非经营性国有资产双重委托代理模型与监督管理应用研究
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摘要
目前,我国从中央到省、市、自治区再到地级市的各级人民政府组建国有资产经营管理公司是国有资产管理的主要方式之一。形成国资委、以资本经营为主的国有资产经营管理公司、以生产经营为主的子公司三级国有资产管理架构。对地市级政府来说,其组建国有资产经营管理公司的目的是促进地方经济和社会事业发展,并为地方政府搭建融资平台。地市级国有资产经营管理公司的资本构成包括经营性资产和非经营性资产两部分,其中非经营性国有资产占相当比重。本论文主要研究如何实现该类国有资产的保值、增值问题。
论文首先研究了非经营性国有资产的监管模式。非经营性国有资产是实现政府职能的物质基础,主要用于提供公共产品,它的配置机制是政府,是以社会效益为配置目标,以是否维护了社会的公平、发展、稳定等诸多要求为目的。论文围绕促进公共效率、实现效益最大化的前提,综合选取定性指标和定量指标,以效率、效益、公平为目标构建了非经营性国有资产监管的监管体系、监管结构、监管方式,以及相应的绩效评价体系。
其次论文研究了非经营性国有资产的单委托代理问题。在国资委、国有资产经营管理公司、下属子公司三级管理架构中,论文假设不考虑上级国资委对国有资产经营管理公司的约束或者下级子公司对其约束的条件下,分别分析国有资产经营管理公司与下属子公司、国资委与国有资产经营管理公司两种单委托代理关系。并得到结论认为：对于成长阶段的创新性下属子公司,国有资产经营管理公司应当减少对其业绩的激励强度；而对于处于成熟阶段的稳健保守型下属公司应当增加其对业绩的激励强度；国有资产经营管理公司的经营目标有经营性业绩和社会效益两个。其中国资委对公司的经营性业绩的激励应当较高,而对社会效益产出上的激励不应过大。
由于国有资产经营管理公司在国资委与其形成的委托代理关系中处于代理人的地位,而同时又在其与下属子公司形成的委托代理关系中处于委托人的地位,因而具有双重委托代理身份。论文进一步的研究考虑上下约束存在,国有资产资本经营公司处于双重委托代理关系中,是如何同时与下属公司以及上级国资委之间进行博弈。论文构建双重委托代理模型得到分析结论认为：国资委应努力将非经营性国有资产的投入推向一些新兴的优势社会公共事业中来,这样才能实现非经营性国有资产的高效运营；国资委应实行非经营性国有资产的职能化管理,进而可以增强非经营性国有资产所创造的价值；国资委应强化对非经营性国有资产的监管力度,进而使非经营性国有资产所创造出的价值得到增加。
再其次,论文在新兴古典框架下研究非经营性国有资产的委托代理问题,并得到结论：在非经营性资产的委托代理中,委托方(国资委或该城市投资公司)与代理方(城市投资公司或其下属子公司)之间采用相容契约能够消除由于道德风险引起的内生交易成本。
论文最后进行了实例研究。XX市是XX省下辖的一个地级市,其非经营性国有资产一部分由市国资委监管,另一部分由市财政局监管。市国资委对非经营性国有资产的监管主要通过X投公司进行。国资委对城市投资公司的考核综合考虑经济效益和社会效益两个方面：在经济效益方面主要考核企业的融资能力,社会效益方面则主要考核企业在基础设施建设方面的投入对城市经济增长的投资贡献率。
At present, state-owned asset management company is one of the principal ways to administrate the state-owned asset in china. National endowment appoints state-owned asset Management Company and the subsidiaries of the state-owned asset management company constitute the state-owned assets management system. For prefecture-level city, the establishment of state-owned assets Management Company's aim is to promote local economic and social development, and set up financing platform for local government. State-owned assets Management Company's capital includes the operating assets and non-operating assets in two parts, wherein the non-operating state-owned assets accounted for a considerable proportion. This dissertation mainly studies how to supervise and manage this kind of state-owned asset.
First, this dissertation study of non-operating state-owned assets supervision modes. Non-operating state-owned assets are the material basis to realize government functions. They are mainly for the provision of public goods. Their allocation mechanisms are based on the government. The non-operating state-owned assets' configuration goal is to seek social benefits and concerning whether the social justice, development and stability are maintained. Non-operating state-owned assets are the material basis of achieving social efficiency and justice, so the contents of performance evaluation are the efficiency, effectiveness and fairness. Based on that, we build the non-operating state-owned assets supervision and performance evaluation system.
The country endowment appoints the state-owned assets Management Company and subsidiary constitute the three-level management system of state-owned assets. The dissertation then focuses on the two single principal-agent issues of the non-operating state-owned assets. One is the principal-agent issue between the Cooperation and its subsidiaries, without considering the superior constraint. The other is the principal-agent issues between country endowments appoint and the State-owned Assets Operation and Management Cooperation, without considering the lower constraint. Through the analysis we believe that, company of state-owned asset management should reduce the performance incentive intensity for the growth and innovative subsidiaries, and should increase the performance incentive intensity for the mature and conservative subsidiaries. We also believe that, the company's operating performance should be highly incented, and the social benefits should not be highly incented by the country endowment.
The dissertation later discusses the double principal-agent issues of the State-owned Assets Operation and Management Cooperation. Through the analysis we conclude that, the country endowment should invest in some new social public utilities, in order to realize the efficient operation of non-operating state-owned assets; the country endowment should execute specialized management of the non-operating state-owned assets, in order to enhance the non-operating state-owned assets value; the country endowment should strengthen supervision of the non-operating state-owned assets, in order to increase the value of these asserts.
After that, we study on the principal-agent issues of the non-operating state-owned assets based on the new classical economics. We get the results that, principal and agent with compatible contracts can eliminate the endogenous transaction cost caused by the moral risk.
Finally, the dissertation devotes research to the issues of supervision and management of the non-operating state-owned assets in city XX. In this city, one part of non-operating state-owned assets is supervised by the country endowment appoints, the other part is supervised by the Bureau of Finance. The country endowment appoints supervise the assets mainly through the XX investment company. To evaluate XX Investment Company, the financing ability should be considered, and the investment contribution rate on Infrastructure investment should also be considered.
论文首先研究了非经营性国有资产的监管模式。非经营性国有资产是实现政府职能的物质基础,主要用于提供公共产品,它的配置机制是政府,是以社会效益为配置目标,以是否维护了社会的公平、发展、稳定等诸多要求为目的。论文围绕促进公共效率、实现效益最大化的前提,综合选取定性指标和定量指标,以效率、效益、公平为目标构建了非经营性国有资产监管的监管体系、监管结构、监管方式,以及相应的绩效评价体系。
其次论文研究了非经营性国有资产的单委托代理问题。在国资委、国有资产经营管理公司、下属子公司三级管理架构中,论文假设不考虑上级国资委对国有资产经营管理公司的约束或者下级子公司对其约束的条件下,分别分析国有资产经营管理公司与下属子公司、国资委与国有资产经营管理公司两种单委托代理关系。并得到结论认为：对于成长阶段的创新性下属子公司,国有资产经营管理公司应当减少对其业绩的激励强度；而对于处于成熟阶段的稳健保守型下属公司应当增加其对业绩的激励强度；国有资产经营管理公司的经营目标有经营性业绩和社会效益两个。其中国资委对公司的经营性业绩的激励应当较高,而对社会效益产出上的激励不应过大。
由于国有资产经营管理公司在国资委与其形成的委托代理关系中处于代理人的地位,而同时又在其与下属子公司形成的委托代理关系中处于委托人的地位,因而具有双重委托代理身份。论文进一步的研究考虑上下约束存在,国有资产资本经营公司处于双重委托代理关系中,是如何同时与下属公司以及上级国资委之间进行博弈。论文构建双重委托代理模型得到分析结论认为：国资委应努力将非经营性国有资产的投入推向一些新兴的优势社会公共事业中来,这样才能实现非经营性国有资产的高效运营；国资委应实行非经营性国有资产的职能化管理,进而可以增强非经营性国有资产所创造的价值；国资委应强化对非经营性国有资产的监管力度,进而使非经营性国有资产所创造出的价值得到增加。
再其次,论文在新兴古典框架下研究非经营性国有资产的委托代理问题,并得到结论：在非经营性资产的委托代理中,委托方(国资委或该城市投资公司)与代理方(城市投资公司或其下属子公司)之间采用相容契约能够消除由于道德风险引起的内生交易成本。
论文最后进行了实例研究。XX市是XX省下辖的一个地级市,其非经营性国有资产一部分由市国资委监管,另一部分由市财政局监管。市国资委对非经营性国有资产的监管主要通过X投公司进行。国资委对城市投资公司的考核综合考虑经济效益和社会效益两个方面：在经济效益方面主要考核企业的融资能力,社会效益方面则主要考核企业在基础设施建设方面的投入对城市经济增长的投资贡献率。
At present, state-owned asset management company is one of the principal ways to administrate the state-owned asset in china. National endowment appoints state-owned asset Management Company and the subsidiaries of the state-owned asset management company constitute the state-owned assets management system. For prefecture-level city, the establishment of state-owned assets Management Company's aim is to promote local economic and social development, and set up financing platform for local government. State-owned assets Management Company's capital includes the operating assets and non-operating assets in two parts, wherein the non-operating state-owned assets accounted for a considerable proportion. This dissertation mainly studies how to supervise and manage this kind of state-owned asset.
First, this dissertation study of non-operating state-owned assets supervision modes. Non-operating state-owned assets are the material basis to realize government functions. They are mainly for the provision of public goods. Their allocation mechanisms are based on the government. The non-operating state-owned assets' configuration goal is to seek social benefits and concerning whether the social justice, development and stability are maintained. Non-operating state-owned assets are the material basis of achieving social efficiency and justice, so the contents of performance evaluation are the efficiency, effectiveness and fairness. Based on that, we build the non-operating state-owned assets supervision and performance evaluation system.
The country endowment appoints the state-owned assets Management Company and subsidiary constitute the three-level management system of state-owned assets. The dissertation then focuses on the two single principal-agent issues of the non-operating state-owned assets. One is the principal-agent issue between the Cooperation and its subsidiaries, without considering the superior constraint. The other is the principal-agent issues between country endowments appoint and the State-owned Assets Operation and Management Cooperation, without considering the lower constraint. Through the analysis we believe that, company of state-owned asset management should reduce the performance incentive intensity for the growth and innovative subsidiaries, and should increase the performance incentive intensity for the mature and conservative subsidiaries. We also believe that, the company's operating performance should be highly incented, and the social benefits should not be highly incented by the country endowment.
The dissertation later discusses the double principal-agent issues of the State-owned Assets Operation and Management Cooperation. Through the analysis we conclude that, the country endowment should invest in some new social public utilities, in order to realize the efficient operation of non-operating state-owned assets; the country endowment should execute specialized management of the non-operating state-owned assets, in order to enhance the non-operating state-owned assets value; the country endowment should strengthen supervision of the non-operating state-owned assets, in order to increase the value of these asserts.
After that, we study on the principal-agent issues of the non-operating state-owned assets based on the new classical economics. We get the results that, principal and agent with compatible contracts can eliminate the endogenous transaction cost caused by the moral risk.
Finally, the dissertation devotes research to the issues of supervision and management of the non-operating state-owned assets in city XX. In this city, one part of non-operating state-owned assets is supervised by the country endowment appoints, the other part is supervised by the Bureau of Finance. The country endowment appoints supervise the assets mainly through the XX investment company. To evaluate XX Investment Company, the financing ability should be considered, and the investment contribution rate on Infrastructure investment should also be considered.
引文
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