:《德兰、雅尔塔、波茨坦会议文件集》[Z]北京:三联书店,1978年版,第162页。
[1]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.145.
[2]FRUS,1945,Conference at Malta and Yalt,pp.702-704.Meeting of The Foreign Ministers,February 7,1945.John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition p.37.
[3]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transtion,p.71.
[4]Alec Cairncross,The Price of War,British Policy on Germany Reparations 1941—1949,N.Y.1986,p.64.note 10.
[5]至于战后盟国从德国到底索取了多少战争赔偿,有关各方的统计数字相差很大。据西方统计,苏联通过在苏占区拆迁设备、获取占领费、提取当前产品、及通过占有公司股份的收益等方式获取的赔偿价值,到1953年共计已达664亿马克,按1938年的价格计算约合171亿美元。民主德国成立后,苏联继续以易货贸易的方式,用大大低于国际市场的价格获取民德的化工、光学、机械等工业产品。英、美占区于1947年修改了赔偿拆迁的计划。联邦德国成立后,赔偿拆迁进一步减少,并于1951年4月完全停止。关于赔偿拆迁的价值估算,盟国和德国差距甚大。大约在15亿至50亿马克之间。如果加上没收德国在国外的财产、以及没收的德国专利、商标、厂名等,估计西方获取的全部赔偿价值为200亿至250亿马克,按上述1938年的汇价换算,相当于51.5亿至64.4亿美元。以上数字参见,杨德利:《德国的战争赔偿问题》[J],载于《德国研究》1996年第1期。
[6]英国代表团认为,在莫斯科赔偿委员会研究赔偿问题之前,不能提出任何赔偿数字。遗留问题留待莫斯科赔偿委员会进一步讨论。FRUS,1945,Conference at Malta and Yalta,p.979.Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference.另参见,《德黑兰、雅尔塔、波茨坦会议记录摘编》第227页.
[1]FRUS,1945,Conference at Malta and Yalta,p.903.Seventh Plenary Meeting,February 10,1945.
[2]FRUS,1945,Vol.3,p.453.Informal Record of a Meeting in the Office of the Secretary of State,March 15,1945.
[3]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Conference,Vol.1,pp.510-511.The Representative on the Allied Commission for Reparations(Panley)to the Sacretary of State.
[4]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Conference,Vol.1,p.519.The Secretary of State ad interim to the Representative on the Allied Commission for Reparations(Panley).
[5]Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.88.
[6]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Conference,vol.2,pp.295-298.Informal Meeting of the Foreign Miniters,July 23,1945.
[1]Carolyn W.Eisenbetg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.86.
[2]Charles S.Maier,The Marshall Plan and Germany:West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program,p.105.
[3]《德黑兰、雅尔塔、波茨坦会议记录摘编》第428页.
[4]Kuklick Bruce,American Policy and the Division of Germany:The Clash with Russia over Reparations,pp.221-222.
[1]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Conference,Vol.1,p.547.The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations(Panley)to the chairman of the Allied Commission for Reparations(Maisky).
[2]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Conference,Vol.1,p.547.The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations(Panley)to the chairman of the Allied Commission for Reparations(Maisky).
[3]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Conference,Vol.2,pp.279-281.Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers,July 23,1945.
[1]Bruce Kuklick,American Policy and the Division of Germany:The Clash with Russia over Reparations,p.139.
[2]James F.Byrnes,Speaking Frankly p.83.
[3]《德黑兰、雅尔塔、波茨坦会议记录摘编》第426页.FRUS,The Potsdam Conference,Vol.2,pp.1478-1498.Protocol of the Proceeding of the Berlin Conference.Augur 1,1945.
[4]FRUS,1945,Vol.3,p.1186.The Ambassador in the Soviet Union(Harriman)to the Secretary of State.
[1]其实,参加波茨坦会议的英国财政部官员会后就评价道:“波茨坦协议是一个不完整、不现实、模糊的协议。特别是关于赔偿的条款自相矛盾、混乱。该条款暗示没有赔偿可以提取——至少在西占区——从当前产品中。它却为苏联从它的占领区得到它想要的提供了自由。参见,Charles S.Maier,The Marshall Plan and Germany:West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program,N.Y.,1991,P.21.
[2]Beate Ruhm yon Oppen,Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-1954,Oxford University Press,1955,pp.565-566.
[3]B类指德国工业及其他资本设各、商船、内陆水运。A类指除B类外的赔偿物资(除了A、B两类外还有一部分物资不由IARA负责分配,因此这里所指是A、B两类赔偿物资总和实际上少于西占区总的赔偿物资。James K.Pollck,Germany under Occupation:Illustrative Materials and Documents,Michigan 1949,P.49.转引,田小惠:《简析战后德国分区赔偿政策的执行》[J],载于《国际论坛》2005年第1期。
[1]FRUS,1945,Vol.3,pp.1357-1360.The Secretary of State to the U.S.Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations(Angell).
[1]《日内瓦第四公约》第55、56条款规定,占领国对被占领地区负有一定的责任。主要包括:占领国有义务保证居民的食物与医疗供应品;占领国负有保证并维护占领地内的医疗和医院建设与服务,以及公共保健和卫生的义务。参见,朱晓青:《国际法》[M]北京:社会科学文献出版社,2005年版,第510页。
[2]Beate Ruhm von Oppen,Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-1954,p.16.
[3]Edward Peterson,The American Occupation of Germany:Retreat to Victory,p.60.
[4]B · Kuklik,American Policy and the division of Gerawny:the Clash with Russza over Reparations,pp.35-36.
[5]《克莱将军文件》的编撰者简·史密斯在日后拜访麦克劳时,麦克劳回忆说:我指出,一旦需要,可以利用这些例外条款。我很了解这些条款,因为我参与了文件的起草工作。参见,Carolyn W.Eiscnberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.80.
[6]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,California,Stanford University Press,1976,p.25.
[1]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Con.Voll.,pp.468-470.The Assistant Secretary of State(Clayton)to the Assistant Secretary of War(Mccloy).
[2]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Vol.l,pp.470-471.The Assistant Secretary of War(Mccloy)to the Assistant Secretary of State(Clayton).
[3]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.23.
[4]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Con.Vol.1,pp.479-481.The Secretary of War(Stimson)to the Secretary of State.
[5]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Con.Vol.1,pp.491-493.The Secretary of State to the President.
[1]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Con.Vol.2,pp.779-780.The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Police(Collado)to the Assistant Secretary of State(Clayton)and Secretary of State.
[2]初到德国时克莱将军的态度十分明确,他告诉工作人员说他们的工作就是与盟国保持一致,为了“惩罚德国,把德国降低到它应有的位置”。他对新闻界说:“我们的第一个目标就是毁灭一切使德国将来可能得到发展的力量。如果德国力量增长了,我们将开始为如何处置德国发愁了。然而,不久克莱将军的观点就发生了变化,在他给麦克劳的信中写道:“德国人民是勤劳的人民,他们在几乎没有交通工具、城市里到处是瓦砾的情况下还从早到晚地工作。我这样说不是同情德国人,只是因为我们面临着十分困难的问题,即找到足够的食品,哪怕是远远低于那些被解放国家的标准。我感觉德国人将遭受饥饿和严寒就像我认为的那样,这样的苦难是使他们认识到他们发动战争的后果所必须的,但是这样的苦难不能超出导致大范围饥荒和疾病发生的程度”。参见.Edward Peterson,The American Occupation of Germany:Retreat to Victory,pp.58-59.
[3]Edward Peterson,The American Occupation of Germany:Retreat to Victory,p.54.
[1]Jean Smith,The Papers of General Lucius D.Clay:Germany 1945-1949,p.54.
[2]Jean Smith,The Papers of General Lucius D.Clay:Germany 1945-1949,p.8.
[3]报告首先计算出德国在1930-1938年间平均的生活水准,它的水准比当时欧洲其他地区大约平均高出1/3。考虑到正常的人口增长以及东欧难民的流入,报告计算出德国战后的生活水准应该降低到1930—1938年平均水准的74%,这大致相当于德国在1932年的生活水准。其次,报告对德国经济状况做出了一些假设。假设德国重工业和一些特殊工业(武器、弹药、军舰、石油、航空、轻金属)如果完全被破坏掉;德国其他的工业(钢铁、电力、汽车、机床、化工)被控制和限制;突出农业与和平的国内工业。2、假设德国战后的人口大约是7,000万,它的东部边境是沿奥德一尼斯河;不为了从当前产品中提取赔偿而保留生产能力,不为德国复兴而保留多余的生产能力。3、假设德国生活水准下降到1932年的水平,那么德国每年的国际收支赤字将是8,180万美元(按10马克兑换1美元计算)。所以如果没有外来援助德国是难以维继的。换句话说,如果当前产品和库存产品的出口首先用来支付进口——像美国所坚持的——德国的国际收支肯定是赤字。参见,FRUS,1945,Vol.3,pp.1320-1321.The United States Political Adviser for Germany(Murphy)to the Secretary of State.
[1]FRUS,1945,Vol.3,pp.1341-1343.The Secretary of State to the United States Political Advisor for Germany (Murphy).
[2]Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.84.
[3]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,pp.32-33.
[4]Edward Peterson,The American Occultation of Germany:Retreat to Victory.p.62.
[5]因为配给的食品定量太低,德国人不愿意从事煤矿之类的重体力劳动。占领军政府虽然给矿工的食品供 给达到了标准,但矿工们经常与他们的妻子、儿女分享食品.所以平均下来矿工们每日的食品热量一般只达到1,550卡路里,有时只能达到1,000卡路里。参见。Nicholas Balabkins,Germany underDirect Control:Economic Aspects of Industrial Disarmaent,1945-1948,N.Y.,Rutgers Uni.Press,1964,p.115.
[1]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan.pp.72-73.、Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.172.
[2]Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.173.
[3]Jean Smith,The Papers of General Lucius D.Clay:Germany 1945-1949,pp.133-134.
[4]Edward Peterson,The American Occupation of Germany:Retreat to Victory,p.64.
[5]声明有12点,其主要内容:1、美国和盟国的安全利益要求在德困破坏掉那些不能用于赔偿拆迁的,或者只能生产武器准备的、或者超出德国和平经济所需的冶金、机械、化工的资本设各工厂。……但美国的赔偿政策并不是为了惩罚性地破坏德国和平经济所需资本设备;2、为了决定德国和平经济的工业能力,赔偿拆迁的数量和种类应该计算出来。3、波茨坦协议既是拆迁工业设备作为赔偿的指导原则,它也对能够提供德国人民不超过欧洲(英国和苏联除外)平均生活水平的和平经济做出了规定。国务院认为波茨坦协议没有打算减少德国生活水准,除非这样的减少是为了提供赔偿。事实上,波茨坦协议规定的德国为遭受它侵略而造成战争损失的国家提供赔偿的义务,不能因为为了使德国保持欧洲的平均生活水准而减少。4、规定了德国生活水准应该大致相当于1930-1938年的平均水平。为了保证德国在没有外援的情况下自我维持,应该给它留下足够的资源使它能够完成赔偿的任务以及重新启动保留的资源。5、为了决 定赔偿拆迁数量的目的,美国不赞成赔偿拆迁达到这样的程度:德国由于缺少资本设备不能出口足够数量的商品以支付必需的进口。6、在接下来的两年内,美国和其他占领国应该资助德国实现最少的必需进口,程度是德国当前产品和库存产品的出口不能达到完全抵消这样的进口。因为波茨坦协议没有对占领时期的德国生活做出规定,所以占领国没有义务为了保持德国生活水准达到欧洲平均水平而提供足够的进口。7、德国恢复期间占领当局的作用总的来说是,提供和创造德国经济能够履行它的义务的条件。这个任务完成后,占领当局应该主要关注德国行政机构的恢复和发展,不只是占领区内的生产和贸易,而是占领区之间的贸易,共同的交通、农业、银行、货币、税收等政策的制定。参见,Beate Ruhm von Oppen,Documents on Germany under Occupation,1945-1954,pp.93-97.
[1]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.75.
[1]FRUS,1946,Vol.2,United States Delegation Record,Council of Foreign Ministers,Second Session.Fortieth Meeting,Paris,July,11 1946.
[2]Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.228.
[3]Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.228.
[1]Jean Smith,The Papers of General Lucius D.Clay:Germany 1945-1949,pp.212-217.
[2]备忘录的前5点分别是:1、总的声明。美国在德国政策的目标是破坏德国战争潜力,对德国人民再教育,按民主程序重建责任制政府,联合国最终平等地接受德国。2、波茨坦协议。美国遵守与英、苏在波茨坦共同达成的协议。然而美国认为波茨坦协议必须被视为一个整体来执行,而不是部分地执行。美国坚持视德国为一个经济体,它的本土资源首先要满足德国自身的需要,其次用于出口以资助必要的进口。3、赔偿。美国建议全面地执行波茨坦协议中有关赔偿的规定。然而美国认为“工业水平计划”是保持德国一个合理的最低生活水平的标准。美国不支持可能给德国经济带来进一步负担的其他形式的赔偿。反对当前产品赔偿,除非当前产品已经超出了德国最低经济标准,以及当前产品不需要出口以支付必要的进口。4、视德国为一个经济体。目前德国现状阻止了“工业水平计划”的实现,只有消除目前的占领区界限,在全德范围内允许商品、人员、思想自由地流动.才能实现最低德国经济的重建.5、财政政策.美国相信一个共同的财政政策对于成功地重建德国经济是必须的,美国支持进行减少货币量、修正债务结构、尽早地使德国处于健康的财政状况等一系列激烈的改革等等。其他几点还包括:视德国为一个经济体所需的其他行政机构、德国的政治结构、德国的边境、德国的未来、占领的期限.参见.Jean Smith,The Papers of General Lucius D.Clay:Germany 1945-1949,pp.236-243.
[3]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.120.
[4]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.121.
[5]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.121.
[1]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,pp.122-123.
[2]贝尔纳斯在演讲中说,“我们已经花费了很多的时间和精力关注德国问题,因为它的正确解决不仅关系到德国,还事关整个欧洲的未来。……德国为它所造成的破坏进行部分赔偿是公正、合法的。……然而正如波茨坦协议预计和要求的那样,ARC同意如果德国不能被视为一个经济体,它的工业水平将进行一些改变。在确定的工业水平之下,不允许提取当前产品赔偿,因为当前产品赔偿不符合现在已经确立的‘工业水平计划'的规定。……而规定的工业水平仅够使德国人自我维持接近于欧洲平均的生活水平。美国将不会同意从德国拿走比波茨坦协议规定的更多赔偿。然而由于ACC没有采取必要的措施使德国成为一个经济体,波茨坦协议的执行受到了挫折”。关于经济的远景,国务卿声称:“德国是欧洲的一部分,如果这样一个富有铁和煤的资源国家变成了济贫院,那么欧洲的复兴,特别是德国邻国的复兴,必定是缓慢的”。在政治方面,贝尔纳斯宣称:“ACC不但没有管理好德国,而且也不允许德国人管理自己。美国政府认为德国人在适当的保证之下,应该担负起管理自己事务的主要责任。美国赞成早日成立一个德国临时政府。我们不希望德国变成任何一个或几个大国的卫星国。美国人民打算帮助德国人民赢回他们在自由的、热爱和平的世界中的荣誉地位”。参见,Beate Ruhm von Oppen,Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945—1954,pp.152-160.
[3]Beate Ruhm von Oppen,Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-1954,p.158.
[4]Lucius D Clay,Decision in Germany,p.79.
[5]威廉·麦克尼尔:《国际事务概览1939—1946年:美国、英国和俄国:它们的合作和冲突,1941—1946年》第1121-1122页。
[6]Lucius D Clay,Decision in Germany,p.81.
[7]康拉德·阿登纳:《阿登纳回忆录1945—1953》上海:上海人民出版社,1976年版,第100页。
[1]Jeffry M.Diefendorf,American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany,1945-1955,p.117.
[2]Arthur M.Schlesinger,The Dynamics of World Power,A Ducumentary History of United States Foreign Policy,1945—1973,Vol.1,Chelsea House Publish,1973,p.300.
[3]William Taubman,Stalin's American Policy:From Entente to Detente to Cold War,N.Y.,W · W · Norton&Company,1982,p.130.
[3]Caroline Kennedy—Pipe,Stalin's cold war:Soviet Strategies in Europe,1943 to 1956,p.96.
[4]Caroline Kennedy—Pipe,Stalin's cold war:Soviet Strategies in Europe,1943 to 1956,p.97.
[5]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany,p.100.
[1]FRUS,1946,vol.5,pp.529-530.The United States Political Adviser for Germany(Murphy)to the Secretary of State.
[2]Thomas Paterson,Soviet-American Confrontation,p.248.
[1]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.18.
[2]Clarrence G.Lasby,Project Paperclip:German Scientist and the cold War,p.70.
[3]Clarrence G.Lasby,Project Paperclip:German Scientist and the cold War,p.71.
[4]各项物资包括一切武器、军火、炸药、军事设备、储存和给养,以及其他各种战争用具和一切战争物资;海军的各级舰艇、辅助军舰和一切商船;各种飞机、航空用和防空用的设备和器材;一切陆地、水路和空中的交通运输工具和设备;一切军事设施和建筑,连同建筑的设计和画样;为生产以上物资的工厂、车间、研究所、实验室、实验站、技术资料、专利、计划、画样和创造发明;盟国代表为这些事项而需要的情报或记录。参见,《德黑兰、雅尔塔、波茨坦会议文件集》第29-30页。
[5]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder·in Postwar Germany,p.19.
[6]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,pp.24-25.
[1]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Con.vol.1,pp.510-511.The Representative on the Allied Commission for Reparations(Pauley)to the Secretary of State.
[2]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.25.
[3]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.27.
[1]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,pp.30-31.
[2]Truman Library,Momorandum,Secretary of Commerce(Henry Wallace)to Truman Dec.4,1945.
[3]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.33.
[4]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.37.
[1]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.18.
[2]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.39.
[3]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.40.
[4]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.40.
[5]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.42.
[6]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.42.
[1]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.43.
[2]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.47.
[3]Jean Smith,The Papers of General Lucius D.Clay:Germany 1945—1949,pp.233-235.
[4]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.48.
[1]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.49.
[2]Clarrence G.Lasby,Project Paperclip:German Scientist and the cold War.p.5.
[3]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany.p.60.
[4]FIAT具体负责制订和完成的职责有:(1)收集技术信息;(2)指导所有与收集信息相关的使团和机构的工作;(3)控制和安置有利于FIAT主要目标的人员、文件、设备、设施。
[5]先是在现场复制选择出来的文件记录,返回后制成胶片,然后编制出内容摘要和检索,完成后交给商务部的技术服务处准备予以公布。例如,对要调查的67家工厂,FIAT预计有多于30亿页的文件需要筛选,需要7年的工作时间。其中大约3300万页的文件需要制成胶片,需要4年的时间。参见,John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.63.
[6]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.63.
[1]John Gimbel.Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.68.
[2]John Gimbel Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.69.
[3]John Gimbel Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.70.
[4]John Gimbel Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.70.
[5]John Gimbel Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar German,pp.75-76.
[6]John Gimbel Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.76.
[1]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.147.
[2]New York Times,26 May 1947.
[3]New York Times,26 May 1947.
[4]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.96.
[5]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.149.
[1]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwry Germany,pp.135-136.
[2]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.137.
[3]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,pp.144-145.
[4]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.146.
[1]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.148.
[2]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.152.
[3]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.259-260.United States Delegation Minutes,Council of Foreign Ministers,Eighth Meeting,Moscow.
[4]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,p.261.United States Delegation Minutes,Council of Foreign Ministers,Eighth Meeting,Moscow.
[5]美国通过盟国赔偿机构(IARA)内部按比例所得到的赔偿价值是66,666美元:为了加强对日作战而进行的直接拆迁的价值是1千万美元;获得的商船价值5百万美元;德国海外资产在1千5百万到2千5百万之间;美国没有获取德国当前产品赔偿,也没有得到黄金赔偿。参见,John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.151.
[1]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.Ⅸ.
[2]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,pp.148-150.
[3]1947年6月,当“智力赔偿”政策即将结束之际,格林公开宣称,在美占区的每一个重要的工厂都将“公开它的工业秘密”。他说只是对莱卡照相机厂所做的微缩胶卷就不少于130卷。如果美国制造商们派更多的技术人员到德国,他们将会得到更多的东西,因为美国政府即将停止这项计划。参见,John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.148.
[1]英国对杜鲁门总统的“煤炭指令”一直不满意。英国还反对限制德国工业水平;反对美国的赔偿政策。迫于美国的压力,英国才勉强同意了美国的政策,但它提出德国工业水平和赔偿政策每年都可以进行修改,从1947年1月就开始进行。但英、美占领区正式合并以来,英美之间又产生了一些新的问题。英国政府打算将这些问题交到莫斯科外长会议上一并解决。(FRUS,1946,vol.5,pp.529-530.The United States Political Adviser for Germany(Murphy)to the Secretary of State.)苏联在会前已经打算支持建立德国临时政府;它也赞同大幅度提高“工业水平计划”的标准。当然,在接受德国复兴观念的同时,苏联又担心这可能会危及其安全。法国自从分区占领德国以后,一直宣称因为法国没有参加波茨坦会议,其协议自然对它不具有约束力,所以在许多有关德国的问题上法国与英、美大唱反调。会议上,法国外长皮杜尔两次提出:在考虑德国其他政治和经济问题之前,法国首先要求德国的煤炭。同时,他也不同意经济一体化、工业水平计划以及赔偿计划,除非法国的要求首先能够得到满足。法国反对最强烈的是“在德国边界确定之前,竟然打算创建德国中央政府机关”。参见,Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949.p.295.、FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.262-263.The Secretary of State to the President and Acting Secretary of State..;FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.265-266.The Secretary of State to the President and Acting Secretary of State..
[2]该文件提出了有关建立临时的德国政府以及在德国建立州政府的计划、波兰与德国边界的建议、德国边界问题的建议、美国起草的有关德国非军事化、非武装化的条约、视德国为一个经济整体、赔偿问题、煤炭生产等一系列问题的计划、主张;并对英、法、苏三国可能采取的政策进行了预测.参见,FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.201-223.Policy Papers Prepared by the Department of State.
[1]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition,p.158.
[2]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,p.218.Policy Papers Prepared by the Department of State.
[3]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.263-265.The Secretary of State to the President and Acting Secretary of State.另参见莫洛托夫:《对外政策问题:1945年4月—1948年11月时期中的演说和声明》第335页。
[4]例如,美国代表乔治·雅各布在致华盛顿的电报中写道:很明显,苏联对于赔偿的要求如果得到满足,那么他们将准备像我国代表团一样同意德国经济统一。参见,Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949.p.300.
[5]莫洛托夫:《对外政策问题:1945年4月—1948年11月时期中的演说和声明》第351页。
[6]莫洛托夫:《对外政策问题:1945年4月—1948年11月时期中的演说和声明》第351页。
[1]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.299-301.The Secretary of Stale to the Acting Secretary of State.
[2]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.298-299.The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State.
[3]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.301-303.The President Truman rio the Secretary of State at Moscow,April 1,1947.
[4]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.303-304.The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State.April 1,1947.
[5]Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.301.
[1]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.337-344.Memorandum of Conversation,Moscow.
[2]Charles Maier,The Marshall Plan and Germany:West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program,p.49.
[3]Lucius D Clay,Decision in Germany,p.174.
[4]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,pp.8-15.
[5]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.199-200.Memorandum by Mr.Sherman S.Sheppard of the Bureau of the Burdget to the Director of the Bureau(Webb).
[1]其中给英国贷款37.5亿美元,给法国6亿美元贷款,通过陆军部的“占领区政府援助与救济”向德国提供8.4亿美元援助。此外,还向意大利、奥地利、东欧等国提供了大量贷款。参见,Charles S.Maier,The Marshall Plan and Germany:West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program,N.Y.,1991,p.9.
[2]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.197-198.The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War(Patterson).
[3]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.199-200.Memorandum by Mr.Sherman S.Sheppard of the Bureau of the Burdget to the Director of the Bureau(Webb).
[4]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,p.219.Editorial Note.
[5]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.186.
[6]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.220-223.Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff(Kennan).
[1]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.223-226.The Director of the Policy Planning Staff(Kennan)to the under Secretary of State(Acheson).
[2]克莱顿作为驻日内瓦国际贸易组织的美国代表正参加关税同盟的谈判,同时他也是美国对欧洲经济委员会的代表。因工作所需,克莱顿在1947年初收集了大量有关欧洲经济和财政状况的一手资料。3月5日,克莱顿曾经向国务院提出了一份备忘录。(Clayton,Memorandum,March 5,1947,Truman Library.)5月27日,他又提出了一份报告。《纽约时报》甚至称“克莱顿就是马歇尔计划”。参见,The New York Times,October 24,1947.因此,克莱顿有时被称为“马歇尔计划”之父。参见,John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.9.
[3]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.230-232.Memorandum by the under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs(Clayton).
[4]Thomas G.Paterson,Soviet—American Confrontation:Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War,p.212.
[5]Stanley Hoffmann & Charles Maier,The Marshall Plan:A Retrospective,p.ⅹⅰ.
[6]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.237-239.Press Release Issued by the Department of State,June 4,1947.
[1]Thomas G.Paterson,Soviet—American Confrontation:Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War,p.213.
[2]在6月24日开始的会谈中,克莱顿说美国在采取措施之前必须得到下列情报:1、为什么欧洲恢复得那么慢;2、欧洲能做些什么来解决自己的问题;3、如美国给予最低限度的援助,欧洲要多久才能自己站起来。他解释了要说服美国人民接受欧洲复兴计划的困难之处:国会要知道欧洲国家多久可以自己站起来,国会还希望看到更加紧密地联合在一起的欧洲经济。参见,FRUS,1947,vol.3,pp.268-273.Memorandum of Conversation,by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom(Peterson).London,June 24,1947.
[3]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,p.308.The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France.July 3.
[4]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,p.301.The Ambassador in France(Caffery)to the Secretary of State.June 29.
[5]Roger Morgan,The United States and West Germany 1945—1973:A Study in Alliance Politics,London,Oxford uni.Press,1974,p.21.
[1]1、由克莱将军和英国占领军最高军事、行政长官罗伯特森在两到三周之内研究修改“工业水平计划”,确定一个新的钢产量:2、按照修改后的“工业水平计划”规定的用于赔偿拆迁的工厂和设备将由管制委员会进行统一分配;3、双占区经济机构将重组,会变得更有效率,但不能成为临时政府;4、双占区的机构在地理上将实现集中化,只要设施能够被分配、协调好。参见,FRUS,1947,vol.2,pp.357-358.The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State.
[2]1、总体计划。原工业水平计划规定德国工业水平可以达到1938年的55%,即1936年的70—75%。新的计划将提高双占区的工业水平,可以达到相当于1936年的水平,那一年德国既没有出现繁荣,也没有出现萧条。2、平衡经济的要求。除了战前的对外贸易,为了实现贸易赢余,双占区必须生产超出它内部所需的多余产品。3、增加受限制发展工业的计划水平。原来计划水平规定的受限制发展的钢铁、冶金机械、精密仪器、光学仪器、电子机械、电力、交通设施工业、化工、陶瓷等都分别做出了新的提高。4、禁止发展的工业。新的工业水平计划规定:铝、镀、钒、镁等禁止生产。参见,Beate Ruhm von Oppen,Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-1954,pp.239-245.
[3]Charles Maier,The Marshall Plan and Germany:West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program,p.2.
[1]John Gimbel,The American Occupation of Germany:Politics and the Military,1945-1949,p.167.
[2]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.258.
[1]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.259.
[2]Thomas G.Paterson,Soviet—American Confrontation:Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War,p.235.
[3]Charles Maier,The Marshall Plan and Germany,p.378.
[4]《国际条约集,1948—1949》[Z]北京:世界知识出版社,1959年版,第517-520页。
[5]法国外长舒曼说,在法国议会,德国赔偿问题是一个争论很多的问题.从心理上说,在讨论缔结对德最后条约之前,试图获取法国议会同意正式放弃战争赔偿将是很困难的。参见,FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.7,pp.91-92.Minutes of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.,the U.K.and France,May 24,1952
[6]《国际条约集,1950—1952》[Z]北京:世界知识出版社,1959年版,第602-603页。
[1]《国际条约集,1953—1955》[Z]北京:世界知识出版社,1959年版,第296页。
[2]《国际条约集,1953—1955》[Z]第103-104页。
[3]Ronald W.Zweig,German Reparations and the Jewish World:a History of the Claims Conference.Lomdon,2001,p.12.
[1]FRUS,1943,Vol.1,pp.443-444.Inter-Allied Declaration against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories Under Enemy Occupation or Control.
[2]FRUS,1945,Potsdam Vol.1,p.513.Acting Secretary of State to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations(Pauley).
[3]Ronald W.Zweig,German Reparations and the Jewish World:a History of the Claims Conference,p.13.
[4]Ronald W.Zweig,German Reparations and the Jewish World:a History of the Claims Conference,p.14.、Shlomo Shafir,Ambiguous Relations:The American Jewish Community and Germany since 1945,Detroit Wayne State University Press,1999,pp.60-61.
[1]Shlomo Shafir,Ambiguous Relations:The American Jewish Community and Germany since 1945,p.61.
[2]Shlomo Shafir,Ambiguous Relations:The American Jewish Community and Germany since 1945,p.61.
[3]Ronald W.Zweig,German Reparations and the Jewish WorM:a History of the Claims Conference,p.15.
[4]Shlomo Shafir,Ambiguous Relations:The American Jewish Community and Germany since 1945,p.163.
[5]康拉德·阿登纳:《阿登纳回忆录1953—1955》第139页。
[6]Ronald W.Zweig,German Reparations and the Jewish World:a History of the Claims Conference,p.20.、Nicholas Balabkins,West German Reparations to Israel,p.120.
[1]FRUS,1951,Vol.5,pp.630-631..Memorandum of Conversation,by Alexander F.Kiefer of the Office of German Economic Affairs,April 10,1951.
[2]FRUS,1951,Vol.5,p.669.Memorandum of Conversation,by the Secretary of State.May 8,1951.
[3]FRUS,1951,Vol.5,p.751.Memorandum of Conversation,by the Assistant Secretary of State for near Eastern,South Asian and African Affairs(McGhee).
[4]FRUS,1951,Vol.5,p.949.Memorandum of Conversation,by the Acting Secretary of State.Novermber 30,1951.
[1]Shlomo Shafir,Ambiguous Relations:The American Jewish Community and Germany since 1945,p.171.
[2]FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.9,pp.913-914.The Secretary of State to the Office of the U.S.High Commissioner for Germany,at Bonn.April 4,1952
[3]Nicholas Balabkins,West German Reparations to Israel,New Brunswick,Rutgers University Press,1971,p.131.
[4]FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.9,Part Ⅰ,p.938.The U.S.High Commissioner for Germany(McCloy)to the Department of State.May 25,1952.
[5]Nicholas Balabkins,West German Reparations to Israel.p.133.
[6]康拉德·阿登纳:《阿登纳回忆录1953—1955》第170-171页。
[1]FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.9,Part Ⅰ,p.1002.Memorandum of Conversation,by the Office in Charge of Palestine-Israel-Jordan Affairs(Waller).September 22,1952.
##属性不符
[1]Herbert Feis,The Diplomacy of the Dollar:First Ere 1919—1932,Archon Books,1965,p.46.
[2]Carolyn Eisenberg,Drawing the Line,pp.17-18.
[1]Bruce Kuklick,American Policy and the Division of Germany:The Clash with Russia over Reparations,p.3-4.
[2]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,pp.571-573.
[3]多边主义外交思想的内容参见本文第四章第一节。
[4]Bruce Kuklick,American Policy and the Division of Germany:The Clash with Russia over Reparations,p.6.
[5]Bruce Kuklick,American Policy and the Division of Germany:The Clash with Russia over Reparations,p.15.
[1]埃德温·哈特里奇:《第四帝国的崛起》第22页。
[1]埃德温·哈特里奇:《第四帝国的崛起》第91页。
[2]吴友法、黄正柏:《德国资本主义发展史》第274页。
[3]卡尔·哈达赫:《二十世纪德国经济史》第27页注释。
[1]本表格由笔者绘制,数据来源,Max Sering,Germany Under the Dawes Plan,p.159.
[1]Bruck Kent,The Spoiols of War:The Politics,Economics,and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918-1932,p.220.
[2]查尔斯·金德尔伯格:《1929—1939年世界经济萧条》[M]上海:上海译文出版社,1986年版,第23页。
[3]Klaus F.Schoenthal,American Attitudes Toward Germany,1919-1932,p.115.
[4]Jeffry M.Diefendorf,American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany,1945-1955,N.Y.Cambridge Press,p.87.
[5]James McAllister,No Exit:American and the German Problem,1943-1954,Ithaca University Press,2002,p.79.
[1]William C.McNeil,American Money and the Weimar Republic,pp.98-99,
[2]卡尔·哈达赫:《二十世纪德国经济史》第50页。
[1]金铎:《二战后德国的战争赔偿与反省》[J],载于《团结》2005年第5期。
[2]杨德利:《德国的战争赔偿问题》[J],载于《德国研究》1996年第1期。
[3]据1946年美国新闻机构发表的调查表明,约80%的德国人认为纽伦堡的审判是公正的,被告的罪行无可辩驳。
[1]Melvyn Leffler,The Elusive Quest:American's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,pp.96-99.
[2]Bruck Kent,The Spoiols of War:The Politics,Economics,and Diplomacy of Reparations,1918-1932,p.2289.
[3]卡尔·艾利希·埃尔德曼:《德意志史》(第四卷,世界大战时期,1914-1950),第281页。
[1]Harley Notter,Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation,1939-1945,Washington,1949,pp.558-559.
[1]莫洛托夫:《对外政策问题:1945年4月—1948年11月时期中的演说和声明》第55页。
[2]托马斯·帕特森:《美国外交政策》第614页。
[3]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.259-263.United States Delegation Minutes,March 18,1947.
[1]Charles S.Maicr,The Marshall Plan and Germany:West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program,p.21.
[2]Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-949,p.280.
[3]James McAllistcr,No Exit:American and the German Problem,1943-1954,p.126.
[4]文安立:《冷战与革命——美苏冲突与中国内战的起源》[M]南宁:广西师范大学出版社,2002年版,第1页。
[1]Owen D.Young to Harriman,Sept.12,1947,Truman Library.
[2]Thomas G.Paterson,Soviet—American Confrontation:Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War,p.231.
[3]Charles Maier,The Marshall Plan and Germany:West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program,pp.123-124.
[4]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.299—300.The Ambassador in France(Caffery)to the Secretary of State.Paris,June 29.
[5]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.343-344.The Ambassador in France(Caffery)to the Secretary of State.August,6 1947.
[6]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,p.306.The Ambassador in the United Kingdom(Douglas)to the Secretary of State.
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88.王晓德:《梦想与现实》[M]北京:中国社会科学出版社,1995年版。
90.王晓德:《美国文化与外交》[M]北京:世界知识出版社,2000年版。
91.余志森:《崛起和扩张的年代,1898—1929》[M]北京:人民出版社,2001年版。
92.刘绪贻等:《战后美国史,1945-2000》[M]北京:人民出版社,2002年版。
93.杨生茂:《美国外交政策史1775—1989》[M]北京:人民出版社,1991年版。
94.吴友法、黄正柏:《德国资本主义发展史》[M]武汉:武汉大学出版社,2000年版。
95.佟连发:《国际法学》[M]北京:北京大学出版社,2003年版。
96.阿瑟·S·林克:《一九00年以来的美国史》[M]北京:中国社会科学出版社,1983年版。
97.C·E·布莱克、E·C·赫尔姆赖克著,黄嘉德译:《二十世纪欧洲史》[M]北京:人民出版社,1984年版。
98.加里·沃塞曼:《美国政治基础》[M]北京:中国社会科学出版社,1994年版。
[2]Edward Buchrig,Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of power,Indiana University Press,1955,p.14.
[1]FRUS,1918,Sup.1,p.343.The Secretary of State t0 the Swiss Charge(Oederlin).
[2]豪斯参与停战协议谈判的过程、结果参见豪斯从1918年10月28日—11月3日连续发给国务卿的几份电报·FRUS,1918,Sup.1,The World War,Vol.1,pp.405-455.The special reperesentative(House)to the Secretary of State.
[3]王铁崖选译:《一九一四——一九一八年第一次世界大战》第147页。
[4]其主要内容有:(1)在停战协定签字以后六小时,须停止陆空战事。(2)立即从下列被占领的国家撤退:法国、比利时、卢森堡及阿尔萨斯—洛林。撤退须自停战协定签字之日起十五天的期限内完成。(3)德国军队必须放弃完好无损的战争物资,就地向协约国和美国军队移交。(4)德国军队须从莱茵河左岸的国家撤退。莱茵河左岸的国家将由在协约国和美国占领部队监督下的地方当局来管理。协约国和美国部队应通过掌握莱茵河各主要通过点(美因兹、科布伦茨、科隆)连同各该点上右岸周围三十公里的桥头堡的驻军以及同样掌握该区战略据点的驻军以保证占领。(5)在盟国和美国指定的海港内,须把现存的 所有潜水艇(包括潜水巡洋舰和所有布雷艇),连同全副军各和装备一起,向协约国和美国移交。(6)德国必须交出协约国指定数量的大炮、机枪、迫击炮、战斗机和轰炸机,以及车厢、火车头、卡车。(7)财政条款(即第19条款):在协约国和美国方面保留今后提出的任何权利和要求。其财政方面的要求是:赔偿所遭受的损失。在停战期间,敌人不得移动足以对协约国作为支付战争赔偿担保品的有价证券。立即归还比利时国家银行的库存,而一般地应立即移交有关被占领国的国家利益和私人利益的所有文件、有价物(动产和纸币及其印刷机)德国军队拿走的俄国和罗马尼亚黄金应予归还并向它们移交,该黄金在签订和约以前由协约国负责保管。FRUS,1918,Sup 1.The World War,Vol.1,p.463-468.Nov.4.1918.The Special Representative(House)to the Secretary of State.另参见,《国际条约集,1917—1923》[Z]北京:世界知识出版社.1961年版,第61-65页.
[1]FRUS,1918,Sup 1.The World War,Vol.1,pp.381-383.October.23.1918.The Secretary of State to the Swiss Charge(Oederlin).
[2]FRUS,1918,Sup 1.The World War,Vol.1,p.466.Nov.4.1918.The Special Representative(House)to the Secretary of State.
[3]FRUS,1919,The PPC,Vol.2,p.586.Memorandum by the Advisory counsel of the American Mission to the Inter—Allied Council on War Purchase and Finance(Cravath).
[4]FRUS,1919,The PPC,Vol.2,pp.585-604.Memorandum by the Advisory counsel of the American Mission to the Inter—Allied Council on War Purchase and Finance(Cravath).
[1]FRUS,1919,The PPC.,Vol.2,pp.606-607.Memorandum by Dr.A.Young:A Suggestion for American Policy with Repect to Indemnities.
[2]FRUS,1919,The PPC.Vol.1,pp.298-304.The Technical Advisers to the Commissin to Negotiate Peace(Scott,Miller)to the Secretary of State.
[1]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.10.
[2]Edward M.House,What really happened at Paris:The Story of the Peace Conference,1918-1919 by American Delegates,pp.275-276.
[3]Arthur Walworth,Wilson and his Peacemakers,American Diplomacy at the Paris Conference,1919,p.107.
[4]FRUS,1919,The PPC,vol.2,pp.575-576.The Italian Ambassador(Machi di Cellere)to the Secretary of State.
[5]FRUS,1919,The PPC,vol.2,pp.601-606.Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M.Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay.
[6]FRUS,1919,The PPC.,vol.2,pp.693-703.Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M.Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay.
[1]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.22.
[2]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.23.
[3]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the.American Delegation,p.24.
[1]Philip M.Burnentt,Keparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.26.
[2]Arthur Walworth,Wilson and his Peacemakers:American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference,1919,pp.173-174.
[3]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.27.
[4]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.62.
[5]Edward Mandell House,What really happened at Paris:The Story of the Peace Conference,1918-1919 by American Delegates,p.269.
[1]Lloyd G.David,The truth about Reparations and War-Debts.London,W.Heinemann,1932,Vol.1,pp.493-495.
[2]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.63.
[3]link Arthur,Thepapers of Woodrow Wilson,Vol.56,p.360.
[4]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.31,
[1]FRUS,1919,The PPC,Vol.1,p.575.The Special Representative(House)to President Wilson.pp.136-137.President Wilson to the Special Representative(House).
[1]FRUS,1919,The PPC.Vol.5,Notes of a Meeting Held in President W'dson's House in Place des Etats-Unis,Paris Appendix.pp.27-28.
[1]FRUS,1919,The PPC,Vo12,p.74.The Acting Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister(Sulzer).
[2]C·E·布莱克、E·C·赫尔姆赖克:《二十世纪欧洲史》[M](上),北京:人民出版社,1984年版,第136页。
[3]Kent Bruce,The Spoils of War:The Politices,Economics and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918-1932,Oxford,Clarendon Press,1989,p.70.
[4]Philip M.Burnentt,Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference:From the standpoint of the American Delegation,p.69.
[5]Edward Mandell House,What really happened at Paris:The Story of the Peace Conference,1918-1919 by American Delegates,p.288.
[6]Thomas A.Bailey,A Diplomatic History of the American People,p.145.
[1]Schwabe Klaus,Woodrow Wilson,Revolutionary Germany,and Peacemakking,1918-1919:Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power,Chapel Hill.North Careolina Uni.Press,1985,p.290.
[2]Klaus Schwabe,Woodrow Wilson,Revolutionary Germany,and Peacemaking,1918-1919,p.187.
[3]卡尔·迪特利希·埃尔德曼:《德意志史》(第四卷,世界大战时期,1914-1950,上册),北京:商务印书馆,1986年版,第219页。
[4]link Arthur,Thepapers of Woodrow Wilson,Vol.59,p.581.
[1]FRUS.1919,The PPC,vol.3,pp.413-420.The Presentation of the Conditions of Peace to the German Delegate.
[2]例如,关于上西西里亚的归属必须经公民投票来决定;德国在不久的将来可以加入国联;如果德国履行它的和约义务,法国可以提早从莱茵地区撤军:德国被允许可以提出有关赔款问题的建议.
[3]其主要内容如下:第一,将国联盟约置于条约的第一部分。第二,重划了德国的疆界。第三,瓜分德国的殖民地。第四.限制德国军备,第五,赔偿和经济问题.和约第231条、232条、233条、234条、235条及附件规定:协约及参战各国政府宣言德国及其各盟国使协约及参战各国政府及其国民因德国及其各盟国之侵略,以致酿成战争之后果,所受一切损失与损害,德国承认由德国及其各盟国负担责任。德国须遵守其已发之诺言,对于违反1839年条约之结果.担任偿还比利时在1918年11月11日以前向协约及参战各国政府所借之一切款项,及按年五厘利息,其总数由赔偿委员会决定。德国的赔偿数额由赔偿委员会在1921年5月1日前确定,并通告德国政府。以示该国之义务范围。在此之前,德国应以黄金、煤、机器和其它物资先偿付200亿马克。德国应交出1,600吨级商船的全部,1,400吨级商船的一半,1/4的渔船和风细雨1/5的内河船只:5年内应为协约国建造20万吨船舶。此外,从1920年起的10年内向法、比、意等协约国提供4,000万吨的煤、及大量机器、化工产品等。和约还规定,战胜国对德输出输入的货物不受限制,德国关税不得高于别国;易北河、奥得河、多瑙河等重要河流由国际专门委员会控制:外国军舰和商船可以自由出入基尔运河等。参见,《国际条约集,1917-1923》[Z]第72-273页。
[4]Levin Gordon,Woodrow Wilson and World Politics:America's Response to War and Revolution.N.Y.1968p.123.
[5]FRUS,1918,SUP.1,The World War I,pp.316-321.Address of President Wilson,opening the Campaign for the Fourth Liberty Loan,Delivered at the Metropolitan Opera House in N.Y.City.September 27,1918.
[1]Arnold.A Offner,The Origin of Second World War:American Foreign Policy and World Politics,1917-1941,N.Y.Praeger Publishers,1975,p.24.
[2]James Scott,President Wilson's Foreign Policy:Messages,Addresses,Papers,p.320.
[3]FRUS,1918,Sup.1,The World War Vol.1,pp.108-113.Address of the President of U.S.Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two House of Congress.
[4]Levin Gordon,Woodrow Wilson and World Politics:America's Response to War and Revolution,p.129.
[5]Levin Gordon,Woodrow Wilson and World Politics:America's Response to War and Revolution,p.128.
[1]John Dulles,challenge and Response in United States Policy.Foreign Affairs ⅩⅩⅩⅥ p.41-42.转引,石斌《杜勒斯与美国对苏战略》[M]北京:中国社会科学出版社.2004年版.第56页.
[2]Arthur Walworth,Wilson and his Peacemakers:American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference,1919,p.167.
[1]Marc Tracchtenberg,Reparation in World Politics:France and European Econimic Doplomacy,1916-1923,N.Y.Columbia University Press,1980,p.54.
[2]Levin Gordon,Woodrow Wilson and World Politics:America's Response to War and Revolution,p.144.
[3]Edward·M·House,What really happened at Paris:The Story of the Peace Conference,1918-1919 by American Delegates.p.289.
[4]FRUS,1919,The PPC.Vol.2,p.556.The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State.
[5]Marc Tracchtcnbcrg,Reparation in World Politics:France and European Econimic Doplomacy,1916-1923,pp.54-55.
[1]王铁崖选译:《一九一四——一九一八年第一次世界大战》[Z]第147页.
[2]FRUS.1918.Sup 1.,The World War,Vol.,1.p.466.Nov.4.1918.The Special Representative(House)to the Secretary of State.
[3]其中,英国战死87.5万人。伤200多万人,商船损毁不下900万吨,船舶及货物损失价值7.5亿英镑,丧失了1/4的海外投资。公债由战争开始时的6.5亿英镑增加到80亿英镑。另外还欠下美国9亿英镑,大约合42亿美元。樊亢、宋则行等:《主要资本主义国家经济简史》[M]北京:人民出版社,1973年版,第88页。
[4]法国北部和东北部最发达的10个省遭受严重破坏,矿区、工厂、房屋、公共建筑、铁路、公路、桥梁都化为废墟,其中包括9,000家工厂,近100万幢建筑物,1,000英里铁路,物资损失达2,000亿法郎,200万人无家可归。杜蒙德:《现代美国》[M]北京:商务印书馆,1984年版,第278页。
[1]Kent Brace,The Spoils of War:The Politices,Economics and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918-1932,p.70.
[2][法]夏尔·卢梭著.张凝等译:《武装冲突法》第442页.
[3][法]夏尔·卢梭著,张凝等译:《武装冲突法》第152页.
[4]这两个英文单词译成汉语基本都有归还、赔偿、补偿的涵义,但在国际法中它们的涵义并不完全相同.《国际法词典》对这两个词的解释如下,“Indemnity”:Monies paid by a defeated state to a victor after a war.Indemnity is based on the “right of the victor”,regardless of whether the war waged by the victory was just or
[1]Arnold A.Offner,The Origins of the Second World War:American Foreign Policy and World Politics,1917-1941,N.Y.Praeger Publishers,1975,p.4.
[2]Jean—Baptiste Duroselle,From Wilson to Roosevelt:Foreign Policy of the United States 1913-1945,p.134.
[1]S·F·比米斯:《美国外交史》(第三分册),第658页。
[2]FRUS,1920,Vol.2,p.393.The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain(Davis).
[3]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.24.
[4]该法案反对取消协约国欠美国的战债.要求债务国自1922年起在25年内付清全部战债的本金和不低于4.25%的利息。
[1]例如,6月15日,在休斯发给驻英国大使的电报中说,世界大战外债委员会要求与英国尽可能早地就战债问题进行谈判,让大使通知英国政府任命谈判代表重开谈判。FRUS,1922,Vol.1,p.402.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain(Harvey).6月30日,法国驻美大使朱赛兰通知国务院,应美国外债委员会要求,法国将派两名财政部官员近期内访问美国,就战债问题进行谈判.参见,FRUS,1922,Vol.1,p.402.The French Ambassador(Juserand)to the Secretary of State.
[2]FRUS,1922,Vol.1,pp.404-405.The Frence President of the Council and Minisiter of Foreign Affairs(Poincare)to the Secretary of State.
[3]FRUS,1922,Vol.1,pp..406-410.The British Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs(Balfour)to the French Ambassador in Great Britian(Saint-Aulaire).
[4]New York Times,October 17,1922.
[5]FRUS,1922,Vol.2,p.175.The Ambassador in France(Herrick)to the Secretary of State.
[1]Frank Costigliola,Awkward Dominion:American Political,Economic,and Cultural Relations with Europe,1919-1933,p.106.
[2]这些会议包括:圣雷莫(Sanremo)会议,海斯(Hythe)会议,斯巴(Spa)会议,布鲁塞尔(Brussels)会议等。
[3]在一战期间,是协约国处理军事、政治问题的最高决策、协调机关。停战后,它负有筹备和会的任务。《凡尔赛和约》签字后,它又兼有处理和约善后问题的职责。最高会议由协约国政府首脑或其代表组成。参见,王绳祖:《国际关系史》[M](第四卷),北京:世界知识出版社,1995年版,第264页注释3.
[4]据《凡尔赛和约》第235条规定:德国应照赔偿委员会所定之分期交付及办法(用现金、商品、船只及有价值之物或用他物),于1919年,1920年间,及1921年之最初四个月间,偿付与200亿金马克价值相等之物。1918年11月11日停战以后各占领军之费用,应在此数内首先提偿。美国驻法国大使韦尔斯向国务院报告:由于美国尚未批准和约,赔偿委员会中的其他国家代表(如英国代表布拉德伯格)质疑美国是否拥有和约赋予的权利;大使还报告说,比利时宣称它有比占领军费用更优先的权利,要求优先得到德国赔偿。国务院立即指示韦尔斯:美国虽然尚未批准和约,但美国在莱茵地区的驻军是以《停战协定》为法律基础。《停战协定》还继续有效,所以美国有权从德国直接收取占领费用,当然它也不反对赔偿委员会代为收缴。国务院又强调说优先提偿占领军费用不仅是和约所规定的,也是1919年1月24日四巨头会议一致赞同的,它比比利时赔偿具有更优先的权利。参见。《国际条约集.1917-1923》[Z》第159页、FRUS,1920,vol.2,pp.338-340.The Ambassador in Frence(Wallace)to the Acting Secretary of State.、FRUS,1920,vol.2,pp.343-345.The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France(Wallace).
[1]FRUS,I921,Vol.1,pp.8-9.The Secretary of State to the Ambassdor in France(Wallace).
[2]美国参议院最后一次否决《凡尔赛和约》后,参众两院曾联合通过了要求结束与德国和其他中欧同盟国的停战状态的提案。即诺克斯——波特决议案,其内容是建议结束与德国的战争状态,废除1917年通过的宣布对德战争.但威尔逊总统否决了联合提案。这样在战争结束两年以后,在法理上美国与德国还处于停战状态。
[3]FRUS,1921,vol.2,p.1,The Commissioner at Berlin(Dresel)to the Acting Secretary of State.
[4]FRUS,1921,Vol.2,p.2.The Secretary of State to the Commission at Berlin(Dresel).
[5]FRUS.1921.Vol.2.p.40.The Secretary of State to the Commission at Berlin(Dresel).
[6]1921年8月25日,德赛尔与德国缔结了和约。1921年10月,哈定总统签署了《德国和美国恢复和平条约》,又称《柏林和约》。德国议会也很快通过了这一和约。美国派往德国的第一任大使是马萨诸塞州的工业家、前国会议员阿兰森·霍顿.参见,FRUS,1921,vol.2,pp.7-8.The Commissioner at Berlin(Dresel)to the Secretary of State.、FRUS,1921,vol.2.pp.29-33.Treaty Between the United States of American and Germany,Signed at Berlin,August 25,1921.
[7]按照《凡尔赛和约》规定,赔偿委员会设在巴黎。委员有五人,赔偿委员会主席由法国人担任,秘书长由英国人担任,而且劳合·乔治同意在投票表决双方票数相等时,法国总统有裁决权。
[1]主要内容:建议德国的赔偿总额为2,260亿金马克,再加德国每年出口额的12%,42年内付清。Manfred Jonas,The United States and Germany:A Diplomacy History,p.155.
[2]FRUS,1921,Vol.2,pp.37-39.The Commissioner at Berlin(Dresel)to the Secretary of State.
[3]FRUS,1921,vol.2,p.40.The Secretary of State to the Commissioner at Berlin(Dresel).
[4]FRUS,1921,Vol.2,pal.The Commissioner at Berlin(Dresel)to the Secretary of State.
[1]FRUS,1921,Vol.2,pp.44-45.The Secretary of State to the Commissioner at Berlin(Dresel).
[2]FRUS,1921,Vol.2,pp.48-50.Memorandum by the under Secretary of State(Fletcher)of a Conversation between the Secretary of State and the British and French Ambasadors(Geddes,Jusserand).
[3]该计划将德国的赔偿总额确定为1320亿金马克,42年内还清.该计划规定.支付款项分为A、B、C三类。其中C类为820亿金马克,可以留待德国有能力支付时再行偿还,其余的赔偿额除1921年5月31日以前先交付10亿金马克外,从1921年5月1日起.按每年20亿金马克支付。为完成支付,应对德国财政进行监督,设立保证委员会机构等。如果德国不履行以上规定,协约国就控制德国税务,扩大征收德国税款,换用对协约国更为有利的另种计划。参见,王绳祖:《国际关系史》[Z](第四卷),第267-268页。
[4]FRUS,1921,Vol.1,p.14.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France(Wallace).
[1]FRUS,1922,vol.2,p.160.The German Charge(Von Thermannn)to the Acting Secretary of State.
[2]FRUS,1922,vol.2,pp.160-162.The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State.
[3]FRUS,1922,vol.2,p.163.The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State.
[4]FRUS,1922,Vol.2,pp.165-168.The Ambassador in France(Herrick)to the Secretary of State.
[5]FRUS,1922,vol.2,pp.198-199.The Ambassador in France(Herrick)to the Secretary of State.
[1]FRUS,1922.Vol.2,pp.199-202.The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France(Herrick).
[1]FRUS,1923,vol.2,pp..57-60.The German Embassy to the Department of State.
[2]FRUS,1923,vol.2,pp.60-61.Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the German Ambassador(Wielfeldt).
[3]FRUS,1923,vol.2,pp.61-62.Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the Belgian
[1]FRUS,1923,Vol.2,pp.70-74.The Secretary of State to the British Charge(Chilton).
[2]Conan Fischer,The Ruhr Crisis,1923-1924,Oxford University Press,2003,p.290.
[3]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.100.
[4]FRUS,1923,Vol.2,pp.74-75.The Ambassador in Belgium(Fletcher)to the Secretary of State.
[5]FRUS,1923,Vol.2,pp.94-95.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France(Herrick). Secretary of State.、FRUS,1923,Vol.2,pp.106-107.The Ambassador in France(Herrick)to the Secretary of State.
[1]Charles G Dawes,A Journal of Reparations,London Macmillan,1939,P.2.
[2]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.91.
[3]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.92.
[4]2月23日,休斯发给兰格的电报中说,美国大约有5亿美元的花消因为技术的原因没有被列入占领军的军费开支之中,美国政府认为这5亿美元的费用应该得到补偿,或者由“混合权利委员会”(美国与德国签订《柏林和约》时建立的机构,主要处理因战争而产生的德国对美国的财政义务问题.笔者注)来决定如何处理。他让道威斯和杨格提醒委员会,美国的合法权利要予以考虑.参见,FRUS,1924,vol.2,pp.1-2.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France(Herrick).
[1]Dawes C.Gates,A Journal of Reparations.pp.299-301.另参见,王绳祖:《国际关系史》(第四卷),第284页.
[2]Dawes C.Gates,A Journal of Reparations,pp.313-328.
[3]Dawes C.Gates,A Journal of Reparations,pp.308-310.
[4]Dawes C.Gates,A Journal of Reparations,pp.332-334.
[1]Bruck Kent,The Spoiols of War:The Politics,Economics,and Diplomacy of Reparations,1918-1932,pp.247-248
[2]Dawes C.Gates,A Journal of Reparations,p.247.
[3]Dawes C.Gates,A Journal of Reparations,pp.227-228.
[4]FRUS,1924,Vol.2,pp.13-15.The Secretary of Stale to the Ambassador in French(Herrick).
[5]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.108.
[1]William C.Mcneil,American Money and the Weimar Republic:Economics and Politices on the eve of the Great Depression,N.Y.Colubia University,1986,p.280.
[2]William C.Mcneil,American Money and the Weimar Republic:Economics and Politices on the eve of the Great Depression,p.27.
[3]William C.Mcneil,American Money and the Weimar Republic:Economics and Politices on the eve of the Great Depression,pp.32-33.
[4]Manfred Jonas,The United States and Germany:A Diplomatic History,p.181.
[1]王绳祖:《国际关系史》[M]武汉:武汉大学出版社,第373页。
[2]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,pp.154-155.
[3]Frank Costigliola,Awkward Dominion American Political,Economic,and Cultural Relations With Europe,1919-1933,p.149.
[4]从1923年开始.美国已经与欧洲的债务国陆续达成了协议,美国同意削减债务利息,各国的债务也有所减少,但应付债款的总数仍然是当初借款的两倍以上。财政部长梅隆在接受普林斯顿大学约翰·哈本博士采访时,详细地说明了美国与其债务国之间的债务情况,以及美国的政策原则.参见,福克纳:《美国经济史》[M]北京:商务印书馆,1964年版,第412页、FRUS,1927,Vol.2,pp.732-738.Press Release Issued by the Treasury Department,March 17,1927.
[1]FRUS,1927,Vol.2,p.738.Press Release Issued by the Treasury Department,March 17,1927.
[2]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.195.
[3]William C.Mcneil,American Money and the Weimar Republic:Economics and Politices on the eve of the Great Depression,p.222.
[4]Melvyn P.Lefflet,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933.p.183.
[5]包括:1、德国说新的专家委员会将为解决问题提供一个极好的机会,但最终问题的解决将在很大程度上依赖于吉尔伯特的努力;2、法国建议举行双边谈判。而德国更愿意通过专家委员会而不是外交会议来谈判,就像1924年的那样,可以邀请不对美国政府负责的美国专家个人参加;3、德国认为,英国为了抑制 德国工业的竞争,英国可能更喜欢目前这种状态,不一定愿意用直接的方式全面地解决问题;4、德团确信,赔偿与国际债务能够实现相互分离。参见,FRUS,1928,vol.2,p.871.The Charge in Germany(Poole)to the Secretary of State.
[1]FRUS,1928,vol.2,p.872.The Charge in Germany(Poole)to the Secretary of State.
[2]FRUS,1928,vol.2,pp.872-873.Memorandum Handed by the German Ambassador(Von Prittwitz)to the Secretary of State on October 30,1928.
[3]FRUS,1928,Vol.2,pp.873-874.The Secretary of State to the Charge in France(Armour).
[4]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.203.
[1]FRUS,1929,Vol.2,pp.1029-1034.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France(Herrick).
[2]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.205.
[3]William C.Mcneil,American Money and the Weimar Republic,p.232.
[4]FRUS,1929,Vol.2,pp.1029-1034.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France(Herrick).
[1]FRUS,1929,Vol.2,pp.1038-1040.The Secretary of State to the Charge in France(Armour).
[2]FRUS,1929,vol.2,pp.1043-1045.The Charge in France(Armour)to the Secretary of State.
[3]FRUS,1929,Vol.2,pp.1070-1071.The Secretary of State to the Charge in France(Armour).Statement Issued to the Press by the Secretary of State,May 16,1929.
[4]FRUS,1929,Vol.2,pp.1071-1072.The Charge in France(Armour)to the Secretary of State.
[5]FRUS,1929,Vol.2,pp.1072-1073.The Secretary of State to the Charge in France(Armour).
[6]FRUS,1929,Vol.2,pp.1075-1076.The Secretary of State to the Charge in France(Armour).
[7]《杨格计划》分11章,另有8个附件,其主要内容:1、赔偿总额与年序:计划规定在59年的期限内,支付总额为1210亿马克,比伦敦会议规定的1320亿马克减少了110亿马克.从1929年9月1日至1966年3月31日,在此37年中,德国每年平均应付19.88亿马克,每年逐年递加;在后22年内,即从1966年4月1日后每年递减。2、无条件赔偿和有条件赔偿:前者指无论德国经济如何,每年必须付6.6亿马克,不得延缓.后者指如德国遇到经济危机时可以延期支付,但以两年为限.3、成立国际清算银行:由与赔偿问题有关各国的中央银行共同组织,其主要任务是负责接收管理并分配德国年度赔偿.负责维持德国金融的稳定和促进国际贸易的发展.《道威斯计划》的收付和管理赔偿的机构停止工作。4、限期取消货物抵付赔偿:《道威斯计划》规定以货物抵付赔款目的在于增加德国出口以便恢复德国工业.但德国大量用货物支付赔偿.会对债权国在国际贸易的竞争不利。所以《杨格计划》规定以货抵现办法限期10 年为止,且每年付货数量逐渐减少.5、发行公债的办法:《杨格计划》力图使赔偿支付摆脱国际政治的束缚。使之商业化等等.参见,王绳祖:《国际关系史》(第四卷),第311-315页。
[1]Melvyn P.Loffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,pp.213-214.
[2]Thomas W.Lamont,The final reparations settlement,Foreign Affair.Apr30.vol.8,pp.336-362.
[3]Robert Forrell,American Diplomacy in the Great Depression:Hoover—Stimson Foreign Policy 1929-1933,Yale Uni.Press,1957,p.11.
[4]Melvyn P.Loffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933, p.218.
[1]Melvyn P.Loffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,pp.217-218.
[1]FRUS,1931,vol.1,pp.2-5.The Charge in Germany(Gordon)to the Secretary of State.
[2]FRUS,1931,Vol.1,pp.6-7.The Charge in Great Britain(Atherton)to the Secretary of State.
[3]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.235.
[4]Patricia Clavin,The Failure of Economic Diplomacy,London,Maclillan,1996,p.14.
[5]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.234.
[6]FRUS,1931,vol.1,pp.32-33.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Germany(Sackett).
[7]其主要内容:美国政府建议。在一年期内延付一切各政府间债务、赔偿和救济借款的本利。但是私人方面对各政府的债务当然除外。在能得到国会通过的条件之下,美国政府从7月份财政年度起,将延缓外国政府对美国一切债务的偿付一年。不过各主要国家间,对债务也须作同样的展缓一年。上项举动的目的,在于给来年以世界经济恢复的机会,并有助于使美国已经运转起来的恢复力量免受国外障碍的影响。……现在并且愿乘这个机会,坦率宣布我个人对于德国赔款和欧洲协约政府欠美国的债务中间的关系。……赔偿完全是一个欧洲问题,和美国没有关系。关于取消对美的债务,我没有丝毫赞同的意思。……不过上述债务的解决,是根据在寻常情形下的偿付能力,倘然我们顾虑到现在世界的反常情势,我们就应该遵照我们的政策同原则。我确实知道,美国人民没有意思想在债务人偿付能力以外,榨取任何金钱。……美国对于讨论严格的欧洲问题,不愿意牵涉在内,像德国赔款问题,就是其中一个。我们的举动可以表示我们对于世界繁荣的及早恢复,愿意做出贡献。美国人民对于世界繁荣。有深切的注意。参见。齐世荣:《世界通史资料选辑:现代部分》(第一分册),第76-77页。另参见。FRUS,1931,vol.1,pp.33-35.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France(Edge).
[8]王绳祖:《国际关系史》(第五卷),第39页.另参见,FRUS,1931,vol.1,pp.54-55.Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of West European Affairs(Boal).
[1]FRUS,1932,vol.1,pp.673-674.The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain(Mellon).
[2]FRUS,1932,vol.1,pp.675-677.The Ambassador in Great Britain(Mellon)to the Secretary of State.
[3]王绳祖:《国际关系史》(第五卷),第20页。
[4]Melvyn P.Leffler,The elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,p.291.
[5]FRUS,1932,vol.1,pp.682-683.Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State(Castle)of a Conversation with the German Ambassador(Von Prittwite).
[1]FRUS,1932,vol.1,p.691.President Hoover to Senator Willian E.Borah.
[2]王绳祖:《国际关系史》(第五卷),第21页。
[1]周永生:《经济外交》[M]北京:中国青年出版社,2004年版,第9-11页。
[2]“十四点”计划的第二点“海洋自由”主要目的就是保证美国的海外贸易畅通无阻;第三点“消除贸易壁垒”主张消除国家间歧视性或排他性的关税壁垒,美国凭借其强大的经济实力实现对外经济扩张的目的。
[3]William C.Mcneil,American Money and the Weimar Republic,N.Y.Colubia University,1986,p.3.
[4]1918年的《韦布—波默林法》。允许美国公司出于推进外贸的原因而联合,不受反托拉斯法的限制;1919年的《爱齐法》从法律上认可美国银行在国外的分行;1920年的《商船法》授权政府向私人企业出售船只,并贷款支持建造新商船。
[5]Jean—Baptiste Duroselle,From Wilson to Roosevelt:Foreign policy of the United States 1913-1945,p.167.
[6]William C.Mcneil,American Money and the Weimar Republic,p.1.
[1]齐世荣:《世界通史资料选辑:现代部分》(第一分册),第33页.
[2]William C.Mcneil,American Money and the Weimar Republic,p.38,p.279.
[3]Jean—Baptiste Duroselle,From Wilson to Roosevelt:Foreign policy of the United States 1913-1945,p.169.
[1]Jean—Baptiste Duroselle,From Wilson to Roosevelt:Foreign policy of the United States,1913-1945,p.171.
[2]1921年11月,当法郎出现危机的时候.法国政府与摩根集团多次进行谈判,要求美国提供贷款。但国务院拒绝了法国的请求。
[3]樊亢、宋则行编:《外国经济史:近代现代》[M]北京:人民出版社,1990年版,第42页.
[4]阿瑟·S·林克:《1900年以来的美国史》(上册)[M]北京:中国社会科学出版社,1983年版,第405页.
[5]Jean—Baptiste Duroslle,From Wilson to the Roosevelt:Foreign Policy of the United State,1913-1945.p.173.
[6]C·E·布莱克、E·C·赫尔姆赖克:《二十世纪欧洲史》(上),第403页。
[7]C·E·布莱克、E·C·赫尔姆赖克:《二十世纪欧洲史》(上),第403页。
[1]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,New Orleans Pauser Press,1959,p.9.
[1]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition,Duke Uni.Press,1978,p.29.
[2]Samuuel F.Bemis,A Diplomatic History of the United State,p.639.
[3]Samuuel F.Bemis,A Diplomatic History of the United State,p.724.
[1]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition,Duke Uni.Press,1978,p.10.
[2]Andrew M.Scott,The Functioning of the International Political System,N.Y.Macmillia,1967,pp.88-90.
[1]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition,p.12.
[2]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition,p.12.
[3]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition,p.15.
[1]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,pp.7-8,pp.171-172.
[2]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,pp.77-78.
[1]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,pp.5-6.
[2]Edward.N Peterson,TheAmerican Occupation of Germany:Retreat to Victory,p.27.
[3]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,N.Y.Harper & Brothers,1948,p.202.
[1]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.204.
[2]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,pp.204-205.
[3]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.211.
[4]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,pp.205-206.
[5]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.206.
[1]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.206.
[2]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.213.
[3]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.217.
[1]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,pp.567-568.
[1]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.13.
[2]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.19.
[3]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,pp.20-21.
[4]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.28.
[5]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.48.
[6]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.63.
[7]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.78.
[1]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.78.
[2]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.79.
[3]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.79.
[4]Henry Morgenthau,Germany is our Problem,p.20.
[1]John L,Gaddis,The United States and the Origins of the Cold War,1941-1947,N,Y.,Columbia University Press,1972,pp.99-100.
[2]罗伯特·达莱克:《罗斯福与美国对外政策1932-1945》[M](下册),北京:商务印书馆,1984年版,第671页。
[3]同上,第671页.
[4]Harold Zink,The United States in Germany,1944-1955,p.87.
[1]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East-West:Dilemma over Germany,p.13.
[2]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.567.
[3]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.569.
[1]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.570.
[2]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,pp.571-573.
[1]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.574.
[1]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.575.
[2]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,pp.578-579.
[1]FRUS,Conference at Malt and Yalta,1945,pp.194-196.Briefing Book Paper:Reparation and Restitution Policy toward Germany.
[2]John Gimble,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.54.
[3]Dennis Merrill ed.,Documentary History of the Truman Presidency vol.3,United States Policy in Occupied Germany after World War Ⅱ:Denazification,Decartelization,Demilitarization,and Democratization,Uni.Publication of American,1995,p.25.
[2]FRUS,1945,vol.3,pp.1222-1226.Instruction for the United States Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations(Pauley).
[1]Henry L.Stimson.On active Service in Peace and War.pp.571-573.
[1]Carolyn Eisenbery,Drawing the line:the American decision to divide Germany 1944-1949,pp.18-19.
[2]Kuklick Bruce,American Policy and the division of Germany:The Clash with Russian over Reparations,p.22.
[3]John L,Gaddis,The United States and the Origins of the Cold War,1941-1947,p.98.
[4]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transtion,p.30.
[5]此项目仔细地研究了德国的净国民产值,把1925-1938年的国民产值使用作为研究的起点。以这些数据为基础估算德国的赔偿能力。认为战后头两年是休养生息。第三年赔偿15亿马克,接下来的连续5年赔偿额有望提高到每年160亿马克,根据这个估算赔偿总额在12年之内将达到1200亿马克。这个估算是以1938年物价以及马克对美元的汇率。联邦储备局文件的结论是。最终的数额是“一个现实的而不是理想的数字”。参见,John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transtion,p.30.
[6]经济学家认为赔偿应该限定在能够增强德国战后经济、社会秩序的范围之内,而不是当成控制德国军事
[1]Bruce Kuklick,American Policy and the Division of Germany:The Clash with Russia over Reparations,p.6.
[2]Bruce Kuklick,American Policy and the Division of Germany:The Clash with Russia over Reparations,p.41.
[1]Henry Stimson,On Active Service in War and Peace,pp.591-592.
[2]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.63.
[3]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.67.
[1]John L,Gaddis,The United States and the Origins of the Cold War,1941-1947,Colub Uni.Press,p.118.
[2]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.69.
[3]FRUS,1943,The Conference at Cairo and Tehran.Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury(White).August 13,1944.不知为何该文件收入了FRUS,1943年卷中.
[4]该计划共有十四点,其主要内容:1、德国彻底非军事化.2、德国新边界以及新德国的组成:法国将合并萨尔地区;波兰将获得大部分西里西亚以及没有被苏联合并的东普鲁士部分地区:其余的德国将被分成两个独立的国家.各自内部以联邦形式进行管理.巴伐利亚、符腾堡、巴登及南部和西南部的小省份组成一个国家.剩下的普鲁士、撒克森、图林根及北部的小省将组成第二个德国.3、德国将成为一个农业化的“地理概念”.根据摩根索计划,鲁尔及其周围地区所有现存的工业将被剥夺,在可预见的未来不能成为工业地区.非工业化将完成两个任务:(1)关闭全部煤矿.(2)拆除、转移所有没有被军事行动破坏的工业及设备给盟国作为赔偿.4、偿还和赔偿.德国要偿还战争中掠夺的受害国的财产;保留在德国的工厂和设备作为赔偿分配给受破坏的国家.另外一些赔偿将由德国的海外资产以及由德国之外的德国劳工支付.5、教育、宣传以及政治的去中央化.6、占领军对当地德国经济的责任.控制德国经济的唯一军事目的是有利于军事行动和军事占领,占领军政府将不承担诸如价格控制、汇率、失业、重建,生产、消费、分配之类的经济问题。占领军政府也不会制定任何保持或者是加强德国经济的计划,除非是军事行动所必需的。7、对德国经济发展的控制.至少是在德国投降20年内,联合国要对德国经济进行充分的控制,包括控制外贸,限制资本输入以防止德国建立和扩大军事工业的基础,控制其他关键性的工业.8、农业计划。德国大地产将被分散给小农。长子继承制将被废止.9、惩处战犯和特定的团体。10、美国的责任。为了全面执行对德计划,美国尽管要承担相应的军事和民事责任,但德国的政治和民事管理责任主要由德国的邻国来承担.特别是苏联、法国、波兰、荷兰、比利时等国。这样。美国军队能够在相对短的时间内撒出。“摩根索计划”的内容参见,摩根索:《德国是我们的问题》(Henry Morgenthau.Germany is our Problem)一书的前插页部分。
[1]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.77.
[2]Kuklick Bruce,American Policy and the division of Germany:The Clash with Russian over Reparations,p.49.
[3]Herny Morgenthau,Morgenthau Diaries,N.Y.,Da Capo Press,1974,p.57.
[1]如在1933年总统曾让摩根索探讨与苏联建立外交关系的可能性.在1934年,摩根索和总统已经讨论“纳粹的反人类政策”。在美国参战前。摩根索尽力阻断纳粹德国与拉丁美洲国家的经济联系,冻结德国在美国的财产。
[2]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.66.
[3]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.72.
[4]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p73.
[5]Carolyn Eisenbery,Drawing the line:the American decision to divide Germany,1944-1949,p.35.
[1]New York Post,Nov 25,1947.
[2]FRUS,1944,Vol.1,pp.S44-546.Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of War.
[3]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition,p.32.
[4]Carolyn Eisenbery,Drawing the line:the American decision to divide Germany,1944-1949,p.37.
[1]例如,有关经济的方案如下:1、德国人生活标准应降低到维持的水平。2、德国在欧洲的经济地位必须降低。3、德国经济必须被改变成严重依靠进出口以至于德国不能用自己的设备再次转向战争生产。
[2]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.570.
[3]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,pp.574-574.
[1]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.574.
[2]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.85.
[3]这些条款包括:1、美国将占领和控制英占区内的不莱梅和不莱梅港地区.2、美国有权穿过英占区,在不莱梅、不莱梅港口与南部美占区之间进行交通和通讯。参见,John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.87.
[4]协议主要包括四点:1、苏联和其他受破坏的国家应该有权“为了弥补他们所遭受的损失,拆迁他们需要的机器”;2、萨尔和鲁尔地区的重工业将被关闭;3、萨尔和鲁尔地区将置于某种形式的国际共管,以防止其重新工业化以及扫除该地区潜在的战争潜力;4、萨尔与鲁尔地区未来将转变成以以农业、牧业为主要特征的地区。参见,John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany.pp.88-89.
[5]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.578.
[6]威廉·哈代·麦克尼尔:《国际事务概览1939—1946:美国、英国和俄国:他们的合作和冲突1941—1946年》[Z]上海:上海译文出版社,1978年版,第752页。
[7]例如,在9月17日的新方案中,一些词语作了微小的改动,但它的含义却意味着巨大的改变。以前方案允许德国接受必需的最少食品“防止疾病和动乱”。新方案改成“防止严重疾病和严重动乱。”新方案还 要求更加彻底地“非纳粹化”。参见:John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.91.
[1]例如,《纽约时报》攻击它不实现;伦敦的《观察者》认为“摩根索计划”主张的破坏德国生产能力,削弱德国市场竞争力在帮助英国方面起不到多大作用。英国工党领袖在下议院指出,“摩根索计划”将使欧洲的生活水准普遍降低.参见,John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.97.
[2]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.580.
[3]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.99.
[4]FRUS,1944,vol.1,pp.344-346.Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President Roosevelt.
[1]Kuklick Bruce,American Policy and the division of Germany:The Clash with Russian over Reparations,p.89.
[2]Kuklick Bruce,American Policy and the division of Germany:The Clash with Russian over Reparations,P.91.
[3]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.583.
[4]继任总统一个月之后,他指着一幅世界地图对史汀生说,通过自由贸易可以将欧洲东部的农、牧区与北部的工业区联系起来。为了便于自由贸易,莱茵河与多瑙河沿岸的每个国家都应该拥有河岸管理权。因此,在波茨坦会议上,杜鲁门总统建议将多瑙河置于国际共管之下。其目的是将其联合成一个自然的经济体,杜鲁门认为这是实现欧洲稳定和安全的第一步。Hadley Arkcs,Bureaucracy,the Marshall Plan,and the National Interest,New Jersey,Princeton Uni.Press,1972,p.24.
[1]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,p.583.
[2]哈里·杜鲁门:《杜鲁门回忆录:决定性的一年1945》 北京:三联书店,1974年版,第253页.
[3]James McAllister,No Exit:American and the German Problem,1943-1954,Ithaca University Press,2002,p.82.,John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition,p.42.
[4]James McAllister,No Exit:American and the German Problem,1943-1954,p.82.
[5]罗斯福通常自己做出决策,他不信任国务院,他更愿意听取他信任的私人朋友的建议.参见罗伯特·达莱克:《罗斯福与美国对外政策1932—1945》 第758-759页.
[1]FRUS,1945,Conference at Malta and Yalt,pp.193-194.Briefing Book Paper:Reparation and Restitution Policy toward Germany.
[2]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Conference,Vol.1,pp,527-528.The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations(Panley)to the Sacretary of State.
[3]Kuklick Bruce,American Policy and the division of Germany:The Clash with Russian over Reparations.p.121.
[1]James P.Warburg,Germany:Key to Peace,London,Andre Beutsch Limited,1954,p.13.
[2]fan D,Turner,Reconstruction in post-war Germany:British Occupation Policy and the West Zones,N.Y.1989,p.128.
[3]迈克尔·鲍尔弗等:《国际事务概览1939—1946年:四国对德国和奥地利的管制1945—1946年》[Z]上海:译文出版社,1980年版,第47页。
[4]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.21.
[5]Ian D.Turner,Reconstruction in post-war Germany:British Occupation Policy and the West Zones,p.129.
[1]John L.SnelI,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.38.
[2]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.38.
[3]Aleksei M.Filitov,Problems of post-war construction policy conceptions during World War Ⅱ,Francesca Goriedite(ed.),The Soviet Union and Europe in the cold war,1943-53,Macmilliarn Press Ltd,1996,p.5.
[4]Aleksei M.Filitov,Problems of post-war construction policy conceptions during World War Ⅱ,Francesca Gofiedite(ed.),The Soviet Union and Europe in the cold war,1943-53,p.7.
[5]Aleksei M.Filitov,Problems of post-war construction policy conceptions during World War Ⅱ,Francesca Goriedite(ed.),The Soviet Union and Europe in the cold war,1943-53,p.17.
[1]B · Kuklick,American Policy and the division of Germany:The Clash with Russian over Reparations,p.42.
[2]Aleksei M.Filitov,Problems of post-war construction policy conceptions during World War Ⅱ,Francesca Goriedite(ed.),The Soviet Union and Europe in the cold war,1943-53,p.17.
[3]Aleksei M.Filitov,Problems of post-war construction policy conceptions during World War Ⅱ,Francesca Goriedite(ed.),The Soviet Union and Europe in the cold war,1943-53,p.17.
[1]FRUS,1945,Conference at Malta and Yalt,p.622.Second Plenary Meeting,February 5,1945.另参见,《德黑兰、雅尔塔、波茨坦会议记录摘编》[Z]上海:上海人民出版社,1974年版,第121-122页。
[2]FRUS,1945,Conference at Malta and Yalt,pp.621-622.Second Plenary Meeting,February 5,1945.另参见,萨纳柯耶夫、崔布列夫斯基:《德兰、雅尔塔、波茨坦会议文件集》[Z]北京:三联书店,1978年版,第162页。
[1]John L.Snell,Wartime Origins of the East and West:Dilemma over Germany,p.145.
[2]FRUS,1945,Conference at Malta and Yalt,pp.702-704.Meeting of The Foreign Ministers,February 7,1945.John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition p.37.
[3]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transtion,p.71.
[4]Alec Cairncross,The Price of War,British Policy on Germany Reparations 1941—1949,N.Y.1986,p.64.note 10.
[5]至于战后盟国从德国到底索取了多少战争赔偿,有关各方的统计数字相差很大。据西方统计,苏联通过在苏占区拆迁设备、获取占领费、提取当前产品、及通过占有公司股份的收益等方式获取的赔偿价值,到1953年共计已达664亿马克,按1938年的价格计算约合171亿美元。民主德国成立后,苏联继续以易货贸易的方式,用大大低于国际市场的价格获取民德的化工、光学、机械等工业产品。英、美占区于1947年修改了赔偿拆迁的计划。联邦德国成立后,赔偿拆迁进一步减少,并于1951年4月完全停止。关于赔偿拆迁的价值估算,盟国和德国差距甚大。大约在15亿至50亿马克之间。如果加上没收德国在国外的财产、以及没收的德国专利、商标、厂名等,估计西方获取的全部赔偿价值为200亿至250亿马克,按上述1938年的汇价换算,相当于51.5亿至64.4亿美元。以上数字参见,杨德利:《德国的战争赔偿问题》[J],载于《德国研究》1996年第1期。
[6]英国代表团认为,在莫斯科赔偿委员会研究赔偿问题之前,不能提出任何赔偿数字。遗留问题留待莫斯科赔偿委员会进一步讨论。FRUS,1945,Conference at Malta and Yalta,p.979.Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference.另参见,《德黑兰、雅尔塔、波茨坦会议记录摘编》第227页.
[1]FRUS,1945,Conference at Malta and Yalta,p.903.Seventh Plenary Meeting,February 10,1945.
[2]FRUS,1945,Vol.3,p.453.Informal Record of a Meeting in the Office of the Secretary of State,March 15,1945.
[3]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Conference,Vol.1,pp.510-511.The Representative on the Allied Commission for Reparations(Panley)to the Sacretary of State.
[4]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Conference,Vol.1,p.519.The Secretary of State ad interim to the Representative on the Allied Commission for Reparations(Panley).
[5]Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.88.
[6]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Conference,vol.2,pp.295-298.Informal Meeting of the Foreign Miniters,July 23,1945.
[1]Carolyn W.Eisenbetg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.86.
[2]Charles S.Maier,The Marshall Plan and Germany:West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program,p.105.
[3]《德黑兰、雅尔塔、波茨坦会议记录摘编》第428页.
[4]Kuklick Bruce,American Policy and the Division of Germany:The Clash with Russia over Reparations,pp.221-222.
[1]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Conference,Vol.1,p.547.The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations(Panley)to the chairman of the Allied Commission for Reparations(Maisky).
[2]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Conference,Vol.1,p.547.The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations(Panley)to the chairman of the Allied Commission for Reparations(Maisky).
[3]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Conference,Vol.2,pp.279-281.Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers,July 23,1945.
[1]Bruce Kuklick,American Policy and the Division of Germany:The Clash with Russia over Reparations,p.139.
[2]James F.Byrnes,Speaking Frankly p.83.
[3]《德黑兰、雅尔塔、波茨坦会议记录摘编》第426页.FRUS,The Potsdam Conference,Vol.2,pp.1478-1498.Protocol of the Proceeding of the Berlin Conference.Augur 1,1945.
[4]FRUS,1945,Vol.3,p.1186.The Ambassador in the Soviet Union(Harriman)to the Secretary of State.
[1]其实,参加波茨坦会议的英国财政部官员会后就评价道:“波茨坦协议是一个不完整、不现实、模糊的协议。特别是关于赔偿的条款自相矛盾、混乱。该条款暗示没有赔偿可以提取——至少在西占区——从当前产品中。它却为苏联从它的占领区得到它想要的提供了自由。参见,Charles S.Maier,The Marshall Plan and Germany:West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program,N.Y.,1991,P.21.
[2]Beate Ruhm yon Oppen,Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-1954,Oxford University Press,1955,pp.565-566.
[3]B类指德国工业及其他资本设各、商船、内陆水运。A类指除B类外的赔偿物资(除了A、B两类外还有一部分物资不由IARA负责分配,因此这里所指是A、B两类赔偿物资总和实际上少于西占区总的赔偿物资。James K.Pollck,Germany under Occupation:Illustrative Materials and Documents,Michigan 1949,P.49.转引,田小惠:《简析战后德国分区赔偿政策的执行》[J],载于《国际论坛》2005年第1期。
[1]FRUS,1945,Vol.3,pp.1357-1360.The Secretary of State to the U.S.Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations(Angell).
[1]《日内瓦第四公约》第55、56条款规定,占领国对被占领地区负有一定的责任。主要包括:占领国有义务保证居民的食物与医疗供应品;占领国负有保证并维护占领地内的医疗和医院建设与服务,以及公共保健和卫生的义务。参见,朱晓青:《国际法》[M]北京:社会科学文献出版社,2005年版,第510页。
[2]Beate Ruhm von Oppen,Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-1954,p.16.
[3]Edward Peterson,The American Occupation of Germany:Retreat to Victory,p.60.
[4]B · Kuklik,American Policy and the division of Gerawny:the Clash with Russza over Reparations,pp.35-36.
[5]《克莱将军文件》的编撰者简·史密斯在日后拜访麦克劳时,麦克劳回忆说:我指出,一旦需要,可以利用这些例外条款。我很了解这些条款,因为我参与了文件的起草工作。参见,Carolyn W.Eiscnberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.80.
[6]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,California,Stanford University Press,1976,p.25.
[1]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Con.Voll.,pp.468-470.The Assistant Secretary of State(Clayton)to the Assistant Secretary of War(Mccloy).
[2]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Vol.l,pp.470-471.The Assistant Secretary of War(Mccloy)to the Assistant Secretary of State(Clayton).
[3]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.23.
[4]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Con.Vol.1,pp.479-481.The Secretary of War(Stimson)to the Secretary of State.
[5]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Con.Vol.1,pp.491-493.The Secretary of State to the President.
[1]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Con.Vol.2,pp.779-780.The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Police(Collado)to the Assistant Secretary of State(Clayton)and Secretary of State.
[2]初到德国时克莱将军的态度十分明确,他告诉工作人员说他们的工作就是与盟国保持一致,为了“惩罚德国,把德国降低到它应有的位置”。他对新闻界说:“我们的第一个目标就是毁灭一切使德国将来可能得到发展的力量。如果德国力量增长了,我们将开始为如何处置德国发愁了。然而,不久克莱将军的观点就发生了变化,在他给麦克劳的信中写道:“德国人民是勤劳的人民,他们在几乎没有交通工具、城市里到处是瓦砾的情况下还从早到晚地工作。我这样说不是同情德国人,只是因为我们面临着十分困难的问题,即找到足够的食品,哪怕是远远低于那些被解放国家的标准。我感觉德国人将遭受饥饿和严寒就像我认为的那样,这样的苦难是使他们认识到他们发动战争的后果所必须的,但是这样的苦难不能超出导致大范围饥荒和疾病发生的程度”。参见.Edward Peterson,The American Occupation of Germany:Retreat to Victory,pp.58-59.
[3]Edward Peterson,The American Occupation of Germany:Retreat to Victory,p.54.
[1]Jean Smith,The Papers of General Lucius D.Clay:Germany 1945-1949,p.54.
[2]Jean Smith,The Papers of General Lucius D.Clay:Germany 1945-1949,p.8.
[3]报告首先计算出德国在1930-1938年间平均的生活水准,它的水准比当时欧洲其他地区大约平均高出1/3。考虑到正常的人口增长以及东欧难民的流入,报告计算出德国战后的生活水准应该降低到1930—1938年平均水准的74%,这大致相当于德国在1932年的生活水准。其次,报告对德国经济状况做出了一些假设。假设德国重工业和一些特殊工业(武器、弹药、军舰、石油、航空、轻金属)如果完全被破坏掉;德国其他的工业(钢铁、电力、汽车、机床、化工)被控制和限制;突出农业与和平的国内工业。2、假设德国战后的人口大约是7,000万,它的东部边境是沿奥德一尼斯河;不为了从当前产品中提取赔偿而保留生产能力,不为德国复兴而保留多余的生产能力。3、假设德国生活水准下降到1932年的水平,那么德国每年的国际收支赤字将是8,180万美元(按10马克兑换1美元计算)。所以如果没有外来援助德国是难以维继的。换句话说,如果当前产品和库存产品的出口首先用来支付进口——像美国所坚持的——德国的国际收支肯定是赤字。参见,FRUS,1945,Vol.3,pp.1320-1321.The United States Political Adviser for Germany(Murphy)to the Secretary of State.
[1]FRUS,1945,Vol.3,pp.1341-1343.The Secretary of State to the United States Political Advisor for Germany (Murphy).
[2]Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.84.
[3]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,pp.32-33.
[4]Edward Peterson,The American Occultation of Germany:Retreat to Victory.p.62.
[5]因为配给的食品定量太低,德国人不愿意从事煤矿之类的重体力劳动。占领军政府虽然给矿工的食品供 给达到了标准,但矿工们经常与他们的妻子、儿女分享食品.所以平均下来矿工们每日的食品热量一般只达到1,550卡路里,有时只能达到1,000卡路里。参见。Nicholas Balabkins,Germany underDirect Control:Economic Aspects of Industrial Disarmaent,1945-1948,N.Y.,Rutgers Uni.Press,1964,p.115.
[1]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan.pp.72-73.、Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.172.
[2]Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.173.
[3]Jean Smith,The Papers of General Lucius D.Clay:Germany 1945-1949,pp.133-134.
[4]Edward Peterson,The American Occupation of Germany:Retreat to Victory,p.64.
[5]声明有12点,其主要内容:1、美国和盟国的安全利益要求在德困破坏掉那些不能用于赔偿拆迁的,或者只能生产武器准备的、或者超出德国和平经济所需的冶金、机械、化工的资本设各工厂。……但美国的赔偿政策并不是为了惩罚性地破坏德国和平经济所需资本设备;2、为了决定德国和平经济的工业能力,赔偿拆迁的数量和种类应该计算出来。3、波茨坦协议既是拆迁工业设备作为赔偿的指导原则,它也对能够提供德国人民不超过欧洲(英国和苏联除外)平均生活水平的和平经济做出了规定。国务院认为波茨坦协议没有打算减少德国生活水准,除非这样的减少是为了提供赔偿。事实上,波茨坦协议规定的德国为遭受它侵略而造成战争损失的国家提供赔偿的义务,不能因为为了使德国保持欧洲的平均生活水准而减少。4、规定了德国生活水准应该大致相当于1930-1938年的平均水平。为了保证德国在没有外援的情况下自我维持,应该给它留下足够的资源使它能够完成赔偿的任务以及重新启动保留的资源。5、为了决 定赔偿拆迁数量的目的,美国不赞成赔偿拆迁达到这样的程度:德国由于缺少资本设备不能出口足够数量的商品以支付必需的进口。6、在接下来的两年内,美国和其他占领国应该资助德国实现最少的必需进口,程度是德国当前产品和库存产品的出口不能达到完全抵消这样的进口。因为波茨坦协议没有对占领时期的德国生活做出规定,所以占领国没有义务为了保持德国生活水准达到欧洲平均水平而提供足够的进口。7、德国恢复期间占领当局的作用总的来说是,提供和创造德国经济能够履行它的义务的条件。这个任务完成后,占领当局应该主要关注德国行政机构的恢复和发展,不只是占领区内的生产和贸易,而是占领区之间的贸易,共同的交通、农业、银行、货币、税收等政策的制定。参见,Beate Ruhm von Oppen,Documents on Germany under Occupation,1945-1954,pp.93-97.
[1]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.75.
[1]FRUS,1946,Vol.2,United States Delegation Record,Council of Foreign Ministers,Second Session.Fortieth Meeting,Paris,July,11 1946.
[2]Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.228.
[3]Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.228.
[1]Jean Smith,The Papers of General Lucius D.Clay:Germany 1945-1949,pp.212-217.
[2]备忘录的前5点分别是:1、总的声明。美国在德国政策的目标是破坏德国战争潜力,对德国人民再教育,按民主程序重建责任制政府,联合国最终平等地接受德国。2、波茨坦协议。美国遵守与英、苏在波茨坦共同达成的协议。然而美国认为波茨坦协议必须被视为一个整体来执行,而不是部分地执行。美国坚持视德国为一个经济体,它的本土资源首先要满足德国自身的需要,其次用于出口以资助必要的进口。3、赔偿。美国建议全面地执行波茨坦协议中有关赔偿的规定。然而美国认为“工业水平计划”是保持德国一个合理的最低生活水平的标准。美国不支持可能给德国经济带来进一步负担的其他形式的赔偿。反对当前产品赔偿,除非当前产品已经超出了德国最低经济标准,以及当前产品不需要出口以支付必要的进口。4、视德国为一个经济体。目前德国现状阻止了“工业水平计划”的实现,只有消除目前的占领区界限,在全德范围内允许商品、人员、思想自由地流动.才能实现最低德国经济的重建.5、财政政策.美国相信一个共同的财政政策对于成功地重建德国经济是必须的,美国支持进行减少货币量、修正债务结构、尽早地使德国处于健康的财政状况等一系列激烈的改革等等。其他几点还包括:视德国为一个经济体所需的其他行政机构、德国的政治结构、德国的边境、德国的未来、占领的期限.参见.Jean Smith,The Papers of General Lucius D.Clay:Germany 1945-1949,pp.236-243.
[3]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.120.
[4]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.121.
[5]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.121.
[1]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,pp.122-123.
[2]贝尔纳斯在演讲中说,“我们已经花费了很多的时间和精力关注德国问题,因为它的正确解决不仅关系到德国,还事关整个欧洲的未来。……德国为它所造成的破坏进行部分赔偿是公正、合法的。……然而正如波茨坦协议预计和要求的那样,ARC同意如果德国不能被视为一个经济体,它的工业水平将进行一些改变。在确定的工业水平之下,不允许提取当前产品赔偿,因为当前产品赔偿不符合现在已经确立的‘工业水平计划'的规定。……而规定的工业水平仅够使德国人自我维持接近于欧洲平均的生活水平。美国将不会同意从德国拿走比波茨坦协议规定的更多赔偿。然而由于ACC没有采取必要的措施使德国成为一个经济体,波茨坦协议的执行受到了挫折”。关于经济的远景,国务卿声称:“德国是欧洲的一部分,如果这样一个富有铁和煤的资源国家变成了济贫院,那么欧洲的复兴,特别是德国邻国的复兴,必定是缓慢的”。在政治方面,贝尔纳斯宣称:“ACC不但没有管理好德国,而且也不允许德国人管理自己。美国政府认为德国人在适当的保证之下,应该担负起管理自己事务的主要责任。美国赞成早日成立一个德国临时政府。我们不希望德国变成任何一个或几个大国的卫星国。美国人民打算帮助德国人民赢回他们在自由的、热爱和平的世界中的荣誉地位”。参见,Beate Ruhm von Oppen,Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945—1954,pp.152-160.
[3]Beate Ruhm von Oppen,Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-1954,p.158.
[4]Lucius D Clay,Decision in Germany,p.79.
[5]威廉·麦克尼尔:《国际事务概览1939—1946年:美国、英国和俄国:它们的合作和冲突,1941—1946年》第1121-1122页。
[6]Lucius D Clay,Decision in Germany,p.81.
[7]康拉德·阿登纳:《阿登纳回忆录1945—1953》上海:上海人民出版社,1976年版,第100页。
[1]Jeffry M.Diefendorf,American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany,1945-1955,p.117.
[2]Arthur M.Schlesinger,The Dynamics of World Power,A Ducumentary History of United States Foreign Policy,1945—1973,Vol.1,Chelsea House Publish,1973,p.300.
[3]William Taubman,Stalin's American Policy:From Entente to Detente to Cold War,N.Y.,W · W · Norton&Company,1982,p.130.
[3]Caroline Kennedy—Pipe,Stalin's cold war:Soviet Strategies in Europe,1943 to 1956,p.96.
[4]Caroline Kennedy—Pipe,Stalin's cold war:Soviet Strategies in Europe,1943 to 1956,p.97.
[5]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany,p.100.
[1]FRUS,1946,vol.5,pp.529-530.The United States Political Adviser for Germany(Murphy)to the Secretary of State.
[2]Thomas Paterson,Soviet-American Confrontation,p.248.
[1]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.18.
[2]Clarrence G.Lasby,Project Paperclip:German Scientist and the cold War,p.70.
[3]Clarrence G.Lasby,Project Paperclip:German Scientist and the cold War,p.71.
[4]各项物资包括一切武器、军火、炸药、军事设备、储存和给养,以及其他各种战争用具和一切战争物资;海军的各级舰艇、辅助军舰和一切商船;各种飞机、航空用和防空用的设备和器材;一切陆地、水路和空中的交通运输工具和设备;一切军事设施和建筑,连同建筑的设计和画样;为生产以上物资的工厂、车间、研究所、实验室、实验站、技术资料、专利、计划、画样和创造发明;盟国代表为这些事项而需要的情报或记录。参见,《德黑兰、雅尔塔、波茨坦会议文件集》第29-30页。
[5]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder·in Postwar Germany,p.19.
[6]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,pp.24-25.
[1]FRUS,1945,The Potsdam Con.vol.1,pp.510-511.The Representative on the Allied Commission for Reparations(Pauley)to the Secretary of State.
[2]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.25.
[3]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.27.
[1]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,pp.30-31.
[2]Truman Library,Momorandum,Secretary of Commerce(Henry Wallace)to Truman Dec.4,1945.
[3]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.33.
[4]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.37.
[1]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.18.
[2]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.39.
[3]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.40.
[4]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.40.
[5]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.42.
[6]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.42.
[1]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.43.
[2]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.47.
[3]Jean Smith,The Papers of General Lucius D.Clay:Germany 1945—1949,pp.233-235.
[4]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.48.
[1]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.49.
[2]Clarrence G.Lasby,Project Paperclip:German Scientist and the cold War.p.5.
[3]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany.p.60.
[4]FIAT具体负责制订和完成的职责有:(1)收集技术信息;(2)指导所有与收集信息相关的使团和机构的工作;(3)控制和安置有利于FIAT主要目标的人员、文件、设备、设施。
[5]先是在现场复制选择出来的文件记录,返回后制成胶片,然后编制出内容摘要和检索,完成后交给商务部的技术服务处准备予以公布。例如,对要调查的67家工厂,FIAT预计有多于30亿页的文件需要筛选,需要7年的工作时间。其中大约3300万页的文件需要制成胶片,需要4年的时间。参见,John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.63.
[6]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.63.
[1]John Gimbel.Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.68.
[2]John Gimbel Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.69.
[3]John Gimbel Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.70.
[4]John Gimbel Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.70.
[5]John Gimbel Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar German,pp.75-76.
[6]John Gimbel Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.76.
[1]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.147.
[2]New York Times,26 May 1947.
[3]New York Times,26 May 1947.
[4]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.96.
[5]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.149.
[1]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwry Germany,pp.135-136.
[2]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.137.
[3]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,pp.144-145.
[4]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.146.
[1]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.148.
[2]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.152.
[3]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.259-260.United States Delegation Minutes,Council of Foreign Ministers,Eighth Meeting,Moscow.
[4]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,p.261.United States Delegation Minutes,Council of Foreign Ministers,Eighth Meeting,Moscow.
[5]美国通过盟国赔偿机构(IARA)内部按比例所得到的赔偿价值是66,666美元:为了加强对日作战而进行的直接拆迁的价值是1千万美元;获得的商船价值5百万美元;德国海外资产在1千5百万到2千5百万之间;美国没有获取德国当前产品赔偿,也没有得到黄金赔偿。参见,John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.151.
[1]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,p.Ⅸ.
[2]John Gimbel,Science Technology and Reparations:Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany,pp.148-150.
[3]1947年6月,当“智力赔偿”政策即将结束之际,格林公开宣称,在美占区的每一个重要的工厂都将“公开它的工业秘密”。他说只是对莱卡照相机厂所做的微缩胶卷就不少于130卷。如果美国制造商们派更多的技术人员到德国,他们将会得到更多的东西,因为美国政府即将停止这项计划。参见,John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.148.
[1]英国对杜鲁门总统的“煤炭指令”一直不满意。英国还反对限制德国工业水平;反对美国的赔偿政策。迫于美国的压力,英国才勉强同意了美国的政策,但它提出德国工业水平和赔偿政策每年都可以进行修改,从1947年1月就开始进行。但英、美占领区正式合并以来,英美之间又产生了一些新的问题。英国政府打算将这些问题交到莫斯科外长会议上一并解决。(FRUS,1946,vol.5,pp.529-530.The United States Political Adviser for Germany(Murphy)to the Secretary of State.)苏联在会前已经打算支持建立德国临时政府;它也赞同大幅度提高“工业水平计划”的标准。当然,在接受德国复兴观念的同时,苏联又担心这可能会危及其安全。法国自从分区占领德国以后,一直宣称因为法国没有参加波茨坦会议,其协议自然对它不具有约束力,所以在许多有关德国的问题上法国与英、美大唱反调。会议上,法国外长皮杜尔两次提出:在考虑德国其他政治和经济问题之前,法国首先要求德国的煤炭。同时,他也不同意经济一体化、工业水平计划以及赔偿计划,除非法国的要求首先能够得到满足。法国反对最强烈的是“在德国边界确定之前,竟然打算创建德国中央政府机关”。参见,Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949.p.295.、FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.262-263.The Secretary of State to the President and Acting Secretary of State..;FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.265-266.The Secretary of State to the President and Acting Secretary of State..
[2]该文件提出了有关建立临时的德国政府以及在德国建立州政府的计划、波兰与德国边界的建议、德国边界问题的建议、美国起草的有关德国非军事化、非武装化的条约、视德国为一个经济整体、赔偿问题、煤炭生产等一系列问题的计划、主张;并对英、法、苏三国可能采取的政策进行了预测.参见,FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.201-223.Policy Papers Prepared by the Department of State.
[1]John H.Backer,The Decision to Divide Germany:American Foreign Policy in Transition,p.158.
[2]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,p.218.Policy Papers Prepared by the Department of State.
[3]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.263-265.The Secretary of State to the President and Acting Secretary of State.另参见莫洛托夫:《对外政策问题:1945年4月—1948年11月时期中的演说和声明》第335页。
[4]例如,美国代表乔治·雅各布在致华盛顿的电报中写道:很明显,苏联对于赔偿的要求如果得到满足,那么他们将准备像我国代表团一样同意德国经济统一。参见,Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949.p.300.
[5]莫洛托夫:《对外政策问题:1945年4月—1948年11月时期中的演说和声明》第351页。
[6]莫洛托夫:《对外政策问题:1945年4月—1948年11月时期中的演说和声明》第351页。
[1]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.299-301.The Secretary of Stale to the Acting Secretary of State.
[2]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.298-299.The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State.
[3]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.301-303.The President Truman rio the Secretary of State at Moscow,April 1,1947.
[4]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.303-304.The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State.April 1,1947.
[5]Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-1949,p.301.
[1]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.337-344.Memorandum of Conversation,Moscow.
[2]Charles Maier,The Marshall Plan and Germany:West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program,p.49.
[3]Lucius D Clay,Decision in Germany,p.174.
[4]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,pp.8-15.
[5]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.199-200.Memorandum by Mr.Sherman S.Sheppard of the Bureau of the Burdget to the Director of the Bureau(Webb).
[1]其中给英国贷款37.5亿美元,给法国6亿美元贷款,通过陆军部的“占领区政府援助与救济”向德国提供8.4亿美元援助。此外,还向意大利、奥地利、东欧等国提供了大量贷款。参见,Charles S.Maier,The Marshall Plan and Germany:West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program,N.Y.,1991,p.9.
[2]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.197-198.The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War(Patterson).
[3]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.199-200.Memorandum by Mr.Sherman S.Sheppard of the Bureau of the Burdget to the Director of the Bureau(Webb).
[4]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,p.219.Editorial Note.
[5]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.186.
[6]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.220-223.Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff(Kennan).
[1]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.223-226.The Director of the Policy Planning Staff(Kennan)to the under Secretary of State(Acheson).
[2]克莱顿作为驻日内瓦国际贸易组织的美国代表正参加关税同盟的谈判,同时他也是美国对欧洲经济委员会的代表。因工作所需,克莱顿在1947年初收集了大量有关欧洲经济和财政状况的一手资料。3月5日,克莱顿曾经向国务院提出了一份备忘录。(Clayton,Memorandum,March 5,1947,Truman Library.)5月27日,他又提出了一份报告。《纽约时报》甚至称“克莱顿就是马歇尔计划”。参见,The New York Times,October 24,1947.因此,克莱顿有时被称为“马歇尔计划”之父。参见,John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.9.
[3]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.230-232.Memorandum by the under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs(Clayton).
[4]Thomas G.Paterson,Soviet—American Confrontation:Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War,p.212.
[5]Stanley Hoffmann & Charles Maier,The Marshall Plan:A Retrospective,p.ⅹⅰ.
[6]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.237-239.Press Release Issued by the Department of State,June 4,1947.
[1]Thomas G.Paterson,Soviet—American Confrontation:Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War,p.213.
[2]在6月24日开始的会谈中,克莱顿说美国在采取措施之前必须得到下列情报:1、为什么欧洲恢复得那么慢;2、欧洲能做些什么来解决自己的问题;3、如美国给予最低限度的援助,欧洲要多久才能自己站起来。他解释了要说服美国人民接受欧洲复兴计划的困难之处:国会要知道欧洲国家多久可以自己站起来,国会还希望看到更加紧密地联合在一起的欧洲经济。参见,FRUS,1947,vol.3,pp.268-273.Memorandum of Conversation,by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom(Peterson).London,June 24,1947.
[3]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,p.308.The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France.July 3.
[4]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,p.301.The Ambassador in France(Caffery)to the Secretary of State.June 29.
[5]Roger Morgan,The United States and West Germany 1945—1973:A Study in Alliance Politics,London,Oxford uni.Press,1974,p.21.
[1]1、由克莱将军和英国占领军最高军事、行政长官罗伯特森在两到三周之内研究修改“工业水平计划”,确定一个新的钢产量:2、按照修改后的“工业水平计划”规定的用于赔偿拆迁的工厂和设备将由管制委员会进行统一分配;3、双占区经济机构将重组,会变得更有效率,但不能成为临时政府;4、双占区的机构在地理上将实现集中化,只要设施能够被分配、协调好。参见,FRUS,1947,vol.2,pp.357-358.The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State.
[2]1、总体计划。原工业水平计划规定德国工业水平可以达到1938年的55%,即1936年的70—75%。新的计划将提高双占区的工业水平,可以达到相当于1936年的水平,那一年德国既没有出现繁荣,也没有出现萧条。2、平衡经济的要求。除了战前的对外贸易,为了实现贸易赢余,双占区必须生产超出它内部所需的多余产品。3、增加受限制发展工业的计划水平。原来计划水平规定的受限制发展的钢铁、冶金机械、精密仪器、光学仪器、电子机械、电力、交通设施工业、化工、陶瓷等都分别做出了新的提高。4、禁止发展的工业。新的工业水平计划规定:铝、镀、钒、镁等禁止生产。参见,Beate Ruhm von Oppen,Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-1954,pp.239-245.
[3]Charles Maier,The Marshall Plan and Germany:West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program,p.2.
[1]John Gimbel,The American Occupation of Germany:Politics and the Military,1945-1949,p.167.
[2]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.258.
[1]John Gimbel,The Origins of the Marshall Plan,p.259.
[2]Thomas G.Paterson,Soviet—American Confrontation:Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War,p.235.
[3]Charles Maier,The Marshall Plan and Germany,p.378.
[4]《国际条约集,1948—1949》[Z]北京:世界知识出版社,1959年版,第517-520页。
[5]法国外长舒曼说,在法国议会,德国赔偿问题是一个争论很多的问题.从心理上说,在讨论缔结对德最后条约之前,试图获取法国议会同意正式放弃战争赔偿将是很困难的。参见,FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.7,pp.91-92.Minutes of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.,the U.K.and France,May 24,1952
[6]《国际条约集,1950—1952》[Z]北京:世界知识出版社,1959年版,第602-603页。
[1]《国际条约集,1953—1955》[Z]北京:世界知识出版社,1959年版,第296页。
[2]《国际条约集,1953—1955》[Z]第103-104页。
[3]Ronald W.Zweig,German Reparations and the Jewish World:a History of the Claims Conference.Lomdon,2001,p.12.
[1]FRUS,1943,Vol.1,pp.443-444.Inter-Allied Declaration against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories Under Enemy Occupation or Control.
[2]FRUS,1945,Potsdam Vol.1,p.513.Acting Secretary of State to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations(Pauley).
[3]Ronald W.Zweig,German Reparations and the Jewish World:a History of the Claims Conference,p.13.
[4]Ronald W.Zweig,German Reparations and the Jewish World:a History of the Claims Conference,p.14.、Shlomo Shafir,Ambiguous Relations:The American Jewish Community and Germany since 1945,Detroit Wayne State University Press,1999,pp.60-61.
[1]Shlomo Shafir,Ambiguous Relations:The American Jewish Community and Germany since 1945,p.61.
[2]Shlomo Shafir,Ambiguous Relations:The American Jewish Community and Germany since 1945,p.61.
[3]Ronald W.Zweig,German Reparations and the Jewish WorM:a History of the Claims Conference,p.15.
[4]Shlomo Shafir,Ambiguous Relations:The American Jewish Community and Germany since 1945,p.163.
[5]康拉德·阿登纳:《阿登纳回忆录1953—1955》第139页。
[6]Ronald W.Zweig,German Reparations and the Jewish World:a History of the Claims Conference,p.20.、Nicholas Balabkins,West German Reparations to Israel,p.120.
[1]FRUS,1951,Vol.5,pp.630-631..Memorandum of Conversation,by Alexander F.Kiefer of the Office of German Economic Affairs,April 10,1951.
[2]FRUS,1951,Vol.5,p.669.Memorandum of Conversation,by the Secretary of State.May 8,1951.
[3]FRUS,1951,Vol.5,p.751.Memorandum of Conversation,by the Assistant Secretary of State for near Eastern,South Asian and African Affairs(McGhee).
[4]FRUS,1951,Vol.5,p.949.Memorandum of Conversation,by the Acting Secretary of State.Novermber 30,1951.
[1]Shlomo Shafir,Ambiguous Relations:The American Jewish Community and Germany since 1945,p.171.
[2]FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.9,pp.913-914.The Secretary of State to the Office of the U.S.High Commissioner for Germany,at Bonn.April 4,1952
[3]Nicholas Balabkins,West German Reparations to Israel,New Brunswick,Rutgers University Press,1971,p.131.
[4]FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.9,Part Ⅰ,p.938.The U.S.High Commissioner for Germany(McCloy)to the Department of State.May 25,1952.
[5]Nicholas Balabkins,West German Reparations to Israel.p.133.
[6]康拉德·阿登纳:《阿登纳回忆录1953—1955》第170-171页。
[1]FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.9,Part Ⅰ,p.1002.Memorandum of Conversation,by the Office in Charge of Palestine-Israel-Jordan Affairs(Waller).September 22,1952.
##属性不符
[1]Herbert Feis,The Diplomacy of the Dollar:First Ere 1919—1932,Archon Books,1965,p.46.
[2]Carolyn Eisenberg,Drawing the Line,pp.17-18.
[1]Bruce Kuklick,American Policy and the Division of Germany:The Clash with Russia over Reparations,p.3-4.
[2]Henry L.Stimson,On active Service in Peace and War,pp.571-573.
[3]多边主义外交思想的内容参见本文第四章第一节。
[4]Bruce Kuklick,American Policy and the Division of Germany:The Clash with Russia over Reparations,p.6.
[5]Bruce Kuklick,American Policy and the Division of Germany:The Clash with Russia over Reparations,p.15.
[1]埃德温·哈特里奇:《第四帝国的崛起》第22页。
[1]埃德温·哈特里奇:《第四帝国的崛起》第91页。
[2]吴友法、黄正柏:《德国资本主义发展史》第274页。
[3]卡尔·哈达赫:《二十世纪德国经济史》第27页注释。
[1]本表格由笔者绘制,数据来源,Max Sering,Germany Under the Dawes Plan,p.159.
[1]Bruck Kent,The Spoiols of War:The Politics,Economics,and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918-1932,p.220.
[2]查尔斯·金德尔伯格:《1929—1939年世界经济萧条》[M]上海:上海译文出版社,1986年版,第23页。
[3]Klaus F.Schoenthal,American Attitudes Toward Germany,1919-1932,p.115.
[4]Jeffry M.Diefendorf,American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany,1945-1955,N.Y.Cambridge Press,p.87.
[5]James McAllister,No Exit:American and the German Problem,1943-1954,Ithaca University Press,2002,p.79.
[1]William C.McNeil,American Money and the Weimar Republic,pp.98-99,
[2]卡尔·哈达赫:《二十世纪德国经济史》第50页。
[1]金铎:《二战后德国的战争赔偿与反省》[J],载于《团结》2005年第5期。
[2]杨德利:《德国的战争赔偿问题》[J],载于《德国研究》1996年第1期。
[3]据1946年美国新闻机构发表的调查表明,约80%的德国人认为纽伦堡的审判是公正的,被告的罪行无可辩驳。
[1]Melvyn Leffler,The Elusive Quest:American's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919-1933,pp.96-99.
[2]Bruck Kent,The Spoiols of War:The Politics,Economics,and Diplomacy of Reparations,1918-1932,p.2289.
[3]卡尔·艾利希·埃尔德曼:《德意志史》(第四卷,世界大战时期,1914-1950),第281页。
[1]Harley Notter,Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation,1939-1945,Washington,1949,pp.558-559.
[1]莫洛托夫:《对外政策问题:1945年4月—1948年11月时期中的演说和声明》第55页。
[2]托马斯·帕特森:《美国外交政策》第614页。
[3]FRUS,1947,Vol.2,pp.259-263.United States Delegation Minutes,March 18,1947.
[1]Charles S.Maicr,The Marshall Plan and Germany:West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program,p.21.
[2]Carolyn W.Eisenberg,Drawing the Line:The American Decision to Divide Germany,1944-949,p.280.
[3]James McAllistcr,No Exit:American and the German Problem,1943-1954,p.126.
[4]文安立:《冷战与革命——美苏冲突与中国内战的起源》[M]南宁:广西师范大学出版社,2002年版,第1页。
[1]Owen D.Young to Harriman,Sept.12,1947,Truman Library.
[2]Thomas G.Paterson,Soviet—American Confrontation:Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War,p.231.
[3]Charles Maier,The Marshall Plan and Germany:West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program,pp.123-124.
[4]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.299—300.The Ambassador in France(Caffery)to the Secretary of State.Paris,June 29.
[5]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,pp.343-344.The Ambassador in France(Caffery)to the Secretary of State.August,6 1947.
[6]FRUS,1947,Vol.3,p.306.The Ambassador in the United Kingdom(Douglas)to the Secretary of State.
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