美国刑事诉讼法对隐私权的保护
|
摘要
美国刑事诉讼法对隐私权的保护途径与现实意义,及其所体现的刑事程序权力控制的基本思路,是本文研究的核心。
刑事司法权力的运用是“公民个体一国家"间紧张关系的焦点。风险社会中,公民对隐私及自主性的强烈需求与刑事司法权对隐私所造成的巨大危险同时成为不可否认的客观存在。美国刑事诉讼法的与众不同之处在于,特别关注隐私权在建立公民个体与国家间平衡关系过程中的特殊作用,以刑事司法权力控制为核心,通过正当程序防御权力对个人领域的不合理侵犯。在国家权力最为集中与强大的刑事诉讼领域,隐私权作为一种权力控制工具被反复论证,并通过上升至宪法层面的权利条款(如不被非法搜查与扣押的权利、不被强迫自证己罪的特权等),在与国家权力的不断衡平中争取着个人自由与价值的最大实现,并现实地解答着司法实践中存在的各种困惑。
美国人在隐私权的价值与功能方面有着独到的见解,并在处理隐私与刑事司法权力的关系问题上做出了里程碑式的历史贡献。隐私权成为支撑刑事诉讼法两大权利条款判例逻辑分析的核心(如作为宪法第四修正案基础的“合理的隐私期待”标准,作为宪法第五修正案基础的隐士理论)。美国人对隐私的突出重视及其在立法、司法与政策方面的特别设计,是对自由主义、法治原则,以及反抗政府侵扰公民私人事务的自由原则的制度实践,体现了美国人所特有的生活认知及其对自由主义的向往。美国在刑事诉讼法对隐私权保护问题上的基本思路是：对宪法隐私权给予基本认可,从限制国家权力滥用的角度通过宪法第四、第五修正案的一系列诉讼确立刑事诉讼法所关注隐私利益的具体范围,形成刑事诉讼法中隐私权的自有范畴；同时不否认公共政策在隐私利益保护问题上的重要作用,强调通过行政性立法与规范调节个人隐私与国家权力、社会公共权力之间的利益平衡,以弥补宪法性隐私权及成文法的不足。
美国隐私权刑事诉讼法保护研究的核心意义在于,刑事诉讼法中个人隐私对公权力,特别是刑事司法权的限制作用。风险社会中,国家权力成为个人隐私的最大威胁。国家以各种可见或不可见的方式深入到私人生活的各个领域,掌控着构成每个公民个体身份的诸要素。而这些构成个人身份的要素,往往体现为个人隐私。隐私已成为构建公民个人主体性与独立性的基础,并因此具有独立的政治价值而成为国家政治民主制度的核心要素。基于隐私政治价值与道德价值的客观性与隐私范畴的不确定性,论文从“身份建构”(identity-building)的角度对隐私进行重新定义,认为隐私是现代社会中构成个人身份的核心要素,隐私权就是排除对个人身份不合理限制的自由。刑事诉讼法所关注的隐私利益包括空间隐私、人身隐私、信息隐私三部分,通过防范、排除公权力侵害实现对隐私利益的保障。公民个人生活的私密度与权力行使的透明度是两个互补的权力控制法律工具,“不被非法搜查与扣押的权利”、“不自证己罪的特权”与“非法证据排除规则”是其具体的制度体现。美国宪法中“不被非法搜查与扣押的权利”与“不自证己罪的特权”基于财产权利保护的理念产生,以沃伦法院时期卡兹案的判决为标志,确立了以隐私权为核心的逻辑分析方法,并逐步明确了刑事诉讼法中隐私保护的基本条件：隐私并不是一项全有或全无的权利,隐私的合理期待随着外部条件的变化而不同；隐私与人身、空间、财产权利亦无必然联系,而仅以其为载体；对隐私的合理期待必须具备主观与客观两方面的认可,个人情感不是隐私期待的充分必要条件；隐私本质具有非绝对性,因此国家安全经常作为权力侵害的免责事由。“合理的隐私期待”标准是美国宪法第四修正案“不被非法搜查与扣押权利”所蕴含的隐私保护理念发展的一条重要线索。1967年美国联邦最高法院在卡兹案的判决中确立了这一标准,进而在针对电子监听设备的限制使用、通讯隐私的保护限度的一系列判例中以风险承担理论为基础进二步细化了“合理的隐私期待”标准,将美国宪法第四修正案隐私利益保护的范围扩展至住宅、人身、文件与动产、部分公共或开放区域、电话与银行记录等方面。美国宪法第五修正案“不自证己罪的特权”与第四修正案在隐私保护方面有着密切的联系,经由“猎狐原理”至“妇人原理”再至“隐士原理”的法理诠释,隐私保护精神已被第五修正案充分接受。理论上,“不自证己罪的特权”主要对个人信息隐私提供一种原则性的保护,但其保护范围却深受刑事政策的影响,并通过缄默证据证明能力以及证人豁免等制度反复证明着隐私利益的非绝对性。美国宪法第四修正案与第五修正案的作用在于,通过规范制约政府获取刑事证据的方式保护个人隐私利益。对于警察违法取得证据的行为,则以“非法证据排除规则”为救济途径,捍卫隐私的政治理想。美国刑事非法证据排除的范围包括非法搜查、扣押取得的证据与自白。据此,警察以违法方式实施搜查、扣押所获取的证据不得作为认定被告有罪的证据,非出于“自愿”的刑事犯罪被告人对其涉嫌犯罪事实的自白不具有证据能力。“非法证据排除规则”作为公民个人隐私权利被国家刑事司法权力侵害时的最有效救济途径,与“不被非法搜查与扣押的权利”及“不自证己罪特权”结合,构成刑事诉讼法中隐私利益实现与国家权力控制的完整制度体系。
隐私不仅是一个法律问题,也是公共政策所关注的焦点。反恐斗争使国家在安全名义下对个人隐私的“合法”侵犯不断加剧,隐私、自由与安全反复较量。在法律社会化与行政国的背景下,政策制定者与立法者运用政策工具努力在公共权力与国家权力行使的目的与所采行的手段之间建立一种妥当、必要和均衡的关联。法律与政策作为两个互补的隐私保护与权力控制工具,共同作用形成了刑事诉讼法体系内隐私保护的基本制度：公共政策机动灵活地弥补立法的不足,并影响着刑事司法实践的方向；宪法与法律在更为抽象、更具一般性的层面对具体隐私利益进行直接保护。随着社会风险度的提高,特别是反恐斗争的深入,隐私权在刑事诉讼法中的地位与作用呈现出新的发展趋势：新型搜查、通讯监听、强制采样等强制处分措施的判断标准不断向安全目标靠拢；犯罪记录、DNA指纹数据等备存资讯的保存与公开标准必须与犯罪控制的目标协调；证人隐私与被害人隐私保护逐渐受到更多的关注。
通过研究,可以对建立在判例基础上的美国刑事诉讼法对隐私权的保护形成一些制度结论：犯罪嫌疑人、被告人、证人等刑事程序相关人员均享有隐私权,并可以此为抗辩事由对抗国家权力的侵害；刑事程序权力的行使必须遵循判例法规则,体现了对国家权力合法侵害隐私权范围的谨慎态度；搜查、扣押等强制处分与技术侦查措施严格遵循令状主义原则,实行第三方审查的外部监督机制；国家权力对隐私权的合法侵害遵循比例原则,将公民的隐私权损害降至最低；对非法侵害隐私权的权力行为给予充分救济,防范国家权力的滥用。
相较而言,隐私权从未成为我国刑事诉讼基本权利体系中的一员,也几乎从未有过以隐私保护为基础的重要刑事诉讼程序性制度设计。搜查、扣押、讯问与询问、强制采样、监视监听、证人隐私保护、被害人隐私保护、备存资讯的保存等涉及隐私的刑事诉讼环节仍有相当大的完善空间。借鉴域外经验,可尝试从以下几方面对我国刑事诉讼法中隐私保护与权力控制机制进行完善：第一,严格遵循“法律保留”原则,站在权力控制的立场,对搜查、扣押、通讯监听等侵害隐私的侦查行为进行立法完善；第二,建立司法审查令状主义原则,对公安检察机关的侦查权进行严格限制；第三,“遵循比例原则”,将权力行为对个人隐私的侵害降至最低限度；第四,建立权利保障与救济机制,明确权力违法运用的制裁措施；具体包括,建立非法证据排除规则对违法权力行为进行程序性制裁,完善国家赔偿制度,建立对滥用职权者个人的责任追究制度；第五,建立证人保护与补偿制度,明确证人拒绝作证的豁免规则。
隐私,基于其在个人主体性与独立性构建过程中的重要作用,及其对宪政民主制度的深刻政治价值,在公法特别是刑事诉讼法领域通过对公民人格的尊重与保护和对国家权力的监督与控制表现出独特的政治深意。放眼人类政治文明发展的历史长河,这是一次伟大的理念与制度的双重进步,值得我们全力以赴认真探究。
This article is focusing on the study of the approaches and realistic meaning regarding the power control oriented US procedural law protection to the right to privacy.
The operation of criminal procedural power is the central issue of the stressful relationship between the individual citizen and the state. In the society in peril, the strong requirement about privacy and autonomy from the citizens, together with the tremendous risk caused by criminal procedural power against privacy become the undeniably objective existence. It is special in the US procedural law that to give sufficient attention to the particular function which the right to privacy plays in the process of establishing the balanced relationship between the individual citizen and the state. In the area of criminal law which national power is extremely concentrated and reinforced, as a power-control tool, the right to privacy has been repeatedly verified and has been pushed up to the citizen right on the level of constitution,(for instance, right against unreasonable search and seizure, the privilege against Self-Incrimination). The right to privacy is centered by the criminal procedural power control, and it is protected in the private field from the unreasonable intrusion by power through due procedure. The right to privacy strives for the utmost realization of personal freedom and value in the process of balancing itself and the national power, and practically solves all kinds of confusions in the judicial practice.
The Americans have developed a unique understanding of the value and function of the right to privacy, and has made remarkable contribution to dealing with relations between the right to privacy and the criminal procedural power. The right to privacy is the core right on the basis of which logical analysis of cases of the two basic rights of criminal procedures are built (e.g. basic right in the Fourth Amendment, the "reasonable expectation of privacy", and the basic right in the Fifth Amendment, the "Hermit Theory"). The special importance the Americans attach to privacy is shown in specific designs of legislation, judiciary and policies. It is an institutional practice of liberalism, the rule of law, and the freedom to resist intrusion of government into people's private affairs. It reveals the American people's understanding of life and yearning for freedom. The major concept that America upholds in dealing with the relations between privacy and Criminal Procedure Law mainly includes:giving fundamental recognition to the right to privacy granted by the constitution; from the perspective of restricting misuse of state power, identifying the specific range of privacy rights concerned in the criminal procedure and forming the scope of the right to privacy in criminal procedure through the cases that led to the Fourth and the Fifth Amendment. Meanwhile, not denying the important role that public policy plays in protecting the right to privacy, emphasizing the balance of interests among privacy and state power and public power through administrative legislation and regulation, so as to make up the deficiency of privacy protection by constitution and common laws.
The core meaning of studying the protection of privacy by criminal procedures lies in the restriction effects that the right to privacy casts on public power and, especially, the criminal justice. In the society in peril, state power becomes the largest threat to privacy. The state permeates almost every aspect of private life in various visible and invisible ways, casting control on elements of citizen identity. While these elements that constitute a citizen's individual identity are the essences of privacy. Privacy has become the foundation of a citizen's subjectivity and independence, and therefore gained independent political value and become the core element of political democracy. Based on the objectivity of political and moral value of privacy, and uncertainty of the scope of privacy, this thesis redefines privacy from the perspective of "identity-building". It regards privacy as a core element that constitutes individual identity, and that privacy is the freedom to eliminate unreasonable restriction of individual identity. Criminal procedure protects the right to privacy by preventing and eliminating the intrusion from state power. It mainly concerns about the intrusion of solitude, public disclosure of private facts, and false light and appropriation. Privacy of personal life and the transparency of the excising of power are two complementary legal instruments of power control. The right against unreasonable search and seizure, the right against self-incrimination, and exclusionary rule of illegal evidence are the specific reflections of the system. The protection from unreasonable search and seizure and the right against self-incrimination are based on the idea of property protection. With Charles Katz v. United States as a milestone, the United States has developed logical analysis methods focused on protection of privacy, and gradually specified the basic conditions of protection of privacy in criminal procedures, which include:the right to privacy is not an all-or-nothing right, and the reasonable expectation of privacy varies according to the changes of external conditions; the right to privacy has no necessary connection with personal rights, personal space rights and property rights, but takes them as carriers; the reasonable expectation to privacy has to gain subjective and objective recognitions, and personal emotion is not a necessary and sufficient condition of expectation of privacy; the state security is often taken as an exemption due to the non-absolute nature of the right to privacy. The standard of "reasonable expectation of privacy" serves as an important clue for the development of the privacy protection concept embodied in "the right to against unreasonable searches and seizures" in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This standard was set up in Katz v. United States, a United States Supreme Court case in1967. Thereafter, based on the Theory of Risk Bearing, the standard of "reasonable expectation of privacy" was further refined in a series of legal precedents concerning the limited use of electronic monitoring equipments, and privacy protection of communications. In the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the scope of right of privacy is extended to persons, houses, papers, effects, some public or open areas, telephone and bank records, etc. The "right against self-incrimination" in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution is closed related to the privacy protection clause in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Through the legal interpretation of Fox Hunter's Theory, An Old Woman's Reason and Hermit Rationale, the spirit of privacy protection has been fully granted by the Fifth Amendment. Theoretically speaking, the "right against self-incrimination" provides a principled protection for the individual privacy. However, its scope of protection is influenced by policy and it constantly proves the non-absolutistic of private interests through silent evidence and witnesses immunity systems. The function of the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment is to protect individual privacy interests through regulating government's way of obtaining criminal evidence. For police's behavior of obtaining evidence through illegal means, the "criminal illegal exclusionary rules" would be used as the remedy approach, safeguarding the political ideal of privacy. The illegally obtained evidence includes illegal search or seizure, and evidence and confessions made subsequent to an illegal arrest. Accordingly, a defendant cannot be found guilty if evidence is achieved through illegal search and seizure, and involuntary confession made by a criminal defendant is the invalid evidence."Exclusionary rule of illegal evidence" acts as the most effective remedy approach when the citizen's individual privacy right is infringed by state criminal judicial power. These "exclusionary rule of illegal evidence ", combined with "the right against unreasonable searches and seizures" and the "right against self-incrimination", constituting a complete system achieving privacy interest and control of state power in Criminal Procedural Law.
Privacy is not only a legal issue, but also the focus of the public policies. In the name of safety, the "legal" violation of individual privacy by the country is constantly intensified because of the anti-terrorism. Privacy, freedom and safety launch repeated trial of strength. Under the circumstance of legal socialization and administrative state, with policy tools, police makers and legislators establish a proper, necessary and balanced link between the aims and approaches of public power and state power. As two complementary tools of privacy preservation and power controlling, laws and policies constitute the basic systems for privacy protection in the system of Criminal Procedure Law. Public policies can be used to make up the deficiency of legislation and influence the direction of the criminal justice practice. Constitution and laws directly protect concrete privacy interests in a common level. With the rising of social risks, especially the further battle of anti-terrorism, status and rules of privacy in Criminal Procedural Law indicate new trends that yardstick of compulsory measures like new searching, communication monitoring and compulsory sampling, should draw close to the security target; the saving and opening standard of backup information such as criminal record and DNA data group should be consistent with the target of criminal control; privacy of the witness and victims is getting increasing attention.
According to the above study, it can draw the following conclusion about the American privacy right's criminal procedural law based on the case law. Suspects, defendants, witnesses and other relevant personnel of the criminal proceedings have the right to privacy, which can be considered as the ground for defense to fight against the state power. The exercise of the criminal procedural power must abide by the rules of case law. It reflects the cautious attitudes towards the legitimate privacy violations by state power. Searching, seizure, other mandatory sanctions and technical investigation measures should strictly follow the principles of the writ, implementing the third-party review of external supervision mechanisms. The legitimate privacy violations by state power should follow the principle of proportion. The damage for citizens' right to privacy should be reduced to the minimum. Give full relief to the illegal invasion of privacy and prevent the abuse of state power.
Comparatively speaking, privacy has never been part of the basic rights of criminal proceedings and the criminal proceedings system has never been designed on the basis of privacy protection in our country. There is considerable room for improvement in the following aspects:searching, seizure, interrogation and inquiries, compulsory sampling, surveillance, protection of witnesses' privacy, protection of victims' privacy, preservation of information and other privacy-related criminal proceedings. Based on the experience from the abroad, the study has tentatively proposed that the privacy protection and power control mechanisms in the criminal procedure law can be improved from the following aspects:
Firstly, follow the principle of "legal reservation" strictly; hold the position of power control; improve the legislation on privacy infringement acts such as search, seizure and wiretapping.
Secondly, build the principle of judicial writ and restrict power of investigation.
Thirdly, abide by the principle of proportion and reduce the damage for citizens' privacy rights to the minimum.
Fourthly, establish the rights protection and relief mechanisms. Define sanction measures clearly for misuse of the authorities, which includes improving the state compensation system, imposing procedural sanctions on misuse of the authority by building illegal evidence exclusion rules and establishing individual accountability system to prevent misuse of the authority.
Fifthly, establish the protection and compensation system for witness and define the exemption rules explicitly for witnesses who refuse to testify.
Privacy plays an important role in constructing the individual subjectivity and independence and has profound political value for constitutional democracy. It is of distinct political significance for respecting and protecting the civil personality and supervising and controlling state power in public law, especially in the field of criminal procedural law. Looking back on the history of political civilization, it is the immense progress in concept and system and is worthwhile exploring.
刑事司法权力的运用是“公民个体一国家"间紧张关系的焦点。风险社会中,公民对隐私及自主性的强烈需求与刑事司法权对隐私所造成的巨大危险同时成为不可否认的客观存在。美国刑事诉讼法的与众不同之处在于,特别关注隐私权在建立公民个体与国家间平衡关系过程中的特殊作用,以刑事司法权力控制为核心,通过正当程序防御权力对个人领域的不合理侵犯。在国家权力最为集中与强大的刑事诉讼领域,隐私权作为一种权力控制工具被反复论证,并通过上升至宪法层面的权利条款(如不被非法搜查与扣押的权利、不被强迫自证己罪的特权等),在与国家权力的不断衡平中争取着个人自由与价值的最大实现,并现实地解答着司法实践中存在的各种困惑。
美国人在隐私权的价值与功能方面有着独到的见解,并在处理隐私与刑事司法权力的关系问题上做出了里程碑式的历史贡献。隐私权成为支撑刑事诉讼法两大权利条款判例逻辑分析的核心(如作为宪法第四修正案基础的“合理的隐私期待”标准,作为宪法第五修正案基础的隐士理论)。美国人对隐私的突出重视及其在立法、司法与政策方面的特别设计,是对自由主义、法治原则,以及反抗政府侵扰公民私人事务的自由原则的制度实践,体现了美国人所特有的生活认知及其对自由主义的向往。美国在刑事诉讼法对隐私权保护问题上的基本思路是：对宪法隐私权给予基本认可,从限制国家权力滥用的角度通过宪法第四、第五修正案的一系列诉讼确立刑事诉讼法所关注隐私利益的具体范围,形成刑事诉讼法中隐私权的自有范畴；同时不否认公共政策在隐私利益保护问题上的重要作用,强调通过行政性立法与规范调节个人隐私与国家权力、社会公共权力之间的利益平衡,以弥补宪法性隐私权及成文法的不足。
美国隐私权刑事诉讼法保护研究的核心意义在于,刑事诉讼法中个人隐私对公权力,特别是刑事司法权的限制作用。风险社会中,国家权力成为个人隐私的最大威胁。国家以各种可见或不可见的方式深入到私人生活的各个领域,掌控着构成每个公民个体身份的诸要素。而这些构成个人身份的要素,往往体现为个人隐私。隐私已成为构建公民个人主体性与独立性的基础,并因此具有独立的政治价值而成为国家政治民主制度的核心要素。基于隐私政治价值与道德价值的客观性与隐私范畴的不确定性,论文从“身份建构”(identity-building)的角度对隐私进行重新定义,认为隐私是现代社会中构成个人身份的核心要素,隐私权就是排除对个人身份不合理限制的自由。刑事诉讼法所关注的隐私利益包括空间隐私、人身隐私、信息隐私三部分,通过防范、排除公权力侵害实现对隐私利益的保障。公民个人生活的私密度与权力行使的透明度是两个互补的权力控制法律工具,“不被非法搜查与扣押的权利”、“不自证己罪的特权”与“非法证据排除规则”是其具体的制度体现。美国宪法中“不被非法搜查与扣押的权利”与“不自证己罪的特权”基于财产权利保护的理念产生,以沃伦法院时期卡兹案的判决为标志,确立了以隐私权为核心的逻辑分析方法,并逐步明确了刑事诉讼法中隐私保护的基本条件：隐私并不是一项全有或全无的权利,隐私的合理期待随着外部条件的变化而不同；隐私与人身、空间、财产权利亦无必然联系,而仅以其为载体；对隐私的合理期待必须具备主观与客观两方面的认可,个人情感不是隐私期待的充分必要条件；隐私本质具有非绝对性,因此国家安全经常作为权力侵害的免责事由。“合理的隐私期待”标准是美国宪法第四修正案“不被非法搜查与扣押权利”所蕴含的隐私保护理念发展的一条重要线索。1967年美国联邦最高法院在卡兹案的判决中确立了这一标准,进而在针对电子监听设备的限制使用、通讯隐私的保护限度的一系列判例中以风险承担理论为基础进二步细化了“合理的隐私期待”标准,将美国宪法第四修正案隐私利益保护的范围扩展至住宅、人身、文件与动产、部分公共或开放区域、电话与银行记录等方面。美国宪法第五修正案“不自证己罪的特权”与第四修正案在隐私保护方面有着密切的联系,经由“猎狐原理”至“妇人原理”再至“隐士原理”的法理诠释,隐私保护精神已被第五修正案充分接受。理论上,“不自证己罪的特权”主要对个人信息隐私提供一种原则性的保护,但其保护范围却深受刑事政策的影响,并通过缄默证据证明能力以及证人豁免等制度反复证明着隐私利益的非绝对性。美国宪法第四修正案与第五修正案的作用在于,通过规范制约政府获取刑事证据的方式保护个人隐私利益。对于警察违法取得证据的行为,则以“非法证据排除规则”为救济途径,捍卫隐私的政治理想。美国刑事非法证据排除的范围包括非法搜查、扣押取得的证据与自白。据此,警察以违法方式实施搜查、扣押所获取的证据不得作为认定被告有罪的证据,非出于“自愿”的刑事犯罪被告人对其涉嫌犯罪事实的自白不具有证据能力。“非法证据排除规则”作为公民个人隐私权利被国家刑事司法权力侵害时的最有效救济途径,与“不被非法搜查与扣押的权利”及“不自证己罪特权”结合,构成刑事诉讼法中隐私利益实现与国家权力控制的完整制度体系。
隐私不仅是一个法律问题,也是公共政策所关注的焦点。反恐斗争使国家在安全名义下对个人隐私的“合法”侵犯不断加剧,隐私、自由与安全反复较量。在法律社会化与行政国的背景下,政策制定者与立法者运用政策工具努力在公共权力与国家权力行使的目的与所采行的手段之间建立一种妥当、必要和均衡的关联。法律与政策作为两个互补的隐私保护与权力控制工具,共同作用形成了刑事诉讼法体系内隐私保护的基本制度：公共政策机动灵活地弥补立法的不足,并影响着刑事司法实践的方向；宪法与法律在更为抽象、更具一般性的层面对具体隐私利益进行直接保护。随着社会风险度的提高,特别是反恐斗争的深入,隐私权在刑事诉讼法中的地位与作用呈现出新的发展趋势：新型搜查、通讯监听、强制采样等强制处分措施的判断标准不断向安全目标靠拢；犯罪记录、DNA指纹数据等备存资讯的保存与公开标准必须与犯罪控制的目标协调；证人隐私与被害人隐私保护逐渐受到更多的关注。
通过研究,可以对建立在判例基础上的美国刑事诉讼法对隐私权的保护形成一些制度结论：犯罪嫌疑人、被告人、证人等刑事程序相关人员均享有隐私权,并可以此为抗辩事由对抗国家权力的侵害；刑事程序权力的行使必须遵循判例法规则,体现了对国家权力合法侵害隐私权范围的谨慎态度；搜查、扣押等强制处分与技术侦查措施严格遵循令状主义原则,实行第三方审查的外部监督机制；国家权力对隐私权的合法侵害遵循比例原则,将公民的隐私权损害降至最低；对非法侵害隐私权的权力行为给予充分救济,防范国家权力的滥用。
相较而言,隐私权从未成为我国刑事诉讼基本权利体系中的一员,也几乎从未有过以隐私保护为基础的重要刑事诉讼程序性制度设计。搜查、扣押、讯问与询问、强制采样、监视监听、证人隐私保护、被害人隐私保护、备存资讯的保存等涉及隐私的刑事诉讼环节仍有相当大的完善空间。借鉴域外经验,可尝试从以下几方面对我国刑事诉讼法中隐私保护与权力控制机制进行完善：第一,严格遵循“法律保留”原则,站在权力控制的立场,对搜查、扣押、通讯监听等侵害隐私的侦查行为进行立法完善；第二,建立司法审查令状主义原则,对公安检察机关的侦查权进行严格限制；第三,“遵循比例原则”,将权力行为对个人隐私的侵害降至最低限度；第四,建立权利保障与救济机制,明确权力违法运用的制裁措施；具体包括,建立非法证据排除规则对违法权力行为进行程序性制裁,完善国家赔偿制度,建立对滥用职权者个人的责任追究制度；第五,建立证人保护与补偿制度,明确证人拒绝作证的豁免规则。
隐私,基于其在个人主体性与独立性构建过程中的重要作用,及其对宪政民主制度的深刻政治价值,在公法特别是刑事诉讼法领域通过对公民人格的尊重与保护和对国家权力的监督与控制表现出独特的政治深意。放眼人类政治文明发展的历史长河,这是一次伟大的理念与制度的双重进步,值得我们全力以赴认真探究。
This article is focusing on the study of the approaches and realistic meaning regarding the power control oriented US procedural law protection to the right to privacy.
The operation of criminal procedural power is the central issue of the stressful relationship between the individual citizen and the state. In the society in peril, the strong requirement about privacy and autonomy from the citizens, together with the tremendous risk caused by criminal procedural power against privacy become the undeniably objective existence. It is special in the US procedural law that to give sufficient attention to the particular function which the right to privacy plays in the process of establishing the balanced relationship between the individual citizen and the state. In the area of criminal law which national power is extremely concentrated and reinforced, as a power-control tool, the right to privacy has been repeatedly verified and has been pushed up to the citizen right on the level of constitution,(for instance, right against unreasonable search and seizure, the privilege against Self-Incrimination). The right to privacy is centered by the criminal procedural power control, and it is protected in the private field from the unreasonable intrusion by power through due procedure. The right to privacy strives for the utmost realization of personal freedom and value in the process of balancing itself and the national power, and practically solves all kinds of confusions in the judicial practice.
The Americans have developed a unique understanding of the value and function of the right to privacy, and has made remarkable contribution to dealing with relations between the right to privacy and the criminal procedural power. The right to privacy is the core right on the basis of which logical analysis of cases of the two basic rights of criminal procedures are built (e.g. basic right in the Fourth Amendment, the "reasonable expectation of privacy", and the basic right in the Fifth Amendment, the "Hermit Theory"). The special importance the Americans attach to privacy is shown in specific designs of legislation, judiciary and policies. It is an institutional practice of liberalism, the rule of law, and the freedom to resist intrusion of government into people's private affairs. It reveals the American people's understanding of life and yearning for freedom. The major concept that America upholds in dealing with the relations between privacy and Criminal Procedure Law mainly includes:giving fundamental recognition to the right to privacy granted by the constitution; from the perspective of restricting misuse of state power, identifying the specific range of privacy rights concerned in the criminal procedure and forming the scope of the right to privacy in criminal procedure through the cases that led to the Fourth and the Fifth Amendment. Meanwhile, not denying the important role that public policy plays in protecting the right to privacy, emphasizing the balance of interests among privacy and state power and public power through administrative legislation and regulation, so as to make up the deficiency of privacy protection by constitution and common laws.
The core meaning of studying the protection of privacy by criminal procedures lies in the restriction effects that the right to privacy casts on public power and, especially, the criminal justice. In the society in peril, state power becomes the largest threat to privacy. The state permeates almost every aspect of private life in various visible and invisible ways, casting control on elements of citizen identity. While these elements that constitute a citizen's individual identity are the essences of privacy. Privacy has become the foundation of a citizen's subjectivity and independence, and therefore gained independent political value and become the core element of political democracy. Based on the objectivity of political and moral value of privacy, and uncertainty of the scope of privacy, this thesis redefines privacy from the perspective of "identity-building". It regards privacy as a core element that constitutes individual identity, and that privacy is the freedom to eliminate unreasonable restriction of individual identity. Criminal procedure protects the right to privacy by preventing and eliminating the intrusion from state power. It mainly concerns about the intrusion of solitude, public disclosure of private facts, and false light and appropriation. Privacy of personal life and the transparency of the excising of power are two complementary legal instruments of power control. The right against unreasonable search and seizure, the right against self-incrimination, and exclusionary rule of illegal evidence are the specific reflections of the system. The protection from unreasonable search and seizure and the right against self-incrimination are based on the idea of property protection. With Charles Katz v. United States as a milestone, the United States has developed logical analysis methods focused on protection of privacy, and gradually specified the basic conditions of protection of privacy in criminal procedures, which include:the right to privacy is not an all-or-nothing right, and the reasonable expectation of privacy varies according to the changes of external conditions; the right to privacy has no necessary connection with personal rights, personal space rights and property rights, but takes them as carriers; the reasonable expectation to privacy has to gain subjective and objective recognitions, and personal emotion is not a necessary and sufficient condition of expectation of privacy; the state security is often taken as an exemption due to the non-absolute nature of the right to privacy. The standard of "reasonable expectation of privacy" serves as an important clue for the development of the privacy protection concept embodied in "the right to against unreasonable searches and seizures" in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This standard was set up in Katz v. United States, a United States Supreme Court case in1967. Thereafter, based on the Theory of Risk Bearing, the standard of "reasonable expectation of privacy" was further refined in a series of legal precedents concerning the limited use of electronic monitoring equipments, and privacy protection of communications. In the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the scope of right of privacy is extended to persons, houses, papers, effects, some public or open areas, telephone and bank records, etc. The "right against self-incrimination" in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution is closed related to the privacy protection clause in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Through the legal interpretation of Fox Hunter's Theory, An Old Woman's Reason and Hermit Rationale, the spirit of privacy protection has been fully granted by the Fifth Amendment. Theoretically speaking, the "right against self-incrimination" provides a principled protection for the individual privacy. However, its scope of protection is influenced by policy and it constantly proves the non-absolutistic of private interests through silent evidence and witnesses immunity systems. The function of the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment is to protect individual privacy interests through regulating government's way of obtaining criminal evidence. For police's behavior of obtaining evidence through illegal means, the "criminal illegal exclusionary rules" would be used as the remedy approach, safeguarding the political ideal of privacy. The illegally obtained evidence includes illegal search or seizure, and evidence and confessions made subsequent to an illegal arrest. Accordingly, a defendant cannot be found guilty if evidence is achieved through illegal search and seizure, and involuntary confession made by a criminal defendant is the invalid evidence."Exclusionary rule of illegal evidence" acts as the most effective remedy approach when the citizen's individual privacy right is infringed by state criminal judicial power. These "exclusionary rule of illegal evidence ", combined with "the right against unreasonable searches and seizures" and the "right against self-incrimination", constituting a complete system achieving privacy interest and control of state power in Criminal Procedural Law.
Privacy is not only a legal issue, but also the focus of the public policies. In the name of safety, the "legal" violation of individual privacy by the country is constantly intensified because of the anti-terrorism. Privacy, freedom and safety launch repeated trial of strength. Under the circumstance of legal socialization and administrative state, with policy tools, police makers and legislators establish a proper, necessary and balanced link between the aims and approaches of public power and state power. As two complementary tools of privacy preservation and power controlling, laws and policies constitute the basic systems for privacy protection in the system of Criminal Procedure Law. Public policies can be used to make up the deficiency of legislation and influence the direction of the criminal justice practice. Constitution and laws directly protect concrete privacy interests in a common level. With the rising of social risks, especially the further battle of anti-terrorism, status and rules of privacy in Criminal Procedural Law indicate new trends that yardstick of compulsory measures like new searching, communication monitoring and compulsory sampling, should draw close to the security target; the saving and opening standard of backup information such as criminal record and DNA data group should be consistent with the target of criminal control; privacy of the witness and victims is getting increasing attention.
According to the above study, it can draw the following conclusion about the American privacy right's criminal procedural law based on the case law. Suspects, defendants, witnesses and other relevant personnel of the criminal proceedings have the right to privacy, which can be considered as the ground for defense to fight against the state power. The exercise of the criminal procedural power must abide by the rules of case law. It reflects the cautious attitudes towards the legitimate privacy violations by state power. Searching, seizure, other mandatory sanctions and technical investigation measures should strictly follow the principles of the writ, implementing the third-party review of external supervision mechanisms. The legitimate privacy violations by state power should follow the principle of proportion. The damage for citizens' right to privacy should be reduced to the minimum. Give full relief to the illegal invasion of privacy and prevent the abuse of state power.
Comparatively speaking, privacy has never been part of the basic rights of criminal proceedings and the criminal proceedings system has never been designed on the basis of privacy protection in our country. There is considerable room for improvement in the following aspects:searching, seizure, interrogation and inquiries, compulsory sampling, surveillance, protection of witnesses' privacy, protection of victims' privacy, preservation of information and other privacy-related criminal proceedings. Based on the experience from the abroad, the study has tentatively proposed that the privacy protection and power control mechanisms in the criminal procedure law can be improved from the following aspects:
Firstly, follow the principle of "legal reservation" strictly; hold the position of power control; improve the legislation on privacy infringement acts such as search, seizure and wiretapping.
Secondly, build the principle of judicial writ and restrict power of investigation.
Thirdly, abide by the principle of proportion and reduce the damage for citizens' privacy rights to the minimum.
Fourthly, establish the rights protection and relief mechanisms. Define sanction measures clearly for misuse of the authorities, which includes improving the state compensation system, imposing procedural sanctions on misuse of the authority by building illegal evidence exclusion rules and establishing individual accountability system to prevent misuse of the authority.
Fifthly, establish the protection and compensation system for witness and define the exemption rules explicitly for witnesses who refuse to testify.
Privacy plays an important role in constructing the individual subjectivity and independence and has profound political value for constitutional democracy. It is of distinct political significance for respecting and protecting the civil personality and supervising and controlling state power in public law, especially in the field of criminal procedural law. Looking back on the history of political civilization, it is the immense progress in concept and system and is worthwhile exploring.
引文
[①] "Cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Right have penumbras formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in it's prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searcher and seizures.'The Fifth Amendment in it's Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides:'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."' Griswold v. Connecticut,482 U. S.479 (1965).
[②][英]约翰·密尔：《论自由》,程崇华译,商务印书馆(1959),第14页。
[①] E. Bloustein, privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity (1992) Wis. L, Rev.1335.
[②] "...but it also has profound significance for the public order. The restraints imposed on government to pry into the lives of the citizen go to the essence of a democratic state." R. v. Dyment, S. C. J,No.82, (1988),2 S. C. R.428.
[③][台】李震山：《人性尊严与人权保障》,台北：元照出版公司(1999)。
[①] "A necessary element of those ends love, respect, and trust; it draws its significance from them. And yet since privacy is only an element of those ends, not the whole value, we have not felt inclined to attribute privacy ultimate significance." Charles Fried, An Anatomy of Values, Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press (1970). At p.138.
[②]参考：[美]波斯纳,《论隐私权》,常鹏翱译,梁慧星主编《民商法论丛》第21卷,金桥文化出版(香港)有限公司(2001),第347页。
[③]阿丽塔·L.艾伦、理查德·C.托克音顿：《美国隐私法—学说、判例与立法》,冯建妹、石宏、郝倩、刘相文、许开辰等译,北京：中国民主法制出版社(2004),第175页。
[①]参见：David Archard. The value of Privacy. Edited by Erik claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the criminal law (2006). At p.29-30.
[②]Anthony D. Amato, Comment Professor Posner's Lecture on Privacy, J.12 Georgia Law Review (1978). at p.499-500.
[②]张千帆：《西方宪政体系(下册·欧洲宪法)》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(2001),第392页。
[①] "There are very many things that individuals should not do to one another and which the criminal law rightly proscribes. Violating privacy-as this is defined by most philosophers-is not one of them. There are also very many significant interests that individuals have which should be protected by the provision of right. Privacy-as defined by most philosophers-is not one of them." David Archard, The value of privacy. Edited by Erik claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the criminal law (2006). At p.31.
[②]"A right to be let alone." Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 Harvard Law Review 193 (1890).
[①] Daniel J. Solove, Information Privacy Law, Marc Rotenberg (2003), at p.24.转引自屠振宇《宪法隐私权研究：一项未列举基本权利的理论论证》,北京：法律出版社(2008),第90页。
[②]参见《荷兰数据保护法》第16条,《葡萄牙个人数据保护法》第7条,《阿根廷个人数据保护法》第2条。转引自周汉华主编《个人信息保护前沿问题研究》,北京：法律出版社(2006)。
[③] Mireille Hildebrandt. Privacy and Identity. Edited by Erik Claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the Criminal Law (2006). At p.44.
[①]"All these approaches rely on four fallacious assumptions:(1) privacy denotes primarily the seclusion or withdrawal of an individual from public affairs, (2) privacy entails a right, (3) privacy presumably is essentially voluntary, and (4) privacy is meaningful by virtue of either its intrinsic worth or its instrumental value." David M. O'Brien, privacy, law, And Public Policy, at p.4.
[②] "Privacy is an interest or condition which derives from and is automatically secured by the protection of more recognizable rights." Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean by 'Right to Privacy'? 4 South Dakota Law Review 1.20 (1959).
[③] David Archard, The value of privacy. Edited by Erik claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the criminal law(2006).At p.22.
[④] A.L. Allen, Uneasy Access, Privacy for Women in a Free Society, Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield (1988) at p.15.
[⑤] 1993 S.C.J. NO.97, (1993),3 S.C.R.281 at p.293.
[⑥]"Not every loss or gain of control over information about ourselves is a loss or gain of privacy." Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy,27 Rutgers Law Review 275, at p.280-81 (1974).
[⑦]"Privacy is not identical with control over access to oneself, because not all privacy is chosen...Privacy refers to a condition of life and, as such, has no necessary connection with control over personal information." David M. O'Brien. Privacy, Law, and Public Policy. At p.15.
[①]Stanley A. Cohen, privacy, Crime and Terror:Legal Rights and Security in a Time of Peril. At p.13.
[②][英]梅因：《古代法》,沈景一译,北京：商务印书馆(1959),第97页。
[①][英]罗奇：《重新思考公民身份：现代社会中的福利、意识形态和变迁》,郭忠华译,长春：吉林出版集团有限责任公司(2010.1),第7页。
[②]Iredell Jenkins, Law and the Image of Man'in Social Order and Limits of Law:A Theoretical Essay. Princeton University Press (1980). At p.314.
[①] "Privacy in the information age is best conceived as the maintenance of metaphorical boundaries that define the contours of personal identity." A. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:Technology, Privacy and Human Emotions (2002) 65 Law and Contemporary Problems (No.2) 125 at p.131.
[②]Ibid.Atp.152.
[③] "If you define personal information as a set of true facts that identify a person as an individual, you imply a static conception of identity:it presumes that the core of an individual, it presumes that the core of an individual can be fixed for identification (data of birth, nationality, eye color, gender etc.)." Mireille Hildebrandt,'Privacy and Identity'. Edited by Erik claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the criminal law (2006). At P.51.
[④]Mireille Hildebrandt, Privacy and Identity. Edited by Erik claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the criminal law (2006). At P.51.
[①] Ibid, at p.45.
[②]"... the core of privacy is to be found in the idea of identity-not only because in our information society it is precisely the advance of high-tech identification technologies that raises questions of privacy-protection, but also because the process of identity-building is what is at stake in privacy." Mireille Hildebrandt,'Privacy and Identity'. Edited by Erik claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the criminal law (2006). At P.50.
[①] "The right to privacy is the freedom from unreasonable constraints on the construction of one's own identity." P.E.. Agre and M. Rotenberg, Technology and Privacy:The new Landscape, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT (2001), at p.7.
[②]I. Altman, The Environment and Social Behavior. Privacy Personal Space Territory Crowding, Montery, Brooks/Cole, (1975).
[①]该条规定：无人应遭受对其隐私、家庭、住宅或通讯的任意干预,也不应遭受对其荣誉和名声的攻击。每个人均享有受法律保护以对抗干预或攻击的权利。
[①] "Privacy claims appear to fall roughly into three major categories, relating to property, to the person, and to information. What runs through all three, and is indeed the force attracting them into one constellation, is the fundamental principle that there are realms-in a physical sense, in which an individual may, as an attribute of his personality, demand to be let alone to do as he sees fit." Citing, Department of Communications and Department of Justice, Canada, Report of the Task Force on Privacy and Computers (Ottawa:Information Canada,1972), Privacy Task Force Report, at p.13.
[①] R v. Mills,1999 S. C. J. No.68, (1999),3 S. C. R.735.
[②] California v. Ciraolo.476 U. S.207 (1986)本案中,警方为调查嫌疑人是否在家中种植大麻,使用飞机在其住宅上方约1000英尺的上空对嫌疑人用栅栏围起的庭院进行空中观察。
[①]如1984年美国Oliver v. United States案(446 U.S.1701984)认为,对于开放性区域,即使个人持有隐私的主观期待,社会也不承认这种期待的合理性。
[①] "It would make a mockery of the Charter to allow governments to extinguish a legitimate expectation of privacy by simply informing citizens that their movements and activities may be monitored; particularly where the area monitored is a central public space heavily used for commerce, leisure, travel, and social interaction. Whether a person has a subjective expectation of privacy may be a factor in some circumstances. But the fundamental question is whether a reasonable person would consider that the investigative technique so trenches on individual privacy that the state should be required to establish cause before a neutral arbiter." Privacy Commissioner of Canada, opinion of La Forest J. regarding video surveillance, April 5,2002, available online at
[②]R. v. Stillman, (1997) S. C. J. No.34,1997 1 S.C. R.607.
[③]加拿大《权利与自由宪章》第7条规定：每个人都有生存、人身自由和安全的权利,除非“依据基本正义的原则”,不得剥夺。第8条规定：人人都有权不受不合理的搜查和扣押。
[④]410 U.S.1,7-12(1973).
[①]P.G.&J.H.v.United Kingdom.该案中,警察为获取该嫌疑人的声音样本,秘密录制了警察局里警官与嫌疑人的谈话。申请人将该案提交给了欧洲人权法院,主张政府侵犯了《欧洲人权公约》第八条赋予的“私生活”的权利。而政府主张,录音只是为了获取其声音文件而非实质的通讯内容,申请人的声音特质属于“公共的、外部的特征”。
[①] "The forced entry into an apartment in order to locate the caller and determine the reason for the call constitutes a justifiable use of police powers. The police, however, do not have a further authority to search the premises or otherwise intrude on a resident's privacy or property." R. v. Godoy,1998 S. C. J. No.85, (1999) I S. C. R.311.
[②]"Strip searches...in addition to reasonable and probable grounds justifying the arrest, the police must be able to establish reasonable and probable grounds justifying the need for a trip search...consistent with this, strip searches generally may only be conducted at the police station..." R. v. Golden,2001 S. C. J. No.81, (2001) 3 S. C. R.679. Canada.
[①]阿丽塔·L.艾伦、理查德·C.托克音顿：《美国隐私法—学说、判例与立法》,冯建妹、石宏、郝倩、刘相文、许开辰等译,北京：中国民主法制出版社(2004),第134-135页。
[①]Griswold v.Connecticut,482 U.S.(1965).在本案中,最高法院认为属于私权的行为仅仅涉及私人之间的利害关系而并不侵害社会利益,因此不应当被犯罪化,据此决定使一个把传播避孕工具消息定为犯罪的州法律失去效力。
[①] "Cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Right have penumbras formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in it's prohibition against the quartering of soldiers'in any house 'in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searcher and seizures.'The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.'" Griswold v. Connecticut,482 U. S.479 (1965).
[②]Justice Ian Binnie, Canada, Speech at a Symposium on "Counterterrorism and the Rule of Law", at the University of Ottawa Law School, Ottawa, Ontario, March 18,2005. Citing, Stanley A. Cohen, Privacy, Crime and Terror-Legal Rights and Security in a Time of Peril, at p.539.
[①] "The balance struck between common law police power and individual liberties puts a premium on individual freedom and makes crime prevention and peacekeeping more difficult for the police. In some situations, the requirement that there must be areal risk of imminent harm before the police can interfere with individual rights will leave the police powerless to prevent crime. The efficacy of laws controlling the relationship between the police and the individual is not, however, measured only from the perspective of crime control and public safety. We want to be safe, but we need to be free." Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force,1998 O.J. No.5274,21 C.R. (5th) 1 (C.A.).
[②] "This is the fate of democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it, and not all methods employed by its enemies are open to it. Sometimes, a democracy must fight with one hand tied behind its back."H.C.5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel,53(4) P.D.817, at p.845, cited in A. Barak, "Foreword:A Judge on Judging:The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy" (2002),116 Harv. L. Rev.16, at p.148.
[③] "Nonetheless, it has the upper hand. Preserving the rule of law and recognition of individual liberties constitute an important component of its understanding of security." A. Barak, "Foreword:A Judge on Judging:The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy" (2002),116 Harv. L. Rev.16, at p.148..
[④]张千帆、赵娟、黄建军：《比较行政法：体系、制度与过程》,北京：法律出版社(2008),第15页。
[①] "An abstract is a general political aim the statement of which does not indicate how that general aim is to be weighted or compromised in particular circumstances against other political aims...Abstract rights in this way provide argument for concrete rights, but the claim of a concrete right is more definite than any claim of abstract right that supports it...Concrete rights...are political aims that are more precisely defined so as to express more definitely the weight they may have against other political aim on particular occasions." Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases,88 Harvard Law Review (1975), at p.1070.
[①]向燕：《美国最高法院‘隐私的合理期待’标准之评介》,《中国刑事法杂志》(2008年第5期)。
[①]'"... property rights reflect society's explicit recognition of a person's authority to act as he wishes in certain areas, and therefore should be considered in determining whether an individual's expectations of privacy are reasonable." Rakas v. Illinois,99 S. CT.421,435 (1978).
[①]v. United States,116 U. S. (1886).
[②] Ibid.,630 (1886). "...It is not the breaking of his doors, and rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal liberty and private property."
[③] Olmstead v. United States,227 U. S.438 (1928).
[④] 389 U. S.347 (1967) at p.351.
[①]96U.S.727(1877).
[②]277U. S.438(1928).
[③] Ibid.
[①] "...we might derive two distinct senses in which the state might wrongfully interfere with our privacy. Firstly, the state might wrongfully invade our privacy through surveillance of our private lives. It does this when it watches us in circumstances where we ought not to be watched. Secondly, the state might prohibit what are essentially private matters. It does this by declaring as crimes, public wrongs..." Victor Tadros, Power and the Value of Privacy, Privacy and the Criminal Law, edited by Erik Claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Hart Publishing (2006), at p.106.
[②]Ibid., at p.107-108.
[①][德]马克思·韦伯：《论经济与社会中的法律》,北京：中国大百科全书出版社(1998),第343页。
[①]关于个人家庭隐私限制的严格审查标准由哈兰大法官在1961年Poe v. Ullman案中提出,并在4年后的Griswold v. Connecticut案中得到确认,认为州政府必须证明立法手段不仅与合法目标合理相关,而且对实现目标必不可少,其对权利剥夺的法律才具有合宪性。
[②]王广辉：《比较宪法学》,北京：北京大学出版社(2007),第173页。
[②]李建良：《基本权利与国家保护义务》,《宪法理论与实践(二)》(2000.12)。
[①]Amendment Ⅳ to the United States Constitution:"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized."一般概括为“人民的人身、住宅、文件和财产安全不受不合理搜查扣押的权利”。
[②]389 U. S.347 (1967). at p.351.
[③] "Instead of the traditional formulation based on constitutionally protected areas. Justice Stewart emphasized that the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places and then focused on whether Katz justifiably relied on his privacy." David M. O'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, at p.58.
[①] "What a person seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States,389 U. S.347 (1967), at p.351-52.
[②] "...the Court assumed that individuals have expectations of either total privacy or total publicity, and it consequently failed to consider the importance of the degree of individual'expectations of privacy or publicity relative to the locus of their engagements." David M. O'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, at p.59.
[③] "If a reasonable expectation of total privacy exists, the fourth amendment prescribes that the search becomes unlawful when the expectation arises; while if there is a reasonable expectation of total publicity, the fourth amendment imposes no restrictions on the search." Type of Property Seizable under the Fourth Amendment,23 U. C. L. A. Law Review 963, 982 (1976).
[④]"...deprive people who clearly merit fourth amendment protection from the benefit of that protection. A person asleep or in a coma, for example, is incapable of entertaining any subjective expectations at all, and his unconscious state may last a lifetime. To deny him freedom from unreasonable governmental intrusion because of his unfortunate condition is absurd." Ibid., at 972 n.41.
[①]401 U.S.786.转引自阿丽塔·L.艾伦、理查德·C.托克音顿：《美国隐私法—学说、判例与立法》,冯建妹、石宏、郝倩、刘相文、许开辰等译,北京：中国民主法制出版社(2004),第62页。
[②] "An act is reasonable in law when it is such as a man of ordinary care, skill, and prudence would do under similar circumstances." Howard, The Reasonableness of mistake in the Criminal Law,4 University of Queensland Law Journal 45(1961)."
[③]Olmstead v. U. S.277 U. S.438 (1928)本案中,联邦最高法院以有无侵入住宅土地(trespass)来决定搜查扣押是否违反宪法第四修正案,如果警察未侵入公民住宅土地,而只是躲在屋外窃听,因为未构成侵入住宅土地,也就不构成非法搜查扣押。
[②] On Lee v. United States,343 U. S.747 (1952).
[③] Anita L. Allen, Richard C. Turkington:《美国隐私法：学说判例与立法》,冯建妹石宏等编译,第68页。
[①]阿丽塔·L.艾伦、理查德·C.托克音顿：《美国隐私法—学说、判例与立法》,冯建妹、石宏、郝倩、刘相文、许开辰等译,北京：中国民主法制出版社(2004),第69页。
[②]425 U.S.435(1976,).案情：Miller由于未对其酒厂进行登记而被指控犯有占有罪和预谋逃税。初审中,Miller要求法院不采纳他的两个开户行根据法院传票提供的银行记录和支票复印件作为证据(银行在没有通知Miller的情况下提供了上述资料复印件),初审法院否决了这一申请。上诉法院认为通过一张有瑕疵的传票所获得的银行按照保密法规定保有的记录,违反了储户的第四修正案权利,因此驳回了此案。
[③]442U.S.735(1979).
[④] Brennan大法官和Marshall大法官认为,首先,公民个人选择这些公共服务是别无选择的：其次,风险分析并不是评估第四修正案所包含的隐私期待合理性的最重要标准,即使是,也应当事先告知要对电话进行监听,否则,这对消费者是相当不公平的。
[①] Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, Electronic Communication Privacy of the Senate Comm, On the Judiciary,99th Cong.49 (1985).
[②]91 N. J.450A2d.952 (1982).案情：被告人Hunt和Pirillo被指控违反新泽西州成文发关于禁止多种赌博和赌赛马的规定,警方未经法院批准就从电话公司获取了Hunt家庭两个月以来的电话费税记录单。庭审中,被告申请法院不采纳上述证据。
[①]Brinegar v. U. S.,338 U. S.160,175 (1949).
[②] Beck v. Ohio,379 U. S.89 (1964).
[①]"The premise here is that any intrusion in the way of search or seizure is an evil, so that no intrusion at all is justified without a careful prior determination of necessity." Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U. S.443,467 (1971).
[②]Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Procedure 167 (Matthew Bender,1997).王兆鹏：《美国刑事诉讼法》,北京：北京大学出版社2005年版,第91页。Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Procedure 167 (Matthew Bender, 1997).
[③] "The point of the Forth Amendment, Which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence... the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime... Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers." Johnson v.U.S.,333 U.S.10,13(1948).
[①]"…a few specifically established and well.delineated exceptions."Katz v U.S..389 U.S.347.357 (19671.
[②]Amos v.U.S.,255U.S.313(1921).
[③]Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,412 U.S.218(1973).
[①]Chimel v. California,395 U. S.752 (1969).
[②]lbid., at 761-62, "The Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the home... The burden is on those seeking exemption to show the need for it."
[②]创设于Chimel v. California案,又称为臂长法则,将被逮捕人可以一臂之长控制的范围。
[④]美国联邦最高法院对“保护性扫视”的确认以Maryland v. Buie案(494 U.S.325<1990>)为始。
[⑤] Carroll v. U. S.,267 U. S.132 (1925).
[⑥] Ibid., "It is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
[⑦]潜在的可移动性作为无令状搜查的相当理由出现在1970年的Chambers v. Maroney (399 U. S.559,<1927>)案中。判决认为,警察对汽车的搜查并不必须具有实时性,汽车被拦截扣押后,警察亦可因其潜在的可移动性而随时对其实施搜查。
[⑧] Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U. S.443 (1971).本案中,警察对扣押的汽车于扣押后第二天、近12个月后及14个月后分别实施三次无搜查证之搜查,联邦最高法院判决,此三次搜查违宪。
[①] "One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view." Cardwell v. Lewis,417 U. S.583 (1974).
[②] United States v. Chadiwick,433 U. S.1 (1977).
[③]Mincey v. Arizona,437 U. S.385 (1978).
[④]"...warrantless intrusion may be justified by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence, or the need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling." Minnesota v. Olson,495 U. S.91 (1990).
[⑤] Mincey v. Arizona,437 U. S.385 (1978).
[⑥] Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U. S.443 (1971).
[①] Arizona v. Hicks,480 U. S.321 (1987).
[②] Horton v. California,496 U. S.128 (1990).
[③]Griffin v. Wisconsin,483 U. S.868 (1987).
[①] Florida v. Rilev.488 U. S.455 (1989).
[②] United States v.Chadwick.433 U. S.1 (1977).
[③] California v. Greenwood,486 U. S.35,40 (1988).
[④]Hester v. United States,265 U. S.57 (1924).
[⑤] Oliver v. United States,466 U. S.170,179 (1984).
[①]Miranda v. Arizona,384 U. S.436 (1966).
[②]警察在讯问前应告知被告的权利包括：你有权保持缄默(You have a right to salience);你所说的一切都可能成为对你不利的证据(Anything you say may be used against you);你有权聘请律师在场CYou have the right of have an attorney present);你若无资力聘请律师,法院会指派律师给你(You have the right to court-appointed counsel, If you are indigent).
[③]NY v. Quarles,467 U. S.649 (1984).
[④] IL. v. Perkins,496 U. S.292 (1990).
[⑤]"...consists in introducing upon the carpet of legal procedure the ideal of fairness, in the sense in which the word is used by sportsmen. The fox is to have a fair chance for his life:he must have what is called law:leave to run a certain length of way, for the express purpose of giving him a chance for escape." Jeremy Bentham, A Rationale of Judicial Evidence, vol.5 (1827), at p.238-39.
[①]see, Miranda v. Arizona,384 U.S.436,460 (1966).
[①]王兆鹏：《美国刑事诉讼法》,北京大学出版社(2005),第310页。
[③]see, Ullmann v. United States,350 U.S.422,445-46 (1956).
[④] "The evil to be guarded against was partly self-accusation under legal compulsion. But that was only a part of the evil. The conscience and dignity of man were also involved." Ibid., at p.446.
[⑤]"Hard it is upon a man, it must be confessed, to be obliged to do anything that he does not like. That he should not much like to do what is meant by his criminating himself, is natural enough; for what it leads to, is, his being punished." Jeremy Bentham, "ARationale of Judicial Evidence", vol.5 (1827), at p.231.
[①] "The privilege against self-incrimination is a constitutional facet of the right of privacy. The right of each individual to remain unmolested in the absence of independent evidence connecting him with the commission of a crime is but an aspect of the limitation which the privilege places upon the powers of the police. The privilege reflects the further principle, however, that a person's own knowledge of whether or not he has any connection with a criminal act is private to him and should not be subjected to compulsory disclosure." Leonard Ratner, The Consequences of Exercising the Privilege against Self-incrimination,24 University of Chicago Law Review 472, (1957), at p.488-89.
[②] "Privacy involves the choice of the individual to disclose or to reveal what he believes, what he thinks, what he possesses... That dual aspect of privacy means that the individual should have the freedom to select for himself the time and circumstances when he will share his secrets with others and decide the extent of that sharing. This is his prerogative, not the State's." Warden v. Hayden,387 U. S.294,323 (1967).
[③]参考：陈芳,吴宏耀：费希尔案与反对强迫自我归罪特权,载《中国审判新闻月刊》(2007.12),第69页。
[①] "While the fourth amendment only prohibits, as a means by which the state can obtain evidence,'unreasonable' searches and seizures, the fifth absolutely prohibits the state from obtaining certain types of evidence against a person's will." Michael Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege against Self-Incrimination:Extorting Evidence from a Suspect,43 Southern California Law Review 597,601-2 (1970).
[②] Warden v. Hayden,387 U. S.294,302-3 (1967).
[①]参考Escobedo v. Illinois,378 U. S.478,490 (1964). Emspack v. United States,349 U.S.190 (1955)等案例判决理由。
[①] Fisher v. United States,425 U. S.391 (1976).
[②] Couch v. United States,409 U. S.322 (1973).
[③]"A Fifth Amendment claim is valid even in absent of personal compulsion so long as the accused has a reasonable expectation of privacy in articles subpoenaed." Ibid., at p.343-44.
[④] "The Fourth and Fifth Amendments do not speak to totally unrelated concerns...Both involve aspects of a person's right to develop for himself a sphere of personal privacy. Where the amendments 'run almost into each other,'I would prohibit the Government from entering. The problem, as I see it, is to develop criteria for determining whether evidence sought by the Government lies within the sphere of activities that petitioner attempted to keep private." Ibid,. At p. 349-50.
[①]参考：David M. O'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, at p.118.
[②] Gregory W. O'Reilly, England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves Toward an Inquisitorial System of Justice,85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 402,402 n.1 (1994).
[①]美国法将证据分为实体证据与弹劾证据。所谓实体证据,指证明犯罪是否成立的证据。所谓弹劾证据,指与犯罪成立与否的证明无关,而在弹劾证人的信用能力时使用的证据,其目的在于动摇证人证词的可信性,使裁判者不相信证人的证词。
[②]380 U. S.609,614(1965).
[③] 271 U.S.494,497(1926).
[④]353U. S.391,424(1957).
[⑤]426 U.S.610,617-18 (1976).
[⑥]455 U.S.603, (1975).
[⑦]477U.S.231,(1980).
[⑧] "Innocence claims the right of speaking, as guilt invokes the privilege of silence." J Bentham, Treatise on Evidence, at p.241.
[①]"...gives insight into the protected area, becoming a window to the defendant's private, unexpressed thoughts." Anna Bowen Poulin, Evidence Use of Silence and the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.191, (1984), at p.210-11.
[②] Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence:Griffin v. California after Fifteen Years,78 Mich. L. Rev.841, (1980), at p.864-68.
[③] Stone. "The Miranda Doctrine in the Bureer Court".1977 Sup. Ct. Rev.99.146 n.241.
[④] 142 U.S.547 (1892).
[①] Ibid..564.
[②]Ibid..564.
[③]161 U.S.591(1896).
[④]Ibid.,610.
[①] "...It is not the breaking of his doors, and rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal liberty and private property... any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict his of crime or to forfeit his goods, is tithing the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other." Boyd v. United States,116 U. S.630 (1886).
[②]参考：David M. O'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, at p.42.
[③]We find that, as to the Federal Government the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and, as to the States, the freedom from unconscionable invasions of privacy and the freedom from convictions bases upon coerced confessions do enjoy an 'intimate relation... "They express'supplementing phases of the same constitutional purposes-to maintain inviolate large areas of personal privacy.'The philosophy of each amendment and of each freedom is complementary to, although not dependent upon, that of the other in its sphere of influence-the very least that together they assure in either sphere is hat no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence." Mapp v. Ohio,367 U. S.643,656-67 (1961).
[①]232U.S.383(1914).
[②] Mapp v. Ohio,367 U. S.643,657 (1961).
[①] Mapp v. Ohio,367 U. S.643, (1961).
[②] "The...rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct..." United States v. Calandra,414 U. S.338, 347(1983).
[③]王兆鹏：《美国刑事诉讼法》,北京：北京大学出版社(2005),第35页。
[④] U. S. v. Leon,468 U. S.897 (1984)本案中,警察根据治安法官所签发的搜查令实施搜查并取得证据,此后发现搜查证不具有正当理由而归于无效。但基于警察凭证搜查时并不知搜查证瑕疵,联邦最高法院判决警察客观合理的相信搜查证有效而取得的证据不应排除,此为证据排除法则的例外规定。
[⑤] Illinois v. Krull,480 U. S.340 (1987).
[②]王立志：《风险社会中刑法范式之转换—以隐私权刑法保护切入》,《政法论坛》(2010年第2期)。
[①] U.S. Office of Management and Budget, First Annual Report to President, Federal Personal Data Systems Subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 (1975), at p.2-3.
[②]"Current law is neither strong enough nor specific enough to solve the problems that now exist. In some cases, changes in record-keeping practice have already made even recent legal protections obsolete. As record-keeping systems come to be used to preclude action by the individual, a recent trend in the credit and financial areas, it is important that the individual also be given preventive protections to supplement the after-the-fact protections he sometimes has today...The law as it now stands simply ignores the strong interest many people have in records about them." U. S., The Privacy Protection Study Commission, Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, Privacy in an Information Society (1977), at p.10-11.
[①]act does not protect the privacy of individuals in the sense of a 'right to let along.'Rather it provides a federal 'code of Fair Information Practice'that secures to individuals a legal right to exercise some measure of control over the information collected about them by the government." Jerome J. Hanus and Harold C. Relyea, A Policy Assessment of the Privacy Act of 1974,25 American University Law Review (1976), at p.573..
[①] U. S. The Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society, Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, July 1977. At p.8.
[①]"To create a proper balance between what an individual is expected to divulge to a record-keeping organization and what he seeks in return (to minimize intrusiveness); to open up record-keeping operations in ways that will minimize the extent to which recorded information about an individual is itself a course of unfairness in any decision about him made on the basis of it (to maximize fairness);and to create and define obligations with respect to the uses and disclosures that will be made of recorded information about an individual (to create legitimate, enforceable expectations of confidentiality)." Ibid., at p.14-15.
[②]这三项核心条款合称“反恐监视权”,是《爱国者法案》赋予中央情报局、联邦调查局等政府机构的三项特权。
[①]曾向荣：《安全与隐私》,2011年11月(http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2011-11-16/180823477019_4.shtml).
[②]《调查称三分之二美国人愿为反恐牺牲部分隐私》,(http://news.163.com/11/0911/04/7DL49ENT00014 AED.html)。
[①]Kyllo v. United States,533 U. S.27 (2001).
[①]"... stands the right of a man to retreat into his own house and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion". Silverman v. U. S.365 U. S.511 (1961).
[②]"...the use of the device is an'off-the-wall'observation rather than a 'through-the-walP surveillance." Kyllo v. U. S., 533 U.S.27 (2001).
[③]1976年美国最高法院作出的Katz v. United States判决,突破了宪法文本中搜查对象为人身、住宅、文件、财产的限制,而将宪法第四修正案的保护范围扩及个人的电话谈话内容。
[①] Steven L. Emanud, Criminal Procedure,22nd edition, New York, Aspen Publishers (1976). At p.80.
[②][美]罗纳尔多v.戴尔卡门著,《美国刑事诉讼—法律和实践》第六版，武汉大学出版社,2006年10月,第349页。
[①] Schmerber v. California,384 U. S.757 (1966).
[②]U. S. v. Lafayette,462, U. S.640 (1983).
[①]梅根是新泽西州的一个七岁女孩,她被一个曾犯有强奸罪的邻居骗入家中奸杀。此事在美国引起了极大的震动,为了保护社区成员的安全,防止此类悲剧再次发生,美国国会通过了《梅根法》。阿丽塔·L.艾伦、理查德·C.托克音顿：《美国隐私法—学说、判例与立法》,冯建妹、石宏、郝倩、刘相文、许开辰等译,北京：中国民主法制出版社(2004),第106页。
[②]同上,第108页。
[①]高春兴：也谈我国刑事司法改革中的人权保障问题,载郝宏奎主编《侦查论坛》第三卷,北京：中国人民公安大学出版社(2004)，第26-40页。
[①]Coy v. Iowa,487 U. S.1012 [1988].
[①]Maryland v.Craig,497 U.S.836[1990].
[②]United States v.Owens,484 U.S.554 [1988].
[①]Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Procedure 167 (Matthew Bender,1997).王兆鹏：《美国刑事诉讼法》,北京：北京大学出版社2005年版,第91页。Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Procedure 167 (Matthew Bender, 1997).
[①]阎如恩,由明语主编：《刑事侦查教程》,长春：吉林人民出版社(1999),第336页。
[①]程味秋、杨宇冠：美国刑事诉讼中逮捕和搜查,《中国刑事法杂志》(2001.5)。
[②]英国《1984年警察与刑事证据法》第8条,载中国政法大学刑事法律研究中心编译：《英国刑事诉讼法》(选编),中国政法大学出版社(2001),第257页。
1. E. Bloustein, privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, (1992) Wis. L, Rev.1335.
2. Iredell Jenkins, Law and the Image of Man'in Social Order and Limits of Law:A Theoretical Essay. Princeton University Press, (1980).
3. A. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:Technology, Privacy and Human Emotions, (2002),65 Law and Contemporary Problems (No.2).
4. Charles Fried, An Anatomy of Values, Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press, (1970).
5. David Archard. The value of Privacy. Edited by Erik claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the criminal law, (2006).
6. Anthony D. Amato. Comment Professor Posner's Lecture on Privacy J.12 Georgia Law Review, (1978).
7. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 Harvard Law Review 193,(1890).
8. Mireille Hildebrandt. Privacy and Identity. Edited by Erik Claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the Criminal Law, (2006).
9. Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean by'Right to Privacy'? 4 South Dakota Law Review 1.20,(1959).
10. A.L. Allen, Uneasy Access, Privacy for Women in a Free Society, Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, (1988).
11. Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy,27 Rutgers Law Review 275, (1974).
12. David M. O'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, (1979).
13. Mireille Hildebrandt,'Privacy and Identity'. Edited by Erik claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the criminal law, (2006).
14. P.E.. Agre and M. Rotenberg, Technology and Privacy:The new Landscape, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT, (2001).
15. I. Altman, The Environment and Social Behavior. Privacy Personal Space Territory Crowding, Montery, Brooks/Cole, (1975).
16. Stanley A. Cohen, privacy, Crime and Terror:Legal Rights and Security in a Time of Peril, (2005).
17. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, First Annual Report to President, Federal Personal Data Systems Subject to the Privacy Act of 1974, (1975).
18. U.S., The Privacy Protection Study Commission, Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, Privacy in an Information Society, (1977).
19. Jerome J. Hanus and Harold C. Relyea, A Policy Assessment of the Privacy Act of 1974,25 American University Law Review 555, (1976).
20. A. Barak, Foreword:A Judge on Judging:The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy (2002),116 Harv. L. Rev.16.
21. H.C.5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel,53(4) P.D. 817.
22. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases,88 Harvard Law Review, (1975).
23. Department of Communications and Department of Justice, Canada, Report of the Task Force on Privacy and Computers (Ottawa:Information Canada,1972).
24. Type of Property Seizable under the Fourth Amendment,23 U.C.L.A. Law Review 963. (1976).
25. Howard, The Reasonableness of mistake in the Criminal Law,4 University of Queensland Law Journal 45, (1961).
26. Jeremy Bentham, A Rationale of Judicial Evidence, vol.5, (1827).
27. Leonard Ratner, The Consequences of Exercising the Privilege against Self-incrimination,24 University of Chicago Law Review 472, (1957).
25. Michael Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege against Self-Incrimination:Extorting Evidence from a Suspect,43 Southern California Law Review 597, (1970).
26. Gregory W. O'Reilly, "England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves Toward an Inquisitorial System of Justice",85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 402, (1994).
27. Anna Bowen Poulin, Evidence Use of Silence and the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.191, (1984).
28. Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence:Griffin v. California After Fifteen Years,78 Mich. L. Rev.841, (1980).
29. Steven L. Emanud. Criminal Procedure,22nd edition, (1976).
1. Griswold v. Connecticut,482-84 U.S. (1965).
2. R. v. Dyment,1988 S. C. J. No.82,1988 2 S.C.R.427.
3. Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force.1998O. J. No.5274,21 C. R. (5th) 1 (C. A.).
4. Boyd v. United States,116 U. S. (1886).
5. Olmstead v. United States,227 U. S. (1928).
6. R v. Mills,1999 S. C. J. No.68,1999 3 S. C. R.735.
7. California v. Ciraolo.476 U. S. (1986).
8. R. v. Stillman, (1997) S.C.J. No.34,1997 1 S.C. R.607.
9. R. v. Godoy,1998 S.C.J. No.85,1999 1 S.C.R.311.
10. R. v. Golden,2001 S.C.J. No.81,20013 S.C.R.679.Canada.
11. Katz v. United States,389 U. S. (1967).
12. United States v. White,401 U. S. (1967).
13. United States v. Miller,425 U. S. (1976).
14. Smith v. Maryland,442 U. S. (1979).
15. State v. Hunt,91 N. J.450A2d 952 (1982).
16. Griffin v. Wisconsin,483 U. S. (1987).
17. Florida v. Riley,488 U. S. (1989).
18. United States v. Chadwick,433 U. S. (1977).
19. California v. Greenwood,486 U. S. (1988).
20. Hester v. United States,265 U. S. (1924).
21. Oliver v. United States,466 U. S. (1984).
22. Mapp v. Ohio,367 U. S. (1961).
23. Miranda v. Arizona,384 U. S. (1966).
24. NY v. Quarles,467 U. S. (1984).
25. IL. v. Perkins,496 U. S. (1990).
26. Ullmann v. United States,350 U. S. (1956).
27. Warden v. Hayden,387 U. S. (1967).
28. Fisher v. United States,425 U. S. (1976).
29. Couch v. United States,409 U. S. (1973).
30. Escobedo v. Illinois,378 U. S. (1964).
31. Raffel v. United States,271 U. S. (1926).
32. Grunewald v. United States,353 U. S. (1957).
33. Doyle v. Ohio,426 U. S. (1976).
34. Fletcher v. Weir,455 U. S. (1975).
35. Jenkins v. Anderson,477 U. S. (1980).
36. Silverman v. U. S.,365 U. S. (1961).
37. Schmerber v. California,384 U. S. (1966).
38. U. S. v. Lafayette,462, U. S. (1983).
39. Horton v. California,496 U. S.128 (1990).
40. Griffin v. Wisconsin,483 U. S.868 (1987).
41. Florida v. Riley,488 U. S.455 (1989).
42. Mincey v. Arizona,437 U. S.385 (1978).
43. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U. S.443 (1971).
44. Arizona v. Hicks,480 U. S.321 (1987).
45. United States v. Chadiwick,433 U. S.1 (1977).
46. Carroll v. U. S.,267 U. S.132 (1925).
1、[英]约翰.密尔：《论自由》,程崇华译,北京：商务印书馆(1959)。
2、李震山：《人性尊严与人权保障》,台北：元照出版公司(1999)。
3、陈光中：《刑事诉讼法实施问题研究》,北京：中国法制出版社(2000)。
4、陈卫东：《刑事诉讼法实施问题调研报告》,北京：中国方正出版社(2001)。
5、何家弘：《外国犯罪侦查制度》,北京：中国人民公安大学出版社(2001)。
6、周伟：《宪法基本权利司法救济研究》,北京：中国人民公安大学出版社(2003)。
7、陈瑞华：《刑事审判原理原理论》,北京：北京大学出版社(1997)。
8、陈瑞华：《问题与主义之间》,北京：中国人民大学出版社(2003)。
9、卞建林：《刑事诉讼的现代化》,北京：中国法制出版社(2003)。
10、陈兴良：《刑事法评论第6卷》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(2000)。
11、徐静村：《刑事诉讼法》,北京：法律出版社(1999)。
12、左为民、周长军：《刑事诉讼的理念》,北京：法律出版社(1999)。
13、程味秋：《外国刑事诉讼法概论》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(1994)。
14、樊崇义、夏红主编：《正当程序文献资料选编》,北京：中国人民公安大学出版社(2004)。
15、陈光中：<21世纪域外刑事诉讼立法最新发展》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(2004)。
16、龙宗智：《相对合理主义》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(1999)。
17、汪建成、黄伟明：《欧盟成员国刑事诉讼概论》,北京：中国人民大学出版社(2000)。
18、易延友：《沉默的自由》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(2001)。
19、杨宇冠：《非法证据排除规则研究》,北京：中国人民公安大学出版社(2002)。
20、顾培东：《社会冲突与诉讼机制》,北京：法律出版社(2004)。
21、王以真主编：《外国刑事诉讼法学》,北京：北京大学出版社(1994)。
22、王兆鹏：《美国刑事诉讼法》,北京：北京大学出版社(2005)。
23、[美】阿丽塔·L.艾伦、理查德·C.托克音顿：《美国隐私法—学说、判例与立法》,冯建妹、石宏、郝倩、刘相文、许开辰等译,北京：中国民主法制出版社(2004)。
24、张千帆：《西方宪政体系》下册欧洲宪法,北京：法律出版社(2001)。
25、屠振宇：《宪法隐私权研究：一项未列举基本权利的理论论证》,北京：法律出版社(2008)。
26、张新宝：《隐私权的法律保护》,北京：群众出版社(2004)。
27、谢佑平：《刑事诉讼国际准则研究》,北京：法律出版社(2002)。
28、杨开湘：《刑事诉讼与隐私权保护的关系研究》,北京：中国法制出版社(2006)。
29、向燕：《刑事侦查中隐私权领域的界定》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(2011)。
30、张军：《宪法隐私权研究》,北京：中国社会科学出版社(2007)。
31、王秀哲：《我国隐私权的宪法保护研究》,北京：法律出版社(2011)。
32、[德]乌尔里希·贝克：《风险社会》(中文版),译林出版社(2004)。
33、杨雪冬：《风险社会与秩序重建》,北京：社会科学文献出版社(2006)。
34、周汉华主编：《个人信息保护前沿问题研究》,北京：法律出版社(2006)。
35、[英]梅因：《古代法》,沈景一译,北京：商务印书馆(2010)。
36、[英]罗奇：《重新思考公民身份：现代社会中的福利、意识形态和变迁》,郭忠华译,长春：吉林出版集团有限责任公司(2010.1)。
37、张千帆、赵娟、黄建军,《比较行政法：体系、制度与过程》,北京：法律出版社(2008)。
38、[德]茨威格特、克茨：《比较法总论》,潘汉典等译,贵州：贵州人民出版社(1992)。
39、王光辉：《比较宪法学》,北京：北京大学出版社(2007)。
40、台湾：林东茂,《刑法综览(修订五版)》,北京：中国人民大学出版社(2009)。
41、阎如恩,由明语：《刑事侦查教程》,长春：吉林人民出版社(1999)。
42、[日】吉川经夫：《改订刑法总论》,法律文化出版社(1974)。
43、马克昌：《比较刑法原理》,湖北：武汉大学出版社(2002)。
44、中国政法大学刑事法律研究中心编译：《英国刑事诉讼法》(选编),北京：中国政法大学出版社(2001)。
45、储槐植：《美国刑法》,北京：北京大学出版社(1996)。
46、黎宏：《日本刑法精义》,北京：中国检察出版社(2004)。
47、沈达明：《衡平法初论》,北京：对外经济贸易出版社(1997)。
48、[日]木村龟二主编：《刑法学词典》,顾肖荣等译,上海：上海翻译出版公司(1991)。
49、赵秉志等主编：《刑法学通论》,北京：高等教育出版社(1994)。
50、周光权：《法定刑研究：罪刑均衡的建构与实现》,北京：中国方正出版社(2000)。
51、高铭暄、马克昌：《刑法学》,北京：北京大学出版社、高等教育出版社(2000)。
52、任惠华：《刑事案件侦查》,北京：法律出版社(2000)。
53、谢佑平、万毅：《刑事侦查制度原理》,北京：中国人民公安大学出版社(2003)。
54、张佛泉：《自由与人权》,台北：台湾商务印书馆(1993)。
55、周国均：《侦查程序论》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(1994)。
56、孙长永：《侦查程序与人权》,北京：中国法制出版社(2000)。
57、陈永生：《侦查程序原理论》,北京：中国人民公安大学出版社(2003)。
58、[德]托马斯·魏根特：《德国刑事诉讼程序》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(2004)。
59、【法】卡斯东·斯特法尼等：《法国刑事诉讼法精义》,罗结珍译,北京：中国政法大学出版社(1998)。
60、[日】田口守一：《刑事诉讼法》,刘迪等译,北京：法律出版社(2000)。
61、宋英辉译：《日本刑事诉讼法》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(2000)。
62、[德】克劳斯·罗科信：《刑事诉讼法》,吴丽琪译,北京：法律出版社(2003)。
63、刘仁文等译：《美国模范刑法典及其评注》,北京：法律出版社(2005)。
64、卞建林等译：《加拿大刑事法典》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(1999)。
65、《牛津英汉双解词典》,北京：商务印书馆(1998)。
66、徐久生、庄敬华译：《德国刑法典》(2002年修订),北京：中国方正出版社(2004)。
67、罗结珍译：《法国新刑法典》,北京：中国法制出版社(2003)。
68、张明楷译：《日本刑法典》,北京：法律出版社(2006)。
69、刘仁文,王炜等译：《美国模范刑法典及其评注》(Model Penal Code-Official Draft and Explanatory Notes),北京：法律出版社(2005)。
70、[日】大塚仁著,冯军译：《刑法概说(各论)(第三版)》,北京：中国人民大学出版社(2003)。
71、[美]波斯纳：《论隐私权》,常鹏翱译,梁慧星主编《民商法论丛》第21卷,金桥文化出版(香港)有限公司(2001)。
72、[德】约克·艾斯勒：《抽象危险犯的基础和边界》,蔡桂生译,《刑法论丛》第14卷,北京：法律出版社。
73、向燕：《美国最高法院‘隐私的合理期待’标准之评介》,《中国刑事法杂志》,2008年第9期。
74、王立志：《英国刑法对隐私权的保护及其评析》,《新疆财经大学学报》,2009年第4期。
75、陈瑞华：《法治视野下的证人保护》,《法学》,2002年第3期。
76、季卫东：《合宪性审查与司法权的强化》,《中国社会科学》,2002年第2期。
77、汪建成：《论犯罪控制与人权保护》,《刑事法评论第6卷》(2000)。
78、汪建成、孙远,《刑事诉讼中口供规则体系论纲》,《北京大学学报》,2002年第2期。
79、张春霞：《论隐私权在刑事诉讼领域的诉求》,《四川大学学报》,2004年第1期。
80、宋英辉：《刑事程序中的技术侦查》,《法学研究》,2000年第3期。
81、高家伟：《论证据法上的利益衡量原则”,《现代法学》,2004年第4期。
82、林钰雄：《从基本权体系论身体检查处分”,《台大法学论丛》,第33卷。
83、龙宗智：《被害人作为公诉案件诉讼当事人制度评析”,《法学》,2001年第4期。
84、杨开湘：《强制侦查行为视野下的国家权力和个人权利",《比较法研究》,2004 年第2期。
85、郑贤君：《基本权利的宪法构成及其实证化’’,《法学研究》,2002年第2期。
86、唐昭红：《商业秘密研究》,梁慧星主编,《民商法论丛》,北京：法律出版社1997年版。
87、陈妮：《中外告诉乃论比较研究》,《政法论坛》,2001年第1期。
88、陈芳吴宏耀：《费希尔案与反对强迫自我归罪特权》,《中国审判新闻月刊》,2007年第12期。
89、陈光中、陈学权：《强制采样与人权保障之冲突与平衡》,《现代法学》,2005年第5期。
90、高春兴：《也谈我国刑事司法改革中的人权保障问题》,郝宏奎主编《侦查论坛》第三卷,北京：中国人民公安大学出版社(2004)。
91、程味秋、杨宇冠：《美国刑事诉讼中逮捕和搜查》,《中国刑事法杂志》,2001年第5期。
92、王立志：《风险社会中刑法范式之转换—以隐私权刑法保护切入》,《政法论坛》,2010年第2期。
93、王晓能,赵英敏：《论人格权的民法保护》,《中外法学》,2000年第5期。
94、张千帆：《论宪法效力的界定及其对私法的影响》,《比较法研究》,2004年第6期。
95、左为民：《权利话语／实践的艰难展开》,《中外法学》,2002年第4期。
96、蔡定剑：《中国宪法实施的私法化之路》,《中国社会科学》,2004年第2期。
[②][英]约翰·密尔：《论自由》,程崇华译,商务印书馆(1959),第14页。
[①] E. Bloustein, privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity (1992) Wis. L, Rev.1335.
[②] "...but it also has profound significance for the public order. The restraints imposed on government to pry into the lives of the citizen go to the essence of a democratic state." R. v. Dyment, S. C. J,No.82, (1988),2 S. C. R.428.
[③][台】李震山：《人性尊严与人权保障》,台北：元照出版公司(1999)。
[①] "A necessary element of those ends love, respect, and trust; it draws its significance from them. And yet since privacy is only an element of those ends, not the whole value, we have not felt inclined to attribute privacy ultimate significance." Charles Fried, An Anatomy of Values, Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press (1970). At p.138.
[②]参考：[美]波斯纳,《论隐私权》,常鹏翱译,梁慧星主编《民商法论丛》第21卷,金桥文化出版(香港)有限公司(2001),第347页。
[③]阿丽塔·L.艾伦、理查德·C.托克音顿：《美国隐私法—学说、判例与立法》,冯建妹、石宏、郝倩、刘相文、许开辰等译,北京：中国民主法制出版社(2004),第175页。
[①]参见：David Archard. The value of Privacy. Edited by Erik claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the criminal law (2006). At p.29-30.
[②]Anthony D. Amato, Comment Professor Posner's Lecture on Privacy, J.12 Georgia Law Review (1978). at p.499-500.
[②]张千帆：《西方宪政体系(下册·欧洲宪法)》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(2001),第392页。
[①] "There are very many things that individuals should not do to one another and which the criminal law rightly proscribes. Violating privacy-as this is defined by most philosophers-is not one of them. There are also very many significant interests that individuals have which should be protected by the provision of right. Privacy-as defined by most philosophers-is not one of them." David Archard, The value of privacy. Edited by Erik claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the criminal law (2006). At p.31.
[②]"A right to be let alone." Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 Harvard Law Review 193 (1890).
[①] Daniel J. Solove, Information Privacy Law, Marc Rotenberg (2003), at p.24.转引自屠振宇《宪法隐私权研究：一项未列举基本权利的理论论证》,北京：法律出版社(2008),第90页。
[②]参见《荷兰数据保护法》第16条,《葡萄牙个人数据保护法》第7条,《阿根廷个人数据保护法》第2条。转引自周汉华主编《个人信息保护前沿问题研究》,北京：法律出版社(2006)。
[③] Mireille Hildebrandt. Privacy and Identity. Edited by Erik Claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the Criminal Law (2006). At p.44.
[①]"All these approaches rely on four fallacious assumptions:(1) privacy denotes primarily the seclusion or withdrawal of an individual from public affairs, (2) privacy entails a right, (3) privacy presumably is essentially voluntary, and (4) privacy is meaningful by virtue of either its intrinsic worth or its instrumental value." David M. O'Brien, privacy, law, And Public Policy, at p.4.
[②] "Privacy is an interest or condition which derives from and is automatically secured by the protection of more recognizable rights." Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean by 'Right to Privacy'? 4 South Dakota Law Review 1.20 (1959).
[③] David Archard, The value of privacy. Edited by Erik claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the criminal law(2006).At p.22.
[④] A.L. Allen, Uneasy Access, Privacy for Women in a Free Society, Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield (1988) at p.15.
[⑤] 1993 S.C.J. NO.97, (1993),3 S.C.R.281 at p.293.
[⑥]"Not every loss or gain of control over information about ourselves is a loss or gain of privacy." Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy,27 Rutgers Law Review 275, at p.280-81 (1974).
[⑦]"Privacy is not identical with control over access to oneself, because not all privacy is chosen...Privacy refers to a condition of life and, as such, has no necessary connection with control over personal information." David M. O'Brien. Privacy, Law, and Public Policy. At p.15.
[①]Stanley A. Cohen, privacy, Crime and Terror:Legal Rights and Security in a Time of Peril. At p.13.
[②][英]梅因：《古代法》,沈景一译,北京：商务印书馆(1959),第97页。
[①][英]罗奇：《重新思考公民身份：现代社会中的福利、意识形态和变迁》,郭忠华译,长春：吉林出版集团有限责任公司(2010.1),第7页。
[②]Iredell Jenkins, Law and the Image of Man'in Social Order and Limits of Law:A Theoretical Essay. Princeton University Press (1980). At p.314.
[①] "Privacy in the information age is best conceived as the maintenance of metaphorical boundaries that define the contours of personal identity." A. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:Technology, Privacy and Human Emotions (2002) 65 Law and Contemporary Problems (No.2) 125 at p.131.
[②]Ibid.Atp.152.
[③] "If you define personal information as a set of true facts that identify a person as an individual, you imply a static conception of identity:it presumes that the core of an individual, it presumes that the core of an individual can be fixed for identification (data of birth, nationality, eye color, gender etc.)." Mireille Hildebrandt,'Privacy and Identity'. Edited by Erik claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the criminal law (2006). At P.51.
[④]Mireille Hildebrandt, Privacy and Identity. Edited by Erik claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the criminal law (2006). At P.51.
[①] Ibid, at p.45.
[②]"... the core of privacy is to be found in the idea of identity-not only because in our information society it is precisely the advance of high-tech identification technologies that raises questions of privacy-protection, but also because the process of identity-building is what is at stake in privacy." Mireille Hildebrandt,'Privacy and Identity'. Edited by Erik claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the criminal law (2006). At P.50.
[①] "The right to privacy is the freedom from unreasonable constraints on the construction of one's own identity." P.E.. Agre and M. Rotenberg, Technology and Privacy:The new Landscape, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT (2001), at p.7.
[②]I. Altman, The Environment and Social Behavior. Privacy Personal Space Territory Crowding, Montery, Brooks/Cole, (1975).
[①]该条规定：无人应遭受对其隐私、家庭、住宅或通讯的任意干预,也不应遭受对其荣誉和名声的攻击。每个人均享有受法律保护以对抗干预或攻击的权利。
[①] "Privacy claims appear to fall roughly into three major categories, relating to property, to the person, and to information. What runs through all three, and is indeed the force attracting them into one constellation, is the fundamental principle that there are realms-in a physical sense, in which an individual may, as an attribute of his personality, demand to be let alone to do as he sees fit." Citing, Department of Communications and Department of Justice, Canada, Report of the Task Force on Privacy and Computers (Ottawa:Information Canada,1972), Privacy Task Force Report, at p.13.
[①] R v. Mills,1999 S. C. J. No.68, (1999),3 S. C. R.735.
[②] California v. Ciraolo.476 U. S.207 (1986)本案中,警方为调查嫌疑人是否在家中种植大麻,使用飞机在其住宅上方约1000英尺的上空对嫌疑人用栅栏围起的庭院进行空中观察。
[①]如1984年美国Oliver v. United States案(446 U.S.1701984)认为,对于开放性区域,即使个人持有隐私的主观期待,社会也不承认这种期待的合理性。
[①] "It would make a mockery of the Charter to allow governments to extinguish a legitimate expectation of privacy by simply informing citizens that their movements and activities may be monitored; particularly where the area monitored is a central public space heavily used for commerce, leisure, travel, and social interaction. Whether a person has a subjective expectation of privacy may be a factor in some circumstances. But the fundamental question is whether a reasonable person would consider that the investigative technique so trenches on individual privacy that the state should be required to establish cause before a neutral arbiter." Privacy Commissioner of Canada, opinion of La Forest J. regarding video surveillance, April 5,2002, available online at
[②]R. v. Stillman, (1997) S. C. J. No.34,1997 1 S.C. R.607.
[③]加拿大《权利与自由宪章》第7条规定：每个人都有生存、人身自由和安全的权利,除非“依据基本正义的原则”,不得剥夺。第8条规定：人人都有权不受不合理的搜查和扣押。
[④]410 U.S.1,7-12(1973).
[①]P.G.&J.H.v.United Kingdom.该案中,警察为获取该嫌疑人的声音样本,秘密录制了警察局里警官与嫌疑人的谈话。申请人将该案提交给了欧洲人权法院,主张政府侵犯了《欧洲人权公约》第八条赋予的“私生活”的权利。而政府主张,录音只是为了获取其声音文件而非实质的通讯内容,申请人的声音特质属于“公共的、外部的特征”。
[①] "The forced entry into an apartment in order to locate the caller and determine the reason for the call constitutes a justifiable use of police powers. The police, however, do not have a further authority to search the premises or otherwise intrude on a resident's privacy or property." R. v. Godoy,1998 S. C. J. No.85, (1999) I S. C. R.311.
[②]"Strip searches...in addition to reasonable and probable grounds justifying the arrest, the police must be able to establish reasonable and probable grounds justifying the need for a trip search...consistent with this, strip searches generally may only be conducted at the police station..." R. v. Golden,2001 S. C. J. No.81, (2001) 3 S. C. R.679. Canada.
[①]阿丽塔·L.艾伦、理查德·C.托克音顿：《美国隐私法—学说、判例与立法》,冯建妹、石宏、郝倩、刘相文、许开辰等译,北京：中国民主法制出版社(2004),第134-135页。
[①]Griswold v.Connecticut,482 U.S.(1965).在本案中,最高法院认为属于私权的行为仅仅涉及私人之间的利害关系而并不侵害社会利益,因此不应当被犯罪化,据此决定使一个把传播避孕工具消息定为犯罪的州法律失去效力。
[①] "Cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Right have penumbras formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in it's prohibition against the quartering of soldiers'in any house 'in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searcher and seizures.'The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.'" Griswold v. Connecticut,482 U. S.479 (1965).
[②]Justice Ian Binnie, Canada, Speech at a Symposium on "Counterterrorism and the Rule of Law", at the University of Ottawa Law School, Ottawa, Ontario, March 18,2005. Citing, Stanley A. Cohen, Privacy, Crime and Terror-Legal Rights and Security in a Time of Peril, at p.539.
[①] "The balance struck between common law police power and individual liberties puts a premium on individual freedom and makes crime prevention and peacekeeping more difficult for the police. In some situations, the requirement that there must be areal risk of imminent harm before the police can interfere with individual rights will leave the police powerless to prevent crime. The efficacy of laws controlling the relationship between the police and the individual is not, however, measured only from the perspective of crime control and public safety. We want to be safe, but we need to be free." Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force,1998 O.J. No.5274,21 C.R. (5th) 1 (C.A.).
[②] "This is the fate of democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it, and not all methods employed by its enemies are open to it. Sometimes, a democracy must fight with one hand tied behind its back."H.C.5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel,53(4) P.D.817, at p.845, cited in A. Barak, "Foreword:A Judge on Judging:The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy" (2002),116 Harv. L. Rev.16, at p.148.
[③] "Nonetheless, it has the upper hand. Preserving the rule of law and recognition of individual liberties constitute an important component of its understanding of security." A. Barak, "Foreword:A Judge on Judging:The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy" (2002),116 Harv. L. Rev.16, at p.148..
[④]张千帆、赵娟、黄建军：《比较行政法：体系、制度与过程》,北京：法律出版社(2008),第15页。
[①] "An abstract is a general political aim the statement of which does not indicate how that general aim is to be weighted or compromised in particular circumstances against other political aims...Abstract rights in this way provide argument for concrete rights, but the claim of a concrete right is more definite than any claim of abstract right that supports it...Concrete rights...are political aims that are more precisely defined so as to express more definitely the weight they may have against other political aim on particular occasions." Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases,88 Harvard Law Review (1975), at p.1070.
[①]向燕：《美国最高法院‘隐私的合理期待’标准之评介》,《中国刑事法杂志》(2008年第5期)。
[①]'"... property rights reflect society's explicit recognition of a person's authority to act as he wishes in certain areas, and therefore should be considered in determining whether an individual's expectations of privacy are reasonable." Rakas v. Illinois,99 S. CT.421,435 (1978).
[①]v. United States,116 U. S. (1886).
[②] Ibid.,630 (1886). "...It is not the breaking of his doors, and rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal liberty and private property."
[③] Olmstead v. United States,227 U. S.438 (1928).
[④] 389 U. S.347 (1967) at p.351.
[①]96U.S.727(1877).
[②]277U. S.438(1928).
[③] Ibid.
[①] "...we might derive two distinct senses in which the state might wrongfully interfere with our privacy. Firstly, the state might wrongfully invade our privacy through surveillance of our private lives. It does this when it watches us in circumstances where we ought not to be watched. Secondly, the state might prohibit what are essentially private matters. It does this by declaring as crimes, public wrongs..." Victor Tadros, Power and the Value of Privacy, Privacy and the Criminal Law, edited by Erik Claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Hart Publishing (2006), at p.106.
[②]Ibid., at p.107-108.
[①][德]马克思·韦伯：《论经济与社会中的法律》,北京：中国大百科全书出版社(1998),第343页。
[①]关于个人家庭隐私限制的严格审查标准由哈兰大法官在1961年Poe v. Ullman案中提出,并在4年后的Griswold v. Connecticut案中得到确认,认为州政府必须证明立法手段不仅与合法目标合理相关,而且对实现目标必不可少,其对权利剥夺的法律才具有合宪性。
[②]王广辉：《比较宪法学》,北京：北京大学出版社(2007),第173页。
[②]李建良：《基本权利与国家保护义务》,《宪法理论与实践(二)》(2000.12)。
[①]Amendment Ⅳ to the United States Constitution:"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized."一般概括为“人民的人身、住宅、文件和财产安全不受不合理搜查扣押的权利”。
[②]389 U. S.347 (1967). at p.351.
[③] "Instead of the traditional formulation based on constitutionally protected areas. Justice Stewart emphasized that the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places and then focused on whether Katz justifiably relied on his privacy." David M. O'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, at p.58.
[①] "What a person seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States,389 U. S.347 (1967), at p.351-52.
[②] "...the Court assumed that individuals have expectations of either total privacy or total publicity, and it consequently failed to consider the importance of the degree of individual'expectations of privacy or publicity relative to the locus of their engagements." David M. O'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, at p.59.
[③] "If a reasonable expectation of total privacy exists, the fourth amendment prescribes that the search becomes unlawful when the expectation arises; while if there is a reasonable expectation of total publicity, the fourth amendment imposes no restrictions on the search." Type of Property Seizable under the Fourth Amendment,23 U. C. L. A. Law Review 963, 982 (1976).
[④]"...deprive people who clearly merit fourth amendment protection from the benefit of that protection. A person asleep or in a coma, for example, is incapable of entertaining any subjective expectations at all, and his unconscious state may last a lifetime. To deny him freedom from unreasonable governmental intrusion because of his unfortunate condition is absurd." Ibid., at 972 n.41.
[①]401 U.S.786.转引自阿丽塔·L.艾伦、理查德·C.托克音顿：《美国隐私法—学说、判例与立法》,冯建妹、石宏、郝倩、刘相文、许开辰等译,北京：中国民主法制出版社(2004),第62页。
[②] "An act is reasonable in law when it is such as a man of ordinary care, skill, and prudence would do under similar circumstances." Howard, The Reasonableness of mistake in the Criminal Law,4 University of Queensland Law Journal 45(1961)."
[③]Olmstead v. U. S.277 U. S.438 (1928)本案中,联邦最高法院以有无侵入住宅土地(trespass)来决定搜查扣押是否违反宪法第四修正案,如果警察未侵入公民住宅土地,而只是躲在屋外窃听,因为未构成侵入住宅土地,也就不构成非法搜查扣押。
[②] On Lee v. United States,343 U. S.747 (1952).
[③] Anita L. Allen, Richard C. Turkington:《美国隐私法：学说判例与立法》,冯建妹石宏等编译,第68页。
[①]阿丽塔·L.艾伦、理查德·C.托克音顿：《美国隐私法—学说、判例与立法》,冯建妹、石宏、郝倩、刘相文、许开辰等译,北京：中国民主法制出版社(2004),第69页。
[②]425 U.S.435(1976,).案情：Miller由于未对其酒厂进行登记而被指控犯有占有罪和预谋逃税。初审中,Miller要求法院不采纳他的两个开户行根据法院传票提供的银行记录和支票复印件作为证据(银行在没有通知Miller的情况下提供了上述资料复印件),初审法院否决了这一申请。上诉法院认为通过一张有瑕疵的传票所获得的银行按照保密法规定保有的记录,违反了储户的第四修正案权利,因此驳回了此案。
[③]442U.S.735(1979).
[④] Brennan大法官和Marshall大法官认为,首先,公民个人选择这些公共服务是别无选择的：其次,风险分析并不是评估第四修正案所包含的隐私期待合理性的最重要标准,即使是,也应当事先告知要对电话进行监听,否则,这对消费者是相当不公平的。
[①] Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, Electronic Communication Privacy of the Senate Comm, On the Judiciary,99th Cong.49 (1985).
[②]91 N. J.450A2d.952 (1982).案情：被告人Hunt和Pirillo被指控违反新泽西州成文发关于禁止多种赌博和赌赛马的规定,警方未经法院批准就从电话公司获取了Hunt家庭两个月以来的电话费税记录单。庭审中,被告申请法院不采纳上述证据。
[①]Brinegar v. U. S.,338 U. S.160,175 (1949).
[②] Beck v. Ohio,379 U. S.89 (1964).
[①]"The premise here is that any intrusion in the way of search or seizure is an evil, so that no intrusion at all is justified without a careful prior determination of necessity." Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U. S.443,467 (1971).
[②]Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Procedure 167 (Matthew Bender,1997).王兆鹏：《美国刑事诉讼法》,北京：北京大学出版社2005年版,第91页。Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Procedure 167 (Matthew Bender, 1997).
[③] "The point of the Forth Amendment, Which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence... the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime... Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers." Johnson v.U.S.,333 U.S.10,13(1948).
[①]"…a few specifically established and well.delineated exceptions."Katz v U.S..389 U.S.347.357 (19671.
[②]Amos v.U.S.,255U.S.313(1921).
[③]Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,412 U.S.218(1973).
[①]Chimel v. California,395 U. S.752 (1969).
[②]lbid., at 761-62, "The Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the home... The burden is on those seeking exemption to show the need for it."
[②]创设于Chimel v. California案,又称为臂长法则,将被逮捕人可以一臂之长控制的范围。
[④]美国联邦最高法院对“保护性扫视”的确认以Maryland v. Buie案(494 U.S.325<1990>)为始。
[⑤] Carroll v. U. S.,267 U. S.132 (1925).
[⑥] Ibid., "It is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
[⑦]潜在的可移动性作为无令状搜查的相当理由出现在1970年的Chambers v. Maroney (399 U. S.559,<1927>)案中。判决认为,警察对汽车的搜查并不必须具有实时性,汽车被拦截扣押后,警察亦可因其潜在的可移动性而随时对其实施搜查。
[⑧] Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U. S.443 (1971).本案中,警察对扣押的汽车于扣押后第二天、近12个月后及14个月后分别实施三次无搜查证之搜查,联邦最高法院判决,此三次搜查违宪。
[①] "One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view." Cardwell v. Lewis,417 U. S.583 (1974).
[②] United States v. Chadiwick,433 U. S.1 (1977).
[③]Mincey v. Arizona,437 U. S.385 (1978).
[④]"...warrantless intrusion may be justified by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence, or the need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling." Minnesota v. Olson,495 U. S.91 (1990).
[⑤] Mincey v. Arizona,437 U. S.385 (1978).
[⑥] Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U. S.443 (1971).
[①] Arizona v. Hicks,480 U. S.321 (1987).
[②] Horton v. California,496 U. S.128 (1990).
[③]Griffin v. Wisconsin,483 U. S.868 (1987).
[①] Florida v. Rilev.488 U. S.455 (1989).
[②] United States v.Chadwick.433 U. S.1 (1977).
[③] California v. Greenwood,486 U. S.35,40 (1988).
[④]Hester v. United States,265 U. S.57 (1924).
[⑤] Oliver v. United States,466 U. S.170,179 (1984).
[①]Miranda v. Arizona,384 U. S.436 (1966).
[②]警察在讯问前应告知被告的权利包括：你有权保持缄默(You have a right to salience);你所说的一切都可能成为对你不利的证据(Anything you say may be used against you);你有权聘请律师在场CYou have the right of have an attorney present);你若无资力聘请律师,法院会指派律师给你(You have the right to court-appointed counsel, If you are indigent).
[③]NY v. Quarles,467 U. S.649 (1984).
[④] IL. v. Perkins,496 U. S.292 (1990).
[⑤]"...consists in introducing upon the carpet of legal procedure the ideal of fairness, in the sense in which the word is used by sportsmen. The fox is to have a fair chance for his life:he must have what is called law:leave to run a certain length of way, for the express purpose of giving him a chance for escape." Jeremy Bentham, A Rationale of Judicial Evidence, vol.5 (1827), at p.238-39.
[①]see, Miranda v. Arizona,384 U.S.436,460 (1966).
[①]王兆鹏：《美国刑事诉讼法》,北京大学出版社(2005),第310页。
[③]see, Ullmann v. United States,350 U.S.422,445-46 (1956).
[④] "The evil to be guarded against was partly self-accusation under legal compulsion. But that was only a part of the evil. The conscience and dignity of man were also involved." Ibid., at p.446.
[⑤]"Hard it is upon a man, it must be confessed, to be obliged to do anything that he does not like. That he should not much like to do what is meant by his criminating himself, is natural enough; for what it leads to, is, his being punished." Jeremy Bentham, "ARationale of Judicial Evidence", vol.5 (1827), at p.231.
[①] "The privilege against self-incrimination is a constitutional facet of the right of privacy. The right of each individual to remain unmolested in the absence of independent evidence connecting him with the commission of a crime is but an aspect of the limitation which the privilege places upon the powers of the police. The privilege reflects the further principle, however, that a person's own knowledge of whether or not he has any connection with a criminal act is private to him and should not be subjected to compulsory disclosure." Leonard Ratner, The Consequences of Exercising the Privilege against Self-incrimination,24 University of Chicago Law Review 472, (1957), at p.488-89.
[②] "Privacy involves the choice of the individual to disclose or to reveal what he believes, what he thinks, what he possesses... That dual aspect of privacy means that the individual should have the freedom to select for himself the time and circumstances when he will share his secrets with others and decide the extent of that sharing. This is his prerogative, not the State's." Warden v. Hayden,387 U. S.294,323 (1967).
[③]参考：陈芳,吴宏耀：费希尔案与反对强迫自我归罪特权,载《中国审判新闻月刊》(2007.12),第69页。
[①] "While the fourth amendment only prohibits, as a means by which the state can obtain evidence,'unreasonable' searches and seizures, the fifth absolutely prohibits the state from obtaining certain types of evidence against a person's will." Michael Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege against Self-Incrimination:Extorting Evidence from a Suspect,43 Southern California Law Review 597,601-2 (1970).
[②] Warden v. Hayden,387 U. S.294,302-3 (1967).
[①]参考Escobedo v. Illinois,378 U. S.478,490 (1964). Emspack v. United States,349 U.S.190 (1955)等案例判决理由。
[①] Fisher v. United States,425 U. S.391 (1976).
[②] Couch v. United States,409 U. S.322 (1973).
[③]"A Fifth Amendment claim is valid even in absent of personal compulsion so long as the accused has a reasonable expectation of privacy in articles subpoenaed." Ibid., at p.343-44.
[④] "The Fourth and Fifth Amendments do not speak to totally unrelated concerns...Both involve aspects of a person's right to develop for himself a sphere of personal privacy. Where the amendments 'run almost into each other,'I would prohibit the Government from entering. The problem, as I see it, is to develop criteria for determining whether evidence sought by the Government lies within the sphere of activities that petitioner attempted to keep private." Ibid,. At p. 349-50.
[①]参考：David M. O'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, at p.118.
[②] Gregory W. O'Reilly, England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves Toward an Inquisitorial System of Justice,85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 402,402 n.1 (1994).
[①]美国法将证据分为实体证据与弹劾证据。所谓实体证据,指证明犯罪是否成立的证据。所谓弹劾证据,指与犯罪成立与否的证明无关,而在弹劾证人的信用能力时使用的证据,其目的在于动摇证人证词的可信性,使裁判者不相信证人的证词。
[②]380 U. S.609,614(1965).
[③] 271 U.S.494,497(1926).
[④]353U. S.391,424(1957).
[⑤]426 U.S.610,617-18 (1976).
[⑥]455 U.S.603, (1975).
[⑦]477U.S.231,(1980).
[⑧] "Innocence claims the right of speaking, as guilt invokes the privilege of silence." J Bentham, Treatise on Evidence, at p.241.
[①]"...gives insight into the protected area, becoming a window to the defendant's private, unexpressed thoughts." Anna Bowen Poulin, Evidence Use of Silence and the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.191, (1984), at p.210-11.
[②] Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence:Griffin v. California after Fifteen Years,78 Mich. L. Rev.841, (1980), at p.864-68.
[③] Stone. "The Miranda Doctrine in the Bureer Court".1977 Sup. Ct. Rev.99.146 n.241.
[④] 142 U.S.547 (1892).
[①] Ibid..564.
[②]Ibid..564.
[③]161 U.S.591(1896).
[④]Ibid.,610.
[①] "...It is not the breaking of his doors, and rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal liberty and private property... any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict his of crime or to forfeit his goods, is tithing the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other." Boyd v. United States,116 U. S.630 (1886).
[②]参考：David M. O'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, at p.42.
[③]We find that, as to the Federal Government the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and, as to the States, the freedom from unconscionable invasions of privacy and the freedom from convictions bases upon coerced confessions do enjoy an 'intimate relation... "They express'supplementing phases of the same constitutional purposes-to maintain inviolate large areas of personal privacy.'The philosophy of each amendment and of each freedom is complementary to, although not dependent upon, that of the other in its sphere of influence-the very least that together they assure in either sphere is hat no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence." Mapp v. Ohio,367 U. S.643,656-67 (1961).
[①]232U.S.383(1914).
[②] Mapp v. Ohio,367 U. S.643,657 (1961).
[①] Mapp v. Ohio,367 U. S.643, (1961).
[②] "The...rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct..." United States v. Calandra,414 U. S.338, 347(1983).
[③]王兆鹏：《美国刑事诉讼法》,北京：北京大学出版社(2005),第35页。
[④] U. S. v. Leon,468 U. S.897 (1984)本案中,警察根据治安法官所签发的搜查令实施搜查并取得证据,此后发现搜查证不具有正当理由而归于无效。但基于警察凭证搜查时并不知搜查证瑕疵,联邦最高法院判决警察客观合理的相信搜查证有效而取得的证据不应排除,此为证据排除法则的例外规定。
[⑤] Illinois v. Krull,480 U. S.340 (1987).
[②]王立志：《风险社会中刑法范式之转换—以隐私权刑法保护切入》,《政法论坛》(2010年第2期)。
[①] U.S. Office of Management and Budget, First Annual Report to President, Federal Personal Data Systems Subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 (1975), at p.2-3.
[②]"Current law is neither strong enough nor specific enough to solve the problems that now exist. In some cases, changes in record-keeping practice have already made even recent legal protections obsolete. As record-keeping systems come to be used to preclude action by the individual, a recent trend in the credit and financial areas, it is important that the individual also be given preventive protections to supplement the after-the-fact protections he sometimes has today...The law as it now stands simply ignores the strong interest many people have in records about them." U. S., The Privacy Protection Study Commission, Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, Privacy in an Information Society (1977), at p.10-11.
[①]act does not protect the privacy of individuals in the sense of a 'right to let along.'Rather it provides a federal 'code of Fair Information Practice'that secures to individuals a legal right to exercise some measure of control over the information collected about them by the government." Jerome J. Hanus and Harold C. Relyea, A Policy Assessment of the Privacy Act of 1974,25 American University Law Review (1976), at p.573..
[①] U. S. The Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society, Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, July 1977. At p.8.
[①]"To create a proper balance between what an individual is expected to divulge to a record-keeping organization and what he seeks in return (to minimize intrusiveness); to open up record-keeping operations in ways that will minimize the extent to which recorded information about an individual is itself a course of unfairness in any decision about him made on the basis of it (to maximize fairness);and to create and define obligations with respect to the uses and disclosures that will be made of recorded information about an individual (to create legitimate, enforceable expectations of confidentiality)." Ibid., at p.14-15.
[②]这三项核心条款合称“反恐监视权”,是《爱国者法案》赋予中央情报局、联邦调查局等政府机构的三项特权。
[①]曾向荣：《安全与隐私》,2011年11月(http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2011-11-16/180823477019_4.shtml).
[②]《调查称三分之二美国人愿为反恐牺牲部分隐私》,(http://news.163.com/11/0911/04/7DL49ENT00014 AED.html)。
[①]Kyllo v. United States,533 U. S.27 (2001).
[①]"... stands the right of a man to retreat into his own house and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion". Silverman v. U. S.365 U. S.511 (1961).
[②]"...the use of the device is an'off-the-wall'observation rather than a 'through-the-walP surveillance." Kyllo v. U. S., 533 U.S.27 (2001).
[③]1976年美国最高法院作出的Katz v. United States判决,突破了宪法文本中搜查对象为人身、住宅、文件、财产的限制,而将宪法第四修正案的保护范围扩及个人的电话谈话内容。
[①] Steven L. Emanud, Criminal Procedure,22nd edition, New York, Aspen Publishers (1976). At p.80.
[②][美]罗纳尔多v.戴尔卡门著,《美国刑事诉讼—法律和实践》第六版，武汉大学出版社,2006年10月,第349页。
[①] Schmerber v. California,384 U. S.757 (1966).
[②]U. S. v. Lafayette,462, U. S.640 (1983).
[①]梅根是新泽西州的一个七岁女孩,她被一个曾犯有强奸罪的邻居骗入家中奸杀。此事在美国引起了极大的震动,为了保护社区成员的安全,防止此类悲剧再次发生,美国国会通过了《梅根法》。阿丽塔·L.艾伦、理查德·C.托克音顿：《美国隐私法—学说、判例与立法》,冯建妹、石宏、郝倩、刘相文、许开辰等译,北京：中国民主法制出版社(2004),第106页。
[②]同上,第108页。
[①]高春兴：也谈我国刑事司法改革中的人权保障问题,载郝宏奎主编《侦查论坛》第三卷,北京：中国人民公安大学出版社(2004)，第26-40页。
[①]Coy v. Iowa,487 U. S.1012 [1988].
[①]Maryland v.Craig,497 U.S.836[1990].
[②]United States v.Owens,484 U.S.554 [1988].
[①]Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Procedure 167 (Matthew Bender,1997).王兆鹏：《美国刑事诉讼法》,北京：北京大学出版社2005年版,第91页。Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Procedure 167 (Matthew Bender, 1997).
[①]阎如恩,由明语主编：《刑事侦查教程》,长春：吉林人民出版社(1999),第336页。
[①]程味秋、杨宇冠：美国刑事诉讼中逮捕和搜查,《中国刑事法杂志》(2001.5)。
[②]英国《1984年警察与刑事证据法》第8条,载中国政法大学刑事法律研究中心编译：《英国刑事诉讼法》(选编),中国政法大学出版社(2001),第257页。
1. E. Bloustein, privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, (1992) Wis. L, Rev.1335.
2. Iredell Jenkins, Law and the Image of Man'in Social Order and Limits of Law:A Theoretical Essay. Princeton University Press, (1980).
3. A. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:Technology, Privacy and Human Emotions, (2002),65 Law and Contemporary Problems (No.2).
4. Charles Fried, An Anatomy of Values, Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press, (1970).
5. David Archard. The value of Privacy. Edited by Erik claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the criminal law, (2006).
6. Anthony D. Amato. Comment Professor Posner's Lecture on Privacy J.12 Georgia Law Review, (1978).
7. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 Harvard Law Review 193,(1890).
8. Mireille Hildebrandt. Privacy and Identity. Edited by Erik Claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the Criminal Law, (2006).
9. Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean by'Right to Privacy'? 4 South Dakota Law Review 1.20,(1959).
10. A.L. Allen, Uneasy Access, Privacy for Women in a Free Society, Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, (1988).
11. Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy,27 Rutgers Law Review 275, (1974).
12. David M. O'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, (1979).
13. Mireille Hildebrandt,'Privacy and Identity'. Edited by Erik claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the criminal law, (2006).
14. P.E.. Agre and M. Rotenberg, Technology and Privacy:The new Landscape, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT, (2001).
15. I. Altman, The Environment and Social Behavior. Privacy Personal Space Territory Crowding, Montery, Brooks/Cole, (1975).
16. Stanley A. Cohen, privacy, Crime and Terror:Legal Rights and Security in a Time of Peril, (2005).
17. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, First Annual Report to President, Federal Personal Data Systems Subject to the Privacy Act of 1974, (1975).
18. U.S., The Privacy Protection Study Commission, Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, Privacy in an Information Society, (1977).
19. Jerome J. Hanus and Harold C. Relyea, A Policy Assessment of the Privacy Act of 1974,25 American University Law Review 555, (1976).
20. A. Barak, Foreword:A Judge on Judging:The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy (2002),116 Harv. L. Rev.16.
21. H.C.5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel,53(4) P.D. 817.
22. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases,88 Harvard Law Review, (1975).
23. Department of Communications and Department of Justice, Canada, Report of the Task Force on Privacy and Computers (Ottawa:Information Canada,1972).
24. Type of Property Seizable under the Fourth Amendment,23 U.C.L.A. Law Review 963. (1976).
25. Howard, The Reasonableness of mistake in the Criminal Law,4 University of Queensland Law Journal 45, (1961).
26. Jeremy Bentham, A Rationale of Judicial Evidence, vol.5, (1827).
27. Leonard Ratner, The Consequences of Exercising the Privilege against Self-incrimination,24 University of Chicago Law Review 472, (1957).
25. Michael Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege against Self-Incrimination:Extorting Evidence from a Suspect,43 Southern California Law Review 597, (1970).
26. Gregory W. O'Reilly, "England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves Toward an Inquisitorial System of Justice",85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 402, (1994).
27. Anna Bowen Poulin, Evidence Use of Silence and the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.191, (1984).
28. Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence:Griffin v. California After Fifteen Years,78 Mich. L. Rev.841, (1980).
29. Steven L. Emanud. Criminal Procedure,22nd edition, (1976).
1. Griswold v. Connecticut,482-84 U.S. (1965).
2. R. v. Dyment,1988 S. C. J. No.82,1988 2 S.C.R.427.
3. Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force.1998O. J. No.5274,21 C. R. (5th) 1 (C. A.).
4. Boyd v. United States,116 U. S. (1886).
5. Olmstead v. United States,227 U. S. (1928).
6. R v. Mills,1999 S. C. J. No.68,1999 3 S. C. R.735.
7. California v. Ciraolo.476 U. S. (1986).
8. R. v. Stillman, (1997) S.C.J. No.34,1997 1 S.C. R.607.
9. R. v. Godoy,1998 S.C.J. No.85,1999 1 S.C.R.311.
10. R. v. Golden,2001 S.C.J. No.81,20013 S.C.R.679.Canada.
11. Katz v. United States,389 U. S. (1967).
12. United States v. White,401 U. S. (1967).
13. United States v. Miller,425 U. S. (1976).
14. Smith v. Maryland,442 U. S. (1979).
15. State v. Hunt,91 N. J.450A2d 952 (1982).
16. Griffin v. Wisconsin,483 U. S. (1987).
17. Florida v. Riley,488 U. S. (1989).
18. United States v. Chadwick,433 U. S. (1977).
19. California v. Greenwood,486 U. S. (1988).
20. Hester v. United States,265 U. S. (1924).
21. Oliver v. United States,466 U. S. (1984).
22. Mapp v. Ohio,367 U. S. (1961).
23. Miranda v. Arizona,384 U. S. (1966).
24. NY v. Quarles,467 U. S. (1984).
25. IL. v. Perkins,496 U. S. (1990).
26. Ullmann v. United States,350 U. S. (1956).
27. Warden v. Hayden,387 U. S. (1967).
28. Fisher v. United States,425 U. S. (1976).
29. Couch v. United States,409 U. S. (1973).
30. Escobedo v. Illinois,378 U. S. (1964).
31. Raffel v. United States,271 U. S. (1926).
32. Grunewald v. United States,353 U. S. (1957).
33. Doyle v. Ohio,426 U. S. (1976).
34. Fletcher v. Weir,455 U. S. (1975).
35. Jenkins v. Anderson,477 U. S. (1980).
36. Silverman v. U. S.,365 U. S. (1961).
37. Schmerber v. California,384 U. S. (1966).
38. U. S. v. Lafayette,462, U. S. (1983).
39. Horton v. California,496 U. S.128 (1990).
40. Griffin v. Wisconsin,483 U. S.868 (1987).
41. Florida v. Riley,488 U. S.455 (1989).
42. Mincey v. Arizona,437 U. S.385 (1978).
43. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U. S.443 (1971).
44. Arizona v. Hicks,480 U. S.321 (1987).
45. United States v. Chadiwick,433 U. S.1 (1977).
46. Carroll v. U. S.,267 U. S.132 (1925).
1、[英]约翰.密尔：《论自由》,程崇华译,北京：商务印书馆(1959)。
2、李震山：《人性尊严与人权保障》,台北：元照出版公司(1999)。
3、陈光中：《刑事诉讼法实施问题研究》,北京：中国法制出版社(2000)。
4、陈卫东：《刑事诉讼法实施问题调研报告》,北京：中国方正出版社(2001)。
5、何家弘：《外国犯罪侦查制度》,北京：中国人民公安大学出版社(2001)。
6、周伟：《宪法基本权利司法救济研究》,北京：中国人民公安大学出版社(2003)。
7、陈瑞华：《刑事审判原理原理论》,北京：北京大学出版社(1997)。
8、陈瑞华：《问题与主义之间》,北京：中国人民大学出版社(2003)。
9、卞建林：《刑事诉讼的现代化》,北京：中国法制出版社(2003)。
10、陈兴良：《刑事法评论第6卷》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(2000)。
11、徐静村：《刑事诉讼法》,北京：法律出版社(1999)。
12、左为民、周长军：《刑事诉讼的理念》,北京：法律出版社(1999)。
13、程味秋：《外国刑事诉讼法概论》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(1994)。
14、樊崇义、夏红主编：《正当程序文献资料选编》,北京：中国人民公安大学出版社(2004)。
15、陈光中：<21世纪域外刑事诉讼立法最新发展》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(2004)。
16、龙宗智：《相对合理主义》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(1999)。
17、汪建成、黄伟明：《欧盟成员国刑事诉讼概论》,北京：中国人民大学出版社(2000)。
18、易延友：《沉默的自由》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(2001)。
19、杨宇冠：《非法证据排除规则研究》,北京：中国人民公安大学出版社(2002)。
20、顾培东：《社会冲突与诉讼机制》,北京：法律出版社(2004)。
21、王以真主编：《外国刑事诉讼法学》,北京：北京大学出版社(1994)。
22、王兆鹏：《美国刑事诉讼法》,北京：北京大学出版社(2005)。
23、[美】阿丽塔·L.艾伦、理查德·C.托克音顿：《美国隐私法—学说、判例与立法》,冯建妹、石宏、郝倩、刘相文、许开辰等译,北京：中国民主法制出版社(2004)。
24、张千帆：《西方宪政体系》下册欧洲宪法,北京：法律出版社(2001)。
25、屠振宇：《宪法隐私权研究：一项未列举基本权利的理论论证》,北京：法律出版社(2008)。
26、张新宝：《隐私权的法律保护》,北京：群众出版社(2004)。
27、谢佑平：《刑事诉讼国际准则研究》,北京：法律出版社(2002)。
28、杨开湘：《刑事诉讼与隐私权保护的关系研究》,北京：中国法制出版社(2006)。
29、向燕：《刑事侦查中隐私权领域的界定》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(2011)。
30、张军：《宪法隐私权研究》,北京：中国社会科学出版社(2007)。
31、王秀哲：《我国隐私权的宪法保护研究》,北京：法律出版社(2011)。
32、[德]乌尔里希·贝克：《风险社会》(中文版),译林出版社(2004)。
33、杨雪冬：《风险社会与秩序重建》,北京：社会科学文献出版社(2006)。
34、周汉华主编：《个人信息保护前沿问题研究》,北京：法律出版社(2006)。
35、[英]梅因：《古代法》,沈景一译,北京：商务印书馆(2010)。
36、[英]罗奇：《重新思考公民身份：现代社会中的福利、意识形态和变迁》,郭忠华译,长春：吉林出版集团有限责任公司(2010.1)。
37、张千帆、赵娟、黄建军,《比较行政法：体系、制度与过程》,北京：法律出版社(2008)。
38、[德]茨威格特、克茨：《比较法总论》,潘汉典等译,贵州：贵州人民出版社(1992)。
39、王光辉：《比较宪法学》,北京：北京大学出版社(2007)。
40、台湾：林东茂,《刑法综览(修订五版)》,北京：中国人民大学出版社(2009)。
41、阎如恩,由明语：《刑事侦查教程》,长春：吉林人民出版社(1999)。
42、[日】吉川经夫：《改订刑法总论》,法律文化出版社(1974)。
43、马克昌：《比较刑法原理》,湖北：武汉大学出版社(2002)。
44、中国政法大学刑事法律研究中心编译：《英国刑事诉讼法》(选编),北京：中国政法大学出版社(2001)。
45、储槐植：《美国刑法》,北京：北京大学出版社(1996)。
46、黎宏：《日本刑法精义》,北京：中国检察出版社(2004)。
47、沈达明：《衡平法初论》,北京：对外经济贸易出版社(1997)。
48、[日]木村龟二主编：《刑法学词典》,顾肖荣等译,上海：上海翻译出版公司(1991)。
49、赵秉志等主编：《刑法学通论》,北京：高等教育出版社(1994)。
50、周光权：《法定刑研究：罪刑均衡的建构与实现》,北京：中国方正出版社(2000)。
51、高铭暄、马克昌：《刑法学》,北京：北京大学出版社、高等教育出版社(2000)。
52、任惠华：《刑事案件侦查》,北京：法律出版社(2000)。
53、谢佑平、万毅：《刑事侦查制度原理》,北京：中国人民公安大学出版社(2003)。
54、张佛泉：《自由与人权》,台北：台湾商务印书馆(1993)。
55、周国均：《侦查程序论》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(1994)。
56、孙长永：《侦查程序与人权》,北京：中国法制出版社(2000)。
57、陈永生：《侦查程序原理论》,北京：中国人民公安大学出版社(2003)。
58、[德]托马斯·魏根特：《德国刑事诉讼程序》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(2004)。
59、【法】卡斯东·斯特法尼等：《法国刑事诉讼法精义》,罗结珍译,北京：中国政法大学出版社(1998)。
60、[日】田口守一：《刑事诉讼法》,刘迪等译,北京：法律出版社(2000)。
61、宋英辉译：《日本刑事诉讼法》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(2000)。
62、[德】克劳斯·罗科信：《刑事诉讼法》,吴丽琪译,北京：法律出版社(2003)。
63、刘仁文等译：《美国模范刑法典及其评注》,北京：法律出版社(2005)。
64、卞建林等译：《加拿大刑事法典》,北京：中国政法大学出版社(1999)。
65、《牛津英汉双解词典》,北京：商务印书馆(1998)。
66、徐久生、庄敬华译：《德国刑法典》(2002年修订),北京：中国方正出版社(2004)。
67、罗结珍译：《法国新刑法典》,北京：中国法制出版社(2003)。
68、张明楷译：《日本刑法典》,北京：法律出版社(2006)。
69、刘仁文,王炜等译：《美国模范刑法典及其评注》(Model Penal Code-Official Draft and Explanatory Notes),北京：法律出版社(2005)。
70、[日】大塚仁著,冯军译：《刑法概说(各论)(第三版)》,北京：中国人民大学出版社(2003)。
71、[美]波斯纳：《论隐私权》,常鹏翱译,梁慧星主编《民商法论丛》第21卷,金桥文化出版(香港)有限公司(2001)。
72、[德】约克·艾斯勒：《抽象危险犯的基础和边界》,蔡桂生译,《刑法论丛》第14卷,北京：法律出版社。
73、向燕：《美国最高法院‘隐私的合理期待’标准之评介》,《中国刑事法杂志》,2008年第9期。
74、王立志：《英国刑法对隐私权的保护及其评析》,《新疆财经大学学报》,2009年第4期。
75、陈瑞华：《法治视野下的证人保护》,《法学》,2002年第3期。
76、季卫东：《合宪性审查与司法权的强化》,《中国社会科学》,2002年第2期。
77、汪建成：《论犯罪控制与人权保护》,《刑事法评论第6卷》(2000)。
78、汪建成、孙远,《刑事诉讼中口供规则体系论纲》,《北京大学学报》,2002年第2期。
79、张春霞：《论隐私权在刑事诉讼领域的诉求》,《四川大学学报》,2004年第1期。
80、宋英辉：《刑事程序中的技术侦查》,《法学研究》,2000年第3期。
81、高家伟：《论证据法上的利益衡量原则”,《现代法学》,2004年第4期。
82、林钰雄：《从基本权体系论身体检查处分”,《台大法学论丛》,第33卷。
83、龙宗智：《被害人作为公诉案件诉讼当事人制度评析”,《法学》,2001年第4期。
84、杨开湘：《强制侦查行为视野下的国家权力和个人权利",《比较法研究》,2004 年第2期。
85、郑贤君：《基本权利的宪法构成及其实证化’’,《法学研究》,2002年第2期。
86、唐昭红：《商业秘密研究》,梁慧星主编,《民商法论丛》,北京：法律出版社1997年版。
87、陈妮：《中外告诉乃论比较研究》,《政法论坛》,2001年第1期。
88、陈芳吴宏耀：《费希尔案与反对强迫自我归罪特权》,《中国审判新闻月刊》,2007年第12期。
89、陈光中、陈学权：《强制采样与人权保障之冲突与平衡》,《现代法学》,2005年第5期。
90、高春兴：《也谈我国刑事司法改革中的人权保障问题》,郝宏奎主编《侦查论坛》第三卷,北京：中国人民公安大学出版社(2004)。
91、程味秋、杨宇冠：《美国刑事诉讼中逮捕和搜查》,《中国刑事法杂志》,2001年第5期。
92、王立志：《风险社会中刑法范式之转换—以隐私权刑法保护切入》,《政法论坛》,2010年第2期。
93、王晓能,赵英敏：《论人格权的民法保护》,《中外法学》,2000年第5期。
94、张千帆：《论宪法效力的界定及其对私法的影响》,《比较法研究》,2004年第6期。
95、左为民：《权利话语／实践的艰难展开》,《中外法学》,2002年第4期。
96、蔡定剑：《中国宪法实施的私法化之路》,《中国社会科学》,2004年第2期。