高级管理层激励与我国中小企业板上市公司成长性实证研究
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摘要
中小企业作为国民经济的重要组成部分,近年来已日益受到各国的普遍关注,研究中国中小上市公司高级管理层激励以及其成长性之间的关系,可以为高级管理层激励机制的理论建设提供新的视角,为我国上市公司高级管理层激励机制的改进和完善提供较为扎实的数据支持,为解决我国上市公司高级管理层激励提供借鉴。对高级管理层激励方案的改善可以提高中小企业的成长性,促使我国中小企业又好又快的成长。
本文通过对我国中小企业板上市公司2005、2006和2007年三年的数据进行分析,运用描述性统计分析、突变级数法和多元回归分析等方法探讨了高级管理层激励与公司成长性之间的关系,发现高级管理层年度薪金收入与公司成长性之间存在显著的正相关关系,高级管理层年薪制是中小上市公司的重要激励机制,也是有效的激励机制；高级管理层人员持股比例以及持股人数占高级管理层总人数的比例也与中小上市公司成长性之间呈正相关关系；高级管理层人员在上市公司领薪的人数越多,公司的成长性则越好；公司规模、财务杠杆比率、所属行业、企业性质等因素也均将对中小上市公司的成长性产生影响。
最后本文提出有利于提高我国中小上市公司成长性的高级管理层激励政策建议,其中包括完善报酬激励机制,提高高级管理层人员的报酬水平；建立合理健全的高级管理层业绩考核体系；运用股权激励,实现对高级管理层的长期激励；充分考虑多种因素对高级管理层激励的影响。
As an important part of the national economy, SMEs has increasingly been the general concern of all countries in recent years. The study about senior management incentive and growth of the listed SMEs is valuable, it can provide a new perspective to the theory of management incentive construction, offer a new data support to improve the mechanism of management incentive of Chinese SMEs, give reference to deal with the management incentive of Chinese listed enterprises. The improvement of the management incentive can promote the growth of SMEs fast and good, in this sense, this paper has important theoretical and practical significance.
Based on the data of listed enterprise on Chinese SMEs board for three years, that is 2005,2006, and 2007, using descriptive statistical analysis, catastrophe series approach and multiple regression analysis and other methods, this paper analyzes the relationship between the management incentive and enterprises'growth. And finds that there is a significant positive influence between the annual salary income of management and enterprises'growth, the annual salary income of management is not only an important but a effective incentive mechanism of listed SMEs; the share proportion of senior management, as well as the proportion of holding stock in management has positive correlation with enterprises'growth; the more senior management salaried in enterprises, the better growth of the enterprises; company size, financial leverage, industry, industry character and other factors also have impact on the growth of enterprises.
Finally, this paper gives some policy recommendations to improve the management incentive of Chinese SMEs, including improving the mechanism of reward incentive, enhancing the salary level of management; establishing rational and right performance evaluation system of management; using stock incentive, in order to achieve long-term incentive of management; giving full consideration about a various factors which have impact on management incentive.
本文通过对我国中小企业板上市公司2005、2006和2007年三年的数据进行分析,运用描述性统计分析、突变级数法和多元回归分析等方法探讨了高级管理层激励与公司成长性之间的关系,发现高级管理层年度薪金收入与公司成长性之间存在显著的正相关关系,高级管理层年薪制是中小上市公司的重要激励机制,也是有效的激励机制；高级管理层人员持股比例以及持股人数占高级管理层总人数的比例也与中小上市公司成长性之间呈正相关关系；高级管理层人员在上市公司领薪的人数越多,公司的成长性则越好；公司规模、财务杠杆比率、所属行业、企业性质等因素也均将对中小上市公司的成长性产生影响。
最后本文提出有利于提高我国中小上市公司成长性的高级管理层激励政策建议,其中包括完善报酬激励机制,提高高级管理层人员的报酬水平；建立合理健全的高级管理层业绩考核体系；运用股权激励,实现对高级管理层的长期激励；充分考虑多种因素对高级管理层激励的影响。
As an important part of the national economy, SMEs has increasingly been the general concern of all countries in recent years. The study about senior management incentive and growth of the listed SMEs is valuable, it can provide a new perspective to the theory of management incentive construction, offer a new data support to improve the mechanism of management incentive of Chinese SMEs, give reference to deal with the management incentive of Chinese listed enterprises. The improvement of the management incentive can promote the growth of SMEs fast and good, in this sense, this paper has important theoretical and practical significance.
Based on the data of listed enterprise on Chinese SMEs board for three years, that is 2005,2006, and 2007, using descriptive statistical analysis, catastrophe series approach and multiple regression analysis and other methods, this paper analyzes the relationship between the management incentive and enterprises'growth. And finds that there is a significant positive influence between the annual salary income of management and enterprises'growth, the annual salary income of management is not only an important but a effective incentive mechanism of listed SMEs; the share proportion of senior management, as well as the proportion of holding stock in management has positive correlation with enterprises'growth; the more senior management salaried in enterprises, the better growth of the enterprises; company size, financial leverage, industry, industry character and other factors also have impact on the growth of enterprises.
Finally, this paper gives some policy recommendations to improve the management incentive of Chinese SMEs, including improving the mechanism of reward incentive, enhancing the salary level of management; establishing rational and right performance evaluation system of management; using stock incentive, in order to achieve long-term incentive of management; giving full consideration about a various factors which have impact on management incentive.
引文
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