我国企业管理层收购定价研究
摘要
管理层收购(Management Buy-Outs,简称MBO),是指目标企业的管理层利用自有或借贷所融资本购买本企业的股份,从而改变企业所有权、控制权和资产结构,进而达到重组企业并获得预期收益目的的收购行为。由于其在激励经营者、提高内部人积极性、降低代理成本、改善企业经营状况等方面的积极作用,得到了广泛的应用。在我国,随着改革的深入,管理层收购已经成为国有企业改制的主要模式之一。与此同时,由于各种原因,管理层收购也带来了诸如暗箱操作、定价过低和国有资产流失等各种各样的问题,引发了关于管理层收购的广泛关注和争论。其中,管理层收购的定价问题是我国实施管理层收购的核心和焦点问题。
本文以企业管理层收购定价作为研究主题,针对传统企业价值评估理论和定价方法的不足,以实物期权理论、博弈论、期权博弈理论以及传统资本预算理论为主要理论基础和研究工具,通过理论分析、实践论证和模型研究等,对管理层收购的定价,包括目标企业价值评估、相关因素的界定及合理量化、产权交易模式的选择等进行全面的、系统的深入研究,提出了适合我国当前国情的管理层收购定价的“三段式”定价方法和综合定价模型,建立起适合我国当前管理层收购的科学合理的定价理论和方法体系,为当前我国正在广为进行的管理层收购的实践提供指导,为相关决策机构提供参考,规范管理层收购的发展,推动国有企业的改革改制。
管理层收购定价是指管理层收购中拟转让目标企业产权价格确定的过程,目标企业产权的价值直接取决于目标企业价值。因此,目标企业价值是管理层收购定价的基础,准确判断和衡量目标企业的价值是管理层收购定价过程的第一步。由于我国特别的市场环境和经济背景,我国当前的管理层收购具有特殊内涵,这些中国特色因素和内涵,已经成为制约管理层收购定价甚至决定管理层收购能否成功实施的重要因素。因此,科学合理地界定和量化企业家人力资本补偿和激励、企业职工人力资本的补偿、控制权价格等相关特殊因素的影响是管理层收购定价的必要步骤。管理层收购最终交易价格确定是通过不同的产权交易方式来实现的,产权交易方式不同,管理层收购最终交易价格的形成途径、数额大小、定价的效率和效果不同。因此,选择科学合理且适合当前实际情况、公开透明的交易模式对于管理层收购定价的公平、公正合理是必不可少的程序和步骤。
基于以上分析,论文将管理层收购定价过程分为三个主要步骤加以研究:企业价值评估、特殊因素的确定和量化与交易模式的选择,分别对应着管理层收购定价的企业评估价值确定、基础价格确定与交易价格确定。其中,企业价值评估是企业价值的判断过程,是管理层收购定价的基础和基本依据,是管理层收购定价的第一阶段;基础价格的确定是当前管理层收购需考虑的特殊因素的确定及其量化的过程,是交易双方谈判或竞价的一个基本底线和一个比较公平的价格基础,是管理层收购定价的第二阶段;而交易价格的确定是一个交易模式的选择确定过程,是管理层收购最终交易价格的确定和实现的过程,是管理层收购定价的第三阶段。论文通过理论分析、实证研究和模型研究等,建立了适合我国当前国情的“三段”式的管理层收购定价方法,内容包括:基于实物期权和期权博弈的目标企业价值评估体系、充分考虑我国当前国情“特色”因素的管理层收购基础价格确定模型和以公开招标竞价为主、协商议价为辅的产权交易模式。
基于实物期权和期权博弈的目标企业价值评估体系。此为论文第三章和第四章的研究内容。传统的企业价值评估方法不能准确衡量企业的价值,同时,管理层收购作为企业战略并购的一种特殊方式,具有一定的期权特征。因此,论文提出了基于实物期权方法的管理层收购中目标企业价值评估的理论模型和整体思路框架:从交易双方的角度分别对目标企业的自身价值和投资价值进行评估,目标企业的自身价值由目标企业的现实资产价值和期权价值构成,目标企业的投资价值由目标企业的自身价值和由于管理层收购的实物期权特征与管理成本节约及战略整合效应而产生的收购增加价值构成。实物期权的评估方法只适用于垄断市场结构下的企业投资行为,在竞争存在的条件下,对管理层收购中的企业价值进行评估必须引入实物期权博弈的方法。根据管理层和目标企业自身资源及能力限制以及外部环境条件情况,利用实物期权博弈理论分析各种竞争条件下管理层收购的最优投资时机及对期权价值的影响,确定在不确定和竞争条件下管理层收购中目标企业自身价值和投资价值。论文以G公司作为实际案例进行了实证研究,分别以成本加和法、收益现值法、实物期权法、实物期权博弈的方法进行评估,对不同评价结果进行对比分析,结果证明,在不考虑竞争的条件下,基于实物期权的评估方法是最佳的评估理论和方法,而竞争的存在会减少实物期权的价值并影响管理层收购的投资决策,得到了和理论研究相一致的结论。
充分考虑我国当前国情“特色”因素的管理层收购基础价格确定模型。此为论文第五章的研究内容。与成熟市场经济国家不同,我国当前的管理层收购具有特殊的内涵,在定价中有三个特殊因素需要考虑:一是企业家人力资本补偿和激励,二是就业弱势群体与企业普通员工人力资本的补偿,三是控制权价值的衡量。论文研究了国有企业管理层收购定价中管理层贡献、职工安置和人力资本补偿、控制权价值量化的理论、依据及意义,提出量化模型。论文在特殊因素分析和企业价值评估的基础上,从交易双方的角度提出了充分考虑我国当前国情、考虑各种“中国特色”因素的管理层收购基础价格确定的模型。交易双方在价值评估的基础上综合考虑各相关因素后确定的基础价格构成了管理层收购最终交易价格区间,作为交易双方协商谈判和招标竞价的基本底线和合理的价格基础。论文仍以G公司案例说明管理层收购中基础价格的确定过程。
以公开招标竞价为主、协商议价为辅的产权交易模式。此为论文第六章和第七章的研究内容。管理层收购最终交易价格需要经过谈判、拍卖、招投标等产权交易方式实现。产权交易方式不同,管理层收购最终交易价格的形成途径、数额大小、定价的效率和效果不同。论文首先从博弈论的角度对当前我国管理层收购的主要定价方式协议定价进行研究,构建了动态信号传递博弈模型,从博弈论的角度解释了协议定价中国有资产流失等问题产生的原因和过程,并构建了定价监督博弈模型,得出管理层作弊成本、股东(或政府)审查成本、惩罚力度、双方收益等指标是控制管理层收购协议定价风险的关键因素。论文通过理论分析和实践研究证明,协议转让是一种低效率的交易方式。传统的交易方式无法完全满足国有企业管理层收购产权交易的全部要求。国有企业管理层收购产权交易模式的选择应在满足政府多元化国有产权转让目标、及管理层收购特别因素的情况下实现价格最大化,因此,管理层收购交易价格的确定应选择公开招标竞价为主、以协商议价为辅的交易模式:在产权交易所挂牌,公开披露国有产权转让信息,根据竞争状况确定交易方式,若通过广泛征集,最后只有企业管理层一个有意向的买方,则交易方式确定为协议转让;若有多个有意向的买方,则组织招标,若同时有两个以上的买方达到及格线,则进入公开市场拍卖阶段,价高者得。
论文最后总结前文研究,提出我国管理层收购“三段式”定价方法和综合定价模型,并针对性地提出了当前我国管理层收购定价的对策建议。论文认为建立科学合理的企业价值评估方法体系、合理确定和量化各种定价影响因素、建立以市场公开竞价为主、协议定价为辅的定价机制、建立健全事前、事后的监督控制体系、完善管理层收购定价的相关法规制度、建立健全融资体制等是规范制度我国当前管理层收购定价的有效措施。
MBO indicates members of incumbent management team acquiring significant equity as individuals with institutional support in order to control the company and obtain expected prospective return, after that the corporate equity and capital structure is changed. As an innovative enterprise M&A technique, MBO has been widely applied in western countries, since it can effectively lower agent cost of enterprises, clarify the property right of enterprise, stimulate enthusiasm of enterprise management level and internal personnel, and improve enterprise operation state. With the setting-up and perfection of the socialist market economic system in China, MBO has become one of the most important methods of state-owned enterprise reform. Meanwhile, with the implement of MBO many problems arise, such as operation in the dark, too low price and loss of station-owned assets, which has caused extensive attention and nationwide dispute. Pricing of MBO is the focus among all the problems.
This paper focuses on the pricing of MBO in current China. According to the disadvantages of traditional theory and enterprise evaluation methods, an all-around and profound study about the pricing of MBO is carried out, based on the theory of real-option, games, option games and the theory of traditional capital budget and so on. Meanwhile, an appropriate "three steps" pricing method and pricing model for the pricing of MBO is presented, which offers a rational and logical theory and method of the pricing of MBO in current China. The study gives directions for the practice of MBO in current China and submits references for the related decision institutions.
The pricing of MBO is the determining procedure of the target property right.Because the target property right rests on the value of the target enterprise, the evaluation of target enterprise is the first step of the pricing of MBO. Because of the special market and economic background, the current MBO in our country has many special meanings. MBO is not only a kind of reform, but also a kind of benefit adjustment of different levels. Pricing of MBO relates with many other factors, such as management team, employee, governments and so on. All the above-related special factors must be taken into account correctively. Final transfer price can be decided through different trade methods. As different trade methods have different procedures, efficiency and achievements, it is a very important and necessary step to choise a suitable trade method in the pricing of MBO.
According to the above analysis, the paper divides the whole pricing process into three steps, i.e., evaluation of target enterprise, confirmation of basic price for negotiation or bid and confirmation of final price for transfer, among which evaluation is the procedure for estimation of target enterprise's vale and the base for MBO pricing. Determining of basic price is the procedure of analysis and measurement of related special factors, which is the basis of negotiation or bid. Confirmation of final transfer price is a game procedure of the two sides and the final price is achieved in this step. After a large number of academic and positive studies, the paper establishes a suitable, rational and integrated "three steps" pricing model, which concludes evaluation of target enterprise based on real options and option games, determining model of basic price with consideration of all related special factors, property right trade method primarily based on public bidding and auction and secondarily based on negotiations.
Evaluation of the target enterprise based on real options and option games.Chaper three and Chapter four are about this topic.Traditional evaluation theory andmethods cannot estimate target enterprise correctly because they neglect the value offuture development opportunity and operation flexibility. There will be many realoptions coming into being with the implement of MBO. The paper puts forward anacademic model and a whole evaluation framework of target enterprises valuation inMBO based on real option and option games theory. Both self value and investmentvalue of the corporation from different angles of seller and buyer shall be evaluated,which constitute the value range of corporation. Self value includes real assets valueand its option value. Investment value includes self value, real option value and valueof management cost thrift and strategic conformity effect. Option value can becalculated by use of compound real option model. The value of management costthrift and strategic conformity effect can be calculated through the use of improveddiscounted cash current model. The valuation method based on real option theory isthe most suitable one when there is no competition. However, there are always manycompetitions in the world. The paper applies the real option games theory to the studyof evaluation of target enterprise and investment decision of MBO and brings forwardthe whole framework of target enterprise evaluation and investment decision undercompetition state. According to academic study the paper makes a real case study.The paper estimates the value of the corporate G respectively with all methods and the results prove the academic study results and shows that the evaluation method based on real options is the most reasonable one and the competition can reduce the value of real options.
Determining model of basic price with all the related special factors considered. Chaper five is about this topic. Different from other developed marketing economy countries, the current MBO in our country has many special meanings. Through academic and practical operation study, three main special factors must be taken into account in determining of basic price, i.e., compensation of management team, compensation of employee and increment and the value of control property. Compensation of management team and employee has become the most important question in MBO pricing. The paper analyses the reason of compensation of management team and employee from the history of socialist market economy system, human resource theory, incentive theory and entrepreneur theory and studies current state of compensation of management team and employee. Price of corporate control is another question which must be considered in MBO pricing. Since the controlling stockholder can get much more benefit than the ordinary stockholders and acquiring control power of the target enterprise becomes one of the most important goals of the management team, the value of corporate control shall be taken into account in MBO pricing. Therefore, the paper brings forth a determining model of basic price, which takes all the above-related special factors into account. Meanwhile, the paper shows how to make a basic price in MBO taking the corporate G as an example.
Property right trade method pimarily based on public bidding and auction and secondarily based on negotiations. Chaper six and Chapter seven are about this topic.Basic price is the basis of negotiation or bid. Final transfer price can be decided through negotiation, auction, bidding in public and so on. Different methods have different procedures, efficiency and achievements. Taking game theory as main research tool, the paper establishes a medol of dynamic game of incomplete information and makes a study of pricing negotiation, which is the most primary trade method in current China. The paper also establishes a supervision game model to find key measures to protect the benefit of stockholders. Comparing with other public methods, making a price through negotiation has much more disadvantages and all the academic and practical study shows that making price through public market is more efficient and can be easily accepted. Traditional trade methods can not satisfy all the demands of property right trade of station-owned enterprise in MBO. The choice of trade method should maximize the final trade price with the satisfaction of diversiform targets of local governments and the special factors of MBO. In courrent China, property right trade method of MBO of tation-owned enterprise should pimarily based on public bidding and auction and secondarily based on negotiations: publicise the news in proterty right exchange and invite intended investers in public at first, then,select the property right trade method according to the competition situation: if there is only one intended investers or more, a public bidding should be held and if there are two bidders or more up to grade, aution should be held and the bidder with the maximum price succeed.
At last, according to the above study, the paper brings forth a general "three steps" MBO pricing method and gives the general pricing model of MBO. The paper also represents six pieces of suggestion on the pricing of MBO, that is to select correct and suitable evaluation method, consider all the special factors comprehensively and exactly, build open marketing mechanism which primarily based on bid in public market and secondarily based on negotiations, strengthen supervision over MBO, perfect related law and rules and build more financing ways. Only under the circumstance of efficient market, can preferable system, better supervision and MBO pricing be more open, fair, just and acceptable.
本文以企业管理层收购定价作为研究主题,针对传统企业价值评估理论和定价方法的不足,以实物期权理论、博弈论、期权博弈理论以及传统资本预算理论为主要理论基础和研究工具,通过理论分析、实践论证和模型研究等,对管理层收购的定价,包括目标企业价值评估、相关因素的界定及合理量化、产权交易模式的选择等进行全面的、系统的深入研究,提出了适合我国当前国情的管理层收购定价的“三段式”定价方法和综合定价模型,建立起适合我国当前管理层收购的科学合理的定价理论和方法体系,为当前我国正在广为进行的管理层收购的实践提供指导,为相关决策机构提供参考,规范管理层收购的发展,推动国有企业的改革改制。
管理层收购定价是指管理层收购中拟转让目标企业产权价格确定的过程,目标企业产权的价值直接取决于目标企业价值。因此,目标企业价值是管理层收购定价的基础,准确判断和衡量目标企业的价值是管理层收购定价过程的第一步。由于我国特别的市场环境和经济背景,我国当前的管理层收购具有特殊内涵,这些中国特色因素和内涵,已经成为制约管理层收购定价甚至决定管理层收购能否成功实施的重要因素。因此,科学合理地界定和量化企业家人力资本补偿和激励、企业职工人力资本的补偿、控制权价格等相关特殊因素的影响是管理层收购定价的必要步骤。管理层收购最终交易价格确定是通过不同的产权交易方式来实现的,产权交易方式不同,管理层收购最终交易价格的形成途径、数额大小、定价的效率和效果不同。因此,选择科学合理且适合当前实际情况、公开透明的交易模式对于管理层收购定价的公平、公正合理是必不可少的程序和步骤。
基于以上分析,论文将管理层收购定价过程分为三个主要步骤加以研究:企业价值评估、特殊因素的确定和量化与交易模式的选择,分别对应着管理层收购定价的企业评估价值确定、基础价格确定与交易价格确定。其中,企业价值评估是企业价值的判断过程,是管理层收购定价的基础和基本依据,是管理层收购定价的第一阶段;基础价格的确定是当前管理层收购需考虑的特殊因素的确定及其量化的过程,是交易双方谈判或竞价的一个基本底线和一个比较公平的价格基础,是管理层收购定价的第二阶段;而交易价格的确定是一个交易模式的选择确定过程,是管理层收购最终交易价格的确定和实现的过程,是管理层收购定价的第三阶段。论文通过理论分析、实证研究和模型研究等,建立了适合我国当前国情的“三段”式的管理层收购定价方法,内容包括:基于实物期权和期权博弈的目标企业价值评估体系、充分考虑我国当前国情“特色”因素的管理层收购基础价格确定模型和以公开招标竞价为主、协商议价为辅的产权交易模式。
基于实物期权和期权博弈的目标企业价值评估体系。此为论文第三章和第四章的研究内容。传统的企业价值评估方法不能准确衡量企业的价值,同时,管理层收购作为企业战略并购的一种特殊方式,具有一定的期权特征。因此,论文提出了基于实物期权方法的管理层收购中目标企业价值评估的理论模型和整体思路框架:从交易双方的角度分别对目标企业的自身价值和投资价值进行评估,目标企业的自身价值由目标企业的现实资产价值和期权价值构成,目标企业的投资价值由目标企业的自身价值和由于管理层收购的实物期权特征与管理成本节约及战略整合效应而产生的收购增加价值构成。实物期权的评估方法只适用于垄断市场结构下的企业投资行为,在竞争存在的条件下,对管理层收购中的企业价值进行评估必须引入实物期权博弈的方法。根据管理层和目标企业自身资源及能力限制以及外部环境条件情况,利用实物期权博弈理论分析各种竞争条件下管理层收购的最优投资时机及对期权价值的影响,确定在不确定和竞争条件下管理层收购中目标企业自身价值和投资价值。论文以G公司作为实际案例进行了实证研究,分别以成本加和法、收益现值法、实物期权法、实物期权博弈的方法进行评估,对不同评价结果进行对比分析,结果证明,在不考虑竞争的条件下,基于实物期权的评估方法是最佳的评估理论和方法,而竞争的存在会减少实物期权的价值并影响管理层收购的投资决策,得到了和理论研究相一致的结论。
充分考虑我国当前国情“特色”因素的管理层收购基础价格确定模型。此为论文第五章的研究内容。与成熟市场经济国家不同,我国当前的管理层收购具有特殊的内涵,在定价中有三个特殊因素需要考虑:一是企业家人力资本补偿和激励,二是就业弱势群体与企业普通员工人力资本的补偿,三是控制权价值的衡量。论文研究了国有企业管理层收购定价中管理层贡献、职工安置和人力资本补偿、控制权价值量化的理论、依据及意义,提出量化模型。论文在特殊因素分析和企业价值评估的基础上,从交易双方的角度提出了充分考虑我国当前国情、考虑各种“中国特色”因素的管理层收购基础价格确定的模型。交易双方在价值评估的基础上综合考虑各相关因素后确定的基础价格构成了管理层收购最终交易价格区间,作为交易双方协商谈判和招标竞价的基本底线和合理的价格基础。论文仍以G公司案例说明管理层收购中基础价格的确定过程。
以公开招标竞价为主、协商议价为辅的产权交易模式。此为论文第六章和第七章的研究内容。管理层收购最终交易价格需要经过谈判、拍卖、招投标等产权交易方式实现。产权交易方式不同,管理层收购最终交易价格的形成途径、数额大小、定价的效率和效果不同。论文首先从博弈论的角度对当前我国管理层收购的主要定价方式协议定价进行研究,构建了动态信号传递博弈模型,从博弈论的角度解释了协议定价中国有资产流失等问题产生的原因和过程,并构建了定价监督博弈模型,得出管理层作弊成本、股东(或政府)审查成本、惩罚力度、双方收益等指标是控制管理层收购协议定价风险的关键因素。论文通过理论分析和实践研究证明,协议转让是一种低效率的交易方式。传统的交易方式无法完全满足国有企业管理层收购产权交易的全部要求。国有企业管理层收购产权交易模式的选择应在满足政府多元化国有产权转让目标、及管理层收购特别因素的情况下实现价格最大化,因此,管理层收购交易价格的确定应选择公开招标竞价为主、以协商议价为辅的交易模式:在产权交易所挂牌,公开披露国有产权转让信息,根据竞争状况确定交易方式,若通过广泛征集,最后只有企业管理层一个有意向的买方,则交易方式确定为协议转让;若有多个有意向的买方,则组织招标,若同时有两个以上的买方达到及格线,则进入公开市场拍卖阶段,价高者得。
论文最后总结前文研究,提出我国管理层收购“三段式”定价方法和综合定价模型,并针对性地提出了当前我国管理层收购定价的对策建议。论文认为建立科学合理的企业价值评估方法体系、合理确定和量化各种定价影响因素、建立以市场公开竞价为主、协议定价为辅的定价机制、建立健全事前、事后的监督控制体系、完善管理层收购定价的相关法规制度、建立健全融资体制等是规范制度我国当前管理层收购定价的有效措施。
MBO indicates members of incumbent management team acquiring significant equity as individuals with institutional support in order to control the company and obtain expected prospective return, after that the corporate equity and capital structure is changed. As an innovative enterprise M&A technique, MBO has been widely applied in western countries, since it can effectively lower agent cost of enterprises, clarify the property right of enterprise, stimulate enthusiasm of enterprise management level and internal personnel, and improve enterprise operation state. With the setting-up and perfection of the socialist market economic system in China, MBO has become one of the most important methods of state-owned enterprise reform. Meanwhile, with the implement of MBO many problems arise, such as operation in the dark, too low price and loss of station-owned assets, which has caused extensive attention and nationwide dispute. Pricing of MBO is the focus among all the problems.
This paper focuses on the pricing of MBO in current China. According to the disadvantages of traditional theory and enterprise evaluation methods, an all-around and profound study about the pricing of MBO is carried out, based on the theory of real-option, games, option games and the theory of traditional capital budget and so on. Meanwhile, an appropriate "three steps" pricing method and pricing model for the pricing of MBO is presented, which offers a rational and logical theory and method of the pricing of MBO in current China. The study gives directions for the practice of MBO in current China and submits references for the related decision institutions.
The pricing of MBO is the determining procedure of the target property right.Because the target property right rests on the value of the target enterprise, the evaluation of target enterprise is the first step of the pricing of MBO. Because of the special market and economic background, the current MBO in our country has many special meanings. MBO is not only a kind of reform, but also a kind of benefit adjustment of different levels. Pricing of MBO relates with many other factors, such as management team, employee, governments and so on. All the above-related special factors must be taken into account correctively. Final transfer price can be decided through different trade methods. As different trade methods have different procedures, efficiency and achievements, it is a very important and necessary step to choise a suitable trade method in the pricing of MBO.
According to the above analysis, the paper divides the whole pricing process into three steps, i.e., evaluation of target enterprise, confirmation of basic price for negotiation or bid and confirmation of final price for transfer, among which evaluation is the procedure for estimation of target enterprise's vale and the base for MBO pricing. Determining of basic price is the procedure of analysis and measurement of related special factors, which is the basis of negotiation or bid. Confirmation of final transfer price is a game procedure of the two sides and the final price is achieved in this step. After a large number of academic and positive studies, the paper establishes a suitable, rational and integrated "three steps" pricing model, which concludes evaluation of target enterprise based on real options and option games, determining model of basic price with consideration of all related special factors, property right trade method primarily based on public bidding and auction and secondarily based on negotiations.
Evaluation of the target enterprise based on real options and option games.Chaper three and Chapter four are about this topic.Traditional evaluation theory andmethods cannot estimate target enterprise correctly because they neglect the value offuture development opportunity and operation flexibility. There will be many realoptions coming into being with the implement of MBO. The paper puts forward anacademic model and a whole evaluation framework of target enterprises valuation inMBO based on real option and option games theory. Both self value and investmentvalue of the corporation from different angles of seller and buyer shall be evaluated,which constitute the value range of corporation. Self value includes real assets valueand its option value. Investment value includes self value, real option value and valueof management cost thrift and strategic conformity effect. Option value can becalculated by use of compound real option model. The value of management costthrift and strategic conformity effect can be calculated through the use of improveddiscounted cash current model. The valuation method based on real option theory isthe most suitable one when there is no competition. However, there are always manycompetitions in the world. The paper applies the real option games theory to the studyof evaluation of target enterprise and investment decision of MBO and brings forwardthe whole framework of target enterprise evaluation and investment decision undercompetition state. According to academic study the paper makes a real case study.The paper estimates the value of the corporate G respectively with all methods and the results prove the academic study results and shows that the evaluation method based on real options is the most reasonable one and the competition can reduce the value of real options.
Determining model of basic price with all the related special factors considered. Chaper five is about this topic. Different from other developed marketing economy countries, the current MBO in our country has many special meanings. Through academic and practical operation study, three main special factors must be taken into account in determining of basic price, i.e., compensation of management team, compensation of employee and increment and the value of control property. Compensation of management team and employee has become the most important question in MBO pricing. The paper analyses the reason of compensation of management team and employee from the history of socialist market economy system, human resource theory, incentive theory and entrepreneur theory and studies current state of compensation of management team and employee. Price of corporate control is another question which must be considered in MBO pricing. Since the controlling stockholder can get much more benefit than the ordinary stockholders and acquiring control power of the target enterprise becomes one of the most important goals of the management team, the value of corporate control shall be taken into account in MBO pricing. Therefore, the paper brings forth a determining model of basic price, which takes all the above-related special factors into account. Meanwhile, the paper shows how to make a basic price in MBO taking the corporate G as an example.
Property right trade method pimarily based on public bidding and auction and secondarily based on negotiations. Chaper six and Chapter seven are about this topic.Basic price is the basis of negotiation or bid. Final transfer price can be decided through negotiation, auction, bidding in public and so on. Different methods have different procedures, efficiency and achievements. Taking game theory as main research tool, the paper establishes a medol of dynamic game of incomplete information and makes a study of pricing negotiation, which is the most primary trade method in current China. The paper also establishes a supervision game model to find key measures to protect the benefit of stockholders. Comparing with other public methods, making a price through negotiation has much more disadvantages and all the academic and practical study shows that making price through public market is more efficient and can be easily accepted. Traditional trade methods can not satisfy all the demands of property right trade of station-owned enterprise in MBO. The choice of trade method should maximize the final trade price with the satisfaction of diversiform targets of local governments and the special factors of MBO. In courrent China, property right trade method of MBO of tation-owned enterprise should pimarily based on public bidding and auction and secondarily based on negotiations: publicise the news in proterty right exchange and invite intended investers in public at first, then,select the property right trade method according to the competition situation: if there is only one intended investers or more, a public bidding should be held and if there are two bidders or more up to grade, aution should be held and the bidder with the maximum price succeed.
At last, according to the above study, the paper brings forth a general "three steps" MBO pricing method and gives the general pricing model of MBO. The paper also represents six pieces of suggestion on the pricing of MBO, that is to select correct and suitable evaluation method, consider all the special factors comprehensively and exactly, build open marketing mechanism which primarily based on bid in public market and secondarily based on negotiations, strengthen supervision over MBO, perfect related law and rules and build more financing ways. Only under the circumstance of efficient market, can preferable system, better supervision and MBO pricing be more open, fair, just and acceptable.
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