中国商业银行公司治理的相关问题研究
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摘要
金融是现代经济的核心,商业银行更是中国金融体系的核心。中国银行业改革是中国经济体制改革的重要组成部分,商业银行的改革将对未来经济和金融发展产生全局性影响,对国家经济和金融安全具有决定性作用。另外,近年来国际金融业处于剧烈的动荡与分化之中,各国金融机构都在进行重组融合,国际金融竞争出现了新的格局。国内外的这些因素都对中国金融业提出了严峻的挑战,这种挑战在客观上要求中国必须尽快提升金融国际竞争力,增强金融安全性,提高银行公司治理水平。基于此,本文从理论和实证两方面对中国上市银行公司治理相关问题进行了研究。
公平偏好理论是经济学上很重要的一个理论,它强调人们在关注自己自利偏好外,还关注公平偏好,说明了公平不仅客观存在于不同的现实背景,而且公平本身的显示形式具有多样性。这个理论也普遍存在于商业银行的公司治理中,本文对其进行了深入研究。这为解决传统经济学理论中由于信息非对称所带来的高监督成本难题,提供了一条有效的新思路。
银行治理问题在全球范围内已经成为经济管理研究的热点,我国正处于企业制度重建和资本市场发展的关键阶段,如何加速构建经济有效的银行治理模式尤显迫切。本文从行为的角度,通过建立模型探讨了中国上市银行所有者与经营者的行为模式和行为的内在动机,从而揭示了双方的行为依据,对更好的理解其行为特点、制定科学有效的银行治理结构提出了理论依据。
本文实证分析了银行董事会独立性、CEO报酬与绩效的关系。研究结果显示,长任期的CEO、CEO兼任董事长、较大比例的内部董事和较大的董事会规模构成了中国上市银行的监管障碍。银行CEO的高薪酬是不足为奇的,因为高薪酬对应的是银行业绩的显著增长。授予银行CEO合理的激励报酬可以克服银行公司监管障碍,提高银行治理水平。
本文还通过建立一系列模型来实证考察独立董事在银行中的运行效率。研究证实,由于银行股权制衡能力比较强,独立董事的监督职能弱化,但是银行独立董事由于其专业背景以及广泛的社会关系,能够提高董事会决策效率,促进银行业绩的提升。研究还发现,独立董事的作用是有滞后的,当期的独立董事能够明显促进银行下一期的绩效。
本文也运用了DEA优势效率模型和劣势效率模型对我国商业银行的DEA综合效率进行的测评。结果表明,国有四大商业银行的效率总体上明显不及新兴的股份制商业银行。研究还发现,四大国有商业银行并没有存在明显的规模经济。回归分析表明,中国商业银行的综合技术效率(EFF)与其公司治理水平存在显著正相关性,即商业银行的公司治理水平越高,其综合技术效率越高。
While finance is the core of the modern economy, commercial banks are the central part of China’s financial system. The reform in China’banking sector is an important part of China’s economic reform, the reform of commercial bank will give an overall impact on national economic and financial development in the future, and play a decisive role in China’s economy and finance. In addition, in recent years with the international financial upheavals and differentiation among the world’s financial institutions, national financial institutions all the world carried out re-integration, new patterns appears in the international financial competition. All these factors at home and abroad of China’s financial pose a severe challenge, which is calling China to raise its financial competitiveness, enhance the financial security, and increase banking firm governance. Based on the above factors, this paper analyzes the administration and efficiency theoretically and empirically of the listed banks in China.
Equity preference theory is a very important theory in economics. It emphasizes the people concerned with not only their own self-interest preferences, but also the fairness preferences, shows not only fair and objective reality in a different background, but also a fair display of the form diversity itself. This theory is also common in the corporate governance of commercial banks. The paper conducted in-depth study of the theory. This method provides a new effective method for solving high surveillance cost owing to asymmetry information in economics.
Bank governance issues have become a hot research in global economic management. Since China is in the critical stage of reconstruction of enterprise system and development of capital markets,it is urgent to speed up to build the cost-effective governance model for the bank. From the perspective of behavior, this paper discusses the behavioral model and intrinsic motivation of behaviors of the owners and operators of China’s listed banks through building the model so as to reveal behavioral basis of the owners and operators, which provides the theoretical basis for better understanding their behaviors and establishing scientific and effective structure of bank governance.
We examine empirically the relationship among bank CEO compensation, board of directors governance and bank performance.The evidence suggests that long-tenure CEO, CEO who is the chairman of the board, higher proportion of inside directors in board and larger board can lead to monitor impediments of China’s listed banks. Because of the high compensation correspond to a significant increase of bank performance CEO of high compensation is not surprising. At last, we give an advice that granting CEO with incentive compensations which can overcome monitoring impediments and improve the bank governance.
In this paper is based on full consideration the special nature of governance in the banking sector, and dose empirical analysis on independent directors in bank operating efficiency by a series of model. Research confirmed that the bank has more power equity, and the independent directors weaken oversight functions. Because of their professional background and extensive social relations, bank of independent directors can improve the efficiency of decision-making by the board of directors to upgrade the bank’s performance. The study also found that the role of independent directors is lagging behind. The current independent directors can significantly enhance the performance of the next period of bank.
We use DEA advantage efficiency model and disadvantage efficiency model to make an assessment of Chinese banks’DEA comprehensive efficiency. The result shows that the big four state-ownership banks are obviously less efficient than others by comparing the share reform. The study also shows that the four major state-owned commercial banks do not have oblivious scale economy. Regression analysis showed that the consolidated technical efficiency (EFF) and corporate governance of China’s commercial banks have significant positive correlation, that is, the higher the level of corporate governance of commercial banks is, the more the efficiency of its integrated technology can be.
公平偏好理论是经济学上很重要的一个理论,它强调人们在关注自己自利偏好外,还关注公平偏好,说明了公平不仅客观存在于不同的现实背景,而且公平本身的显示形式具有多样性。这个理论也普遍存在于商业银行的公司治理中,本文对其进行了深入研究。这为解决传统经济学理论中由于信息非对称所带来的高监督成本难题,提供了一条有效的新思路。
银行治理问题在全球范围内已经成为经济管理研究的热点,我国正处于企业制度重建和资本市场发展的关键阶段,如何加速构建经济有效的银行治理模式尤显迫切。本文从行为的角度,通过建立模型探讨了中国上市银行所有者与经营者的行为模式和行为的内在动机,从而揭示了双方的行为依据,对更好的理解其行为特点、制定科学有效的银行治理结构提出了理论依据。
本文实证分析了银行董事会独立性、CEO报酬与绩效的关系。研究结果显示,长任期的CEO、CEO兼任董事长、较大比例的内部董事和较大的董事会规模构成了中国上市银行的监管障碍。银行CEO的高薪酬是不足为奇的,因为高薪酬对应的是银行业绩的显著增长。授予银行CEO合理的激励报酬可以克服银行公司监管障碍,提高银行治理水平。
本文还通过建立一系列模型来实证考察独立董事在银行中的运行效率。研究证实,由于银行股权制衡能力比较强,独立董事的监督职能弱化,但是银行独立董事由于其专业背景以及广泛的社会关系,能够提高董事会决策效率,促进银行业绩的提升。研究还发现,独立董事的作用是有滞后的,当期的独立董事能够明显促进银行下一期的绩效。
本文也运用了DEA优势效率模型和劣势效率模型对我国商业银行的DEA综合效率进行的测评。结果表明,国有四大商业银行的效率总体上明显不及新兴的股份制商业银行。研究还发现,四大国有商业银行并没有存在明显的规模经济。回归分析表明,中国商业银行的综合技术效率(EFF)与其公司治理水平存在显著正相关性,即商业银行的公司治理水平越高,其综合技术效率越高。
While finance is the core of the modern economy, commercial banks are the central part of China’s financial system. The reform in China’banking sector is an important part of China’s economic reform, the reform of commercial bank will give an overall impact on national economic and financial development in the future, and play a decisive role in China’s economy and finance. In addition, in recent years with the international financial upheavals and differentiation among the world’s financial institutions, national financial institutions all the world carried out re-integration, new patterns appears in the international financial competition. All these factors at home and abroad of China’s financial pose a severe challenge, which is calling China to raise its financial competitiveness, enhance the financial security, and increase banking firm governance. Based on the above factors, this paper analyzes the administration and efficiency theoretically and empirically of the listed banks in China.
Equity preference theory is a very important theory in economics. It emphasizes the people concerned with not only their own self-interest preferences, but also the fairness preferences, shows not only fair and objective reality in a different background, but also a fair display of the form diversity itself. This theory is also common in the corporate governance of commercial banks. The paper conducted in-depth study of the theory. This method provides a new effective method for solving high surveillance cost owing to asymmetry information in economics.
Bank governance issues have become a hot research in global economic management. Since China is in the critical stage of reconstruction of enterprise system and development of capital markets,it is urgent to speed up to build the cost-effective governance model for the bank. From the perspective of behavior, this paper discusses the behavioral model and intrinsic motivation of behaviors of the owners and operators of China’s listed banks through building the model so as to reveal behavioral basis of the owners and operators, which provides the theoretical basis for better understanding their behaviors and establishing scientific and effective structure of bank governance.
We examine empirically the relationship among bank CEO compensation, board of directors governance and bank performance.The evidence suggests that long-tenure CEO, CEO who is the chairman of the board, higher proportion of inside directors in board and larger board can lead to monitor impediments of China’s listed banks. Because of the high compensation correspond to a significant increase of bank performance CEO of high compensation is not surprising. At last, we give an advice that granting CEO with incentive compensations which can overcome monitoring impediments and improve the bank governance.
In this paper is based on full consideration the special nature of governance in the banking sector, and dose empirical analysis on independent directors in bank operating efficiency by a series of model. Research confirmed that the bank has more power equity, and the independent directors weaken oversight functions. Because of their professional background and extensive social relations, bank of independent directors can improve the efficiency of decision-making by the board of directors to upgrade the bank’s performance. The study also found that the role of independent directors is lagging behind. The current independent directors can significantly enhance the performance of the next period of bank.
We use DEA advantage efficiency model and disadvantage efficiency model to make an assessment of Chinese banks’DEA comprehensive efficiency. The result shows that the big four state-ownership banks are obviously less efficient than others by comparing the share reform. The study also shows that the four major state-owned commercial banks do not have oblivious scale economy. Regression analysis showed that the consolidated technical efficiency (EFF) and corporate governance of China’s commercial banks have significant positive correlation, that is, the higher the level of corporate governance of commercial banks is, the more the efficiency of its integrated technology can be.
引文
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