审计合谋的预警与防治对策的有效性研究
|
摘要
审计合谋严重损害了证券市场的基本秩序与声誉。严惩合谋者虽然给受害者带来心理安慰但补偿效果甚微,投资者、债权人等利益相关者更加关注如何尽早发现审计合谋并及时予以制止,并且希望有效惩治以防止类似事件的重复发生。审计合谋的预警和防治仍是重要的研究课题。
本文首先运用经济学、管理学、法学、博弈论等多学科的基本理论工具分析审计合谋的形成机理,然后从上市公司的财务状况、股权结构和治理结构、审计师特征、审计收费等视角获取审计合谋的特征指标,再以这些特征指标为变量采用多种方法构建审计合谋预警模型。最后,对防治审计合谋的奖惩对策的有效性进行理论分析和实证测度。
本文共安排六章从三个大的方面研究审计合谋的预警与防治问题。第一,运用经济人假设、信息不对称理论、声誉理论、博弈论等基本理论,规范研究制度安排缺陷、声誉机制作用微弱情况下合谋者机会主义动机如何向机会主义行为转化,通过建立多方博弈模型研究合谋各方的行为特点和制度在防范审计合谋中的作用,为后续审计合谋预警与防治的数理论证、实证检验提供理论基础;第二,采用实证的方法研究上市公司的异常财务状况、特殊的股权结构和治理结构、审计师特征、异常审计收费等与审计合谋之间的关系,通过多元回归分析获取构建审计合谋预警模型的特征变量。然后,在此基础上,分别运用单变量判定、主成分分析、线性概率回归、LOGIT回归和PROBIT回归等方法建立了预警效果较好的审计合谋预警模型。经验检验发现,在预警效果上,多变量预警模型大大优于单变量判定模型,且Logistic模型依次优于PROBIT模型和LPM模型;第三,拓展Tirole(1986)、Kofman和Lawarree(1993)、Fahad(2006)等审计合谋研究模型,对奖、惩审计师以防范审计合谋的有效性问题进行博弈分析和数理论证。进一步运用实证方法从股票市场的异常反应、上市公司的市场价值、审计师声誉、审计质量和审计独立性等方面测度惩罚机制对防治审计合谋的效果。研究结果表明上市公司的市场价值和会计师事务所声誉未受到实质影响,但惩罚措施在一定程度上促进了审计质量和审计独立性的提高。
论文的主要创新在于:(1)从制度安排、治理结构、法律责任压力和声誉机制等方面系统研究审计师合谋动机向合谋行为转化的作用机制,为审计合谋的研究提供理论基础平台。(2)在财务报告舞弊预警研究的基础上,充分考虑审计合谋的特点,从不同视角进行实证分析获取审计合谋的特征变量,构建了效果较好的审计合谋预警模型,弥补了审计合谋预警缺乏实证模型的缺陷,为我国的监管机构预警审计合谋提供操作性更强的方法;(3)理论论证奖惩措施对于防治审计合谋的效果问题,并采用实证的方法测度惩罚对策对于防治审计合谋的有效性,为较科学地评价和改进现有防范审计合谋制度提供科学的理论支持和经验证据。
Audit collusion seriously damaged the basic order and reputation of the securities market. Although severely punish those who conspire to bring psychological comfort to victims but compensation effect is little. Investors, creditors and other stakeholders more concern about how to detect early and stop it timely, and hope that the Punishment Strategies is effective to prevent similar incidents from recurring. How to identify and prevent audit collusion is still important research topic.
The thesis use the basic theory such as economics, management science, law and game theory to analyses the formation mechanism of audit collusion. The thesis gets Characteristic variables of audit collusion from perspective of the listed company's financial condition, ownership structure and governance structure, the characteristics of accounting firms, auditing fees, then constructs the audit collusion discerning model by using a variety of methods.
The thesis has organized a total of six chapters from the three major aspects to study the problem of identification and governance of audit collusion. First, the thesis uses the basic theory such as economic man hypothesis, asymmetric information theory, the reputation theory, game theory, to analyses the collaborators how to transform his opportunistic motives to opportunistic behavior when there are deficiencies in institutional arrangements and reputation mechanism works weakly. By constructing a multi-game model, the thesis analyses the characteristics of collusive behavior and the role in the prevention of the audit collusion. These studies provide a solid foundation for the following theoretical analysis and empirical testing. Second, using empirical methods to study the relationship between anomalies listed company's financial situation, special ownership structure and governance structure, accounting firm characteristics, abnormal audit fees and collusion, and then obtain the characteristic variable of audit collusion by multiple regression analysis. On this basis, the thesis use the methods of single-variable model, principal component analysis, LPM, LOGIT and PROBIT regression methods to construct the model of discernment of audit collusion respectively. As audit collusion is highly concealed, it is not ideal to discern by single-variable model, but multi-variable model is better than single-variable model greatly. The discerning accuracy rate of PROBIT model is higher than LPM model, but Logistic model is higher than PROBIT model. Third, expanding the model constructed by Tirole (1986), Kofman and Lawarree (1993), Fahad (2003), the thesis carries on reasoning and demonstrating to analyze the validity of preventing collusion by rewarding or punishing the auditor. Then uses empirical methods to test the effectiveness of punishment mechanism in the fight against collusion from the aspect of abnormal stock market reaction, the value of listed companies, the reputation of auditors, audit quality and audit independence. The results show that the market value of listed companies and the reputation of accounting firms had not been impacted substantially, but punishment mechanism enhance the independence of the audit quality and the audit independence.
The main innovation of the thesis lies in: First, the thesis analyses the collaborators how to transform his opportunistic motives to opportunistic behavior from the aspect of institutional arrangements, governance structure, legal liability and reputation stress, which provides theoretical foundation of the research. Second, based on the research about identification of financial reporting fraud, the thesis fully considers the characteristics of the audit conspiracy and constructs the identification models of audit collusion, which provide a better approach to identify the audit collusion case. Third, the thesis analyses the effects of preventive measures and tests it by empirical study, which provide theoretical basis and evidence to improve the existing system for preventing audit collusion.
本文首先运用经济学、管理学、法学、博弈论等多学科的基本理论工具分析审计合谋的形成机理,然后从上市公司的财务状况、股权结构和治理结构、审计师特征、审计收费等视角获取审计合谋的特征指标,再以这些特征指标为变量采用多种方法构建审计合谋预警模型。最后,对防治审计合谋的奖惩对策的有效性进行理论分析和实证测度。
本文共安排六章从三个大的方面研究审计合谋的预警与防治问题。第一,运用经济人假设、信息不对称理论、声誉理论、博弈论等基本理论,规范研究制度安排缺陷、声誉机制作用微弱情况下合谋者机会主义动机如何向机会主义行为转化,通过建立多方博弈模型研究合谋各方的行为特点和制度在防范审计合谋中的作用,为后续审计合谋预警与防治的数理论证、实证检验提供理论基础;第二,采用实证的方法研究上市公司的异常财务状况、特殊的股权结构和治理结构、审计师特征、异常审计收费等与审计合谋之间的关系,通过多元回归分析获取构建审计合谋预警模型的特征变量。然后,在此基础上,分别运用单变量判定、主成分分析、线性概率回归、LOGIT回归和PROBIT回归等方法建立了预警效果较好的审计合谋预警模型。经验检验发现,在预警效果上,多变量预警模型大大优于单变量判定模型,且Logistic模型依次优于PROBIT模型和LPM模型;第三,拓展Tirole(1986)、Kofman和Lawarree(1993)、Fahad(2006)等审计合谋研究模型,对奖、惩审计师以防范审计合谋的有效性问题进行博弈分析和数理论证。进一步运用实证方法从股票市场的异常反应、上市公司的市场价值、审计师声誉、审计质量和审计独立性等方面测度惩罚机制对防治审计合谋的效果。研究结果表明上市公司的市场价值和会计师事务所声誉未受到实质影响,但惩罚措施在一定程度上促进了审计质量和审计独立性的提高。
论文的主要创新在于:(1)从制度安排、治理结构、法律责任压力和声誉机制等方面系统研究审计师合谋动机向合谋行为转化的作用机制,为审计合谋的研究提供理论基础平台。(2)在财务报告舞弊预警研究的基础上,充分考虑审计合谋的特点,从不同视角进行实证分析获取审计合谋的特征变量,构建了效果较好的审计合谋预警模型,弥补了审计合谋预警缺乏实证模型的缺陷,为我国的监管机构预警审计合谋提供操作性更强的方法;(3)理论论证奖惩措施对于防治审计合谋的效果问题,并采用实证的方法测度惩罚对策对于防治审计合谋的有效性,为较科学地评价和改进现有防范审计合谋制度提供科学的理论支持和经验证据。
Audit collusion seriously damaged the basic order and reputation of the securities market. Although severely punish those who conspire to bring psychological comfort to victims but compensation effect is little. Investors, creditors and other stakeholders more concern about how to detect early and stop it timely, and hope that the Punishment Strategies is effective to prevent similar incidents from recurring. How to identify and prevent audit collusion is still important research topic.
The thesis use the basic theory such as economics, management science, law and game theory to analyses the formation mechanism of audit collusion. The thesis gets Characteristic variables of audit collusion from perspective of the listed company's financial condition, ownership structure and governance structure, the characteristics of accounting firms, auditing fees, then constructs the audit collusion discerning model by using a variety of methods.
The thesis has organized a total of six chapters from the three major aspects to study the problem of identification and governance of audit collusion. First, the thesis uses the basic theory such as economic man hypothesis, asymmetric information theory, the reputation theory, game theory, to analyses the collaborators how to transform his opportunistic motives to opportunistic behavior when there are deficiencies in institutional arrangements and reputation mechanism works weakly. By constructing a multi-game model, the thesis analyses the characteristics of collusive behavior and the role in the prevention of the audit collusion. These studies provide a solid foundation for the following theoretical analysis and empirical testing. Second, using empirical methods to study the relationship between anomalies listed company's financial situation, special ownership structure and governance structure, accounting firm characteristics, abnormal audit fees and collusion, and then obtain the characteristic variable of audit collusion by multiple regression analysis. On this basis, the thesis use the methods of single-variable model, principal component analysis, LPM, LOGIT and PROBIT regression methods to construct the model of discernment of audit collusion respectively. As audit collusion is highly concealed, it is not ideal to discern by single-variable model, but multi-variable model is better than single-variable model greatly. The discerning accuracy rate of PROBIT model is higher than LPM model, but Logistic model is higher than PROBIT model. Third, expanding the model constructed by Tirole (1986), Kofman and Lawarree (1993), Fahad (2003), the thesis carries on reasoning and demonstrating to analyze the validity of preventing collusion by rewarding or punishing the auditor. Then uses empirical methods to test the effectiveness of punishment mechanism in the fight against collusion from the aspect of abnormal stock market reaction, the value of listed companies, the reputation of auditors, audit quality and audit independence. The results show that the market value of listed companies and the reputation of accounting firms had not been impacted substantially, but punishment mechanism enhance the independence of the audit quality and the audit independence.
The main innovation of the thesis lies in: First, the thesis analyses the collaborators how to transform his opportunistic motives to opportunistic behavior from the aspect of institutional arrangements, governance structure, legal liability and reputation stress, which provides theoretical foundation of the research. Second, based on the research about identification of financial reporting fraud, the thesis fully considers the characteristics of the audit conspiracy and constructs the identification models of audit collusion, which provide a better approach to identify the audit collusion case. Third, the thesis analyses the effects of preventive measures and tests it by empirical study, which provide theoretical basis and evidence to improve the existing system for preventing audit collusion.
引文
[1]阎长乐.上市公司的会计舞弊分析.管理世界,2004, (4): 111-116
[2]刘峰,郭永祥,任承蠡.会计师事务所与上市公司审计合谋的经济分析.经济体制改革,2002, (3): 138-142
[3]龚启辉,刘桂良.审计合谋的治理:来自审计收费模型的风险博弈分析.审计研究,2006, (4): 68-71
[4]谭宏.论上市公司审计合谋的成因与对策.财经论丛,2000,84, (5): 72-75
[5]林钟高,徐正刚.审计合谋的成因与治理对策.预测,2004, (2): 22-27
[6]叶雪芳.上市公司审计合谋及治理对策.财经论丛,2001, (3): 72-76
[7]朱锦余,雷光勇.审计合谋的制度分析及对策.中南财经大学学报,2001, (3): 109-112
[8]余玉苗,田娟,朱业明.审计合谋的一个博弈均衡分析框架,管理科学学报,2007,8: 32-36
[9]王善平,赵国宇.注册会计师行业监管的若干问题研究.审计与经济研究,2006,3: 12-15
[10]雷光勇.证券市场审计合谋:识别与规制.第一版,北京:中国经济出版社,2005, 61-88
[11]吴联生.审计意见购买;行为特征与监管策略.经济研究,2005, (3): 66-73
[12] DeAngelo, L., Auditor Independence, Low-balling, and Disclosure Regulation, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1981, 3(August): 113-127
[13] McConnell Donald K., Auditor Changes and Related Disagreements, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 1984, 3(2): 44-56
[14] Craswell, A., Stokes, D. J., Loughton, J. Auditor Independence and Fee Dependence, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2000, 33: 253-275
[15] Frankel, R. M., M. F. Johnson, K. K. Nelson, the Relation between Auditors' Fees for Non-audit Services and Earnings Quality. The Accounting Review, 2002, 77: 71-105
[16]雷光勇.审计合谋与财务报告舞弊:共生与治理.管理世界,2004, (2): 97-103
[17] Treadway Committee. Fraud Commission Issues Final Report , Journal of Accountancy, 1987, (10): 34
[18] Albrecht W.S,Wernz G.W &Williams T.L.Fraud: Bring the Light to the Dark Side of Business.New York Irwin Inc, 1995: 15-52
[19] Persons O. Using Financial Statement Data to Identify Factors Associated with Fraudulent Financing Reporting. Journal of Applied business Research, 1995, (11) : 1995-2005
[20] Beneish M D. The Detective of Earnings Manipulation. Financial Analysis Journal, 1999, (5): 24-36
[21] Thomas A. Lee,Robert W. Ingram and Thomas P. Howard. The Difference between Earnings Management and Operating Cash Flow as an Indicator of Financial Reporting Fraud,Contemporary Accounting Research,1999, (6): 749-786
[22] Joseph T. Well. So That is Why It's Called a Pyramid Scheme. Journal of Accountancy, 2000, 190 : 65-85
[23]何红.上市公司舞弊性财务报告产生的因素分析:[复旦大学博士学位论文].上海:复旦大学, 2000, 5
[24]娄权.我国上市公司财务报告舞弊行为之经验研究.证券市场导报,2003, (10): 8-11
[25]方军雄.财务欺诈鉴别的实证分析.上市公司,2003, (4): 40-45
[26]张长海,陈险峰,吴顺祥.舞弊性财务报告识别的实证研究.美中经济评论,2005, (1): 1-9
[27]陈国欣,吕占甲,何峰.财务报告舞弊识别的实证研究——基于中国上市公司经验数据.审计研究,2007, (11): 88-93
[28]吴革,叶陈刚.财务报告舞弊的特征指标研究:来自A股上市公司的经验证据.审计研究,2008, (6): 34-41
[29] Fama E. F. M. C Jensen. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, (26) :301-325
[30] Beasley, M., An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud, The Accounting Review, 1996, 71: 43-65
[31] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58: 3-27
[32]陈汉文,王华等.安达兴:事件与反思.广州:暨南大学出版社,2003, 6
[33]胡勤勤,沈艺峰.独立外部董事能否提高上市公司的经营业绩.世界经济,2002,( 7): 55-62
[34]刘立国,杜莹.公司治理与会计信息质量关系的实证研究.会计研究,2003,(2):28-36
[35]蔡宁,梁丽珍.公司治理与财务舞弊关系的经验分析.财经理论与实践,2003, (6): 80-84
[36]梁杰,顾琳琳.上市公司虚假会计信息披露及法律监管.财会研究,2004, (11): 45-46
[37]韩丹,闵亮,陈婷.管理层股权激励与上市公司会计造假相关性的实证检验.统计与决策,2007, (9): 69-72
[38]杨忠莲,谢香兵.我国上市公司财务报告舞弊的经济后果——来自证监会与财政部处罚公告的市场反应.审计研究,2008, (1): 67-74
[39] Tirole Jean. Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, 1986, 2:181-214
[40] Kofman Fred , Jacques Lawaree. Collusion in Hierarchical Agency. Econometrica, 1993, 61(3): 629-656
[41] Baiman S., J. Evans,N. Nagarajan, Collusion in Auditing. Journal of Accounting Research, 1991, 29: 1-18
[42] Khalil Fahad. Auditing without Commitment. Rand Journal of Economics. 1997, (4): 629-640
[43] Laffont, Jean-Jacques,Jean Tirole. Collusion in Organizations. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1993, 99(4): 485-495
[44] Picard Pierre. Auditing Claims in the Insurance Market with Fraud: The Credibility Issue. Journal of Public Economics, 1996, 63: 27-56
[45] Khalil Fahad,Jacques Lawaree. Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2006, 54(2): 269-291
[46]赵新刚,关忠良,宋学安.上市公司阻止审计合谋的博弈分析.数量经济技术经济研究,2003, (2): 108-111
[47]李洁,刘桂良.审计合谋治理:来自有效惩罚及其注册会计师私人财富抵押的分析.审计研究,2007, (1): 68-74
[48] Bente Villadsen. Communication and Delegation in Collusive Agencies, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1995, 19: 315-344
[49] Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations. Edwin Canaan, New York Modem Library, 1937: 13
[50]王冰,杨虎涛.“合谋”的负面经济后果及对有关几种观点的评析.学术研究,2003, (9): 49-52
[51]汤姆·李著.徐宝权,张立民译.企业审计,天津大学出版社,1991, 133
[52] Dechow, Patricia M., Richard G. Sloan,Amy P. Sweeney, Cause and Sequence of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, Contemporary Accounting Research, 1996, 13(1): 1-36
[53]陈工孟,高宁.我国证券监管有效性的实证研究.管理世界, 2005, (7): 40-47
[54]西蒙.现代决策理论的基石——有限理性说.北京:北京经济学院出版社,1989, 3-4
[55] Antle, R. The Auditor as an Economic Agent. Journal of Accounting Research, 1982, 20(2): 503–527
[56] Antle, R. Auditor Independence. Journal of Accounting Research, 1984, 22(1):1-20
[57] Laffont, Jean-Jacques,David Martimort, Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior, Rand Journal of Economics , 1999, 30: 232-262
[58] Baron D P,D Besanko.Regulation,Asymmetric Information and Auditing.Rand Journal of Economics,1984, 15(4): 447-470
[59]威廉姆森.资本主义经济组织.纽约:自由出版社,1985, 47
[60]刘燕.“机会主义”内容与表现形式的理论解析.经济问题探索,2006, (5): 122-125
[61]王遥.注册会计师审计行为的影响因素分析——基于行为金融学的“非理性”假定.审计研究,2008, (2): 72-78
[62]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革.第一版.北京:北京大学出版社, 1999, 30-205
[63] Peasnell, K. V., P. F. Pope, S. Young. Board monitoring and earnings management:Do outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 2005, 32(September): 1311-1345
[64] Jensen, Michal. The Market for Corporate Control. The Scientific Evidence, Journal of Financial Economics. 1983, (11) :5-50
[65] Dechow, Patricia m., Richard G. Sloan and Amy p. Sweeney, Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: an Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1996, 13(1):1-36
[66] Nicholas Dopuch,Ronald R.King.Negligence versus Strict Liability Regimes in Auditing:An Experimental Investigation.The Accounting Review,1992,(January):97-120
[67] DeAngelo, L. E. Auditor Size and Audit Quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1981, 3(3): 183-199
[68] Palmrose, Z. An Analysis of auditor litigation and audit service quality. The Accounting Review, 1988, 63: 55-73
[69] DeFond, M. L., and K.R. Subramanyam, Auditor Changes and Discretionary Accruals, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1998, (February): 35-37
[70]赵国宇,王善平. CPA法律责任安排制度变迁对审计质量的影响.财经科学,2008, (10): 87-93
[71]李爽,吴溪.后中天勤时代的中国证券审计市场.会计研究,2005, (6): 10-15
[72]吴联生,顾智勇.审计质量与注册会计师责任.中国注册会计师,2002, (5): 22-25
[73]王善平,唐红等.人性、产权与独立审计管理制度安排.长沙:湖南大学出版社. 2007, 145-147
[74]张维迎.法律制度的信誉基础.经济研究,2002, (1): 3-13
[75] David Kreps, Paul R. Milgrom, D. John Roberts, and Robert Wilson. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 1982, 27 :245 -252
[76] Drew Fudenberg,David K. Levine. Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed. Review of Economic Studies, 1992, 59 : 561- 579
[77] Klein, Benjamin, Leffler, Keith B. 1981. The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, Journal of Political Economy, 89(4): 615-641
[78] David M. Kreps. Corporate Culture and Economic Theory. In James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Editor, Perspective on Positive Political Economy, 1990, 90-143
[79] George J. Mailath,Larry Samuelson, Your Reputation is Who You’re not, Not Who You’d Like To Be, CARESS Working Pager, 1998: 98-11
[80] George J. Mailath,Larry Samuelson, Who Wants a Good Reputation, Review of Economic Studies, 2001: 415-441
[81]查道林,费娟英.独立审计声誉机制研究.审计研究,2004, (5): 68-72
[82] Brian W. Wayhew, Auditor Reputation Building, Journal of Accounting Research, 2001, 39: 599-618
[83] Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,American Sociological Review, 1963, 28: 55-67
[84] William Pyle, Reputation Flow, Middlebury College Working Paper No. 0239, 2002
[85] John Kennes,Aaron Schiff, The Value of a Reputation System, Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL, 2002
[86] Randolph P. Bcatty, Auditor Reputation and the Pricing of Initial Public Offerings, Accounting Review, 1989, 64: 693-709
[87] Klein, B., Crawford, R. & Alchian, A. Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process. Journal of Law and Economics, 1978, 21: 297-326
[88] Balvers R. J, Bill McDonald,Robert E. Miller, Under Pricing of New Issues and the Choice of Auditor as a Signal of Investment Banker Reputation, Journal of Accounting Research, 1988, 63: 605- 622
[89] Chaney, P.,K. Philipich. Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit Failure. Journal of Accounting Research, 2002, 40: 1221-1245
[90] Fama E. F., Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy, 1980, 88: 288-308
[91] Holmstrom, B., Moral Hazard in Teams, Journal of Economics, 1982, 13: 324-340
[92] Steven Tadelis, What’s in a Name? Reputation as a Tradable Asset, Stanford University working Paper, 1998
[93] Alan D. Morrison,William J. Wilnelm, Jr, Partnership Firms, Reputation, Human Capital, 2003, 24
[94]张奇峰.祝福管制能提高会计师事务所声誉吗?——来自中国证券市场的经验证据.管理世界,2005, (12): 14-21
[95] Francis, J.,J. Krishnan. Accounting Accruals and Auditor Reporting Conservatism. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1999,16: 135-165
[96] Bartov E., GulF. A , Tsui J. S. Discretionary-accruals Models and Audit Qualifications.The Accounting Review,2000,76 ( January) : 27-58
[97] Shockley, R., Perceptions of Auditors' Independence: An Empirical Analysis, The Accounting Review, 1981, (10): 785-800
[98] Toeh, S. H.,T. J. Wong., Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earning Response Coefficient, The Accounting Review, 1993, 68: 346-367
[99] Jong Hag Choi , T. J. Wong, Auditors Governance Functions and legalEnvironments:An International Investigation Contemporary Accounting Research, 2007, 24(1): 13-46
[100]王善平.独立审计的诚信问题.会计研究,2002, (7): 36-40
[101]赵国宇,王善平.审计合谋的特征变量、预警模型及其效果研究.会计研究,2009, (6): 55-64
[102] Kinney. W,McDaniel L. Characteristics of Firms Correcting Previously Reported Quarterly Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1989, (Feb)
[103]张玲.财务危机预警分析判别模型.数量经济技术经济研究,2000, (3): 49-51
[104]吴世农,卢贤义.我国上市公司财务困境的预测模型研究.经济研究, 2001, (6): 25-38
[105] Beasley, M. S., J. V. Carcello, D. R. Hermanson, P. D. Lapides. Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Consideration of Industry Traits and Corporate Governance Mechanisms. Accounting Horizons, 2000, 14(4), 441-454
[106] Cohen, Jeffrey; Moorthy, Ganesh Krishna; Wright, Arnold M. Corporate Governance and the Audit Process, Contemporary Accounting Research, 2002, 19(4): 573-594
[107] Grossman, Sanford and Oliver Hart. Takeover Bids, the Free-raid Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation. Journal of Economics, 1980, (11) : 41-46
[108] Shleifer Anrei, R. W. Vishny. Survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal of Finance, 1997 , (11): 753-754
[109]陈关亭.我国上市公司财务报告舞弊因素的实证分析.审计研究,2007, (5): 91-96
[110] Lipton, M.,J. Lorsch, A modest proposal for improved corporate governance, Business Lawyer, 1992, 48, 59-77
[111] Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. Journal of Finance, 1993, (5) :31-80
[112] Rosenstein, S. , J. G. Wyatt, Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, (26): 175-184
[113] Chow, C.,S. Rice. Qualified audit opinions and auditor switching.The Accounting Review,1982,57:326-335
[114] Smith, D. Auditor Subject to Opinions, Disclaimers and Auditor Changes. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 1986, (6): 95-108
[115] Krishnan J.Auditor switching and conservatism.The Accounting Review,1994,January: 200-215
[116] Krishnan Jagaan,Stephens G. Ray, Evidence on Opinion Shopping from Auditor Opinion Conservatism.Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,1995, 14: 179-201
[117]陆正飞,童盼.审计意见、审计师变更与监管政策——一项以14号规则为例的经验研究.审计研究,2003, (3): 30-35
[118]吴联生,谭力.审计师变更决策与审计意见改善.审计研究,2005, (2): 45-51
[119]赵国宇,王善平.盈余管理、审计收费与审计独立性.中南财经政法大学学报,2008, (3): 58-62
[120] Lexnnox. Docompany successfully in opinion shopping? Evidence from the UK, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2000, 29: 321-337
[121]李爽,吴溪.审计意见变通及其监管:经验证据.中国会计与财务研究,2002, (4): 25
[122]陈杰平,苏锡嘉,吴溪.异常审计收费与不利审计意见的改善.中国会计与财务研究,2005, (4): 1-29
[123]朱小平,郭志英.不更换会计师事务所条件下审计费用增加的信息含量研究——不更换会计师事务所条件下审计意见购买的线索分析.审计研究,2006, (2): 64-68
[124]唐跃军.审计收费、审计委员会与意见购买——来自2004-2005年中国上市公司的证据.金融研究,2007, (4): 114-127
[125] Simunic D A. The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Accounting Research, 1980, 18: 161-190
[126] Francis, J. R. The Effect of Audit Firm Size on Audit Prices: A Study on the Australian Market. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1984, August: 133-151
[127] Michacl Firth. An Analysis of Audit Fees and Their Determinants in New Zealand. Audit, A Journal of Practice and Theory, 1985, (4): 23-37
[128] Anderson, T, Zeghal, D. The Pricing of Audit Services: Further Evidence from the Canadian Market. Accounting and Business Research, 1994, 24 (9): 195-207
[129] Low L C., Tan P., Koh H. C. The Determination of Audit Fees: an Analysis in the Singapore Context. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 1990, (2): 285-295
[130] Krishnagopal Menon,David D. Williams. Long-Term Trends in Audit Fees. Audit, Journal of Practice and Theory, 2001, (March): 115-136
[131]刘斌,叶建中,廖莹毅.我国上市公司审计收费影响因素的实证研究——深沪市2001年报的经验证据.审计研究,2003, (1): 44-47
[132]韩厚军,周春生.中国证券市场会计师报酬研究.管理世界,2003, (2): 15-22
[133]王善平,李斌.我国上市公司审计收费影响因素的实证分析——来自深市上市公司的经验证据.财经理论与实践,2004, (3): 68-71
[134]薛云奎,程敏.盈余管理、公司治理与国有企业改革——来自中国上市公司国有股权变更的经验证据.中国会计与财务研究,2007, (3): 110-135
[135] Chaney, P. K., D. C. Jeter and L. Shivakumar, Self-selection of Auditors an Audit Pricing in Private Firms, The Accounting Review, 2004, 79(1): 51-72
[136]李连军,薛云奎.中国证券市场审计师声誉溢价与审计质量的经验研究.中国会计评论,2007, 5(3): 401-414
[137]王振林.政府规范、审计服务的供求与审计收费——中国上市公司的证据:[上海财经大学博士学位论文].上海:上海财经大学学位论文,2002, 20-23
[138] Platt H. D, Platt M. B. Predicting Corporate Financial Distress: Reflections on Choice-based Sample Bias. Journal of Economics and Finance, 2002, 26(2): 184-199
[139] Ohlson J. Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy, Journal of Accounting Research, 1980, 18(1): 109-131
[140] Platt H. D., M. B. Platt,J. G. Pedersen. Bankruptcy Discrimination with Real Variables, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 1994, 21: 491-511
[141] Huang, C. S., R. E. Dorsey,M. A. Bosse. Life Insure Financial Distress Prediction: A Neural Network Model. Journal of Insurance Regulation, 1994, 13: 131-167
[142] Beneish M. Detecting GAAP Violation: Implications for Assessing Earnings Management among Firms with Extreme Financial Performance. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. 1997, 16 : 271-309
[143] Bell Timothy B,Carcello Joseph V. A Decision Aid forAssessing the likelibood Fraudulent Financial Reporting,Auditing, 2000, Spring
[144]秦江萍.会计舞弊的市场反应与识别:理论分析与经验证据.北京:经济科学出版社,2006
[145]郭春丽.上市公司的股权结构、公司治理与经营绩效.经济管理,2002, (6): 72-79
[146] Parrino,R., Sias,R.W.,Stalks,L T., Voting with Their Feet:Institutional Investors and CEO Turnover, Journal of Financial Economics, 2003, 68(March):3-46
[147] Beaver, W. H. Financial Ratios as Predicts of Failure. Accounting Review, 1966, (4): 71-111
[148] Meyer P. A.,H. W. Pifer, Predicts of Bank Failures, Journal of Finance, 1970, 25: 853-868
[149] Khalil, F., Lawarree, J., Collusive auditors. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 1996.85, 442-446
[150] Martimort David, The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs, Review of Economic Studies, 2000, 66: 929-948
[151] Kessler Anke, On Monitoring and Collusion in Hierarchies, Journal of Economics Theory, 2000, 91(2) : 280-291
[152] Strause, Roland, Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship, Review of Economic Studies, 1997, 64(3) : 337-357
[153]让-雅克·拉丰,大卫·马赫蒂摩.激励理论.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002, 20-23
[154]王善平,赵国宇.奖励审计师与防治审计合谋问题研究.系统工程,2005, (5): 85-88
[155]王善平,赵国宇.防治审计合谋之奖惩措施的有效性.系统工程,2008, (1): 110-113
[156]赵新刚,廖涌泉,袁晓波等.上市公司审计合谋问题分析.北方交通大学学报(社会科学版),2003, (3): 44-46
[157]吴联生,王亚平.有效会计监管的均衡模型.经济研究,2003, (6): 14-19
[158]张亦春,周颖刚.中国股市弱式有效吗?.金融研究,2001, (3): 34-40
[159]汤光华,邓益民.技术指标与市场弱式有效的实证研究.统计研究,2004, (12): 31-34
[160] Brown S.J.,J. B .Warner, Measuring security price performance, Journal of Financial Economics, 1980, 8: 205-258
[161]方军雄,许平,洪剑峭. CPA职业声誉损害经济后果性研究——来自银广夏事件的初步发现和启示.南方经济,2006, (6): 90-101
[162]方哲.关于会计师事务所业务质量检查审计结果公告的市场反应.审计研究,2008, (6): 17-21
[163]苏启林,朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值.经济研究,2003, (8): 36-45
[164]汪辉.上市公司债务融资、公司治理与市场价值.经济研究,2003, (8): 28-35
[165]蔡祥.控制权利益、管理者股权与企业价值.财经科学,2002, (5): 48-51
[166]李志文,宋衍蘅.股权结构会影响筹资决策吗——来自中国赛格系公司的案例.管理世界,2003, (6): 128-138
[167]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲等.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究.经济研究,2005, (2): 81-91
[168] Jensen, Michael C.,William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,3 (10) : 305-360
[169] Francis J.R.,D.T. Simon, A Test of Audit Pricing in the Small Client Segment of the U.S. Audit market, Accounting Review, 1987, ( January) : 145-157
[170]朱红军,夏立军,陈信元.转型经济中审计市场的需求特征研究.审计研究,2004, 5: 53-62
[171] Moreland, keith, Criticism of Auditors and the Association between Earning and Returns of Client firms, Auditing, 1995, 14(1): 94-105
[172] Paul K. Chaney,Kirk L. Philipich, Shredded Reputation: the Cost of Audit Failure, Journal of Accounting Research , 2002, 40: 1221-1245
[173]朱红军,何贤杰,孙跃等.市场在关注审计师的职业声誉吗?——基于“科龙电器事件”的经验与启示.审计研究,2008, (4): 44-52
[174] Dopuch, N.,D. Simunic, The Nature of Competition in the Auditing Profession: A Description and Nnormative View. In J. W. Buckly and J. F. Weston (eds.), Regulation and the Accounting Profession, CA: Lifetime Learning Publications, 1980, 77-94
[175] Wilson, T., R. Grimlund, An Examination of the Importance of an Auditor’s Reputation, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 1990,12: 43-59
[176] Michael Firth, Auditor Reputation: the Impact of Critical Reports Issued by Government Inspectors, RAND Journal of Economics, 1990, 21: 374-387
[177] D. Paul Newman, Evelyn R. Patterson, J. Reed Smith, The Role of Auditing in Investor Protection, The Accounting Review, 2005, 80(1): 46-53
[178]陈武朝,张泓.盈余管理审计师变更与审计独立性.会计研究,2004, (8): 81-86
[179] Subramanyam K. R., The Pricing of Discretionary Accruals, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1996, 22: 249-282
[180] Heninger W. G. The Association between Auditor Litigation and Abnormal Accruals, The Accounting Review, 2001, 76 (January): 111-126
[181]蒋义宏.一个不容忽视的问题——上市公司利润操纵的实证研究.中国证券报,1998, (3): 19-20
[182] Chen K,H. Yuan.Earnings Management and Capital Resource Allocation: Evidence from China’s Accounting Based Regulation on Rights Issues. The Accounting Review, 2004. ( July): 645-665
[183]夏立军.盈余管理计量模型在中国股票市场的应用研究.中国会计与财务研究,2003, 5(2): 94-154
[184] Myers J. N., Myers L. A.,Omer T. C. Exploring the Term of the Auditor2Client Relationship and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation? The Accounting Review, 2003, 78: 779-799
[185]陈信元,夏立军.审计任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据.会计研究,2006, (1): 44-53
[186] Walker, R. Why so Many Audits Have Been Failing, Business Review Weekly, 1991, 2: 82–84
[187]刘启亮.事务所任期与审计质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据.审计研究,2006, (4): 40-49
[188] Geiger, M.,Raghunandan. Auditor Tenure and Audit Reporting Failures, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 2002.3:187-196
[189] Ghosh, Aloke,Moon, Doocheol. Auditor Tenure and Perceptions of Audit Quality. Accounting Review, 2005, 80 (2) : 585-612
[190] Mansi S. A., Maxwell W. F.,Miller D. P. Does Auditor Quality and Tenure Matter to Investors? Evidence from the Bond Market. The Journal of Accounting Research, 2004, (9): 755-793
[191]蔡春,杨麟,陈晓媛等.上市公司审计意见类型影响因素的实证分析.财经科学,2005, (1): 95-102
[192]李维安,王新汉,王威.盈余管理对审计意见的影响.财经论丛,2005, (1): 79-85
[193] Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan,A. P. Sweeney. Detecting Earnings Management. The Accounting Review, 1995, 70: 193-225
[194] DeFond, M.,C. Park. Smoothing Income in Anticipation of Future Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1997. 23 ( July) : 115-139
[195] Becker C. L., Defongd M. L., Jiam balvo J., and Subramanyam K. R. The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1998, (Spring) : 1-24
[196] Chen, C. J., S. Chen, X. Su, Y. Wang, Incentives for and Consequences of InitialVoluntary Asset Write– Downs in the Emerging Chinese Market, Journal of International Accounting Research, 2004, l3(11): 43-61
[197] DeFond M. L., T. J. Wong, S H.,Li. The Impact of Imp roved Auditor Independence on AuditMarket Concentration in China. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1999, December: 269-305
[198]夏立军,陈信元.审计任期与审计独立性:来自中国证券市场的经验证据.中国会计与财务研究,2005, (3): 44-53
[199] Chen, J. P., Su, X.,Zhao, R., An Emerging Market’s Reaction to Initial Modified Audit Opinions: Evidence from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Contemporary Accounting Research, 2000, 17:429-455
[200] Chen, J. P., Chen, S.,Su, X., Profitability Regulation, Earning Management and Modified Audit Opinions: Evidence from China, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 2001, (Fall):645-665
[201] Nichols D. R.,Smith D. B., Auditor Credibility and Auditor Changes, Journal of Accounting Research, 1983, 21(Fall):534-544
[202] Davidson, R. A.,Neu D., A Note on the Association between Audit firm Size and Audit Quality, Contemporary Accounting Research, 1993, 9(Sping): 479-488
[203] Francis, J.R., Maydew, E.L., Sparks, H.C., The Role of Big 6 Auditors in the Credible Reporting of Accruals, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 1999, 18(Fall), 17-34
[2]刘峰,郭永祥,任承蠡.会计师事务所与上市公司审计合谋的经济分析.经济体制改革,2002, (3): 138-142
[3]龚启辉,刘桂良.审计合谋的治理:来自审计收费模型的风险博弈分析.审计研究,2006, (4): 68-71
[4]谭宏.论上市公司审计合谋的成因与对策.财经论丛,2000,84, (5): 72-75
[5]林钟高,徐正刚.审计合谋的成因与治理对策.预测,2004, (2): 22-27
[6]叶雪芳.上市公司审计合谋及治理对策.财经论丛,2001, (3): 72-76
[7]朱锦余,雷光勇.审计合谋的制度分析及对策.中南财经大学学报,2001, (3): 109-112
[8]余玉苗,田娟,朱业明.审计合谋的一个博弈均衡分析框架,管理科学学报,2007,8: 32-36
[9]王善平,赵国宇.注册会计师行业监管的若干问题研究.审计与经济研究,2006,3: 12-15
[10]雷光勇.证券市场审计合谋:识别与规制.第一版,北京:中国经济出版社,2005, 61-88
[11]吴联生.审计意见购买;行为特征与监管策略.经济研究,2005, (3): 66-73
[12] DeAngelo, L., Auditor Independence, Low-balling, and Disclosure Regulation, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1981, 3(August): 113-127
[13] McConnell Donald K., Auditor Changes and Related Disagreements, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 1984, 3(2): 44-56
[14] Craswell, A., Stokes, D. J., Loughton, J. Auditor Independence and Fee Dependence, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2000, 33: 253-275
[15] Frankel, R. M., M. F. Johnson, K. K. Nelson, the Relation between Auditors' Fees for Non-audit Services and Earnings Quality. The Accounting Review, 2002, 77: 71-105
[16]雷光勇.审计合谋与财务报告舞弊:共生与治理.管理世界,2004, (2): 97-103
[17] Treadway Committee. Fraud Commission Issues Final Report , Journal of Accountancy, 1987, (10): 34
[18] Albrecht W.S,Wernz G.W &Williams T.L.Fraud: Bring the Light to the Dark Side of Business.New York Irwin Inc, 1995: 15-52
[19] Persons O. Using Financial Statement Data to Identify Factors Associated with Fraudulent Financing Reporting. Journal of Applied business Research, 1995, (11) : 1995-2005
[20] Beneish M D. The Detective of Earnings Manipulation. Financial Analysis Journal, 1999, (5): 24-36
[21] Thomas A. Lee,Robert W. Ingram and Thomas P. Howard. The Difference between Earnings Management and Operating Cash Flow as an Indicator of Financial Reporting Fraud,Contemporary Accounting Research,1999, (6): 749-786
[22] Joseph T. Well. So That is Why It's Called a Pyramid Scheme. Journal of Accountancy, 2000, 190 : 65-85
[23]何红.上市公司舞弊性财务报告产生的因素分析:[复旦大学博士学位论文].上海:复旦大学, 2000, 5
[24]娄权.我国上市公司财务报告舞弊行为之经验研究.证券市场导报,2003, (10): 8-11
[25]方军雄.财务欺诈鉴别的实证分析.上市公司,2003, (4): 40-45
[26]张长海,陈险峰,吴顺祥.舞弊性财务报告识别的实证研究.美中经济评论,2005, (1): 1-9
[27]陈国欣,吕占甲,何峰.财务报告舞弊识别的实证研究——基于中国上市公司经验数据.审计研究,2007, (11): 88-93
[28]吴革,叶陈刚.财务报告舞弊的特征指标研究:来自A股上市公司的经验证据.审计研究,2008, (6): 34-41
[29] Fama E. F. M. C Jensen. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, (26) :301-325
[30] Beasley, M., An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud, The Accounting Review, 1996, 71: 43-65
[31] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58: 3-27
[32]陈汉文,王华等.安达兴:事件与反思.广州:暨南大学出版社,2003, 6
[33]胡勤勤,沈艺峰.独立外部董事能否提高上市公司的经营业绩.世界经济,2002,( 7): 55-62
[34]刘立国,杜莹.公司治理与会计信息质量关系的实证研究.会计研究,2003,(2):28-36
[35]蔡宁,梁丽珍.公司治理与财务舞弊关系的经验分析.财经理论与实践,2003, (6): 80-84
[36]梁杰,顾琳琳.上市公司虚假会计信息披露及法律监管.财会研究,2004, (11): 45-46
[37]韩丹,闵亮,陈婷.管理层股权激励与上市公司会计造假相关性的实证检验.统计与决策,2007, (9): 69-72
[38]杨忠莲,谢香兵.我国上市公司财务报告舞弊的经济后果——来自证监会与财政部处罚公告的市场反应.审计研究,2008, (1): 67-74
[39] Tirole Jean. Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, 1986, 2:181-214
[40] Kofman Fred , Jacques Lawaree. Collusion in Hierarchical Agency. Econometrica, 1993, 61(3): 629-656
[41] Baiman S., J. Evans,N. Nagarajan, Collusion in Auditing. Journal of Accounting Research, 1991, 29: 1-18
[42] Khalil Fahad. Auditing without Commitment. Rand Journal of Economics. 1997, (4): 629-640
[43] Laffont, Jean-Jacques,Jean Tirole. Collusion in Organizations. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1993, 99(4): 485-495
[44] Picard Pierre. Auditing Claims in the Insurance Market with Fraud: The Credibility Issue. Journal of Public Economics, 1996, 63: 27-56
[45] Khalil Fahad,Jacques Lawaree. Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2006, 54(2): 269-291
[46]赵新刚,关忠良,宋学安.上市公司阻止审计合谋的博弈分析.数量经济技术经济研究,2003, (2): 108-111
[47]李洁,刘桂良.审计合谋治理:来自有效惩罚及其注册会计师私人财富抵押的分析.审计研究,2007, (1): 68-74
[48] Bente Villadsen. Communication and Delegation in Collusive Agencies, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1995, 19: 315-344
[49] Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations. Edwin Canaan, New York Modem Library, 1937: 13
[50]王冰,杨虎涛.“合谋”的负面经济后果及对有关几种观点的评析.学术研究,2003, (9): 49-52
[51]汤姆·李著.徐宝权,张立民译.企业审计,天津大学出版社,1991, 133
[52] Dechow, Patricia M., Richard G. Sloan,Amy P. Sweeney, Cause and Sequence of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, Contemporary Accounting Research, 1996, 13(1): 1-36
[53]陈工孟,高宁.我国证券监管有效性的实证研究.管理世界, 2005, (7): 40-47
[54]西蒙.现代决策理论的基石——有限理性说.北京:北京经济学院出版社,1989, 3-4
[55] Antle, R. The Auditor as an Economic Agent. Journal of Accounting Research, 1982, 20(2): 503–527
[56] Antle, R. Auditor Independence. Journal of Accounting Research, 1984, 22(1):1-20
[57] Laffont, Jean-Jacques,David Martimort, Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior, Rand Journal of Economics , 1999, 30: 232-262
[58] Baron D P,D Besanko.Regulation,Asymmetric Information and Auditing.Rand Journal of Economics,1984, 15(4): 447-470
[59]威廉姆森.资本主义经济组织.纽约:自由出版社,1985, 47
[60]刘燕.“机会主义”内容与表现形式的理论解析.经济问题探索,2006, (5): 122-125
[61]王遥.注册会计师审计行为的影响因素分析——基于行为金融学的“非理性”假定.审计研究,2008, (2): 72-78
[62]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革.第一版.北京:北京大学出版社, 1999, 30-205
[63] Peasnell, K. V., P. F. Pope, S. Young. Board monitoring and earnings management:Do outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 2005, 32(September): 1311-1345
[64] Jensen, Michal. The Market for Corporate Control. The Scientific Evidence, Journal of Financial Economics. 1983, (11) :5-50
[65] Dechow, Patricia m., Richard G. Sloan and Amy p. Sweeney, Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: an Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1996, 13(1):1-36
[66] Nicholas Dopuch,Ronald R.King.Negligence versus Strict Liability Regimes in Auditing:An Experimental Investigation.The Accounting Review,1992,(January):97-120
[67] DeAngelo, L. E. Auditor Size and Audit Quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1981, 3(3): 183-199
[68] Palmrose, Z. An Analysis of auditor litigation and audit service quality. The Accounting Review, 1988, 63: 55-73
[69] DeFond, M. L., and K.R. Subramanyam, Auditor Changes and Discretionary Accruals, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1998, (February): 35-37
[70]赵国宇,王善平. CPA法律责任安排制度变迁对审计质量的影响.财经科学,2008, (10): 87-93
[71]李爽,吴溪.后中天勤时代的中国证券审计市场.会计研究,2005, (6): 10-15
[72]吴联生,顾智勇.审计质量与注册会计师责任.中国注册会计师,2002, (5): 22-25
[73]王善平,唐红等.人性、产权与独立审计管理制度安排.长沙:湖南大学出版社. 2007, 145-147
[74]张维迎.法律制度的信誉基础.经济研究,2002, (1): 3-13
[75] David Kreps, Paul R. Milgrom, D. John Roberts, and Robert Wilson. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 1982, 27 :245 -252
[76] Drew Fudenberg,David K. Levine. Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed. Review of Economic Studies, 1992, 59 : 561- 579
[77] Klein, Benjamin, Leffler, Keith B. 1981. The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, Journal of Political Economy, 89(4): 615-641
[78] David M. Kreps. Corporate Culture and Economic Theory. In James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Editor, Perspective on Positive Political Economy, 1990, 90-143
[79] George J. Mailath,Larry Samuelson, Your Reputation is Who You’re not, Not Who You’d Like To Be, CARESS Working Pager, 1998: 98-11
[80] George J. Mailath,Larry Samuelson, Who Wants a Good Reputation, Review of Economic Studies, 2001: 415-441
[81]查道林,费娟英.独立审计声誉机制研究.审计研究,2004, (5): 68-72
[82] Brian W. Wayhew, Auditor Reputation Building, Journal of Accounting Research, 2001, 39: 599-618
[83] Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,American Sociological Review, 1963, 28: 55-67
[84] William Pyle, Reputation Flow, Middlebury College Working Paper No. 0239, 2002
[85] John Kennes,Aaron Schiff, The Value of a Reputation System, Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL, 2002
[86] Randolph P. Bcatty, Auditor Reputation and the Pricing of Initial Public Offerings, Accounting Review, 1989, 64: 693-709
[87] Klein, B., Crawford, R. & Alchian, A. Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process. Journal of Law and Economics, 1978, 21: 297-326
[88] Balvers R. J, Bill McDonald,Robert E. Miller, Under Pricing of New Issues and the Choice of Auditor as a Signal of Investment Banker Reputation, Journal of Accounting Research, 1988, 63: 605- 622
[89] Chaney, P.,K. Philipich. Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit Failure. Journal of Accounting Research, 2002, 40: 1221-1245
[90] Fama E. F., Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy, 1980, 88: 288-308
[91] Holmstrom, B., Moral Hazard in Teams, Journal of Economics, 1982, 13: 324-340
[92] Steven Tadelis, What’s in a Name? Reputation as a Tradable Asset, Stanford University working Paper, 1998
[93] Alan D. Morrison,William J. Wilnelm, Jr, Partnership Firms, Reputation, Human Capital, 2003, 24
[94]张奇峰.祝福管制能提高会计师事务所声誉吗?——来自中国证券市场的经验证据.管理世界,2005, (12): 14-21
[95] Francis, J.,J. Krishnan. Accounting Accruals and Auditor Reporting Conservatism. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1999,16: 135-165
[96] Bartov E., GulF. A , Tsui J. S. Discretionary-accruals Models and Audit Qualifications.The Accounting Review,2000,76 ( January) : 27-58
[97] Shockley, R., Perceptions of Auditors' Independence: An Empirical Analysis, The Accounting Review, 1981, (10): 785-800
[98] Toeh, S. H.,T. J. Wong., Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earning Response Coefficient, The Accounting Review, 1993, 68: 346-367
[99] Jong Hag Choi , T. J. Wong, Auditors Governance Functions and legalEnvironments:An International Investigation Contemporary Accounting Research, 2007, 24(1): 13-46
[100]王善平.独立审计的诚信问题.会计研究,2002, (7): 36-40
[101]赵国宇,王善平.审计合谋的特征变量、预警模型及其效果研究.会计研究,2009, (6): 55-64
[102] Kinney. W,McDaniel L. Characteristics of Firms Correcting Previously Reported Quarterly Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1989, (Feb)
[103]张玲.财务危机预警分析判别模型.数量经济技术经济研究,2000, (3): 49-51
[104]吴世农,卢贤义.我国上市公司财务困境的预测模型研究.经济研究, 2001, (6): 25-38
[105] Beasley, M. S., J. V. Carcello, D. R. Hermanson, P. D. Lapides. Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Consideration of Industry Traits and Corporate Governance Mechanisms. Accounting Horizons, 2000, 14(4), 441-454
[106] Cohen, Jeffrey; Moorthy, Ganesh Krishna; Wright, Arnold M. Corporate Governance and the Audit Process, Contemporary Accounting Research, 2002, 19(4): 573-594
[107] Grossman, Sanford and Oliver Hart. Takeover Bids, the Free-raid Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation. Journal of Economics, 1980, (11) : 41-46
[108] Shleifer Anrei, R. W. Vishny. Survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal of Finance, 1997 , (11): 753-754
[109]陈关亭.我国上市公司财务报告舞弊因素的实证分析.审计研究,2007, (5): 91-96
[110] Lipton, M.,J. Lorsch, A modest proposal for improved corporate governance, Business Lawyer, 1992, 48, 59-77
[111] Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. Journal of Finance, 1993, (5) :31-80
[112] Rosenstein, S. , J. G. Wyatt, Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, (26): 175-184
[113] Chow, C.,S. Rice. Qualified audit opinions and auditor switching.The Accounting Review,1982,57:326-335
[114] Smith, D. Auditor Subject to Opinions, Disclaimers and Auditor Changes. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 1986, (6): 95-108
[115] Krishnan J.Auditor switching and conservatism.The Accounting Review,1994,January: 200-215
[116] Krishnan Jagaan,Stephens G. Ray, Evidence on Opinion Shopping from Auditor Opinion Conservatism.Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,1995, 14: 179-201
[117]陆正飞,童盼.审计意见、审计师变更与监管政策——一项以14号规则为例的经验研究.审计研究,2003, (3): 30-35
[118]吴联生,谭力.审计师变更决策与审计意见改善.审计研究,2005, (2): 45-51
[119]赵国宇,王善平.盈余管理、审计收费与审计独立性.中南财经政法大学学报,2008, (3): 58-62
[120] Lexnnox. Docompany successfully in opinion shopping? Evidence from the UK, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2000, 29: 321-337
[121]李爽,吴溪.审计意见变通及其监管:经验证据.中国会计与财务研究,2002, (4): 25
[122]陈杰平,苏锡嘉,吴溪.异常审计收费与不利审计意见的改善.中国会计与财务研究,2005, (4): 1-29
[123]朱小平,郭志英.不更换会计师事务所条件下审计费用增加的信息含量研究——不更换会计师事务所条件下审计意见购买的线索分析.审计研究,2006, (2): 64-68
[124]唐跃军.审计收费、审计委员会与意见购买——来自2004-2005年中国上市公司的证据.金融研究,2007, (4): 114-127
[125] Simunic D A. The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Accounting Research, 1980, 18: 161-190
[126] Francis, J. R. The Effect of Audit Firm Size on Audit Prices: A Study on the Australian Market. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1984, August: 133-151
[127] Michacl Firth. An Analysis of Audit Fees and Their Determinants in New Zealand. Audit, A Journal of Practice and Theory, 1985, (4): 23-37
[128] Anderson, T, Zeghal, D. The Pricing of Audit Services: Further Evidence from the Canadian Market. Accounting and Business Research, 1994, 24 (9): 195-207
[129] Low L C., Tan P., Koh H. C. The Determination of Audit Fees: an Analysis in the Singapore Context. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 1990, (2): 285-295
[130] Krishnagopal Menon,David D. Williams. Long-Term Trends in Audit Fees. Audit, Journal of Practice and Theory, 2001, (March): 115-136
[131]刘斌,叶建中,廖莹毅.我国上市公司审计收费影响因素的实证研究——深沪市2001年报的经验证据.审计研究,2003, (1): 44-47
[132]韩厚军,周春生.中国证券市场会计师报酬研究.管理世界,2003, (2): 15-22
[133]王善平,李斌.我国上市公司审计收费影响因素的实证分析——来自深市上市公司的经验证据.财经理论与实践,2004, (3): 68-71
[134]薛云奎,程敏.盈余管理、公司治理与国有企业改革——来自中国上市公司国有股权变更的经验证据.中国会计与财务研究,2007, (3): 110-135
[135] Chaney, P. K., D. C. Jeter and L. Shivakumar, Self-selection of Auditors an Audit Pricing in Private Firms, The Accounting Review, 2004, 79(1): 51-72
[136]李连军,薛云奎.中国证券市场审计师声誉溢价与审计质量的经验研究.中国会计评论,2007, 5(3): 401-414
[137]王振林.政府规范、审计服务的供求与审计收费——中国上市公司的证据:[上海财经大学博士学位论文].上海:上海财经大学学位论文,2002, 20-23
[138] Platt H. D, Platt M. B. Predicting Corporate Financial Distress: Reflections on Choice-based Sample Bias. Journal of Economics and Finance, 2002, 26(2): 184-199
[139] Ohlson J. Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy, Journal of Accounting Research, 1980, 18(1): 109-131
[140] Platt H. D., M. B. Platt,J. G. Pedersen. Bankruptcy Discrimination with Real Variables, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 1994, 21: 491-511
[141] Huang, C. S., R. E. Dorsey,M. A. Bosse. Life Insure Financial Distress Prediction: A Neural Network Model. Journal of Insurance Regulation, 1994, 13: 131-167
[142] Beneish M. Detecting GAAP Violation: Implications for Assessing Earnings Management among Firms with Extreme Financial Performance. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. 1997, 16 : 271-309
[143] Bell Timothy B,Carcello Joseph V. A Decision Aid forAssessing the likelibood Fraudulent Financial Reporting,Auditing, 2000, Spring
[144]秦江萍.会计舞弊的市场反应与识别:理论分析与经验证据.北京:经济科学出版社,2006
[145]郭春丽.上市公司的股权结构、公司治理与经营绩效.经济管理,2002, (6): 72-79
[146] Parrino,R., Sias,R.W.,Stalks,L T., Voting with Their Feet:Institutional Investors and CEO Turnover, Journal of Financial Economics, 2003, 68(March):3-46
[147] Beaver, W. H. Financial Ratios as Predicts of Failure. Accounting Review, 1966, (4): 71-111
[148] Meyer P. A.,H. W. Pifer, Predicts of Bank Failures, Journal of Finance, 1970, 25: 853-868
[149] Khalil, F., Lawarree, J., Collusive auditors. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 1996.85, 442-446
[150] Martimort David, The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs, Review of Economic Studies, 2000, 66: 929-948
[151] Kessler Anke, On Monitoring and Collusion in Hierarchies, Journal of Economics Theory, 2000, 91(2) : 280-291
[152] Strause, Roland, Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship, Review of Economic Studies, 1997, 64(3) : 337-357
[153]让-雅克·拉丰,大卫·马赫蒂摩.激励理论.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002, 20-23
[154]王善平,赵国宇.奖励审计师与防治审计合谋问题研究.系统工程,2005, (5): 85-88
[155]王善平,赵国宇.防治审计合谋之奖惩措施的有效性.系统工程,2008, (1): 110-113
[156]赵新刚,廖涌泉,袁晓波等.上市公司审计合谋问题分析.北方交通大学学报(社会科学版),2003, (3): 44-46
[157]吴联生,王亚平.有效会计监管的均衡模型.经济研究,2003, (6): 14-19
[158]张亦春,周颖刚.中国股市弱式有效吗?.金融研究,2001, (3): 34-40
[159]汤光华,邓益民.技术指标与市场弱式有效的实证研究.统计研究,2004, (12): 31-34
[160] Brown S.J.,J. B .Warner, Measuring security price performance, Journal of Financial Economics, 1980, 8: 205-258
[161]方军雄,许平,洪剑峭. CPA职业声誉损害经济后果性研究——来自银广夏事件的初步发现和启示.南方经济,2006, (6): 90-101
[162]方哲.关于会计师事务所业务质量检查审计结果公告的市场反应.审计研究,2008, (6): 17-21
[163]苏启林,朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值.经济研究,2003, (8): 36-45
[164]汪辉.上市公司债务融资、公司治理与市场价值.经济研究,2003, (8): 28-35
[165]蔡祥.控制权利益、管理者股权与企业价值.财经科学,2002, (5): 48-51
[166]李志文,宋衍蘅.股权结构会影响筹资决策吗——来自中国赛格系公司的案例.管理世界,2003, (6): 128-138
[167]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲等.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究.经济研究,2005, (2): 81-91
[168] Jensen, Michael C.,William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,3 (10) : 305-360
[169] Francis J.R.,D.T. Simon, A Test of Audit Pricing in the Small Client Segment of the U.S. Audit market, Accounting Review, 1987, ( January) : 145-157
[170]朱红军,夏立军,陈信元.转型经济中审计市场的需求特征研究.审计研究,2004, 5: 53-62
[171] Moreland, keith, Criticism of Auditors and the Association between Earning and Returns of Client firms, Auditing, 1995, 14(1): 94-105
[172] Paul K. Chaney,Kirk L. Philipich, Shredded Reputation: the Cost of Audit Failure, Journal of Accounting Research , 2002, 40: 1221-1245
[173]朱红军,何贤杰,孙跃等.市场在关注审计师的职业声誉吗?——基于“科龙电器事件”的经验与启示.审计研究,2008, (4): 44-52
[174] Dopuch, N.,D. Simunic, The Nature of Competition in the Auditing Profession: A Description and Nnormative View. In J. W. Buckly and J. F. Weston (eds.), Regulation and the Accounting Profession, CA: Lifetime Learning Publications, 1980, 77-94
[175] Wilson, T., R. Grimlund, An Examination of the Importance of an Auditor’s Reputation, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 1990,12: 43-59
[176] Michael Firth, Auditor Reputation: the Impact of Critical Reports Issued by Government Inspectors, RAND Journal of Economics, 1990, 21: 374-387
[177] D. Paul Newman, Evelyn R. Patterson, J. Reed Smith, The Role of Auditing in Investor Protection, The Accounting Review, 2005, 80(1): 46-53
[178]陈武朝,张泓.盈余管理审计师变更与审计独立性.会计研究,2004, (8): 81-86
[179] Subramanyam K. R., The Pricing of Discretionary Accruals, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1996, 22: 249-282
[180] Heninger W. G. The Association between Auditor Litigation and Abnormal Accruals, The Accounting Review, 2001, 76 (January): 111-126
[181]蒋义宏.一个不容忽视的问题——上市公司利润操纵的实证研究.中国证券报,1998, (3): 19-20
[182] Chen K,H. Yuan.Earnings Management and Capital Resource Allocation: Evidence from China’s Accounting Based Regulation on Rights Issues. The Accounting Review, 2004. ( July): 645-665
[183]夏立军.盈余管理计量模型在中国股票市场的应用研究.中国会计与财务研究,2003, 5(2): 94-154
[184] Myers J. N., Myers L. A.,Omer T. C. Exploring the Term of the Auditor2Client Relationship and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation? The Accounting Review, 2003, 78: 779-799
[185]陈信元,夏立军.审计任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据.会计研究,2006, (1): 44-53
[186] Walker, R. Why so Many Audits Have Been Failing, Business Review Weekly, 1991, 2: 82–84
[187]刘启亮.事务所任期与审计质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据.审计研究,2006, (4): 40-49
[188] Geiger, M.,Raghunandan. Auditor Tenure and Audit Reporting Failures, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 2002.3:187-196
[189] Ghosh, Aloke,Moon, Doocheol. Auditor Tenure and Perceptions of Audit Quality. Accounting Review, 2005, 80 (2) : 585-612
[190] Mansi S. A., Maxwell W. F.,Miller D. P. Does Auditor Quality and Tenure Matter to Investors? Evidence from the Bond Market. The Journal of Accounting Research, 2004, (9): 755-793
[191]蔡春,杨麟,陈晓媛等.上市公司审计意见类型影响因素的实证分析.财经科学,2005, (1): 95-102
[192]李维安,王新汉,王威.盈余管理对审计意见的影响.财经论丛,2005, (1): 79-85
[193] Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan,A. P. Sweeney. Detecting Earnings Management. The Accounting Review, 1995, 70: 193-225
[194] DeFond, M.,C. Park. Smoothing Income in Anticipation of Future Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1997. 23 ( July) : 115-139
[195] Becker C. L., Defongd M. L., Jiam balvo J., and Subramanyam K. R. The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1998, (Spring) : 1-24
[196] Chen, C. J., S. Chen, X. Su, Y. Wang, Incentives for and Consequences of InitialVoluntary Asset Write– Downs in the Emerging Chinese Market, Journal of International Accounting Research, 2004, l3(11): 43-61
[197] DeFond M. L., T. J. Wong, S H.,Li. The Impact of Imp roved Auditor Independence on AuditMarket Concentration in China. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1999, December: 269-305
[198]夏立军,陈信元.审计任期与审计独立性:来自中国证券市场的经验证据.中国会计与财务研究,2005, (3): 44-53
[199] Chen, J. P., Su, X.,Zhao, R., An Emerging Market’s Reaction to Initial Modified Audit Opinions: Evidence from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Contemporary Accounting Research, 2000, 17:429-455
[200] Chen, J. P., Chen, S.,Su, X., Profitability Regulation, Earning Management and Modified Audit Opinions: Evidence from China, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 2001, (Fall):645-665
[201] Nichols D. R.,Smith D. B., Auditor Credibility and Auditor Changes, Journal of Accounting Research, 1983, 21(Fall):534-544
[202] Davidson, R. A.,Neu D., A Note on the Association between Audit firm Size and Audit Quality, Contemporary Accounting Research, 1993, 9(Sping): 479-488
[203] Francis, J.R., Maydew, E.L., Sparks, H.C., The Role of Big 6 Auditors in the Credible Reporting of Accruals, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 1999, 18(Fall), 17-34