竞争中的国际官僚组织—组织文化与规范倡导
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摘要
作为建构主义关于观念研究的科学研究纲领，国际规范扩散纲领的当然假定之一便是国际组织自动倡导国际规范，国际组织甚至成为这些“美好国际规范”的化身。但是关于国际组织“虚伪”性、“非法行为”、“病症”等现象的经验研究则揭示出国际组织并不等同于国际规范本身，在一定程度上，国际组织具有独立的组织偏好与组织文化。因此，国际官僚组织在推动国际规范扩散时，其倡导行为不是自动和和谐的，甚至可能相互竞争。另外，从国际规范扩散纲领内部的“问题转换”来看，发展出一种国际组织的规范倡导理论作为新的“保护带”，也为消除纲领当前面临的国际规范竞争这一“反常”所必需，即解释在同一历史阶段中，在同一问题领域内相关国际组织对同一国际规范的竞争性倡导行为这一反常，进而将国际规范竞争的研究议程再度纳入既有的规范扩散纲领内。
专业性政府间国际组织虽然由主权国家建立，但由于国际官僚具有双重认同、国际组织的专业化程度、长期的组织工作实践等，其实际上又具有官僚组织的特质，因而会逐渐形成自身的组织偏好，特别是独特的组织文化。国际官僚组织的组织文化是组织成员共享的、关于如何才是最好的实现组织任务方法的一种集体信念和假设，组织文化塑造了国际组织对自身利益的认知，同时，更为重要的是，其也塑造了国际组织对于如何才是最佳的规范倡导方案的理解。一般而言，专业性国际官僚组织依据自身的组织文化重新阐释和组合国际规范包含的一系列禁止性规则，使两者相匹配。因而，实际上，国际规范都是经历了国际组织组织文化过滤后而加以扩散。例如，在20世纪末，随着国际知识产权保护规范进入垂直扩散阶段，在同一时间段内，针对知识产权国际保护这一单一问题领域，联合国教科文组织、世界贸易组织和世界知识产权组织这三个专业性国际组织，针对如何才是最为有效的保护知识产权路径，给出了不同的答案，特别是教科文组织与世界贸易组织的倡导差异更为明显：具有“平等”组织文化的教科文组织倾向于对知识产权保护实行人权化倡导，而以组织的贸易文化强烈著称的世界贸易组织，则强调应确立绝对产权，主张对知识产权进行“产权化”国际保护。
As a Scientific Research Program for constructivist scholar, researches aboutinternational norm diffusion assume that international organizations wouldautomatically be a norm enterpreur, even the embodiment of those nice interntionalnorms. However, a series of researches about the “illegal actions”,“hypocrisy”, and“pathology” of international organizations just show that we should treat them asindependent international actors. Furthermore, with the progressive “problem-shift” inthe international norm diffusion Research Program, this program must solve a newanomaly, i.e. there are competing international organizations to push one internationalnorm towards different directions at the same time.
Although international governmental organizations are founded by national state,they are actually international bureaucratic organiztions because of dual indentities ofinternational employees, the control of knowledge and information, which makesthem have their own preferences and organizational cultures. Organizational culturesshape the preferences of international organizations, more important; it affects thedirections of norm enterpreuring of IOs. As collective shared assumptions, beliefs oforganizational members, organizational culture defines the methods andunderstanding of “what is the best way to complete organizational assignments andgoals”. Based on its organizational culture, international bureaucratic organizationwould reinterprete the meanings of prohibiting rules of one international norm,making it more compatibale with its organizational culture.
As norm enterpreurs for Intellectual Property Protection Norm (IPPN), WTO,WIPO and UNESCO try to fix the real meaning of this international norm separately.Based on its “tade culture”, WTO would think “propertization” of intellectualproperty is the best way to promote the IPPN; however, UNESCO puts the humanrights protection as the focus of IPPN because of its “equality cluture”. In addition,WIPO stands the middle way among them.
专业性政府间国际组织虽然由主权国家建立，但由于国际官僚具有双重认同、国际组织的专业化程度、长期的组织工作实践等，其实际上又具有官僚组织的特质，因而会逐渐形成自身的组织偏好，特别是独特的组织文化。国际官僚组织的组织文化是组织成员共享的、关于如何才是最好的实现组织任务方法的一种集体信念和假设，组织文化塑造了国际组织对自身利益的认知，同时，更为重要的是，其也塑造了国际组织对于如何才是最佳的规范倡导方案的理解。一般而言，专业性国际官僚组织依据自身的组织文化重新阐释和组合国际规范包含的一系列禁止性规则，使两者相匹配。因而，实际上，国际规范都是经历了国际组织组织文化过滤后而加以扩散。例如，在20世纪末，随着国际知识产权保护规范进入垂直扩散阶段，在同一时间段内，针对知识产权国际保护这一单一问题领域，联合国教科文组织、世界贸易组织和世界知识产权组织这三个专业性国际组织，针对如何才是最为有效的保护知识产权路径，给出了不同的答案，特别是教科文组织与世界贸易组织的倡导差异更为明显：具有“平等”组织文化的教科文组织倾向于对知识产权保护实行人权化倡导，而以组织的贸易文化强烈著称的世界贸易组织，则强调应确立绝对产权，主张对知识产权进行“产权化”国际保护。
As a Scientific Research Program for constructivist scholar, researches aboutinternational norm diffusion assume that international organizations wouldautomatically be a norm enterpreur, even the embodiment of those nice interntionalnorms. However, a series of researches about the “illegal actions”,“hypocrisy”, and“pathology” of international organizations just show that we should treat them asindependent international actors. Furthermore, with the progressive “problem-shift” inthe international norm diffusion Research Program, this program must solve a newanomaly, i.e. there are competing international organizations to push one internationalnorm towards different directions at the same time.
Although international governmental organizations are founded by national state,they are actually international bureaucratic organiztions because of dual indentities ofinternational employees, the control of knowledge and information, which makesthem have their own preferences and organizational cultures. Organizational culturesshape the preferences of international organizations, more important; it affects thedirections of norm enterpreuring of IOs. As collective shared assumptions, beliefs oforganizational members, organizational culture defines the methods andunderstanding of “what is the best way to complete organizational assignments andgoals”. Based on its organizational culture, international bureaucratic organizationwould reinterprete the meanings of prohibiting rules of one international norm,making it more compatibale with its organizational culture.
As norm enterpreurs for Intellectual Property Protection Norm (IPPN), WTO,WIPO and UNESCO try to fix the real meaning of this international norm separately.Based on its “tade culture”, WTO would think “propertization” of intellectualproperty is the best way to promote the IPPN; however, UNESCO puts the humanrights protection as the focus of IPPN because of its “equality cluture”. In addition,WIPO stands the middle way among them.
引文
2Kenneth A. Oye,“Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” World Politics, Vol.38,No.1(Oct.,1985), pp.1-24; Kenneth A. Oye, Cooperation under Anarchy, Princeton: Princeton University Press,1986.
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1李敏：《身份干扰与行为偏失》，外交学院博士学位论文，2012年，第2-3页。
1Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, p.891; Jeffrey T.Checkel,“Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies Quarterly,Vol.43, No.1,1999p.83; Suzette R. Grillot,“Global Gun Control: Examining the Consequences of CompetingInternational Norms,” Global Governance, Vol.17Issue4,2011,p.533; Amy Gurowitz,“Mobilizing InternationalNorms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the Japanese State,” World Politics, Vol.51, No.3(Apr.,1999), p.417;Ann E. Towns,“Norms and Social Hierarchies: Understanding International Policy Diffusion ‘From Below’,”International Organization, Vol.66, Issue2, April2012, p.187.
2Ann Florini,“The Evolution of International Norms,” p.364.
3转引自Judith Kelley,“Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International ElectionMonitoring,” International Organization, Vol.62, Issue2,April2008,p.223。
4Ethan A. Nadelmann,“Global Prohibition Regimes: the Evolution of Norms in International Society,”International Organization, Vol.44, Issue4, September1990, p.484.
5Judith Kelley,“Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring,”p.224.
1Theo Farrell,“Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army,”
2European Journal of International Relations, Vol.7, Issue1,2001,p.78.Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p.895;Judith Kelley,“Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring,” p.226;Ann Florini,“The Evolution of International Norms,” p.375.
3Ethan A. Nadelmann,“Global Prohibition Regimes: the Evolution of Norms in International Society,” p.484.
4Lisa L. Martin,“Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,” International Organization, Vol.46, No.4, Autumn1992,p.767.
1Jeffrey W. Legro,“Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” InternationalOrganization, Vol.51, No.1,Winter1997, p.37.
1[美]尼古拉斯·G.奥努弗：《建构主义的哲学渊源探析》，《世界经济与政治》，2006年第9期，第56页。
2董青岭：《建构主义是一种国际政治理论吗?》，《欧洲研究》，2012年第5期，第85页。
1Peter J. Katzenstein., Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan, Ithaca,N.Y.:Cornell University Press,1996,pp.18-19.
1漆海霞：《国际关系学科中研究方法的应用分野——对2005—2009年<国际组织>杂志的数据分析》，《外交评论》，2011年第5期，第145页。
2《政治心理学》（Political Psychology）上的文章是一个典型的代表，该杂志发表了大量运用文本分析法研究政治人物心理和性格的文章。例如Krista De Castella, Craig McGarty and Luke Musgrove,“FearAppeals inPolitical Rhetoric about Terrorism: An Analysis of Speeches by Australian Prime Minister Howard,” PoliticalPsychology, Vol.30, No.1(Feb.,2009), pp.1-26。
3例如R. L. Friedheim, J. B. Kadane and J. K. Gamble, Jr.,“Quantitative ContentAnalysis of the United NationsSeabed Debate: Methodology and a Continental Shelf Case Study,” International Organization, Vol.24, No.3(Summer,1970), pp.479-502; Kjell Goldmann,“East-West Tension in Europe,1946-1970: A Conceptual Analysisand a Quantitative Description,” World Politics, Vol.26, No.1(Oct.,1973), pp.106-125。
1Robert Jervis,“The Costs of the Scientific Study of Politics: An Examination of the Stanford ContentAnalysis Studies,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.11, No.4(Dec.,1967), pp.366-393;Deborah WelchLarson,“Problems of Content Analysis in Foreign-Policy Research: Notes from the Study of the Origins of ColdWar Belief Systems,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.32, No.2(Jun.,1988), pp.241-255.
2袁正清：《中国的国际关系研究既要解释也要理解》，《世界经济与政治》，2003年第3期，第30页。
1Sarah V. Percy,“Mercenaries: Strong Norm, Weak Law,” International Organization, Vol.61, No.2(Spring,2007), pp.367-397.
1崔伟奇、史阿娜：《论库恩范式理论在社会科学领域中运用的张力》，《学习与探索》，2011年第1期，第40页。
2库恩：《科学革命的结构》，金吾伦、胡新和译，北京：北京大学出版社，2003年，第32页。
1崔伟奇、史阿娜：《论库恩范式理论在社会科学领域中运用的张力》，第40页。
2卢旺林：《拉卡托斯科学研究纲领方法论——一部温情的“达尔文式”进化论》，《江西财经大学学报》，2006年第5期，第79页。
3拉卡托斯，《科学研究纲领方法论》，兰征译，上海：上海译文出版社，1986年，第125页。
1拉卡托斯，《科学研究纲领方法论》，第71页。
6王班超：《拉卡托斯科学研究纲领方法论述评》，《长白学刊》，1988年第6期，第67页。
1廖舜右：《Thomas Kuhn与Imre Lakatos有关国际关系理论的争论》，《政治科学论丛》，2007年第29期，第31页。
2陈宏铭：《现实主义典范的进步或退化：以Vasquez采Lakatos科学研究纲领的论战为焦点》，《东吴政治学报》，2003年第17期，第87页。
3黄文华、郭铭杰：《科学研究纲领方法论在国际关系学界的误用：重新检视现实主义典范进化或退化的辩论》，《东吴政治学报》，2006年第24期，第117-118页。
4这种意义包括理论与数据之间的切合需要谨慎面对；理论的取舍在于其与对手的竞争等等，参见ColinElman and Miriam Fendius Elman,“How Not to Be Lakatos Intolerant: Appraising Progress in IR Research,”International Studies Quarterly, Vol.46, No.2(Jun.,2002),p.255。
5有学者简单对建构主义研究纲领做了概括，将其分为“体系建构主义”和“单元建构主义”两大类，参见陈小鼎：《试析国际关系理论的合成——一种科学哲学的分析视角》，《国际政治研究》，2006年第4期，166页。
1秦亚青：《观念的力量》，《世界经济与政治》，2005年第10期，第1页。
3Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: the Politics of Reality, New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,2002, pp.2-3.
4秦亚青：《建构主义:思想渊源、理论流派与学术理念》，《国际政治研究》，2006年第3期，第13页。
5拉卡托斯，《科学研究纲领方法论》，第47页。
1Alastair Iain Johnston,“Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Cultureof National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia UniversityPress,1996,pp.217-268.
2Elizabeth Kier,“Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars,” International Security, Vol.19, No.4,Spring1995, pp.65-93.
3Colins S. Gray,“Strategic Culture as Context: the First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,”Review of International Studies, Vol.25, Issue1, January1999,pp.49-69.除此之外，还有最新的对战略文化“预测”能力的怀疑与批评，参见Christoph Meyer,“The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insightsfrom Strategic Culture Research for the European Union’s Evolution as a Military Power,” International StudiesQuarterly, Vol.55, Issue3,2011,pp.669–690。
4Mona Lena Krook and Jacqui True,“Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms: The United Nations andthe Global Promotion of Gender Equality,” p.104.
5Fiona B. Adamson,“Global Liberalism Versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks inInternational Politics,” p.547.持相似看法的还有Ann E. Towns,“Norms and Social Hierarchies: UnderstandingInternational Policy Diffusion ‘From Below’,” p.185。
3柳思思：《从规范进化到规范退化》，《当代亚太》，2010年第3期，第146页。
3拉卡托斯，《科学研究纲领方法论》，第67页。
4Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano,“Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement theResponsibility to Protect,” International Relations, Vol.25,No.2,2011,pp.208-209.
1Amitav Acharya,“How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change inAsian Regionalism,” pp.239-275.
2Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano,“Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement theResponsibility to Protect,” p.205.
3Hiro Katsumata,“Mimetic Adoption and Norm Diffusion:‘Western’ Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia?”Review of International Studies, Vol.37, Issue2, April2011, pp.557-576.
2Michael0. Slobodchikoff,“The New European Union: Integration as a Means of Norm Diffusion,” Journal onEthnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Vol.9, No.1,2010, pp.1-25.
3Pamela A. Jordan,“Does Membership Have Its Privileges?: Entrance into the Council of Europe andCompliance with Human Rights Norms,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.25, No.3, August2003, pp.660-688.
7Alastair Iain Johnston,“Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” International StudiesQuarterly, Vol.45, Issue4,2001, p.489.
1Pamela A. Jordan,“Does Membership Have Its Privileges?: Entrance into the Council of Europe andCompliance with Human Rights Norms,” pp.660-688.
2秦亚青：《研究设计与学术创新》，第79页。
3Jeffrey T. Checkel,“International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” pp.801-826.
4Jeffrey Checkel,“International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist Constructivist Divide,”European Journal of International Relations, Vol.3, No.4,1997,p.475.
5Ann E. Towns,“Norms and Social Hierarchies: Understanding International Policy Diffusion ‘From Below’,”pp.184-185.当然有学者认为国际规范扩散最为主要的社会化机制是“规范性强迫”，Asher Alkoby,“Theories
6of Compliance with International Law and the Challenge of Cultural Difference,” p.156.Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks,“How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law,”Duke Law Journal, Vol.54, No.3,Dec.,2004, p.631.
7Leonard J. Schoppa,“The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining,” International Organization,Vol.53, No.2, Spring1999, p.309.
8Theo Farrell,“Transnational Norms and Military Development:Constructing Ireland's Professional Army,” p.91.
4Amitav Acharya,“How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change inAsian Regionalism,” pp.239-275.
5Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano,“Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement theResponsibility to Protect,” p.210.
6Jeffrey W. Legro,“Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’of Internationalism,” p.44.
1Suzette R. Grillot,“Global Gun Control: Examining the Consequences of Competing International Norms,”pp.534-542.
2例如Sandholtz认为规范内部的一般性规则与具体事实之间的冲突以及不同规则之间的冲突导致规范发生改变，参见Wayne Sandholtz,“Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules against Wartime Plunder,”pp.101-131; Kees Van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek也认为国际规范在被行为体接受和内化后，也出现再定义该规范的情况，参见Kees Van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek,“The Politics of International Norms:Subsidiarity and the Imperfect Competence Regime of the European Union,” pp.217–238.更为激进的看法是Antje Wiener的规范实践论，她认为规范扩散论纲是一种行为主义视角，规范的有效性实际上来源于国家实践，实践若变化，规范的内在意义也就相应转变。参见Antje Wiener,“Contested Compliance: Interventions onthe Normative Structure of World Politics,” pp.192-193.
3参见Wayne Sandholtz,“Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules against Wartime Plunder,” p.102.
4参见Mona Lena Krook and Jacqui True,“Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms: The UnitedNations and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality,” p.104.
5Kees Van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek,“The Politics of International Norms: Subsidiarity and the ImperfectCompetence Regime of the European Union,” p.221.
1参见陈寒溪：《论华尔兹纲领的硬核与问题转换》，第29页。
1Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p.892.
2参见Hayley Stevenson,“India and International Norms of Climate Governance: a ConstructivistAnalysis ofNormative Congruence Building,” pp.997,1003。
34Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p.908.Richard Price,“Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” pp.629-632; HayleyStevenson,“India and International Norms of Climate Governance: a Constructivist Analysis of NormativeCongruence Building,” pp.997, p.1004; Theo Farrell,“Transnational Norms and Military Development:Constructing Ireland's Professional Army,” p.81.
5Hayley Stevenson,“India and International Norms of Climate Governance: a Constructivist Analysis ofNormative Congruence Building,” pp.997,1004.
1Markus Kornprobst,“Argumentation and Compromise: Ireland's Selection of the Territorial Status Quo Norm,”pp.75-78.
2黄超：《说服战略与规范传播——以地雷规范和小武器规范为例》，第49-50页。
3Jutta Joachim,“Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and Women's Rights,” InternationalStudies Quarterly, Vol.47, No.2(Jun.,2003),pp.250,257.
4Amitav Acharya,“How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change inAsian Regionalism,” p.246.
5例如其他学科如心理学的研究已经揭示了框定与规范说服的效力关联度。即便是表达同样的内容，正向的收益框定与反向的损失框定则有截然不同的效果，前者如“你如果吃阿司匹林，你的心脏将会更健康”，后者则如“你如果不吃阿司匹林，你的心脏将会不那么健康”。相较之下，正向的表达收益取向的框定更具说服力，参见Adam Corner and Ulrike Hahn,“Message Framing, Normative Advocacy and PersuasiveSuccess,” Argumentation, Vol.24, Issue2,2010, p.153.
6Amitav Acharya,“How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change inAsian Regionalism,” pp.239-275; Jeffrey W. Legro,“Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ofInternationalism,” pp.31-63; Jeffrey T. Checkel,“Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in ContemporaryEurope,” p.87.
7Hayley Stevenson,“India and International Norms of Climate Governance: a Constructivist Analysis ofNormative Congruence Building,” pp.997,1004-1005.
8Theo Farrell,“Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army,”pp.78-81.
1Theo Farrell,“Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army,” p.71;Hayley Stevenson,“India and International Norms of Climate Governance: a Constructivist Analysis of NormativeCongruence Building,” pp.997,1002,1004.
1Tamar Gutner,“When ‘doing good’ Does Not: the MIF and the Millennium Development Goals,” in DeborahD.Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan K.Sell, eds., Who Governs the Globe?New York: Cambridge UniversityPress,2010,p.266.
2实际上，制度主义发现的“机制复杂性”、“机制重叠”和“制度互动”，在概念所指上存在很大程度的交叉，核心的意思都是指机制管辖边界之间的交叉与规则竞争。有时候，其又称“制度复杂性”或“制度重叠”。
3Sebastian Oberthür and Olav Schram Stokke,“Institutional Complexity and Interplay Management:Compatibility and Change in Global Governance,” Paper Submitted to the ISA Annual Convention in San Diego,USA, April2012, and to the Earth System Governance conference in Lund, Sweden, April212, p.1,www.lund2012.earthsystemgovernance.org/LC2012-paper123.pdf,登录时间：12/19/2012.
4Kal Raustiala and David G.Victor,“The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources,” InternationalOrganization, Vol.58, No.2, Spring2004, p.299.
5Daniel W. Drezner,“The Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol.7,No.1, March2009,p.66.
6Kal Raustiala and David G.Victor,“The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources,” pp.277-278.
1Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring,“Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance:The Case of the Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade Organization,” Global Environmental Politics, Vol.6, No.2, May2006,pp.1-3.
2Howard Loewen,“Towards a Dynamic Model of the Interplay Between International Institutions,” p.6.
3W. Bradnee Chambers, Joy A. Kim and Claudia ten Have,“Institutional Interplay and the Governance ofBiosafety,” in Oran R. Young, et al, eds., Institutional Interplay: Biosafety and Trade, New York: United NationsUniversity Press,2008,p.6.
4Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler and Alexander H. Montgomery,“Network Analysis for InternationalRelations,” International Organization, Vol.763, No.2, Summer2009, pp.559-560.
5Catherine E. Weaver, The Hypocrisy of International Organizations: the Rhetoric, Reality, and Reform of theWorld Bank; Catherine Weaver, Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank and the Poverty of Reform, Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press,2008;甚至在美国的“占领华尔街”运动中，一些抗议者也直斥联合国、IMF等国际组织虚伪，拿着高薪水的国际官僚们明知危机的存在而放任自流，参见“Forum Post: Hypocrisy of InternationalOrganizations,” Occupy Wall Street website,http://occupywallst.org/forum/hypocrisy-of-international-organizations,登录时间：12/21/2012。
6Amir Attaran, et al.,“The World Bank: False Financial and Statistical Accounts and Medical Malpractice inMalaria Treatment,” The Lancet, Vol.368, Issue9531, July15,2006, pp.247-252.
7Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,“The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of InternationalOrganizations,” pp.701,719.
1Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,2003; Michael N. Barnett,“The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda,” CulturalAnthropology, Vol.12, No.4,1997, pp.551-578.
2本书在不同的学术圈受到关注，《外交事务》、《全球治理》、《政治视野》、《政治科学季刊》、《经济学家》、《国际史评论》、《耶鲁国际法评论》、《现代非洲研究》、《当代社会学》等不同学科的刊物约刊发了约30多篇书评，书评人包括像杰克·斯奈德这样的著名学者。参见Jack Snyder,“Book Review: Eyewitness to aGenocide: The United Nations and Rwanda”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol.117,No.3,2002,pp.506-507; ArthurJay Klinghoffer,“Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda by Michael Barnett,” TheInternational History Review, Vol.24, No.4(Dec.,2002),pp.983-985; Tamara Dragadze and Ignatius Mugabo,“Book Review: Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda by Michael Barnett,” ContemporarySociology, Vol.33, No.1(Jan.,2004), pp.87-88。
3Dirk Salomons,“Good Intentions to Naught: the Pathology of Human Resources Management at the UnitedNations,” in Dennis Dijkzeul and Yves Beigbeder, eds., Rethinking International Organizations: Pathology and
4Promise, New York: Berghahn Books,2003, pp.111-139.Matthias Finger and Bérangère Ruchat,“The Transformation of International Public Organizations: The Case ofUNCTAD,” in Dennis Dijkzeul and Yves Beigbeder, eds., Rethinking International Organizations: Pathology andPromise, New York: Berghahn Books,2003,p.161.
5Ngaire Woods and Amrita Narlikar,“Governance and the Limits of Accountability: The WTO, the IMF, and theWorld Bank,” International Social Science Journal, Vol.53, Issue170, December2001, p.570.
6“Afghan Analysts Say Some International Organizations Have Corrupt Background,” BBC MonitoringInternational Reports, July30,2011.
2J. Samuel Barkin, International Organization: Theories and Institutions, Palgrave Macmillan,2006,p.1.
3Lisa L. Martin,“Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,” p.767.
4Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor,“The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources,” p.295;相似的判断还可见Christer Jonsson,“Interorganization Theory and International Organization,” International Studies Quarterly,Vol.30, No.1(Mar.,1986), p.40.
1Cheryl Shanksa, Harold K. Jacobsona and Jeffrey H. Kaplana,“Inertia and Change in the Constellation ofInternational Governmental Organizations,1981–1992,” International Organization, Vol.50, Issue4, September1996,pp.593-594,598-599.
2Ibid., p.599.
3Kirsten Haack and John Mathiason,“Editorial: International Organization Studies—A New Frontier forScholarship,” Journal of International Organization Studies, Vol.1, No.1,2010,p.5.
4J. Martin Rochester,“The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study,” InternationalOrganization, Vol.40, No.4(Autumn,1986),p.780.
5Christopher Balding and Daniel Wehrenfennig,“Theorizing International Organizations: An OrganizationalTheory of International Institutions,” p.7.
6Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal,“Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” p.29.Kratochwil认为国际组织的学术研究与现实世界里国际组织本身的发展息息相关。国际组织研究在二战后也经历了兴衰，并出现了20世纪80年代后国际组织学术研究与实际的组织实践相割裂的情况，参见Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie,“International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of theState,” International Organization, Vol.40, No.4(Autumn,1986), pp.753-775。认为制度研究的学术方向与国际关系实践存在对应关系的还可见Oran R. Young,“Review: International Regimes: Toward a New Theory ofInstitutions,” World Politics, Vol.39, No.1(Oct.,1986), pp.104-105.
7J. Martin Rochester,“The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study,” p.801.
1Yoram Z. Haftel and Alexander Thompson,“The Independence of International Organizations: Concept andApplications,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.50No.2, April2006, p.253.
2Howard Loewen,“Towards a Dynamic Model of the Interplay Between International Institutions,” p.9.例如Ikenberry就认为制度不仅仅被用于解决集体行动难题，更被强国和霸权国用来政治上控制他国的工具，参见G. John Ikenberry,“State Power and International Institutions:America and the Logic of Economic and SecurityMultilateralism,” in Dimitris Bourantonis, Kostas Ifantis and Panayotis Tsakonas, eds., Multilateralism andSecurity Institutions in An Era of Globalization, New York: Routledge,2008,p.23.
3Marc Bennett,“The Superpowers and International Institutions,” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.44, No.3(Sep.,1991), p.750.
4参见Joseph M. Grieco,“Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: ARealist Critique of the Newest LiberalInstitutionalism,” International Organization, Vol.42, No.3(Summer1988), pp.495-502; Robert Powell,“Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,” The American Political Science Review, Vol.85,No.4(Dec.,1991), pp.1303,1316。
5John J. Mearsheimer,“The False Promise of International Institutions,” p.7.
6Wolfram F. Hanrieder,“International Organizations and International Systems,” The Journal of ConflictResolution, Vol.10, No.3(Sep.,1966), p.298.或者如一位国际组织研究者所说，现实主义认为“国际组织仅仅是反映了而不是影响世界政治”，参见Boehmer Charles, et. al.,“Do Intergovernmental Organizations PromotePeace?” World Politics, Vol.57, No.1, October2004,p.1.
7Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal,“Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” p.8.
8Stephen D. Krasner,“Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,”International Organization, Vol.36, No.2(Spring,1982),pp.185,189.
1参见Gayl D. Ness and Steven R. Brechin,“Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organizations,”International Organization, Vol.42, No.2(Spring,1988),p.246的总结。
2江启臣：《坎昆回忆下的WTO角色：主要国际关系理论的诠释》，《政治科学论丛》，2006年第23期，第137-138页。
3Susan Engel,“the World Bank and Neoliberal Hegemony in Vietnam,” in Richard Howson and Kylie Smith,eds.,
4Hegemony: Studies in Consensus and Coercion, New York: Rouledge,2008,p.165.Richard Swedberg,“The Doctrine of Economic Neutrality of the IMF and the World Bank,” Journal of PeaceResearch, Vol.23, No.4(Dec.,1986), pp.387-388.
5Strom C. Thacker,“The High Politics of IMF Lending,” World Politics, Vol.52, Issue1, October1999,pp.69-71;Robert K. Fleck and Christopher Kilby,“World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of USInfluence,” Review of Development Economics, Vol.10, No.2,2006,p.237; Axel Dreher and Nathan M.Jensen,“Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on InternationalMonetary Fund Conditions,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.50, No.1,2007,p.121; Randall W. Stone,“ThePolitical Economy of IMF Lending in Africa,” American Political Science Review,Vol.98, No.4, November2004,pp.577,590.
6阎学通：《第十二讲：国际组织与国际规范》，清华大学课件，第十二讲国际组织与国际规范》，http://course.qqhru.edu.cn/eol/.../qqhru/.../jgzy_12.ppt，登录日期：2013/1/10。
7现实主义对待规范自主性的态度可从施耐德的观点窥见一斑。施耐德认为，规范治理的政治秩序必须建立在竞争性集团的交易基础上并且需要有强力的管理制度来确保达成法律的实施。他进一步认为，“如果规范能够塑造行为和结果，规范必须得到其所适用的社会环境中主导性联盟的支持”。参见Jack Snyder and LeslieVinjamuri,“Unipolar Empire and Principled Multilateralism,” in Dimitris Bourantonis, Kostas Ifantis andPanayotis Tsakonas, eds., Multilateralism and Security Institutions in An Era of Globalization, New York:Routledge,2008, pp.50,54.
1Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press1986,pp.74-75.
2Stephen D. Krasner,“State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics, Vol.28, No.3(Apr.,1976),p.323.
3关于这一点，可参见Yan Xuetong,“International Leadership and Norm Evolution,” The Chinese Journal ofInternational Politics, Vol.4,2011, pp.233-264.
4除了基欧汉将国际组织包括进国际制度之外，其他的类似概括也可参见Barbara Koremenos, CharlesLipson,and Duncan Snidal,“The Rational Design of International Institutions,” International Organization, Vol.55, No.4, Autumn2001, p.763; G. John Ikenberry,“Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence ofAmerican Postwar Order,” International Security, Vol.23, No.3,Winter1998-1999, p.52.
5参见Howard Loewen,“Towards a Dynamic Model of the Interplay Between International Institutions,”p.7;Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring,“Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: TheCase of the Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade Organization,” p.3; Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal,“Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” p.8.
6Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, Anne-Marie Slaughter,“Introduction: Legalization andWorld Politics,” International Organization, Vol.54, No.3(Summer,2000),p.392.
7Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal,“The Rational Design of International Institutions,”p.762.持类似观点还有Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring,“Institutional Interaction in GlobalEnvironmental Governance: The Case of the Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade Organization,” p.5; Robert O.Keohane and Joseph S. Nye,“Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” World Politics, Vol.27, No.1(Oct.,1974),p.39.
1Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,“The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of InternationalOrganizations,” p.704.需要指出的是，有人认为对国际组织的机制研究路径与制度研究路径是两个不同的研究方法，参见J. Samuel Barkin, International Organization: Theories and Institutions, pp.27-37.
2Robert O. Keohane,“Governance in a Partially Globalized World,Presidential Address, American PoliticalScience Association,2000,” The American Political Science Review, Vol.95, No.1(Mar.,2001), p.1; Robert O.Keohane and Lisa L. Martin,“The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” p.39.
3江启臣：《坎昆回忆下的WTO角色：主要国际关系理论的诠释》，第142页。
4Lisa L. Martin,“Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,” pp.767.769.
5Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye,“Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” pp.
650-52.Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal,“Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” p.4.
7将国际制度及其最高形式国际组织视为一组规则是新自由制度主义的普遍观点，参见Robert O. Keohane,“Governance in a Partially Globalized World,Presidential Address, American Political Science Association,2000,”p.2; John S. Duffield,“Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes,”Review of International Studies, Vol.20, No.4(Oct.,1994),p.375;伯诺尔（Bernauer）则认为这种作为规则的国际制度可能包含也可以不包括国际组织，参见Thomas Bernauer,“The Effect of InternationalEnvironmental Institutions: How We Might Learn More,” International Organization, Vol.49, No.2(Spring1995),p.351；克拉斯勒的经典定义则将国际机制视为规范、决策程序、规则与原则的聚合物，参见StephenD. Krasner,“Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” p.186。关于国际组织是谈判舞台和讨论场馆、论坛的看法可见Lisa L. Martin,“Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,”p.765;Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye,“Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,”p.55; Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal,“Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” p.10.
8Robert0.Keohane,“International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?” p.82.
1参见Robert O. Keohane,“Governance in a Partially Globalized World,PresidentialAddress,American PoliticalScience Association,2000,” pp.8,11; Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal,“The RationalDesign of International Institutions,” p.762.
2例如拉格的“内嵌的自由主义”一说就揭示了战后世界经济制度体系背后隐含的自由主义价值观念,“内嵌的自由主义”反映了国际社会对于核心社会价值、目的等广泛的共识。参见Adrian Jones,“EmbeddedLiberalism,” http://globalautonomy.ca/global1/glossary_pop.jsp?id=CO.0035,登录时间：1/4/2013; John GerardRuggie,“International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar EconomicOrder,” International Organization, Vol.36, Issue2, Spring1982, pp.379-415.
3Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür,“The Causal Mechanisms of Interaction between InternationalInstitutions,” p.131.
4John S. Duffield,“Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes,” pp.369-388; John S. Duffield,“International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional ForceLevels,” International Organization, Vol.46, No.4(Autumn,1992), pp.819-855.
5Celeste A.Wallander,“Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” InternationalOrganization, Vol.54, No.4, Autumn2000, pp.705-706.
6Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,“The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of InternationalOrganizations,” p.703.
7转引自Thomas D. Zweifel, International Organizations And Democracy: Accountability, Politics, And Power,Boulder,Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers,2005,p.48。
1James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, New York:The Free Press,1989.转引自Keiko Hirata,“Beached Whales: Examining Japan's Rejection of an InternationalNorm,” p.178。
2Martha Finnemorea,“International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: the United Nations Educational,Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy,” p.594.
3John Gerard Ruggie,“International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism inthe Postwar Economic Order,” p.404.
4参见Darren G. Hawkins, DavidA. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, eds., Delegation and Agency inInternational Organizations, New York: Cambridge University Press,2006;Mark A. Pollack,“Delegation, Agency,and Agenda Setting in the European Community,” International Organization, Vol.51, No.1(Winter1997), p.100.
5Kathleen M. Eisenhardt,“Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” The Academy of Management Review,Vol.14, No.1(Jan.,1989),pp.60,64.
1Darren Hawkins,et al.,“Introduction: Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, andPrincipal-agent Theory,” in Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney,eds.,Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, p.11.
2Darren Hawkins,et al.,“Introduction: Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, andPrincipal-agent Theory,” pp.13-20.
3Mark A. Pollack,“Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community,” pp.101,108-109;就委托-代理关系中国际组织是否增加国家承诺的可信度这一问题，有学者进行了经验研究，认为两者具有统计学意义上的正相关关系，参见Axel Dreher and Stefan Voigt,“Does Membership in International OrganizationsIncrease Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers,” Journal of Comparative Economics,Vol.39, No.3,2011, pp.326-438.
4一般而言，对于任何代理关系，代理损耗都是客观存在的，或者说不可避免的，按照委托-代理理论，若监管不力，这种损耗可能会较正常幅度更高。参见Darren Hawkins,et al.,“Introduction: Delegation underAnarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-agent Theory,” pp.8-9.
5有学者认为，当代理任务“不现实、不清楚和高度复杂”时，就有可能出现代理病态。参见Tamar Gutner,“When ‘doing good’ Does Not: the MIF and the Millennium Development Goals,” in Deborah D.Avant, MarthaFinnemore, and Susan K.Sell, eds., Who Governs the Globe?New York: Cambridge University Press,2010,p.269。
6Darren Hawkins,et al.,“Introduction: Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, andPrincipal-agent Theory,” p.5.
7Mark A. Pollack,“Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community,” p.101.
8David A. Lake and Mathew D. McCubbins,“The Logic of Delegation to International Organizations,” in DarrenG. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney,eds., Delegation and Agency in InternationalOrganizations, pp.341,344.
1Darren Hawkins,et al.,“Introduction: Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, andPrincipal-agent Theory,” p.4; Roland Vaubel,“Principal-agent Problems in International Organizations,” TheReview of International Organizations, Vol.1,No.2,2006,pp.126-127; Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,“The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” p.705.
2Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney,“Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory andWorld Bank Environmental Reform,” International Organization, Vol.57, Issue2, Spring2003,p.242.
3Edgar Kiser,“Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology: AnIllustration from State Policy Implementation,” Sociological Theory, Vol.17, No.2(July1999),p.154.
4Mark A. Pollack,“Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community,” p.119.
5刘宏松：《国际组织的自主性行为:两种理论视角及其比较》，《外交评论》，2006年第3期，第107页。
6Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal,“Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” p.25.
1David A. Lake and Mathew D. McCubbins,“The Logic of Delegation to International Organizations,” p.341.
2J. Samuel Barkin, International Organization: Theories and Institutions,p.34.
3Ibid., pp.35-36.
4Graham T. Allison and Morton Halperin,“Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and some Policy Implication,”World Politics, Vol.24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations, Spring1972, p.54.
1Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,“The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of InternationalOrganizations,” p.699.
2虽然在很大程度上Alexandra Gheciu并没有明确指出北约是一个官僚机制而是直接假设其是西方集体认同的制度表达，参见Alexandra Gheciu,“Security Institutions asAgents of Socialization? NATO and the 'NewEurope',” International Organization, Vol.59, No.4(Autumn,2005), p.975.
3参见Per-Olof Busch,“The OECD Environment Directorate: theArt of Persuasion and Its Limitation,” in FrankBiermann and Bernd Siebenhüner, eds., Managers of Global Change: The Influence of InternationalEnvironmental Bureaucracies, Boston: The MIT Press,2009, pp.80-82;Steffen Bauer,”the Secretariat of theUnited Nations Environment Programme: Tangeled up in Blue,” in Frank Biermann and Bernd Siebenhüner, eds.,Managers of Global Change: The Influence of International Environmental Bureaucracies, Boston: The MIT Press,2009,pp.173-177等。
4Brian Cook and B. Wood,“Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy,” The American PoliticalScience Review,Vol.83, No.3, Sep.,1989,pp.971-972.
5Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,“The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of InternationalOrganizations,” pp.705-706.
1Christopher Balding and Daniel Wehrenfennig,“Theorizing International Organizations: An OrganizationalTheory of International Institutions,” p.7.
2例如组织共享的信念、组织仪式等，参见Yaacov Vertzberger,“Bureaucratic-Organizational Politics andInformation Processing in a Developing State,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.28, No.1, Mar.,1984,p.71.
3Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between Wars, p.19.
4参见[美]迈克尔·巴尼特、玛莎·芬尼莫尔：《为世界定规则：全球政治中的国际组织》，薄燕译，上海：上海人民出版社，2009年。
1Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin,“Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,”World Politics, Vol.24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations, Spring1972,pp.47-50; YaacovVertzberger,“Bureaucratic-Organizational Politics and Information Processing in a Developing State,” pp.72-75;I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: the Politics of Organizational Reform,Princeton:Princeton University Press,1972, p.56.
2K.Waltz,“Anarchic Order and Balance of Power,” in R. Keohane, ed., Neo-Realism and its Critics, New York:Columbia University Press, April15,1986,p.112.
3I. Wallerstein,“The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System,” Comparative Studies in Societyand History, Vol.16, Issue4(Sep.,1974), p.154.
4Garret Hardin,“The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, December13,1968, p.1246
5Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye,“Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” pp.52-53.
6Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal,“Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” p.9.
1Deborah D.Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan K.Sell,“Who Governs the Globe?”in Deborah D.Avant,Martha Finnemore, and Susan K.Sell,eds., Who Governs the Globe?New York: Cambridge UniversityPress,2010,p.12.
2AbrahamL.Newman,“International Organization Control under Condition of Dual Delegation: aTransgovernmental Politics Approach,” in Deborah D.Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan K.Sell, eds., WhoGoverns the Globe?New York: Cambridge University Press,2010,p.134.
3Christian Joerges andJurgen Neyer,“Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Problem-solving:European Comitology in the Foodstuffs Sector,”Journal of European Public Policy,Vol.4, Issue4,1997,pp.609-625; Morten Egeberg,“Transcending Intergovernmentalism? Identity and Role Perceptions of National
4Officials in EU decision-making,” Journal of European Public Policy,Vol.6, Issue3,1999,456-474.Tamar Gutner,“When ‘doing good’ Does Not: the MIF and the Millennium Development Goals,” in DeborahD.Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan K.Sell, eds., Who Governs the Globe?New York: Cambridge UniversityPress,2010,p.268.
3Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane,“Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in JudithGoldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press,1993,pp.9-15.
4Jeffrey T. Checkel,“Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” p.87.
1Gayl D. Ness and Steven R. Brechin,“Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organizations,” pp.269-270.
2Darren Hawkins,et al.,“Introduction: Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, andPrincipal-agent Theory,” p.5
3Amitav Ghosh,“The Global Reservation: Notes toward an Ethnography of International Peacekeeping,”Cultural Anthropology, Vol.9, No.3,1994, p.413.
1Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,“The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of InternationalOrganizations,” p.719.
2Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, Michael Minkov, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, ThirdEdition, New York: McGraw-Hill,2010, pp.11-12.
3Michael Kramer, Organizational Socialization: Joining and Leaving Organizations, Cambridge: Polity,2010, p.103.
2Deborah D. Avant,“The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars,” pp.410-411.对于军事教义作用的类似看法还可参见Geoffrey Sloan,“Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy and theGeneration of Fighting Power: Genesis and Theory,” International Affairs, Vol.88, Issue2,2012, p.245。
3Bert Chapman, Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook, Santa Barbara, California: Praeger,2009,p.2.
4Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between Wars.p.4.
5Ibid., p.21.
6Ibid., p.27.
7Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of1914, Ithaca：Cornell University Press,1984, pp.15-16,30-31.
8Alastair Iain Johnston,“Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” pp.222-223.
1Jeffrey W. Legro,“Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step,” The American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.90, No.1(Mar.,1996), p.121.
2Peter M. Haas,“Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” InternationalOrganization, Vol.46, No.1(Winter1992), pp.1-35.
3Leslie Johns,“A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats,”International Organization, Vol.61, No.2, Spring2007, pp.245–275; Michael N. Barnett,“The UN SecurityCouncil, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda,” p.563.
1Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between Wars, p.29.
5Deborah D. Avant,“The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars,” p.411.
6Jay Y. Wu,“A General Behavior Model and New Definitions of Organizational Cultures,”2540
1Jeffrey W. Legro,“Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step,” p.122.
2Daniel W. Drezner,“Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy,” p.736.
3Ibid., p.735.
4Susan Koch and Stanley Deetz,“Metaphor Analysis of Social Reality in Organizations,” Journal of AppliedCommunication Research, Vol.9, No.1,1981,pp.2-3.
5参见纽曼对外交官群体依据三种剧本而社会化成为外交官的分析，Iver B. Neumann,“To Be a Diplomat,”International Studies Perspectives, Vol.6, Issue1,2005, pp.72-93.
2Andreas Reckwitz,“Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist Theorizing,” EuropeanJournal of Social Theory, Vo.l5, No.2,2002, p.249.转引自朱立群、聂文娟：《国际关系理论研究的实践转向》，第103页。
3Susan Koch and Stanley Deetz,“Metaphor Analysis of Social Reality in Organizations,” p.3.
4Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,“The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of InternationalOrganizations,” p.719.
1Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, Michael Minkov, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, pp.4-6.
2Michael N. Barnett,“The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda,” p.555.
3I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: the Politics of Organizational Reform, p.70.
4Jeffrey W. Legro,“Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step,” p.118.
5Jeffrey W. Legro,“Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step,” pp.121-122.
6Michael N. Barnett,“The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda,” pp.562-563.
7Amitav Ghosh,“The Global Reservation: Notes toward an Ethnography of International Peacekeeping,” p.421.
1刘宏松：《国际组织的自主性行为：两种理论视角及其比较》，第109页。
2同上。
3Jeffrey W. Legro,“Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” p.37.
4玛莎·费丽莫：《国际社会的国家利益》，袁正清译，杭州：浙江人民出版社，2001年，第44页。
5Michael Kramer, Organizational Socialization: Joining and Leaving Organizations, pp.99-102.
1Martha Finnemorea,“International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: the United Nations Educational,Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy,” p.584.
2玛莎·费丽莫：《国际社会的国家利益》，第46页。
3Martha Finnemorea,“International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: the United Nations Educational,Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy,” p.585.
4玛莎·费丽莫：《国际社会的国家利益》，第69页。
1李少军：《论国际关系中的案例研究法》，《当代亚太》，2008年第3期，第120页。
2John Gerrin,“What is A Case Study and What is It Good for,” American Political Science Review, Vol.98, No.2,2004,p.341.
1Debra P. Steger,“The Culture of The WTO: Why It Needs to Change,” Journal of International Economic Law,Vol.10, Issue3,2007, p.3.
2章毓群：《论信息时代著作权国际保护的发展与调整》，中国政法大学博士学位论文，2006年，第40-41页。
8管汉辉：《与贸易相关的知识产权保护与经济增长》，浙江大学博士学位论文，第2005年，第1页。
9杨艺文：《知识产权保护国际化比较研究》，中国政法大学博士学位论文，2009年，“摘要”。
5Stanley M. Besen and Leo J. Raskind,“An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property,” TheJournal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.5, No.1(Winter,1991),p.5
6UNESCO,“Approaching Intellectual Property as A Human Right,” p.14.
7D. B. Resnik,“A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property,” p.322.当然就洛克的劳动论如何归类来看，洛克的理论既是功利主义的，也可以是自由主义的。更有学者指出，从宏观哲学抽象到具体的知识产权合法性，反对和支持保护知识产权的学者们都能从自由主义、功利主义等哲学传统中找到支撑自己观点的哲学根源，参见Tom G. Palmer,“Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and IdealObjects,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol.13, No.3,1990, p.820.
8Michael A. Carrier,“Cabining Intellectual Property through a Property Paradigm,” Duke Law Journal, Vol.54,No.1,2004, p.25.
1哈丁认为防止“搭便车”，避免公用地悲剧的一大应对措施便是确立私人产权。Garret Hardin,“The Tragedyof the Commons,” p.1247。
2参见D. B. Resnik,“APluralistic Account of Intellectual Property,” p.322。
3Tom G. Palmer,“Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and IdealObjects,” p.822.
4Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.32;也有学者认为洛克的劳动理论也可以是规范性的，例如如果将劳动视为人类所不希望的，那么观念的创造就涉及这些为人类不喜的劳动，从而其需要被奖励，这是一种规范性称述；与此同时，既然劳动的不舒服特性促使社会给予劳动者以激励以使其继续创造观念，这才是工具性的，参见Justin Hughes,“The Philosophy of IntellectualProperty,” Georgetown Law Journal, Vol.77,1988,p.297。
5Tom G. Palmer,“Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and IdealObjects,” p.819.
6D. B. Resnik,“A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property,” p.326.
1Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
2柴海涛：《知识产权国际保护与国家战略》，中国政法大学博士学位论文，2009年，第6页。
1Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.7.
2在印刷术出现之前，或者说在未能发明以低成本方式传播文本之前，是不可能有版权概念的，参见WillaimP. Alford,“Don't Stop Thinking About... Yesterday: Why There Was No Indigenous Counterpart to IntellectualProperty Law in Imperial China,” Journal of Chinese Law, Vol.7,1993, pp.3-4。
3Paul E. Geller,“Copyright History and the Future: What's Culture Got to Do With It?” Journal of the CopyrightSociety of the USA, Vol.47,2000, p.210.
4杨艺文：《知识产权保护国际化比较研究》，第5页。
5范超：《经济全球化背景下国际贸易中的知识产权保护问题研究》，东北财经大学博士学位论文，2011年，第28页。
6杨艺文：《知识产权保护国际化比较研究》，第6页。
7UNESCO,“Approaching Intellectual Property as A Human Right,” p.7.
8范超：《经济全球化背景下国际贸易中的知识产权保护问题研究》，第28页。
1杨艺文：《知识产权保护国际化比较研究》，第8页。
2Markus Krummenacker,“Are ‘Intellectual Property Rights’ Justified?”http://www.n-a-n-o.com/ipr/extro2/extro2mk.html,登录时间：2012-11-11。
3UNESCO,“Approaching Intellectual Property as A Human Right,” p.9.
4Jerome H. Reichman,“Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a RestructuredInternational Intellectual Property System,” Cardozo Arts&Entertainment Law Journal, Vol.13,1995,p.477.
5Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.231.
6柴海涛：《知识产权国际保护与国家战略对策》，第5页。
1Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.12.
2对于这种结果性逻辑与恰当性逻辑的作用以及本研究的取舍，本文已在前文做了解释，这里便不详述。
3Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
4Paul E. Geller,“Copyright History and the Future: What's Culture Got to Do with It?” p.229.
1Jukka Liedes,“Copyright: Evolution, Not Revolution,” Science, Vol.276, No.5310(Apr.11,1997), p.223.
2有学者认为，这种泾渭分明的划分是当时故意为之，即不给民族国家留下自由裁决的空间，Jerome H.Reichman,“Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured InternationalIntellectual Property System,” p.479。
3有学者据此将知识产权保护划分为三个历史阶段：1710年之前的前版权时代、从1710到1886年的经典版权时代以及1886年之后的版权在全球拓展时期。参见Paul E. Geller,“Copyright History and the Future: What'sCulture Got to Do with It?” p.210。
4杨艺文：《知识产权保护国际化比较研究》，第13页。
5Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
6龚璇：《德国知识产权法的历史演进》，华中师范大学硕士学位论文，2011年，第62页。
7Paul E. Geller,“Copyright History and the Future: What's Culture Got to Do with It?” p.233.
1Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
23Paul E. Geller,“Copyright History and the Future: What's Culture Got to Do with It?” p.234.Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.220.
4杨艺文：《知识产权保护国际化比较研究》，第13页。
5同上。
6WIPO, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use,“Chapter5-International Treaties andConventions on Intellectual Property,” p.241.
1WIPO, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use,“Chapter5-International Treaties andConventions on Intellectual Property,” p.241.
2分别是1886年罗马、1890-1891年马德里、1897-1900布鲁塞尔、1911华盛顿、1925海牙、1934伦敦、1958里斯本、1967斯德哥尔摩，参见聂义峰：《<巴黎公约>及工业产权国际保护的开端》，《中国知识产权报》》，2001年5月9日，第3版；WIPO, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use,“Chapter5-International Treaties and Conventions on Intellectual Property,” p.241.
3范超：《经济全球化背景下国际贸易中的知识产权保护问题研究》，第34-35页。
4聂义峰：《<巴黎公约>及工业产权国际保护的开端》。
5杨艺文：《知识产权保护国际化比较研究》，第14页。相关内容也可参见WIPO, WIPO Intellectual PropertyHandbook: Policy, Law and Use,“Chapter5-International Treaties and Conventions on Intellectual Property,”p.262.
1徐学银：《<伯尔尼公约>与<世界版权公约>之比较》，《徐州师范学院学报》，1995年第3期，第142页；柴海涛：《知识产权国际保护与国家战略对策》，第19页：陈新亮：《伯尔尼公约述略》，《现代法学》，1992年第3期，第77页。
1Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.190.
2韦之、杨红菊：《<伯尔尼公约>中的“国民待遇”原则之例外》，《知识产权》，1997年第4期，第46页。
3Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.200.
1Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
2Ibid.
3Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.222.
2翟一我：《国际版权保护的沿革和基本原则》，《中国出版》，1987年第12期，第89-90页；徐学银：《<伯尔尼公约>与<世界版权公约>之比较》，第142-143页。
6柴海涛：《知识产权国际保护与国家战略对策》，第30页。
1柴海涛：《知识产权国际保护与国家战略对策》，第8页。
2UNESCO,“Approaching Intellectual Property as A Human Right,” p.9.
3Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
4Graeme B. Dinwoodie,,“The International Intellectual Property System: Treaties, Norms, National Courts, andPrivate Ordering,” p.67.
5Jerome H. Reichman,“Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a RestructuredInternational Intellectual Property System,” p.498.
1范超：《经济全球化背景下国际贸易中的知识产权保护问题研究》，第42页。
1Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
2Jayashree Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries, New Delhi:OxfordUniversity Press,2002,p.5.
3Susy Frankel,“Challenging Trips-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes,” Journal ofInternational Economic Law, Vol.12, Issue4,2009, p.1039.
4范超：《经济全球化背景下国际贸易中的知识产权保护问题研究》，第34页。
5《与贸易有关的知识产权协议》，中华人民共和国国家知识产权局网站，http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo/flfg/zscq/gjty/200703/t20070329148066.htm，2007-03-29，登录时间：2012/12/1。
6G.Gregory Letterman, Basics of International Intellectual Property Law, Ardsley,New York: TranslationalPublishers.Inc.,2001,p.30.
1Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: the Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, NewYork:Cambridge University Press,2003,p.121
2Susy Frankel,“Challenging Trips-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes,” p.1028.
3Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries, New York: Zed Books,Ltd.,2000,pp.8-9.
1T.K.Bhaumik, the WTO: A Discordant Orchestra, Thousands Oaks,California: C.A.,SagePublications,2006,pp.45-46.
2吴汉东：《后TRIPS时代知识产权制度的变革与中国的应对方略》，《法商研究》，2005年第5期，第3-4页。
3Susy Frankel,“Challenging Trips-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes,” p.1023.
4张建邦：《“TRIPS-递增”协定:类型化与特征分析(下)——基于后TRIPS时代知识产权国际保护制度发展趋势的一种考察》，《世界贸易组织动态与研究》，2008年第6期，第26页。
1张建邦：《“TRIPS-递增”协定的发展与后TRIPS时代的知识产权国际保护秩序》，《西安政法大学学报》，2008年第2期，第18页。
2Cynthia Ho, Access to Medicine in the Global Economy: International Agreements on Patents and RelatedRights, chapter8, New York: Oxford University Press,2011, p.225.
3揭捷：《“TRIPs—plus”协定研究》，厦门大学硕士学位论文，2009年，第9页。
4同上，第11-12页。
5张建邦：《“TRIPS-递增”协定的发展与后TRIPS时代的知识产权国际保护秩序》，第18页。
6揭捷：《“TRIPs—plus”协定研究》，第23页。
1古祖雪：《后TRIPS时代的国际知识产权制度变革与国际关系的演变——以WTO多哈回合谈判为中心》，《中国社会科学》，2007年第2期，第145-146页。
2张建邦：《“TRIPS-递增”协定的发展与后TRIPS时代的知识产权国际保护秩序》，第18页。
3Susy Frankel,“Challenging Trips-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes,” p.1025.
1张建邦：《“TRIPS-递增”协定的发展与后TRIPS时代的知识产权国际保护秩序》，第18-19页。
2揭捷：《“TRIPs—plus”协定研究》，厦门大学硕士学位论文，2009年，第24-25页。
3Cynthia Ho, Access to Medicine in the Global Economy: International Agreements on Patents and RelatedRights, chapter8, p.251.
4Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, The Final Report: Integrating Intellectual Property Rights andDeveloping Policies, p.5, http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm.登录时间：3/5/2013。
5Susy Frankel,“Challenging Trips-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes,” p.1037.
1Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights---Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution,2000/7,http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda,登录时间：2/2013。
2UNDP and UNAIDS, The Potential Impact of Free Trade Agreements on Public Health,www.unaids.org/.../JC2349_Issue_Brief_Free-Trade-Agreements_en, pp.3-5,登录时间：3/2/2013。
2衣淑玲：《国际人权法视角下的变革研究》，厦门大学博士学位论文，2008年，第121页。
3衣淑玲：《国际人权法视角下的变革研究》，第118-119页。
4王培舒：《知识产权与人权的联系、冲突与协调发展》，吉林大学博士学位论文，2007年，第72页。
1吴汉东《：知识产权的私权与人权属性——以<知识产权协议>与<世界人权公约>为对象》，《法学研究》，2003年第3期，第70页。
2UNESCO,“Approaching Intellectual Property as A Human Right,” p.5.
3Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
4Laurence R. Helfer,“Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property,” U.C. Davis Law Review,Vol.40,2007, pp.979-980.
5Beatrice Lindstrom,“Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis of Intellectual Property Provisions in TradeAgreements and Implications for Asia and the Pacific,” Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol.42, Issue3,2010,pp.921,978.
6D. B. Resnik,“A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property,” p.327.
7吴汉东：《知识产权VS.人权：冲突、交叉与协调》《法令期刊》，2003年8月号，转引自田胜：《知识产权与人权的冲突和协调》，中南民族大学硕士毕业论文，2007年，第3页。
1“Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,” https://www.eff.org/issues/acta,登录时间：3/3/2013。
2Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, The Final Report: Integrating Intellectual Property Rights andDeveloping Policies, p.2.
3Jukka Liedes,“Copyright: Evolution, Not Revolution,” p.223.
4UNESCO, Approaching Intellectual Property as A Human Right,” p.21.
5当然也有学者认为，自TRIPs协议签订后，“双边主义则占据知识产权国际保护规则制定的主导”，但这一看法目前来说还是少数，参见Mohamed R. Hassanien,“Bilateral 'WTO-Plus' Free TradeAgreements in theMiddle East,” p.162.
6Audrey Chapman,“A Human Rights Perspective on Intellectual Property, Scientific Progress, and Access to theBenefits of Science.”
1Sisule F. Musungu and Graham Dutfield, Multilateral agreements and a TRIPS-plus World: The WorldIntellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), p.3.
2吴汉东：《后TRIPS时代知识产权制度的变革与中国的应对方略》，第4-5页。
3转引自阮思宇：《论知识产权的权利限制——以正当性分析为探索路径》，吉林大学博士学位论文，2011年，第43页。
4转引自阮思宇：《论知识产权的权利限制——以正当性分析为探索路径》，第43页。
5古祖雪：《从体制转换到体制协调: TRIPS的矫正之路——以发展中国家的视角》，第147页。
1Lori Wallach and Patrick Woodall, Whose Trade Organization?A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO,New York:The New Press,2004,p.4.
2D. B. Resnik,“A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property,” p.19.
3Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights&Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It ThreatensCreativity, New York, NY: New York University Press,2001, p.4.
4Ibid., p.11.
5Jerome H. Reichman,“Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured
6International Intellectual Property System,” p.477.Antony Taubman, et al., A Handbook on The WTO TRIPS Agreement,“Preface,” New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,2012, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/handbook_wtotripsag12_e.htm,登录时间：3/15/2013。
7Michael A. Carrier,“Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm,” p.1.
2范超：《经济全球化背景下国际贸易中的知识产权保护问题研究》，第33页。
3Graeme B. Dinwoodie,“The International Intellectual Property System: Treaties, Norms, National Courts, andPrivate Ordering,” p.79.
4Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
5Jane Ford, A Social Theory of the WTO: Trading Cultures, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2003,p.41.
6吴郁秋：《与贸易相关的知识产权保护摩擦的政治经济学分析》，第61页。
1Susan Esserman and Robert Howse,“The WTO on Trial,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.82, No.1, January/February2003,pp.130-131.
2贺小勇：《从<多哈宣言>到<总理事会决议>看国际知识产权保护》，第105页。
3Graeme B. Dinwoodie,“The International Intellectual Property System: Treaties, Norms, National Courts, andPrivate Ordering,” pp.77-78.
4柴海涛：《知识产权国际保护与国家战略》，第33页。
5吴郁秋：《与贸易相关的知识产权保护摩擦的政治经济学分析》，第62页。
1“Uruguay Round Agreement: Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.”
2褚晓琳：《世界贸易组织（WTO）中的最惠国待遇研究》，山东大学硕士学位论文，2005年，第11页。
3Kent Jones, Who’s Afraid of the WTO?New York: Oxford University Press,2004,p.75.
4徐大泰：《协议6中最惠国待遇适用效力范围之分析》，《兰州商学院学报》，2002年第4期，第69页。
5同上，第69页。
6褚晓琳：《世界贸易组织（WTO）中的最惠国待遇研究》，第1页。
1Beatrice Lindstrom,“Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis of Intellectual Property Provisions in TradeAgreements and Implications for Asia and the Pacific,” p.979.
2Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, The Final Report: Integrating Intellectual Property Rights andDeveloping Policies, p.6.
3WTO, WIPO and WHO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections betweenPublic Health, Intellectual Property and Trade, p.23.
4Susy Frankel,“Challenging Trips-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes,” p.1025.
5UNESCO,“Approaching Intellectual Property as A Human Right,” p.22.
6Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: the Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, p.94.
4姚新超：《世贸组织与贸易有关的知识产权协议在医药专利保护方面面临的问题》，《国际贸易问题》，2005年第6期，第116页。
1Anna Lanoszka, The World Trade Organization:Changing Dynamics in The Global Political Economy,London:Lynnne Rienner Publishers,Inc.,2009,p.138.
2冯洁涵：《全球公共健康危机、知识产权国际保护与WTO多哈宣言》，《法学评论》，2003年第2期，第16页。
3胡朝阳：《论知识产权的正当性》，第50页。
4周俊强：《21世纪知识产权国际保护制度的走向》，《安徽师范大学学报》(人文社会科学版)，2005年第2期，第206页。
1杨艺文：《知识产权保护国际化比较研究》，第31页。
1Frederick M. Abbott,“The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines and the WTO Doha MinisterialConference,” Quaker United Nations Office–Geneva, Occasional Paper7, September8,2001,p.3,http://www.quno.org/economicissues/intellectual-property/intellectualLinks.htm,登录时间：3/16/2013。
2Debra P. Steger,“The Culture of The WTO: Why It Needs to Change,” p.1.
3Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: the Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, chapter4.
4Debra P. Steger,“The Culture of The WTO: Why It Needs to Change,” p.1.
1Graeme B. Dinwoodie,“The International Intellectual Property System: Treaties, Norms, National Courts, andPrivate Ordering,” pp.76-77.
2Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development”.
3Peter M. Haas,“Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” p.2.
1WTO and WHO, WTO Agreement and Public Health,2002, p.26,https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wto_agree_health_e.htm,登录时间：3/23/2013。
2Jeffery S.Thomas and Michael A.Meyer, The New Rules of Global Trade: a Guide to the World TradeOrganization, Toronto: Carswell,1997, pp.40-41.
3Xu Yi‐chong and Patrick Weller, The Governance Of World Trade: International Civil Servants and the GATT/WTO, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc.,2004,p.12.
4Kent Jones, Who’s Afraid of the WTO?New York: Oxford University Press,2004,pp.67-71.
5Debra P. Steger,“The Culture of The WTO: Why It Needs to Change,” p.1.
1Jane Ford, A Social Theory of the WTO: Trading Cultures, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2003,p.36.
2WTO, WIPO and WHO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections betweenPublic Health, Intellectual Property and Trade, p.23.
3Jeffrey W. Legro,“Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” p.36.
1Manning Marable,“Seattle and Beyond: Making the Connection in the21st Century,” in Kevin Danaher andRoger Burbach, Globalize This!: The Battle against the World Trade Organization, Monroe, Maine: CommonCourage Press,2000,p.83.
2Lori Wallach and Patrick Woodall, Whose Trade Organization?A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO,New York:The New Press,2004,p.161.
1Peter Gallagher, The First Ten Year of the WTO,1995-2005, New York: Cambridge University Press,2005,p.34.
2Anna Lanoszka, The World Trade Organization:Changing Dynamics in The Global Political Economy,London:Lynnne Rienner Publishers,Inc.,2009,pp.180-181.
3Kent Jones, Who’s Afraid of the WTO?New York: Oxford University Press,2004,p.108.
2Kent Jones, Who’s Afraid of the WTO?New York: Oxford University Press,2004,p.105.
3Lori Wallach and Patrick Woodall, Whose Trade Organization?A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO,New York:The New Press,2004,pp.28-29.
4Peter Gallagher, The First Ten Year of the WTO,1995-2005, New York: Cambridge UniversityPress,2005,pp.58-59.
5Lori Wallach and Patrick Woodall, Whose Trade Organization?A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO,New York:The New Press,2004,p.241.
6WTO, WIPO and WHO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections between PublicHealth, Intellectual Property and Trade, p.23.
1Stanley M. Besen and Leo J. Raskind,“An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property,” p.5
2吴汉东：《知识产权的私权与人权属性——以<知识产权协议>与<世界人权公约>为对象》，第70页。
3Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.137.
4Ibid., p.148.
5Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.47.
1Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International TradeNegotiations, New York: Zed Books,2003,“Introduction”.
2Ibid.,p.xxi.
3J. Michael Finger and Philip Schuler,“Implementation of Urugauy Round Commitments: The Development
4Challenge,” The World Economy, Vol.23, Issue4,2002, p.522.Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International TradeNegotiations,“Introduction”,p.4.
5Manfred Elsig,“The World Trade Organization’s Bureaucrats: Runaway Agents or Masters’ Servants?” p.7.
6参见Fatoumata Jawara andAileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International TradeNegotiations, pp.16-23。
1Xu Yi‐chong and Patrick Weller, The Governance Of World Trade: International Civil Servants and the GATT/WTO, p.1
2Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International TradeNegotiations, pp.57-60.
3Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International TradeNegotiations,“Introduction”,p.85.
1Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International TradeNegotiations, p.120.
2这一访谈转引自Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World ofInternational Trade Negotiations, p.208。
3UNESCO,“Approaching Intellectual Property as A Human Right,” p.24.
4Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International TradeNegotiations, p.206.
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3Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton:Princeton University Press,1984.
1李敏：《身份干扰与行为偏失》，外交学院博士学位论文，2012年，第2-3页。
1Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, p.891; Jeffrey T.Checkel,“Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies Quarterly,Vol.43, No.1,1999p.83; Suzette R. Grillot,“Global Gun Control: Examining the Consequences of CompetingInternational Norms,” Global Governance, Vol.17Issue4,2011,p.533; Amy Gurowitz,“Mobilizing InternationalNorms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the Japanese State,” World Politics, Vol.51, No.3(Apr.,1999), p.417;Ann E. Towns,“Norms and Social Hierarchies: Understanding International Policy Diffusion ‘From Below’,”International Organization, Vol.66, Issue2, April2012, p.187.
2Ann Florini,“The Evolution of International Norms,” p.364.
3转引自Judith Kelley,“Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International ElectionMonitoring,” International Organization, Vol.62, Issue2,April2008,p.223。
4Ethan A. Nadelmann,“Global Prohibition Regimes: the Evolution of Norms in International Society,”International Organization, Vol.44, Issue4, September1990, p.484.
5Judith Kelley,“Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring,”p.224.
1Theo Farrell,“Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army,”
2European Journal of International Relations, Vol.7, Issue1,2001,p.78.Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p.895;Judith Kelley,“Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring,” p.226;Ann Florini,“The Evolution of International Norms,” p.375.
3Ethan A. Nadelmann,“Global Prohibition Regimes: the Evolution of Norms in International Society,” p.484.
4Lisa L. Martin,“Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,” International Organization, Vol.46, No.4, Autumn1992,p.767.
1Jeffrey W. Legro,“Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” InternationalOrganization, Vol.51, No.1,Winter1997, p.37.
1[美]尼古拉斯·G.奥努弗：《建构主义的哲学渊源探析》，《世界经济与政治》，2006年第9期，第56页。
2董青岭：《建构主义是一种国际政治理论吗?》，《欧洲研究》，2012年第5期，第85页。
1Peter J. Katzenstein., Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan, Ithaca,N.Y.:Cornell University Press,1996,pp.18-19.
1漆海霞：《国际关系学科中研究方法的应用分野——对2005—2009年<国际组织>杂志的数据分析》，《外交评论》，2011年第5期，第145页。
2《政治心理学》（Political Psychology）上的文章是一个典型的代表，该杂志发表了大量运用文本分析法研究政治人物心理和性格的文章。例如Krista De Castella, Craig McGarty and Luke Musgrove,“FearAppeals inPolitical Rhetoric about Terrorism: An Analysis of Speeches by Australian Prime Minister Howard,” PoliticalPsychology, Vol.30, No.1(Feb.,2009), pp.1-26。
3例如R. L. Friedheim, J. B. Kadane and J. K. Gamble, Jr.,“Quantitative ContentAnalysis of the United NationsSeabed Debate: Methodology and a Continental Shelf Case Study,” International Organization, Vol.24, No.3(Summer,1970), pp.479-502; Kjell Goldmann,“East-West Tension in Europe,1946-1970: A Conceptual Analysisand a Quantitative Description,” World Politics, Vol.26, No.1(Oct.,1973), pp.106-125。
1Robert Jervis,“The Costs of the Scientific Study of Politics: An Examination of the Stanford ContentAnalysis Studies,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.11, No.4(Dec.,1967), pp.366-393;Deborah WelchLarson,“Problems of Content Analysis in Foreign-Policy Research: Notes from the Study of the Origins of ColdWar Belief Systems,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.32, No.2(Jun.,1988), pp.241-255.
2袁正清：《中国的国际关系研究既要解释也要理解》，《世界经济与政治》，2003年第3期，第30页。
1Sarah V. Percy,“Mercenaries: Strong Norm, Weak Law,” International Organization, Vol.61, No.2(Spring,2007), pp.367-397.
1崔伟奇、史阿娜：《论库恩范式理论在社会科学领域中运用的张力》，《学习与探索》，2011年第1期，第40页。
2库恩：《科学革命的结构》，金吾伦、胡新和译，北京：北京大学出版社，2003年，第32页。
1崔伟奇、史阿娜：《论库恩范式理论在社会科学领域中运用的张力》，第40页。
2卢旺林：《拉卡托斯科学研究纲领方法论——一部温情的“达尔文式”进化论》，《江西财经大学学报》，2006年第5期，第79页。
3拉卡托斯，《科学研究纲领方法论》，兰征译，上海：上海译文出版社，1986年，第125页。
1拉卡托斯，《科学研究纲领方法论》，第71页。
6王班超：《拉卡托斯科学研究纲领方法论述评》，《长白学刊》，1988年第6期，第67页。
1廖舜右：《Thomas Kuhn与Imre Lakatos有关国际关系理论的争论》，《政治科学论丛》，2007年第29期，第31页。
2陈宏铭：《现实主义典范的进步或退化：以Vasquez采Lakatos科学研究纲领的论战为焦点》，《东吴政治学报》，2003年第17期，第87页。
3黄文华、郭铭杰：《科学研究纲领方法论在国际关系学界的误用：重新检视现实主义典范进化或退化的辩论》，《东吴政治学报》，2006年第24期，第117-118页。
4这种意义包括理论与数据之间的切合需要谨慎面对；理论的取舍在于其与对手的竞争等等，参见ColinElman and Miriam Fendius Elman,“How Not to Be Lakatos Intolerant: Appraising Progress in IR Research,”International Studies Quarterly, Vol.46, No.2(Jun.,2002),p.255。
5有学者简单对建构主义研究纲领做了概括，将其分为“体系建构主义”和“单元建构主义”两大类，参见陈小鼎：《试析国际关系理论的合成——一种科学哲学的分析视角》，《国际政治研究》，2006年第4期，166页。
1秦亚青：《观念的力量》，《世界经济与政治》，2005年第10期，第1页。
3Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: the Politics of Reality, New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,2002, pp.2-3.
4秦亚青：《建构主义:思想渊源、理论流派与学术理念》，《国际政治研究》，2006年第3期，第13页。
5拉卡托斯，《科学研究纲领方法论》，第47页。
1Alastair Iain Johnston,“Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Cultureof National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia UniversityPress,1996,pp.217-268.
2Elizabeth Kier,“Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars,” International Security, Vol.19, No.4,Spring1995, pp.65-93.
3Colins S. Gray,“Strategic Culture as Context: the First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,”Review of International Studies, Vol.25, Issue1, January1999,pp.49-69.除此之外，还有最新的对战略文化“预测”能力的怀疑与批评，参见Christoph Meyer,“The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insightsfrom Strategic Culture Research for the European Union’s Evolution as a Military Power,” International StudiesQuarterly, Vol.55, Issue3,2011,pp.669–690。
4Mona Lena Krook and Jacqui True,“Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms: The United Nations andthe Global Promotion of Gender Equality,” p.104.
5Fiona B. Adamson,“Global Liberalism Versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks inInternational Politics,” p.547.持相似看法的还有Ann E. Towns,“Norms and Social Hierarchies: UnderstandingInternational Policy Diffusion ‘From Below’,” p.185。
3柳思思：《从规范进化到规范退化》，《当代亚太》，2010年第3期，第146页。
3拉卡托斯，《科学研究纲领方法论》，第67页。
4Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano,“Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement theResponsibility to Protect,” International Relations, Vol.25,No.2,2011,pp.208-209.
1Amitav Acharya,“How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change inAsian Regionalism,” pp.239-275.
2Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano,“Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement theResponsibility to Protect,” p.205.
3Hiro Katsumata,“Mimetic Adoption and Norm Diffusion:‘Western’ Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia?”Review of International Studies, Vol.37, Issue2, April2011, pp.557-576.
2Michael0. Slobodchikoff,“The New European Union: Integration as a Means of Norm Diffusion,” Journal onEthnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Vol.9, No.1,2010, pp.1-25.
3Pamela A. Jordan,“Does Membership Have Its Privileges?: Entrance into the Council of Europe andCompliance with Human Rights Norms,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.25, No.3, August2003, pp.660-688.
7Alastair Iain Johnston,“Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” International StudiesQuarterly, Vol.45, Issue4,2001, p.489.
1Pamela A. Jordan,“Does Membership Have Its Privileges?: Entrance into the Council of Europe andCompliance with Human Rights Norms,” pp.660-688.
2秦亚青：《研究设计与学术创新》，第79页。
3Jeffrey T. Checkel,“International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” pp.801-826.
4Jeffrey Checkel,“International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist Constructivist Divide,”European Journal of International Relations, Vol.3, No.4,1997,p.475.
5Ann E. Towns,“Norms and Social Hierarchies: Understanding International Policy Diffusion ‘From Below’,”pp.184-185.当然有学者认为国际规范扩散最为主要的社会化机制是“规范性强迫”，Asher Alkoby,“Theories
6of Compliance with International Law and the Challenge of Cultural Difference,” p.156.Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks,“How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law,”Duke Law Journal, Vol.54, No.3,Dec.,2004, p.631.
7Leonard J. Schoppa,“The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining,” International Organization,Vol.53, No.2, Spring1999, p.309.
8Theo Farrell,“Transnational Norms and Military Development:Constructing Ireland's Professional Army,” p.91.
4Amitav Acharya,“How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change inAsian Regionalism,” pp.239-275.
5Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano,“Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement theResponsibility to Protect,” p.210.
6Jeffrey W. Legro,“Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’of Internationalism,” p.44.
1Suzette R. Grillot,“Global Gun Control: Examining the Consequences of Competing International Norms,”pp.534-542.
2例如Sandholtz认为规范内部的一般性规则与具体事实之间的冲突以及不同规则之间的冲突导致规范发生改变，参见Wayne Sandholtz,“Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules against Wartime Plunder,”pp.101-131; Kees Van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek也认为国际规范在被行为体接受和内化后，也出现再定义该规范的情况，参见Kees Van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek,“The Politics of International Norms:Subsidiarity and the Imperfect Competence Regime of the European Union,” pp.217–238.更为激进的看法是Antje Wiener的规范实践论，她认为规范扩散论纲是一种行为主义视角，规范的有效性实际上来源于国家实践，实践若变化，规范的内在意义也就相应转变。参见Antje Wiener,“Contested Compliance: Interventions onthe Normative Structure of World Politics,” pp.192-193.
3参见Wayne Sandholtz,“Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules against Wartime Plunder,” p.102.
4参见Mona Lena Krook and Jacqui True,“Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms: The UnitedNations and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality,” p.104.
5Kees Van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek,“The Politics of International Norms: Subsidiarity and the ImperfectCompetence Regime of the European Union,” p.221.
1参见陈寒溪：《论华尔兹纲领的硬核与问题转换》，第29页。
1Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p.892.
2参见Hayley Stevenson,“India and International Norms of Climate Governance: a ConstructivistAnalysis ofNormative Congruence Building,” pp.997,1003。
34Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p.908.Richard Price,“Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” pp.629-632; HayleyStevenson,“India and International Norms of Climate Governance: a Constructivist Analysis of NormativeCongruence Building,” pp.997, p.1004; Theo Farrell,“Transnational Norms and Military Development:Constructing Ireland's Professional Army,” p.81.
5Hayley Stevenson,“India and International Norms of Climate Governance: a Constructivist Analysis ofNormative Congruence Building,” pp.997,1004.
1Markus Kornprobst,“Argumentation and Compromise: Ireland's Selection of the Territorial Status Quo Norm,”pp.75-78.
2黄超：《说服战略与规范传播——以地雷规范和小武器规范为例》，第49-50页。
3Jutta Joachim,“Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and Women's Rights,” InternationalStudies Quarterly, Vol.47, No.2(Jun.,2003),pp.250,257.
4Amitav Acharya,“How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change inAsian Regionalism,” p.246.
5例如其他学科如心理学的研究已经揭示了框定与规范说服的效力关联度。即便是表达同样的内容，正向的收益框定与反向的损失框定则有截然不同的效果，前者如“你如果吃阿司匹林，你的心脏将会更健康”，后者则如“你如果不吃阿司匹林，你的心脏将会不那么健康”。相较之下，正向的表达收益取向的框定更具说服力，参见Adam Corner and Ulrike Hahn,“Message Framing, Normative Advocacy and PersuasiveSuccess,” Argumentation, Vol.24, Issue2,2010, p.153.
6Amitav Acharya,“How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change inAsian Regionalism,” pp.239-275; Jeffrey W. Legro,“Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ofInternationalism,” pp.31-63; Jeffrey T. Checkel,“Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in ContemporaryEurope,” p.87.
7Hayley Stevenson,“India and International Norms of Climate Governance: a Constructivist Analysis ofNormative Congruence Building,” pp.997,1004-1005.
8Theo Farrell,“Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army,”pp.78-81.
1Theo Farrell,“Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army,” p.71;Hayley Stevenson,“India and International Norms of Climate Governance: a Constructivist Analysis of NormativeCongruence Building,” pp.997,1002,1004.
1Tamar Gutner,“When ‘doing good’ Does Not: the MIF and the Millennium Development Goals,” in DeborahD.Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan K.Sell, eds., Who Governs the Globe?New York: Cambridge UniversityPress,2010,p.266.
2实际上，制度主义发现的“机制复杂性”、“机制重叠”和“制度互动”，在概念所指上存在很大程度的交叉，核心的意思都是指机制管辖边界之间的交叉与规则竞争。有时候，其又称“制度复杂性”或“制度重叠”。
3Sebastian Oberthür and Olav Schram Stokke,“Institutional Complexity and Interplay Management:Compatibility and Change in Global Governance,” Paper Submitted to the ISA Annual Convention in San Diego,USA, April2012, and to the Earth System Governance conference in Lund, Sweden, April212, p.1,www.lund2012.earthsystemgovernance.org/LC2012-paper123.pdf,登录时间：12/19/2012.
4Kal Raustiala and David G.Victor,“The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources,” InternationalOrganization, Vol.58, No.2, Spring2004, p.299.
5Daniel W. Drezner,“The Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol.7,No.1, March2009,p.66.
6Kal Raustiala and David G.Victor,“The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources,” pp.277-278.
1Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring,“Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance:The Case of the Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade Organization,” Global Environmental Politics, Vol.6, No.2, May2006,pp.1-3.
2Howard Loewen,“Towards a Dynamic Model of the Interplay Between International Institutions,” p.6.
3W. Bradnee Chambers, Joy A. Kim and Claudia ten Have,“Institutional Interplay and the Governance ofBiosafety,” in Oran R. Young, et al, eds., Institutional Interplay: Biosafety and Trade, New York: United NationsUniversity Press,2008,p.6.
4Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler and Alexander H. Montgomery,“Network Analysis for InternationalRelations,” International Organization, Vol.763, No.2, Summer2009, pp.559-560.
5Catherine E. Weaver, The Hypocrisy of International Organizations: the Rhetoric, Reality, and Reform of theWorld Bank; Catherine Weaver, Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank and the Poverty of Reform, Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press,2008;甚至在美国的“占领华尔街”运动中，一些抗议者也直斥联合国、IMF等国际组织虚伪，拿着高薪水的国际官僚们明知危机的存在而放任自流，参见“Forum Post: Hypocrisy of InternationalOrganizations,” Occupy Wall Street website,http://occupywallst.org/forum/hypocrisy-of-international-organizations,登录时间：12/21/2012。
6Amir Attaran, et al.,“The World Bank: False Financial and Statistical Accounts and Medical Malpractice inMalaria Treatment,” The Lancet, Vol.368, Issue9531, July15,2006, pp.247-252.
7Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,“The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of InternationalOrganizations,” pp.701,719.
1Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,2003; Michael N. Barnett,“The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda,” CulturalAnthropology, Vol.12, No.4,1997, pp.551-578.
2本书在不同的学术圈受到关注，《外交事务》、《全球治理》、《政治视野》、《政治科学季刊》、《经济学家》、《国际史评论》、《耶鲁国际法评论》、《现代非洲研究》、《当代社会学》等不同学科的刊物约刊发了约30多篇书评，书评人包括像杰克·斯奈德这样的著名学者。参见Jack Snyder,“Book Review: Eyewitness to aGenocide: The United Nations and Rwanda”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol.117,No.3,2002,pp.506-507; ArthurJay Klinghoffer,“Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda by Michael Barnett,” TheInternational History Review, Vol.24, No.4(Dec.,2002),pp.983-985; Tamara Dragadze and Ignatius Mugabo,“Book Review: Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda by Michael Barnett,” ContemporarySociology, Vol.33, No.1(Jan.,2004), pp.87-88。
3Dirk Salomons,“Good Intentions to Naught: the Pathology of Human Resources Management at the UnitedNations,” in Dennis Dijkzeul and Yves Beigbeder, eds., Rethinking International Organizations: Pathology and
4Promise, New York: Berghahn Books,2003, pp.111-139.Matthias Finger and Bérangère Ruchat,“The Transformation of International Public Organizations: The Case ofUNCTAD,” in Dennis Dijkzeul and Yves Beigbeder, eds., Rethinking International Organizations: Pathology andPromise, New York: Berghahn Books,2003,p.161.
5Ngaire Woods and Amrita Narlikar,“Governance and the Limits of Accountability: The WTO, the IMF, and theWorld Bank,” International Social Science Journal, Vol.53, Issue170, December2001, p.570.
6“Afghan Analysts Say Some International Organizations Have Corrupt Background,” BBC MonitoringInternational Reports, July30,2011.
2J. Samuel Barkin, International Organization: Theories and Institutions, Palgrave Macmillan,2006,p.1.
3Lisa L. Martin,“Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,” p.767.
4Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor,“The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources,” p.295;相似的判断还可见Christer Jonsson,“Interorganization Theory and International Organization,” International Studies Quarterly,Vol.30, No.1(Mar.,1986), p.40.
1Cheryl Shanksa, Harold K. Jacobsona and Jeffrey H. Kaplana,“Inertia and Change in the Constellation ofInternational Governmental Organizations,1981–1992,” International Organization, Vol.50, Issue4, September1996,pp.593-594,598-599.
2Ibid., p.599.
3Kirsten Haack and John Mathiason,“Editorial: International Organization Studies—A New Frontier forScholarship,” Journal of International Organization Studies, Vol.1, No.1,2010,p.5.
4J. Martin Rochester,“The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study,” InternationalOrganization, Vol.40, No.4(Autumn,1986),p.780.
5Christopher Balding and Daniel Wehrenfennig,“Theorizing International Organizations: An OrganizationalTheory of International Institutions,” p.7.
6Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal,“Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” p.29.Kratochwil认为国际组织的学术研究与现实世界里国际组织本身的发展息息相关。国际组织研究在二战后也经历了兴衰，并出现了20世纪80年代后国际组织学术研究与实际的组织实践相割裂的情况，参见Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie,“International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of theState,” International Organization, Vol.40, No.4(Autumn,1986), pp.753-775。认为制度研究的学术方向与国际关系实践存在对应关系的还可见Oran R. Young,“Review: International Regimes: Toward a New Theory ofInstitutions,” World Politics, Vol.39, No.1(Oct.,1986), pp.104-105.
7J. Martin Rochester,“The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study,” p.801.
1Yoram Z. Haftel and Alexander Thompson,“The Independence of International Organizations: Concept andApplications,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.50No.2, April2006, p.253.
2Howard Loewen,“Towards a Dynamic Model of the Interplay Between International Institutions,” p.9.例如Ikenberry就认为制度不仅仅被用于解决集体行动难题，更被强国和霸权国用来政治上控制他国的工具，参见G. John Ikenberry,“State Power and International Institutions:America and the Logic of Economic and SecurityMultilateralism,” in Dimitris Bourantonis, Kostas Ifantis and Panayotis Tsakonas, eds., Multilateralism andSecurity Institutions in An Era of Globalization, New York: Routledge,2008,p.23.
3Marc Bennett,“The Superpowers and International Institutions,” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.44, No.3(Sep.,1991), p.750.
4参见Joseph M. Grieco,“Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: ARealist Critique of the Newest LiberalInstitutionalism,” International Organization, Vol.42, No.3(Summer1988), pp.495-502; Robert Powell,“Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,” The American Political Science Review, Vol.85,No.4(Dec.,1991), pp.1303,1316。
5John J. Mearsheimer,“The False Promise of International Institutions,” p.7.
6Wolfram F. Hanrieder,“International Organizations and International Systems,” The Journal of ConflictResolution, Vol.10, No.3(Sep.,1966), p.298.或者如一位国际组织研究者所说，现实主义认为“国际组织仅仅是反映了而不是影响世界政治”，参见Boehmer Charles, et. al.,“Do Intergovernmental Organizations PromotePeace?” World Politics, Vol.57, No.1, October2004,p.1.
7Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal,“Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” p.8.
8Stephen D. Krasner,“Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,”International Organization, Vol.36, No.2(Spring,1982),pp.185,189.
1参见Gayl D. Ness and Steven R. Brechin,“Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organizations,”International Organization, Vol.42, No.2(Spring,1988),p.246的总结。
2江启臣：《坎昆回忆下的WTO角色：主要国际关系理论的诠释》，《政治科学论丛》，2006年第23期，第137-138页。
3Susan Engel,“the World Bank and Neoliberal Hegemony in Vietnam,” in Richard Howson and Kylie Smith,eds.,
4Hegemony: Studies in Consensus and Coercion, New York: Rouledge,2008,p.165.Richard Swedberg,“The Doctrine of Economic Neutrality of the IMF and the World Bank,” Journal of PeaceResearch, Vol.23, No.4(Dec.,1986), pp.387-388.
5Strom C. Thacker,“The High Politics of IMF Lending,” World Politics, Vol.52, Issue1, October1999,pp.69-71;Robert K. Fleck and Christopher Kilby,“World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of USInfluence,” Review of Development Economics, Vol.10, No.2,2006,p.237; Axel Dreher and Nathan M.Jensen,“Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on InternationalMonetary Fund Conditions,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.50, No.1,2007,p.121; Randall W. Stone,“ThePolitical Economy of IMF Lending in Africa,” American Political Science Review,Vol.98, No.4, November2004,pp.577,590.
6阎学通：《第十二讲：国际组织与国际规范》，清华大学课件，第十二讲国际组织与国际规范》，http://course.qqhru.edu.cn/eol/.../qqhru/.../jgzy_12.ppt，登录日期：2013/1/10。
7现实主义对待规范自主性的态度可从施耐德的观点窥见一斑。施耐德认为，规范治理的政治秩序必须建立在竞争性集团的交易基础上并且需要有强力的管理制度来确保达成法律的实施。他进一步认为，“如果规范能够塑造行为和结果，规范必须得到其所适用的社会环境中主导性联盟的支持”。参见Jack Snyder and LeslieVinjamuri,“Unipolar Empire and Principled Multilateralism,” in Dimitris Bourantonis, Kostas Ifantis andPanayotis Tsakonas, eds., Multilateralism and Security Institutions in An Era of Globalization, New York:Routledge,2008, pp.50,54.
1Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press1986,pp.74-75.
2Stephen D. Krasner,“State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics, Vol.28, No.3(Apr.,1976),p.323.
3关于这一点，可参见Yan Xuetong,“International Leadership and Norm Evolution,” The Chinese Journal ofInternational Politics, Vol.4,2011, pp.233-264.
4除了基欧汉将国际组织包括进国际制度之外，其他的类似概括也可参见Barbara Koremenos, CharlesLipson,and Duncan Snidal,“The Rational Design of International Institutions,” International Organization, Vol.55, No.4, Autumn2001, p.763; G. John Ikenberry,“Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence ofAmerican Postwar Order,” International Security, Vol.23, No.3,Winter1998-1999, p.52.
5参见Howard Loewen,“Towards a Dynamic Model of the Interplay Between International Institutions,”p.7;Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring,“Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: TheCase of the Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade Organization,” p.3; Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal,“Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” p.8.
6Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, Anne-Marie Slaughter,“Introduction: Legalization andWorld Politics,” International Organization, Vol.54, No.3(Summer,2000),p.392.
7Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal,“The Rational Design of International Institutions,”p.762.持类似观点还有Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring,“Institutional Interaction in GlobalEnvironmental Governance: The Case of the Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade Organization,” p.5; Robert O.Keohane and Joseph S. Nye,“Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” World Politics, Vol.27, No.1(Oct.,1974),p.39.
1Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,“The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of InternationalOrganizations,” p.704.需要指出的是，有人认为对国际组织的机制研究路径与制度研究路径是两个不同的研究方法，参见J. Samuel Barkin, International Organization: Theories and Institutions, pp.27-37.
2Robert O. Keohane,“Governance in a Partially Globalized World,Presidential Address, American PoliticalScience Association,2000,” The American Political Science Review, Vol.95, No.1(Mar.,2001), p.1; Robert O.Keohane and Lisa L. Martin,“The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” p.39.
3江启臣：《坎昆回忆下的WTO角色：主要国际关系理论的诠释》，第142页。
4Lisa L. Martin,“Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,” pp.767.769.
5Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye,“Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” pp.
650-52.Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal,“Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” p.4.
7将国际制度及其最高形式国际组织视为一组规则是新自由制度主义的普遍观点，参见Robert O. Keohane,“Governance in a Partially Globalized World,Presidential Address, American Political Science Association,2000,”p.2; John S. Duffield,“Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes,”Review of International Studies, Vol.20, No.4(Oct.,1994),p.375;伯诺尔（Bernauer）则认为这种作为规则的国际制度可能包含也可以不包括国际组织，参见Thomas Bernauer,“The Effect of InternationalEnvironmental Institutions: How We Might Learn More,” International Organization, Vol.49, No.2(Spring1995),p.351；克拉斯勒的经典定义则将国际机制视为规范、决策程序、规则与原则的聚合物，参见StephenD. Krasner,“Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” p.186。关于国际组织是谈判舞台和讨论场馆、论坛的看法可见Lisa L. Martin,“Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,”p.765;Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye,“Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,”p.55; Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal,“Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” p.10.
8Robert0.Keohane,“International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?” p.82.
1参见Robert O. Keohane,“Governance in a Partially Globalized World,PresidentialAddress,American PoliticalScience Association,2000,” pp.8,11; Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal,“The RationalDesign of International Institutions,” p.762.
2例如拉格的“内嵌的自由主义”一说就揭示了战后世界经济制度体系背后隐含的自由主义价值观念,“内嵌的自由主义”反映了国际社会对于核心社会价值、目的等广泛的共识。参见Adrian Jones,“EmbeddedLiberalism,” http://globalautonomy.ca/global1/glossary_pop.jsp?id=CO.0035,登录时间：1/4/2013; John GerardRuggie,“International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar EconomicOrder,” International Organization, Vol.36, Issue2, Spring1982, pp.379-415.
3Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür,“The Causal Mechanisms of Interaction between InternationalInstitutions,” p.131.
4John S. Duffield,“Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes,” pp.369-388; John S. Duffield,“International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional ForceLevels,” International Organization, Vol.46, No.4(Autumn,1992), pp.819-855.
5Celeste A.Wallander,“Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” InternationalOrganization, Vol.54, No.4, Autumn2000, pp.705-706.
6Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,“The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of InternationalOrganizations,” p.703.
7转引自Thomas D. Zweifel, International Organizations And Democracy: Accountability, Politics, And Power,Boulder,Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers,2005,p.48。
1James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, New York:The Free Press,1989.转引自Keiko Hirata,“Beached Whales: Examining Japan's Rejection of an InternationalNorm,” p.178。
2Martha Finnemorea,“International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: the United Nations Educational,Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy,” p.594.
3John Gerard Ruggie,“International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism inthe Postwar Economic Order,” p.404.
4参见Darren G. Hawkins, DavidA. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, eds., Delegation and Agency inInternational Organizations, New York: Cambridge University Press,2006;Mark A. Pollack,“Delegation, Agency,and Agenda Setting in the European Community,” International Organization, Vol.51, No.1(Winter1997), p.100.
5Kathleen M. Eisenhardt,“Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” The Academy of Management Review,Vol.14, No.1(Jan.,1989),pp.60,64.
1Darren Hawkins,et al.,“Introduction: Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, andPrincipal-agent Theory,” in Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney,eds.,Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, p.11.
2Darren Hawkins,et al.,“Introduction: Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, andPrincipal-agent Theory,” pp.13-20.
3Mark A. Pollack,“Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community,” pp.101,108-109;就委托-代理关系中国际组织是否增加国家承诺的可信度这一问题，有学者进行了经验研究，认为两者具有统计学意义上的正相关关系，参见Axel Dreher and Stefan Voigt,“Does Membership in International OrganizationsIncrease Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers,” Journal of Comparative Economics,Vol.39, No.3,2011, pp.326-438.
4一般而言，对于任何代理关系，代理损耗都是客观存在的，或者说不可避免的，按照委托-代理理论，若监管不力，这种损耗可能会较正常幅度更高。参见Darren Hawkins,et al.,“Introduction: Delegation underAnarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-agent Theory,” pp.8-9.
5有学者认为，当代理任务“不现实、不清楚和高度复杂”时，就有可能出现代理病态。参见Tamar Gutner,“When ‘doing good’ Does Not: the MIF and the Millennium Development Goals,” in Deborah D.Avant, MarthaFinnemore, and Susan K.Sell, eds., Who Governs the Globe?New York: Cambridge University Press,2010,p.269。
6Darren Hawkins,et al.,“Introduction: Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, andPrincipal-agent Theory,” p.5.
7Mark A. Pollack,“Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community,” p.101.
8David A. Lake and Mathew D. McCubbins,“The Logic of Delegation to International Organizations,” in DarrenG. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney,eds., Delegation and Agency in InternationalOrganizations, pp.341,344.
1Darren Hawkins,et al.,“Introduction: Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, andPrincipal-agent Theory,” p.4; Roland Vaubel,“Principal-agent Problems in International Organizations,” TheReview of International Organizations, Vol.1,No.2,2006,pp.126-127; Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,“The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” p.705.
2Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney,“Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory andWorld Bank Environmental Reform,” International Organization, Vol.57, Issue2, Spring2003,p.242.
3Edgar Kiser,“Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology: AnIllustration from State Policy Implementation,” Sociological Theory, Vol.17, No.2(July1999),p.154.
4Mark A. Pollack,“Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community,” p.119.
5刘宏松：《国际组织的自主性行为:两种理论视角及其比较》，《外交评论》，2006年第3期，第107页。
6Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal,“Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” p.25.
1David A. Lake and Mathew D. McCubbins,“The Logic of Delegation to International Organizations,” p.341.
2J. Samuel Barkin, International Organization: Theories and Institutions,p.34.
3Ibid., pp.35-36.
4Graham T. Allison and Morton Halperin,“Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and some Policy Implication,”World Politics, Vol.24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations, Spring1972, p.54.
1Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,“The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of InternationalOrganizations,” p.699.
2虽然在很大程度上Alexandra Gheciu并没有明确指出北约是一个官僚机制而是直接假设其是西方集体认同的制度表达，参见Alexandra Gheciu,“Security Institutions asAgents of Socialization? NATO and the 'NewEurope',” International Organization, Vol.59, No.4(Autumn,2005), p.975.
3参见Per-Olof Busch,“The OECD Environment Directorate: theArt of Persuasion and Its Limitation,” in FrankBiermann and Bernd Siebenhüner, eds., Managers of Global Change: The Influence of InternationalEnvironmental Bureaucracies, Boston: The MIT Press,2009, pp.80-82;Steffen Bauer,”the Secretariat of theUnited Nations Environment Programme: Tangeled up in Blue,” in Frank Biermann and Bernd Siebenhüner, eds.,Managers of Global Change: The Influence of International Environmental Bureaucracies, Boston: The MIT Press,2009,pp.173-177等。
4Brian Cook and B. Wood,“Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy,” The American PoliticalScience Review,Vol.83, No.3, Sep.,1989,pp.971-972.
5Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,“The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of InternationalOrganizations,” pp.705-706.
1Christopher Balding and Daniel Wehrenfennig,“Theorizing International Organizations: An OrganizationalTheory of International Institutions,” p.7.
2例如组织共享的信念、组织仪式等，参见Yaacov Vertzberger,“Bureaucratic-Organizational Politics andInformation Processing in a Developing State,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.28, No.1, Mar.,1984,p.71.
3Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between Wars, p.19.
4参见[美]迈克尔·巴尼特、玛莎·芬尼莫尔：《为世界定规则：全球政治中的国际组织》，薄燕译，上海：上海人民出版社，2009年。
1Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin,“Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,”World Politics, Vol.24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations, Spring1972,pp.47-50; YaacovVertzberger,“Bureaucratic-Organizational Politics and Information Processing in a Developing State,” pp.72-75;I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: the Politics of Organizational Reform,Princeton:Princeton University Press,1972, p.56.
2K.Waltz,“Anarchic Order and Balance of Power,” in R. Keohane, ed., Neo-Realism and its Critics, New York:Columbia University Press, April15,1986,p.112.
3I. Wallerstein,“The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System,” Comparative Studies in Societyand History, Vol.16, Issue4(Sep.,1974), p.154.
4Garret Hardin,“The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, December13,1968, p.1246
5Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye,“Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” pp.52-53.
6Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal,“Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” p.9.
1Deborah D.Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan K.Sell,“Who Governs the Globe?”in Deborah D.Avant,Martha Finnemore, and Susan K.Sell,eds., Who Governs the Globe?New York: Cambridge UniversityPress,2010,p.12.
2AbrahamL.Newman,“International Organization Control under Condition of Dual Delegation: aTransgovernmental Politics Approach,” in Deborah D.Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan K.Sell, eds., WhoGoverns the Globe?New York: Cambridge University Press,2010,p.134.
3Christian Joerges andJurgen Neyer,“Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Problem-solving:European Comitology in the Foodstuffs Sector,”Journal of European Public Policy,Vol.4, Issue4,1997,pp.609-625; Morten Egeberg,“Transcending Intergovernmentalism? Identity and Role Perceptions of National
4Officials in EU decision-making,” Journal of European Public Policy,Vol.6, Issue3,1999,456-474.Tamar Gutner,“When ‘doing good’ Does Not: the MIF and the Millennium Development Goals,” in DeborahD.Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan K.Sell, eds., Who Governs the Globe?New York: Cambridge UniversityPress,2010,p.268.
3Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane,“Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in JudithGoldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press,1993,pp.9-15.
4Jeffrey T. Checkel,“Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” p.87.
1Gayl D. Ness and Steven R. Brechin,“Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organizations,” pp.269-270.
2Darren Hawkins,et al.,“Introduction: Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, andPrincipal-agent Theory,” p.5
3Amitav Ghosh,“The Global Reservation: Notes toward an Ethnography of International Peacekeeping,”Cultural Anthropology, Vol.9, No.3,1994, p.413.
1Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,“The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of InternationalOrganizations,” p.719.
2Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, Michael Minkov, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, ThirdEdition, New York: McGraw-Hill,2010, pp.11-12.
3Michael Kramer, Organizational Socialization: Joining and Leaving Organizations, Cambridge: Polity,2010, p.103.
2Deborah D. Avant,“The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars,” pp.410-411.对于军事教义作用的类似看法还可参见Geoffrey Sloan,“Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy and theGeneration of Fighting Power: Genesis and Theory,” International Affairs, Vol.88, Issue2,2012, p.245。
3Bert Chapman, Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook, Santa Barbara, California: Praeger,2009,p.2.
4Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between Wars.p.4.
5Ibid., p.21.
6Ibid., p.27.
7Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of1914, Ithaca：Cornell University Press,1984, pp.15-16,30-31.
8Alastair Iain Johnston,“Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” pp.222-223.
1Jeffrey W. Legro,“Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step,” The American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.90, No.1(Mar.,1996), p.121.
2Peter M. Haas,“Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” InternationalOrganization, Vol.46, No.1(Winter1992), pp.1-35.
3Leslie Johns,“A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats,”International Organization, Vol.61, No.2, Spring2007, pp.245–275; Michael N. Barnett,“The UN SecurityCouncil, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda,” p.563.
1Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between Wars, p.29.
5Deborah D. Avant,“The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars,” p.411.
6Jay Y. Wu,“A General Behavior Model and New Definitions of Organizational Cultures,”2540
1Jeffrey W. Legro,“Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step,” p.122.
2Daniel W. Drezner,“Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy,” p.736.
3Ibid., p.735.
4Susan Koch and Stanley Deetz,“Metaphor Analysis of Social Reality in Organizations,” Journal of AppliedCommunication Research, Vol.9, No.1,1981,pp.2-3.
5参见纽曼对外交官群体依据三种剧本而社会化成为外交官的分析，Iver B. Neumann,“To Be a Diplomat,”International Studies Perspectives, Vol.6, Issue1,2005, pp.72-93.
2Andreas Reckwitz,“Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist Theorizing,” EuropeanJournal of Social Theory, Vo.l5, No.2,2002, p.249.转引自朱立群、聂文娟：《国际关系理论研究的实践转向》，第103页。
3Susan Koch and Stanley Deetz,“Metaphor Analysis of Social Reality in Organizations,” p.3.
4Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,“The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of InternationalOrganizations,” p.719.
1Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, Michael Minkov, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, pp.4-6.
2Michael N. Barnett,“The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda,” p.555.
3I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: the Politics of Organizational Reform, p.70.
4Jeffrey W. Legro,“Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step,” p.118.
5Jeffrey W. Legro,“Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step,” pp.121-122.
6Michael N. Barnett,“The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda,” pp.562-563.
7Amitav Ghosh,“The Global Reservation: Notes toward an Ethnography of International Peacekeeping,” p.421.
1刘宏松：《国际组织的自主性行为：两种理论视角及其比较》，第109页。
2同上。
3Jeffrey W. Legro,“Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” p.37.
4玛莎·费丽莫：《国际社会的国家利益》，袁正清译，杭州：浙江人民出版社，2001年，第44页。
5Michael Kramer, Organizational Socialization: Joining and Leaving Organizations, pp.99-102.
1Martha Finnemorea,“International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: the United Nations Educational,Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy,” p.584.
2玛莎·费丽莫：《国际社会的国家利益》，第46页。
3Martha Finnemorea,“International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: the United Nations Educational,Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy,” p.585.
4玛莎·费丽莫：《国际社会的国家利益》，第69页。
1李少军：《论国际关系中的案例研究法》，《当代亚太》，2008年第3期，第120页。
2John Gerrin,“What is A Case Study and What is It Good for,” American Political Science Review, Vol.98, No.2,2004,p.341.
1Debra P. Steger,“The Culture of The WTO: Why It Needs to Change,” Journal of International Economic Law,Vol.10, Issue3,2007, p.3.
2章毓群：《论信息时代著作权国际保护的发展与调整》，中国政法大学博士学位论文，2006年，第40-41页。
8管汉辉：《与贸易相关的知识产权保护与经济增长》，浙江大学博士学位论文，第2005年，第1页。
9杨艺文：《知识产权保护国际化比较研究》，中国政法大学博士学位论文，2009年，“摘要”。
5Stanley M. Besen and Leo J. Raskind,“An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property,” TheJournal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.5, No.1(Winter,1991),p.5
6UNESCO,“Approaching Intellectual Property as A Human Right,” p.14.
7D. B. Resnik,“A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property,” p.322.当然就洛克的劳动论如何归类来看，洛克的理论既是功利主义的，也可以是自由主义的。更有学者指出，从宏观哲学抽象到具体的知识产权合法性，反对和支持保护知识产权的学者们都能从自由主义、功利主义等哲学传统中找到支撑自己观点的哲学根源，参见Tom G. Palmer,“Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and IdealObjects,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol.13, No.3,1990, p.820.
8Michael A. Carrier,“Cabining Intellectual Property through a Property Paradigm,” Duke Law Journal, Vol.54,No.1,2004, p.25.
1哈丁认为防止“搭便车”，避免公用地悲剧的一大应对措施便是确立私人产权。Garret Hardin,“The Tragedyof the Commons,” p.1247。
2参见D. B. Resnik,“APluralistic Account of Intellectual Property,” p.322。
3Tom G. Palmer,“Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and IdealObjects,” p.822.
4Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.32;也有学者认为洛克的劳动理论也可以是规范性的，例如如果将劳动视为人类所不希望的，那么观念的创造就涉及这些为人类不喜的劳动，从而其需要被奖励，这是一种规范性称述；与此同时，既然劳动的不舒服特性促使社会给予劳动者以激励以使其继续创造观念，这才是工具性的，参见Justin Hughes,“The Philosophy of IntellectualProperty,” Georgetown Law Journal, Vol.77,1988,p.297。
5Tom G. Palmer,“Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and IdealObjects,” p.819.
6D. B. Resnik,“A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property,” p.326.
1Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
2柴海涛：《知识产权国际保护与国家战略》，中国政法大学博士学位论文，2009年，第6页。
1Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.7.
2在印刷术出现之前，或者说在未能发明以低成本方式传播文本之前，是不可能有版权概念的，参见WillaimP. Alford,“Don't Stop Thinking About... Yesterday: Why There Was No Indigenous Counterpart to IntellectualProperty Law in Imperial China,” Journal of Chinese Law, Vol.7,1993, pp.3-4。
3Paul E. Geller,“Copyright History and the Future: What's Culture Got to Do With It?” Journal of the CopyrightSociety of the USA, Vol.47,2000, p.210.
4杨艺文：《知识产权保护国际化比较研究》，第5页。
5范超：《经济全球化背景下国际贸易中的知识产权保护问题研究》，东北财经大学博士学位论文，2011年，第28页。
6杨艺文：《知识产权保护国际化比较研究》，第6页。
7UNESCO,“Approaching Intellectual Property as A Human Right,” p.7.
8范超：《经济全球化背景下国际贸易中的知识产权保护问题研究》，第28页。
1杨艺文：《知识产权保护国际化比较研究》，第8页。
2Markus Krummenacker,“Are ‘Intellectual Property Rights’ Justified?”http://www.n-a-n-o.com/ipr/extro2/extro2mk.html,登录时间：2012-11-11。
3UNESCO,“Approaching Intellectual Property as A Human Right,” p.9.
4Jerome H. Reichman,“Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a RestructuredInternational Intellectual Property System,” Cardozo Arts&Entertainment Law Journal, Vol.13,1995,p.477.
5Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.231.
6柴海涛：《知识产权国际保护与国家战略对策》，第5页。
1Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.12.
2对于这种结果性逻辑与恰当性逻辑的作用以及本研究的取舍，本文已在前文做了解释，这里便不详述。
3Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
4Paul E. Geller,“Copyright History and the Future: What's Culture Got to Do with It?” p.229.
1Jukka Liedes,“Copyright: Evolution, Not Revolution,” Science, Vol.276, No.5310(Apr.11,1997), p.223.
2有学者认为，这种泾渭分明的划分是当时故意为之，即不给民族国家留下自由裁决的空间，Jerome H.Reichman,“Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured InternationalIntellectual Property System,” p.479。
3有学者据此将知识产权保护划分为三个历史阶段：1710年之前的前版权时代、从1710到1886年的经典版权时代以及1886年之后的版权在全球拓展时期。参见Paul E. Geller,“Copyright History and the Future: What'sCulture Got to Do with It?” p.210。
4杨艺文：《知识产权保护国际化比较研究》，第13页。
5Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
6龚璇：《德国知识产权法的历史演进》，华中师范大学硕士学位论文，2011年，第62页。
7Paul E. Geller,“Copyright History and the Future: What's Culture Got to Do with It?” p.233.
1Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
23Paul E. Geller,“Copyright History and the Future: What's Culture Got to Do with It?” p.234.Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.220.
4杨艺文：《知识产权保护国际化比较研究》，第13页。
5同上。
6WIPO, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use,“Chapter5-International Treaties andConventions on Intellectual Property,” p.241.
1WIPO, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use,“Chapter5-International Treaties andConventions on Intellectual Property,” p.241.
2分别是1886年罗马、1890-1891年马德里、1897-1900布鲁塞尔、1911华盛顿、1925海牙、1934伦敦、1958里斯本、1967斯德哥尔摩，参见聂义峰：《<巴黎公约>及工业产权国际保护的开端》，《中国知识产权报》》，2001年5月9日，第3版；WIPO, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use,“Chapter5-International Treaties and Conventions on Intellectual Property,” p.241.
3范超：《经济全球化背景下国际贸易中的知识产权保护问题研究》，第34-35页。
4聂义峰：《<巴黎公约>及工业产权国际保护的开端》。
5杨艺文：《知识产权保护国际化比较研究》，第14页。相关内容也可参见WIPO, WIPO Intellectual PropertyHandbook: Policy, Law and Use,“Chapter5-International Treaties and Conventions on Intellectual Property,”p.262.
1徐学银：《<伯尔尼公约>与<世界版权公约>之比较》，《徐州师范学院学报》，1995年第3期，第142页；柴海涛：《知识产权国际保护与国家战略对策》，第19页：陈新亮：《伯尔尼公约述略》，《现代法学》，1992年第3期，第77页。
1Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.190.
2韦之、杨红菊：《<伯尔尼公约>中的“国民待遇”原则之例外》，《知识产权》，1997年第4期，第46页。
3Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.200.
1Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
2Ibid.
3Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.222.
2翟一我：《国际版权保护的沿革和基本原则》，《中国出版》，1987年第12期，第89-90页；徐学银：《<伯尔尼公约>与<世界版权公约>之比较》，第142-143页。
6柴海涛：《知识产权国际保护与国家战略对策》，第30页。
1柴海涛：《知识产权国际保护与国家战略对策》，第8页。
2UNESCO,“Approaching Intellectual Property as A Human Right,” p.9.
3Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
4Graeme B. Dinwoodie,,“The International Intellectual Property System: Treaties, Norms, National Courts, andPrivate Ordering,” p.67.
5Jerome H. Reichman,“Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a RestructuredInternational Intellectual Property System,” p.498.
1范超：《经济全球化背景下国际贸易中的知识产权保护问题研究》，第42页。
1Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
2Jayashree Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries, New Delhi:OxfordUniversity Press,2002,p.5.
3Susy Frankel,“Challenging Trips-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes,” Journal ofInternational Economic Law, Vol.12, Issue4,2009, p.1039.
4范超：《经济全球化背景下国际贸易中的知识产权保护问题研究》，第34页。
5《与贸易有关的知识产权协议》，中华人民共和国国家知识产权局网站，http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo/flfg/zscq/gjty/200703/t20070329148066.htm，2007-03-29，登录时间：2012/12/1。
6G.Gregory Letterman, Basics of International Intellectual Property Law, Ardsley,New York: TranslationalPublishers.Inc.,2001,p.30.
1Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: the Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, NewYork:Cambridge University Press,2003,p.121
2Susy Frankel,“Challenging Trips-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes,” p.1028.
3Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries, New York: Zed Books,Ltd.,2000,pp.8-9.
1T.K.Bhaumik, the WTO: A Discordant Orchestra, Thousands Oaks,California: C.A.,SagePublications,2006,pp.45-46.
2吴汉东：《后TRIPS时代知识产权制度的变革与中国的应对方略》，《法商研究》，2005年第5期，第3-4页。
3Susy Frankel,“Challenging Trips-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes,” p.1023.
4张建邦：《“TRIPS-递增”协定:类型化与特征分析(下)——基于后TRIPS时代知识产权国际保护制度发展趋势的一种考察》，《世界贸易组织动态与研究》，2008年第6期，第26页。
1张建邦：《“TRIPS-递增”协定的发展与后TRIPS时代的知识产权国际保护秩序》，《西安政法大学学报》，2008年第2期，第18页。
2Cynthia Ho, Access to Medicine in the Global Economy: International Agreements on Patents and RelatedRights, chapter8, New York: Oxford University Press,2011, p.225.
3揭捷：《“TRIPs—plus”协定研究》，厦门大学硕士学位论文，2009年，第9页。
4同上，第11-12页。
5张建邦：《“TRIPS-递增”协定的发展与后TRIPS时代的知识产权国际保护秩序》，第18页。
6揭捷：《“TRIPs—plus”协定研究》，第23页。
1古祖雪：《后TRIPS时代的国际知识产权制度变革与国际关系的演变——以WTO多哈回合谈判为中心》，《中国社会科学》，2007年第2期，第145-146页。
2张建邦：《“TRIPS-递增”协定的发展与后TRIPS时代的知识产权国际保护秩序》，第18页。
3Susy Frankel,“Challenging Trips-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes,” p.1025.
1张建邦：《“TRIPS-递增”协定的发展与后TRIPS时代的知识产权国际保护秩序》，第18-19页。
2揭捷：《“TRIPs—plus”协定研究》，厦门大学硕士学位论文，2009年，第24-25页。
3Cynthia Ho, Access to Medicine in the Global Economy: International Agreements on Patents and RelatedRights, chapter8, p.251.
4Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, The Final Report: Integrating Intellectual Property Rights andDeveloping Policies, p.5, http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm.登录时间：3/5/2013。
5Susy Frankel,“Challenging Trips-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes,” p.1037.
1Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights---Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution,2000/7,http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda,登录时间：2/2013。
2UNDP and UNAIDS, The Potential Impact of Free Trade Agreements on Public Health,www.unaids.org/.../JC2349_Issue_Brief_Free-Trade-Agreements_en, pp.3-5,登录时间：3/2/2013。
2衣淑玲：《国际人权法视角下
3衣淑玲：《国际人权法视角下
4王培舒：《知识产权与人权的联系、冲突与协调发展》，吉林大学博士学位论文，2007年，第72页。
1吴汉东《：知识产权的私权与人权属性——以<知识产权协议>与<世界人权公约>为对象》，《法学研究》，2003年第3期，第70页。
2UNESCO,“Approaching Intellectual Property as A Human Right,” p.5.
3Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
4Laurence R. Helfer,“Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property,” U.C. Davis Law Review,Vol.40,2007, pp.979-980.
5Beatrice Lindstrom,“Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis of Intellectual Property Provisions in TradeAgreements and Implications for Asia and the Pacific,” Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol.42, Issue3,2010,pp.921,978.
6D. B. Resnik,“A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property,” p.327.
7吴汉东：《知识产权VS.人权：冲突、交叉与协调》《法令期刊》，2003年8月号，转引自田胜：《知识产权与人权的冲突和协调》，中南民族大学硕士毕业论文，2007年，第3页。
1“Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,” https://www.eff.org/issues/acta,登录时间：3/3/2013。
2Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, The Final Report: Integrating Intellectual Property Rights andDeveloping Policies, p.2.
3Jukka Liedes,“Copyright: Evolution, Not Revolution,” p.223.
4UNESCO, Approaching Intellectual Property as A Human Right,” p.21.
5当然也有学者认为，自TRIPs协议签订后，“双边主义则占据知识产权国际保护规则制定的主导”，但这一看法目前来说还是少数，参见Mohamed R. Hassanien,“Bilateral 'WTO-Plus' Free TradeAgreements in theMiddle East,” p.162.
6Audrey Chapman,“A Human Rights Perspective on Intellectual Property, Scientific Progress, and Access to theBenefits of Science.”
1Sisule F. Musungu and Graham Dutfield, Multilateral agreements and a TRIPS-plus World: The WorldIntellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), p.3.
2吴汉东：《后TRIPS时代知识产权制度的变革与中国的应对方略》，第4-5页。
3转引自阮思宇：《论知识产权的权利限制——以正当性分析为探索路径》，吉林大学博士学位论文，2011年，第43页。
4转引自阮思宇：《论知识产权的权利限制——以正当性分析为探索路径》，第43页。
5古祖雪：《从体制转换到体制协调: TRIPS的矫正之路——以发展中国家的视角》，第147页。
1Lori Wallach and Patrick Woodall, Whose Trade Organization?A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO,New York:The New Press,2004,p.4.
2D. B. Resnik,“A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property,” p.19.
3Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights&Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It ThreatensCreativity, New York, NY: New York University Press,2001, p.4.
4Ibid., p.11.
5Jerome H. Reichman,“Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured
6International Intellectual Property System,” p.477.Antony Taubman, et al., A Handbook on The WTO TRIPS Agreement,“Preface,” New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,2012, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/handbook_wtotripsag12_e.htm,登录时间：3/15/2013。
7Michael A. Carrier,“Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm,” p.1.
2范超：《经济全球化背景下国际贸易中的知识产权保护问题研究》，第33页。
3Graeme B. Dinwoodie,“The International Intellectual Property System: Treaties, Norms, National Courts, andPrivate Ordering,” p.79.
4Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development.”
5Jane Ford, A Social Theory of the WTO: Trading Cultures, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2003,p.41.
6吴郁秋：《与贸易相关的知识产权保护摩擦的政治经济学分析》，第61页。
1Susan Esserman and Robert Howse,“The WTO on Trial,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.82, No.1, January/February2003,pp.130-131.
2贺小勇：《从<多哈宣言>到<总理事会决议>看国际知识产权保护》，第105页。
3Graeme B. Dinwoodie,“The International Intellectual Property System: Treaties, Norms, National Courts, andPrivate Ordering,” pp.77-78.
4柴海涛：《知识产权国际保护与国家战略》，第33页。
5吴郁秋：《与贸易相关的知识产权保护摩擦的政治经济学分析》，第62页。
1“Uruguay Round Agreement: Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.”
2褚晓琳：《世界贸易组织（WTO）中的最惠国待遇研究》，山东大学硕士学位论文，2005年，第11页。
3Kent Jones, Who’s Afraid of the WTO?New York: Oxford University Press,2004,p.75.
4徐大泰：《
5同上，第69页。
6褚晓琳：《世界贸易组织（WTO）中的最惠国待遇研究》，第1页。
1Beatrice Lindstrom,“Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis of Intellectual Property Provisions in TradeAgreements and Implications for Asia and the Pacific,” p.979.
2Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, The Final Report: Integrating Intellectual Property Rights andDeveloping Policies, p.6.
3WTO, WIPO and WHO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections betweenPublic Health, Intellectual Property and Trade, p.23.
4Susy Frankel,“Challenging Trips-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes,” p.1025.
5UNESCO,“Approaching Intellectual Property as A Human Right,” p.22.
6Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: the Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, p.94.
4姚新超：《世贸组织与贸易有关的知识产权协议在医药专利保护方面面临的问题》，《国际贸易问题》，2005年第6期，第116页。
1Anna Lanoszka, The World Trade Organization:Changing Dynamics in The Global Political Economy,London:Lynnne Rienner Publishers,Inc.,2009,p.138.
2冯洁涵：《全球公共健康危机、知识产权国际保护与WTO多哈宣言》，《法学评论》，2003年第2期，第16页。
3胡朝阳：《论知识产权的正当性》，第50页。
4周俊强：《21世纪知识产权国际保护制度的走向》，《安徽师范大学学报》(人文社会科学版)，2005年第2期，第206页。
1杨艺文：《知识产权保护国际化比较研究》，第31页。
1Frederick M. Abbott,“The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines and the WTO Doha MinisterialConference,” Quaker United Nations Office–Geneva, Occasional Paper7, September8,2001,p.3,http://www.quno.org/economicissues/intellectual-property/intellectualLinks.htm,登录时间：3/16/2013。
2Debra P. Steger,“The Culture of The WTO: Why It Needs to Change,” p.1.
3Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: the Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, chapter4.
4Debra P. Steger,“The Culture of The WTO: Why It Needs to Change,” p.1.
1Graeme B. Dinwoodie,“The International Intellectual Property System: Treaties, Norms, National Courts, andPrivate Ordering,” pp.76-77.
2Peter Drahos,“The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Development”.
3Peter M. Haas,“Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” p.2.
1WTO and WHO, WTO Agreement and Public Health,2002, p.26,https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wto_agree_health_e.htm,登录时间：3/23/2013。
2Jeffery S.Thomas and Michael A.Meyer, The New Rules of Global Trade: a Guide to the World TradeOrganization, Toronto: Carswell,1997, pp.40-41.
3Xu Yi‐chong and Patrick Weller, The Governance Of World Trade: International Civil Servants and the GATT/WTO, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc.,2004,p.12.
4Kent Jones, Who’s Afraid of the WTO?New York: Oxford University Press,2004,pp.67-71.
5Debra P. Steger,“The Culture of The WTO: Why It Needs to Change,” p.1.
1Jane Ford, A Social Theory of the WTO: Trading Cultures, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2003,p.36.
2WTO, WIPO and WHO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections betweenPublic Health, Intellectual Property and Trade, p.23.
3Jeffrey W. Legro,“Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” p.36.
1Manning Marable,“Seattle and Beyond: Making the Connection in the21st Century,” in Kevin Danaher andRoger Burbach, Globalize This!: The Battle against the World Trade Organization, Monroe, Maine: CommonCourage Press,2000,p.83.
2Lori Wallach and Patrick Woodall, Whose Trade Organization?A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO,New York:The New Press,2004,p.161.
1Peter Gallagher, The First Ten Year of the WTO,1995-2005, New York: Cambridge University Press,2005,p.34.
2Anna Lanoszka, The World Trade Organization:Changing Dynamics in The Global Political Economy,London:Lynnne Rienner Publishers,Inc.,2009,pp.180-181.
3Kent Jones, Who’s Afraid of the WTO?New York: Oxford University Press,2004,p.108.
2Kent Jones, Who’s Afraid of the WTO?New York: Oxford University Press,2004,p.105.
3Lori Wallach and Patrick Woodall, Whose Trade Organization?A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO,New York:The New Press,2004,pp.28-29.
4Peter Gallagher, The First Ten Year of the WTO,1995-2005, New York: Cambridge UniversityPress,2005,pp.58-59.
5Lori Wallach and Patrick Woodall, Whose Trade Organization?A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO,New York:The New Press,2004,p.241.
6WTO, WIPO and WHO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections between PublicHealth, Intellectual Property and Trade, p.23.
1Stanley M. Besen and Leo J. Raskind,“An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property,” p.5
2吴汉东：《知识产权的私权与人权属性——以<知识产权协议>与<世界人权公约>为对象》，第70页。
3Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.137.
4Ibid., p.148.
5Anthony D’ Amato and Doris Estelle Long, International Intellectual Property Law, p.47.
1Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International TradeNegotiations, New York: Zed Books,2003,“Introduction”.
2Ibid.,p.xxi.
3J. Michael Finger and Philip Schuler,“Implementation of Urugauy Round Commitments: The Development
4Challenge,” The World Economy, Vol.23, Issue4,2002, p.522.Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International TradeNegotiations,“Introduction”,p.4.
5Manfred Elsig,“The World Trade Organization’s Bureaucrats: Runaway Agents or Masters’ Servants?” p.7.
6参见Fatoumata Jawara andAileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International TradeNegotiations, pp.16-23。
1Xu Yi‐chong and Patrick Weller, The Governance Of World Trade: International Civil Servants and the GATT/WTO, p.1
2Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International TradeNegotiations, pp.57-60.
3Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International TradeNegotiations,“Introduction”,p.85.
1Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International TradeNegotiations, p.120.
2这一访谈转引自Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World ofInternational Trade Negotiations, p.208。
3UNESCO,“Approaching Intellectual Property as A Human Right,” p.24.
4Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International TradeNegotiations, p.206.
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聂义峰：《<巴黎公约>及工业产权国际保护的开端》，《中国知识产权报》，2001年5月9日。