后股权分置时期上市公司治理结构对技术效率影响的研究
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摘要
股权分置是我国资本市场在特殊历史背景下出现的独有现象,指的是我国上市公司的股票被人为地划分为流通股和非流通股两类,导致了同股不同权,同股不同利的局面。股权分置格局下,我国的资本市场和公司治理均存在严重的缺陷,不利于上市公司的健康发展。为了解决这些问题,中国证监会于2005年4月29日颁布了《关于上市公司股权分置改革试点有关问题的通知》,标志着股权分置改革工作的正式启动,2006年10月10日,中国石化股改完成后复牌,标志着中国A股市场股权分置改革工作的基本完成。股权分置改革工作的终极目标是实现股票全流通,但是为了稳定股票市场的供给关系,避免股价的大幅度波动,对部分非流通股规定了限售期(锁定期),限制了其在股改后一段时期内的流通能力。因此,从上市公司股改结束到真正实现全流通尚需几年的时间,而这段时期则被称之为后股权分置时期。国内关于股权分置时期的上市公司治理问题已有丰富的研究成果,全流通时期的上市公司治理问题可以借鉴西方发达国家的研究成果,而针对后股权分置时期这一承前启后阶段的上市公司治理问题,研究还不够深入和充足。因此,本文选取后股权分置时期为研究区间,深入分析后股权分置时期我国上市公司治理结构对绩效的影响机制。
本文在理论回顾和文献评述的基础上,理论分析了后股权分置时期上市公司治理结构对技术效率的影响机制,构建出本文的理论框架并提出研究假设。在理论分析的基础上,本文利用数据包络分析方法测度了研究样本的技术效率值,并且分别实证检验了股权结构、董事会结构、管理层激励及债务融资对技术效率的影响作用。通过实证研究,得出以下结论:
1.后股权分置时期我国制造业上市公司的技术效率表现一般。2006年至2008年,制造业上市公司的技术效率均值分别为0.632,0.688和0.589,总体上表现一般。行业之间的差距明显,食品饮料业,医药生物制品业和金属非金属业的技术效率均值较高,三年平均值均高于0.63,纺织服装皮毛业和造纸印刷业的技术效率均值较低,三年的平均值均低于0.5。
2.后股权分置时期股权集中度与公司技术效率间呈现倒U形关系,转折点为50%,表明我国上市公司应该构建股权适当集中且存在几个大股东相互制衡的股权结构。在股权属性方面,国有股比例对公司技术效率有负向影响,但是随着国有股比例的降低已逐渐变得不显著;法人股比例与公司技术效率间呈现U形关系,表明法人股比例只有达到20%方可发挥出治理效用;流通股比例对公司技术效率的影响不显著。
3.后股权分置时期董事会规模与公司技术效率间存在倒U形关系,即董事会规模存在最优值,本文的实证结果表明最优值为9人;独立董事比例对公司技术效率的影响不显著;董事长与总经理两职合一对公司技术效率有负向影响;年度董事会会议次数对上市公司技术效率有负向影响;董事持股比例与公司技术效率间存在倒U形关系,转折点为18%。
4.后股权分置时期管理层激励对公司技术效率有正向影响。本文选取管理层年度报酬和管理层持股比例两个代表变量,检验结果表明作为短期激励形式的管理层年度报酬和作为长期激励形式的管理层持股比例均对公司管理层起到了激励作用,均对公司技术效率起到了促进作用。但是,目前我国上市公司中管理层持股比例较低,股权激励尚未完全发挥效用。
5.后股权分置时期债务的治理效用仍未发挥。本文选取资产负债率作为解释变量,检验结果表明资产负债率对公司技术效率有显著负向影响。股权分置改革后,我国上市公司的负债融资比例略有提高但并不显著,仍然保持在50%左右,究其原因一方面是由于我国国有银行的“软约束”性,另一方面则是由于我国债券市场尚不完善而导致上市公司债券发行数量较少。
最后,在理论分析和实证研究的基础上,从股权结构,独立董事制度,股权激励制度及债权治理四个方面提出了改善后股权分置时期上市公司治理结构的政策建议。
本文的创新点主要体现在以下几个方面:
1.运用数据包络分析方法测度我国制造业上市公司的技术效率,并将其作为上市公司的绩效指标,用于验证上市公司的治理效果。上市公司作为稀缺资源的配置者,其生产效率是提高公司市场竞争力,增加公司利润水平的核心。而技术效率作为反映上市公司投入产出水平的综合效率指标,具有稳定性和可靠性。
2.以股权分置改革为研究界点,选取我国制造业上市公司为研究对象,通过搜集相关数据,比较全面、深入地研究了在股改后的2006年至2008年,我国制造业上市公司技术效率的表现以及治理结构对技术效率的影响作用。
3.通过测度我国制造业上市公司的技术效率值,发现我国制造业上市公司在后股权分置时期的表现一般,且行业之间的差异较大。在资本较密集,进入壁垒较高或竞争较激烈的行业中,其技术效率表现较好,相反,在一些传统劳动密集型的行业中,其技术效率表现较差。
4.运用分年度回归模型和混合效应回归模型实证检验了后股权分置时期我国制造业上市公司治理结构对技术效率的影响机制。本文分别检验了内部治理结构(包括股权结构,董事会结构和管理层激励)和外部治理结构(债务融资)对公司技术效率的影响机制,在分析实证结果的基础上,针对后股权分置时期的治理问题提出了若干建议和政策。
Non-tradable share structure is a unique phenomenon of China's capital market in special history background. It means that the stocks are divided into two types:non-tradable stocks and tradable stock, and the two kinds of stocks have different rights and profits. Because of this phenomenon, the internal governance structure and external governance structure of China’s listed companies have serious defects, and it is not conducive to the healthy development of the listed company. In order to solve the problem, the stock supervise committee of China promulgated a document and begin a new exploration of comprehensive settlement of the shareholder structure on April 29th 2005.In the end of 2006, the equity division reform work successfully completed. The ultimate goal of reform work is the full circulation of stocks, but due to the existence of limited sales period and prolong limited sales period, the present stage of China’s capital market is post non-tradable share reform era. There are abundant domestic research achievements about the governance structure of listed company in the equity division period, and the corporate governance during the period of full circulation have reference from the research results from western developed countries. But about the corporate governance during the post non-tradable share reform era, the research is not sufficient. Therefore, this article selects the post non-tradable share reform era as the research object, analyze in-depth the characteristics of corporate governance structure, and how the governance structure effect the performance.
On the basis of previous literature, first, the paper makes theoretical analysis that how the company governance affects the performance, and puts forward the theoretical framework and 12 hypotheses. Secondly, this paper measures the technical efficiency of the sample by data envelopment analysis methods, and makes an empirical analysis.Through the empirical research, we get the following conclusions:
1. The technical efficiency of manufacturing listed companies in China is general. In 2006 -2008, the average technical efficiency was 0.632, 0.688 and 0.589, and the overall performance is general. There’s obvious gap between different industry, the performance of food and beverage industry, pharmaceutical and biological industry, metal and nonmetal industry are higher, the average technical efficiency is higher than 0.63. The performance of textiles and apparel industry, paper printing industry is lower, the average technical efficiency is lower than 0.5.
2. There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and the technical efficiency, and the turning point is 50%, indicating that the formation of equity should be appropriate concentrated. About the equity property, the proportion of state-owned shares has a negative impact on the technical efficiency. There is a U-shaped relationship legal shares proportion and the technical efficiency, indicating that the legal shares can play governance effectiveness if it accounted for only 20%. The proportion of outstanding shares has no significant impact on the technical efficiency.
3. There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the board size and technical efficiency , and the empirical result shows that the optimal value is 9.the proportion of independent directors has no had no significant impact .Directors One length and general manager of the technical efficiency of the company had negative effects. The annual times of board meeting had a negative impact. There is inverted U-shaped relationship between the directors’shareholdings and technical efficiency, and the turning point was 18%.
4. The management incentive system has a positive influence on technical efficiency. This paper selects the annual remuneration and the management shareholdings as the representative variables, the results showed that the annual compensation as the short-term incentive form and the proportion of management shareholdings as the long-term incentive both have positive effects on the technical efficiency. However, the current percent of management shareholders is relatively low, and it has not been fully effective.
5. The debt management has not yet played the effectiveness. This paper selects asset-liability ratio as explanatory variables; the test results show that the asset-liability ratio has significant negative impact on technical efficiency. After the non-tradable share reform, the debt ratio of China's listed companies increased slightly but not significantly, remained at 50%. About the reason, the one hand is that China's state-owned banks have "soft constraints”and another reason is that credit market is not perfect.
Finally, through the theoretical analysis and empirical research, we put forward some suggestions about the governance issues during the post non-tradable share era.
The Innovation areas of this paper are:
1. The paper selects the no-tradable share reform as the critical point, and selects the manufacturing listed companies in China as the research object. Based on collecting the relevant data, we make more comprehensive, in-depth study the features and changes of China’s listed companies in 2006 -2008.
2. The paper used the data envelopment analysis method (DEA) measuring the technical efficiency of listed companies as the performance indicator. As the allocation of scarce resources, the improvement of productivity is the core of that the listed companies increase the market competitiveness and profit level. The value of technical efficiency reflects the level of comprehensive efficiency.
3. The technical efficiency of manufacturing listed companies in China is general. There’s obvious gap between different industry, the performance of food and beverage industry, pharmaceutical and biological industry, metal and nonmetal industry are higher. The performance of textiles and apparel industry, paper printing industry is lower.
4. The paper used the mixed effect regression model examining the relationship between governance structure and performance of listed companies. This paper examines how the internal governance structure (including ownership structure, board structure and management incentives) and external governance structure (debt financing) make effects on the technical efficiency. Based on the analysis of empirical results, the paper proposed a number of recommendations and policies.
本文在理论回顾和文献评述的基础上,理论分析了后股权分置时期上市公司治理结构对技术效率的影响机制,构建出本文的理论框架并提出研究假设。在理论分析的基础上,本文利用数据包络分析方法测度了研究样本的技术效率值,并且分别实证检验了股权结构、董事会结构、管理层激励及债务融资对技术效率的影响作用。通过实证研究,得出以下结论:
1.后股权分置时期我国制造业上市公司的技术效率表现一般。2006年至2008年,制造业上市公司的技术效率均值分别为0.632,0.688和0.589,总体上表现一般。行业之间的差距明显,食品饮料业,医药生物制品业和金属非金属业的技术效率均值较高,三年平均值均高于0.63,纺织服装皮毛业和造纸印刷业的技术效率均值较低,三年的平均值均低于0.5。
2.后股权分置时期股权集中度与公司技术效率间呈现倒U形关系,转折点为50%,表明我国上市公司应该构建股权适当集中且存在几个大股东相互制衡的股权结构。在股权属性方面,国有股比例对公司技术效率有负向影响,但是随着国有股比例的降低已逐渐变得不显著;法人股比例与公司技术效率间呈现U形关系,表明法人股比例只有达到20%方可发挥出治理效用;流通股比例对公司技术效率的影响不显著。
3.后股权分置时期董事会规模与公司技术效率间存在倒U形关系,即董事会规模存在最优值,本文的实证结果表明最优值为9人;独立董事比例对公司技术效率的影响不显著;董事长与总经理两职合一对公司技术效率有负向影响;年度董事会会议次数对上市公司技术效率有负向影响;董事持股比例与公司技术效率间存在倒U形关系,转折点为18%。
4.后股权分置时期管理层激励对公司技术效率有正向影响。本文选取管理层年度报酬和管理层持股比例两个代表变量,检验结果表明作为短期激励形式的管理层年度报酬和作为长期激励形式的管理层持股比例均对公司管理层起到了激励作用,均对公司技术效率起到了促进作用。但是,目前我国上市公司中管理层持股比例较低,股权激励尚未完全发挥效用。
5.后股权分置时期债务的治理效用仍未发挥。本文选取资产负债率作为解释变量,检验结果表明资产负债率对公司技术效率有显著负向影响。股权分置改革后,我国上市公司的负债融资比例略有提高但并不显著,仍然保持在50%左右,究其原因一方面是由于我国国有银行的“软约束”性,另一方面则是由于我国债券市场尚不完善而导致上市公司债券发行数量较少。
最后,在理论分析和实证研究的基础上,从股权结构,独立董事制度,股权激励制度及债权治理四个方面提出了改善后股权分置时期上市公司治理结构的政策建议。
本文的创新点主要体现在以下几个方面:
1.运用数据包络分析方法测度我国制造业上市公司的技术效率,并将其作为上市公司的绩效指标,用于验证上市公司的治理效果。上市公司作为稀缺资源的配置者,其生产效率是提高公司市场竞争力,增加公司利润水平的核心。而技术效率作为反映上市公司投入产出水平的综合效率指标,具有稳定性和可靠性。
2.以股权分置改革为研究界点,选取我国制造业上市公司为研究对象,通过搜集相关数据,比较全面、深入地研究了在股改后的2006年至2008年,我国制造业上市公司技术效率的表现以及治理结构对技术效率的影响作用。
3.通过测度我国制造业上市公司的技术效率值,发现我国制造业上市公司在后股权分置时期的表现一般,且行业之间的差异较大。在资本较密集,进入壁垒较高或竞争较激烈的行业中,其技术效率表现较好,相反,在一些传统劳动密集型的行业中,其技术效率表现较差。
4.运用分年度回归模型和混合效应回归模型实证检验了后股权分置时期我国制造业上市公司治理结构对技术效率的影响机制。本文分别检验了内部治理结构(包括股权结构,董事会结构和管理层激励)和外部治理结构(债务融资)对公司技术效率的影响机制,在分析实证结果的基础上,针对后股权分置时期的治理问题提出了若干建议和政策。
Non-tradable share structure is a unique phenomenon of China's capital market in special history background. It means that the stocks are divided into two types:non-tradable stocks and tradable stock, and the two kinds of stocks have different rights and profits. Because of this phenomenon, the internal governance structure and external governance structure of China’s listed companies have serious defects, and it is not conducive to the healthy development of the listed company. In order to solve the problem, the stock supervise committee of China promulgated a document and begin a new exploration of comprehensive settlement of the shareholder structure on April 29th 2005.In the end of 2006, the equity division reform work successfully completed. The ultimate goal of reform work is the full circulation of stocks, but due to the existence of limited sales period and prolong limited sales period, the present stage of China’s capital market is post non-tradable share reform era. There are abundant domestic research achievements about the governance structure of listed company in the equity division period, and the corporate governance during the period of full circulation have reference from the research results from western developed countries. But about the corporate governance during the post non-tradable share reform era, the research is not sufficient. Therefore, this article selects the post non-tradable share reform era as the research object, analyze in-depth the characteristics of corporate governance structure, and how the governance structure effect the performance.
On the basis of previous literature, first, the paper makes theoretical analysis that how the company governance affects the performance, and puts forward the theoretical framework and 12 hypotheses. Secondly, this paper measures the technical efficiency of the sample by data envelopment analysis methods, and makes an empirical analysis.Through the empirical research, we get the following conclusions:
1. The technical efficiency of manufacturing listed companies in China is general. In 2006 -2008, the average technical efficiency was 0.632, 0.688 and 0.589, and the overall performance is general. There’s obvious gap between different industry, the performance of food and beverage industry, pharmaceutical and biological industry, metal and nonmetal industry are higher, the average technical efficiency is higher than 0.63. The performance of textiles and apparel industry, paper printing industry is lower, the average technical efficiency is lower than 0.5.
2. There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and the technical efficiency, and the turning point is 50%, indicating that the formation of equity should be appropriate concentrated. About the equity property, the proportion of state-owned shares has a negative impact on the technical efficiency. There is a U-shaped relationship legal shares proportion and the technical efficiency, indicating that the legal shares can play governance effectiveness if it accounted for only 20%. The proportion of outstanding shares has no significant impact on the technical efficiency.
3. There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the board size and technical efficiency , and the empirical result shows that the optimal value is 9.the proportion of independent directors has no had no significant impact .Directors One length and general manager of the technical efficiency of the company had negative effects. The annual times of board meeting had a negative impact. There is inverted U-shaped relationship between the directors’shareholdings and technical efficiency, and the turning point was 18%.
4. The management incentive system has a positive influence on technical efficiency. This paper selects the annual remuneration and the management shareholdings as the representative variables, the results showed that the annual compensation as the short-term incentive form and the proportion of management shareholdings as the long-term incentive both have positive effects on the technical efficiency. However, the current percent of management shareholders is relatively low, and it has not been fully effective.
5. The debt management has not yet played the effectiveness. This paper selects asset-liability ratio as explanatory variables; the test results show that the asset-liability ratio has significant negative impact on technical efficiency. After the non-tradable share reform, the debt ratio of China's listed companies increased slightly but not significantly, remained at 50%. About the reason, the one hand is that China's state-owned banks have "soft constraints”and another reason is that credit market is not perfect.
Finally, through the theoretical analysis and empirical research, we put forward some suggestions about the governance issues during the post non-tradable share era.
The Innovation areas of this paper are:
1. The paper selects the no-tradable share reform as the critical point, and selects the manufacturing listed companies in China as the research object. Based on collecting the relevant data, we make more comprehensive, in-depth study the features and changes of China’s listed companies in 2006 -2008.
2. The paper used the data envelopment analysis method (DEA) measuring the technical efficiency of listed companies as the performance indicator. As the allocation of scarce resources, the improvement of productivity is the core of that the listed companies increase the market competitiveness and profit level. The value of technical efficiency reflects the level of comprehensive efficiency.
3. The technical efficiency of manufacturing listed companies in China is general. There’s obvious gap between different industry, the performance of food and beverage industry, pharmaceutical and biological industry, metal and nonmetal industry are higher. The performance of textiles and apparel industry, paper printing industry is lower.
4. The paper used the mixed effect regression model examining the relationship between governance structure and performance of listed companies. This paper examines how the internal governance structure (including ownership structure, board structure and management incentives) and external governance structure (debt financing) make effects on the technical efficiency. Based on the analysis of empirical results, the paper proposed a number of recommendations and policies.
引文
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