高新技术企业动态联盟利益分配方法研究
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摘要
组建高新技术企业动态联盟可以集成成员企业的核心能力和资源,保证企业研发需要的资金及人才,提高企业的创新能力和科技成果转化能力,增强企业的抗风险能力,因此,越来越多的高新技术企业通过组建动态联盟来实现其发展。但是,由于利益分配的不合理,导致了许多高新技术企业动态联盟的失败,利益分配问题是制约高新技术企业动态联盟发展的关键问题之一。高新技术企业动态联盟利益分配已经引起学术界的重视,目前,已有学者对高新技术企业动态联盟利益分配进行研究,但是没有针对不同类型的联盟进行,利益分配效果不显著,并且对利益分配方法的研究多是描述性数学模型,其假设前提要求对未来的利益进行预测,难以有效运用于利益分配实践。因此,针对不同类型高新技术企业动态联盟进行利益分配研究和制定能够有效运用于实践的利益分配方法对高新技术企业动态联盟的顺利运行具有重要的意义。
本文对不同类型的高新技术企业动态联盟利益分配方法进行研究。首先对高新技术企业动态联盟的界定、组建原因、组建过程和特点等基本问题进行研究,并针对高新技术企业动态联盟的特点对其进行分类。其次,对高新技术企业动态联盟利益分配进行了系统分析,通过分析高新技术企业动态联盟利益分配的现状得出联盟利益分配中存在的问题,通过定量与定性相结合的方式,分析了研发型联盟和产品型联盟的利益分配影响要素。然后通过对收益/风险分配方法进行改进分别设计了不同类型高新技术企业动态联盟利益分配方法,运用模糊综合评价法、层次分析法等方法对模型中变量值进行确定,并对联盟的无形利益的分配方法进行研究。最后通过实证研究对利益分配方法的可行性和合理性进行检验。本文的研究更加有针对性,设计的利益分配方法更具有合理性和可行性,对高新技术企业动态联盟利益分配方法和策略的制定具有一定的指导意义。
Constructing dynamic alliance of high-tech enterprise can integrate core competence and resources of the members in the alliance, can obtain the capital and talents needed in the R&D of an enterprise, can improve its innovation ability and its ability of science and technology achievement transformation, can enhance its capacity to resist risks. Hence, more high-tech enterprises construct dynamic alliance to accelerate development. However, lots of high-tech enterprise dynamic alliances failed because of irrational interest distribution, interest distribution of high-tech enterprise dynamic alliance is one of the most crucial problems restricting its development, which therefore attracts extensive attention in academic circles. Presently, studies on interest distribution of high-tech enterprise dynamic alliance are not infrequent, but few of them gives enough consideration to the influences of different alliance types on the distribution result, which causes the effect not very satisfactory. What makes it worse is that in the existing research mathematical description models are mainly used as the method to solve interest distribution problems, the strict hypothesis that forcasting future interest of which are always quite hard to meet in practice. Hence, it is of great importance for high-tech enterprise dynamic alliance to choose an effective and practical interest distribution method according to alliance type.
This paper mainly studied on interest distribution methods of different types of high-tech enterprise dynamic alliance. Firstly, it studied on the basic problems such as the related definition, constructing reasons, constructing process and characteristics of high-tech enterprise dynamic alliance, and then it classified high-tech enterprise dynamic alliances according to their characteristics. Secondly, it analyzed interest distribution of high-tech enterprise dynamic alliance systemically, the problems in interest distribution were extracted through present situation analysis, while the influence factors of R&D oriented and product oriented alliances was discussed through qualitative analysis combined with quantitative derivation. After that, using an improved profit/risk distribution method, the paper designed interest distribution methods for different types of dynamic alliances separately, and then calculated variable value of the models using AHP and fuzzy synthetic evaluation method, it also studied on the distribution method of intangible assets. Finally an application example was presented to verify the rationality and feasibility of the model. The research of this paper is more pertinent and the interest distribution method formulated is more rational and practical, it has guiding significance for the design of interest distribution method and strategies of high-tech enterprise dynamic alliance.
本文对不同类型的高新技术企业动态联盟利益分配方法进行研究。首先对高新技术企业动态联盟的界定、组建原因、组建过程和特点等基本问题进行研究,并针对高新技术企业动态联盟的特点对其进行分类。其次,对高新技术企业动态联盟利益分配进行了系统分析,通过分析高新技术企业动态联盟利益分配的现状得出联盟利益分配中存在的问题,通过定量与定性相结合的方式,分析了研发型联盟和产品型联盟的利益分配影响要素。然后通过对收益/风险分配方法进行改进分别设计了不同类型高新技术企业动态联盟利益分配方法,运用模糊综合评价法、层次分析法等方法对模型中变量值进行确定,并对联盟的无形利益的分配方法进行研究。最后通过实证研究对利益分配方法的可行性和合理性进行检验。本文的研究更加有针对性,设计的利益分配方法更具有合理性和可行性,对高新技术企业动态联盟利益分配方法和策略的制定具有一定的指导意义。
Constructing dynamic alliance of high-tech enterprise can integrate core competence and resources of the members in the alliance, can obtain the capital and talents needed in the R&D of an enterprise, can improve its innovation ability and its ability of science and technology achievement transformation, can enhance its capacity to resist risks. Hence, more high-tech enterprises construct dynamic alliance to accelerate development. However, lots of high-tech enterprise dynamic alliances failed because of irrational interest distribution, interest distribution of high-tech enterprise dynamic alliance is one of the most crucial problems restricting its development, which therefore attracts extensive attention in academic circles. Presently, studies on interest distribution of high-tech enterprise dynamic alliance are not infrequent, but few of them gives enough consideration to the influences of different alliance types on the distribution result, which causes the effect not very satisfactory. What makes it worse is that in the existing research mathematical description models are mainly used as the method to solve interest distribution problems, the strict hypothesis that forcasting future interest of which are always quite hard to meet in practice. Hence, it is of great importance for high-tech enterprise dynamic alliance to choose an effective and practical interest distribution method according to alliance type.
This paper mainly studied on interest distribution methods of different types of high-tech enterprise dynamic alliance. Firstly, it studied on the basic problems such as the related definition, constructing reasons, constructing process and characteristics of high-tech enterprise dynamic alliance, and then it classified high-tech enterprise dynamic alliances according to their characteristics. Secondly, it analyzed interest distribution of high-tech enterprise dynamic alliance systemically, the problems in interest distribution were extracted through present situation analysis, while the influence factors of R&D oriented and product oriented alliances was discussed through qualitative analysis combined with quantitative derivation. After that, using an improved profit/risk distribution method, the paper designed interest distribution methods for different types of dynamic alliances separately, and then calculated variable value of the models using AHP and fuzzy synthetic evaluation method, it also studied on the distribution method of intangible assets. Finally an application example was presented to verify the rationality and feasibility of the model. The research of this paper is more pertinent and the interest distribution method formulated is more rational and practical, it has guiding significance for the design of interest distribution method and strategies of high-tech enterprise dynamic alliance.
引文
[1]张晓强.中国高新技术产业发展情况[R].北京:国务院新闻办公室,2007.
[2] PRREISS Kenneth, GOLDMAN L Steven. 21st Century Manufacturing Enterprises Strategy[J].An Industry-Led View,1991,(5):20-23.
[3] DAVIDOW H William, MALONE S Michael. The Virtual Corporation Structuring and Revitalizing the Corporation for the 21st Century[J].Harper Business,1992,(2):30-40.
[4] BYRNE A Jone. The Virtual Corporation[J].Business Week,1993,(2):1-3.
[5] PRREISS Kenneth, GOLDMAN L Steven. Agile Competitors and Virtual Organizations[J].Van Nnctrsnd Renhold,1995,(3):8-10.
[6] TUTTLE Douglas. Activities:the Common Currency of the Virtual Or-ganization[C].JIANG Brain Kanter.4th Annual Agility Forum.Conf.Proc.Atlanta,USA,1995:13-25.
[7] HANDY Charles. Trust and the Virtual Organization[J].Harvard Business Review,1995,(7):40-45.
[8] Dort C Richard. Designing the Virtual Enterprise[J].Managing Virtual IEMC,1998,(8):139-141.
[9] BARNET William, ADREEN Presley. An Architecture forth Virtual Enterprise[J].Proceedings of Information Technology to a Virtual Enterprise Broker,1999,(1):20-24.
[10] KANET J J, FAESST W. Applications of Information Technology to a Virtual Enterprise Broker,the Case of Bill Epstein[J].International Journal of Production Economics,1999,(1):8-10.
[11]麦克金赛.博弈论导引[M].高鸿勋.北京:人民教育出版社,1960:8.
[12]冯·诺依曼,摩根斯顿.博弈论与经济行为[M].王文玉.北京:三联出版社,2004:12-15.
[13] COLEMAN George W. Who Pays for the Unexpected:An Attorneys View[J].Proceeding of Construction Congress in the Constructed Project, 1989,(4):524-529.
[14] BURROWS Geoff, BLACK Christopher. Profit Sharing in Australian Big Accounting Firms:an Exploratory Study[J].Accounting Organizations and Society,1998,(6):517-530.
[15]陈剑,冯蔚东.虚拟企业构建与管理[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2002:2-15.
[16]成红银,路周岚.高新技术行业动态联盟探析[J].电子科技大学学报社科版,2003,(1):82-86.
[17]罗剑宏,李笑.基于联盟共享核心能力的高新技术企业技术创新方式[J].系统工程,2006,(6):119-122.
[18]黄敏,徐飞,等.一种动态联盟企业风险概率识别方法[J].东北大学学报,2005,(12):1138-1140.
[19]王硕.虚拟企业理论与实务[M].安徽:合肥工业大学出版社,2005: 3-5.
[20]郝宇,罗永泰.高新技术企业虚拟型学习团队构建研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2003,(6):112-114.
[21]赵忠华,王小华.虚拟企业利益分配要素及其价值确定[J].商业研究,2002,(12):4-5.
[22]戴建华,薛恒新.基于Shapley值法的动态联盟伙伴企业利益分配策略[J].中国管理科学,2004,(4):33-35.
[23]叶飞,郭东风,等.虚拟企业成员之间利益分配方法研究[J].统计与决策,2000,(7):11.
[24]刘晓君,曾丽娟.工程项目动态联盟的利益分配研究[J].建筑经济,2006,(7):81-83.
[25]余伟.研发联盟收益分配的模糊评价方法研究[J].企业经济,2006,(8):61-63.
[26]李亚东,李从东,等.动态联盟收益分配问题的博弈研究[J].工业工程,2006,(5):15-18.
[27]雷宣云,叶飞,等.虚拟企业战略性合作伙伴利益分配方法研究[J].工业工程,2005,(9):16-21.
[28] COASE R I. The Nature of the Firm[J].Economica,1937,(4):386-405.
[29] WILLIAMSON O. E. Market and Hierarchies[M].New York:The Press New York,1975:40.
[30]迈克尔·波特.竞争优势[M].北京:华夏出版社,1997:10-15.
[31] GARY Hamel, PRAHALAD C. K. The Core Competence of The Corporation[J].Harvard Business Review,1990,(3):79-91.
[32] ROSS S. The Economic Theory of Agent:the Principal's Problem [J].American Economic Review,1973,(2):117-129.
[33] MIRRLESS J. The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization[J].Journal of Economic.1976,(1):145-162.
[34] STIGLITZ J E. Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping[J].Review of Economic Studies.1947,(4):133-154.
[35]璐羽.科技政策词汇[M],北京:中国标准出版社,2001:15-17.
[36]葛玲英.新产品开发:如何对市场反应更敏捷[J].科技进步与对策,2000,(6):52-53.
[37]王贯中.培育和提升高新技术企业的核心竞争力[J].技术经济与管理研究,2007,(1):52-53.
[38]江文奇.基于自主创新的高新技术企业评价指标体系的构建[J].经济研究,2007,(15):30-31.
[39]孟卫东,吕臻.基于价值链理论的高新技术企业核心竞争力研究[J].科技进步与对策,2006,(6):112-114.
[40]方青.供应链企业合作利益分配机制研究[D].湖北:武汉理工大学,2004:21-23.
[41]赵莉,单晓光.产学研中知识产权利益分配方法研究[J].学术研究,2007,(1):18-20.
[42]陈菊红,汪应洛,等.虚拟企业收益分配问题博弈研究[J].运筹与管理,2002,(1):11-15.
[43] SHAPLEY L. S. A. Value for N-person Game.Contributions to the Theory of Games[J].Annals of Mathematics Studies Kuhn and TucKer,1953:56-78.
[44]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004:158-170.
[45] NASH J. F. Two-Person Cooperative Games[J].Econometrica,1953,(1):128-140.
[46]阿瑟·奥肯.平等与效率[M].王奔洲等.北京:华夏出版社,1999:130-132.
[47]冯蔚东,陈剑.虚拟企业中伙伴收益分配比例的确定[J].系统工程理论与实践,2002,(4):45-46.
[48]杜栋,庞庆华.现代综合评价方法与案例精选[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2005:35-61.
[49]陈宝.动态联盟的利益分配问题研究[J].商业研究,2005,(23):8-9.
[50]阮捷.企业战略联盟利益分配机制研究[D].湖南:中南大学,2004:53-55.
[2] PRREISS Kenneth, GOLDMAN L Steven. 21st Century Manufacturing Enterprises Strategy[J].An Industry-Led View,1991,(5):20-23.
[3] DAVIDOW H William, MALONE S Michael. The Virtual Corporation Structuring and Revitalizing the Corporation for the 21st Century[J].Harper Business,1992,(2):30-40.
[4] BYRNE A Jone. The Virtual Corporation[J].Business Week,1993,(2):1-3.
[5] PRREISS Kenneth, GOLDMAN L Steven. Agile Competitors and Virtual Organizations[J].Van Nnctrsnd Renhold,1995,(3):8-10.
[6] TUTTLE Douglas. Activities:the Common Currency of the Virtual Or-ganization[C].JIANG Brain Kanter.4th Annual Agility Forum.Conf.Proc.Atlanta,USA,1995:13-25.
[7] HANDY Charles. Trust and the Virtual Organization[J].Harvard Business Review,1995,(7):40-45.
[8] Dort C Richard. Designing the Virtual Enterprise[J].Managing Virtual IEMC,1998,(8):139-141.
[9] BARNET William, ADREEN Presley. An Architecture forth Virtual Enterprise[J].Proceedings of Information Technology to a Virtual Enterprise Broker,1999,(1):20-24.
[10] KANET J J, FAESST W. Applications of Information Technology to a Virtual Enterprise Broker,the Case of Bill Epstein[J].International Journal of Production Economics,1999,(1):8-10.
[11]麦克金赛.博弈论导引[M].高鸿勋.北京:人民教育出版社,1960:8.
[12]冯·诺依曼,摩根斯顿.博弈论与经济行为[M].王文玉.北京:三联出版社,2004:12-15.
[13] COLEMAN George W. Who Pays for the Unexpected:An Attorneys View[J].Proceeding of Construction Congress in the Constructed Project, 1989,(4):524-529.
[14] BURROWS Geoff, BLACK Christopher. Profit Sharing in Australian Big Accounting Firms:an Exploratory Study[J].Accounting Organizations and Society,1998,(6):517-530.
[15]陈剑,冯蔚东.虚拟企业构建与管理[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2002:2-15.
[16]成红银,路周岚.高新技术行业动态联盟探析[J].电子科技大学学报社科版,2003,(1):82-86.
[17]罗剑宏,李笑.基于联盟共享核心能力的高新技术企业技术创新方式[J].系统工程,2006,(6):119-122.
[18]黄敏,徐飞,等.一种动态联盟企业风险概率识别方法[J].东北大学学报,2005,(12):1138-1140.
[19]王硕.虚拟企业理论与实务[M].安徽:合肥工业大学出版社,2005: 3-5.
[20]郝宇,罗永泰.高新技术企业虚拟型学习团队构建研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2003,(6):112-114.
[21]赵忠华,王小华.虚拟企业利益分配要素及其价值确定[J].商业研究,2002,(12):4-5.
[22]戴建华,薛恒新.基于Shapley值法的动态联盟伙伴企业利益分配策略[J].中国管理科学,2004,(4):33-35.
[23]叶飞,郭东风,等.虚拟企业成员之间利益分配方法研究[J].统计与决策,2000,(7):11.
[24]刘晓君,曾丽娟.工程项目动态联盟的利益分配研究[J].建筑经济,2006,(7):81-83.
[25]余伟.研发联盟收益分配的模糊评价方法研究[J].企业经济,2006,(8):61-63.
[26]李亚东,李从东,等.动态联盟收益分配问题的博弈研究[J].工业工程,2006,(5):15-18.
[27]雷宣云,叶飞,等.虚拟企业战略性合作伙伴利益分配方法研究[J].工业工程,2005,(9):16-21.
[28] COASE R I. The Nature of the Firm[J].Economica,1937,(4):386-405.
[29] WILLIAMSON O. E. Market and Hierarchies[M].New York:The Press New York,1975:40.
[30]迈克尔·波特.竞争优势[M].北京:华夏出版社,1997:10-15.
[31] GARY Hamel, PRAHALAD C. K. The Core Competence of The Corporation[J].Harvard Business Review,1990,(3):79-91.
[32] ROSS S. The Economic Theory of Agent:the Principal's Problem [J].American Economic Review,1973,(2):117-129.
[33] MIRRLESS J. The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization[J].Journal of Economic.1976,(1):145-162.
[34] STIGLITZ J E. Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping[J].Review of Economic Studies.1947,(4):133-154.
[35]璐羽.科技政策词汇[M],北京:中国标准出版社,2001:15-17.
[36]葛玲英.新产品开发:如何对市场反应更敏捷[J].科技进步与对策,2000,(6):52-53.
[37]王贯中.培育和提升高新技术企业的核心竞争力[J].技术经济与管理研究,2007,(1):52-53.
[38]江文奇.基于自主创新的高新技术企业评价指标体系的构建[J].经济研究,2007,(15):30-31.
[39]孟卫东,吕臻.基于价值链理论的高新技术企业核心竞争力研究[J].科技进步与对策,2006,(6):112-114.
[40]方青.供应链企业合作利益分配机制研究[D].湖北:武汉理工大学,2004:21-23.
[41]赵莉,单晓光.产学研中知识产权利益分配方法研究[J].学术研究,2007,(1):18-20.
[42]陈菊红,汪应洛,等.虚拟企业收益分配问题博弈研究[J].运筹与管理,2002,(1):11-15.
[43] SHAPLEY L. S. A. Value for N-person Game.Contributions to the Theory of Games[J].Annals of Mathematics Studies Kuhn and TucKer,1953:56-78.
[44]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004:158-170.
[45] NASH J. F. Two-Person Cooperative Games[J].Econometrica,1953,(1):128-140.
[46]阿瑟·奥肯.平等与效率[M].王奔洲等.北京:华夏出版社,1999:130-132.
[47]冯蔚东,陈剑.虚拟企业中伙伴收益分配比例的确定[J].系统工程理论与实践,2002,(4):45-46.
[48]杜栋,庞庆华.现代综合评价方法与案例精选[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2005:35-61.
[49]陈宝.动态联盟的利益分配问题研究[J].商业研究,2005,(23):8-9.
[50]阮捷.企业战略联盟利益分配机制研究[D].湖南:中南大学,2004:53-55.