上市公司管理层收购及其对公司绩效的影响
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摘要
本文收集整理了自1997年以来发生的上市公司管理层收购样本,对我国上市公司管理层收购特征、实施倾向、管理层收购对公司绩效的影响进行了实证检验和分析,是对我国上市公司管理层收购行为及影响的深入研究,丰富了以中国转型经济制度特征为背景的管理层收购理论及实证研究。
总体上看,我国上市公司MBO的发展分为初步探索阶段、曲折发展阶段和规范发展阶段。实施管理层收购的上市公司大部分集中于传统成熟产业中的中小型企业,开始出现针对高科技行业和服务行业上市公司进行的MBO。
对公司管理层收购前两年和前一年的特征进行分析后发现,实施管理层收购前上市公司特征发生了变化。实施管理层收购前两年管理层收购样本公司与配对样本公司之间不存在特征上的显著性差异；但是在实施管理层收购前一年,较之配对样本公司,实施管理层收购上市公司在市盈率和流动比率上存在显著性差异,实施管理层收购上市公司在管理层收购实施前存在价值低估现象,未来具有较好的市场盈利能力和较高的资产变现能力。
对我国上市公司管理层收购实施倾向的分析发现,不同终极控制人性质对管理层收购实施倾向具有不同影响,较之社会法人终极控制人,国家终极控制人更倾向于实施管理层收购；针对国有上市公司的研究发现,较之中央政府控制人,地方政府终极控制人更倾向于实施管理层收购：管理层收购前核心管理层在公司的任职时间越长越倾向于实施管理层收购；董事长或总经理为公司创始人时实施管理层收购的可能性就越大；公司的流动比率越高越可能实施管理层收购。
对管理层收购绩效的研究发现,MBO公司绩效显著高于配对样本公司,同时对MBO前后公司绩效的对比发现管理层收购带来了上市公司绩效的提高。
从终极控制视角对我国上市公司管理层收购后的特征进行分析后发现,我国上市公司实施管理层收购后终极控制权转移程度表现为三种类型：终极控制权转移、终极控制权未转移、分散持股。管理层收购后公司控制权转移即以管理层或由其控制的公司作为终极控制人占了较大比例。管理层收购后终极控制人采用实体控股公司和壳控股公司两种控制形式构建金字塔结构实现对上市公司的控制,采用实体控股公司控制形式占总样本的比例高于壳控股公司；实施管理层收购后上市公司存在终极控制人现金流权与控制权的分离现象,终极控制人往往通过金字塔结构控制上市公司。国家作为终极控制人的两权分离度大于管理层或管理层控制的公司为终极控制人的公司。管理层或管理层控制的公司作为终极控制人比国家作为终极控制人时倾向于通过更长的控制链(即更多的控制层级)控制上市公司；在控制链条数量上,终极控制人通过单一控制链条对上市公司形成控制的情况比较常见；在多条控制链情况下,较之终极控制人为管理层和管理层控制的公司,大多数的国家终极控制人往往通过较短的控制链条和较少的控制链数量实现对实施管理层收购后上市公司的控制。
在中国目前转轨经济时期通过管理层收购这种方式将终极控制权全部转移到管理层或管理层控制的公司时能够实现公司绩效的有效提升；终极控制人控制权与公司绩效之间存在倒U型非线性关系；管理层收购后终极控制股东的控制存在堑壕防御效应和利益趋同效应,公司终极控制人的两权分离度与公司绩效之间显著负相关,MBO后两权分离度越高公司绩效越差,实施MBO后终极控制股东控制存在“堑壕防御效应”；而终极控制人现金流权与公司财务绩效显著正相关,表明MBO后终极控制人现金流权的提高有助于公司绩效的提升,现金流权的提高具有“利益趋同效应”；金字塔结构控制链宽度对实施管理层收购后上市公司绩效产生显著负向影响,同时控制链宽度对控制链层级与公司绩效ROE之间的负向关系产生了显著加强的调节作用,因此,管理层收购后公司金字塔结构的构建对公司MBO后绩效产生了负向影响；管理层持股比例与公司财务绩效ROE之间存在显著正向线性相关关系。
实施MBO后上市公司董事会规模呈下降态势；各年度两职分任所占比例大于75%,两职分任公司中董事长和总经理职务大部分由当时属于实施管理层收购团队中的核心成员担任；公司存在内部人控制现象,且呈现逐步上升趋势；实施管理层收购后大部分样本公司拥有连锁董事,但是这一比例低于全国平均水平。对管理层收购后公司董事会特征与公司绩效关系的研究发现,实施管理层收购后,上市公司两职兼任与公司财务绩效ROE和公司市场绩效Tobin's Q之间具有显著的负相关关系,董事长与总经理两职兼任时公司绩效低于两职分任时的公司绩效；董事会规模与公司市场绩效Tobin's Q之间存在U型的非线性相关关系,需要确定一个合理的董事会规模；内部人控制度与ROA、ROE和Tobin's Q之间具有显著的负相关关系,内部人控制度越强,公司绩效越差；董事会持股比例与Tobin's Q之间具有显著的正相关关系,管理层收购后公司董事会持股比例的提高有助于公司绩效提升。董事会会议频率与公司绩效ROE显著正相关,管理层收购后为了降低内部控制对公司绩效产生的负面影响,增强董事会行为强度不失为一个可行的选择。连锁董事与ROE显著正相关,支持了资源依赖理论,管理层收购后,公司凭借连锁董事网络建立起与外界的联系最终能够带来公司绩效的提升。
Based on the collections of Chinese MBO of listed company occurred from1997onwards, this study empirically test and investigate the distinguishing pre-existing characteristics of Chinese listed firms engaging in MBO, the MBO tendency, and the impact of MBO on the performance of the company.
On the whole, the development of Chinese MBO of listed companies can be divided into three stages:the initial stage of exploration, the stage of tortuous development and the stage of regulation. Most of the MBOs of listed companies are small and medium-sized enterprises in traditional mature industries, MBO in the high tech industry and service industry of listed companies started to appear.
By investigating and identifying the pre-existing characteristics of the companies for the two year and one year preceding the year in which the firm achieved the MBO, we found that the characteristics of the firms have changed. Namely, compared to matched samples, the characteristics of the firms engaged in MBO didn't have significant difference two year before they achieve the MBO, but one year preceding MBO there are significant differences on price earning ratio and current ratio. There exists value underestimation phenomenon one year before the firm achieved MBO, and the firms have better market profitability and higher financial liquidity can be used in the future. The longer the time of core management member be in office before MBO, the higher the probability that the firm will undergo MBO. Firms which the chairman of the board of directors or general manager is the founder of the company have higher probability to perform MBO. The higher the current ratio of the company the higher the probability undergoing MBO.
Companys'financial and market performance post MBO is significantly higher than matching samples, at the same time the comparison of management buy-out performance between pre and post MBO found that the performance of listed corporations has been improved after management buy-out.
The characteristic analysis based on the perspective of ultimate control of post MBO listed companies in China found that, there are three types of ultimate control transfer of MBO companies:the ultimate control transfered, ultimate control unchanged and scattered ownership.
The ultimate controller employed entities and shell holding company to form pyramidal structure to realize their control on the post MBO listed companies, the proportion of entity holding company is higher than that of shell holding company. There exists the divergence between cash flow right ans the ultimate control right in post MBO firms. The ultimate controller usually keeps the listed companies under control through the pyramidl structure. The separation degree between cash flow right and control right of state ultimate controller is higher than management controller or management-controled-company as ultimate controller. Compared to the state controllers, management controllers or management-controlled-company controllers tend to keep the company under their control through longer control chain(namely more control level) As for the number of control chain, the post MBO companies which were controlled by ultimate controller via a single chain are more common. Under multi-control chain circumstance, compared to the management controller or management-controlled-company controller, most of the state controller tends to employ shorter control chain and less number of chains to realize their control on the post MBO companies.
In China's transition economic period, to transfer the ultimate control to the incumbent management or management-controlled-company by means of MBO will help to realize the performance of post MBO companies to ascend effectively. There exists a U nonlinear relationship between ultimate control and corporate performance of post MBO. The control of untimate controller of the post MBO companies has two different effects-the intrenchment defensive effect and benefit convergent effect. The divergence degree of ultimate control from cash flow right has a significant negative correlation with the performance, that is, the higher the divergence the worse the performance post MBO, and the cash flow right of ultimate controller is positively correlated with the company's financial performance. The results show that improvement of the cash flow right of the ultimate controller after MBO will help to improve the performance of the company, cash flow right has "convergent effect". Width of the control chain in pyramid structure has significant negative influence on post MBO performance, and the width of control chain has strong adjustment function on the negative relationship between finicial performance and the levels of control chain. Therefore, the pyramid structure negatively affects the post MBO performance. The managerial ownership has a significantly positive linear correlation on the post MBO financial performance.
The board scale of directors of the post MBO listed companies has a trend of decline, the management structure, that is, the position of chairman of the board and general manager are taken by different people, the proportion is mor than75%. The post MBO companies has serious insider control phenomenon, most MBO companis has director-to-company interlocks, but this ratio is below the national average. If the position of chairman of the board and general manager are taken by the same person, the performance after buyout will be worse, otherwise the performance improved. The higher the insider control degree, the worse post MBO performance. The companys' post MBO performance will be improved with the ownership of board increased. The increasing frequency of board meeting is of signigicant and positive effect on the companys'post MBO performance. The quantity of director-to-company interlocks has significant positive correlation with post MBO performance, our finding has proved the resources dependence theory under transition circumstance, The size of the board significant nonlinear related with the market performance Tobin's Q.
总体上看,我国上市公司MBO的发展分为初步探索阶段、曲折发展阶段和规范发展阶段。实施管理层收购的上市公司大部分集中于传统成熟产业中的中小型企业,开始出现针对高科技行业和服务行业上市公司进行的MBO。
对公司管理层收购前两年和前一年的特征进行分析后发现,实施管理层收购前上市公司特征发生了变化。实施管理层收购前两年管理层收购样本公司与配对样本公司之间不存在特征上的显著性差异；但是在实施管理层收购前一年,较之配对样本公司,实施管理层收购上市公司在市盈率和流动比率上存在显著性差异,实施管理层收购上市公司在管理层收购实施前存在价值低估现象,未来具有较好的市场盈利能力和较高的资产变现能力。
对我国上市公司管理层收购实施倾向的分析发现,不同终极控制人性质对管理层收购实施倾向具有不同影响,较之社会法人终极控制人,国家终极控制人更倾向于实施管理层收购；针对国有上市公司的研究发现,较之中央政府控制人,地方政府终极控制人更倾向于实施管理层收购：管理层收购前核心管理层在公司的任职时间越长越倾向于实施管理层收购；董事长或总经理为公司创始人时实施管理层收购的可能性就越大；公司的流动比率越高越可能实施管理层收购。
对管理层收购绩效的研究发现,MBO公司绩效显著高于配对样本公司,同时对MBO前后公司绩效的对比发现管理层收购带来了上市公司绩效的提高。
从终极控制视角对我国上市公司管理层收购后的特征进行分析后发现,我国上市公司实施管理层收购后终极控制权转移程度表现为三种类型：终极控制权转移、终极控制权未转移、分散持股。管理层收购后公司控制权转移即以管理层或由其控制的公司作为终极控制人占了较大比例。管理层收购后终极控制人采用实体控股公司和壳控股公司两种控制形式构建金字塔结构实现对上市公司的控制,采用实体控股公司控制形式占总样本的比例高于壳控股公司；实施管理层收购后上市公司存在终极控制人现金流权与控制权的分离现象,终极控制人往往通过金字塔结构控制上市公司。国家作为终极控制人的两权分离度大于管理层或管理层控制的公司为终极控制人的公司。管理层或管理层控制的公司作为终极控制人比国家作为终极控制人时倾向于通过更长的控制链(即更多的控制层级)控制上市公司；在控制链条数量上,终极控制人通过单一控制链条对上市公司形成控制的情况比较常见；在多条控制链情况下,较之终极控制人为管理层和管理层控制的公司,大多数的国家终极控制人往往通过较短的控制链条和较少的控制链数量实现对实施管理层收购后上市公司的控制。
在中国目前转轨经济时期通过管理层收购这种方式将终极控制权全部转移到管理层或管理层控制的公司时能够实现公司绩效的有效提升；终极控制人控制权与公司绩效之间存在倒U型非线性关系；管理层收购后终极控制股东的控制存在堑壕防御效应和利益趋同效应,公司终极控制人的两权分离度与公司绩效之间显著负相关,MBO后两权分离度越高公司绩效越差,实施MBO后终极控制股东控制存在“堑壕防御效应”；而终极控制人现金流权与公司财务绩效显著正相关,表明MBO后终极控制人现金流权的提高有助于公司绩效的提升,现金流权的提高具有“利益趋同效应”；金字塔结构控制链宽度对实施管理层收购后上市公司绩效产生显著负向影响,同时控制链宽度对控制链层级与公司绩效ROE之间的负向关系产生了显著加强的调节作用,因此,管理层收购后公司金字塔结构的构建对公司MBO后绩效产生了负向影响；管理层持股比例与公司财务绩效ROE之间存在显著正向线性相关关系。
实施MBO后上市公司董事会规模呈下降态势；各年度两职分任所占比例大于75%,两职分任公司中董事长和总经理职务大部分由当时属于实施管理层收购团队中的核心成员担任；公司存在内部人控制现象,且呈现逐步上升趋势；实施管理层收购后大部分样本公司拥有连锁董事,但是这一比例低于全国平均水平。对管理层收购后公司董事会特征与公司绩效关系的研究发现,实施管理层收购后,上市公司两职兼任与公司财务绩效ROE和公司市场绩效Tobin's Q之间具有显著的负相关关系,董事长与总经理两职兼任时公司绩效低于两职分任时的公司绩效；董事会规模与公司市场绩效Tobin's Q之间存在U型的非线性相关关系,需要确定一个合理的董事会规模；内部人控制度与ROA、ROE和Tobin's Q之间具有显著的负相关关系,内部人控制度越强,公司绩效越差；董事会持股比例与Tobin's Q之间具有显著的正相关关系,管理层收购后公司董事会持股比例的提高有助于公司绩效提升。董事会会议频率与公司绩效ROE显著正相关,管理层收购后为了降低内部控制对公司绩效产生的负面影响,增强董事会行为强度不失为一个可行的选择。连锁董事与ROE显著正相关,支持了资源依赖理论,管理层收购后,公司凭借连锁董事网络建立起与外界的联系最终能够带来公司绩效的提升。
Based on the collections of Chinese MBO of listed company occurred from1997onwards, this study empirically test and investigate the distinguishing pre-existing characteristics of Chinese listed firms engaging in MBO, the MBO tendency, and the impact of MBO on the performance of the company.
On the whole, the development of Chinese MBO of listed companies can be divided into three stages:the initial stage of exploration, the stage of tortuous development and the stage of regulation. Most of the MBOs of listed companies are small and medium-sized enterprises in traditional mature industries, MBO in the high tech industry and service industry of listed companies started to appear.
By investigating and identifying the pre-existing characteristics of the companies for the two year and one year preceding the year in which the firm achieved the MBO, we found that the characteristics of the firms have changed. Namely, compared to matched samples, the characteristics of the firms engaged in MBO didn't have significant difference two year before they achieve the MBO, but one year preceding MBO there are significant differences on price earning ratio and current ratio. There exists value underestimation phenomenon one year before the firm achieved MBO, and the firms have better market profitability and higher financial liquidity can be used in the future. The longer the time of core management member be in office before MBO, the higher the probability that the firm will undergo MBO. Firms which the chairman of the board of directors or general manager is the founder of the company have higher probability to perform MBO. The higher the current ratio of the company the higher the probability undergoing MBO.
Companys'financial and market performance post MBO is significantly higher than matching samples, at the same time the comparison of management buy-out performance between pre and post MBO found that the performance of listed corporations has been improved after management buy-out.
The characteristic analysis based on the perspective of ultimate control of post MBO listed companies in China found that, there are three types of ultimate control transfer of MBO companies:the ultimate control transfered, ultimate control unchanged and scattered ownership.
The ultimate controller employed entities and shell holding company to form pyramidal structure to realize their control on the post MBO listed companies, the proportion of entity holding company is higher than that of shell holding company. There exists the divergence between cash flow right ans the ultimate control right in post MBO firms. The ultimate controller usually keeps the listed companies under control through the pyramidl structure. The separation degree between cash flow right and control right of state ultimate controller is higher than management controller or management-controled-company as ultimate controller. Compared to the state controllers, management controllers or management-controlled-company controllers tend to keep the company under their control through longer control chain(namely more control level) As for the number of control chain, the post MBO companies which were controlled by ultimate controller via a single chain are more common. Under multi-control chain circumstance, compared to the management controller or management-controlled-company controller, most of the state controller tends to employ shorter control chain and less number of chains to realize their control on the post MBO companies.
In China's transition economic period, to transfer the ultimate control to the incumbent management or management-controlled-company by means of MBO will help to realize the performance of post MBO companies to ascend effectively. There exists a U nonlinear relationship between ultimate control and corporate performance of post MBO. The control of untimate controller of the post MBO companies has two different effects-the intrenchment defensive effect and benefit convergent effect. The divergence degree of ultimate control from cash flow right has a significant negative correlation with the performance, that is, the higher the divergence the worse the performance post MBO, and the cash flow right of ultimate controller is positively correlated with the company's financial performance. The results show that improvement of the cash flow right of the ultimate controller after MBO will help to improve the performance of the company, cash flow right has "convergent effect". Width of the control chain in pyramid structure has significant negative influence on post MBO performance, and the width of control chain has strong adjustment function on the negative relationship between finicial performance and the levels of control chain. Therefore, the pyramid structure negatively affects the post MBO performance. The managerial ownership has a significantly positive linear correlation on the post MBO financial performance.
The board scale of directors of the post MBO listed companies has a trend of decline, the management structure, that is, the position of chairman of the board and general manager are taken by different people, the proportion is mor than75%. The post MBO companies has serious insider control phenomenon, most MBO companis has director-to-company interlocks, but this ratio is below the national average. If the position of chairman of the board and general manager are taken by the same person, the performance after buyout will be worse, otherwise the performance improved. The higher the insider control degree, the worse post MBO performance. The companys' post MBO performance will be improved with the ownership of board increased. The increasing frequency of board meeting is of signigicant and positive effect on the companys'post MBO performance. The quantity of director-to-company interlocks has significant positive correlation with post MBO performance, our finding has proved the resources dependence theory under transition circumstance, The size of the board significant nonlinear related with the market performance Tobin's Q.
引文
①张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革[M].北京：北京大学出版社,1999.
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