上市公司管理层股权激励对经营绩效影响的实证研究
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摘要
股权激励制度作为一种被西方实践所广泛证实的有效的激励方式,在解决委托代理问题、改善公司绩效、吸引和挽留人才等方面都表现出了极大的优越性。正是因为如此,对管理层股权激励相关问题的研究一直是学术界的前沿和热点。然而,由于我国引入该制度的时间较短,发展相对不完善,股权激励对上市公司经营绩效可能会产生除积极影响之外的其它不同类型的结果表现形式。因此,本文力图通过研究我国上市公司管理层股权激励对经营绩效所产生的影响问题,以期更好的加快我国上市公司股权激励制度建设。
本文首先系统的论述了管理层股权激励思想所蕴含的理论体系,分别总结了国内外关于管理层股权激励对经营绩效影响关系所形成的理论假说和文献综述。然后,对我国上市公司管理层股权激励的实施现状及实施特点进行了整体分析。接着,通过建立体现管理层股权激励对公司经营绩效影响关系的多元线性回归模型,运用SPSS17.0统计分析软件进行回归分析,验证假说真伪,深层次剖析管理层股权激励的实施对公司经营绩效是否存在影响以及影响程度如何的问题。最终实证回归结论表明,管理层持股比例对上市公司经营绩效呈现正向关系,但这种积极的作用在样本公司中却表现相当微弱。文章最后针对实证结论,提出了进一步完善我国股权激励制度的对策与建议。
Shareholding incentive system is considered as an effective motivation way, which has been generally proven by practice in west countries. Shareholding incentive system has showed great superiority in solving principal-agent problem, improving the performance of the corporation, and attracting and retaining talents. Because of that, the research on stock share incentive of the management has always been leading edge and hot spot in academic circle. While it was a short time for our country to introduce this system that has not developed perfectly. Shareholding incentive may have different kinds of effects on performance of listed companies except the positive effects. So the paper attempts to probe into stock share incentive of the management’s effects on performance of listed companies in our country. So that it could better develop shareholding incentive system of our listed companies.
First of all, the paper systematically discusses theory system on stock share incentive of the management and separately summarizes the theory hypothesis and literature summary about stock share incentive of the management’s effects on the performance of the corporation in and out of our country. Then, the paper gives the whole analysis of implementation present situation and features about listed companies of our country. Following, by means of building the multivariable linear regression model that shows the relationship between stock share incentive of the management and the performance of listed companies, and using linear regression analysis based on software of SPSS 17.0, test true or false of the hypothesis. Deeply analysis that whether implementation of stock shares incentive of the management has effects on the performance of the corporation or not and how does it matter. Finally the paper indicates the conclusion that the proportion of management share holders and the performance of listed companies have positive correlation. But the positive affects shows weakly in sample companies. At last, according to the conclusion, the paper proposes the countermeasures and the suggestions about perfection of our shareholding incentive system.
本文首先系统的论述了管理层股权激励思想所蕴含的理论体系,分别总结了国内外关于管理层股权激励对经营绩效影响关系所形成的理论假说和文献综述。然后,对我国上市公司管理层股权激励的实施现状及实施特点进行了整体分析。接着,通过建立体现管理层股权激励对公司经营绩效影响关系的多元线性回归模型,运用SPSS17.0统计分析软件进行回归分析,验证假说真伪,深层次剖析管理层股权激励的实施对公司经营绩效是否存在影响以及影响程度如何的问题。最终实证回归结论表明,管理层持股比例对上市公司经营绩效呈现正向关系,但这种积极的作用在样本公司中却表现相当微弱。文章最后针对实证结论,提出了进一步完善我国股权激励制度的对策与建议。
Shareholding incentive system is considered as an effective motivation way, which has been generally proven by practice in west countries. Shareholding incentive system has showed great superiority in solving principal-agent problem, improving the performance of the corporation, and attracting and retaining talents. Because of that, the research on stock share incentive of the management has always been leading edge and hot spot in academic circle. While it was a short time for our country to introduce this system that has not developed perfectly. Shareholding incentive may have different kinds of effects on performance of listed companies except the positive effects. So the paper attempts to probe into stock share incentive of the management’s effects on performance of listed companies in our country. So that it could better develop shareholding incentive system of our listed companies.
First of all, the paper systematically discusses theory system on stock share incentive of the management and separately summarizes the theory hypothesis and literature summary about stock share incentive of the management’s effects on the performance of the corporation in and out of our country. Then, the paper gives the whole analysis of implementation present situation and features about listed companies of our country. Following, by means of building the multivariable linear regression model that shows the relationship between stock share incentive of the management and the performance of listed companies, and using linear regression analysis based on software of SPSS 17.0, test true or false of the hypothesis. Deeply analysis that whether implementation of stock shares incentive of the management has effects on the performance of the corporation or not and how does it matter. Finally the paper indicates the conclusion that the proportion of management share holders and the performance of listed companies have positive correlation. But the positive affects shows weakly in sample companies. At last, according to the conclusion, the paper proposes the countermeasures and the suggestions about perfection of our shareholding incentive system.
引文
[1]韦敏.浅议我国上市公司股权激励制度.当代经济,2008.(3):22
[2]罗明嵩.股权激励效用研究.四川大学硕士学位论文.2006.10
[3] G万科股权激励计划的主要内容.会计师,第8期
[4]闫巍.股权激励的法律分析.现代商业,2008,(17):44
[5]奚玉琴.业绩股票激励摸式:中国上市公司案例分析.上市公司,2002.(4):35-38
[6]安东妮.股权激励与上市公司绩效的实证研究.东北师范大学硕士学位论文.2008.8-9
[7]廖英,覃洪兵.我国企业股权激励模式的选择.市场论坛,2007.(12):111
[8]魏桂梅.浅谈国际股权激励模式及国内现状分析.中国高新技术企业,2007.(12):49
[9]刘进.股权激励的四种相关理论.现代企业,2008.(5):22-23
[10] Eugene F.Fama , Michael C.Jensen.Separation of ownership and control.Jounal of Law and Economics,1983.(26):301-325
[11] Edvin Leuven, Hassle Oosterbeek.Firm-Specific Human Capital as a Shared Investment:Comment.The American Economic Review,2001.(1):342-347
[12]陈文.股权激励与公司治理法律实务.北京:法律出版社,2006.24-37
[13] Jensen,M.C,Meckling,W.H. Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics,1976.(3):305-340
[14] Leland, H.and Pyle, D.Informational asymmetries, financial structure and financial intermediation. Journal of Finance,1977.(32):371-387
[15] Kaplan,S.. Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a Source of Value.Journal of Finance,1989.(7):611-632
[16] Kim, D.K.The Incentive Effects of Executive Stock Options: Evidence from International Acquisitions. Journal of Multinational Financial Management,2004.(14): 187-200
[17] Liang,N.,and S.Weisbenner. Who Benefits from a Bull Market? An Analysis of Employee Stock Option Grants and Stock Pries. Working paper,the Federal Reserve System and University of Illinois,2002
[18] Eugene F.Fama and Michael C.Jensen.Separation of ownership and control.Jounal of Law and Economics,1983.(26):301-325
[19] DeAngelo,H.,DeAngelo,L.,and Rice, E.. Going Private: the Effect of a Change in Corporate Ownership Structure. Midland Corporate Finance Journal,1984.(2):35-84
[20] Morck,R.,Shleifer,A.,Vishny,R.W.. Management ownership and Market Valuation:Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics,1998.(20)
[21] McConnell, J.J, Servaes, H.Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics,1990.(34):27
[22] DemsetZ, H.and Lehn, K.The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economics,1985.(93):1155
[23] Himmelberg Charles P.,R.Glenn Hubbard., Understand the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and perforance.Journal of Financial Economics,1999.(153):353-384
[24] K.Chung.H, St.Pruitt.W.Executive Ownership, Corporate Value and Executive Compensation: A Unifying Framework. Journal of Banking and Finance,1996.(30):135-159
[25]刘慧瀛.管理层股权激励与公司绩效关系研究.内蒙古科技与经济,2008.(14):247-250
[26] Kole,A. Firm Performance and Board Independence. Ownership Structure and Performance:Evidence from Real Estate Finance Economics,2003.(26):287-318
[27] Claudio Loderer and Kenneth Martin. Executive stock ownership and Performance tracking faint traces. Journal of Financial Economics,1997.(45):223-255
[28] Cho Myeong-Hyeon.Ownership structure,investment,and the corporate value: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics,1998.(47):103-121
[29]刘国亮,王加胜.上市公司股权结构、激励制度及绩效的实证研究.经济理论与经济管理,2000.(5):36
[30]周建波,孙菊生.经营者股权激励的治理效应研究.经济研究,2003.(5)
[31]宋兆刚.我国上市公司管理层股权激励的决定因素研究.山东社会科学,2006.(5):47
[32]吴淑琨.股权结构与公司绩效的U型关系研究——1997～2000年上市公司的实证研究.中国工业经济,2002.(1):80-87
[33]黄小花,李林初.管理层收购与上市公司治理绩效研究.财经理论与实践,2004.(1):52-57
[34]王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值——基于内生性视角的经验分析.管理世界,2006.(9):101-172
[35]宋增基,张宗宪,朱健.上市公司经营者股权激励的影响分析.管理评论,2005.(3):3-8
[36]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效经济研究,2000.(3):23-25
[37]于东智,谷立日.上市公司管理层持股的激励效用及影响因素.经济理论与经济管理,2001.(9)
[38]袁国良、王怀芳、刘明.上市公司股权激励的实证分析及其相关问题.中国资本市场前沿理论研究文集,2000
[39]顾斌,周立烨.我国上市公司股权激励实施效果研究.会计研究,2007.(2):79-84
[40]和君咨询2008年度中国股权激励年度报告
[41]中国证券监督管理委员会.《上市公司股权激励管理办法》(试行)
[42]闫巍.股权激励的法律分析.现代商业,2008.(17):44
[43]葛杰,殷建.国有上市公司高管股权激励机制实证研究.长春金融高等专科学校学报,2008.(2):20-23
[44]何烛竹.企业营运能力评价指标分析.商业时代,2007.(33):56
[45]周江生.浅析上市公司资本结构及其业绩的关系.经营管理,2009.(1):65-66
[46]张红凤,孔宪香.股票期权制度:理论·实践·反思.北京:经济科学出版社,2003.169
[47]李维安.公司治理理论与实务前沿.北京:中国财政经济出版社,2003.247-256
[2]罗明嵩.股权激励效用研究.四川大学硕士学位论文.2006.10
[3] G万科股权激励计划的主要内容.会计师,第8期
[4]闫巍.股权激励的法律分析.现代商业,2008,(17):44
[5]奚玉琴.业绩股票激励摸式:中国上市公司案例分析.上市公司,2002.(4):35-38
[6]安东妮.股权激励与上市公司绩效的实证研究.东北师范大学硕士学位论文.2008.8-9
[7]廖英,覃洪兵.我国企业股权激励模式的选择.市场论坛,2007.(12):111
[8]魏桂梅.浅谈国际股权激励模式及国内现状分析.中国高新技术企业,2007.(12):49
[9]刘进.股权激励的四种相关理论.现代企业,2008.(5):22-23
[10] Eugene F.Fama , Michael C.Jensen.Separation of ownership and control.Jounal of Law and Economics,1983.(26):301-325
[11] Edvin Leuven, Hassle Oosterbeek.Firm-Specific Human Capital as a Shared Investment:Comment.The American Economic Review,2001.(1):342-347
[12]陈文.股权激励与公司治理法律实务.北京:法律出版社,2006.24-37
[13] Jensen,M.C,Meckling,W.H. Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics,1976.(3):305-340
[14] Leland, H.and Pyle, D.Informational asymmetries, financial structure and financial intermediation. Journal of Finance,1977.(32):371-387
[15] Kaplan,S.. Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a Source of Value.Journal of Finance,1989.(7):611-632
[16] Kim, D.K.The Incentive Effects of Executive Stock Options: Evidence from International Acquisitions. Journal of Multinational Financial Management,2004.(14): 187-200
[17] Liang,N.,and S.Weisbenner. Who Benefits from a Bull Market? An Analysis of Employee Stock Option Grants and Stock Pries. Working paper,the Federal Reserve System and University of Illinois,2002
[18] Eugene F.Fama and Michael C.Jensen.Separation of ownership and control.Jounal of Law and Economics,1983.(26):301-325
[19] DeAngelo,H.,DeAngelo,L.,and Rice, E.. Going Private: the Effect of a Change in Corporate Ownership Structure. Midland Corporate Finance Journal,1984.(2):35-84
[20] Morck,R.,Shleifer,A.,Vishny,R.W.. Management ownership and Market Valuation:Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics,1998.(20)
[21] McConnell, J.J, Servaes, H.Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics,1990.(34):27
[22] DemsetZ, H.and Lehn, K.The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economics,1985.(93):1155
[23] Himmelberg Charles P.,R.Glenn Hubbard., Understand the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and perforance.Journal of Financial Economics,1999.(153):353-384
[24] K.Chung.H, St.Pruitt.W.Executive Ownership, Corporate Value and Executive Compensation: A Unifying Framework. Journal of Banking and Finance,1996.(30):135-159
[25]刘慧瀛.管理层股权激励与公司绩效关系研究.内蒙古科技与经济,2008.(14):247-250
[26] Kole,A. Firm Performance and Board Independence. Ownership Structure and Performance:Evidence from Real Estate Finance Economics,2003.(26):287-318
[27] Claudio Loderer and Kenneth Martin. Executive stock ownership and Performance tracking faint traces. Journal of Financial Economics,1997.(45):223-255
[28] Cho Myeong-Hyeon.Ownership structure,investment,and the corporate value: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics,1998.(47):103-121
[29]刘国亮,王加胜.上市公司股权结构、激励制度及绩效的实证研究.经济理论与经济管理,2000.(5):36
[30]周建波,孙菊生.经营者股权激励的治理效应研究.经济研究,2003.(5)
[31]宋兆刚.我国上市公司管理层股权激励的决定因素研究.山东社会科学,2006.(5):47
[32]吴淑琨.股权结构与公司绩效的U型关系研究——1997～2000年上市公司的实证研究.中国工业经济,2002.(1):80-87
[33]黄小花,李林初.管理层收购与上市公司治理绩效研究.财经理论与实践,2004.(1):52-57
[34]王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值——基于内生性视角的经验分析.管理世界,2006.(9):101-172
[35]宋增基,张宗宪,朱健.上市公司经营者股权激励的影响分析.管理评论,2005.(3):3-8
[36]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效经济研究,2000.(3):23-25
[37]于东智,谷立日.上市公司管理层持股的激励效用及影响因素.经济理论与经济管理,2001.(9)
[38]袁国良、王怀芳、刘明.上市公司股权激励的实证分析及其相关问题.中国资本市场前沿理论研究文集,2000
[39]顾斌,周立烨.我国上市公司股权激励实施效果研究.会计研究,2007.(2):79-84
[40]和君咨询2008年度中国股权激励年度报告
[41]中国证券监督管理委员会.《上市公司股权激励管理办法》(试行)
[42]闫巍.股权激励的法律分析.现代商业,2008.(17):44
[43]葛杰,殷建.国有上市公司高管股权激励机制实证研究.长春金融高等专科学校学报,2008.(2):20-23
[44]何烛竹.企业营运能力评价指标分析.商业时代,2007.(33):56
[45]周江生.浅析上市公司资本结构及其业绩的关系.经营管理,2009.(1):65-66
[46]张红凤,孔宪香.股票期权制度:理论·实践·反思.北京:经济科学出版社,2003.169
[47]李维安.公司治理理论与实务前沿.北京:中国财政经济出版社,2003.247-256