社会资本视角下的县域小微企业信用互助问题研究
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摘要
促进农村及县域小微企业的发展对解决农村富余劳动力、提高农民及乡镇居民收入、促进乡镇社会生活的稳定有积极的作用。然而,在融资方面,农村及县域小微企业却面临着重重困难。2011年北京大学国家发展研究院联合阿里巴巴集团发布的《小企业经营与融资困境调研报告》显示,有融资需求的小企业中,通过亲友和民间借贷融资的小企业占50%,通过银行和农村信用社等传统金融机构融资的小企业仅占21%,有22%的小企业从未获得贷款；银行对中小企业的贷款利率上浮基本上都在30%左右。在正规金融对小微企业融资缺乏有力支持的现实下,非正规融资具有信息成本及交易成本低、手续便捷、方式灵活等优势,对于解决小微企业融资问题发挥着重要的作用。本研究以我国县域小微企业为例,从社会资本视角分析小微企业的信用互助行为,符合了当前国家、社会对促进小微企业发展的思路,对解决当前小微企业融资困境,引导民间资本规范有序进入金融领域也具有启示意义。同时,对于银行设计适用于小微企业的金融互助产品,加强贷款监督,降低交易成本也有积极的作用。
本研究对小微企业信用互助的类型、信用互助的联接纽带进行了划分与界定。基于制度经济学与社会资本理论,对小微企业间的信用互助行为进行了理论分析。在些基础上,实证分析了社会资本对小微企业非正规信用互助行为及监督行为的影响,以及社会网络关系对联保贷款小组同伴监督及联保企业再次合作意愿的影响。最后,对小微企业信用互助提出了对策与建议。研究的具体内容如下：
第一,将小微企业信用互助的类型划分为正规信用互助和非正规信用互助两大类,并将信用互助的联接纽带归为六类,分别为：血缘、地缘；金融掮客、银背；行业协会、商会；供应链融资；政府牵线；金融中介平台。
第二,基于制度经济学分析了小微企业信用互助的产生与变迁。基于社会资本理论,分析了社会资本对小微企业信用互助的作用机理,以及社会支持、人情、信任对小微企业信用互助的影响。
第三,以福建省县域小微企业作为调查样本,采用问卷调查方法收集数据,使用探索性因子分析、logistic回归分析和多元线性回归分析等统计方法,分析了社会资本对小微企业非正规信用互助行为及监督行为的影响。研究发现,互惠与人情及亲友帮助、社会互动、社会依存度以及信任这四个社会资本因子均与非正规信用互助借贷贷出意愿之间存在显著的正向关系,说明小微企业的社会资本可以促进贷方愿意提供非正规信用互助借贷；社会互动与社会依存度与非正规信用互助借贷贷后监督之间均存在显著的正向关系。
第四,使用某商业银行的联保贷款调查数据,分析了社会网络关系对联保贷款小组同伴监督及联保企业再次合作意愿的影响。研究表明,企业主不会因为认识时间较长而忽略连带责任带来的风险放大效应。但相识时间长,强化了再次合作的意愿：距离相近的企业相互监督的成本较低,但联保企业不依据距离远近来决定是否继续保持联保关系；企业间的合作与业务往来对减轻联保中的信息不对称性和维护联保关系的稳定性都有积极的作用；由于风险基金具有代偿功能,联保企业放松了同伴监督,而风险基金并没有起到显著加固联保关系的作用。这提示信贷人员风险基金虽然有补偿保障,但仍应注意保持对这些联保贷款小组的贷后检查。
最后,针对研究结果,提出加强小微企业信用互助的相关政策建议。分别为：鼓励小微企业建立信用互助联盟,拓宽融资渠道；健全非正规金融制度；法治与社会规范相辅相承；加强社会信用体系建设,防范失信行为；借助社会资本,组建小微企业信用互助担保机构。
To promote the development of small and micro enterprises in countryside and county to solve the surplus rural labor force, increase the income of farmers and rural residents, and promote the stability of the township and village social life has a positive effect. However, in terms of financing, small and micro enterprises in countryside and county are faced with many difficulties. In2011, the national development research institute of Peking University jointly Alibaba group released "the research report on small enterprises management and financing problems" showed that in financing needs of small enterprises, small enterprises financing through by friends and relatives and folk lending accounted for50%, small enterprises financing through by the banks and rural credit cooperatives and other traditional financial institutions accounted for only21%, with22%of small enterprises had never got loans; The loan interest rates of banks for small and medium-sized enterprises rose generally at about30%. In the reality of the formal finance lack of strong support for small and micro enterprises financing, the informal financing has advantage in the information cost and the transaction cost is low, the procedure is convenient and flexible and so on, it plays an important role to solve the problem of financing for small and micro enterprises. This study takes small and micro enterprises in our countryside and county for example, and analyses the behavior of credit mutual help of small and micro enterprises from the perspective of social capital, it conforms the current thought to promote the development of small and micro enterprises for the country and society, it also has significance to solve the current financing predicament for small and micro enterprises and guide the private capital into the financial field orderly.
This research divides and defines the type of credit mutual help and the connecting link of credit mutual help for small and micro enterprises. Bases on the theory of institutional economics and social capital, the behavior of credit mutual help for small and micro enterprises analyzed in theory. On this bases, uses the empirical analyze the social capital to the influence of behavior of informal credit mutual help and behavior of supervise for the small and micro enterprises, as well as the social network relations to the influence of peer supervision for the group lending and willingness of cooperation again for group enterprises. Finally, puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions on credit mutual help for small and micro enterprises. The specific contents of the research are as follows:
First, the types of credit mutual help for small and micro enterprises are divided into two categories:formal credit support and informal credit support,and the connecting link of credit mutual help are divided into six categories, respectively: blood kinship, geopolitics; Financial broker, silverback; industry associations, chamber of commerce; supply chain financing; government matchmaking; financial intermediary platform.
Second, bases on institutional economics, this paper analyzes the production and change in credit mutual help for small and micro enterprises. Bases on social capital theory, it analyzes mechanism in the social capital to credit mutual help for small and micro enterprises, and social support, human feelings and trust to impact credit mutual help for small and micro enterprises.
Third, it takes country small and micro enterprises in Fujian province as a sample, adopts the method of questionnaire survey to collect data, uses exploratory factor analysis, logistic regression analysis and multiple linear regression analysis and other statistical methods, analyzes the social capital to the influence of behavior of informal credit mutual help and behavior of supervise for the small and micro enterprises. The study found that the reciprocity,human feelings and friends to help social interaction, social dependence and trust were four social capital factors, there were significant positive correlation with loans will of informal credit mutual help lending, it explained that the social capital of small and micro enterprises could promote the lender willing to provide informal credit mutual help lending; there were significant positive correlation between social interaction and social dependence and informal credit borrowing and post-loan supervision.
Fourth, the use of survey data of group lending in a commercial bank, analyzes the influence in the social network relations to peer supervision in group lending and willingness of cooperation again for group enterprises. Studies show that business owners won't because know for a long time and ignore joint liability to take the amplification effect of risks. But get to know each other long time, it strengthens the will of cooperation again; the cost of mutual supervision in distance of similar enterprise is low, but the group enterprises are not based on distance to decide whether to continue the coinsurance relationship; there is a positive effect in cooperation between enterprises and business transactions to reduce information asymmetry in joint guarantee and maintain the stability of the relationship; Because the risk fund has the compensatory function, the group enterprises relax peer supervision, but risk fund does not have the effect of reinforcement of group relations. This reminds the credit officers that there is a compensation for risk fund, but still should pay attention to keep the post-loan inspection in group lending.
Finally, on the results of the study, put forward to related policy and suggestions to strengthen credit mutual help for small and micro enterprises. Small and micro enterprises are encouraged to establish credit mutual union, broaden the financing channels; perfecting informal financal system; the rule of law and social norms are in full accord; strengthening the construction of social credit system and guarding against bad credit behaviors; with the aid of social capital, to form credit mutual guarantee organisations of small and micro enterprises.
本研究对小微企业信用互助的类型、信用互助的联接纽带进行了划分与界定。基于制度经济学与社会资本理论,对小微企业间的信用互助行为进行了理论分析。在些基础上,实证分析了社会资本对小微企业非正规信用互助行为及监督行为的影响,以及社会网络关系对联保贷款小组同伴监督及联保企业再次合作意愿的影响。最后,对小微企业信用互助提出了对策与建议。研究的具体内容如下：
第一,将小微企业信用互助的类型划分为正规信用互助和非正规信用互助两大类,并将信用互助的联接纽带归为六类,分别为：血缘、地缘；金融掮客、银背；行业协会、商会；供应链融资；政府牵线；金融中介平台。
第二,基于制度经济学分析了小微企业信用互助的产生与变迁。基于社会资本理论,分析了社会资本对小微企业信用互助的作用机理,以及社会支持、人情、信任对小微企业信用互助的影响。
第三,以福建省县域小微企业作为调查样本,采用问卷调查方法收集数据,使用探索性因子分析、logistic回归分析和多元线性回归分析等统计方法,分析了社会资本对小微企业非正规信用互助行为及监督行为的影响。研究发现,互惠与人情及亲友帮助、社会互动、社会依存度以及信任这四个社会资本因子均与非正规信用互助借贷贷出意愿之间存在显著的正向关系,说明小微企业的社会资本可以促进贷方愿意提供非正规信用互助借贷；社会互动与社会依存度与非正规信用互助借贷贷后监督之间均存在显著的正向关系。
第四,使用某商业银行的联保贷款调查数据,分析了社会网络关系对联保贷款小组同伴监督及联保企业再次合作意愿的影响。研究表明,企业主不会因为认识时间较长而忽略连带责任带来的风险放大效应。但相识时间长,强化了再次合作的意愿：距离相近的企业相互监督的成本较低,但联保企业不依据距离远近来决定是否继续保持联保关系；企业间的合作与业务往来对减轻联保中的信息不对称性和维护联保关系的稳定性都有积极的作用；由于风险基金具有代偿功能,联保企业放松了同伴监督,而风险基金并没有起到显著加固联保关系的作用。这提示信贷人员风险基金虽然有补偿保障,但仍应注意保持对这些联保贷款小组的贷后检查。
最后,针对研究结果,提出加强小微企业信用互助的相关政策建议。分别为：鼓励小微企业建立信用互助联盟,拓宽融资渠道；健全非正规金融制度；法治与社会规范相辅相承；加强社会信用体系建设,防范失信行为；借助社会资本,组建小微企业信用互助担保机构。
To promote the development of small and micro enterprises in countryside and county to solve the surplus rural labor force, increase the income of farmers and rural residents, and promote the stability of the township and village social life has a positive effect. However, in terms of financing, small and micro enterprises in countryside and county are faced with many difficulties. In2011, the national development research institute of Peking University jointly Alibaba group released "the research report on small enterprises management and financing problems" showed that in financing needs of small enterprises, small enterprises financing through by friends and relatives and folk lending accounted for50%, small enterprises financing through by the banks and rural credit cooperatives and other traditional financial institutions accounted for only21%, with22%of small enterprises had never got loans; The loan interest rates of banks for small and medium-sized enterprises rose generally at about30%. In the reality of the formal finance lack of strong support for small and micro enterprises financing, the informal financing has advantage in the information cost and the transaction cost is low, the procedure is convenient and flexible and so on, it plays an important role to solve the problem of financing for small and micro enterprises. This study takes small and micro enterprises in our countryside and county for example, and analyses the behavior of credit mutual help of small and micro enterprises from the perspective of social capital, it conforms the current thought to promote the development of small and micro enterprises for the country and society, it also has significance to solve the current financing predicament for small and micro enterprises and guide the private capital into the financial field orderly.
This research divides and defines the type of credit mutual help and the connecting link of credit mutual help for small and micro enterprises. Bases on the theory of institutional economics and social capital, the behavior of credit mutual help for small and micro enterprises analyzed in theory. On this bases, uses the empirical analyze the social capital to the influence of behavior of informal credit mutual help and behavior of supervise for the small and micro enterprises, as well as the social network relations to the influence of peer supervision for the group lending and willingness of cooperation again for group enterprises. Finally, puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions on credit mutual help for small and micro enterprises. The specific contents of the research are as follows:
First, the types of credit mutual help for small and micro enterprises are divided into two categories:formal credit support and informal credit support,and the connecting link of credit mutual help are divided into six categories, respectively: blood kinship, geopolitics; Financial broker, silverback; industry associations, chamber of commerce; supply chain financing; government matchmaking; financial intermediary platform.
Second, bases on institutional economics, this paper analyzes the production and change in credit mutual help for small and micro enterprises. Bases on social capital theory, it analyzes mechanism in the social capital to credit mutual help for small and micro enterprises, and social support, human feelings and trust to impact credit mutual help for small and micro enterprises.
Third, it takes country small and micro enterprises in Fujian province as a sample, adopts the method of questionnaire survey to collect data, uses exploratory factor analysis, logistic regression analysis and multiple linear regression analysis and other statistical methods, analyzes the social capital to the influence of behavior of informal credit mutual help and behavior of supervise for the small and micro enterprises. The study found that the reciprocity,human feelings and friends to help social interaction, social dependence and trust were four social capital factors, there were significant positive correlation with loans will of informal credit mutual help lending, it explained that the social capital of small and micro enterprises could promote the lender willing to provide informal credit mutual help lending; there were significant positive correlation between social interaction and social dependence and informal credit borrowing and post-loan supervision.
Fourth, the use of survey data of group lending in a commercial bank, analyzes the influence in the social network relations to peer supervision in group lending and willingness of cooperation again for group enterprises. Studies show that business owners won't because know for a long time and ignore joint liability to take the amplification effect of risks. But get to know each other long time, it strengthens the will of cooperation again; the cost of mutual supervision in distance of similar enterprise is low, but the group enterprises are not based on distance to decide whether to continue the coinsurance relationship; there is a positive effect in cooperation between enterprises and business transactions to reduce information asymmetry in joint guarantee and maintain the stability of the relationship; Because the risk fund has the compensatory function, the group enterprises relax peer supervision, but risk fund does not have the effect of reinforcement of group relations. This reminds the credit officers that there is a compensation for risk fund, but still should pay attention to keep the post-loan inspection in group lending.
Finally, on the results of the study, put forward to related policy and suggestions to strengthen credit mutual help for small and micro enterprises. Small and micro enterprises are encouraged to establish credit mutual union, broaden the financing channels; perfecting informal financal system; the rule of law and social norms are in full accord; strengthening the construction of social credit system and guarding against bad credit behaviors; with the aid of social capital, to form credit mutual guarantee organisations of small and micro enterprises.
引文
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