中国地方政府竞争失范及其治理初探
摘要
目前,中国地方政府之间的竞争在推动地方经济发展、改善地方公共基础设施、提高地方政府服务质量的同时,地方政府竞争失范及其负面影响也越发凸显,地方政府竞争失范问题亟待解决。本文以中国当前的体制改革为背景,基于中国特有的历史、经济、政治环境研究地方政府竞争的失范问题,寻找地方政府竞争失范的原因,并提出转型期背景下的地方政府竞争失范的治理对策。全文分四部分:
第一部分是对中国地方政府竞争及其失范的概念界定。
第二、三部分通过阐述、分析中国地方政府竞争失范的表现、影响和成因,全面理解地方政府竞争失范问题。地方政府间的无序竞争、过度竞争、恶性竞争都是地方政府竞争失范的典型表现,对中国的社会发展产生了一系列消极影响,其产生的原因既来自于地方政府本身,又与中国转轨时期的政治经济体制以及环境因素密切相关。
第四部分从提高地方政府能力与改善中国地方政府竞争环境两个方面提出治理地方政府竞争失范的对策思路。
After China’s reform and opening-up, the horizontal inter-governmental relationship is more and more active day by day. With the progressing of decentralized and market-oriented reform, the local governments have become increasingly unattached interests subjects. The competition among local governments which stimulated the local government's enthusiasm and creativity has received more concerns. On the initial stage of reform and opening-up, competition among local governments has played an irreplaceable and positive role in improving local economy, promoting market-oriented, enhancing effective installation and flow of resources, uplifting citizen's living standard and so on. Undoubtedly it has been the main reason that leads to China's successful economic transition.
But because of lacking corresponding system in this transformation period, the competition among local governments is becoming more fiercer, and its content and style has gradually went beyond or deviated from the scope of the functions of local governments. Nonstandard competition among local governments even produced a negative impact that counteracts the positive impact. This paper researches the problem of nonstandard competition among local governments. Through seeking the roots of nonstandard competition among local governments, it is hoped to find out countermeasures which can effectively standardize local government's competition during the transformation period. The understanding of the competition among local governments and that among regions are often confused, also local government's competitiveness and regional competitiveness are lumped together. In fact, the local government,as key subject of promoting development of the region, can only choose competitive strategy or adopt competition behavior within the framework of its function. Just because of the local governments who go beyond or deviate from its function in practice, directly participate in market competition like enterprises, or directly intervene in the local economic activity using administrative means, people confuse local government's competition with regional competition. As a matter of fact, local government’s direct involvement and intervention in the market go directly against market principles, which go against the direction of economic transition.
Local government’s irrational behavior causes damages to both public and national benefits; this is also nonstandard competition among local governments. Because of the limited rational subject identity of the local government, it is not surprising to find the emergence of Non-rational Behavior under conditions short of corresponding restraint. In addition, the performance appraisal system in China relying mainly on economic achievement, which, as an important standard for officials promotion under the unitary system, stimulates local governments’impulse of Short-term interests directly. All these play an important role for the emergence of non-rational behavior.
This paper consists four parts:
The first part clarifies the Concept of competition among local governments and nonstandard competition among local governments. The second part depicts the concrete view of nonstandard competition among local governments by elaborating on three typical government competitions, local protectionism, redundant construction, and policy competition. Through analysis of these three kinds of behavior, this paper explores the situation of nonstandard competition among local governments, which has a negative effect on public interests, national benefit and unified domestic market which is under establishment.
The third part analyses the causes of nonstandard competition among local governments from two aspects, subject and environment. From the subject perspective, inadequate local government competitiveness is the basic reason. With the progressing of decentralized and market-oriented reform, local governments have become increasingly unattached interests subjects, and their impulse on pursuing economic benefits are strengthened day by day. When it is impossible to realize the goal of local governments and those of governmental officials, behavior of violating responsibility and sacrificing public interests come out. In real practice, government's function has not yet been cleared, and the power range of local government is still very great. So it becomes possible that the local government, in the capacity of market subject, directly participates in the market. In condition of interests’conflict and multi-choices, with low public managerial ability, local governments can only compete in a simple, easy and immediate way, which makes nonstandard competition inevitable. From the environment perspective, since the reform and opening-up, evaluation system with economic development as its main standard, and no-win political competition that follows directly cause the irrational behavior among local governments. As a limited-rational entity, local government always has an impulse to expand its power. Weak competition system just offers good opportunity for the local governments’deviated behavior in the competition. In addition, with China’s broad territory, sharp regional difference, and uneven development policy taking the east superior over the west since the initial period of the opening-up, this development difference and disequilibrium are greatly expanded. Disparity of area expedites the emergence of nonstandard competition among local governments to a certain extent, too.
The forth part proposes countermeasures on adjusting nonstandard competition among local governments. Improving local government's competitive power is the key to change local government's function and refresh local government official's idea and knowledge. In improving local government's environment, revised scientific performance appraisal system and Constraint system of local government's competition behavior are needed to create a fair and harmonious environment for local government's competition.
第一部分是对中国地方政府竞争及其失范的概念界定。
第二、三部分通过阐述、分析中国地方政府竞争失范的表现、影响和成因,全面理解地方政府竞争失范问题。地方政府间的无序竞争、过度竞争、恶性竞争都是地方政府竞争失范的典型表现,对中国的社会发展产生了一系列消极影响,其产生的原因既来自于地方政府本身,又与中国转轨时期的政治经济体制以及环境因素密切相关。
第四部分从提高地方政府能力与改善中国地方政府竞争环境两个方面提出治理地方政府竞争失范的对策思路。
After China’s reform and opening-up, the horizontal inter-governmental relationship is more and more active day by day. With the progressing of decentralized and market-oriented reform, the local governments have become increasingly unattached interests subjects. The competition among local governments which stimulated the local government's enthusiasm and creativity has received more concerns. On the initial stage of reform and opening-up, competition among local governments has played an irreplaceable and positive role in improving local economy, promoting market-oriented, enhancing effective installation and flow of resources, uplifting citizen's living standard and so on. Undoubtedly it has been the main reason that leads to China's successful economic transition.
But because of lacking corresponding system in this transformation period, the competition among local governments is becoming more fiercer, and its content and style has gradually went beyond or deviated from the scope of the functions of local governments. Nonstandard competition among local governments even produced a negative impact that counteracts the positive impact. This paper researches the problem of nonstandard competition among local governments. Through seeking the roots of nonstandard competition among local governments, it is hoped to find out countermeasures which can effectively standardize local government's competition during the transformation period. The understanding of the competition among local governments and that among regions are often confused, also local government's competitiveness and regional competitiveness are lumped together. In fact, the local government,as key subject of promoting development of the region, can only choose competitive strategy or adopt competition behavior within the framework of its function. Just because of the local governments who go beyond or deviate from its function in practice, directly participate in market competition like enterprises, or directly intervene in the local economic activity using administrative means, people confuse local government's competition with regional competition. As a matter of fact, local government’s direct involvement and intervention in the market go directly against market principles, which go against the direction of economic transition.
Local government’s irrational behavior causes damages to both public and national benefits; this is also nonstandard competition among local governments. Because of the limited rational subject identity of the local government, it is not surprising to find the emergence of Non-rational Behavior under conditions short of corresponding restraint. In addition, the performance appraisal system in China relying mainly on economic achievement, which, as an important standard for officials promotion under the unitary system, stimulates local governments’impulse of Short-term interests directly. All these play an important role for the emergence of non-rational behavior.
This paper consists four parts:
The first part clarifies the Concept of competition among local governments and nonstandard competition among local governments. The second part depicts the concrete view of nonstandard competition among local governments by elaborating on three typical government competitions, local protectionism, redundant construction, and policy competition. Through analysis of these three kinds of behavior, this paper explores the situation of nonstandard competition among local governments, which has a negative effect on public interests, national benefit and unified domestic market which is under establishment.
The third part analyses the causes of nonstandard competition among local governments from two aspects, subject and environment. From the subject perspective, inadequate local government competitiveness is the basic reason. With the progressing of decentralized and market-oriented reform, local governments have become increasingly unattached interests subjects, and their impulse on pursuing economic benefits are strengthened day by day. When it is impossible to realize the goal of local governments and those of governmental officials, behavior of violating responsibility and sacrificing public interests come out. In real practice, government's function has not yet been cleared, and the power range of local government is still very great. So it becomes possible that the local government, in the capacity of market subject, directly participates in the market. In condition of interests’conflict and multi-choices, with low public managerial ability, local governments can only compete in a simple, easy and immediate way, which makes nonstandard competition inevitable. From the environment perspective, since the reform and opening-up, evaluation system with economic development as its main standard, and no-win political competition that follows directly cause the irrational behavior among local governments. As a limited-rational entity, local government always has an impulse to expand its power. Weak competition system just offers good opportunity for the local governments’deviated behavior in the competition. In addition, with China’s broad territory, sharp regional difference, and uneven development policy taking the east superior over the west since the initial period of the opening-up, this development difference and disequilibrium are greatly expanded. Disparity of area expedites the emergence of nonstandard competition among local governments to a certain extent, too.
The forth part proposes countermeasures on adjusting nonstandard competition among local governments. Improving local government's competitive power is the key to change local government's function and refresh local government official's idea and knowledge. In improving local government's environment, revised scientific performance appraisal system and Constraint system of local government's competition behavior are needed to create a fair and harmonious environment for local government's competition.
引文
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① 《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典》(第一卷),经济科学出版社 1996 年版,第 477 页。
① 银温泉、才婉如:《我国地方市场分割的成因和治理》,《经济研究》,2001 年第 6 期,第 3-12 页。
① 王勇、杨新海:《城市竞争与政府竞争》,《苏州科技学院学报(社会科学版)》,2005 年第 5 期, 第23-27 页。
② [澳]欧文·E·休斯:《公共管理导论》(第二版),彭和平、周明德、金竹青等译,中国人民大学出版社 2001 年版,第 118-122 页。
① 尹呐、祝小宁:《地方政府竞争的异质化--非理性竞争行为分析》,《电子科技大学学报(社科版)》,2007 年第 6 期,第 44-47 页。
① 蔡玉胜:《中国区域经济发展中地方政府竞争的异质性》,《学海》,2006 年第 3 期,第 20-23 页。
① 张飞、曲福田:《土地市场秩序混乱与地方政府竞争》,《社会科学》,2005 年第 5 期,第 22-23 页。
② 李一花:《“地方政府竞争”的比较分析》,《贵州财经学院学报》,2005 年第 3 期,第 10-14 页。
① 崔宏铁:《府际竞争中地方政府行为失范探因》,《重庆行政》,2006 年第 3 期,第 59-60 页。
① 宋莉莉、彭涛:《现阶段制度创新的“第一行动集团”--论在渐进的市场取向改革中地方政府的角色行为》,《理论月刊》,2001 年第 1 期,第 53-54 页。
① 宋蕾:《政府竞争力在区域经济发展中的影响》,西北大学硕士学位论文,2007 年 5 月,第 15 页。
② 刘亚平:《当代中国地方政府间竞争》,社会科学文献出版社 2007 年版,第 78-79 页。
① 唐丽萍:《我国地方政府竞争中的地方治理研究》,复旦大学博士学位论文,2007 年 4 月,第 94 页。
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① 杨飞虎:《关于规范我国地方政府竞争的政策建议》,《集团经济研究》,2006 年 4 期,第 7 页。
① 沈晓东:《城市竞争失范现象的分析与治理研究—以苏锡常地区为例》,重庆大学硕士学位论文,2006 年 4 月,第 44-45 页。
② 徐桂庭:《中国地方政府间竞争及其治理研究》,山东大学硕士学位论文,2007 年 2 月,第 31 页。
① 林尚立:《政府间合作与地方区域发展》,中国政治学在线,2006-5-16。
① 徐桂庭:《中国地方政府间竞争及其治理研究》,山东大学硕士学位论文,2007 年 2 月,第 33-34页.
① 刘汉屏、刘锡田:《地方政府竞争:分权、公共物品与制度创新》,《改革》,2003 年第 6 期,第 23-28页。
① 尹呐、祝小宁:《地方政府竞争的异质化--非理性竞争行为分析》,《电子科技大学学报(社科版)》,2007 年第 6 期,第 44-47 页。
① 杨虎涛:《政府竞争对制度变迁的影响机理研究》,武汉大学博士学位论文,2004 年 4 月,第 289-290页。
② 吴家庆:《论地方保护主义的危害及遏制》,《政治学研究》,2001 年第 1 期,第 69-73 页。
① 见《中华人民共和国宪法》1993 年修正案第七条。
② 见《中华人民共和国宪法》第一章第十五条。
③ 杨寅:《行政区域利益冲突的法律规制》,《法学评论》,2006 年第 3 期,第 46-55 页。
① 唐丽萍《:我国地方政府竞争中的地方治理研究》,复旦大学博士学位论文, 2007 年 4 月,第 123-124页。
① 康丽丽:《对地方政府间横向关系协调机制的探析》,《行政论坛》,2007 年第 5 期,第 28-30 页。
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28. 康丽丽:《对地方政府间横向关系协调机制的探析》,《行政论坛》,2007 年第 5 期。
29. 杨飞虎:《关于规范我国地方政府竞争的政策建议》,《集团经济研究》,2006 年第 4 期。
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36. 沈晓东:《城市竞争失范现象的分析与治理研究—以苏锡常地区为例》,重庆大学硕士学位论文,2006 年 4 月。
37. 徐桂庭:《中国地方政府间竞争及其治理研究》,山东大学硕士学位论文,2007 年 2 月。