电力市场风险规避及对市场力影响研究
|
摘要
电力市场化改革后,电价随着供需关系的变化而变化,市场交易者面临随机电价风险;在市场的作用下,电能流动性的增强导致了输电阻塞现象的增加,市场交易者还面临区域电价风险。为规避这两种价格风险,电力市场设计者将金融工具引入到电力市场中。同时由于电力市场为寡头垄断竞争市场,发电商或多或少都具有市场力。因此,风险规避和市场力抑制一直是电力市场研究的重点,相关研究可谓是汗牛充栋。与以往将风险规避和市场力抑制割裂成两个问题分别研究不同,本论文在总结和借鉴国内外相关研究成果的基础上,将风险规避和市场力抑制纳入到一个统一的框架内进行研究,考察电力市场功能设计之间的相互关联性。最后本论文还根据我国电力市场改革的特点,对我国直购电市场的建设进行研究。相比于国外电力市场改革的“一蹴而就”,我国国情决定了我国电力市场改革必须以“稳”为改革的前提,只能以局部地区、局部市场为“试点”逐步推进市场化改革。我国电力市场会长期呈现出计划经济与市场经济体制共存的局面,因此有必要探讨这两种体制下相关政策之间的相互影响性。
本论文首先分析了电力市场的特征,介绍了电力市场化改革的基础—节点边际电价理论,及远期合约和金融输电权对价格风险的规避。然后通过综合应用电力经济理论、博弈论、最优化理论、风险度量方法等系统分析远期合约和金融输电权与市场力的关系,最后对我国正在进行的直购电市场的建设进行了研究,论文的主要工作与创新体现在:
①从重复博弈的角度,研究不同惩罚措施下远期合约对发电厂商现货市场竞争时合谋行为的影响。相对于已有研究大多将远期合约视为无限期,本文假设远期市场与现货市场交替进行更接近于现实,这点与Liski&Montero(2006)研究的假设相同。与他们主要是从不同的竞争行为(价格竞争和产量竞争)的角度研究相比,本文主要从不同的惩罚措施(理性和非理性)的角度进行研究。由于电能质量相差不大,一般情况下用户对电能质量的要求又不高,因此假设发电商进行产量竞争更合理。本论文研究得到与已有研究不同的结论,结果表明:远期合约与默契合谋行为的关系不能一概而论。完全竞争惩罚会加强电厂商默契合谋的可能性。这是因为完全竞争惩罚会使发电商偏离合谋后获得零竞争利润,此惩罚措施可以有效的恫吓对手,防止偏离行为的发生。古诺竞争惩罚时:双边差价合约降低了发电商默契合谋的可能性,单边差价合约对默契合谋行为没有影响。
②金融输电权引入电力市场后,也可能会使寡头发电商拥有垂直市场力。本论文通过求解引入金融输电权前后市场纳什均衡解,首次定量研究了金融输电权对不同地理位置的发电商市场力的影响,并首次从寡头垄断市场结构的角度研究了金融输电权与发电商市场力的关系。研究结果表明:1)金融输电权对不同地理位置的发电商市场力的影响力度是不同的,最多可以提高进口区发电商市场力6%左右;最多可以降低出口区发电商市场力40%左右。电力逆需求弹性系数对出口区发电商市场力没有影响,在弹性系数较大时时可以提高进口区发电商原有市场力。发电成本系数的变化对发电商原有市场力影响甚小。2)金融输电权对发电商市场力的提高有递进增长现象。三种寡头竞争市场结构中,Cournot模型市场力提高最多,Stackelberg模型次之,Forchheimer模型提高的最少,这与三种模型原有市场力大小排序相同。电力逆需求函数截距的增大可以大约同等程度的降低三种寡头竞争模型下发电商输电权市场力;电力逆需求函数斜率的增大可以提高发电商输电权市场力;降低发电成本可以提高发电商输电权市场力。
③我国直购电市场建设的开展离不开市场主体的积极参与,通过构造市场参与主体的收益模型,对大用户和发电商参与直购电交易的动机进行分析。结果表明:达成交易的电价区间大小与调剂量与直购合同电量的比值成反比,比值越大达成交易的电价区间越小,达成交易的谈判难度就会越大。因此,大用户对实际需求电量预测的准确性直接决定了直购电交易谈判的难易度。
④在余缺电量调剂受到惩罚的规定下,大用户的决策对直购电市场建设有重要的影响。通过引入一致性风险计量工具CVaR,将均值—CVaR收益模型应用于大用户直购电量的优化决策模型,分析大用户用电目录电价及发电厂上网电价对大用户最优直购合同电量的影响,并重点分析国家电价政策的调整对大用户直购电合同电量的影响。研究结果表明:发电厂商上网电价与大用户用电目录电价与直购电合同电量有正向关系。随着发电厂商上网电价的提高其对直购电合同电量的影响越来越小,而随着用电目录电价的提高其对直购电合同电量的影响则越来越大。大用户对用电需求预测越准确,直购合同电量对国家电价政策的调整越不敏感。
Since the 1980s, many countries have carried out the reformation of the electricity market, breaking the traditional vertically integrated monopoly structure down and promoting competition to improve the efficiency of the market. Since 2002, China has begun to reform the electricity market. After the reformation, market traders face random price risk and regional price risk. To avoid price risks, the financial instrument was introduced into the electricity market. By adopting forward contracts, random price risk can be hedged, and by applying financial transmission rights, regional price risk can be avoided. The electricity market structure is oligopolistic, so generators have market power more or less. Many scholars have studied the issues of risk aversion and market power control in electricity market. However, what effects the introduction of financial instruments has upon the market power of generators in addition to risk aversion? The research in this area is still at the exploratory stage, for widely-accepted research results have not been achieved.
This paper first analyzes the characteristics of the electricity market and introduces the theory of locational marginal pricing and how the financial transmission rights and contracts for differences avoid the price risk. Based on the summary and references of the research results both at home and abroad, this paper systematically analyses how forward contracts and financial transmission rights take effects on market efficiency.
This paper also studies the ongoing electricity market reform in China.
①The impact of forward contracts on competition is discussed. In the deregulated electricity market, contracts market can hedge the risk of the price fluctuation. This paper studies how contract for differences affects the possibility of tacit collusion between power plants. In this model power plants compete in quantities complying with trigger strategies which trading electric energy in the infinite interchanging contract and spot market. The results show: if the punishment leads the market to perfect competition equilibrium, the forward market will increase the possibility of tacit collusion. The power plants will get zero profit after the penalty of perfect competition. The penalty will prevent the occurrence of deviation from tacit collusion. If the punishment leads the market to Cournot equilibrium, the two-way CFDs have pro-competition effect, while the one-way CFDs have no effect on tacit collusion.
②Research on the relationship between financial transmission rights(FTR) and the market power of the generators. In this thesis, by solving the market equilibrium before and introducing transmission rights after, the relationship between FTR and the market power of generators is researched in terms of market structure and generators’location respectively. The results show: 1) FTR will mitigate the market power of generators in exporting region markedly, thus the market price will reduce by 6%; while the FTR will increase the market power of generators in an importing region slightly, thus the market price will increase by 40%. 2) FTR will increase the market power of generators in all three models (Cournot, Stackelberg and Forchheimer models). Specifically, FTR has the greatest market power in the Cournot model and the least in the Forchheimer model.
③Analysis of the motivation of Direct-power-purchasing for large consumers. Considering the actuality of China’s electricity market, based on the latest regulation on Direct-power-purchasing, this paper developed benefit mathematic models for large consumers and power plants, finally analyzed the risks for them and deduced the necessary of participate condition in Direct-power-purchasing market. The results show: the internal length of trading price is inversely proportional to the quantity of direct-purchasing. The greater the price interval is, the smaller the ratio of the quantity of Direct-power-purchasing is. Therefore, the forecasting accuracy of the quantity of Direct-power-purchasing determines the degree of difficulty of negotiation.
④Research on decision of large consumers’direct-purchasing based on CVaR. In the Direct-power-purchasing electric market, when the quantity of demand is not equal to the quantity of contract, the large consumers will be punished. Supposing the quantity of demand is random, this paper takes the CVaR as risk measurement index to construct the optimal model. The results show: there is a positive relation between the discrimination price and the quantity of Direct-purchasing. With the increase of on-grid price,it exerts increasing less influence on the quantity of Direct-power-purchasing. The more accurate the larger consumers’prediction is, the less sensitive the quantity of Direct-power-purchasing reacts to the adjustment of the national electricity price policy.
本论文首先分析了电力市场的特征,介绍了电力市场化改革的基础—节点边际电价理论,及远期合约和金融输电权对价格风险的规避。然后通过综合应用电力经济理论、博弈论、最优化理论、风险度量方法等系统分析远期合约和金融输电权与市场力的关系,最后对我国正在进行的直购电市场的建设进行了研究,论文的主要工作与创新体现在:
①从重复博弈的角度,研究不同惩罚措施下远期合约对发电厂商现货市场竞争时合谋行为的影响。相对于已有研究大多将远期合约视为无限期,本文假设远期市场与现货市场交替进行更接近于现实,这点与Liski&Montero(2006)研究的假设相同。与他们主要是从不同的竞争行为(价格竞争和产量竞争)的角度研究相比,本文主要从不同的惩罚措施(理性和非理性)的角度进行研究。由于电能质量相差不大,一般情况下用户对电能质量的要求又不高,因此假设发电商进行产量竞争更合理。本论文研究得到与已有研究不同的结论,结果表明:远期合约与默契合谋行为的关系不能一概而论。完全竞争惩罚会加强电厂商默契合谋的可能性。这是因为完全竞争惩罚会使发电商偏离合谋后获得零竞争利润,此惩罚措施可以有效的恫吓对手,防止偏离行为的发生。古诺竞争惩罚时:双边差价合约降低了发电商默契合谋的可能性,单边差价合约对默契合谋行为没有影响。
②金融输电权引入电力市场后,也可能会使寡头发电商拥有垂直市场力。本论文通过求解引入金融输电权前后市场纳什均衡解,首次定量研究了金融输电权对不同地理位置的发电商市场力的影响,并首次从寡头垄断市场结构的角度研究了金融输电权与发电商市场力的关系。研究结果表明:1)金融输电权对不同地理位置的发电商市场力的影响力度是不同的,最多可以提高进口区发电商市场力6%左右;最多可以降低出口区发电商市场力40%左右。电力逆需求弹性系数对出口区发电商市场力没有影响,在弹性系数较大时时可以提高进口区发电商原有市场力。发电成本系数的变化对发电商原有市场力影响甚小。2)金融输电权对发电商市场力的提高有递进增长现象。三种寡头竞争市场结构中,Cournot模型市场力提高最多,Stackelberg模型次之,Forchheimer模型提高的最少,这与三种模型原有市场力大小排序相同。电力逆需求函数截距的增大可以大约同等程度的降低三种寡头竞争模型下发电商输电权市场力;电力逆需求函数斜率的增大可以提高发电商输电权市场力;降低发电成本可以提高发电商输电权市场力。
③我国直购电市场建设的开展离不开市场主体的积极参与,通过构造市场参与主体的收益模型,对大用户和发电商参与直购电交易的动机进行分析。结果表明:达成交易的电价区间大小与调剂量与直购合同电量的比值成反比,比值越大达成交易的电价区间越小,达成交易的谈判难度就会越大。因此,大用户对实际需求电量预测的准确性直接决定了直购电交易谈判的难易度。
④在余缺电量调剂受到惩罚的规定下,大用户的决策对直购电市场建设有重要的影响。通过引入一致性风险计量工具CVaR,将均值—CVaR收益模型应用于大用户直购电量的优化决策模型,分析大用户用电目录电价及发电厂上网电价对大用户最优直购合同电量的影响,并重点分析国家电价政策的调整对大用户直购电合同电量的影响。研究结果表明:发电厂商上网电价与大用户用电目录电价与直购电合同电量有正向关系。随着发电厂商上网电价的提高其对直购电合同电量的影响越来越小,而随着用电目录电价的提高其对直购电合同电量的影响则越来越大。大用户对用电需求预测越准确,直购合同电量对国家电价政策的调整越不敏感。
Since the 1980s, many countries have carried out the reformation of the electricity market, breaking the traditional vertically integrated monopoly structure down and promoting competition to improve the efficiency of the market. Since 2002, China has begun to reform the electricity market. After the reformation, market traders face random price risk and regional price risk. To avoid price risks, the financial instrument was introduced into the electricity market. By adopting forward contracts, random price risk can be hedged, and by applying financial transmission rights, regional price risk can be avoided. The electricity market structure is oligopolistic, so generators have market power more or less. Many scholars have studied the issues of risk aversion and market power control in electricity market. However, what effects the introduction of financial instruments has upon the market power of generators in addition to risk aversion? The research in this area is still at the exploratory stage, for widely-accepted research results have not been achieved.
This paper first analyzes the characteristics of the electricity market and introduces the theory of locational marginal pricing and how the financial transmission rights and contracts for differences avoid the price risk. Based on the summary and references of the research results both at home and abroad, this paper systematically analyses how forward contracts and financial transmission rights take effects on market efficiency.
This paper also studies the ongoing electricity market reform in China.
①The impact of forward contracts on competition is discussed. In the deregulated electricity market, contracts market can hedge the risk of the price fluctuation. This paper studies how contract for differences affects the possibility of tacit collusion between power plants. In this model power plants compete in quantities complying with trigger strategies which trading electric energy in the infinite interchanging contract and spot market. The results show: if the punishment leads the market to perfect competition equilibrium, the forward market will increase the possibility of tacit collusion. The power plants will get zero profit after the penalty of perfect competition. The penalty will prevent the occurrence of deviation from tacit collusion. If the punishment leads the market to Cournot equilibrium, the two-way CFDs have pro-competition effect, while the one-way CFDs have no effect on tacit collusion.
②Research on the relationship between financial transmission rights(FTR) and the market power of the generators. In this thesis, by solving the market equilibrium before and introducing transmission rights after, the relationship between FTR and the market power of generators is researched in terms of market structure and generators’location respectively. The results show: 1) FTR will mitigate the market power of generators in exporting region markedly, thus the market price will reduce by 6%; while the FTR will increase the market power of generators in an importing region slightly, thus the market price will increase by 40%. 2) FTR will increase the market power of generators in all three models (Cournot, Stackelberg and Forchheimer models). Specifically, FTR has the greatest market power in the Cournot model and the least in the Forchheimer model.
③Analysis of the motivation of Direct-power-purchasing for large consumers. Considering the actuality of China’s electricity market, based on the latest regulation on Direct-power-purchasing, this paper developed benefit mathematic models for large consumers and power plants, finally analyzed the risks for them and deduced the necessary of participate condition in Direct-power-purchasing market. The results show: the internal length of trading price is inversely proportional to the quantity of direct-purchasing. The greater the price interval is, the smaller the ratio of the quantity of Direct-power-purchasing is. Therefore, the forecasting accuracy of the quantity of Direct-power-purchasing determines the degree of difficulty of negotiation.
④Research on decision of large consumers’direct-purchasing based on CVaR. In the Direct-power-purchasing electric market, when the quantity of demand is not equal to the quantity of contract, the large consumers will be punished. Supposing the quantity of demand is random, this paper takes the CVaR as risk measurement index to construct the optimal model. The results show: there is a positive relation between the discrimination price and the quantity of Direct-purchasing. With the increase of on-grid price,it exerts increasing less influence on the quantity of Direct-power-purchasing. The more accurate the larger consumers’prediction is, the less sensitive the quantity of Direct-power-purchasing reacts to the adjustment of the national electricity price policy.
引文
朱治中,于尔铿,刘亚芳,等. 2005.电力市场设计原理[J].电力系统自动化, 29(14):1-5.
周伟,郑丹丹,龚乐年. 2004.考虑网络约束的市场力判别方法[J].继电器, 32(6):9-12.
周明,聂艳丽,李庚银等. 2006.电力市场下长期购电方案及风险评估[J].中国电机工程学报, 26(6):116-122.
赵永亮. 2008.基于LMP FTR及优先权调度的输电阻塞管理方法研究[D].华北电力大学,博士学位论文.
赵磊. 2006.开放用户的电力市场改革研究[D].华北电力大学,博士学位论文.
张永平,方军,魏萍,等. 2001.输电阻塞管理的新方法述评(二):金融输电权及与FGR之比较[J].电网技术, 25(9):16-20.
张显,王锡凡. 2005.电力金融市场综述[J].电力系统自动化, 29(20):1-9.
张森林,张尧,陈皓勇. 2009b.大用户直购电国内外交易实践及成功经验[J].华东电力, 37(6):0993-0998.
张森林,张尧,陈皓勇. 2009a.大用户直购电交易若干关键问题研究[J].华东电力, 37(4): 0523-0528.
张粒子,张集,程瑜. 2006.电力市场中的串谋溢价和串谋行为规制[J].电网技术, 30(24):61-67.
张海静,赵永亮,曾鸣. 2005.我国区域电力市场价格风险规避间题研究.中国电力教育2005年研究生论丛专刊:211-213.
曾鸣,刘中书,吴至复. 2006.电力市场中金融输电权理论及其应用研究[J].中国电力教育, (S1):42-44.
姚建刚,章建. 1998.实时电价及其控制模式的研究[J].湖南大学学报, 25(6):66-71.
杨昆. 2006.电力市场目标模式研究[D].华北电力大学,博士学位论文.
徐楠,文福栓. 2005.电力市场中发电公司间心照不宣的勾结浅析[J].电力系统自动化, 29(8):10-15.
谢品杰,谭忠福,王绵斌,夏建朝. 2009.基于CVaR的供电公司现货市场购电优化决策模型[J].电工技术学报, 24(4):186-192.
王永福,张伯明,孙宏斌. 2002.实时电力市场运营模式[J].电力系统自动化, 26(11):1-5.
王瑞庆,李渝曾,张少华. 2008.考虑输电约束的期权市场与现货市场联合均衡分析[J].电力系统自动化, 32(2):35-39.
王鹏,吴素华,等. 2009.基于激励相容原理的大用户直购电模型与机制研究[J].中国电机工程学报, 29(10):91-96.
王剑辉,刘伟,王良友. 2004.电力市场中市场力与管制问题研究[J].继电器, 32(5):1-6.
王刚,王超,谢松,等. 2004.基于博弈论的电力大用户直接购电交易研究[J].电网技术, 28(13):75-79.
王冰. 2004.竞争性电力市场中有效电价的形成机制研究[J].中国软科学, (8):136-144.
田红云,陈继祥. 2005.我国电力工业体制改革中的垄断与管制[J].西南交通大学学报, 40(5):690-695.
宋永华,孙锦鑫. 1999.英国电力市场面临新的改革—现行模式比较及其问题[J].电网技术, 23(7):55-60.
宋依群,侯志俭,文福栓,等. 2003.电力市场中三种寡头竞争模型的市场力分析比较[J].电网技术, 27(8):10-15.
史晋川,杜立民. 2007.长期期货合约与默契合谋:以电力市场为例[J].世界经济, (3)59-66.
沈瑜,夏清,康重庆. 2000.中国电力市场模式的探讨[J].电力系统自动化, (6):5-8.
平狄克,鲁宾菲尔德. 2000.微观经济学(第四版)[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.
刘敦南,武亚光,姜晓亮,等. 2005.安全约束对区域电力市场的影响.电力系统自动化, 29(21):5-9.
林国庆,黄民翔. 2007.大用户直购电试点运行转运定价机制研究[J].电力系统及其自动化学报, 19(4): 32-40.
廖菁,江辉,彭建春,等. 2007.基于VaR和CVaR风险度量的发电商竞价策略[J].继电器, 35(11):30-34.
李虹. 2004.电力市场设计:理论与中国的改革[J].经济研究, (11):119-128.
雷霞,刘俊勇,党晓强. 2010.配电市场购售电优化模型研究综述[J].电力系统保护与控制, 38(2):136-145.
赖也宁. 2006.电力市场稳定性及其风险管理[D].东南大学,博士学位论文.
焦连伟,祁达才,张永平,等. 2001.从现代工业组织理论看电力市场[J].电力系统自动化[J], (20):14-19.
黄继民,罗毅芳,薛年华. 2002.电力市场中输电权及市场力问题综述[J].电网技术, 26(12):66-70
华东电力市场运营规则[EB/OL].[2006-07-15]. http://www.ecerb.gov.cn/zcfg.jsp
胡江溢,黄家裕,侯志俭,等. 1997.电力市场中的价格基础[J].上海交通大学学报, 36(2):73-78.
国家电监会. 2009.关于完善电力用户与发电企业直接交易试点工作有关问题的通知[S].北京:电监输电[2009]20号文件.
国家电监会. 2009. 2008年度电价执行情况监管报告[R].北京:国家电力监管委员会.
国家电监会. 2004.电力用户向发电企业直接购电试点暂行办法[S].北京:电监输电[2004]17号文件.
郭丽岩. 2010.竞争性电力市场交易模式的选择及发展趋势[J].中国物价, (05):24-27.
关勇,王绵斌,谭忠福,等. 2009.基于区间法下的大用户直购电风险度量模型[J].华东电力, 37(3), 0366-0369.
冯伟林. 2008.现货与期货交易并存的电力市场理论建模与实证研究[D].湖南大学,博士学位论文.
方军,张永平,魏萍,等. 2001.输电阻塞管理的新方法述评(一):基于潮流的可交易输电权.电网技术, 25(7):4-8
樊铁钢. 2000.竞争电力市场中电价风险成因分析与估测电站[J].系统工程, 16(5):284-286.
丁晓莺,土锡凡. 2005.考虑输电网络损耗的节点电价计算方法[J].电力系统自动化, 29(2):14-18.
刁强,鲍海,等. 2007.大用户直购电中的网损分摊问题[J].电网技术, 31(Supplement2): 236-237.
陈晓林,刘俊勇,宋永华,等. 2005.利用差价合同和金融输电权的组合规避电力市场风险[J]. 中国电机工程学报, 25(10):75-81.
陈西颖,胡江溢. 2008.大用户与发电企业直接交易算法探讨[J].电力系统自动化[J], 32(24) 100-104.
陈建华,杨莉,张宁,等. 2009.基于发电商申报的差价合同电量分解[J].电力系统自动化, 33(3): 30-34.
陈皓勇,张森林,张尧. 2008.电力市场中大用户直购电交易模式及算法研究[J],电网技术, 32(21):85-90.
陈刚,王超等. 2004.基于博弈论的电力大用户直接购电交易研究[J].电网技术, 28(13):75-79.
Woo C., Lloyd D., Tishler A. 2003. Electricity Market Reform Failures: UK, Norway, Alberta and California[J]. Energy Policy, (31):1103–1115.
Woo C., King M., Tishler A., Chow L. 2006. Cost of Electricity Deregulation[J]. Energy, (31):747–768.
Wolfram, C. 1999. Measuring duopoly power in the British electricity spot market[J]. The American Economic Review, 89(4),805–827.
Wolfram C. 1999. Electricity markets: should the rest of the world adopt the UK reforms?[J]. Regulation, 22(4):48-53.
Wise J. 1999. Financial Market Trading in the Australia Electricity Market. IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting. New York: IEEE, PP:1274-1277.
Willems B., Emmanuel D. 2008. Market power mitigation by regulating contract portfolio risk[J]. Energy Policy, (36):3787–3796.
Willems B. 2005. Cournot Competition, Financial Option Markets and Efficiency. CSEM, WP. www.econ.kuleuven.ac.be/ete/personal/bwillems/
Werden, G. 1996. Identifying Market Power in Electric Generation[J]. Public Utilities Fortnightly, 134(4):16-21.
Watanabe, T. 2002. Prospects of deregulated power market in Japan and challenges to realize stable operation. Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exhibition, 10(2):1486-1488.
Walter S. 1998. The Analytical Approach to Measuring Horizontal Market Power in Electric Utility Markets: A Historical Perspective[J]. The Electricity Journal, 11(6):13-21.
Torre S., Arroyo J.M., Conejo A.J., et al. 2002. Pricemaker self-scheduling in a pool-based electricity market a mixedinteger LP approach[J]. IEEE Trans Power System, 17(4):1037-1042.
Tishler A., Woo C. 2006. Likely Failure of Electricity Deregulation: Explanation with Application to Israel[J]. Energy, (31):845–856.
Stoft S. 2002. Power System Economics: Designing Markets for Electricity, New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Stoft S. 1999. Financial transmission rights meet Cournot: how TCCs curb market power[J]. The Energy Journal, 20(1):1-24.
Spear S. 2003. The Electricity Market Game[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 19(2):300-323. Schweppe F C., Tabor R D., Kirtley J., et al. 1980. Homeostatic Utility control[J]. IEEE transon PAS, 99(3):1151-1163.
Schweppe F C., Caramanis M C., Bohn, R E. 1982. Optimal Spot Pricing- Practice and Theory[J]. IEEE Transaction on Power Systems, 101(9):3243-3245.
Schweppe F C., Caramanis M C. 1988. Spot Pricing of Electricity[C]. Kluwer Acadamic Publishers, 1988, Norwell, USA.
Sander H., Schwab J., Muhr M. 2001. The deregulation of the electricity market in the view of a regional Austrian utility[J]. Electricity Distribution, 6(6):5-12.
Rockafeller R T., Uryasev S. 2000. Optimization of conditional value-at-risk[J]. The Journal of Risk, 2(3):21-41.
Rockafellar R T., Uryasev S. 2002. Conditional value-at-risk for general loss distributions[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, (26):1443-1471.
Richard Green., ChloéLe Coq. 2009. The length of contracts and collusion[J], International Journal of Industrial Organization, pp:1-9.
Richard G., Karsten N., David N. 2004. Allocating transmission to mitigate market power in electricity networks[J] RAND Journal of Economics, 35(4):691-709.
Rajaraman R., Sarlashkar J.V., Alvarado F.L. 1997. The effect of demand elasticity on security pricesfor the poolco and multi-lateral contract model[J]. IEEE Transaction on Power Systems, 12(3):1177-1184.
Pritchard G, Philpott A. 2005. On financial transmission rights and market power[J]. Decision Support Systems, (40):507-515.
Pavlo K., Jonas P., Uryasev S. 2002. Portfolio optimization with conditional value-at-risk objective and constraints[J]. The Journal of Risk, 4(2):11-27.
Oren S.S., Spiller P.T., Varaiya P. et al. 1995. Nodal prices and transmission rights: a critical appraisal[J]. The Electricity Journal, pp:24–35.
Oren S.S. 1997.’Economic Inefficiency of Passive Transmission Rights in Congested Electricity Systems with Competitive Generation’[J]. The Energy Journal, 18(1):63-83.
Matti, L., Juan-Pablo M. 2006. Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly[J], Journal of Economic Theory, 13(1):212-230.
Liu Y., Guan X. 2003. Purchase allocation and demand bidding in electric power markets[J]. IEEE Trans. Power System, 18(1):106-112.
Littlechild, S C. 2000. Privatization, competition and regulation in the British Electricity Industry[J]. Advances in Power System Control, Operation and Management, 11(1):10-15.
Leautier, T O. 2001. Transmission constraints and imperfect markets for power[J]. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 19(1):27-54.
Kaye R J., Outhred H R., Bannister C H. 1990. Forward Contracts for the Operation of an Electricity Industry under Spot Pricing[J]. IEEE Transaction on Power Systems, 5(1):46-52.
Kahn E. 1998. Numerical Techniques for Analyzing Market Power in Electricity[J]. The Electricity Journal, 11(7):34-43.
Joskow P L., Tirole J. 2005. "Merchant Transmission Investment,"[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 53(2):233-264.
Joskow P L., Tirole J. 2000. Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 31(3):450-487.
Jose′Luis Ferreira. 2003. Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, (108)141–151.
Horizontal Market Power in Restructured Electricity Markets, Office of Economic, Electricity and Natural Gas Analysis, U.S. Department of Energy, March 2000, http://www.pi.energy.gov/pdf/library/HMPReport.pdf
Hogan W W. 2001. Electricity market Restructuring: Reforms of Reforms, WP. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/rut052501.pdf
Hogan W W. 1992. Contract networks for electric power transmission[J]. Journal of RegulatoryEconomics, 4(3):211-242
Harvey M., Hogan W W., Pope S L. 1996.“Transmission Capacity Reservations and Transmission Congestion contracts”Report. http://ksghome.harvard.edu/ .whogan.cbg.ksg/tccoptr3.pdf Green R., Newbery, D. 1992. Competition in the British electricity spot market[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 100(5),929–953.
Green R., Newbery D. 1999. The Electricity Contract Market in the England and Wales[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 47(5):107-124.
Green R. 2007. Nodal pricing of electricity. How much does it cost to get it wrong?[J]. Journal of Regulatory Economics, (31):125-149.
Green R. 2003. Failing electricity markets: Should we shoot the pools?[J]. Utilities Policy, 11(3),155–167.
Green R. 1999. The electricity contract market in England and Wales[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, (1):107-124.
Green R. 1997.“Electricity Transmission Pricing-An International Comparison”[J]. Utilities Policy, 6(3):177-184.
Green R. 1996. Increasing competition in the British electricity market.[J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics, (44):205–216.
Golbon Z., Tony D. 2010. Exploring the Strategic Behaviour of FTR Holders with Market Power. http://www.sol.co.nz/projects/10/MRP/SOL_MRP_10-1.pdf
Gedra T W., Varaiya P P. 1993. Markets and Pricing for Interruptible Electric Power[J]. IEEE Transaction on Power Systems, 8(1):122-128
Gedra T W. l994. Optional Forward Contracts for Electric Power Markets[J]. IEEE Transaction on Power Systems, 9(4): 1766-1773.
Fox-Penner, Peter. 1997. Electric Utility Restructuring-A Guide to the Competitive Era. Virginia: Public Utilities Reports, PP. 81-88.
Finney J D., Othmrm H A., Rutz W L. 1997. Evaluating transmission congestion constraints in system planning[J]. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 12(3):1143-1150. FERC. 2006. RTO-ISO Handbook.
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/handbook.asp FERC. 2002. NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING.
http://www.Ferc.Gov/Electric /rto/ Mrkt-Strct/comments/nopr/Web-NOPR.pdf. Fabra v., Fehr, H. 2004. Designing Electricity Auctions”, CSEM Working Paper. http://www.ferc.gov/Electric/rto/Mrkt-Strct-comments/nopr/Web-NOPR.pdf
Ehrenmann A., Neuhoff K.. 2003. A comparison of electricity market designs in networks. Dept. ofApplied Economics, Cambridge University. Working Paper. http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/electricity/publications/wp
David, N., Pollitt M. 1997.“The Restructuring and Privatization of Britain’s CEGB-Was it Worth It?”[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 45(3):269-303.
David A K., Wen F. 2001. Market power in electricity supply[J]. IEEE Trans on Energy Conversion, 16(4): 352-360.
David A K. 1996. Risk Modeling in Energy Contracts between Host Utilities and BOT Plant Investors[J]. IEEE Transaction on Power Systems, 11(2):359-365.
David A K. 1994. Modeling Risk in Energy Contracts with Investor Owned Generation[J]. IEEE Generation Transmission and Distribution, 141(1):75-80.
Christie R D., Wangensteen I. 1998. The Energy Market in Norway and Swenden:Congestion Management[J]. IEEE Power Engineering Review, 18(5):61-63.
Chloe Le Coq. 2004.“Long-Term Supply Contracts and Collusion in The Electricity Market”Mimeo, Stockholm School of Economics, WP.
http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0552.pdf.
Chen, L., Suzuki, H,, et al. 2002. Components of Nodal Prices for Electric Power Systems [J]. Transaction on Power Systems, 17(1):41-49.
Chao H P., Peck S. 1996. A Market Mechanism for Electric Power Transmission[J]. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 10(1):25-60.
Chao H P., Peak S., Oren S., Wilson R. 2000. Flow-Based Transmission Rights and Congestion Management[J]. Electricity Journal, October, 38-58.
Caramanis M C., Bohn R E., Schweppe F C. 1982. Optimal Spot Pricing: Practice and Theory[J]. IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, 101(9):234-245.
Bushnell J., Stoft S. 1996. Electric grid investment under a contract network regime[J]. Journal of Regulatow Economics, (10):61-79.
Bushnell J., Saravia C. 2002. An empirical assessment of the competitiveness of the New England electricity market. University of California Energy Institute, CSEM WP-101. http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDF/csemwp101.pdf
Bushnell J. 2007. Oligopoly equilibrium in Electricity Contract Markets[J], Journal of Regulatory Economics, 32(3):225-245.
Bushnell J. 1999. Transmission Rights and Market Power[J]. The Electricity Journal, 12(8):77-85. Brunekreeft G. 2002.“Regulatory Threat in Vertically Related Markets; The Case of German Electricity”, CMI Working Paper.
http://www.vwl.uni-freiburg.de/fakultaet/vw/publikationen/brunekreeft/RT_brunekreeft.pdf.
Bower,J., Bunn, D. 2000. Model-Based Comparisons of Pool and Bilateral Markets for Electricity[J]. The Energy Journal, 21(3):1-29.
Boucher, J., Smeers, Y. 2001. Alternative models of restructured electricity systems. Part 1: No market power[J]. Operations Research, (49):821-838.
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J.B., Wolak, F. 2002. Measuring market inefficiencies in california’s deregulated electricity industry[J]. American Economic Review, 92(5):1376-1405.
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J., Knittel, C.R. 1999. Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures[J], The Energy Journal, 20(4):65-88.
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J., Kahn, E. et al. 1995. Market Power in California Electricity Markets[J]. Utilities Policy, 5(3):219-236.
Borenstein, S., Bushnell J., Stoft, S. 2000.“The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in a Deregulated Electricity Industry”[J]. RAND Journal of Economics, 31(2)294-325.
Borenstein, S. 2002. The trouble with electricity markets: understanding california’s restructuring disaster[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, (16)191-211.
Blumstein, C., Friedman, L., Green, R. 2002. The history of electricity restructuring in california[J]. Journal of Industry Competition and Trade, 2(12):9-38.
Barkovich, B.R. 1996. Electric power deregulation-end of monopoly. Cement Industry. Technical Conference, (4):315-321.
Anderson, K.P, McCarthy, A. 1999. Transmission pricing and expansion methodology: lessons from Arxentina[J], Lkiliiies Policy, (8):199-211.
Alvey, T., Goodwin, D., Ma, X., ea al. 1998.“A security-constrained bid-clearing system for the New Zealand wholesale electricity market,”[J]. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 13(2):340–346.
Allza, B., Vila, J. 1993. Cournot Competition, Forwards Markets and Efficiency[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, (59)1-16.
Abreu, D. 1988. On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting[J], Econometrica, (56):383-396.
周伟,郑丹丹,龚乐年. 2004.考虑网络约束的市场力判别方法[J].继电器, 32(6):9-12.
周明,聂艳丽,李庚银等. 2006.电力市场下长期购电方案及风险评估[J].中国电机工程学报, 26(6):116-122.
赵永亮. 2008.基于LMP FTR及优先权调度的输电阻塞管理方法研究[D].华北电力大学,博士学位论文.
赵磊. 2006.开放用户的电力市场改革研究[D].华北电力大学,博士学位论文.
张永平,方军,魏萍,等. 2001.输电阻塞管理的新方法述评(二):金融输电权及与FGR之比较[J].电网技术, 25(9):16-20.
张显,王锡凡. 2005.电力金融市场综述[J].电力系统自动化, 29(20):1-9.
张森林,张尧,陈皓勇. 2009b.大用户直购电国内外交易实践及成功经验[J].华东电力, 37(6):0993-0998.
张森林,张尧,陈皓勇. 2009a.大用户直购电交易若干关键问题研究[J].华东电力, 37(4): 0523-0528.
张粒子,张集,程瑜. 2006.电力市场中的串谋溢价和串谋行为规制[J].电网技术, 30(24):61-67.
张海静,赵永亮,曾鸣. 2005.我国区域电力市场价格风险规避间题研究.中国电力教育2005年研究生论丛专刊:211-213.
曾鸣,刘中书,吴至复. 2006.电力市场中金融输电权理论及其应用研究[J].中国电力教育, (S1):42-44.
姚建刚,章建. 1998.实时电价及其控制模式的研究[J].湖南大学学报, 25(6):66-71.
杨昆. 2006.电力市场目标模式研究[D].华北电力大学,博士学位论文.
徐楠,文福栓. 2005.电力市场中发电公司间心照不宣的勾结浅析[J].电力系统自动化, 29(8):10-15.
谢品杰,谭忠福,王绵斌,夏建朝. 2009.基于CVaR的供电公司现货市场购电优化决策模型[J].电工技术学报, 24(4):186-192.
王永福,张伯明,孙宏斌. 2002.实时电力市场运营模式[J].电力系统自动化, 26(11):1-5.
王瑞庆,李渝曾,张少华. 2008.考虑输电约束的期权市场与现货市场联合均衡分析[J].电力系统自动化, 32(2):35-39.
王鹏,吴素华,等. 2009.基于激励相容原理的大用户直购电模型与机制研究[J].中国电机工程学报, 29(10):91-96.
王剑辉,刘伟,王良友. 2004.电力市场中市场力与管制问题研究[J].继电器, 32(5):1-6.
王刚,王超,谢松,等. 2004.基于博弈论的电力大用户直接购电交易研究[J].电网技术, 28(13):75-79.
王冰. 2004.竞争性电力市场中有效电价的形成机制研究[J].中国软科学, (8):136-144.
田红云,陈继祥. 2005.我国电力工业体制改革中的垄断与管制[J].西南交通大学学报, 40(5):690-695.
宋永华,孙锦鑫. 1999.英国电力市场面临新的改革—现行模式比较及其问题[J].电网技术, 23(7):55-60.
宋依群,侯志俭,文福栓,等. 2003.电力市场中三种寡头竞争模型的市场力分析比较[J].电网技术, 27(8):10-15.
史晋川,杜立民. 2007.长期期货合约与默契合谋:以电力市场为例[J].世界经济, (3)59-66.
沈瑜,夏清,康重庆. 2000.中国电力市场模式的探讨[J].电力系统自动化, (6):5-8.
平狄克,鲁宾菲尔德. 2000.微观经济学(第四版)[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.
刘敦南,武亚光,姜晓亮,等. 2005.安全约束对区域电力市场的影响.电力系统自动化, 29(21):5-9.
林国庆,黄民翔. 2007.大用户直购电试点运行转运定价机制研究[J].电力系统及其自动化学报, 19(4): 32-40.
廖菁,江辉,彭建春,等. 2007.基于VaR和CVaR风险度量的发电商竞价策略[J].继电器, 35(11):30-34.
李虹. 2004.电力市场设计:理论与中国的改革[J].经济研究, (11):119-128.
雷霞,刘俊勇,党晓强. 2010.配电市场购售电优化模型研究综述[J].电力系统保护与控制, 38(2):136-145.
赖也宁. 2006.电力市场稳定性及其风险管理[D].东南大学,博士学位论文.
焦连伟,祁达才,张永平,等. 2001.从现代工业组织理论看电力市场[J].电力系统自动化[J], (20):14-19.
黄继民,罗毅芳,薛年华. 2002.电力市场中输电权及市场力问题综述[J].电网技术, 26(12):66-70
华东电力市场运营规则[EB/OL].[2006-07-15]. http://www.ecerb.gov.cn/zcfg.jsp
胡江溢,黄家裕,侯志俭,等. 1997.电力市场中的价格基础[J].上海交通大学学报, 36(2):73-78.
国家电监会. 2009.关于完善电力用户与发电企业直接交易试点工作有关问题的通知[S].北京:电监输电[2009]20号文件.
国家电监会. 2009. 2008年度电价执行情况监管报告[R].北京:国家电力监管委员会.
国家电监会. 2004.电力用户向发电企业直接购电试点暂行办法[S].北京:电监输电[2004]17号文件.
郭丽岩. 2010.竞争性电力市场交易模式的选择及发展趋势[J].中国物价, (05):24-27.
关勇,王绵斌,谭忠福,等. 2009.基于区间法下的大用户直购电风险度量模型[J].华东电力, 37(3), 0366-0369.
冯伟林. 2008.现货与期货交易并存的电力市场理论建模与实证研究[D].湖南大学,博士学位论文.
方军,张永平,魏萍,等. 2001.输电阻塞管理的新方法述评(一):基于潮流的可交易输电权.电网技术, 25(7):4-8
樊铁钢. 2000.竞争电力市场中电价风险成因分析与估测电站[J].系统工程, 16(5):284-286.
丁晓莺,土锡凡. 2005.考虑输电网络损耗的节点电价计算方法[J].电力系统自动化, 29(2):14-18.
刁强,鲍海,等. 2007.大用户直购电中的网损分摊问题[J].电网技术, 31(Supplement2): 236-237.
陈晓林,刘俊勇,宋永华,等. 2005.利用差价合同和金融输电权的组合规避电力市场风险[J]. 中国电机工程学报, 25(10):75-81.
陈西颖,胡江溢. 2008.大用户与发电企业直接交易算法探讨[J].电力系统自动化[J], 32(24) 100-104.
陈建华,杨莉,张宁,等. 2009.基于发电商申报的差价合同电量分解[J].电力系统自动化, 33(3): 30-34.
陈皓勇,张森林,张尧. 2008.电力市场中大用户直购电交易模式及算法研究[J],电网技术, 32(21):85-90.
陈刚,王超等. 2004.基于博弈论的电力大用户直接购电交易研究[J].电网技术, 28(13):75-79.
Woo C., Lloyd D., Tishler A. 2003. Electricity Market Reform Failures: UK, Norway, Alberta and California[J]. Energy Policy, (31):1103–1115.
Woo C., King M., Tishler A., Chow L. 2006. Cost of Electricity Deregulation[J]. Energy, (31):747–768.
Wolfram, C. 1999. Measuring duopoly power in the British electricity spot market[J]. The American Economic Review, 89(4),805–827.
Wolfram C. 1999. Electricity markets: should the rest of the world adopt the UK reforms?[J]. Regulation, 22(4):48-53.
Wise J. 1999. Financial Market Trading in the Australia Electricity Market. IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting. New York: IEEE, PP:1274-1277.
Willems B., Emmanuel D. 2008. Market power mitigation by regulating contract portfolio risk[J]. Energy Policy, (36):3787–3796.
Willems B. 2005. Cournot Competition, Financial Option Markets and Efficiency. CSEM, WP. www.econ.kuleuven.ac.be/ete/personal/bwillems/
Werden, G. 1996. Identifying Market Power in Electric Generation[J]. Public Utilities Fortnightly, 134(4):16-21.
Watanabe, T. 2002. Prospects of deregulated power market in Japan and challenges to realize stable operation. Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exhibition, 10(2):1486-1488.
Walter S. 1998. The Analytical Approach to Measuring Horizontal Market Power in Electric Utility Markets: A Historical Perspective[J]. The Electricity Journal, 11(6):13-21.
Torre S., Arroyo J.M., Conejo A.J., et al. 2002. Pricemaker self-scheduling in a pool-based electricity market a mixedinteger LP approach[J]. IEEE Trans Power System, 17(4):1037-1042.
Tishler A., Woo C. 2006. Likely Failure of Electricity Deregulation: Explanation with Application to Israel[J]. Energy, (31):845–856.
Stoft S. 2002. Power System Economics: Designing Markets for Electricity, New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Stoft S. 1999. Financial transmission rights meet Cournot: how TCCs curb market power[J]. The Energy Journal, 20(1):1-24.
Spear S. 2003. The Electricity Market Game[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 19(2):300-323. Schweppe F C., Tabor R D., Kirtley J., et al. 1980. Homeostatic Utility control[J]. IEEE transon PAS, 99(3):1151-1163.
Schweppe F C., Caramanis M C., Bohn, R E. 1982. Optimal Spot Pricing- Practice and Theory[J]. IEEE Transaction on Power Systems, 101(9):3243-3245.
Schweppe F C., Caramanis M C. 1988. Spot Pricing of Electricity[C]. Kluwer Acadamic Publishers, 1988, Norwell, USA.
Sander H., Schwab J., Muhr M. 2001. The deregulation of the electricity market in the view of a regional Austrian utility[J]. Electricity Distribution, 6(6):5-12.
Rockafeller R T., Uryasev S. 2000. Optimization of conditional value-at-risk[J]. The Journal of Risk, 2(3):21-41.
Rockafellar R T., Uryasev S. 2002. Conditional value-at-risk for general loss distributions[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, (26):1443-1471.
Richard Green., ChloéLe Coq. 2009. The length of contracts and collusion[J], International Journal of Industrial Organization, pp:1-9.
Richard G., Karsten N., David N. 2004. Allocating transmission to mitigate market power in electricity networks[J] RAND Journal of Economics, 35(4):691-709.
Rajaraman R., Sarlashkar J.V., Alvarado F.L. 1997. The effect of demand elasticity on security pricesfor the poolco and multi-lateral contract model[J]. IEEE Transaction on Power Systems, 12(3):1177-1184.
Pritchard G, Philpott A. 2005. On financial transmission rights and market power[J]. Decision Support Systems, (40):507-515.
Pavlo K., Jonas P., Uryasev S. 2002. Portfolio optimization with conditional value-at-risk objective and constraints[J]. The Journal of Risk, 4(2):11-27.
Oren S.S., Spiller P.T., Varaiya P. et al. 1995. Nodal prices and transmission rights: a critical appraisal[J]. The Electricity Journal, pp:24–35.
Oren S.S. 1997.’Economic Inefficiency of Passive Transmission Rights in Congested Electricity Systems with Competitive Generation’[J]. The Energy Journal, 18(1):63-83.
Matti, L., Juan-Pablo M. 2006. Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly[J], Journal of Economic Theory, 13(1):212-230.
Liu Y., Guan X. 2003. Purchase allocation and demand bidding in electric power markets[J]. IEEE Trans. Power System, 18(1):106-112.
Littlechild, S C. 2000. Privatization, competition and regulation in the British Electricity Industry[J]. Advances in Power System Control, Operation and Management, 11(1):10-15.
Leautier, T O. 2001. Transmission constraints and imperfect markets for power[J]. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 19(1):27-54.
Kaye R J., Outhred H R., Bannister C H. 1990. Forward Contracts for the Operation of an Electricity Industry under Spot Pricing[J]. IEEE Transaction on Power Systems, 5(1):46-52.
Kahn E. 1998. Numerical Techniques for Analyzing Market Power in Electricity[J]. The Electricity Journal, 11(7):34-43.
Joskow P L., Tirole J. 2005. "Merchant Transmission Investment,"[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 53(2):233-264.
Joskow P L., Tirole J. 2000. Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 31(3):450-487.
Jose′Luis Ferreira. 2003. Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, (108)141–151.
Horizontal Market Power in Restructured Electricity Markets, Office of Economic, Electricity and Natural Gas Analysis, U.S. Department of Energy, March 2000, http://www.pi.energy.gov/pdf/library/HMPReport.pdf
Hogan W W. 2001. Electricity market Restructuring: Reforms of Reforms, WP. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/rut052501.pdf
Hogan W W. 1992. Contract networks for electric power transmission[J]. Journal of RegulatoryEconomics, 4(3):211-242
Harvey M., Hogan W W., Pope S L. 1996.“Transmission Capacity Reservations and Transmission Congestion contracts”Report. http://ksghome.harvard.edu/ .whogan.cbg.ksg/tccoptr3.pdf Green R., Newbery, D. 1992. Competition in the British electricity spot market[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 100(5),929–953.
Green R., Newbery D. 1999. The Electricity Contract Market in the England and Wales[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 47(5):107-124.
Green R. 2007. Nodal pricing of electricity. How much does it cost to get it wrong?[J]. Journal of Regulatory Economics, (31):125-149.
Green R. 2003. Failing electricity markets: Should we shoot the pools?[J]. Utilities Policy, 11(3),155–167.
Green R. 1999. The electricity contract market in England and Wales[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, (1):107-124.
Green R. 1997.“Electricity Transmission Pricing-An International Comparison”[J]. Utilities Policy, 6(3):177-184.
Green R. 1996. Increasing competition in the British electricity market.[J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics, (44):205–216.
Golbon Z., Tony D. 2010. Exploring the Strategic Behaviour of FTR Holders with Market Power. http://www.sol.co.nz/projects/10/MRP/SOL_MRP_10-1.pdf
Gedra T W., Varaiya P P. 1993. Markets and Pricing for Interruptible Electric Power[J]. IEEE Transaction on Power Systems, 8(1):122-128
Gedra T W. l994. Optional Forward Contracts for Electric Power Markets[J]. IEEE Transaction on Power Systems, 9(4): 1766-1773.
Fox-Penner, Peter. 1997. Electric Utility Restructuring-A Guide to the Competitive Era. Virginia: Public Utilities Reports, PP. 81-88.
Finney J D., Othmrm H A., Rutz W L. 1997. Evaluating transmission congestion constraints in system planning[J]. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 12(3):1143-1150. FERC. 2006. RTO-ISO Handbook.
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/handbook.asp FERC. 2002. NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING.
http://www.Ferc.Gov/Electric /rto/ Mrkt-Strct/comments/nopr/Web-NOPR.pdf. Fabra v., Fehr, H. 2004. Designing Electricity Auctions”, CSEM Working Paper. http://www.ferc.gov/Electric/rto/Mrkt-Strct-comments/nopr/Web-NOPR.pdf
Ehrenmann A., Neuhoff K.. 2003. A comparison of electricity market designs in networks. Dept. ofApplied Economics, Cambridge University. Working Paper. http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/electricity/publications/wp
David, N., Pollitt M. 1997.“The Restructuring and Privatization of Britain’s CEGB-Was it Worth It?”[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 45(3):269-303.
David A K., Wen F. 2001. Market power in electricity supply[J]. IEEE Trans on Energy Conversion, 16(4): 352-360.
David A K. 1996. Risk Modeling in Energy Contracts between Host Utilities and BOT Plant Investors[J]. IEEE Transaction on Power Systems, 11(2):359-365.
David A K. 1994. Modeling Risk in Energy Contracts with Investor Owned Generation[J]. IEEE Generation Transmission and Distribution, 141(1):75-80.
Christie R D., Wangensteen I. 1998. The Energy Market in Norway and Swenden:Congestion Management[J]. IEEE Power Engineering Review, 18(5):61-63.
Chloe Le Coq. 2004.“Long-Term Supply Contracts and Collusion in The Electricity Market”Mimeo, Stockholm School of Economics, WP.
http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0552.pdf.
Chen, L., Suzuki, H,, et al. 2002. Components of Nodal Prices for Electric Power Systems [J]. Transaction on Power Systems, 17(1):41-49.
Chao H P., Peck S. 1996. A Market Mechanism for Electric Power Transmission[J]. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 10(1):25-60.
Chao H P., Peak S., Oren S., Wilson R. 2000. Flow-Based Transmission Rights and Congestion Management[J]. Electricity Journal, October, 38-58.
Caramanis M C., Bohn R E., Schweppe F C. 1982. Optimal Spot Pricing: Practice and Theory[J]. IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, 101(9):234-245.
Bushnell J., Stoft S. 1996. Electric grid investment under a contract network regime[J]. Journal of Regulatow Economics, (10):61-79.
Bushnell J., Saravia C. 2002. An empirical assessment of the competitiveness of the New England electricity market. University of California Energy Institute, CSEM WP-101. http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDF/csemwp101.pdf
Bushnell J. 2007. Oligopoly equilibrium in Electricity Contract Markets[J], Journal of Regulatory Economics, 32(3):225-245.
Bushnell J. 1999. Transmission Rights and Market Power[J]. The Electricity Journal, 12(8):77-85. Brunekreeft G. 2002.“Regulatory Threat in Vertically Related Markets; The Case of German Electricity”, CMI Working Paper.
http://www.vwl.uni-freiburg.de/fakultaet/vw/publikationen/brunekreeft/RT_brunekreeft.pdf.
Bower,J., Bunn, D. 2000. Model-Based Comparisons of Pool and Bilateral Markets for Electricity[J]. The Energy Journal, 21(3):1-29.
Boucher, J., Smeers, Y. 2001. Alternative models of restructured electricity systems. Part 1: No market power[J]. Operations Research, (49):821-838.
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J.B., Wolak, F. 2002. Measuring market inefficiencies in california’s deregulated electricity industry[J]. American Economic Review, 92(5):1376-1405.
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J., Knittel, C.R. 1999. Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures[J], The Energy Journal, 20(4):65-88.
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J., Kahn, E. et al. 1995. Market Power in California Electricity Markets[J]. Utilities Policy, 5(3):219-236.
Borenstein, S., Bushnell J., Stoft, S. 2000.“The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in a Deregulated Electricity Industry”[J]. RAND Journal of Economics, 31(2)294-325.
Borenstein, S. 2002. The trouble with electricity markets: understanding california’s restructuring disaster[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, (16)191-211.
Blumstein, C., Friedman, L., Green, R. 2002. The history of electricity restructuring in california[J]. Journal of Industry Competition and Trade, 2(12):9-38.
Barkovich, B.R. 1996. Electric power deregulation-end of monopoly. Cement Industry. Technical Conference, (4):315-321.
Anderson, K.P, McCarthy, A. 1999. Transmission pricing and expansion methodology: lessons from Arxentina[J], Lkiliiies Policy, (8):199-211.
Alvey, T., Goodwin, D., Ma, X., ea al. 1998.“A security-constrained bid-clearing system for the New Zealand wholesale electricity market,”[J]. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 13(2):340–346.
Allza, B., Vila, J. 1993. Cournot Competition, Forwards Markets and Efficiency[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, (59)1-16.
Abreu, D. 1988. On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting[J], Econometrica, (56):383-396.