转轨时期中国行政垄断的经济绩效研究
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摘要
本文是一项关于转轨时期中国行政垄断的经济学研究。为探讨转轨时期中国行政垄断的经济绩效,本文以产业经济理论为基本理论框架,以博弈论、最优化、计量经济学、制度变迁理论等为研究工具,进行理论和实证研究。
为突破现有理论和研究方法的局限性,本文进行了一系列新尝试：(1)经济绩效研究与制度分析相结合,以经济绩效解释计划经济国家建立和渐进转轨国家长期坚持行政垄断制度的客观原因；理论研究与实证分析相结合,以理论模型解释行政垄断规制下的产业出现高价格、高利润和低消费者剩余的根本原因,并以计量经济研究检验数理模型结论。(2)在理论研究方面,为研究行政垄断对市场运行的动态影响,本文构建了一个动态的创新与产量竞争模型。该模型融合了创新的成本节约效应和需求刺激效应,以博弈论和动态最优控制理论为工具,在一个动态视角下揭示行政垄断的市场绩效。本文还采用新贸易理论和序贯博弈法,首次探讨行政垄断与FDI、国际贸易的关系,结果发现FDI流量、进出口额度和贸易政策的有效性均受到行政垄断制度的重要影响。(3)在实证研究方面,本文将行政垄断规制下的产业和竞争性产业区分开来,以截面计量模型进行样本分组回归,结果发现：忽略行政垄断的制度因素,把来自行政垄断和自由竞争的产业样本放在一起进行回归,很可能是以往实证研究结果不显著、结论不稳健且常常互相矛盾的根本原因。本文还使用工具变量法对行政垄断的区域经济绩效进行实证研究,在控制关键变量的内生性问题后,结果发现：以往常用的OLS估计会低估地区性行政垄断的危害,因而不完全适用于地区性行政垄断的实证研究。
本文的主要研究结论如下：
(1)行政垄断、国有经济与市场经济长期稳定共存,是转轨时期中国经济制度的一大特色。中国现阶段的行政垄断制度主要以《国务院关于投资体制改革的决定》、《政府核准的投资项目目录》、《企业投资项目核准暂行办法》、《指导外商投资方向规定》、《外商投资项目核准暂行管理办法》和《外商投资产业指导目录》等法规为载体,以项目核准制为主要表现形式。任何企业要进入部分指定产业投资项目,必须经过各级投资主管部门(以发改部门和经贸部门为主)或地方政府的核准。
(2)国有企业离不开行政垄断,因为行政垄断为它们带来高价格和高利润。理论研究表明,行政垄断会导致更高的市场价格,并使在位企业攫取更多经济利润。随技术进步和产业发展,行政垄断规制下的市场结构会内生地趋于集中,且这种市场内生出来的垄断势力与社会福利合意。在行政垄断产业,大型国企市场势力越强越好,因为这样会提升以企业利润为主的社会总福利,尽管损害了消费者剩余。
这导致行政垄断成为社会主义国家建国初期的必然选择。因为,只有高价格和高利润才能保障国有经济的高速发展,只有以行政垄断阻止私营企业进入这些高利润产业,才能保证经济计划的顺利实施,使国民经济实现全面国有化和重工业化。由于行政垄断与国有经济之间的共生关系,东欧激进转轨国家实施的产权私有化改革必然伴随反行政垄断法律的立法与施行。这是激进转轨向苏联式计划经济体制投出的两块密不可分的改革“敲门砖”。而在渐进转轨国家,国有企业依旧是国计民生的经济命脉,其上缴的利税占据着各级政府财政总收入的一大部分。一旦国有企业出现长期亏损甚至破产,其后果是不可想象的。所以,当今中国的国有企业离不开行政垄断。高价格和高利润是计划经济国家建立和渐进转轨国家长期坚持行政垄断制度的客观原因。
(3)行政垄断以牺牲消费者剩余和总消费量为代价,换取高额的企业利润。但行政垄断造成的消费者剩余减少,远多于企业总利润的增加。由于大幅损害消费者剩余,行政垄断最终损害了一个产业内的社会总福利。即行政垄断会同时损害一个产业内的社会总福利、消费者剩余和总消费量。
(4)相对于自由竞争,行政垄断会拉长产业生命周期,使经济发展和新老产业更替的新陈代谢减缓。行政垄断还会损害产业的创新总量和单位产量创新,抑制整个产业的技术进步。
(5)理论研究表明,熊彼特假说在企业可以自由进入和退出的竞争性产业中不成立,而在行政垄断规制下的产业中成立。在行政垄断的规制下,产业的创新与市场垄断势力(市场结构集中)相辅相成；在自由竞争的产业中,创新与市场集中度则呈一定程度的负相关关系。实证检验结果与理论模型结论一致：行政垄断是决定熊彼特假说是否成立的关键。
(6)《指导外商投资方向规定》、《外商投资项目核准暂行管理办法》和《外商投资产业指导目录》规定：在部分指定产业,外资企业必须向投资主管部门申请并通过项目核准,并与本土企业合资后方得进行FDI。这种针对外资企业的行政垄断可以提高产品价格、增加本土企业利润,从而提升本国的社会总福利,同时损害贸易竞争对手国的企业利润和本国的消费者剩余,是一项“以邻为壑”的制度。
(7)由地方政府实施的地区性行政垄断损害了区域经济的生产效率、资本配置效率、技术创新能力以及国际竞争力,对区域经济发展产生显著的负面作用。政绩激励和经济激励是地方官员实施地区性行政垄断的主要原因。
(8)限制竞争和行政权力是转轨时期中国行政垄断的内涵与本质。在行政垄断干预下的市场,企业失去了进入市场的自由,市场本身丧失了一定程度的竞争活力,行政垄断下的市场并非市场的常态。当今中国的行政垄断权力是一种集行政权力、行政立法权与部分司法权于一体的行政权力。
由于渐进转轨的国情约束和保持国有经济主体地位的历史任务,社会主义市场经济条件下的行政垄断将长期存在。但如果国有经济改革要继续下去,本研究表明：消除行政垄断是国有企业产权改革的关键前提,产权改革离不开行政垄断制度改革。
This paper studies administrative monopoly of transition period in China. To find administrative monopoly's economic performance, this paper researches China's administrative monopoly in the analysis framework of industrial economics, by combining theoretical analysis with empirical test, adopting game theory, optimization, econometric methods, institutional change theory as tools.
To overcome the limitation of existing theoretical framework and research methods, the research undertakes some innovation in the following three aspects. Firstly, this paper combines economic performance study and institutional analysis, using institution's economic performance to interpret the reason why the planned economy and the gradual transition countries persist in administrative monopoly. The paper also combines theoretical research with empirical analysis, using theoretical model to explain the reason why China's administrative monopoly industries are with high prices, high profits and low consumer surplus. And it is supported by the result of empirical analysis.
Secondly, in the theory field, through building a dynamic model of innovation and Cournot competition, this paper discusses administrative monopoly's effect on operation of the industrial economy. The model takes cost-saving and demand stimulus effects into account, in order to analyze dynamic influence of administrative monopoly on market performance. By studying the relations among administrative monopoly, FDI, international trade with new trade theory and sequential game method, this thesis discusses important influence of FDI administrative monopoly on FDI inflows, export and effectiveness of trade policy.
Finally, in empirical study field, Chapter IV takes empirical study on the relationship of administrative monopoly and market structure with a cross-section econometric model, by separating the samples of administrative monopoly industries from free-market industries. The research finds that if empirical study ignored the administrative monopoly, its result must be statistically insignificant or unrobust, even self-contradictory. Chapter VI researches administrative monopoly's effect on the regional economy, adopting panel data model and the method of instrument variable. After controlling endogenous problems of the key variable, the regression proves that OLS method is not totally suitable for empirical study of regional administrative monopoly, and its harmfulness would be underestimated.
Conclusions are as follows:
(1) Administrative monopoly, stated-owned economy and socialist market economy will coexist stably in a long-term, which is a essential feature of China's economic institution in the transition period.
(2) State-owned enterprises cannot do without administrative monopoly. Owing to administrative monopoly, state-owned enterprises realize high prices and profits. With the advance of technology and development of the industry, market structure of administrative monopoly industries tends to be endogenously concentrated. The social welfare even agrees with monopoly born of such market. As a matter of fact, the greater state-owned enterprises'monopoly power is, the better. In spite of the harm to consumer surplus, the strong monopoly power helps to improve the profit-based social welfare.
Such satisfactory economic performance causes a socialist country to exercise administrative monopoly in the initial period. State-owned economy cannot develop so fast without high prices and profits, and only when private enterprises are prevented from entering into high-profit industry by administrative monopoly can China implement the economic planning so smoothly and realize the nationalization and heavy industrialization in such a short period. In the light of the symbiotic relationship between administrative monopoly and state-owned enterprises, the privatization of property rights in the radical transition countries in Eastern Europe is always accompanied with the legislation and enforcement against administrative monopoly. They are two stepping stones of the reform for Soviet-style planned economy, which are cast by radical transition countries. Meanwhile in the gradual transition countries, state-owned enterprises remain to be the national assets after reform. The profits and taxes paid by them still account for a large percentage in government fiscal revenues. Once state-owned economy suffers long-term losses or even bankruptcy, the consequences will be unimaginable since it is the lifeline of national economy. As a result, state-owned enterprises depend largely on administrative monopoly now.
That is the objective reason why the planned economy establishes and gradual transition countries insist to administrative monopoly.
(3) Administrative monopoly harms social welfare, consumer surplus and consumption simultaneously.
(4) Relative to free market, administrative monopoly lengthens the life cycle of the industry, which accordingly retards the development of economy and the evolvement of industries. Thereby it inhibits the industrial innovation and technological progress. Innovation is the driving force of the development in human society. So administrative monopoly has a far-reaching impaction on the society.
(5) Free market does not support Schumpeterian Hypothesis but administrative monopoly industry does. The relationship between R&D and market structure is U-shaped in the administrative monopoly industries. The relationship between R&D and market structure is invert-U-shaped in the free-market industries, which means Schumpeterian Hypothesis is false in free-market industry. Administrative monopoly is a decisive factor of Schumpeterian Hypothesis.
(6) FDI administrative monopoly could increase the total social welfare of its own country, while harming the profits of trading partner's enterprises and consumer surplus of its own country. It also increases the price of products and the profit of local company.
(7) Administrative monopoly would be the abuse of administrative power. Our empirical study finds that regional administrative monopoly does harm to regional economy. The production efficiency, allocative efficiency of resources, technical innovation capability and international competitiveness of China's province are impaired by regional administrative monopoly.
(8) It is restricted competition and administrative power that constitute the essence of administrative monopoly in China's transition period. In administrative monopoly industries, enterprises have lost the freedom to enter the market while the market has lost its competitive vitality. The market where competition is exogenously intervened by administrative monopoly isn't at a normal state. China's administrative monopoly power today is a trinity of administrative power, administrative legislative power and partial judicial power.
Given that China takes gradual transition and keeps state-owned economy in a dominant position, our socialist market economy is supposed to allow administrative monopoly in the long run. However, if the reform is supposed to continue in the administrative monopoly industries, our theoretical research shows that administrative monopoly reform is the key prerequisite for property rights reform of state-owned enterprises. Property rights reform cannot be done without administrative monopoly reform.
为突破现有理论和研究方法的局限性,本文进行了一系列新尝试：(1)经济绩效研究与制度分析相结合,以经济绩效解释计划经济国家建立和渐进转轨国家长期坚持行政垄断制度的客观原因；理论研究与实证分析相结合,以理论模型解释行政垄断规制下的产业出现高价格、高利润和低消费者剩余的根本原因,并以计量经济研究检验数理模型结论。(2)在理论研究方面,为研究行政垄断对市场运行的动态影响,本文构建了一个动态的创新与产量竞争模型。该模型融合了创新的成本节约效应和需求刺激效应,以博弈论和动态最优控制理论为工具,在一个动态视角下揭示行政垄断的市场绩效。本文还采用新贸易理论和序贯博弈法,首次探讨行政垄断与FDI、国际贸易的关系,结果发现FDI流量、进出口额度和贸易政策的有效性均受到行政垄断制度的重要影响。(3)在实证研究方面,本文将行政垄断规制下的产业和竞争性产业区分开来,以截面计量模型进行样本分组回归,结果发现：忽略行政垄断的制度因素,把来自行政垄断和自由竞争的产业样本放在一起进行回归,很可能是以往实证研究结果不显著、结论不稳健且常常互相矛盾的根本原因。本文还使用工具变量法对行政垄断的区域经济绩效进行实证研究,在控制关键变量的内生性问题后,结果发现：以往常用的OLS估计会低估地区性行政垄断的危害,因而不完全适用于地区性行政垄断的实证研究。
本文的主要研究结论如下：
(1)行政垄断、国有经济与市场经济长期稳定共存,是转轨时期中国经济制度的一大特色。中国现阶段的行政垄断制度主要以《国务院关于投资体制改革的决定》、《政府核准的投资项目目录》、《企业投资项目核准暂行办法》、《指导外商投资方向规定》、《外商投资项目核准暂行管理办法》和《外商投资产业指导目录》等法规为载体,以项目核准制为主要表现形式。任何企业要进入部分指定产业投资项目,必须经过各级投资主管部门(以发改部门和经贸部门为主)或地方政府的核准。
(2)国有企业离不开行政垄断,因为行政垄断为它们带来高价格和高利润。理论研究表明,行政垄断会导致更高的市场价格,并使在位企业攫取更多经济利润。随技术进步和产业发展,行政垄断规制下的市场结构会内生地趋于集中,且这种市场内生出来的垄断势力与社会福利合意。在行政垄断产业,大型国企市场势力越强越好,因为这样会提升以企业利润为主的社会总福利,尽管损害了消费者剩余。
这导致行政垄断成为社会主义国家建国初期的必然选择。因为,只有高价格和高利润才能保障国有经济的高速发展,只有以行政垄断阻止私营企业进入这些高利润产业,才能保证经济计划的顺利实施,使国民经济实现全面国有化和重工业化。由于行政垄断与国有经济之间的共生关系,东欧激进转轨国家实施的产权私有化改革必然伴随反行政垄断法律的立法与施行。这是激进转轨向苏联式计划经济体制投出的两块密不可分的改革“敲门砖”。而在渐进转轨国家,国有企业依旧是国计民生的经济命脉,其上缴的利税占据着各级政府财政总收入的一大部分。一旦国有企业出现长期亏损甚至破产,其后果是不可想象的。所以,当今中国的国有企业离不开行政垄断。高价格和高利润是计划经济国家建立和渐进转轨国家长期坚持行政垄断制度的客观原因。
(3)行政垄断以牺牲消费者剩余和总消费量为代价,换取高额的企业利润。但行政垄断造成的消费者剩余减少,远多于企业总利润的增加。由于大幅损害消费者剩余,行政垄断最终损害了一个产业内的社会总福利。即行政垄断会同时损害一个产业内的社会总福利、消费者剩余和总消费量。
(4)相对于自由竞争,行政垄断会拉长产业生命周期,使经济发展和新老产业更替的新陈代谢减缓。行政垄断还会损害产业的创新总量和单位产量创新,抑制整个产业的技术进步。
(5)理论研究表明,熊彼特假说在企业可以自由进入和退出的竞争性产业中不成立,而在行政垄断规制下的产业中成立。在行政垄断的规制下,产业的创新与市场垄断势力(市场结构集中)相辅相成；在自由竞争的产业中,创新与市场集中度则呈一定程度的负相关关系。实证检验结果与理论模型结论一致：行政垄断是决定熊彼特假说是否成立的关键。
(6)《指导外商投资方向规定》、《外商投资项目核准暂行管理办法》和《外商投资产业指导目录》规定：在部分指定产业,外资企业必须向投资主管部门申请并通过项目核准,并与本土企业合资后方得进行FDI。这种针对外资企业的行政垄断可以提高产品价格、增加本土企业利润,从而提升本国的社会总福利,同时损害贸易竞争对手国的企业利润和本国的消费者剩余,是一项“以邻为壑”的制度。
(7)由地方政府实施的地区性行政垄断损害了区域经济的生产效率、资本配置效率、技术创新能力以及国际竞争力,对区域经济发展产生显著的负面作用。政绩激励和经济激励是地方官员实施地区性行政垄断的主要原因。
(8)限制竞争和行政权力是转轨时期中国行政垄断的内涵与本质。在行政垄断干预下的市场,企业失去了进入市场的自由,市场本身丧失了一定程度的竞争活力,行政垄断下的市场并非市场的常态。当今中国的行政垄断权力是一种集行政权力、行政立法权与部分司法权于一体的行政权力。
由于渐进转轨的国情约束和保持国有经济主体地位的历史任务,社会主义市场经济条件下的行政垄断将长期存在。但如果国有经济改革要继续下去,本研究表明：消除行政垄断是国有企业产权改革的关键前提,产权改革离不开行政垄断制度改革。
This paper studies administrative monopoly of transition period in China. To find administrative monopoly's economic performance, this paper researches China's administrative monopoly in the analysis framework of industrial economics, by combining theoretical analysis with empirical test, adopting game theory, optimization, econometric methods, institutional change theory as tools.
To overcome the limitation of existing theoretical framework and research methods, the research undertakes some innovation in the following three aspects. Firstly, this paper combines economic performance study and institutional analysis, using institution's economic performance to interpret the reason why the planned economy and the gradual transition countries persist in administrative monopoly. The paper also combines theoretical research with empirical analysis, using theoretical model to explain the reason why China's administrative monopoly industries are with high prices, high profits and low consumer surplus. And it is supported by the result of empirical analysis.
Secondly, in the theory field, through building a dynamic model of innovation and Cournot competition, this paper discusses administrative monopoly's effect on operation of the industrial economy. The model takes cost-saving and demand stimulus effects into account, in order to analyze dynamic influence of administrative monopoly on market performance. By studying the relations among administrative monopoly, FDI, international trade with new trade theory and sequential game method, this thesis discusses important influence of FDI administrative monopoly on FDI inflows, export and effectiveness of trade policy.
Finally, in empirical study field, Chapter IV takes empirical study on the relationship of administrative monopoly and market structure with a cross-section econometric model, by separating the samples of administrative monopoly industries from free-market industries. The research finds that if empirical study ignored the administrative monopoly, its result must be statistically insignificant or unrobust, even self-contradictory. Chapter VI researches administrative monopoly's effect on the regional economy, adopting panel data model and the method of instrument variable. After controlling endogenous problems of the key variable, the regression proves that OLS method is not totally suitable for empirical study of regional administrative monopoly, and its harmfulness would be underestimated.
Conclusions are as follows:
(1) Administrative monopoly, stated-owned economy and socialist market economy will coexist stably in a long-term, which is a essential feature of China's economic institution in the transition period.
(2) State-owned enterprises cannot do without administrative monopoly. Owing to administrative monopoly, state-owned enterprises realize high prices and profits. With the advance of technology and development of the industry, market structure of administrative monopoly industries tends to be endogenously concentrated. The social welfare even agrees with monopoly born of such market. As a matter of fact, the greater state-owned enterprises'monopoly power is, the better. In spite of the harm to consumer surplus, the strong monopoly power helps to improve the profit-based social welfare.
Such satisfactory economic performance causes a socialist country to exercise administrative monopoly in the initial period. State-owned economy cannot develop so fast without high prices and profits, and only when private enterprises are prevented from entering into high-profit industry by administrative monopoly can China implement the economic planning so smoothly and realize the nationalization and heavy industrialization in such a short period. In the light of the symbiotic relationship between administrative monopoly and state-owned enterprises, the privatization of property rights in the radical transition countries in Eastern Europe is always accompanied with the legislation and enforcement against administrative monopoly. They are two stepping stones of the reform for Soviet-style planned economy, which are cast by radical transition countries. Meanwhile in the gradual transition countries, state-owned enterprises remain to be the national assets after reform. The profits and taxes paid by them still account for a large percentage in government fiscal revenues. Once state-owned economy suffers long-term losses or even bankruptcy, the consequences will be unimaginable since it is the lifeline of national economy. As a result, state-owned enterprises depend largely on administrative monopoly now.
That is the objective reason why the planned economy establishes and gradual transition countries insist to administrative monopoly.
(3) Administrative monopoly harms social welfare, consumer surplus and consumption simultaneously.
(4) Relative to free market, administrative monopoly lengthens the life cycle of the industry, which accordingly retards the development of economy and the evolvement of industries. Thereby it inhibits the industrial innovation and technological progress. Innovation is the driving force of the development in human society. So administrative monopoly has a far-reaching impaction on the society.
(5) Free market does not support Schumpeterian Hypothesis but administrative monopoly industry does. The relationship between R&D and market structure is U-shaped in the administrative monopoly industries. The relationship between R&D and market structure is invert-U-shaped in the free-market industries, which means Schumpeterian Hypothesis is false in free-market industry. Administrative monopoly is a decisive factor of Schumpeterian Hypothesis.
(6) FDI administrative monopoly could increase the total social welfare of its own country, while harming the profits of trading partner's enterprises and consumer surplus of its own country. It also increases the price of products and the profit of local company.
(7) Administrative monopoly would be the abuse of administrative power. Our empirical study finds that regional administrative monopoly does harm to regional economy. The production efficiency, allocative efficiency of resources, technical innovation capability and international competitiveness of China's province are impaired by regional administrative monopoly.
(8) It is restricted competition and administrative power that constitute the essence of administrative monopoly in China's transition period. In administrative monopoly industries, enterprises have lost the freedom to enter the market while the market has lost its competitive vitality. The market where competition is exogenously intervened by administrative monopoly isn't at a normal state. China's administrative monopoly power today is a trinity of administrative power, administrative legislative power and partial judicial power.
Given that China takes gradual transition and keeps state-owned economy in a dominant position, our socialist market economy is supposed to allow administrative monopoly in the long run. However, if the reform is supposed to continue in the administrative monopoly industries, our theoretical research shows that administrative monopoly reform is the key prerequisite for property rights reform of state-owned enterprises. Property rights reform cannot be done without administrative monopoly reform.
引文
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