现象概念与现象属性
|
摘要
本文关注的是关于意识的难问题,即,如何在自然的世界中为现象属性定位。我希望通过本文的分析讨论为属性二元论——现象属性不是物理的——辩护。达成这个目标需要两个方面的工作：一是给出支持属性二元论为真的论证并捍卫该论证,二是说明对属性二元论的其他质疑都不是致命的。
具体地,本文要使用一个新的可设想性论证支持属性二元论。这个论证的成立取决于两个关键的论题,一个是现象概念直显性,一个是模态理性主义。现象概念的直显性论题是关于现象概念的一个特征,指的是：如果我们理解了一个现象属性q的概念Q,那么我们知道属性q的实质是什么。对于现象概念的研究主要来自于物理主义者那一方,来自二元论者的系统性说明还不多。我对日常概念进行分类,把现象概念和其他不具有直显性的日常概念进行对比,得到现象概念在认知方面具独特性的结论,并且使用二维语义学的工具来进一步说明我的结论。另一个关键的论题是模态理性主义,其基本想法是在某种限制下的可设想性蕴涵可能性,经本文讨论得到的限制是,要使用直显性概念对可设想的情景进行描述,且要满足不包含逻辑矛盾这样的要求。对模态理性主义的辩护,将从我们对模态的使用和对可能世界的理解这些一般性考虑入手,此外我还回击了种种反例和反对意见。
在给出一个新的可设想性论证支持属性二元论之后,我考虑了对这个论证的种种反驳,尤其是来自于现象概念策略的反对意见,这个策略被认为是最有希望成功的捍卫物理主义的策略,我将对查莫斯的全能论证进行改进,从而全面地回击现象概念策略。
第二个方面的工作考虑的是对属性二元论的其他反对意见,主要有心智因果性难题、滑向实体二元论的质疑,以及指责属性二元论是反科学和反自然主义的立场。经过分析和讨论,这些反对意见都不是致命的,属性二元论是一个合理的解决意识问题的选项,是值得慎重对待的。
This dissertation addresses the hard problem of consciousness, which is, how to find a place for phenomenal consciousness in the natural world. The goal is to defend Property Dualism—the doctrine that the phenomenal properties are not physical. Two aspects of work are needed to be done:one is to give an argument for Property Dualism and to defend the argument, and the other is to argue that some other problems are not fatal to the acceptance of property dualism.
Specifically, I offer a new version of the conceivability argument, the soundness of which relies on two theses:the Revelation Thesis of Phenomenal Concepts (RTPC for short) and Modal Rationalism (MR for short). Revelation is a feature of phenomenal concepts, and RTPC means that if we understand a phenomenal concept Q of a phenomenal property q, then we know the essential conditions for an object to be q. It is the materialists that have the most enthusiasm for the phenomenal concepts, and yet the dualists have not developed a comprehensive framework concerning the phenomenal concepts. I will fill the gap here. By comparing phenomenal concepts with other ordinary concepts, I conclude that phenomenal concepts have a unique feature in revealing the essence of the phenomenal to us. Also I use two-dimensional semantics to illustrate my reasons for RTPC. The basic idea of MR is that conceivability under certain restrictions is a reliable guide to metaphysical possibility. I argue that the restrictions are that one should conceive using revealable concepts and the conceived scenarios cannot contain any logical contradictions. We should accept MR considering our applications of modal notions and our understanding of possible worlds. I also defend MR from some salient counterexamples and objections.
Based on RTPC and MR, I give a new version of conceivability argument for Property Dualism and defend its soundness from the objections from the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS for short), which is thought as the most promising strategy in defending materialism. I improve Chalmers' Master Argument and rebut the PCS once for all.
The second aspect of my work deals with other doubts about Property Dualism, including the problem from mental causation, the challenge from Substance Dualism and the accusation of being anti-scientific and anti-naturalism. I argue that these objections are not fatal. In a word, Property Dualism is a tenable theory.
具体地,本文要使用一个新的可设想性论证支持属性二元论。这个论证的成立取决于两个关键的论题,一个是现象概念直显性,一个是模态理性主义。现象概念的直显性论题是关于现象概念的一个特征,指的是：如果我们理解了一个现象属性q的概念Q,那么我们知道属性q的实质是什么。对于现象概念的研究主要来自于物理主义者那一方,来自二元论者的系统性说明还不多。我对日常概念进行分类,把现象概念和其他不具有直显性的日常概念进行对比,得到现象概念在认知方面具独特性的结论,并且使用二维语义学的工具来进一步说明我的结论。另一个关键的论题是模态理性主义,其基本想法是在某种限制下的可设想性蕴涵可能性,经本文讨论得到的限制是,要使用直显性概念对可设想的情景进行描述,且要满足不包含逻辑矛盾这样的要求。对模态理性主义的辩护,将从我们对模态的使用和对可能世界的理解这些一般性考虑入手,此外我还回击了种种反例和反对意见。
在给出一个新的可设想性论证支持属性二元论之后,我考虑了对这个论证的种种反驳,尤其是来自于现象概念策略的反对意见,这个策略被认为是最有希望成功的捍卫物理主义的策略,我将对查莫斯的全能论证进行改进,从而全面地回击现象概念策略。
第二个方面的工作考虑的是对属性二元论的其他反对意见,主要有心智因果性难题、滑向实体二元论的质疑,以及指责属性二元论是反科学和反自然主义的立场。经过分析和讨论,这些反对意见都不是致命的,属性二元论是一个合理的解决意识问题的选项,是值得慎重对待的。
This dissertation addresses the hard problem of consciousness, which is, how to find a place for phenomenal consciousness in the natural world. The goal is to defend Property Dualism—the doctrine that the phenomenal properties are not physical. Two aspects of work are needed to be done:one is to give an argument for Property Dualism and to defend the argument, and the other is to argue that some other problems are not fatal to the acceptance of property dualism.
Specifically, I offer a new version of the conceivability argument, the soundness of which relies on two theses:the Revelation Thesis of Phenomenal Concepts (RTPC for short) and Modal Rationalism (MR for short). Revelation is a feature of phenomenal concepts, and RTPC means that if we understand a phenomenal concept Q of a phenomenal property q, then we know the essential conditions for an object to be q. It is the materialists that have the most enthusiasm for the phenomenal concepts, and yet the dualists have not developed a comprehensive framework concerning the phenomenal concepts. I will fill the gap here. By comparing phenomenal concepts with other ordinary concepts, I conclude that phenomenal concepts have a unique feature in revealing the essence of the phenomenal to us. Also I use two-dimensional semantics to illustrate my reasons for RTPC. The basic idea of MR is that conceivability under certain restrictions is a reliable guide to metaphysical possibility. I argue that the restrictions are that one should conceive using revealable concepts and the conceived scenarios cannot contain any logical contradictions. We should accept MR considering our applications of modal notions and our understanding of possible worlds. I also defend MR from some salient counterexamples and objections.
Based on RTPC and MR, I give a new version of conceivability argument for Property Dualism and defend its soundness from the objections from the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS for short), which is thought as the most promising strategy in defending materialism. I improve Chalmers' Master Argument and rebut the PCS once for all.
The second aspect of my work deals with other doubts about Property Dualism, including the problem from mental causation, the challenge from Substance Dualism and the accusation of being anti-scientific and anti-naturalism. I argue that these objections are not fatal. In a word, Property Dualism is a tenable theory.
引文
②Nagel, T., What is it like to be a bat?, The Philosophical Review,82:435-450,1974.
①薛庆生,于布为.伤害性感受信号的传递与调制[J].国外医学(麻醉学与复苏分册)第3期,2002.
②李胜光.从伤害感受到痛觉产生过程中的皮层活动特征描述[J].中国疼痛医学杂志第2期,2010.
①对Substance Dualism的翻译,朱菁认为应该采取质料二元论的译法(2012年春季武汉大学认知科学哲学讲座),理由是“实体”(至少在中文中)有某种奇怪的本体论承诺的嫌疑,并不符合笛卡尔的本意。出于尊重学界习惯、便于承袭文献的需要,我依然沿用传统的翻译——实体二元论。②斯多佳(D.Stoljar)首次将这种策略称为现象概念策略,被学界沿用。见Stoljar, Daniel, Physicalism and phenomenal concepts, Mind and Language,20:469-494,2005.
③关于现象概念的讨论,Alter和Walter主编了一本很好的文集,其中集合了多家观点,参见T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and physicalism, Oxford University Press,2007.
④ Chalmers, D. J., Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap, in T Alter and S Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and physicalism, Oxford University Press,2007.
① Chalmers, D. J., The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief, in Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford:Oxford University Press:220-72,2003.
② Nida-Riimelin, M., Grasping Phenomenal Properties, in T. Alter and S. Walter, (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York:Oxford University Press,2006.
①参见Margolis, Eric and Laurence, Stephen, Concepts, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/concepts/, fall 2012.
①一个可供争论的论题当然是可能为真、可能为假,而非显然错误或者空洞为真的(trivially true)。
②参见Hempel, C.G., Reduction:Ontological and Linguistic Facets, in S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes, and M. White (eds.),Phibsophy, Science, and Method:Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, St. Martin's Press:179-199,1969. 以及Crane, T., Mellor, D., There is No Question of Physicalism, Mind,99:185-206,1990另外,斯多佳提出了更多类似的关于物理的定义的问题,见Stoljar, D.,Physicalism, New York:Roudedge,2010.
①Lewis, David, K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell,1986, p14.
①更形式化的依随关系的定义可见附录A。
②查莫斯使用的是逻辑依随关系,但是物理主义者一般认为物理主义只需承诺现象属性是形而上学依随于物理属性的,形而上学上的可能性来自于克里普克的讨论。下文会说明,克里普克的区分并不导致逻辑可能性和形而上学可能性的分离,逻辑可能性就等同于形而上学可能性。
① Chalmers, D. J., The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York:Oxford University Press,1996, p38.
④Jackson, F., Armchair Metaphysics, in M. Michael and John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer,1993, p28.
①详见Papineau, D.,Thinking about Consciousness, New York:Oxford University Press,2002.
① Chalmers, D. J., The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York:Oxford University Press,1996, p16.
①关于自然类词项语义学的讨论,可以参见Kripke, S. A., Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press,1980.以及Putnam, Hilary, The Meaning of Meaning, Philosophical Papers, Vol. Ⅱ:Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1975.
①参见Kaplan, D., Demonstratives, in J. Almog,J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, New York: Oxford University Press:481-563,1989.以及Kaplan, D., After thoughts, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, New York:Oxford University Press:565-614,1989.
① Kaplan, D., Dthat, in P. Cole, ed., Syntax and Semantics, New York:Academic Press,1979. 以及Kaplan, D., Demonstratives, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, New York:Oxford University Press:481-563,1989.
② Stalnaker, R., Assertion revisited:On the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics, Philosophical Studies 118:299-322,2004.
③ Chalmers, D.J., Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics, Philosophical Studies,118:153-226,2004.
①对于二维语义学的批评意见,查莫斯作了一个较好的总结,参见Chalmers, D. J., Two-Dimensional Semantics, in E. Lepore and B. Smith (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford:Oxford University Press: 575-606,2006.
① Chalmers, D. J., The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York:Oxford University Press,1996, p105.
① Descartes, R., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,3 vols., John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny, (trans.), Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1984-91, Ⅱ, plO8.
② Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, David Fate Norton and Mary j. Norton, (eds.), Oxford/New York:Oxford University Press 1739/2000, p112.
②Kripke, S. A., Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press,1980.
① Chalmers, D. J., Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?, in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2002, p193.
②查莫斯列举了认知二维语义学的应用：弗雷格内涵、窄内容、呈现模式、直陈条件句、可设想性与可能性,这些都可以通过一个维度的、基于理性的模态空间加上二维语义学得到很好的解释和说明。参见Chalmers, D. J., Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics, Philosophical Studies,118:153-226,2004.
① Yablo, S., Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts, Pacific Philosophic al Quarterly 81:98-122, 2000.
② Chalmers, D. J., Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-96, 1999, section3.3.
①叶峰.为什么相信自然主义及物理主义[J].哲学评论第10辑,2012,pp.56-57。
① Vaidya, A., Modal Rationalism and Modal Monism, Erkenntnis,68(2),2008, p197.
② Ibid.,p200.
① Jackson, F., Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32:127-36,1982.
② Levine, J., Materialism and Qualia:The Explanatory Gap, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:354-61,1983.
③ Papineau, D., What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?, Philosophia 39 (1):5-19,2011, p15.
①有哲学家出于其他理由认为并不存在值得被严肃对待的现象概念、并不存在能构成“难问题”的现象属性,比如杜普雷(John Dupre)认为现象意识的“难问题”完全是由我们对于现象意识日常谈论的模糊性造成的,这种观点类似于取消主义,将会在第5章讨论。参见Duprejohn, Hard and Easy Questions About Consciousness, in P. M. S. Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy: Essays for P.M.S. Hacker, Oxford University Press,2009.
①金在权对还原性解释有精彩的说明,他认为功能性还原(functional reduction)有三个步骤：(1)将目标功能化——假设m是被还原的属性,那么要给出如下形式的功能性定义,具有m=具有在还原始基中的某个属性p,p担负因果任务C,p就是m的“实现者(realizer)";(2)找到m的实现者——在还原始基中找到担负因果任务C的属性；(3)构造解释理论——构造一个理论解释m的实现者是如何完成因果任务C的。Kim,J., Physcialism or Something Near Enough, Princeton University Press,2005, pp101-102.
② Balog, K., Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-body Problem, Philosophical Review 108:497-528,1999.
③可参见Ludlow, Peter; Nagasawa, Yujin; Stoljar, Daniel, (eds.), There's Something about Mary:essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. Cambridge:MIT Press,2004.
④ Chalmers, D. J., The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York:Oxford University Press,1996; Chalmers, D. J., The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism, in Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press:313-337,2009.
①Perry, J., Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass:MIT Press,2001.
② Churchland, Paul M., The Rediscovery of Light Journal of Philosophy 93:211-28,1996.
③ White, S., Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise, in Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press,2006, p212.
①怀特对这个术语的使用有预设概念的表征主义之嫌疑,但是我们不必陷入这方面的争论,只需将他所谓的表征呈现模式理解为认知相关的、概念的呈现模式。
① White, S., Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise, in Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press,2006, p217.
② Block, Ned, Max Black's Objection to Mind-body identity, in Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 2:3-78,2006.
① White, S., Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise, in Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physkalism, Oxford University Press,2006, p226.
②怀特认为,对有理性的认知者持有关于后天同一的信念进行说明需要存在一系列可能世界,理由有三：一、如果没有这样的可能世界,那么相信后天同一可能为假的认知者的信念内容一定是包含了矛盾的,这个认知者就是无理性的；二、如果想赋予认知者信念以内容又不诉诸于可能世界,那么就会出现“要求3”所示的困难；三、信念的承载者(the vehide for beliefs)与信念内容的区分,即,信念的表征内容和表征他物的东西的区分,预设了信念内容需要可能世界来提供。
①Nida-Rumelin, M., Grasping Phenomenal Properties, in T. Alter and S. Walter, eds., Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York:Oxford University Press,2007, p327.
①已有的反驳意见大多数针对的是经典的可设想性论证,例如知识论证和障痹论证,而非专门针对我的论证;但是,正如上一章对比各个版本所示,我的新论证也隶属于可设想性论证且是一个改进版本,所以我在下面列出的反对意见都是同样适用于新论证的,或者略微修改表述就可以适用于新论证的,而且(如无特殊需要)我将不具体指出哪些意见原本是针对哪个版本的可设想性论证的。
②叶峰.为什么相信自然主义及物理主义[J].哲学评论第10辑,2012.类似的观点还有???提出过。
③如Perry, J., Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass:MIT Press,2001; O'Dea, J., The Indexical Nature of Sensory Concepts, Philosophical Papers 31:169-81,2002.
④如Loar, B., Phenomenal states, Philosophical Perspectives,4:81-108,1990; repr. with revisions in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Co nscious ness, Cambridge, Mass:MIT Press:597-616,1997.
①Loar, B., Phenomenal states, Philosophical Perspectives,4:81-108,1990; repr. with revisions in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass:MIT Press:597-616,1997.
① Hill, C. S., Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-body Problem, Philosophical Studies 87:61-85, 1997.以及Hill, C. S. and B. P. McLaughlin., There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:445-54,1999.
①这个说法来自于查莫斯,参见Chalmers, D.J., Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-96,1999.
① Balog, K., In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy, Philosophy and Phtnomenological Research 84(1):1-23, 2012, p9.
①拥护者包括帕皮诺、拜劳格和布洛克,等等。参见Papineau, D., Thinking about Consciousness, New York: Oxford University Press,2002; Papineau, D., Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts, in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York:Oxford University Press,2007; Balog, K., Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem, in Christopher Hill & Simone Gozzano (eds.), New Perspective on Type Identity:The Mental and the Physical, Cambridge University Press,2012; Block, Ned, Max Black's Objection to Mind-body identity, in Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics,2:3-78,2006.
② Papineau, D., Thinking about Consciousness, New York:Oxford University Press,2002, pp107-108.
① Balog, K., Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-body Problem, Philosophical Review 108:497-528,1999.
②其中,Shombie论证的目的是论证二元论为假,另两个论证的结论是物理主义为真。参见Frankish, F., The Anti-Zombie Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 57:650-666,2007; Brown, R., Deprioritizing the A Priori Arguments Against Physicalism.Journal of Consciousness Studies,17:49-69,2010; Balog, K., Illuminati, zombies and metaphysical gridlock (ms).
①斯多佳首次将这种策略称为现象概念策略(phenomenal concept strategy),被学界沿用。见于Stoljar, D., Physicalism and phenomenal concepts, in Mind and Language,20:469-494,2005.
② Loar, B.,Phenomenal states, Philosophical Perspectives,4:81-108,1990
③如Loar, B., Phenomenal states, Philosophical Perspectives,4:81-108,1990; repr. with revisions in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge, Massr:MIT Press:597-616,1997和Tye, M., A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts, Philosophy,53:91-106,2003.
④如Perry, J., Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass:MIT Press,2001和Levin, Janet, What is a Phenomenal Concept?, in T. Alter and S. Walter, eds., Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York:Oxford University Press:87-110,2007.
⑤ Aydede, M., and Giizeldere, G., Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection:An Information-Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness, Nous,39:197-255,2005.
⑥ Papineau, D., Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts, in T. Alter and S. Walter, eds., Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York:Oxford University Press,2007; Balog, K., Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem, in Christopher Hill & Simone Gozzano (eds.), New Perspective on Type Identity:The Mental and the Physical, Cambridge University Press,2012.
② Chalmers, D. J., Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap, in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and physicalism, Oxford University Press,2007, p174.
①Diaz-Leon, E., Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain The Epistemic Gap?, Mind 119 (476):933-951,2010.
②Carruthers, P. and B. Veillet., The Phenomenal Concept Strategy, Journal of Consciousness Studies 14:212-36,2007.
① Balog, K., In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy, Philosophy and Phenomenohgical Research 84(1):1-23, 2012.
①王球.现象概念与物理主义——打破二元论的谜咒[D].浙江大学博士学位论文,2011,p114。
②Evans, Gareth, The Varieties of Reference. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1982, p122.
①Dretske, F., Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA:MIT Press,1981, p45. ② Ibid.,p135.
③ Aydede, M., and Giizeldere, G., Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection:An Information-Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness, Nous,39:197-255,2005, p204.
④这也就是为什么我们只能通过表征一个三角形具体的大小、形状等等来感知地表征一个三角形,但是我们无需表征三角形任何具体的属性来概念地表征一个三角形,
⑤ Aydede, M., and Guzeldere, G., Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection:An Information-Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness, Nous,39:197-255,2005, p205.
⑥ Ibid.,p206.
① Cummins, R., Meaning and mental representation, Cambridge, Massachusetts:MIT Press,1989. 以及Cummins, R., Representations, targets and attitudes, Cambridge, Massachusetts:MIT Press,1996.
① Chalmers, D.J., The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York:Oxford University Press,1996, p268.
② Balog, K., Illuminati, Zombies and The Metaphysical Gridlock, unpublished manuscript, http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/-kbalog/Web%20Publications/ZRedux.pdf.
① Stoljar, D., Two conceptions of the physical, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62:253-81,2001.
② Flanagan, O., Consciousness Reconsidered, Cambridge, MA:MIT Press,1992.
③ Strawson, G., Red and'red'. Synthese,78:193-232,1989.
④ Russell, B., The Analysis of Matter, London:Kegan Paul,1927.
①先天物理主义者包括丹尼特、德雷斯基、刘易斯等等。参见Dennett, D., The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies,Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):322-26,1995; Dretske, F., Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,1995; Lewis, David, K., What experience teaches, Proceedings of the Russellian Society,University of Sydney, 1988.
① Dennett, D., The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):322-26,1995.
② Churchland, Paul M., The Rediscovery of Light, Journal of Philosophy 93:211-28,1996.
③ Stoljar, D., Ignorance and Imagination:The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2006.
④程炼.障痹与物理主义[A].中外人文精神研究[M],第三辑,中国大百科全书出版社,2010,P248。
①可视为这种观点的有Nagel, T., Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem, Philosophy 73:337-352, 1998.
② Chalmers, D. J., The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York:Oxford University Press,1996, pp133-134.
① Yablo, S., Mental causation, The Philosophical Review 101:245-280,1992, pp252-253. ② Ibid.,p256.
③S是自然的必然的,指的是在所有自然的可能世界中S皆成立；相应的,S是自然的可能的,指的是存在某个自然的可能世界其中S成立。w是一个自然的可能世界,说的是,w是形而上学可能的,且w具有与现实世界同样自然律。
①Yablo, S., Mental causation, The Philosophical Review 101:245-280,1992, p252.
① Lewis, D., Counterfactuals, Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1973.
②也许这并非是过度决定的唯一必要条件,但是只要心智因果性的例子违背这一个条件就不是过度决定了,所以此处无需考虑过度决定是否有其他的必要条件,更无需找到过度决定的充分条件。
③一个条件句空洞的为真,即,该条件句的前件必然为假。
④ Bennett, K., Why the exclusion problem seems intractable, and how, just maybe, to tract it, Nous 37:471-497,2003, p476.
① Bennett, K., Why the exclusion problem seems intractable, and how, just maybe, to tract it, Nous 37:471-497,2003, pp481-489.
② Bennett, K., Exclusion Again, in Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced:New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, Oxford University Press,2008, p292.
① Bennett, K., Exclusion Again, in Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced:New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, Oxford University Press,2008, p289.
①支持因果属性观的有Shoemaker, S., Causality and Properties, in Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. Dordrecht:Reidel, pp.109-35,1980; reprinted in S. Shoemaker, Identity, Cause, and Mind. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,206-33,1984; Hawthorne, J., Causal Structuralism, Philosophical Perspectives 15:361-78,2001等等。
②程炼.作为元哲学的自然主义[J].科学文化评论第9卷第1期,2012,p38。
③参见Ellis, Brian, Scientific Essentialism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,2001; Molnar, George, Powers, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2003.
④ Armstrong, David M., Four Disputes About Properties, Synthese,144:309-320,2005, p314.
③自在属性观是与因果属性观对立的,并不仅仅将属性视作某种因果效力,而是自在的、事物存在的方式。感谢程炼向我建议这种翻译：categorical properties—自在的属性。
⑥参见Armstrong, David M., Four Disputes About Properties, Synthese,144:309-320,2005; Martin, C.B., On the Need for Properties:The Road to Pythagoreanism and Back, Synthese,112:193-231,1997; Heil, J., From an Ontological Point of View. New York, Oxford University Press,2003.
① Armstrong, D., M., The Nature of Mind and Other Essays, Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press,1981, ch16, p156.
② Bird, A., Laws and Essences, Ratio 18:437-61,2005.
9 Ellis, Brain, Causal Powers and Categorical Properties, in Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers:Their Grounding and Their Manifestations, Routledge,2010.
④术语来自查莫斯,见于Chalmers, D. J., The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York: Oxford University Press,1996, p18.
① Kim,J., Mind in a Physical World:An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation, Cambridge, MA: Bradford,1998, p31.
①Kirk,R.,Zombies and Consciousness,oxford University Press,2.06以及Kirk,R,The Inconceivability of Zombies,Philosophical Studies 139(1):73-89,2008.
① Lycan, W., Is Property Dualism better off than Substance Dualism?, Philosophy Studies,2012.
② Zimmerman, D., From property dualism to substance dualism, Aristotelian Society Supplementary 84:119-150,2010; Schneider, Susan, Why property dualists must reject substance dualism, Philosophy Studies 157:61-76,2012.
① Lycan, W., Is Property Dualism better off than Substance Dualism?, Philosophy Studies,164:533-542,2013, p535.
② Ibid.,pp534-541.
①Zimmerman,D.,From property dualism to substance dualism,Aristotilian Society Suulementar 84:119-150,2010, p137.
① Zimmerman, D., From property dualism to substance dualism, Aristotelian Society Supplementary 84:119-150,2010, p137.
② Ibid.,p143.
③ Ibid., pp 144-145.
①Schneider, Susan, Why property dualists must reject substance dualism, Philosophy Studies 157:61-76,2012.
②Ibid.,p70.
①感谢程炼对此处翻译的建议。
②Schneider, Susan, Why property dualists must reject substance dualism, Philosophy Studies 157:61-76,2012, p62.
①程炼.作为元哲学的自然主义[J].科学文化评论第9卷第1期,2012,P31.
②Papineau, David, Naturalism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/, Spring 2009.
① Ross, Don, Chalmers's Naturalistic Dualism:The Irrelevance of the Mind-Body Problem to the Scientific Study of Consciousness, in Christina E. Erneling & David Mattel Johnson (eds.), The Mind as a Scientific Object:Between Brain and Culture, Oxford University Press,2005, p167.
② Ibid., p 168.
③叶峰.为什么相信自然主义及物理主义[J].哲学评论第10辑,2012,pP.2-3.
②叶峰.为什么相信自然主义及物理主义[J].哲学评论第10辑,2012,pP.8-9.
①这种分类来自于Papineau, David, "Naturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/, Spring 2009,2.2.
① Jackson, F., From Metaphysics to Ethics:A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, New York:Oxford University Press,1998, pp.4-5.
②堪培拉计划的拥护者需要具体说明什么算是关于C的日常意见,甚至会面临是否有足够的关于C的日常意见的质疑,当然这些问题都是需要堪培拉计划的拥护者进一步研究的,我暂时不能提供详细的解答,只能说,这些日常意见是与我们对概念的先天理解分不开的,在给定某个特定情境时,我们能判断该概念的指称究竟是什么,这些就部分的构成了关于该概念的日常意见。也许我们不能给出一个充分必要的对于某个概念的分析,但是也许我们并不需要这种明确表达出来的充要条件。
③这些也被刘易斯称为“摩尔事实(Moorean facts) ",参见Lewis, David, K., Naming the Colours, in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, pp.332-358.
④ Nolan D., Platitudes and Metaphysics, in Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, D Braddon-Mitchell, R Nola, eds., Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:267-300,2009, pp.267-269.
③主张这种观点的有罗斯、哈特那、帕皮诺、叶峰等。参见Ross, Don, Chalmers's Naturalistic Dualism:The Irrelevance of the Mind-Body Problem to the Scientific Study of Consciousness, in Christina E. Erneling& David Martel Johnson (eds.), The Mind as a Scientific Object:Between Brain and Culture, Oxford University Press,2005; Hartner, Daniel, F., Conceptual analysis as armchair psychology:in defense of methodological naturalism, forthcoming in Philosophical Studies; Papineau, D., Naturalism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/, Spring 2009;叶峰.为什么相信自然主义及物理主义[J].哲学评论第10辑,2012.
① Chalmers, D. J., How can we construct a science of Consciousness?, in Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences Ⅲ, Mit Press,2004.
① Ibid., p1116.
②Lycan, W., Giving Dualism its Due, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,87(4):551-563,2009, p551.
① Lycan, W., Giving Dualism its Due, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,87(4):551-563,2009, p551.
①豪甘(Horgan, Terence)提出一种基于小于世界的时空区域的依随关系,称为区域依随(regional supervenience),本文不考虑这种依随关系。参见Horgan, Terence, Supervenience and Microphysics, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,63:29-43,1982.
②参见Kim, J., Concepts of Supervenience, reprinted in Kim 1993:53-78, Kim, J., Strong'and'Global'Supervenience Revisited, reprinted in Kim 1993:79-91; Kim, J., Supervenience and Mind:Selected Philosophical Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1993.
①卡拉特斯认为具有现象意识的必要条件是拥有复杂的高阶信念和构成这些信念的概念,大多数动物和婴儿是没有的。但是格纳罗(Gennaro)认为高阶信念是有不同程度的,也许具有现象意识所需的高阶信念无需那么复杂,这意味着婴儿甚至动物也可能有现象意识。参见Carruthers, P., Phenomenal Consciousness:A Naturalistic Theory, New York:Cambridge University Press,2000, p193.以及Gennaro, R., Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation:A reply to Carruthers and Levine, in Gennaro, R. (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness:An Anthology, Amsterdam and Philadelphia:John Benjamins,2004.
② Nida-Riimelin, M., Grasping Phenomenal Properties, in T. Alter and S. Walter, eds., Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York:Oxford University Press,2007, p310.
③指杰克逊“黑白屋中的玛丽”思想实验中的玛丽。
④ Dennett, D., What RoboMary Knows, in Alter.T. and S.Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2007, p24.
①Chalmers, D.J., Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics, Philosophical Studies,118:153-226,2004, p182.
②参见附录C。
③类似的说法参见Chalmers, D. J., Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-96,1999.另外,还有一些其他的理解方式,可参见Chalmers, D.J., Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics, Philosophical Studies,118:153-226,2004.
[1]Aranyosi, Istvan, Commentary on Katalin Balog, "In defense of the phenomenal concept strategy", Consciousness Online Conference, Feb.20-March 4,2009, http://consciousnessonline.files.wordpress.com/2009/01/corrected-comment-on-balog.pdf.
[2]Armstrong, D.M., Naturalism, Materialism and First Philosophy, Philosophia,8:261-276,1978. Reprinted in The Nature of Mind and Other Essays, Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press,1981; page references are to the latter.
[3]Armstrong, David M., Four Disputes About Properties, Synthese,144:309-320,2005.
[4]Aydede, M., and Guzeldere, G., Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection:An Information-Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness, Nous,39:197-255, 2005.
[5]Aydede, Murat,The Language of Thought Hypothesis, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/language-thought/, fall 2010.
[6]Balog, K., Conceivability Arguments, PhD Dissertation, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 1998.
[7]Balog, K., Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-body Problem, Philosophical Review 108: 497-528,1999.
[8]Balog, K., Phenomenal Concepts, in Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press,2009.
[9]Balog, K., In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84(1):1-23,2012.
[10]Balog, K., Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem, in Christopher Hill & Simone Gozzano (eds.),New Perspective on Type Identity:The Mental and the Physical, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
[11]Balog, K., Illuminati, Zombies and The Metaphysical Gridlock, unpublished manuscript, http://andromedarutgers.edu/～kbalog/Web%20Publications/ZRedux.pdf.
[12]Bennett, K., Why the exclusion problem seems intractable, and how, just maybe, to tract it, Nous 37:471-497,2003.
[13]Bennett, K., Mental causation, Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337,2007.
[14]Bennett, K., Exclusion Again, in Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced:New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, Oxford University Press,2008.
[15]Bird, A., Laws and Essences, Ratio 18:437-61,2005.
[16]Blackburn, Simon, Losing Your Mind:Physics, Identity, and Folk Burglar Protection, in Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford:Oxford University Press,229-254,1991.
[17]Block, Ned, Max Black's Objection to Mind-body identity, in Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics,2:3-78,2006.
[18]Brandom, R., Reason, Expression, and the Philosophical Enterprise, in C. Ragland and S. Heidt (eds.), What Is Philosophy?, New Haven:Yale University Press,2001.
[19]Brown, R., Deprioritizing the a priori arguments against physicalism, Journal of Consciousness Studies 17:47-69,2010.
[20]Burge, Tyler, Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice, in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.). Mental Causation, Oxford:Clarendon Press,97-120,1993.
[21]Burgess, J.P, Quinus equinus ab omni naevo vindicates, in Ali A. Kazmi (ed.), Meaning and Reference, University of Calgary Press,1998.
[22]Carruthers, P. and B. Veillet., The Phenomenal Concept Strategy, Journal of Consciousness Studies 14:212-36,2007.
[23]Chalmers, D. J., Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-96,1999.
[24]Chalmers, D. J. and Jackson, F., Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation, Philosophical Review 110:315-60,2001.
[25]Chalmers, D. J., Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?, in T. Gendler andj. Hawthorne (tds.),Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford:Oxford University Press:145-200,2002.
[26]Chalmers, D. J., Consciousness and Its Place in N ature, in P. Stich and T. Warfield (eds.),T?3 e Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford:Blackwell,2001. Reprinted in D. Chalmers (ed.),The Philosophy of Mind:Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York:Oxford University Press:247-72,2002. All references are to the reprinted version.
[27]Chalmers, D. J.,The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief, in Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness:New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford:Oxford University Press:220-72,2003.
[28]Chalmers, D. J., Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics, Philosophical Studies,118:153-226, 2004.
[29]Chalmers, D. J., How can we construct a science of Consciousness?, in Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences Ⅲ, Mit Press,2004.
[30]Chalmers, D. J., The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics, in M. Garcia-Carpintero and J. Macia (eds.),Two-Dimensional Semantics:Foundations and Applications, Oxford:Oxford University Press:55-140,2006.
[31]Chalmers, D. J., Two-Dimensional Semantics, in E. Lepore and B. Smith (eds.),Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford:Oxford University Press, pp.575-606,2006.
[32]Chalmers, D. J., Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap, in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness andphysicalism, Oxford University Press,2007.
[33]Chalmers, D. J., The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism, in Brian P. McLaughlin and Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press: 313-337,2009.
[34]Chalmers, D. J., The Nature of Epistemic Space, in A. Egan and B. Weatherson (eds.),Epistemic Modality, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2011.
[35]Churchland, Paul M., The Rediscovery of Light, Journal of Philosophy 93:211-28,1996.
[36]Crane, T., Mellor, D., There is No Question of Physicalism, Mind,99:185-206,1990.
[37]Cummins, Robert and Pierre Poirier, Representation and indication, in P. Staines and P. Slezak (eds.), Representation in mind, Dordrecht, Holland:Elsevier,2004.
[38]Dennett, D., The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):322-26,1995.
[39J Dennett, D., What RoboMary Knows, in Alter,T. and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford:Oxford University Press:15-31,2007.
[40]Diaz Leon, E., Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain The Epistemic Gap?, Mind 119 (476):933-951, 2010.
[41]Dupre, John, Hard and Easy Questions About Consciousness, in P. M. S. Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock and John Hyman (eds.), Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy:Essays for P.M.S. Hacker, Oxford University Press,2009.
[42]Elder, C., An Epistemological Defence of Realism about "Necessity, Philosophical Quarterly,42(168): 317-336,1992.
[43]Ellis, Brain, Causal Powers and Categorical Properties, in Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers:Their Grounding and Their Manifestations, Routledge,2010.
[44]Gennaro, R., Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation:A reply to Carruthers and Levine, in Gennaro, R. (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness:An Anthology, Amsterdam and Philadelphia:John Benjamins,2004.
[45]Gettier,E., Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, Analysis 23,1963.
[46]Hartner, Daniel, F., Conceptual analysis as armchair psychology:in defense of methodological naturalism, forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
[47]Hempel, C.G., Reduction:Ontological and Linguistic Facets, S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes, and M. White (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Method:Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, St. Martin's Press: 179-199,1969.
[48]Hill, C. S., Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-body Problem, Philosophical Studies 87:61-85,1997.
[49]Hill, C. S. and McLaughlin, B. P., There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:445-54,1999.
[50]Horgan, Terence, Supervenience and Microphysics, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,63:29-43, 1982.
[51]Horgan, Terence, Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion, Philosophical Perspectives 11: 165-184,1997.
[52]Hawthorne, J., Causal Strnctaralism,Philosophical Perspectives 15:361-78,2001.
[53]Jackson, F., Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32:127-36,1982.
[54]Jackson, F., Armchair Metaphysics, in M. Michael and John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht:Kluwer,1993.
[55]Johnston, M., How to Speak of the Colors, Philosophical Studies,68:221-263,1992. [56] Kaplan, D., Dthat, in P. Cole, (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, New York:Academic Press,1979.
[57]Kaplan, D., Opacity, in L. Hahn and P. Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy of W.V. Quint, La Salle: Open Court:229-89,1986.
[58]Kaplan, D., Demonstratives, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, New York:Oxford University Press:481-563,1989.
[59]Kaplan, D., After thoughts, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, New York:Oxford University Press:565-614,1989.
[60]Kim,J., Concepts of Supervenience, reprinted in his Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:53-78,1984/1993.
[61]Kim,J.,'Strong and 'Global' Supervenience Revisited, reprinted in his Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press:79-91,1987/1993.
[62]Kim, J., The nonreductivist's troubles with mental causation, reprinted in his Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press:336-357,1993.
[63]Kim,J., Postscripts on mental causation, in his Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, pp.358-367,1993.
[64]Kirk, Robert, The Inaugural Address:Why There Couldn't Be Zombies, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):1-16,1999.
[65]Kirk, Robert, The Inconceivability of Zombies, Philosophical Studies.139 (l):73-89,2008. [66] Levine, J., Materialism and Qualia:The Explanatory Gap, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64: 354-361,1983.
[67]Levine, J., David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59: 464-71,1999.
[68]Levin, Janet, What is a Phenomenal Concept?, in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York: Oxford University Press:87-110,2007.
[69]Lewis, David, K., What experience teaches, Proceedings of the Russellian Society, University of Sydney,1988.
[70]Lewis, David, K., Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia?, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,73: 140-144,1995, repr. in his Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press:325-31,1999. AH references are to the reprinted version.
[71]Lewis, David, K., Naming the Colours, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,75:325-342,1997. repr. in his Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press:332-358. All references are to the reprinted version,1999.
[72]Loar, B., Phenomenal states, Philosophical Perspectives,4:81-108,1990; repr. with revisions in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass:MIT Press:597-616,1997.
[73]Lycan, W., Giving Dualism its Due, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,87(4):551-563,2009. [74] Lycan, W., Is Property Dualism better off than Substance Dualism?, Philosophy Studies,164: 533-542,2013.
[75]Margolis, Eric and Laurence, Stephen, Concepts, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/concepts/, fall 2012.
[76]Martin, C.B., On the Need for Properties:The Road to Pythagoreanism and Back, Synth ese,112: 193-231,1997.
[77]Mcleod, Stephen K., Rationalism and Modal Knowledge, Critica,41(122):29-42,2009.
[78]Miscevic, N., Explaining Modal Intuition, Acta Analytica,18 (30-31):5-41,2003.
[79]Miscevic, N., The Explainabiliry of Intuitions, Dialectica,58 (11):43-70,2004.
[80]Nagel, T., What Is It Like To Be a Bat?, Philosophical Review 4:435-50,1974.
[81]Nagel, T., Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem, Philosophy 73:337-352,1998.
[82]Nida-Rumelin, M., Grasping Phenomenal Properties, in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York: Oxford University Press,2007.
[83]Nolan D., Platitudes and Metaphysics, in Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, D Braddon-Mitchell, R Nola, (eds.), Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:267-300,2009.
[84]Noordhof, Paul, Making the Change:the Functionalist's Way, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48:233-250,1997.
[85]O'Dea, J., The Indexical Nature of Sensory Concepts, Philosophical Papers 31:169-81,2002.
[86]Papineau, D., Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts, in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York: Oxford University Press,2007.
[87]Papineau, D., Naturalism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/, Spring 2009.
[88]Papineau,D., What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?, Philosophia 39 (1):5-19,2011.
[89]Pereboom, Derk and Kornblith, Hilary, The Metaphysics of Irreducibility, Philosophical Studies 63:125-145,1991.
[90]Polcyn, K., Brain Loar on Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts, Diametros,11:10-39,2007.
[91]Putnam, Hilary, The Meaning of Meaning, Philosophical Papers, Vol. Ⅱ:Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1975.
[92]Quine, W.v.O., Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Philosoph ical Review,60:20-43; reprinted in Fro m a Logical Point of View,20-46,1951.
[93]Quine, W.v.O., Three Grades of Modal Involvement, in Proceedings of the Ⅺth International Congress of Philosophy. North-Holland Publishing Co,1953. Reprinted in Quine, W.v.O., The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, Cambridge and London:Harvard University Press, revised and enlarged edition:158-177,1976.
[94]Quine, W.V.O., Reference and Modality, in Linsky 1971:139-159,1961.
[95]Ross, Don, Chalmers's Naturalistic Dualism:The Irrelevance of the Mind-Body Problem to the Scientific Study of Consciousness, in Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), The Mind as a Scientific Object:Between Brain and Culture, Oxford University Press,2005.
[96]Schneider, Susan, Why property dualists must reject substance dualism, Philosophy Studies 157: 61-76,2012.
[97]Shoemaker, S., Causality and Properties, in Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. Dordrecht: Reidel:109-35,1980; reprinted in S. Shoemaker, Identity, Cause, and Mind. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press:206-33,1984. All references are to the reprinted version.
[98]Shoemaker, S., Causal and Metaphysical Necessity, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79:59-77, 1998.
[99]Sider, T., Reductive Theories of Modality, in M. J. Loux and D. W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford. Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,2003.
[100]Siewert,Charles, Saving appearances, in Robert C. Koons and George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism, Oxford University Press,2010.
[101]Smart,J.J.C., Sensations and Brain Processes, Philosophical Review,68:141-156,1959.
[102]Stalnaker, R., Assertion, in P. Cole, (ed.), Syntax and Semantics:Pragmatics, Vol.9, New York: Academic Press,1978.
[103]Stalnaker, R., On Considering a Possible World as Actual, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (suppl. volume) 75:141-156,2001.
[104]Stalnaker, R., Conceptual Truth and Metaphysical Necessity, in Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays, Oxford University Press,2003.
[105]Stalnaker, R., Assertion revisited:On the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics, Philosophical Studies 118:299-322,2004.
[106]Stoljar, D., Two conceptions of the physical, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62: 253-81,2001.
[107]Stoljar, D., Physicalism and phenomenal concepts, in Mind and Language,20:469-494,2005.
[108]Strawson, G., Red and 'red'. Synthese,78:193-232,1989.
[109]Sturgeon, Scott, Apriorism about Modality, in Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality:
Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, Oxford University Press,2010.
[110]Tye, M., A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts, Philosophy,53:91-106,2003.
[111]Vaidya, A., Modal Rationalism and Modal Monism, Erkenntnis,68(2),2008.
[112]White, S., Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise, in Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press,2006.
[113]Yablo, S., Mental causation, The Philosophical Review 101:245-280,1992.
[114]Yablo, S., Wide Causation, in James Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 11:251-281, 1997.
[115]Yablo, S., Concepts and Consciousness, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:455-63, 1999.
[116]Yablo, S., Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81:98-122,2000.
[117]Yablo, S., Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda, in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and
Possibility, New York:Oxford University Press,2002.
[118]Zimmerman, D., From property dualism to substance dualism, Aristotelian Society Supplementary 84:119-150,2010.
[1]Alter, T. and Walter, S., Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2007.
[2]Burgess, John P.,A Subject with No Object:Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics, Oxford University Press,1997.
[3]Carruthers, P., Phenomenal Consciousness:A Naturalistic Theory, New York:Cambridge University Press,2000.
[4]Chalmers, D.J., The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York:Oxford University Press,1996.
[5]Chalmers, D.J., The Character of Consciousness, New York:Oxford University Press,2010.
[6]Cummins, R., Meaning and mental representation, Cambridge, Massachusetts:MIT Press,1989.
[7]Cummins, R., Representations, targets and attitudes, Cambridge, Massachusetts:MIT Press,1996.
[8]Descartes, R., Meditations on First Philosophy, trans, and ed. J. Cottingham, New York:Cambridge University Press,1641/1996.
[9]Descartes, R., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,3 vols.,John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny, (trans.), Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1984-91.
[10]Dretske, F., Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA:MIT Press,1981.
[11]Dretske, F., Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press,1995.
[12]Elder, C., Real Natures and Familiar Objects, MIT Press, Cam bridge, Mass,2004.
[13]Ellis, Brian, Scientific Essentialism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,2001.
[14]Evans, Gareth, The Varieties of Reference. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1982.
[15]Flanagan, O., Consciousness Reconsidered, Cambridge, MA:MIT Press,1992.
[16]Fodor,Jerry, The Language of Thought, New York:Crowell,1975.
[17]Fodor, Jerry, Concepts:Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, Oxford University Press,1998.
[18]Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J., (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2002.
[19]Heil, J., From an Ontological Point of View. New York, Oxford University Press,2003.
[20]Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, (eds.), Oxford/New York:Oxford University Press,1739/2000.
[21]Jackson, F., From Metaphysics to Ethics:A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, New York:Oxford University Press,1998.
[22]Kim, J., Supervenience and Mind:Selected Philosophical Essays, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1993.
[23]Kim.J., Mind in a Physical World:An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation, Cambridge, MA:Bradford,1998.
[24]Kim,J., Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Princeton University Press,2005.
[25]Kirk, R., Zombies and Consciousness, Oxford University Press,2006.
[26]Kripke, S. A., Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press,1980.
[27]Lewis, David, K., Counterfactuals, Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1973.
[28]Lewis, David, K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers,1986.
[29]Lewis, David K., Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1999.
[30]Linsky, Leonard (ed.), Reference and Modality, Oxford:Oxford University Press,1971.
[31]Ludlow, Peter; Nagasawa, Yujin; Stoljar, Daniel, (eds.), There's Something about Mary:essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. Cambridge:MIT Press,2004.
[32]Melia, Joseph, Modality, Acumen,2003.
[33]Mellor, D. H., The Facts of Causation, NY:Routledge,1995.
[34]Molnar, George, Powers, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2003.
[35]Papineau, D., Thinking about Consciousness, New York:Oxford University Press,2002.
[36]Perry, J., Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass:MIT Press,2001.
[37]Planringa, A., The Nature of Necessity, Oxford:Clarendon Press,1974.
[38]Russell, B., The Analysis of Matter, London:Kegan Paul,1927.
[39]Stoljar, D., Ignorance and Imagination:The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2006.
[40]Stoljar, D., Physicalism, New York:Routledge,2010.
[1]程炼.杰克逊的“知识论证”错在何处?[J].哲学研究第4期,2008.
[2]程炼.障痹与物理主义[A].中外人文精神研究[M],第三辑,中国大百科全书出版社,2010.
[3]程炼.作为元哲学的自然主义[J].科学文化评论第9卷第1期,2012.
[4]蒉益民.现象概念和物理主义[J].学术月刊第4期,2009.
[5]王球.现象概念与物理主义——打破二元论的谜咒[D].浙江大学博士学位论文,2011.
[6]叶峰.克里普克模态性的一个自然主义解释[J].哲学研究第1期,2008.
[7]叶峰.为什么相信自然主义及物理主义[J].哲学评论第10辑,2012.
①薛庆生,于布为.伤害性感受信号的传递与调制[J].国外医学(麻醉学与复苏分册)第3期,2002.
②李胜光.从伤害感受到痛觉产生过程中的皮层活动特征描述[J].中国疼痛医学杂志第2期,2010.
①对Substance Dualism的翻译,朱菁认为应该采取质料二元论的译法(2012年春季武汉大学认知科学哲学讲座),理由是“实体”(至少在中文中)有某种奇怪的本体论承诺的嫌疑,并不符合笛卡尔的本意。出于尊重学界习惯、便于承袭文献的需要,我依然沿用传统的翻译——实体二元论。②斯多佳(D.Stoljar)首次将这种策略称为现象概念策略,被学界沿用。见Stoljar, Daniel, Physicalism and phenomenal concepts, Mind and Language,20:469-494,2005.
③关于现象概念的讨论,Alter和Walter主编了一本很好的文集,其中集合了多家观点,参见T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and physicalism, Oxford University Press,2007.
④ Chalmers, D. J., Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap, in T Alter and S Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and physicalism, Oxford University Press,2007.
① Chalmers, D. J., The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief, in Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford:Oxford University Press:220-72,2003.
② Nida-Riimelin, M., Grasping Phenomenal Properties, in T. Alter and S. Walter, (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York:Oxford University Press,2006.
①参见Margolis, Eric and Laurence, Stephen, Concepts, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/concepts/, fall 2012.
①一个可供争论的论题当然是可能为真、可能为假,而非显然错误或者空洞为真的(trivially true)。
②参见Hempel, C.G., Reduction:Ontological and Linguistic Facets, in S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes, and M. White (eds.),Phibsophy, Science, and Method:Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, St. Martin's Press:179-199,1969. 以及Crane, T., Mellor, D., There is No Question of Physicalism, Mind,99:185-206,1990另外,斯多佳提出了更多类似的关于物理的定义的问题,见Stoljar, D.,Physicalism, New York:Roudedge,2010.
①Lewis, David, K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell,1986, p14.
①更形式化的依随关系的定义可见附录A。
②查莫斯使用的是逻辑依随关系,但是物理主义者一般认为物理主义只需承诺现象属性是形而上学依随于物理属性的,形而上学上的可能性来自于克里普克的讨论。下文会说明,克里普克的区分并不导致逻辑可能性和形而上学可能性的分离,逻辑可能性就等同于形而上学可能性。
① Chalmers, D. J., The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York:Oxford University Press,1996, p38.
④Jackson, F., Armchair Metaphysics, in M. Michael and John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer,1993, p28.
①详见Papineau, D.,Thinking about Consciousness, New York:Oxford University Press,2002.
① Chalmers, D. J., The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York:Oxford University Press,1996, p16.
①关于自然类词项语义学的讨论,可以参见Kripke, S. A., Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press,1980.以及Putnam, Hilary, The Meaning of Meaning, Philosophical Papers, Vol. Ⅱ:Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1975.
①参见Kaplan, D., Demonstratives, in J. Almog,J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, New York: Oxford University Press:481-563,1989.以及Kaplan, D., After thoughts, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, New York:Oxford University Press:565-614,1989.
① Kaplan, D., Dthat, in P. Cole, ed., Syntax and Semantics, New York:Academic Press,1979. 以及Kaplan, D., Demonstratives, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, New York:Oxford University Press:481-563,1989.
② Stalnaker, R., Assertion revisited:On the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics, Philosophical Studies 118:299-322,2004.
③ Chalmers, D.J., Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics, Philosophical Studies,118:153-226,2004.
①对于二维语义学的批评意见,查莫斯作了一个较好的总结,参见Chalmers, D. J., Two-Dimensional Semantics, in E. Lepore and B. Smith (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford:Oxford University Press: 575-606,2006.
① Chalmers, D. J., The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York:Oxford University Press,1996, p105.
① Descartes, R., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,3 vols., John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny, (trans.), Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1984-91, Ⅱ, plO8.
② Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, David Fate Norton and Mary j. Norton, (eds.), Oxford/New York:Oxford University Press 1739/2000, p112.
②Kripke, S. A., Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press,1980.
① Chalmers, D. J., Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?, in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2002, p193.
②查莫斯列举了认知二维语义学的应用：弗雷格内涵、窄内容、呈现模式、直陈条件句、可设想性与可能性,这些都可以通过一个维度的、基于理性的模态空间加上二维语义学得到很好的解释和说明。参见Chalmers, D. J., Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics, Philosophical Studies,118:153-226,2004.
① Yablo, S., Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts, Pacific Philosophic al Quarterly 81:98-122, 2000.
② Chalmers, D. J., Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-96, 1999, section3.3.
①叶峰.为什么相信自然主义及物理主义[J].哲学评论第10辑,2012,pp.56-57。
① Vaidya, A., Modal Rationalism and Modal Monism, Erkenntnis,68(2),2008, p197.
② Ibid.,p200.
① Jackson, F., Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32:127-36,1982.
② Levine, J., Materialism and Qualia:The Explanatory Gap, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:354-61,1983.
③ Papineau, D., What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?, Philosophia 39 (1):5-19,2011, p15.
①有哲学家出于其他理由认为并不存在值得被严肃对待的现象概念、并不存在能构成“难问题”的现象属性,比如杜普雷(John Dupre)认为现象意识的“难问题”完全是由我们对于现象意识日常谈论的模糊性造成的,这种观点类似于取消主义,将会在第5章讨论。参见Duprejohn, Hard and Easy Questions About Consciousness, in P. M. S. Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy: Essays for P.M.S. Hacker, Oxford University Press,2009.
①金在权对还原性解释有精彩的说明,他认为功能性还原(functional reduction)有三个步骤：(1)将目标功能化——假设m是被还原的属性,那么要给出如下形式的功能性定义,具有m=具有在还原始基中的某个属性p,p担负因果任务C,p就是m的“实现者(realizer)";(2)找到m的实现者——在还原始基中找到担负因果任务C的属性；(3)构造解释理论——构造一个理论解释m的实现者是如何完成因果任务C的。Kim,J., Physcialism or Something Near Enough, Princeton University Press,2005, pp101-102.
② Balog, K., Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-body Problem, Philosophical Review 108:497-528,1999.
③可参见Ludlow, Peter; Nagasawa, Yujin; Stoljar, Daniel, (eds.), There's Something about Mary:essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. Cambridge:MIT Press,2004.
④ Chalmers, D. J., The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York:Oxford University Press,1996; Chalmers, D. J., The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism, in Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press:313-337,2009.
①Perry, J., Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass:MIT Press,2001.
② Churchland, Paul M., The Rediscovery of Light Journal of Philosophy 93:211-28,1996.
③ White, S., Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise, in Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press,2006, p212.
①怀特对这个术语的使用有预设概念的表征主义之嫌疑,但是我们不必陷入这方面的争论,只需将他所谓的表征呈现模式理解为认知相关的、概念的呈现模式。
① White, S., Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise, in Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press,2006, p217.
② Block, Ned, Max Black's Objection to Mind-body identity, in Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 2:3-78,2006.
① White, S., Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise, in Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physkalism, Oxford University Press,2006, p226.
②怀特认为,对有理性的认知者持有关于后天同一的信念进行说明需要存在一系列可能世界,理由有三：一、如果没有这样的可能世界,那么相信后天同一可能为假的认知者的信念内容一定是包含了矛盾的,这个认知者就是无理性的；二、如果想赋予认知者信念以内容又不诉诸于可能世界,那么就会出现“要求3”所示的困难；三、信念的承载者(the vehide for beliefs)与信念内容的区分,即,信念的表征内容和表征他物的东西的区分,预设了信念内容需要可能世界来提供。
①Nida-Rumelin, M., Grasping Phenomenal Properties, in T. Alter and S. Walter, eds., Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York:Oxford University Press,2007, p327.
①已有的反驳意见大多数针对的是经典的可设想性论证,例如知识论证和障痹论证,而非专门针对我的论证;但是,正如上一章对比各个版本所示,我的新论证也隶属于可设想性论证且是一个改进版本,所以我在下面列出的反对意见都是同样适用于新论证的,或者略微修改表述就可以适用于新论证的,而且(如无特殊需要)我将不具体指出哪些意见原本是针对哪个版本的可设想性论证的。
②叶峰.为什么相信自然主义及物理主义[J].哲学评论第10辑,2012.类似的观点还有???提出过。
③如Perry, J., Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass:MIT Press,2001; O'Dea, J., The Indexical Nature of Sensory Concepts, Philosophical Papers 31:169-81,2002.
④如Loar, B., Phenomenal states, Philosophical Perspectives,4:81-108,1990; repr. with revisions in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Co nscious ness, Cambridge, Mass:MIT Press:597-616,1997.
①Loar, B., Phenomenal states, Philosophical Perspectives,4:81-108,1990; repr. with revisions in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass:MIT Press:597-616,1997.
① Hill, C. S., Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-body Problem, Philosophical Studies 87:61-85, 1997.以及Hill, C. S. and B. P. McLaughlin., There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:445-54,1999.
①这个说法来自于查莫斯,参见Chalmers, D.J., Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-96,1999.
① Balog, K., In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy, Philosophy and Phtnomenological Research 84(1):1-23, 2012, p9.
①拥护者包括帕皮诺、拜劳格和布洛克,等等。参见Papineau, D., Thinking about Consciousness, New York: Oxford University Press,2002; Papineau, D., Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts, in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York:Oxford University Press,2007; Balog, K., Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem, in Christopher Hill & Simone Gozzano (eds.), New Perspective on Type Identity:The Mental and the Physical, Cambridge University Press,2012; Block, Ned, Max Black's Objection to Mind-body identity, in Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics,2:3-78,2006.
② Papineau, D., Thinking about Consciousness, New York:Oxford University Press,2002, pp107-108.
① Balog, K., Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-body Problem, Philosophical Review 108:497-528,1999.
②其中,Shombie论证的目的是论证二元论为假,另两个论证的结论是物理主义为真。参见Frankish, F., The Anti-Zombie Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 57:650-666,2007; Brown, R., Deprioritizing the A Priori Arguments Against Physicalism.Journal of Consciousness Studies,17:49-69,2010; Balog, K., Illuminati, zombies and metaphysical gridlock (ms).
①斯多佳首次将这种策略称为现象概念策略(phenomenal concept strategy),被学界沿用。见于Stoljar, D., Physicalism and phenomenal concepts, in Mind and Language,20:469-494,2005.
② Loar, B.,Phenomenal states, Philosophical Perspectives,4:81-108,1990
③如Loar, B., Phenomenal states, Philosophical Perspectives,4:81-108,1990; repr. with revisions in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge, Massr:MIT Press:597-616,1997和Tye, M., A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts, Philosophy,53:91-106,2003.
④如Perry, J., Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass:MIT Press,2001和Levin, Janet, What is a Phenomenal Concept?, in T. Alter and S. Walter, eds., Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York:Oxford University Press:87-110,2007.
⑤ Aydede, M., and Giizeldere, G., Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection:An Information-Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness, Nous,39:197-255,2005.
⑥ Papineau, D., Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts, in T. Alter and S. Walter, eds., Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York:Oxford University Press,2007; Balog, K., Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem, in Christopher Hill & Simone Gozzano (eds.), New Perspective on Type Identity:The Mental and the Physical, Cambridge University Press,2012.
② Chalmers, D. J., Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap, in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and physicalism, Oxford University Press,2007, p174.
①Diaz-Leon, E., Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain The Epistemic Gap?, Mind 119 (476):933-951,2010.
②Carruthers, P. and B. Veillet., The Phenomenal Concept Strategy, Journal of Consciousness Studies 14:212-36,2007.
① Balog, K., In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy, Philosophy and Phenomenohgical Research 84(1):1-23, 2012.
①王球.现象概念与物理主义——打破二元论的谜咒[D].浙江大学博士学位论文,2011,p114。
②Evans, Gareth, The Varieties of Reference. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1982, p122.
①Dretske, F., Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA:MIT Press,1981, p45. ② Ibid.,p135.
③ Aydede, M., and Giizeldere, G., Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection:An Information-Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness, Nous,39:197-255,2005, p204.
④这也就是为什么我们只能通过表征一个三角形具体的大小、形状等等来感知地表征一个三角形,但是我们无需表征三角形任何具体的属性来概念地表征一个三角形,
⑤ Aydede, M., and Guzeldere, G., Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection:An Information-Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness, Nous,39:197-255,2005, p205.
⑥ Ibid.,p206.
① Cummins, R., Meaning and mental representation, Cambridge, Massachusetts:MIT Press,1989. 以及Cummins, R., Representations, targets and attitudes, Cambridge, Massachusetts:MIT Press,1996.
① Chalmers, D.J., The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York:Oxford University Press,1996, p268.
② Balog, K., Illuminati, Zombies and The Metaphysical Gridlock, unpublished manuscript, http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/-kbalog/Web%20Publications/ZRedux.pdf.
① Stoljar, D., Two conceptions of the physical, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62:253-81,2001.
② Flanagan, O., Consciousness Reconsidered, Cambridge, MA:MIT Press,1992.
③ Strawson, G., Red and'red'. Synthese,78:193-232,1989.
④ Russell, B., The Analysis of Matter, London:Kegan Paul,1927.
①先天物理主义者包括丹尼特、德雷斯基、刘易斯等等。参见Dennett, D., The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies,Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):322-26,1995; Dretske, F., Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,1995; Lewis, David, K., What experience teaches, Proceedings of the Russellian Society,University of Sydney, 1988.
① Dennett, D., The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):322-26,1995.
② Churchland, Paul M., The Rediscovery of Light, Journal of Philosophy 93:211-28,1996.
③ Stoljar, D., Ignorance and Imagination:The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2006.
④程炼.障痹与物理主义[A].中外人文精神研究[M],第三辑,中国大百科全书出版社,2010,P248。
①可视为这种观点的有Nagel, T., Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem, Philosophy 73:337-352, 1998.
② Chalmers, D. J., The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York:Oxford University Press,1996, pp133-134.
① Yablo, S., Mental causation, The Philosophical Review 101:245-280,1992, pp252-253. ② Ibid.,p256.
③S是自然的必然的,指的是在所有自然的可能世界中S皆成立；相应的,S是自然的可能的,指的是存在某个自然的可能世界其中S成立。w是一个自然的可能世界,说的是,w是形而上学可能的,且w具有与现实世界同样自然律。
①Yablo, S., Mental causation, The Philosophical Review 101:245-280,1992, p252.
① Lewis, D., Counterfactuals, Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1973.
②也许这并非是过度决定的唯一必要条件,但是只要心智因果性的例子违背这一个条件就不是过度决定了,所以此处无需考虑过度决定是否有其他的必要条件,更无需找到过度决定的充分条件。
③一个条件句空洞的为真,即,该条件句的前件必然为假。
④ Bennett, K., Why the exclusion problem seems intractable, and how, just maybe, to tract it, Nous 37:471-497,2003, p476.
① Bennett, K., Why the exclusion problem seems intractable, and how, just maybe, to tract it, Nous 37:471-497,2003, pp481-489.
② Bennett, K., Exclusion Again, in Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced:New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, Oxford University Press,2008, p292.
① Bennett, K., Exclusion Again, in Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced:New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, Oxford University Press,2008, p289.
①支持因果属性观的有Shoemaker, S., Causality and Properties, in Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. Dordrecht:Reidel, pp.109-35,1980; reprinted in S. Shoemaker, Identity, Cause, and Mind. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,206-33,1984; Hawthorne, J., Causal Structuralism, Philosophical Perspectives 15:361-78,2001等等。
②程炼.作为元哲学的自然主义[J].科学文化评论第9卷第1期,2012,p38。
③参见Ellis, Brian, Scientific Essentialism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,2001; Molnar, George, Powers, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2003.
④ Armstrong, David M., Four Disputes About Properties, Synthese,144:309-320,2005, p314.
③自在属性观是与因果属性观对立的,并不仅仅将属性视作某种因果效力,而是自在的、事物存在的方式。感谢程炼向我建议这种翻译：categorical properties—自在的属性。
⑥参见Armstrong, David M., Four Disputes About Properties, Synthese,144:309-320,2005; Martin, C.B., On the Need for Properties:The Road to Pythagoreanism and Back, Synthese,112:193-231,1997; Heil, J., From an Ontological Point of View. New York, Oxford University Press,2003.
① Armstrong, D., M., The Nature of Mind and Other Essays, Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press,1981, ch16, p156.
② Bird, A., Laws and Essences, Ratio 18:437-61,2005.
9 Ellis, Brain, Causal Powers and Categorical Properties, in Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers:Their Grounding and Their Manifestations, Routledge,2010.
④术语来自查莫斯,见于Chalmers, D. J., The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York: Oxford University Press,1996, p18.
① Kim,J., Mind in a Physical World:An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation, Cambridge, MA: Bradford,1998, p31.
①Kirk,R.,Zombies and Consciousness,oxford University Press,2.06以及Kirk,R,The Inconceivability of Zombies,Philosophical Studies 139(1):73-89,2008.
① Lycan, W., Is Property Dualism better off than Substance Dualism?, Philosophy Studies,2012.
② Zimmerman, D., From property dualism to substance dualism, Aristotelian Society Supplementary 84:119-150,2010; Schneider, Susan, Why property dualists must reject substance dualism, Philosophy Studies 157:61-76,2012.
① Lycan, W., Is Property Dualism better off than Substance Dualism?, Philosophy Studies,164:533-542,2013, p535.
② Ibid.,pp534-541.
①Zimmerman,D.,From property dualism to substance dualism,Aristotilian Society Suulementar 84:119-150,2010, p137.
① Zimmerman, D., From property dualism to substance dualism, Aristotelian Society Supplementary 84:119-150,2010, p137.
② Ibid.,p143.
③ Ibid., pp 144-145.
①Schneider, Susan, Why property dualists must reject substance dualism, Philosophy Studies 157:61-76,2012.
②Ibid.,p70.
①感谢程炼对此处翻译的建议。
②Schneider, Susan, Why property dualists must reject substance dualism, Philosophy Studies 157:61-76,2012, p62.
①程炼.作为元哲学的自然主义[J].科学文化评论第9卷第1期,2012,P31.
②Papineau, David, Naturalism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/, Spring 2009.
① Ross, Don, Chalmers's Naturalistic Dualism:The Irrelevance of the Mind-Body Problem to the Scientific Study of Consciousness, in Christina E. Erneling & David Mattel Johnson (eds.), The Mind as a Scientific Object:Between Brain and Culture, Oxford University Press,2005, p167.
② Ibid., p 168.
③叶峰.为什么相信自然主义及物理主义[J].哲学评论第10辑,2012,pP.2-3.
②叶峰.为什么相信自然主义及物理主义[J].哲学评论第10辑,2012,pP.8-9.
①这种分类来自于Papineau, David, "Naturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/, Spring 2009,2.2.
① Jackson, F., From Metaphysics to Ethics:A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, New York:Oxford University Press,1998, pp.4-5.
②堪培拉计划的拥护者需要具体说明什么算是关于C的日常意见,甚至会面临是否有足够的关于C的日常意见的质疑,当然这些问题都是需要堪培拉计划的拥护者进一步研究的,我暂时不能提供详细的解答,只能说,这些日常意见是与我们对概念的先天理解分不开的,在给定某个特定情境时,我们能判断该概念的指称究竟是什么,这些就部分的构成了关于该概念的日常意见。也许我们不能给出一个充分必要的对于某个概念的分析,但是也许我们并不需要这种明确表达出来的充要条件。
③这些也被刘易斯称为“摩尔事实(Moorean facts) ",参见Lewis, David, K., Naming the Colours, in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, pp.332-358.
④ Nolan D., Platitudes and Metaphysics, in Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, D Braddon-Mitchell, R Nola, eds., Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:267-300,2009, pp.267-269.
③主张这种观点的有罗斯、哈特那、帕皮诺、叶峰等。参见Ross, Don, Chalmers's Naturalistic Dualism:The Irrelevance of the Mind-Body Problem to the Scientific Study of Consciousness, in Christina E. Erneling& David Martel Johnson (eds.), The Mind as a Scientific Object:Between Brain and Culture, Oxford University Press,2005; Hartner, Daniel, F., Conceptual analysis as armchair psychology:in defense of methodological naturalism, forthcoming in Philosophical Studies; Papineau, D., Naturalism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/, Spring 2009;叶峰.为什么相信自然主义及物理主义[J].哲学评论第10辑,2012.
① Chalmers, D. J., How can we construct a science of Consciousness?, in Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences Ⅲ, Mit Press,2004.
① Ibid., p1116.
②Lycan, W., Giving Dualism its Due, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,87(4):551-563,2009, p551.
① Lycan, W., Giving Dualism its Due, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,87(4):551-563,2009, p551.
①豪甘(Horgan, Terence)提出一种基于小于世界的时空区域的依随关系,称为区域依随(regional supervenience),本文不考虑这种依随关系。参见Horgan, Terence, Supervenience and Microphysics, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,63:29-43,1982.
②参见Kim, J., Concepts of Supervenience, reprinted in Kim 1993:53-78, Kim, J., Strong'and'Global'Supervenience Revisited, reprinted in Kim 1993:79-91; Kim, J., Supervenience and Mind:Selected Philosophical Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1993.
①卡拉特斯认为具有现象意识的必要条件是拥有复杂的高阶信念和构成这些信念的概念,大多数动物和婴儿是没有的。但是格纳罗(Gennaro)认为高阶信念是有不同程度的,也许具有现象意识所需的高阶信念无需那么复杂,这意味着婴儿甚至动物也可能有现象意识。参见Carruthers, P., Phenomenal Consciousness:A Naturalistic Theory, New York:Cambridge University Press,2000, p193.以及Gennaro, R., Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation:A reply to Carruthers and Levine, in Gennaro, R. (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness:An Anthology, Amsterdam and Philadelphia:John Benjamins,2004.
② Nida-Riimelin, M., Grasping Phenomenal Properties, in T. Alter and S. Walter, eds., Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York:Oxford University Press,2007, p310.
③指杰克逊“黑白屋中的玛丽”思想实验中的玛丽。
④ Dennett, D., What RoboMary Knows, in Alter.T. and S.Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2007, p24.
①Chalmers, D.J., Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics, Philosophical Studies,118:153-226,2004, p182.
②参见附录C。
③类似的说法参见Chalmers, D. J., Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-96,1999.另外,还有一些其他的理解方式,可参见Chalmers, D.J., Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics, Philosophical Studies,118:153-226,2004.
[1]Aranyosi, Istvan, Commentary on Katalin Balog, "In defense of the phenomenal concept strategy", Consciousness Online Conference, Feb.20-March 4,2009, http://consciousnessonline.files.wordpress.com/2009/01/corrected-comment-on-balog.pdf.
[2]Armstrong, D.M., Naturalism, Materialism and First Philosophy, Philosophia,8:261-276,1978. Reprinted in The Nature of Mind and Other Essays, Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press,1981; page references are to the latter.
[3]Armstrong, David M., Four Disputes About Properties, Synthese,144:309-320,2005.
[4]Aydede, M., and Guzeldere, G., Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection:An Information-Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness, Nous,39:197-255, 2005.
[5]Aydede, Murat,The Language of Thought Hypothesis, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/language-thought/, fall 2010.
[6]Balog, K., Conceivability Arguments, PhD Dissertation, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 1998.
[7]Balog, K., Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-body Problem, Philosophical Review 108: 497-528,1999.
[8]Balog, K., Phenomenal Concepts, in Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press,2009.
[9]Balog, K., In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84(1):1-23,2012.
[10]Balog, K., Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem, in Christopher Hill & Simone Gozzano (eds.),New Perspective on Type Identity:The Mental and the Physical, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
[11]Balog, K., Illuminati, Zombies and The Metaphysical Gridlock, unpublished manuscript, http://andromedarutgers.edu/～kbalog/Web%20Publications/ZRedux.pdf.
[12]Bennett, K., Why the exclusion problem seems intractable, and how, just maybe, to tract it, Nous 37:471-497,2003.
[13]Bennett, K., Mental causation, Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337,2007.
[14]Bennett, K., Exclusion Again, in Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced:New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, Oxford University Press,2008.
[15]Bird, A., Laws and Essences, Ratio 18:437-61,2005.
[16]Blackburn, Simon, Losing Your Mind:Physics, Identity, and Folk Burglar Protection, in Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford:Oxford University Press,229-254,1991.
[17]Block, Ned, Max Black's Objection to Mind-body identity, in Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics,2:3-78,2006.
[18]Brandom, R., Reason, Expression, and the Philosophical Enterprise, in C. Ragland and S. Heidt (eds.), What Is Philosophy?, New Haven:Yale University Press,2001.
[19]Brown, R., Deprioritizing the a priori arguments against physicalism, Journal of Consciousness Studies 17:47-69,2010.
[20]Burge, Tyler, Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice, in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.). Mental Causation, Oxford:Clarendon Press,97-120,1993.
[21]Burgess, J.P, Quinus equinus ab omni naevo vindicates, in Ali A. Kazmi (ed.), Meaning and Reference, University of Calgary Press,1998.
[22]Carruthers, P. and B. Veillet., The Phenomenal Concept Strategy, Journal of Consciousness Studies 14:212-36,2007.
[23]Chalmers, D. J., Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-96,1999.
[24]Chalmers, D. J. and Jackson, F., Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation, Philosophical Review 110:315-60,2001.
[25]Chalmers, D. J., Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?, in T. Gendler andj. Hawthorne (tds.),Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford:Oxford University Press:145-200,2002.
[26]Chalmers, D. J., Consciousness and Its Place in N ature, in P. Stich and T. Warfield (eds.),T?3 e Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford:Blackwell,2001. Reprinted in D. Chalmers (ed.),The Philosophy of Mind:Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York:Oxford University Press:247-72,2002. All references are to the reprinted version.
[27]Chalmers, D. J.,The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief, in Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness:New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford:Oxford University Press:220-72,2003.
[28]Chalmers, D. J., Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics, Philosophical Studies,118:153-226, 2004.
[29]Chalmers, D. J., How can we construct a science of Consciousness?, in Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences Ⅲ, Mit Press,2004.
[30]Chalmers, D. J., The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics, in M. Garcia-Carpintero and J. Macia (eds.),Two-Dimensional Semantics:Foundations and Applications, Oxford:Oxford University Press:55-140,2006.
[31]Chalmers, D. J., Two-Dimensional Semantics, in E. Lepore and B. Smith (eds.),Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford:Oxford University Press, pp.575-606,2006.
[32]Chalmers, D. J., Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap, in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness andphysicalism, Oxford University Press,2007.
[33]Chalmers, D. J., The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism, in Brian P. McLaughlin and Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press: 313-337,2009.
[34]Chalmers, D. J., The Nature of Epistemic Space, in A. Egan and B. Weatherson (eds.),Epistemic Modality, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2011.
[35]Churchland, Paul M., The Rediscovery of Light, Journal of Philosophy 93:211-28,1996.
[36]Crane, T., Mellor, D., There is No Question of Physicalism, Mind,99:185-206,1990.
[37]Cummins, Robert and Pierre Poirier, Representation and indication, in P. Staines and P. Slezak (eds.), Representation in mind, Dordrecht, Holland:Elsevier,2004.
[38]Dennett, D., The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):322-26,1995.
[39J Dennett, D., What RoboMary Knows, in Alter,T. and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford:Oxford University Press:15-31,2007.
[40]Diaz Leon, E., Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain The Epistemic Gap?, Mind 119 (476):933-951, 2010.
[41]Dupre, John, Hard and Easy Questions About Consciousness, in P. M. S. Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock and John Hyman (eds.), Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy:Essays for P.M.S. Hacker, Oxford University Press,2009.
[42]Elder, C., An Epistemological Defence of Realism about "Necessity, Philosophical Quarterly,42(168): 317-336,1992.
[43]Ellis, Brain, Causal Powers and Categorical Properties, in Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers:Their Grounding and Their Manifestations, Routledge,2010.
[44]Gennaro, R., Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation:A reply to Carruthers and Levine, in Gennaro, R. (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness:An Anthology, Amsterdam and Philadelphia:John Benjamins,2004.
[45]Gettier,E., Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, Analysis 23,1963.
[46]Hartner, Daniel, F., Conceptual analysis as armchair psychology:in defense of methodological naturalism, forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
[47]Hempel, C.G., Reduction:Ontological and Linguistic Facets, S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes, and M. White (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Method:Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, St. Martin's Press: 179-199,1969.
[48]Hill, C. S., Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-body Problem, Philosophical Studies 87:61-85,1997.
[49]Hill, C. S. and McLaughlin, B. P., There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:445-54,1999.
[50]Horgan, Terence, Supervenience and Microphysics, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,63:29-43, 1982.
[51]Horgan, Terence, Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion, Philosophical Perspectives 11: 165-184,1997.
[52]Hawthorne, J., Causal Strnctaralism,Philosophical Perspectives 15:361-78,2001.
[53]Jackson, F., Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32:127-36,1982.
[54]Jackson, F., Armchair Metaphysics, in M. Michael and John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht:Kluwer,1993.
[55]Johnston, M., How to Speak of the Colors, Philosophical Studies,68:221-263,1992. [56] Kaplan, D., Dthat, in P. Cole, (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, New York:Academic Press,1979.
[57]Kaplan, D., Opacity, in L. Hahn and P. Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy of W.V. Quint, La Salle: Open Court:229-89,1986.
[58]Kaplan, D., Demonstratives, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, New York:Oxford University Press:481-563,1989.
[59]Kaplan, D., After thoughts, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, New York:Oxford University Press:565-614,1989.
[60]Kim,J., Concepts of Supervenience, reprinted in his Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:53-78,1984/1993.
[61]Kim,J.,'Strong and 'Global' Supervenience Revisited, reprinted in his Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press:79-91,1987/1993.
[62]Kim, J., The nonreductivist's troubles with mental causation, reprinted in his Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press:336-357,1993.
[63]Kim,J., Postscripts on mental causation, in his Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, pp.358-367,1993.
[64]Kirk, Robert, The Inaugural Address:Why There Couldn't Be Zombies, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):1-16,1999.
[65]Kirk, Robert, The Inconceivability of Zombies, Philosophical Studies.139 (l):73-89,2008. [66] Levine, J., Materialism and Qualia:The Explanatory Gap, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64: 354-361,1983.
[67]Levine, J., David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59: 464-71,1999.
[68]Levin, Janet, What is a Phenomenal Concept?, in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York: Oxford University Press:87-110,2007.
[69]Lewis, David, K., What experience teaches, Proceedings of the Russellian Society, University of Sydney,1988.
[70]Lewis, David, K., Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia?, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,73: 140-144,1995, repr. in his Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press:325-31,1999. AH references are to the reprinted version.
[71]Lewis, David, K., Naming the Colours, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,75:325-342,1997. repr. in his Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press:332-358. All references are to the reprinted version,1999.
[72]Loar, B., Phenomenal states, Philosophical Perspectives,4:81-108,1990; repr. with revisions in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass:MIT Press:597-616,1997.
[73]Lycan, W., Giving Dualism its Due, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,87(4):551-563,2009. [74] Lycan, W., Is Property Dualism better off than Substance Dualism?, Philosophy Studies,164: 533-542,2013.
[75]Margolis, Eric and Laurence, Stephen, Concepts, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/concepts/, fall 2012.
[76]Martin, C.B., On the Need for Properties:The Road to Pythagoreanism and Back, Synth ese,112: 193-231,1997.
[77]Mcleod, Stephen K., Rationalism and Modal Knowledge, Critica,41(122):29-42,2009.
[78]Miscevic, N., Explaining Modal Intuition, Acta Analytica,18 (30-31):5-41,2003.
[79]Miscevic, N., The Explainabiliry of Intuitions, Dialectica,58 (11):43-70,2004.
[80]Nagel, T., What Is It Like To Be a Bat?, Philosophical Review 4:435-50,1974.
[81]Nagel, T., Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem, Philosophy 73:337-352,1998.
[82]Nida-Rumelin, M., Grasping Phenomenal Properties, in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York: Oxford University Press,2007.
[83]Nolan D., Platitudes and Metaphysics, in Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, D Braddon-Mitchell, R Nola, (eds.), Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:267-300,2009.
[84]Noordhof, Paul, Making the Change:the Functionalist's Way, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48:233-250,1997.
[85]O'Dea, J., The Indexical Nature of Sensory Concepts, Philosophical Papers 31:169-81,2002.
[86]Papineau, D., Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts, in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York: Oxford University Press,2007.
[87]Papineau, D., Naturalism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/, Spring 2009.
[88]Papineau,D., What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?, Philosophia 39 (1):5-19,2011.
[89]Pereboom, Derk and Kornblith, Hilary, The Metaphysics of Irreducibility, Philosophical Studies 63:125-145,1991.
[90]Polcyn, K., Brain Loar on Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts, Diametros,11:10-39,2007.
[91]Putnam, Hilary, The Meaning of Meaning, Philosophical Papers, Vol. Ⅱ:Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1975.
[92]Quine, W.v.O., Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Philosoph ical Review,60:20-43; reprinted in Fro m a Logical Point of View,20-46,1951.
[93]Quine, W.v.O., Three Grades of Modal Involvement, in Proceedings of the Ⅺth International Congress of Philosophy. North-Holland Publishing Co,1953. Reprinted in Quine, W.v.O., The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, Cambridge and London:Harvard University Press, revised and enlarged edition:158-177,1976.
[94]Quine, W.V.O., Reference and Modality, in Linsky 1971:139-159,1961.
[95]Ross, Don, Chalmers's Naturalistic Dualism:The Irrelevance of the Mind-Body Problem to the Scientific Study of Consciousness, in Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), The Mind as a Scientific Object:Between Brain and Culture, Oxford University Press,2005.
[96]Schneider, Susan, Why property dualists must reject substance dualism, Philosophy Studies 157: 61-76,2012.
[97]Shoemaker, S., Causality and Properties, in Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. Dordrecht: Reidel:109-35,1980; reprinted in S. Shoemaker, Identity, Cause, and Mind. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press:206-33,1984. All references are to the reprinted version.
[98]Shoemaker, S., Causal and Metaphysical Necessity, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79:59-77, 1998.
[99]Sider, T., Reductive Theories of Modality, in M. J. Loux and D. W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford. Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford University Press,2003.
[100]Siewert,Charles, Saving appearances, in Robert C. Koons and George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism, Oxford University Press,2010.
[101]Smart,J.J.C., Sensations and Brain Processes, Philosophical Review,68:141-156,1959.
[102]Stalnaker, R., Assertion, in P. Cole, (ed.), Syntax and Semantics:Pragmatics, Vol.9, New York: Academic Press,1978.
[103]Stalnaker, R., On Considering a Possible World as Actual, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (suppl. volume) 75:141-156,2001.
[104]Stalnaker, R., Conceptual Truth and Metaphysical Necessity, in Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays, Oxford University Press,2003.
[105]Stalnaker, R., Assertion revisited:On the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics, Philosophical Studies 118:299-322,2004.
[106]Stoljar, D., Two conceptions of the physical, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62: 253-81,2001.
[107]Stoljar, D., Physicalism and phenomenal concepts, in Mind and Language,20:469-494,2005.
[108]Strawson, G., Red and 'red'. Synthese,78:193-232,1989.
[109]Sturgeon, Scott, Apriorism about Modality, in Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality:
Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, Oxford University Press,2010.
[110]Tye, M., A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts, Philosophy,53:91-106,2003.
[111]Vaidya, A., Modal Rationalism and Modal Monism, Erkenntnis,68(2),2008.
[112]White, S., Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise, in Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press,2006.
[113]Yablo, S., Mental causation, The Philosophical Review 101:245-280,1992.
[114]Yablo, S., Wide Causation, in James Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 11:251-281, 1997.
[115]Yablo, S., Concepts and Consciousness, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:455-63, 1999.
[116]Yablo, S., Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81:98-122,2000.
[117]Yablo, S., Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda, in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and
Possibility, New York:Oxford University Press,2002.
[118]Zimmerman, D., From property dualism to substance dualism, Aristotelian Society Supplementary 84:119-150,2010.
[1]Alter, T. and Walter, S., Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge:New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2007.
[2]Burgess, John P.,A Subject with No Object:Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics, Oxford University Press,1997.
[3]Carruthers, P., Phenomenal Consciousness:A Naturalistic Theory, New York:Cambridge University Press,2000.
[4]Chalmers, D.J., The Conscious Mind:In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York:Oxford University Press,1996.
[5]Chalmers, D.J., The Character of Consciousness, New York:Oxford University Press,2010.
[6]Cummins, R., Meaning and mental representation, Cambridge, Massachusetts:MIT Press,1989.
[7]Cummins, R., Representations, targets and attitudes, Cambridge, Massachusetts:MIT Press,1996.
[8]Descartes, R., Meditations on First Philosophy, trans, and ed. J. Cottingham, New York:Cambridge University Press,1641/1996.
[9]Descartes, R., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,3 vols.,John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny, (trans.), Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1984-91.
[10]Dretske, F., Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA:MIT Press,1981.
[11]Dretske, F., Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press,1995.
[12]Elder, C., Real Natures and Familiar Objects, MIT Press, Cam bridge, Mass,2004.
[13]Ellis, Brian, Scientific Essentialism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,2001.
[14]Evans, Gareth, The Varieties of Reference. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1982.
[15]Flanagan, O., Consciousness Reconsidered, Cambridge, MA:MIT Press,1992.
[16]Fodor,Jerry, The Language of Thought, New York:Crowell,1975.
[17]Fodor, Jerry, Concepts:Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, Oxford University Press,1998.
[18]Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J., (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2002.
[19]Heil, J., From an Ontological Point of View. New York, Oxford University Press,2003.
[20]Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, (eds.), Oxford/New York:Oxford University Press,1739/2000.
[21]Jackson, F., From Metaphysics to Ethics:A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, New York:Oxford University Press,1998.
[22]Kim, J., Supervenience and Mind:Selected Philosophical Essays, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1993.
[23]Kim.J., Mind in a Physical World:An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation, Cambridge, MA:Bradford,1998.
[24]Kim,J., Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Princeton University Press,2005.
[25]Kirk, R., Zombies and Consciousness, Oxford University Press,2006.
[26]Kripke, S. A., Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press,1980.
[27]Lewis, David, K., Counterfactuals, Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1973.
[28]Lewis, David, K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers,1986.
[29]Lewis, David K., Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1999.
[30]Linsky, Leonard (ed.), Reference and Modality, Oxford:Oxford University Press,1971.
[31]Ludlow, Peter; Nagasawa, Yujin; Stoljar, Daniel, (eds.), There's Something about Mary:essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. Cambridge:MIT Press,2004.
[32]Melia, Joseph, Modality, Acumen,2003.
[33]Mellor, D. H., The Facts of Causation, NY:Routledge,1995.
[34]Molnar, George, Powers, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2003.
[35]Papineau, D., Thinking about Consciousness, New York:Oxford University Press,2002.
[36]Perry, J., Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass:MIT Press,2001.
[37]Planringa, A., The Nature of Necessity, Oxford:Clarendon Press,1974.
[38]Russell, B., The Analysis of Matter, London:Kegan Paul,1927.
[39]Stoljar, D., Ignorance and Imagination:The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2006.
[40]Stoljar, D., Physicalism, New York:Routledge,2010.
[1]程炼.杰克逊的“知识论证”错在何处?[J].哲学研究第4期,2008.
[2]程炼.障痹与物理主义[A].中外人文精神研究[M],第三辑,中国大百科全书出版社,2010.
[3]程炼.作为元哲学的自然主义[J].科学文化评论第9卷第1期,2012.
[4]蒉益民.现象概念和物理主义[J].学术月刊第4期,2009.
[5]王球.现象概念与物理主义——打破二元论的谜咒[D].浙江大学博士学位论文,2011.
[6]叶峰.克里普克模态性的一个自然主义解释[J].哲学研究第1期,2008.
[7]叶峰.为什么相信自然主义及物理主义[J].哲学评论第10辑,2012.