中国上市公司股权分置改革的绩效问题研究
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摘要
从2005年4月股权分置改革试点正式启动起,在经过两年的改革进程后,股权分置改革己接近尾声。股权分置改革是一项深刻改变中国股市发展方向的改革实践,是中国股市自创建以后最重要的历史事件,总结这场改革实践的得失与经验,从而为中国资本市场的下一发展提供有益的经验支持,意义重大。不过,在现有对股权分置改革的政策研究或评述中,大多是以规范性分析方法为主,而缺乏以实证性分析为基础的从学术角度而客观分析、检验、评价股权分置改革工作成效的深度研究。
本文在借鉴国内外学者相关研究成果的基础上,提出股权分置改革的绩效评价概念,从“对价绩效”、“市场绩效”和“公司绩效”等三方面,构建一个上市公司股权分置改革绩效评价的学术性研究框架。在此为基础,本文应用理论与实证的分析方法,对股改的绩效问题进行深入分析,从而为股改中存在的一些现象与疑问提供科学证据,同时也为证券监管部门在今后证券市场发展中的一些政策问题提供参考与借鉴。
论文共分七章,各章的主要内容如下:
第一章为导论,主要对论文进行一个简要介绍,具体包括研究背景与研究问题的提出,研究思路、研究的主要内容以及研究的改进与创新。
第二章为文献综述,首先对国内外关于股权分置改革的理论研究文献进行较为全面的系统回顾、整理与归纳,其次是对公司股权结构与公司治理及公司经营业绩之间关系的研究文献做一个较为细致、全面的整理。
第三章介绍股权分置改革的有关制度背景。本章重点对股权分置问题的产生与影响,对股权分置改革工作的演进与现状进行全面的回顾与分析。
第四章是股权分置改革的对价绩效研究。本章从股改对价确定的影响因素分析出发,通过相关理论假说的建立和实证检验来探讨股改对价确定的绩效状况,探讨股改政策的执行效果和股改博弈机制的公平与效率。
第五章是股权分置改革的公司绩效研究。本章以股权结构和大股东行为作为股改与上市公司绩效关系的研究变量,通过相关财务理论构建理论假设并进行实证检验,探讨股权分置改革对上市公司治理的影响、对上市公司经营的影响。
第六章是股权分置改革的市场绩效研究。本章通过对“市场对实施股改公司的股票有何反应”、“什么样的因素影响了股改公司股票的市场反应”等问题的实证分析,探讨股改的市场绩效。
第七章是对论文研究成果的总结,包括研究结论与启示、研究的局限性和进一步研究的方向。
本文主要的结论如下:
1.从股改对价的效率角度看,1400家上市公司股改工作在两年内的快速推进,股改对价方案的高通过率,以及股改对价确定随着改革进程推进时的更富效率、随着在不同类型企业中的更富针对性等,说明了股改的高效性。然而,从公平角度看,股改对价确定中所反映的非流通股东意志主导而流通股东议价作用不明显、股改受到外界非经济因素的显著影响等,说明了股改公平性的有所欠缺。在效率与公平的二维尺度上,股改的对价绩效是“高效但欠缺公平”。
2.具体而言,股改对价所反映的流通股东和非流通股东的利益博弈情况说明,此次股改中非流通股东的议价力得到良好体现,而流通股东议价力发挥很不显著,机构投资者在股改对价确定中对中小投资者的保护作用并没有得到应有体现,股改对价的确定基本还是以非流通股东的意志为主导而进行;股改对价与公司自身发展特点相关系的情况说明,股改对价的确定并没有与公司自身的经营发展特点密切相关,股改工作受到“政治动机与利益”的驱动的程度较大,股改的“尽快”、“从众”或“非自愿性”选择因素客观存在。
3.股权分置改革带来了上市公司治理指数的提高。特别地,股权分置改革带来了上市公司股权结构的显著变化,表现为股东成份结构的变化(国有股、法人股持股比例下降,社会公众股持股比例上升)和股权集中度的下降。由于我国上市公司治理的理论研究与实践都表明,国有股、法人股持股比例过高和股权集中度过大所表现的一股独大等现象是我国上市公司治理不完善的根源,股改所带来了上市公司股权结构的显著改善说明了股改对上市公司治理改善的积极作用。
4.股权分置改革对公司经营绩效影响的实证分析结果表明,股权分置改革对上市公司经营绩效的影响是明显的,突出表现为股改后控股股东做大做强上市公司的意愿及行为,通过资产注入、整体上市手段,股改后上市公司的经营利润得到相当的提升。同时,股权分置改革对公司经营绩效的影响还表现为股改后公司资产管理能力的显著上升。不过,由于研究样本数据的限制,对于股改与上市公司经营绩效关系的结论还有待进一步的分析探讨。
5.股权分置改革的市场绩效是积极和明显的,突出表现为股改公司的股票存在显著为正的超常收益,其中,股改公司在预案公告前10日到方案实施日期间的累计平均超常收益率达到5.187%,且预案公告日公司的平均超常收益率最为突出。但对影响股改市场绩效因素的分析表明,除了短期内就能带来利益的流通股东所获得的对价比率和反映投资者认同度的流通股东投反对票比例对股票的累计超额收益有影响外,公司治理水平的提高和M/B所代表的流动溢价等从长期角度影响股东利益的因素对于股票的市场表现没有影响。由此说明,投资者更多把股权分置改革视为一个短期的题材,而对其能给中国股市带来多大的长期利好效应缺乏信心。
本文研究具有较好的探索性。研究的改进及创新体现在以下六个方面。
第一,在研究框架上,本文首次提出股权分置改革“绩效”的概念,以此为基础,结合股权分置改革工作的具体实践,本文在理论上系统地定义了股权分置改革绩效的三个主要内涵(或层面):股改的对价绩效、股改的公司绩效和股改的市场绩效,从而构建一个较为完整的对股权分置改革成效进行全面的学术性评价的研究框架。
第二,在对价绩效研究中,本文从改革的效率与公平角度提出股改对价绩效评价的二维标准体系。同时,与一般的单纯探讨股改对价确定影响因素的研究不同,本文把管理机构为推动股改顺利进行而制定的一系列政策与制度的实施效果作为研究对象,重点探讨了股改博弈机制的执行效果,从而使一般的单纯对价影响因素研究上升到对价(也就是改革)绩效的评价研究。
第三,本文基于财务理论分析,在已有研究基础上,结合股改的实际工作,建立一个全面的对价确定影响因素分析体系。同时,通过试点与非试点企业、不同改革时段企业、不同业绩情况企业、不同所有制结构企业、不同规模结构企业、不同对价类型企业的全面对比分析,而全面评价股改对价确定问题,这在已有的同类研究中还是首次。
第四,本文提出了针对中国上市公司发展特点的(基于股权分置改革背景的)公司治理绩效评价指标体系和公司经营绩效评价指标体系,从这两个指标体系出发,本文探讨了股改对上市公司治理和经营的影响。
第五,本文首次对股权分置改革对上市公司经营绩效影响的机制及后果展开较为系统的理论和实证分析。不同于一般仅从规范性分析角度就股改与公司价值之间关系展开的研究,本研究提出股权分置改革对上市公司经营绩效影响的机理,从股改直接影响的中间变量出发,围绕股权结构、大股东行为和与作为最终结果的上市公司经营绩效展开两方面的实证研究,同时对这两方面的研究结论进行相互验证,使研究更为系统和全面。
第六,在大多数的股改市场反应研究中,一般仅通过对超常累积收益率(CAR)的描述分析来探讨市场的价格反映,本文在此基础上,通过超常累积收益率(CAR)的影响因素分析,从而更好地揭示股改市场绩效的内在问题。此外,比其他研究更进一步的是,本文的创新之处还在于样本数据的扩展上,在所有对价绩效、公司绩效和市场绩效的实证分析中,研究均采取了尽可能的全样本分析和细致的样本分类分析。
Since the pilot reform of the non-tradable shares reform started on April 29 in 2005, after the process of two years reform, the reform tends to finish. The non-tradable share reform is the most important issue since the foundation of China's securities market, which will deeply changed the direction of its development. Therefore, summarizing the advantages and disadvantages of this reform will have important implications for the next step in the capital market development. However, most of the literature about the non-tradable share reform focuses on the normative analyses, but the empirical evidence in this field is relatively limited.
Based on related literature, this paper develops a framework for evaluating the performance of the non-tradable share reform from three dimensions: the compensation ration performance, the firm performance and the market performance. Then, this paper uses the theoretical and empirical analysis methods to investigate the performance of the non-tradable share reform, which will not only provide scientific evidence to explain the phenomenon in the reform, but also have important implications for the security market regulator's policy making.
This paper consists of seven chapters. Major contents of each chapter are outlined as follows:
Chapter 1 is the introduction, which briefly introduces the research background, issues under research, research ideas, research contents, and research improvements and innovations.
Chapter2 is the literature review. In this chapter, the author fully reviews and comments on the literature about the non-tradable shares reform, and the literature about the relationship between ownership structure, corporate governance and firm performance.
Chapter3 describes the institutional background of non-tradable shares reform of listed companies in China, including the origin and consequence of the non-tradable shares, the process and status quo of the non-tradable shares reform.
Chapter 4 examines the performance of non-tradable share reform. This chapter starts with analyzing the determinants of the compensation ratios, then investigates the performance of the reform and the efficiency and justice of the reform.
Chapter 5 examines the firm performance of the reform. This chapter uses the ownership structure and the behavior of the large shareholder to examine the relationship between the reform and firm performance of listed firms. Based on related financial theory, this chapter develops hypotheses to investigate the effect of the reform on the corporate governance and firm performance of listed firms.
Chapter 6 examines the market reactions to the non-tradable share reform. This chapter will investigate how and what affect the market reactions to the reform.
Chapter 7 sums up the research findings of this paper, including its conclusions and lessons, research limitations, and the direction of further research.
This paper has arrived at the following conclusions after research:
1. From the efficiency of the compensation ratios, the results of the quick process of the reform in the last two years, the high votes for the compensation package, and the different compensation ratios in the different industries indicate the high efficiency of the reform. However, the results that the compensation ratios are mainly determined by the non-tradable shareholders and other non-economic factors, but not the bargaining power of the tradable shareholders indicate that the justice of the reform is limited.
2. In detail, the bargaining process between tradable shareholders and non-tradable shareholders indicates that the bargaining power of the non-tradable shareholders plays a critical role in the reform, but the bargaining power of the tradable shareholders does not play its own role. What's more, the institutional shareholders do not fully protect the interest of the minority investors. In addition, the compensation ratios are more determined by the political influence than the fundamentals of the reformed firms.
3. The non-tradable share reform leads to the significant change in the ownership structure of listed firms: the change in different kinds of ownership structure and the decline of ownership concentration. Most of the literature and practice on the corporate governance of listed firms in China show that the highly concentrated ownership has a negative impact on the corporate governance of listed firm in China. Thus, the change in the ownership structure resulting from the non-tradable share reform suggests that the reform have positive effect on the corporate governance.
4. The non-tradable share reform significantly impacts the performance of reformed firms. The controlling shareholders are willing to make the listed firms more strong and infuse assets into the listed firms, which lead to the better earning performance and improvement of the ability of asset management. However, considering the limitation of the data, the relationship between the reform and firm performance is needed to be examined in the future.
5. The market reaction to the reform is significantly positive. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the period from ten days before the announcement to the reform day is 5.187 percent, and the average abnormal return on the announcement day is most significant. The results of what determine the market reaction show that the compensation ratio and the percent of tradable shareholders' veto for the reform affect the CAR, but the corporate governance and M/B do not affect the CAR. These results indicate the investors view the reform as only a short time issue, and have no confidence for the long term consequence that the reform will result in.
This research is exploratory in nature; major improvements and innovations are evident in the following aspects:
1. In terms of research framework, this paper first defines the performance of non-tradable share reform from three dimensions: the compensation ration performance, the firm performance and the market performance. Thus, this paper builds a systematical framework for evaluating the performance of the non-tradable shares reform of listed companies in China.
2. This paper evaluates the performance of non-tradable share reform from the viewpoints of efficiency and justice. Different from other studies that just examine the determinants of compensation ratios, this paper also evaluates the consequence of the related policies and arrangements in the reform, and focus on the bargaining result evaluation. Thus, this paper can evaluate the performance of the reform more comprehensively.
3. Based on the background of the non-tradable share reform, this paper constructs the corporate governance evaluation system and firm performance evaluation system, which provide a base for constructing the index of corporate governance and evaluating the performance of listed firms.
4. For the first time, this paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis on how the non-tradable reform affecting the performance of listed firm. Different from other studies that just normatively analyze the relationship between the reform and the firm value, this paper examines the mechanism of how the reform affecting firm performance, based on the relationship between ownership structure, large shareholders and firm performance.
5. Different from the previous literature that just focusing on the market reaction to the non-tradable reform, this paper investigate not only how market reaction to the reform, but also what determine the reactions, which will shed better insights on the market performance of the reform.
6. Based on financial theories and the reality of the reform, this paper develops a comprehensive system to investigate the determinants of compensation ratios. In detail, this paper investigates the determinants of compensation ratio between the pilot reformed firms and non-pilot reformed firms, in different patches of the reform, in different nature of the firms, in different firm size and different compensation methods
本文在借鉴国内外学者相关研究成果的基础上,提出股权分置改革的绩效评价概念,从“对价绩效”、“市场绩效”和“公司绩效”等三方面,构建一个上市公司股权分置改革绩效评价的学术性研究框架。在此为基础,本文应用理论与实证的分析方法,对股改的绩效问题进行深入分析,从而为股改中存在的一些现象与疑问提供科学证据,同时也为证券监管部门在今后证券市场发展中的一些政策问题提供参考与借鉴。
论文共分七章,各章的主要内容如下:
第一章为导论,主要对论文进行一个简要介绍,具体包括研究背景与研究问题的提出,研究思路、研究的主要内容以及研究的改进与创新。
第二章为文献综述,首先对国内外关于股权分置改革的理论研究文献进行较为全面的系统回顾、整理与归纳,其次是对公司股权结构与公司治理及公司经营业绩之间关系的研究文献做一个较为细致、全面的整理。
第三章介绍股权分置改革的有关制度背景。本章重点对股权分置问题的产生与影响,对股权分置改革工作的演进与现状进行全面的回顾与分析。
第四章是股权分置改革的对价绩效研究。本章从股改对价确定的影响因素分析出发,通过相关理论假说的建立和实证检验来探讨股改对价确定的绩效状况,探讨股改政策的执行效果和股改博弈机制的公平与效率。
第五章是股权分置改革的公司绩效研究。本章以股权结构和大股东行为作为股改与上市公司绩效关系的研究变量,通过相关财务理论构建理论假设并进行实证检验,探讨股权分置改革对上市公司治理的影响、对上市公司经营的影响。
第六章是股权分置改革的市场绩效研究。本章通过对“市场对实施股改公司的股票有何反应”、“什么样的因素影响了股改公司股票的市场反应”等问题的实证分析,探讨股改的市场绩效。
第七章是对论文研究成果的总结,包括研究结论与启示、研究的局限性和进一步研究的方向。
本文主要的结论如下:
1.从股改对价的效率角度看,1400家上市公司股改工作在两年内的快速推进,股改对价方案的高通过率,以及股改对价确定随着改革进程推进时的更富效率、随着在不同类型企业中的更富针对性等,说明了股改的高效性。然而,从公平角度看,股改对价确定中所反映的非流通股东意志主导而流通股东议价作用不明显、股改受到外界非经济因素的显著影响等,说明了股改公平性的有所欠缺。在效率与公平的二维尺度上,股改的对价绩效是“高效但欠缺公平”。
2.具体而言,股改对价所反映的流通股东和非流通股东的利益博弈情况说明,此次股改中非流通股东的议价力得到良好体现,而流通股东议价力发挥很不显著,机构投资者在股改对价确定中对中小投资者的保护作用并没有得到应有体现,股改对价的确定基本还是以非流通股东的意志为主导而进行;股改对价与公司自身发展特点相关系的情况说明,股改对价的确定并没有与公司自身的经营发展特点密切相关,股改工作受到“政治动机与利益”的驱动的程度较大,股改的“尽快”、“从众”或“非自愿性”选择因素客观存在。
3.股权分置改革带来了上市公司治理指数的提高。特别地,股权分置改革带来了上市公司股权结构的显著变化,表现为股东成份结构的变化(国有股、法人股持股比例下降,社会公众股持股比例上升)和股权集中度的下降。由于我国上市公司治理的理论研究与实践都表明,国有股、法人股持股比例过高和股权集中度过大所表现的一股独大等现象是我国上市公司治理不完善的根源,股改所带来了上市公司股权结构的显著改善说明了股改对上市公司治理改善的积极作用。
4.股权分置改革对公司经营绩效影响的实证分析结果表明,股权分置改革对上市公司经营绩效的影响是明显的,突出表现为股改后控股股东做大做强上市公司的意愿及行为,通过资产注入、整体上市手段,股改后上市公司的经营利润得到相当的提升。同时,股权分置改革对公司经营绩效的影响还表现为股改后公司资产管理能力的显著上升。不过,由于研究样本数据的限制,对于股改与上市公司经营绩效关系的结论还有待进一步的分析探讨。
5.股权分置改革的市场绩效是积极和明显的,突出表现为股改公司的股票存在显著为正的超常收益,其中,股改公司在预案公告前10日到方案实施日期间的累计平均超常收益率达到5.187%,且预案公告日公司的平均超常收益率最为突出。但对影响股改市场绩效因素的分析表明,除了短期内就能带来利益的流通股东所获得的对价比率和反映投资者认同度的流通股东投反对票比例对股票的累计超额收益有影响外,公司治理水平的提高和M/B所代表的流动溢价等从长期角度影响股东利益的因素对于股票的市场表现没有影响。由此说明,投资者更多把股权分置改革视为一个短期的题材,而对其能给中国股市带来多大的长期利好效应缺乏信心。
本文研究具有较好的探索性。研究的改进及创新体现在以下六个方面。
第一,在研究框架上,本文首次提出股权分置改革“绩效”的概念,以此为基础,结合股权分置改革工作的具体实践,本文在理论上系统地定义了股权分置改革绩效的三个主要内涵(或层面):股改的对价绩效、股改的公司绩效和股改的市场绩效,从而构建一个较为完整的对股权分置改革成效进行全面的学术性评价的研究框架。
第二,在对价绩效研究中,本文从改革的效率与公平角度提出股改对价绩效评价的二维标准体系。同时,与一般的单纯探讨股改对价确定影响因素的研究不同,本文把管理机构为推动股改顺利进行而制定的一系列政策与制度的实施效果作为研究对象,重点探讨了股改博弈机制的执行效果,从而使一般的单纯对价影响因素研究上升到对价(也就是改革)绩效的评价研究。
第三,本文基于财务理论分析,在已有研究基础上,结合股改的实际工作,建立一个全面的对价确定影响因素分析体系。同时,通过试点与非试点企业、不同改革时段企业、不同业绩情况企业、不同所有制结构企业、不同规模结构企业、不同对价类型企业的全面对比分析,而全面评价股改对价确定问题,这在已有的同类研究中还是首次。
第四,本文提出了针对中国上市公司发展特点的(基于股权分置改革背景的)公司治理绩效评价指标体系和公司经营绩效评价指标体系,从这两个指标体系出发,本文探讨了股改对上市公司治理和经营的影响。
第五,本文首次对股权分置改革对上市公司经营绩效影响的机制及后果展开较为系统的理论和实证分析。不同于一般仅从规范性分析角度就股改与公司价值之间关系展开的研究,本研究提出股权分置改革对上市公司经营绩效影响的机理,从股改直接影响的中间变量出发,围绕股权结构、大股东行为和与作为最终结果的上市公司经营绩效展开两方面的实证研究,同时对这两方面的研究结论进行相互验证,使研究更为系统和全面。
第六,在大多数的股改市场反应研究中,一般仅通过对超常累积收益率(CAR)的描述分析来探讨市场的价格反映,本文在此基础上,通过超常累积收益率(CAR)的影响因素分析,从而更好地揭示股改市场绩效的内在问题。此外,比其他研究更进一步的是,本文的创新之处还在于样本数据的扩展上,在所有对价绩效、公司绩效和市场绩效的实证分析中,研究均采取了尽可能的全样本分析和细致的样本分类分析。
Since the pilot reform of the non-tradable shares reform started on April 29 in 2005, after the process of two years reform, the reform tends to finish. The non-tradable share reform is the most important issue since the foundation of China's securities market, which will deeply changed the direction of its development. Therefore, summarizing the advantages and disadvantages of this reform will have important implications for the next step in the capital market development. However, most of the literature about the non-tradable share reform focuses on the normative analyses, but the empirical evidence in this field is relatively limited.
Based on related literature, this paper develops a framework for evaluating the performance of the non-tradable share reform from three dimensions: the compensation ration performance, the firm performance and the market performance. Then, this paper uses the theoretical and empirical analysis methods to investigate the performance of the non-tradable share reform, which will not only provide scientific evidence to explain the phenomenon in the reform, but also have important implications for the security market regulator's policy making.
This paper consists of seven chapters. Major contents of each chapter are outlined as follows:
Chapter 1 is the introduction, which briefly introduces the research background, issues under research, research ideas, research contents, and research improvements and innovations.
Chapter2 is the literature review. In this chapter, the author fully reviews and comments on the literature about the non-tradable shares reform, and the literature about the relationship between ownership structure, corporate governance and firm performance.
Chapter3 describes the institutional background of non-tradable shares reform of listed companies in China, including the origin and consequence of the non-tradable shares, the process and status quo of the non-tradable shares reform.
Chapter 4 examines the performance of non-tradable share reform. This chapter starts with analyzing the determinants of the compensation ratios, then investigates the performance of the reform and the efficiency and justice of the reform.
Chapter 5 examines the firm performance of the reform. This chapter uses the ownership structure and the behavior of the large shareholder to examine the relationship between the reform and firm performance of listed firms. Based on related financial theory, this chapter develops hypotheses to investigate the effect of the reform on the corporate governance and firm performance of listed firms.
Chapter 6 examines the market reactions to the non-tradable share reform. This chapter will investigate how and what affect the market reactions to the reform.
Chapter 7 sums up the research findings of this paper, including its conclusions and lessons, research limitations, and the direction of further research.
This paper has arrived at the following conclusions after research:
1. From the efficiency of the compensation ratios, the results of the quick process of the reform in the last two years, the high votes for the compensation package, and the different compensation ratios in the different industries indicate the high efficiency of the reform. However, the results that the compensation ratios are mainly determined by the non-tradable shareholders and other non-economic factors, but not the bargaining power of the tradable shareholders indicate that the justice of the reform is limited.
2. In detail, the bargaining process between tradable shareholders and non-tradable shareholders indicates that the bargaining power of the non-tradable shareholders plays a critical role in the reform, but the bargaining power of the tradable shareholders does not play its own role. What's more, the institutional shareholders do not fully protect the interest of the minority investors. In addition, the compensation ratios are more determined by the political influence than the fundamentals of the reformed firms.
3. The non-tradable share reform leads to the significant change in the ownership structure of listed firms: the change in different kinds of ownership structure and the decline of ownership concentration. Most of the literature and practice on the corporate governance of listed firms in China show that the highly concentrated ownership has a negative impact on the corporate governance of listed firm in China. Thus, the change in the ownership structure resulting from the non-tradable share reform suggests that the reform have positive effect on the corporate governance.
4. The non-tradable share reform significantly impacts the performance of reformed firms. The controlling shareholders are willing to make the listed firms more strong and infuse assets into the listed firms, which lead to the better earning performance and improvement of the ability of asset management. However, considering the limitation of the data, the relationship between the reform and firm performance is needed to be examined in the future.
5. The market reaction to the reform is significantly positive. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the period from ten days before the announcement to the reform day is 5.187 percent, and the average abnormal return on the announcement day is most significant. The results of what determine the market reaction show that the compensation ratio and the percent of tradable shareholders' veto for the reform affect the CAR, but the corporate governance and M/B do not affect the CAR. These results indicate the investors view the reform as only a short time issue, and have no confidence for the long term consequence that the reform will result in.
This research is exploratory in nature; major improvements and innovations are evident in the following aspects:
1. In terms of research framework, this paper first defines the performance of non-tradable share reform from three dimensions: the compensation ration performance, the firm performance and the market performance. Thus, this paper builds a systematical framework for evaluating the performance of the non-tradable shares reform of listed companies in China.
2. This paper evaluates the performance of non-tradable share reform from the viewpoints of efficiency and justice. Different from other studies that just examine the determinants of compensation ratios, this paper also evaluates the consequence of the related policies and arrangements in the reform, and focus on the bargaining result evaluation. Thus, this paper can evaluate the performance of the reform more comprehensively.
3. Based on the background of the non-tradable share reform, this paper constructs the corporate governance evaluation system and firm performance evaluation system, which provide a base for constructing the index of corporate governance and evaluating the performance of listed firms.
4. For the first time, this paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis on how the non-tradable reform affecting the performance of listed firm. Different from other studies that just normatively analyze the relationship between the reform and the firm value, this paper examines the mechanism of how the reform affecting firm performance, based on the relationship between ownership structure, large shareholders and firm performance.
5. Different from the previous literature that just focusing on the market reaction to the non-tradable reform, this paper investigate not only how market reaction to the reform, but also what determine the reactions, which will shed better insights on the market performance of the reform.
6. Based on financial theories and the reality of the reform, this paper develops a comprehensive system to investigate the determinants of compensation ratios. In detail, this paper investigates the determinants of compensation ratio between the pilot reformed firms and non-pilot reformed firms, in different patches of the reform, in different nature of the firms, in different firm size and different compensation methods
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[74]Black,B.S.,Jang.H.,and Kim,W.,2003,Does Corporate Governance Predict Firm's Market Value? Evidence from Korea,Working paper,SSRN.
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[76]Claessens,S.,Djankov,S.,and Lang L.,2000,The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations,Journal of Financial Economics.
[77]Andrei Shleifer and Robert W.Vishny.1997.A Survey of Corporate Governance.Journal of Finance.Vol 52,June:737-783.
[78]Demsets,H.and K.Lehn.1985.The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences.Journal of Political Economy.Vol 93:1115-1176.
[79]De Angelo,Harry and Linda De Angelo.1985.Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights:a Study of Public Corporation with Dual Classes of Common Stock..Journal of Financial Economics,Vol 14(1):33-69.
[80]Fama Eugene and Michael Jensen.1983.Separation of Ownership and Control.Journal of Law and Economics,Vol.ⅩⅩⅥ June:301-325.
[81]Grossman,Sanford and Hart,Oliver,1986.The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94:691-719.
[ 82 ] Belrle.A., and GMeans(1932): The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan, New York.
[ 83 ] Shleifer. A., and Vishny. R.(1986): Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of Political Economy,94,pp,401-488.
[ 84 ] La Porta.r., F.Lopez-de-Silanes, and A.Shleifer(1999): Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal of Finance,54,pp, 157-471.
[ 85 ] Levy.J.(1983): The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the Degree of Control. Economic Journal,93(2),pp,351-369.
[ 86 ] La Porta, R.,F. Lopez-De-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. Corporate Ownership Around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54,pp471-517.
[ 87 ] Admati,A.,P,Pfleiderer and J.Zechner(1994).Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy, 102(6): 1097-1130.
[ 88 ] Michael A.Habib and Alexander P.Ljungqvist(November 30,2000). Firm value and Managerial Incentives. Working paper.
[ 89 ] Harold Demsetz and Bel Villalonga. Ownership structure and corporate performance (2001). Working paper.
[ 90 ] Ahn,S.,D.J.Denis. Internal Capital Markets and Investment Policy: Evidence from Corporate Spin-offs. Journal of Financial Economics,2004,(71):489-516.
[ 91 ] E.Fama, M.Jesen. Agency Problems and Residual Claims [J].Journal of Law and Economics, 1983.
[ 92 ] Jesen, Meckling. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs , and Ownership Structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976.
[ 93 ] Johnson. S, La Porta. R, lopez-de-Silanes. F., and Shleifer. A. Tunneling [J].American Economic Review, 2000,(90).
[ 94 ] Hansen, R a., Crutchley, C,(1990). Corporate Earnings and Financing: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Business 63,347-371.
[95] Spiess, K, Affleck-Graves, J.,(1995). Underperformance In Long-Run Stock Returns Following Seasoned Equity Offerings. Journal of Finance 52,1823-1850.
[ 96 ] Healy, P.M., Palepu, K.G(1990). Earnings and Risk Changes Surrounding Primary Stock Offers. Journal of Accounting Research 28,25-48.
[97] Milnor,J., and Shapley,L.,1978.Values of large games II. Oceanic Games. Mathematics of Operations Research 3(4), p290-307.
[ 98 ] McConnell, John and Henri Servaes,1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics Vol.27,595-612.
[ 99 ] Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics,20(1988):293-315.
[ 100] Fama, E.F., 1980.Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy 88,288-307.
[ 101 ] Bolton & Thaden,1998,Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control, Journal of Financial Economics 41,359-399.
[ 102 ] Thomsen, Steen and Torbin Pedersen,1998,Industry and Ownership Structure. International Review of Law and Economics, 18:385-402.
[ 103 ] MeCuckin, Robert H. and Sang V.nGuyen,2001,The Impact of Ownership Changes: A View from Labor Markets. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19:739-762.
[ 104 ] Holderness ,C. and Sheehan D,1988. The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics,20.
[ 105 ] Bengt Holmstrom and Steven N.Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger activity in the U.S.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Economics working paper series, February 2002.
[ 106 ] Martin,K and McConnell,J,1991. Corporate Performance. Corporate Takeovers and Management Turnover. Journal of Finance.
[ 107 ] Shleifer,A and Vishny,R,1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance.
[ 108 ] Fama, Eugene(1980), Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy,88,288-307.