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装配型供应链调度与协调研究
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摘要
信息与计算机技术的普及给市场竞争模式带来了革命性的变化,传统的以企业为单元的竞争发展为以供应链为单元的竞争模式。有效的供应链管理为现代企业带来了巨大价值,体现在运输、库存成本的大幅降低,订单处理周期的缩短,综合绩效与客户满意度的提升等方面。供应链调度是传统调度在供应链模式下的一种发展。供应链调度沿承了传统调度的理论价值和应用价值,其问题范围更加宽广,层次更加复杂,并凸显出供应链成员之间的协调及信息共享等新问题,已成为应用数学、运筹学、博弈论、信息系统乃至智能体等多领域的研究热点。本文将纳什讨价还价理论引入供应链调度领域,建立了供应链调度的讨价还价模型,旨在为各种不同背景下的供应链调度问题提供一种合理、有效、可行的协调方法。论文主要工作如下:
     1将传统调度博弈问题拓展到供应链范畴,提出了供应链调度博弈问题。探讨了供应链调度过程中的成员关系及决策冲突问题,将其归纳为一种以成员为参与人,调度方案为策略集,调度目标函数为支付的合作博弈关系。将纳什讨价还价理论引入供应链调度领域,建立了供应链调度的讨价还价模型。模型所取得调度结果的个体理性与帕累托最优性特征表明了模型的合理性。
     2以传统调度问题的三参数表达结构为基础,针对供应链调度提出了一套新型问题表达方法。新表达方法沿袭了传统车间调度问题三参数表达法的惯用记号及参数结构,并在各参数域中纳入了供应链的组成、系统约束、系统目标等内容。各个成员内部的机器类型特征、约束、局部目标也在新表达法中充分体现,并且与供应链的组成形成了明确的一一对应关系。新方法尤其适合于表达多阶段链条结构和复杂的供应网络结构。
     3选取典型的装配系统为模型的应用背景,基于对供应商参与或主导开发模式下成员关系新特征的把握,提出了一种供应商参与调度的分布式决策协调方式,并设计了此协调方式下的两类协议。分别针对每类协议,应用所建立的讨价还价模型,讨论了不同机器环境、约束及目标下的调度博弈问题。在讨价还价方式下,调度问题呈现出一种新的特点:其目标函数形式为乘积型,区别于传统问题的线性加权和型,、针对一系列调度问题,进行了启发式算法设计,如时问复杂度为O(n3)的HAPI算法等。并引入协调效率,排列逆序数等概念,为模型的协调效果评价提供了量化指标。数值实验分析结果验证了模型的有效性。
     4利用智能体技术,设计了在有限理性成员在有限信息反馈下的规范化协商过程。通过数值实验分析研究了系统收敛问题和性能问题,研究表明模型能够满足实际供应链调度的客观条件限制,与实际生产情况较为贴近,具有一定的可行性。
The developing and popular of information, computer application has brought about a revolution in the market competition mode. The competition unit has been transformed from the enterprisers to supply chains. The effective supply chain management brings about great value for the company, including the reduction of transportation and inventory cost, the lessening of the order processing cycle, the improvement of comprehensive performance, and the promotion of customer satisfaction. Supply chain scheduling can be seen as the development of the traditional scheduling in supply chains. While retaining the considerable value in theory and application, supply chain scheduling targets the optimal problems in a more wide and complicated environment compared to the traditional research. Moreover, the problems of coordination and information sharing are highlighted in the expanded research area. Nowadays, the supply chain scheduling has been considered as the focus in relative research domains such as domain applied mathematics, operation research, game theory, information system, multi-agent system etc. The bargaining theory of Nash is introduced to supply chain scheduling domain. Aiming at providing a rational, effective and feasible method for supply chain scheduling in different context, a bargaining model is built in this dissertation. The main work is as follows:
     1. The traditional scheduling game has been expanded to supply chain area, and the supply chain scheduling game problem is proposed. Based on the analysis of the member relationship and decision conflict, a cooperative game is used to demonstrate the supply chain scheduling problem. The members in the chains are considered as the players, whose strategies are the scheduling schemes. The pay off in the game is set as the objective of each member. The bargaining model of supply chain scheduling is built by introducing the Nash bargaining theory to supply chain research. The rationality of the model can be supported by the individual rationality and Pareto optimality of the solution.
     2. On the basis of the three parameters expression method in tradition scheduling theory, a new expression method has been proposed for supply chain scheduling. The new method inherits the customary sign and structure of the traditional one, however, the supply chain composition, relative constrains, system objective are involved in each parameter domain. The machine character, constrains and individual objective of each member can be also found, and form a one-to-one correspondence in the composition of the new expression. Especially, the new method can clearly express the complicated structure such as multi-stage chain and networks.
     3. The representative assembly system is selected to be the application background. Concerning the new characters of relationship between members in the context of supplier-manufacturer cooperative R&D. a supplier-manufacturer cooperative scheduling mode has been proposed to coordinate the decentralized decision. Meanwhile, two contracts are designed for the new cooperative scheduling mode. On the basis of each contract, the bargaining model is used to discuss the scheduling game concerning different machines, constrains and objectives. During the bargaining process, a novel kind of scheduling problem marked by its product form objective is displayed. The product form is distinguished from the traditional linear weighted sum form. Targeting the novel problems, the heuristics are designed to find the solution. The HAPI with O(n3) complexity is one of the example of the heuristics. Some concepts including cooperation efficiency and sequence inversions are introduced to provide the quantified index for the evaluation of the coordination result. Numerical experiments results validated the effectiveness of the model.
     4. By using the agent technology, a normalized bargaining process between players with bounded rationality and information are designed. The convergence and efficiency performance of the system are investigated by numerical experiments. The results show that the system can fit the limitation of objective conditions in actual supply chain production, which supports the feasibility of the model proposed in this dissertation.
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